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79 results for "zeno"
1. Homer, Iliad, 24.261 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9
24.261. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way?
2. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 64
3. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 64
4. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 64
5. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206
6. Herodotus, Histories, 6.128-6.131 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9
6.128. These were the suitors. When they arrived on the appointed day, Cleisthenes first inquired the country and lineage of each; then he kept them with him for a year, testing their manliness and temper and upbringing and manner of life; this he did by consorting with them alone and in company, putting the younger of them to contests of strength, but especially watching their demeanor at the common meal; for as long as he kept them with him, he did everything for them and entertained them with magnificence. ,The suitors that most pleased him were the ones who had come from Athens, and of these Hippocleides son of Tisandrus was judged foremost, both for his manliness and because in ancestry he was related to the Cypselids of Corinth. 6.129. When the appointed day came for the marriage feast and for Cleisthenes' declaration of whom he had chosen out of them all, Cleisthenes sacrificed a hundred oxen and gave a feast to the suitors and to the whole of Sicyon. ,After dinner the suitors vied with each other in music and in anecdotes for all to hear. As they sat late drinking, Hippocleides, now far outdoing the rest, ordered the flute-player to play him a dance-tune; the flute-player obeyed and he began to dance. I suppose he pleased himself with his dancing, but Cleisthenes saw the whole business with much disfavor. ,Hippocleides then stopped for a while and ordered a table to be brought in; when the table arrived, he danced Laconian figures on it first, and then Attic; last of all he rested his head on the table and made gestures with his legs in the air. ,Now Cleisthenes at the first and the second bout of dancing could no more bear to think of Hippocleides as his son-in-law, because of his dancing and his shamelessness, but he had held himself in check, not wanting to explode at Hippocleides; but when he saw him making gestures with his legs, he could no longer keep silence and said, “son of Tisandrus, you have danced away your marriage.” Hippocleides said in answer, “It does not matter to Hippocleides!” Since then this is proverbial. 6.130. Then Cleisthenes bade them all be silent and spoke to the company at large: “Suitors for my daughter's hand, I thank you one and all; if it were possible I would grant each of you his wish, neither choosing out one to set him above another nor disparaging the rest. ,But since I have but one maiden to plan for and so cannot please all of you, to those of you whose suit is rejected I make a gift of a talent of silver to each, for his desire to take a wife from my house and for his sojourn away from his home; and to Megacles son of Alcmeon do I betroth my daughter Agariste, by the laws of the Athenians.” Megacles accepted the betrothal, and Cleisthenes brought the marriage to pass. 6.131. Such is the tale of the choice among the suitors; and thus the fame of the Alcmeonidae resounded throughout Hellas. From this marriage was born that Cleisthenes, named after his mother's father from Sicyon, who gave the Athenians their tribes and their democracy; ,he and Hippocrates were born to Megacles; Hippocrates was father of another Megacles and another Agariste, called after Agariste who was Cleisthenes' daughter. She was married to Xanthippus son of Ariphron, and when she was pregt she saw in her sleep a vision in which she thought she gave birth to a lion. In a few days she bore Xanthippus a son, Pericles.
7. Plato, Philebus, 44, 46, 45 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 195
8. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 112
9. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 74
10. Hippocrates, The Sacred Disease, 14.1-14.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 103
11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 195
12. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.10.6 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 74
13. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, a b c d\n0 '4.32 '4.32 '4 32\n1 3.75 3.75 3 75\n2 3.12 3.12 3 12\n3 2.61 2.61 2 61\n4 3.76 3.76 3 76\n5 3.74 3.74 3 74\n6 3.58 3.58 3 58\n7 3.55 3.55 3 55\n8 3.61 3.61 3 61\n9 4.39 4.39 4 39\n10 3.28 3.28 3 28\n11 3.54 3.54 3 54\n12 3.44 3.44 3 44\n13 3.41 3.41 3 41\n14 5.5 5.5 5 5 \n15 3.49 3.49 3 49\n16 2.44 2.44 2 44\n17 3.38 3.38 3 38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714
14. Philodemus of Gadara, De Pietate \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 208
15. Cicero, On Duties, 1.14-1.16, 1.67, 1.69, 1.159, 2.18, 2.20, 2.69, 2.81, 2.84, 2.99, 2.103, 3.8-3.10, 3.116, 5.24-5.32, 5.37, 5.45, 5.48, 5.58, 5.77-5.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius •zeno of sidon (epicurean philosopher) Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 102; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 8, 31, 100, 106; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 106
1.14. Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque. quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 1.16. Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque verissimum sit. quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur, subiecta est veritas. 1.67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea. quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae. 1.69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari. 1.159. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem. 2.18. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gigtur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit, alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci pa/qh nomit, appetitionesque, quas illi o(rma/s, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur. 2.20. At vero interitus exercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, clades imperatorum, ut nuper summi et singularis viri, invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugae, rursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, victoriae, quamquam fortuita sunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici possunt. Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus. Quae si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse etiam brevior videbitur. 2.69. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio est; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit. Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem et, qui rettulerit, habere et, qui habeat, rettulisse. At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se usos aut clientes appellari mortis instar putant. 2.81. At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum eius civitas quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem clandestine introitu urbe est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem improviso oppressisset, sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi fuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam adventu suo liberavit. Sed cum magnam animadverteret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem, quod et eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possederant, egere iniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quinquaginta annorum possessiones moveri non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur sine iniuria, iudicavit neque illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum illa fuerant, oportere. 2.84. Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam? Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat, providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti, ut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes alienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe sublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea perfecit, cum eius iam nihil interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset. 3.8. Quod eo magis miror, quia scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse Panaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quen locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium. 3.9. Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest, quin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam; praeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum. 3.10. Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae Panaetius praetermisisset et non perfecisset propter eorum, quae perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum. 3.116. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, moderatione, modestia, continentia, temperantia continetur. Potest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huic talium virtutum choro contrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque censuerunt ob eam em esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis floret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. Cum his viris equisque, ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere sententia est, decertandum est. 1.67.  All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. 1.69.  Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers and certain other earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates. 1.159.  The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether this social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do any of those things. 2.18.  And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties; the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses (ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their cooperation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward of any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit. 2.20.  But think, on the one side, of the destruction of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and military honours, and the victories, — though all these contain an element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good or for ill, without the influence and the cooperation of our fellow-men. With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to explain how we can win the affectionate cooperation of our fellows and enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short. 2.69.  Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return. But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As someone has happily said, "A man has not repaid money, if he still has it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the sense of the favour, he has repaid it." On the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a favour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a patron or to be called clients. 2.81.  Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his city had been kept for fifty years in the power of its tyrants, he came over from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by surprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from banishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the city, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great difficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he considered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be left in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken possession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that tenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course of that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands by right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore decided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the present incumbents or to let them keep it without compensation to its former possessors. 2.84.  And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money? We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred, we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for the repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my consulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to force the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this plague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was never greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully; for the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was enforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still carried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal advantage to him. So great was his passion for wrongdoing that the very doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake even when there was no motive for it. 3.8.  And I wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records that Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those three books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so essentially important as this. 3.9.  Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that point was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it was not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such a thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with regard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt — whether that question which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been included or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to debate — that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For, if a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third must necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close of the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper turn. 3.10.  We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact. He writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also was a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that "as no painter had been found to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left unfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt adequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture to supply what he had left undone." 3.116.  We have still left our fourth division comprising propriety, moderation, temperance, self-restraint, self-control. Can anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of virtues? And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus, and the philosophers who bear the name of Annicerians find all good to consist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is productive of pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus has come into vogue — an advocate and supporter of practically the same doctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse and foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our standard of moral rectitude.
16. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 3.13, 3.17-3.18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 74
17. Cicero, In Pisonem, 20, 37, 59, 68-72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189
18. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 6.11.2, 13.1.2, 15.19.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 8, 100
19. Cicero, Letters, 12.52.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189
20. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.1-2.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 8
2.1. Magna nobis pueris, Quinte frater, si memoria tenes, opinio fuit L. Crassum non plus attigisse doctrinae, quam quantum prima illa puerili institutione potuisset; M. autem Antonium omnino omnis eruditionis expertem atque ignarum fuisse; erantque multi qui, quamquam non ita se rem habere arbitrarentur, tamen, quo facilius nos incensos studio discendi a doctrina deterrerent, libenter id, quod dixi, de illis oratoribus praedicarent, ut, si homines non eruditi summam essent prudentiam atque incredibilem eloquentiam consecuti, iis omnis noster esse labor et stultum in nobis erudiendis patris nostri, optimi ac prudentissimi viri, studium videretur. 2.2. Quos tum, ut pueri, refutare domesticis testibus patre et C. Aculeone propinquo nostro et L. Cicerone patruo solebamus, quod de Crasso pater et Aculeo, quocum erat nostra matertera, quem Crassus dilexit ex omnibus plurimum, et patruus, qui cum Antonio in Ciliciam profectus una decesserat, multa nobis de eius studio et doctrina saepe narravit; cumque nos cum consobrinis nostris, Aculeonis filiis, et ea disceremus, quae Crasso placerent, et ab eis doctoribus, quibus ille uteretur, erudiremur, etiam illud saepe intelleximus, cum essemus eius domi, quod vel pueri sentire poteramus, illum et Graece sic loqui, nullam ut nosse aliam linguam videretur, et doctoribus nostris ea ponere in percontando eaque ipsum omni in sermone tractare, ut nihil esse ei novum, nihil inauditum videretur. 2.3. De Antonio vero, quamquam saepe ex humanissimo homine patruo nostro acceperamus, quem ad modum ille vel Athenis vel Rhodi se doctissimorum hominum sermonibus dedisset, tamen ipse adulescentulus, quantum illius ineuntis aetatis meae patiebatur pudor, multa ex eo saepe quaesivi. Non erit profecto tibi, quod scribo, hoc novum; nam iam tum ex me audiebas mihi illum ex multis variisque sermonibus nullius rei, quae quidem esset in eis artibus, de quibus aliquid existimare possem, rudem aut ignarum esse visum. 2.4. Sed fuit hoc in utroque eorum, ut Crassus non tam existimari vellet non didicisse, quam illa despicere et nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Graecis anteferre; Antonius autem probabiliorem hoc populo orationem fore censebat suam, si omnino didicisse numquam putaretur; atque ita se uterque graviorem fore, si alter contemnere, alter ne nosse quidem Graecos videretur. 2.5. Quorum consilium quale fuerit, nihil sane ad hoc tempus; illud autem est huius institutae scriptionis ac temporis, neminem eloquentia non modo sine dicendi doctrina, sed ne sine omni quidem sapientia florere umquam et praestare potuisse. Etenim ceterae fere artes se ipsae per se tuentur singulae; bene dicere autem, quod est scienter et perite et ornate dicere, non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cuius terminis saepta teneatur: omnia, quaecumque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt, bene sunt ei dicenda, qui hoc se posse profitetur, aut eloquentiae nomen relinquendum est. 2.6. Qua re equidem et in nostra civitate et in ipsa Graecia, quae semper haec summa duxit, multos et ingeniis eximiis et magna laude dicendi sine summa rerum omnium scientia fuisse fateor; talem vero exsistere eloquentiam, qualis fuit in Crasso et Antonio, non cognitis rebus omnibus, quae ad tantam prudentiam pertinerent, tantamque dicendi copiam, quanta in illis fuit, non potuisse confirmo. 2.7. Quo etiam feci libentius, ut eum sermonem, quem illi quondam inter se de his rebus habuissent, mandarem litteris, vel ut illa opinio, quae semper fuisset, tolleretur, alterum non doctissimum, alterum plane indoctum fuisse; vel ut ea, quae existimarem a summis oratoribus de eloquentia divinitus esse dicta, custodirem litteris, si ullo modo adsequi complectique potuissem; vel me hercule etiam ut laudem eorum iam prope senescentem, quantum ego possem, ab oblivione hominum atque a silentio vindicarem. 2.8. Nam si ex scriptis cognosci ipsi suis potuissent, minus hoc fortasse mihi esse putassem laborandum; sed cum alter non multum, quod quidem exstaret, et id ipsum adulescens, alter nihil admodum scripti reliquisset, deberi hoc a me tantis hominum ingeniis putavi, ut, cum etiam nunc vivam illorum memoriam teneremus, hanc immortalem redderem, si possem. 2.9. Quod hoc etiam spe adgredior maiore ad probandum, quia non de Ser. Galbae aut C. Carbonis eloquentia scribo aliquid, in quo liceat mihi fingere, si quid velim, nullius memoria iam me refellente, sed edo haec eis cognoscenda, qui eos ipsos, de quibus loquor, saepe audierunt; ut duos summos viros eis, qui neutrum illorum viderint, eorum, quibus ambo illi oratores cogniti sint, vivorum et praesentium memoria teste commendemus. 2.10. Nec vero te, carissime frater atque optime, rhetoricis nunc quibusdam libris, quos tu agrestis putas, insequor ut erudiam; quid enim tua potest esse oratione aut subtilius aut ornatius? Sed sive iudicio, ut soles dicere, sive, ut ille pater eloquentiae de se Isocrates scripsit ipse, pudore a dicendo et timiditate ingenua quadam refugisti, sive, ut ipse iocari soleo, unum putasti satis esse non modo in una familia rhetorem, sed paene in tota civitate, non tamen arbitror tibi hos libros in eo fore genere, quod merito propter eorum, qui de dicendi ratione disputarunt, ieiunitatem bonarum artium possit inludi; nihil enim mihi quidem videtur in Crassi et Antoni sermone esse praeteritum, quod quisquam summis ingeniis, acerrimis studiis, optima doctrina, maximo usu cognosci ac percipi potuisse arbitraretur, quod tu facillime poteris iudicare, qui prudentiam rationemque dicendi per te ipsum, usum autem per nos percipere voluisti. 2.11. Sed quo citius hoc, quod suscepimus, non mediocre munus conficere possimus, omissa nostra adhortatione ad eorum, quos proposuimus, sermonem disputationemque veniamus.
21. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6, 1.41-1.45, 1.59, 1.61, 1.85, 1.93, 1.113, 1.115, 1.122 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 279; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189, 208; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 9, 100; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 19
1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) 1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that 'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. 1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? 'It is difficult to deny their existence.' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 1.85. Well then, if the gods do not possess the appearance of men, as I have proved, nor some such form as that of the heavenly bodies, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny their existence? You do not dare to. Well, that is no doubt wise — although in this matter it is not the public that you fear, but the gods themselves: I personally am acquainted with Epicureans who worship every paltry image, albeit I am aware that according to some people's view Epicurus really abolished the gods, but nominally retained them in order not to offend the people of Athens. Thus the first of his selected aphorisms or maxims, which you call the Kyriai Doxai, runs, I believe, thus: That which is blessed and immortal neither experiences trouble nor causes it to anyone. Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional, though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly; their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind. 1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. 1.113. You tell me that you consider these pleasures inferior, which merely 'tickle' the senses (the expression is that of Epicurus). When will you cease jesting? Why, even our friend Philo was impatient with the Epicureans for affecting to despise the pleasures of senseless indulgence; for he had an excellent memory and could quote verbatim a number of maxims from the actual writings of Epicurus. As for Metrodorus, Epicurus's co‑partner in philosophy, he supplied him with many still more outspoken quotations; in fact Metrodorus takes his brother Timocrates to task for hesitating to measure every element of happiness by the standard of the belly, nor is this an isolated utterance, but he repeats it several times. I see you nod your assent, as you are acquainted with the passages; and did you deny it, I would produce the volumes. Not that I am at the moment criticizing your making pleasure the sole standard of value — that belongs to another inquiry. What I am trying to prove is that your gods are incapable of pleasure, and therefore by your verdict can have no happiness either. 1.115. " 'Yes, but Epicurus actually wrote books about holiness and piety.' But what is the language of these books? Such that you think you are listening to a Coruncanius or a Scaevola, high priests, not to the man who destroyed the very foundations of religion, and overthrew — not by main force like Xerxes, but by argument — the temples and the altars of the immortal gods. Why, what reason have you for maintaining that men owe worship to the gods, if the gods not only pay no respect to men, but care for nothing and do nothing at all? 1.122. But as for you, what mischief you cause when you reckon kindness and benevolence as weaknesses! Apart altogether from the nature and attributes of deity, do you think that even human beneficence and benignity are solely due to human infirmity? Is there no natural affection between the good? There is something attractive in the very sound of the word 'love,' from which the Latin term for friendship is derived. If we base our friendship on its profit to ourselves, and not on its advantage to those whom we love, it will not be friendship at all, but a mere bartering of selfish interests. That is our standard of value for meadows and fields and herds of cattle: we esteem them for the profits that we derive from them; but affection and friendship between men is disinterested; how much more so therefore is that of the gods, who, although in need of nothing, yet both love each other and care for the interests of men. If this be not so, why do we worship and pray to them? why have pontiffs and augurs to preside over our sacrifices and auspices? why make petitions and vow offerings to heaven? 'Why, but Epicurus (you tell me) actually wrote a treatise on holiness.'
22. Cicero, Lucullus, 142, 97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 100
23. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.119 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189
2.119.  I would press my question and drag an answer from you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the arduous labours that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!" Here I concluded. "I am at no loss for authorities," said Torquatus, "to whom to refer your arguments. I might be able to do some execution myself, but I prefer to find better equipped champions." "No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned friends Siro and Philodemus." "You are right," he replied. "Very well then," said I; "but it would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some verdict on our dispute." "I formally object to him as prejudiced," he rejoined with a smile, "at all events on this issue. You have shown us some mercy, but Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic." "Oh," interposed Triarius, "I'll fight more boldly still next time, for I shall have the arguments I have just heard ready to my hand, though I won't attack you till I see you have been armed by the instructors whom you mention." And with these words we brought our promenade and our discussion to an end together.
24. Cicero, On Divination, 2.59 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 100
2.59. Nos autem ita leves atque inconsiderati sumus, ut, si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus? Ante vero Marsicum bellum quod clipeos Lanuvii, ut a te dictum est, mures rosissent, maxumum id portentum haruspices esse dixerunt; quasi vero quicquam intersit, mures diem noctem aliquid rodentes scuta an cribra corroserint! Nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian nuper apud me mures corroserunt, de re publica debui pertimescere, aut, si Epicuri de voluptate liber rosus esset, putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore. 2.59. But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life? But, you say, the fact that just before the Marsian War mice gnawed the shields at Lanuvium was pronounced by the soothsayers to be a very direful portent. As if it mattered a whit whether mice, which are gnawing something day and night, gnawed shields or sieves! Hence, by the same token, the fact that, at my house, mice recently gnawed my Platos Republic should fill me with alarm for the Roman republic; or if they had gnawed my Epicurus On Pleasure I should have expected a rise in the market price of food! [28]
25. Cicero, On Friendship, 45 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Nijs (2023), The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus. 38
26. Cicero, Brutus, 313-314 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 10
314. itaque cum me et amici et medici hortarentur ut causas agere desisterem, quodvis potius periculum mihi adeundum quam a sperata dicendi gloria discedendum desciscendum maluit Ernesti putavi. Sed cum censerem remissione et moderatione vocis et commutato genere dicendi me et periculum vitare posse et temperatius dicere, ut consuetudinem dicendi et... dicendi secl. Weidner mutarem mutarim FBHM : ut . . mutarem secl. Eberhard , ea causa mihi in Asiam proficiscendi fuit. Itaque cum essem biennium versatus in causis et iam et iam F : etiam C in foro celebratum meum nomen esset, Roma sum profectus.
27. Cicero, Academica, 2.44.135, 2.135 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
28. Philodemus, De Libertate Dicendi, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 217
29. Philodemus, Epigrams, 27-29 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 38
30. Lucilius Gaius, Fragments, 1331, 589-596, 588 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9
31. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14-1.16, 1.25, 1.30-1.31, 1.66-1.70, 2.18, 2.20, 2.69, 2.81, 2.84, 2.99, 2.103, 2.119, 5.24-5.32, 5.37, 5.45, 5.48, 5.58, 5.77-5.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 33; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 189; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 8, 31, 100, 106
1.14. nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos inter nos primo BE de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, nacti te VN 2 hac tite A 1 BER, N 1 (ut videtur); hac die A 2 inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent pertinent R ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, aristoteli A 1 aristotili E aristotilis Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud illuc NV ad illud A 2 quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 1.15. Vide, quantum, inquam, fallare, fallare A. Man. fallere Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane, quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner, si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aeque satisfacit, satis facit R satisfecit et quidem locis pluribus. plurimis BE sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus. Quam ob rem tandem, inquit, non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille bene noris. 1.16. Nisi mihi Phaedrum, inquam, inquam tu NV inquā A (ā in ras.; quid antea fuerit, non liquet), inquam RBE tu mentitum mentitu BE aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem sedulitatem RN 2 V sed utilitatem probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt. atque eos, quos nominavi, cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret, cotidieque inter nos ea, quae audiebamus, conferebamus, neque erat umquam controversia, quid ego intellegerem, sed quid probarem. 1.25. nec mihi illud dixeris: Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis. Torquatis edd. torquati ABER torquato NV Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus Metrodorus P. Man. vero tu aut quisquam eorum, qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista fortasse legendum qui et saperet aliquid et ista didicisset. et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, epicuri BE, R (Ep.), N sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem everti, si ita res se habeat. nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda. 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. esse. Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse cf. ad p. 12, 5) R itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum asperdum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.18. sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et iudicandi quale quidque sit quidque sit sit quidque A et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea, quae docere doceri R dicere V vult, ulla arte distinguit, ut haec ipsa, quae modo loquebamur. summum a vobis bonum voluptas dicitur. aperiendum est igitur, quid sit voluptas; aliter enim explicari, quod quaeritur, non potest. quam si explicavisset, non tam haesitaret. aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur, quam Aristippus, id est, qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur, quam etiam pecudes, si loqui possent, appellarent voluptatem, aut, si magis placeret suo more loqui, quam ut Omnés Danai atque Mycénenses. atque Lamb. aut (a E) Attica pubes reliquique Graeci, qui hoc anapaesto citantur, hoc non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud Aristippeum contemneret, aut, si utrumque probaret, ut ut edd. aut (in V ut probat excid.) probat, coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum voluptate et duobus ultimis uteretur. 2.20. duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum —nam id facilius paterer—, sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo nullo modo fieri BE potest. hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re, neque re neque neque ( om. re) BE remque R tamen dividit verbis. cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, appellant A 1 laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis, atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio oratio eius est BE de summo bono. in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt—quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kuri/as do/cas, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?—animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter: 2.69. non potes potest RN ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris; pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret inprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. Nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus, aliud negotii aliud negotii nihil dett. aliud negotium nihil ARNV aliud negocium non BE nihil habemus. 2.81. Et quidem iure fortasse, sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. in omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis scientia vel in ipsa virtute optimum quidque rarissimum est. ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et Epicurei et Lamb. et epicurei A et epicurij N 1 epicurei (epicuri E) sunt BE epicurei RV epicurij N 2 fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed sed se A 1 BER officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere. 2.84. Licet hic rursus ea commemores, ea commemores p. 28,19 sqq. quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. non quaero, quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi rationi possit R et sententiae suae dicere. Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita. est quaesita (quesita) ARN 2 V est quaesita est N 1 quesita est BE Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse, quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? gramana ABERN 1 gramina V, N 2 ( ubi a man. poster. adscr. est grana- ria puto) collige omnia, quae soletis: Praesidium praesidium p. 30, 3 amicorum. Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis praesidii. praesidii marg. ed. Cratandr.; praesidium iam contemni non poteris. odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis. ad eas enim res res enim BE ab Epicuro praecepta dantur. et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem liberalitatem ed. Colon. 1467 libertatem utens etiam etiam P. Man. eam (eam N 2 ) sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benivolentia praeclare tuebere et munies. tuebere et munies Mdv. tuebare munies BE et tuebere et munies ARNV At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia? 2.99. Huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet, nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum scriptum epistula (e pl a B) BE ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. ita redarguitur redarguitur edd. redarguetur ipse a sese, sese se A convincunturque convincunturque Dav. vincunturque ABEN vincuntur V veneantur que R scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam. quod enim testimonium maius quaerimus, quae honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, cum videamus tanta officia morientis? 2.103. quodsi dies notandus fuit, eumne potius, quo natus, an eum, quo sapiens factus est? Non potuit, inquies, fieri sapiens, nisi natus esset. et sustul. P. Man. et Lamb. Isto modo, ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. quos quidem dies quem ad modum agatis et in quantam hominum facetorum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico— nihil opus est litibus—; tantum dico, magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem, quam illius testamento cavere ut ageretur. 2.119. elicerem Elicerem N 2 eligerem ABERN 1 exigerem V ( idem a poster. man. in marg. add. in N) ex te cogeremque, ut responderes, nisi vererer ne Herculem ipsum ea, quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset, voluptatis causa gessisse diceres. Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores. Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos. Recte, inquit, intellegis. Age sane, inquam. sed erat aequius Triarium aliquid de dissensione nostra iudicare. Eiuro, Eiuro Gz. Iuro (Itiro R) inquit adridens, iniquum, hac quidem de re; tu enim ista lenius, levius BENV levius an le- nius incert. in R hic Stoicorum more nos vexat. Tum Triarius: Posthac quidem, inquit, audacius. nam haec ipsa mihi erunt in promptu, quae modo audivi, nec ante aggrediar, quam te ab istis, quos dicis, instructum videro. Quae cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et disputandi. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.27. haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt, sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. huius enim aetati haec igitur ... aetati Non. p. 15 ignoscetis cuius aetatis Non. et huic nunc haec primum haec primum R primum hoc ( ante primum ras., in qua cognosc. h) N 2 hic primum BE hoc primum V fortasse secl. Mdv. audientis audientis Mdv. audienti (audiendi E) servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam; etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur. Exposita igitur, inquit, inquit om. BE terminatione rerum expetendarum cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. quam ob rem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse reapse re ab se primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. diligere N 2 V diligi BERN 1 quod quamquam dubitationem non habet—est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur que suis add. Crat. natura ac comprehenditur suis Alanus cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur—, tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto. 5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. 5.29. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'. et qui Et qui RV Equi BE et qui (et ab alt. m. in ras. add. ) N ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus inimicus esse BE atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum. 5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. 5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? 5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.45. In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem autem om. RNV est in ea, quod quidam quidem BER volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit. 5.48. Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. inditia nature N iudicia natura BE iudicia nature RV tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi ut pulsi P. Man. aut pulsi ( etiam B) recurrant? ut aliquid recurrant ut aliquid cod. Morel. recurrentur aliquid R recurrant aliquid BEV recurrerentur aliquid ( ut vid. ) N 1 recurrerent et aliquid N 2 scire se scire se etiam R gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis ingeniis BER studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.77. illud mihi a te nimium festiter dictum dictum p. 161, 11-21 videtur, sapientis omnis esse semper beatos; nescio quo modo praetervolavit oratio. quod nisi ita efficitur, quae Theophrastus de fortuna, de dolore, de cruciatu corporis dixit, cum quibus coniungi vitam beatam nullo modo posse putavit, vereor, ne vera sint. nam illud vehementer repugnat, repugnet BER eundem beatum esse et multis malis malls modis BE oppressum. haec quo modo conveniant, non sane intellego. Utrum igitur tibi non placet, inquit, inquit non placet BE virtutisne tantam esse esse tantam BE vim, ut ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta sit? an, si id probas, fieri ita posse negas, ut ii, qui virtutis compotes sint, etiam malis quibusdam quibusdam malls BE affecti beati sint? Ego vero volo in virtute vim esse quam maximam; sed quanta sit alias; nunc tantum possitne esse tanta, si quicquam extra virtutem habeatur in bonis. 5.78. Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene pene BENV porro R minima. quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. quare attende, quaeso. nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque quid ad id, quod quaerebam, quaerebam ( p. 194, 14-18 ) Mdv. et Wes. ( apud Mdv. ); queram respondeas. 5.79. Respondebo me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo igitur, igitur ( i. e. quoniam ita quaeris, accuratius dic cur id facias ) om. BE inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est', et Quare? Post vocab. Quare in N reliqua desunt, cum sequatur pravumve quid consentiens quid et q. s. Acad. poster. I 19 sqq. inquit, respondet: add. Se. Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum. Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere. 5.80. dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem—quod quidem solet solet om. BE ebullire non numquam—, quem quidem, cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: 'Quam suave est! quam nihil curo!'; non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum habeat in natura boni; cur ... boni = cur in boni natura tantum inesse censeat illud urgueam, non intellegere eum quid sibi dicendum sit, cum dolorem summum malum esse dixerit. Eadem nunc mea adversum te oratio est. dicis eadem omnia et bona et mala, quae quidem dicunt ii, quae ... ii = quae eos dicere concedo ii Mdv. hi BEV om. R qui numquam philosophum pictum, ut dicitur, viderunt: valitudinem, vires, staturam, formam, integritatem unguiculorum omnium bona, deformitatem, morbum, debilitatem add. Lamb. mala. mala om. R 5.81. iam illa externa parce tu quidem; sed haec cum corporis bona sint, eorum conficientia certe in bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquos, divitias, honores, opes. contra hoc attende me nihil dicere, illud dicere, si ista mala sunt, add. Mdv. sint Bai. in quae potest incidere sapiens, sapientem esse non esse non esse om. R ad beate vivendum satis esse ad beate vivendum BE satis. Immo vero, inquit, ad beatissime vivendum parum est, ad beate vero vero om. BE satis. Animadverti, inquam, te isto modo paulo ante paulo ante p. 191, 13-16 ponere, et scio ab Antiocho nostro dici sic solere; sed quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? quod autem satis est, eo quicquid accessit, accessit C. F. W. Mue. accesserit nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; ita ita Dav. et nemo beato beatior. 5.82. Ergo, inquit, tibi Q. Metellus, qui tris filios consules vidit, e quibus unum etiam et censorem et triumphantem, post triumphantem add. vidit BE quartum autem praetorem, eosque salvos reliquit et tris tris Bai. tres filias nuptas, cum ipse consul, censor, censor consul BEV etiam etiam dett. esset ( ee t, esset, scriptum est pro ēt = etiam) add. edd. augur fuisset et triumphasset, ut sapiens fuerit, nonne beatior quam, ut item sapiens fuerit, qui in potestate hostium vigiliis et inedia necatus est, Regulus? 5.83. Quid me istud rogas? inquam. inquam rogas BE Stoicos roga. Quid igitur, inquit, eos responsuros putas? Nihilo beatiorem esse Metellum quam Regulum. Inde igitur, inquit, ordiendum ordiendum Mdv. audiendum est. Tamen a proposito, inquam, aberramus. non enim quaero quid verum, sed quid cuique cuiquam BE dicendum sit. utinam quidem dicerent alium alio beatiorem! iam ruinas videres. in virtute enim sola et in ipso honesto cum sit bonum positum, cumque nec virtus, ut placet illis, nec honestum crescat, idque bonum solum sit, quo qui potiatur, necesse est beatus sit, cum id augeri augeri id BE non possit, in quo uno positum est beatum esse, qui potest esse quisquam alius alio beatior? videsne, ut haec concit? concit conveniant R et et om. BE hercule—fatendum est enim, quod quod ut BE sentio—mirabilis est apud illos contextus rerum. respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus. quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident. ut in geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia. concede nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit: concedendum est in virtute esse positam add. ante positam Bai., post positam Mdv. beatam vitam. vitam beatam BE vide rursus retro: 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.85. Tibi hoc incredibile, quod quod Mdv. quid B quia ERV beatissimum. quid? tuum credibile? si enim ad populum me vocas, eum, qui ita sit affectus, beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute, ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint, alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugtia. Theophrasti igitur, inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita? Tamen aberramus a proposito, et, ne longius, prorsus, inquam, Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet. Nonne igitur tibi videntur, nonne inquit igitur tibi videntur BE inquit, mala? 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.88. sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. 5.90. Sed venio ad inconstantiae crimen, ne ne ut BE saepius dicas me aberrare; quam tu ponis in verbis, ego positam in re putabam. si satis erit hoc perceptum, in quo adiutores Stoicos optimos habemus, tantam vim esse virtutis, ut omnia, si ex altera parte potur, ne appareant quidem, cum omnia, quae illi commoda certe dicunt esse et sumenda et eligenda et praeposita —quae ita definiunt, ut satis magno aestimanda sint—, haec igitur cum ego tot nominibus a Stoicis appellata, partim novis et commenticiis, ut ista producta et 'reducta', partim idem significantibus—quid enim interest, expetas an eligas? mihi quidem etiam lautius laucius E lautius V lacius B latitius R videtur, quod eligitur, et ad quod dilectus adhibetur—, sed, cum ego ista omnia bona dixero, tantum refert quam magna dicam, cum expetenda, quam valde. sin autem nec expetenda ego magis quam tu eligenda, nec illa pluris aestimanda ego, qui bona, quam tu, producta qui appellas, quam tu producta qui appellas RV quam qui cum produt appellas BE omnia ista necesse est obscurari nec apparere et in virtutis virtutis ed. princ. Rom. virtutes tamquam in solis radios incurrere. 5.91. At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum paulum Brem. parum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo audeo R igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt V bona appellare nec fraudare fraudari BR suo vetere vetere Wes. ad or. p. Sest. p. 7 (sec. Mdv) veteri nomine neque iam neque iam Se. quam aliquod aliquod Lamb. aliquid RV ali- quam BE potius novum exquirere, acquirere E virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. 5.92. terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at at Ascens. an hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita ait in vita om. Sacerd. risisse quem ... risisse Sacerd. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil VI 442) Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat acciderat V accideret ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, Oroete Vict. oronte BE oriente R orente V praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At At V ad R et BE multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. 5.93. An ne hoc quidem Peripateticis concedis, ut dicant omnium bonorum virorum, id est sapientium omnibusque que om. BE virtutibus ornatorum, vitam omnibus partibus plus habere semper boni quam mali? Quis hoc dicit? Stoici scilicet. Stoici scilicet Lamb. stoicis licet Minime; sed isti ipsi, qui voluptate et dolore omnia metiuntur, nonne clamant sapienti plus semper adesse quod velit quam quod nolit? cum tantum igitur in virtute pot ii, qui fatentur se virtutis causa, nisi ea voluptatem faceret, voluptatem faceret RKl. voluptate maceret BEV voluptatem maceret R ne manum quidem versuros fuisse, quid facere nos oportet, qui quamvis minimam animi praestantiam praestantiam animi BE omnibus bonis corporis anteire dicamus, ut ea ne in conspectu quidem relinquantur? quis est enim, qui hoc cadere in sapientem dicere audeat, ut, si fieri possit, virtutem in perpetuum abiciat, ut dolore omni liberetur? quis nostrum dixerit, quos quos dett. quis BER quem V non pudet ea, quae Stoici aspera dicunt, mala dicere, melius esse turpiter aliquid facere cum voluptate quam honeste cum dolore? 5.94. nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum oculorum g-|enu R (num legendum sit renum sec. Tusc. II 60 incertum est) dolorem. quasi quasi Lamb. quis vero hoc hoc vero R didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse et esse P. Man. et esset ferendum viro. viro dett. vero hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui qui BE qm (= quoniam) RV dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis. is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides charmides BE carimdes R carneades V Epicureus Epicureus Mdv. epicurus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide carmide B carnide E carimde R carneades V noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. ostendit pedes et pectus. ac tamen hic mallet non dolere. 5.95. Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et add. Gz. (e cod. Spirensi ?) summe laudabiles laudabilesque RV virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, labor possit possit molestia BE labor possit molestia R labor possit et molestia V non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes esse semper semper esse BE beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit. 5.96. Tum Quintus: Mihi quidem, inquit, satis hoc confirmatum videtur, laetorque eam laetorque eam Dav. letor quidem philosophiam, cuius antea supellectilem pluris aestimabam quam possessiones reliquarum reliquarum cum aliis Mdv.; reliquorum —ita mihi dives videbatur, ut ab ea petere possem, quicquid in studiis nostris concupissem—, hanc igitur laetor etiam acutiorem repertam quam ceteras, quod quidam quidam BE quidem RV ei deesse dicebant. Non quam non quam BE numquam RV nostram quidem, inquit Pomponius iocans; sed mehercule pergrata mihi oratio mihi fuit oratio Mdv. tua. quae enim dici Latine posse non arbitrabar, ea dicta sunt a te verbis aptis nec minus plane quam dicuntur a Graecis. verbis aptis nec minus plane quam dicuntur a Graecis Schue. nec minus plane verbis quam dicuntur a Graecis aptis BE nec minus plane quam dicuntur a Graecis verbis aptis RV (verba verbis aptis videntur adscripta fuisse in marg. et inde falso loco, in BE praeterea separatim, receptae) Sed tempus est, si videtur, et recta quidem ad me. ad me a me ERV Quod cum ille dixisset et satis disputatum videretur, in oppidum ad Pomponium perreximus omnes. 2.18.  Epicurus however, Torquatus, in his contempt for dialectic, which comprises at once the entire science of discerning the essence of things, of judging their qualities, and of conducting a systematic and logical argument, — Epicurus, I say, makes havoc of his exposition. He entirely fails, in my opinion at all events, to impart scientific precision to the doctrines he desires to convey. Take for example the particular tenet that we have just been discussing. The Chief Good is pleasure, say you Epicureans. Well then, you must explain what pleasure is; otherwise it is impossible to make clear the subject under discussion. Had Epicurus cleared up the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen into such confusion. Either he would have upheld pleasure in the same sense as Aristippus, that is, an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure; or, if he preferred to use an idiom of his own, instead of speaking the language of the Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, Scions of Athens, and the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, he might have confined the name of pleasure to this state of freedom from pain, and despised pleasure as Aristippus understands it; or else, if he approved of both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, then he ought to combine together pleasure and absence of pain, and profess two ultimate Goods. 2.20.  "For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings — not merely under a single name (for that I could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master's Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I will ask you kindly to notice whether I translate this maxim correctly: 2.69.  Believe me then, Torquatus, if you will but look within, and study your own thoughts and inclinations, you cannot continue to defend the doctrines you profess. You will be put to the blush, I say, by the picture that Cleanthes used to draw so cleverly in his lectures. He would tell his audience to imagine a painting representing Pleasure, decked as a queen, and gorgeously apparelled, seated on a throne; at her side should stand the Virtues as her handmaids, who should make it their sole object and duty to minister to Pleasure, merely whispering in her ear the warning (provided this could be conveyed by the painter's art) to beware of unwittingly doing aught to offend public opinion, or anything from which pain might result. 'As for us Virtues, we were born to be your slaves; that is our one and only business.' 2.81.  'But he won many disciples.' Yes, and perhaps he deserved to do so; but still the witness of the crowd does not carry much weight; for as in every art or study, or science of any kind, so in right conduct itself, supreme excellence is extremely rare. And to my mind the fact that Epicurus himself was a good man and that many Epicureans both have been and to‑day are loyal to their friends, consistent and high-principled throughout their lives, ruling their conduct by duty and not by pleasure, — all this does but enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons' lives and behaviour refute the principles they profess. Most men's words are thought to be better than their deeds; these people's deeds on the contrary seem to me better than their words. 2.84.  It is no good your once again repeating Epicurus's admirable remarks in praise of friendship. I am not asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes. 'Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility.' Well, but surely you don't reckon Triarius here a more valuable asset than the granaries at Puteoli would be if they belonged to you? Cite all the stock Epicurean maxims. 'Friends are a protection.' You can protect yourself; the laws will protect you; ordinary friendships offer protection enough; you will be too powerful to despise as it is, while hatred and envy it will be easy to avoid, — Epicurus gives rules for doing so! And in any case, with so large an income to give away, you can dispense with the romantic sort of friendship that we have in mind; you will have plenty of well-wishers to defend you quite effectively. 2.99.  "Yes, Torquatus, you people may turn and twist as you like, but you will not find a line in this famous letter of Epicurus that is not inconsistent and incompatible with his teachings. Hence he is his own refutation; his writings are disproved by the uprightness of his character. That provision for the care of the children, that loyalty to friendship and affection, that observance of these solemn duties with his latest breath, prove that there was innate in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by pleasure nor elicited by prizes and rewards. Seeing so strong a sense of duty in a dying man, what clearer evidence do we want that morality and rectitude are desirable for their own sakes? 2.103.  And if a special day was to be kept, did he do well to take the day on which he was born, and not rather that on which he became a Wise Man? You will object that he could not have become a Wise Man if he had not first of all been born. You might equally well say, if his grandmother had not been born either. The entire notion of wishing one's name and memory to be celebrated by a banquet after one's death is alien to a man of learning. I won't refer to your mode of keeping these anniversaries, or the shafts of wit you bring upon you from persons with a sense of humour. We do not want to quarrel. I only remark that it was more your business to keep Epicurus's birthday than his business to provide by will for its celebration. 2.119.  I would press my question and drag an answer from you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the arduous labours that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!" Here I concluded. "I am at no loss for authorities," said Torquatus, "to whom to refer your arguments. I might be able to do some execution myself, but I prefer to find better equipped champions." "No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned friends Siro and Philodemus." "You are right," he replied. "Very well then," said I; "but it would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some verdict on our dispute." "I formally object to him as prejudiced," he rejoined with a smile, "at all events on this issue. You have shown us some mercy, but Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic." "Oh," interposed Triarius, "I'll fight more boldly still next time, for I shall have the arguments I have just heard ready to my hand, though I won't attack you till I see you have been armed by the instructors whom you mention." And with these words we brought our promenade and our discussion to an end together. 5.24.  "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25.  At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26.  Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27.  This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28.  Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29.  The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30.  Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31.  Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus — as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree — the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32.  Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();" affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.37.  "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.45.  "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sum‑total of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.48.  "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.58.  "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. 5.77.  It is the doctrine that the Wise Man is always and invariably happy that I would challenge as too hurriedly touched upon by you. Your discourse somehow skimmed past this point. But unless this doctrine is proved, I am afraid that the truth will lie with Theophrastus, who held that misfortune, sorrow and bodily anguish were incompatible with happiness. For it is violently inconsistent to call a man happy and at the same time say that he is overwhelmed with evils. How happiness and misfortune can go together I entirely fail to understand." "Which position then do you question?" he replied; "that virtue is so potent that she need not look outside herself for happiness? or, if you can accept this, do you deny that the virtuous can be happy even when afflicted by certain evils?" "Oh, I would rate the potency of virtue as high as possible; but let us defer the question of her exact degree of greatness; the only point is now, could she be so great as she is, if anything outside virtue be classed as a good?" 5.78.  "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.79.  "My reply will be," said I, "that I am not at the present asking what result virtue can produce, but what is a consistent and what a self-contradictory account of it." "How do you mean?" said he. "Why," I said, "first Zeno enunciates the lofty and oracular utterance, 'Virtue need not look outside herself for happiness'; 'Why?' says some one. 'Because,' he answers, 'nothing else is good but what is morally good.' I am not now asking whether this is true; I merely say that Zeno's statements are admirably logical and consistent. 5.80.  Suppose Epicurus to say the same thing, that the Wise Man is always happy, — for he is fond of ranting like this now and then, and indeed tells us that when the Wise Man is suffering torments of pain, he will say 'How pleasant this is! how little I mind! — Well, I should not join issue with the man as to why he goes so far astray about the nature of the Good; but I should insist that he does not understand what is the necessary corollary of his own avowal that pain is the supreme evil. I take the same line now against you. As to what is good and what is evil, your account agrees entirely with that of those who have never set eyes on a philosopher even in a picture, as the saying is: you call health, strength, poise, beauty, soundness of every part from top to toe, goods, and ugliness, disease and weakness evils. 5.81.  As for external goods, you were, it is true, cautious; but since these bodily excellences are goods, you will doubtless reckon as goods the things productive of them, namely friends, children, relations, riches, rank and power. Mark that against this I say nothing; what I say is, if misfortunes which a Wise Man may encounter are as you say evils, to be wise is not enough for happiness." "Say rather," said he, "not enough for supreme happiness, but it is enough for happiness." "I noticed," I replied, "you made that distinction a little time ago, and I am aware that our master Antiochus is fond of saying the same; but what can be more unsatisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not happy enough? Any addition to what is enough makes it too much; now no one has too much happiness; therefore no one can be happier than happy." 5.82.  "Then what is your view," he said, "of Quintus Metellus, who saw three sons consuls, and one of these made censor and celebrating a triumph as well, and a fourth praetor, and who left his four sons alive and well and three daughters married, having himself been consul, censor and augur and having had a triumph? Supposing him to have been a Wise Man, was he not happier than Regulus, who died a captive in the hands of the enemy, from starvation and want of sleep, allowing him also to have been a Wise Man?" 5.83.  "Why," said I, "do you ask that question of me? Ask the Stoics." "What answer then," he said, "do you think they would give?" "That Metellus is no happier than Regulus." "Well then," said he, "let us start from that." "Still," said I, "we are wandering from our subject. For I am not inquiring what is true, but what each school ought consistently to say. I only wish that they did allow degrees of happiness! then you would see a collapse! For since the Good consists solely in virtue and in actual Moral Worth, and neither virtue nor Moral Worth, as they hold, admits of increase, and since that alone is good which necessarily makes its possessor happy, when that which alone constitutes happiness does not allow of increase, how can anyone possibly be happier than anyone else? Do you see how logical this is? And in fact (for I must confess what I really think) their system is a marvellously consistent whole. The conclusions agree with the first principles, the middle steps with both, in fact every part with every other. They understand what inference follows from and what contradicts a given premise. It is like geometry: grant the premises and you must grant everything. Admit that there is no good but Moral Worth, and you are bound to admit that happiness consists in virtue. Or again conversely: given the latter, you must grant the former. 5.84.  Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.85.  You draw the line at this; you can't believe that he is supremely happy. Well, but can one believe what you say either? Call me before a jury of ordinary people, and you will never persuade them that the man so afflicted is happy; refer the case to the learned, and it is possible that on one of the two counts you will be doubtful about their verdict, whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris: but on the other, they will find without hesitation that the Stoic doctrine is consistent and yours self-contradictory. 'Ah,' says the Academic, 'then you agree with Theophrastus in his great work On Happiness?' However, we are wandering from the subject; and to cut the matter short, Piso," I said, "I do fully agree with Theophrastus, if misfortunes, as you say, are evils." 5.86.  "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87.  On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.88.  But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. 5.89.  What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, — if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, — let them coin new words at their pleasure. 5.90.  "But I come to the charge of inconsistency, or you will say I digress too often. You make inconsistency a matter of words, but I imagined it to be a question of fact. Only let it be clearly grasped, and in this we have the Stoics as our strongest supporters, that such is the power of virtue that all other things, if ranged in contrast with it, are absolutely eclipsed and extinguished; then, as for all the things which they admit to be advantageous and 'to be adopted' and 'selected' and 'preferred' (terms which they define so as to mean possessed of considerable value), when I style these things, which receive so many names from the Stoics, some new and original, like your words 'promoted' and 'degraded,' some identical in meaning (for what difference is there between 'desiring' a thing and 'selecting' it? to my ear there is a more sumptuous sound about a thing that is selected, and to which choice is applied), — however, when I call all these things good, the only thing that matters is, how good do I mean, when I call them desirable, the only question is, how desirable? But if on the other hand I do not think them more 'to be desired' than you 'to be selected,' and if I who call them good do not deem them more valuable than you who call them 'promoted,' all these external things will necessarily be overwhelmed and eclipsed by the side of virtue; its radiance will envelop them like the rays of the sun. 5.91.  But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92.  Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.93.  "Or do you even refuse to let the Peripatetics say that the life of all good, that is of all wise men, men whom every virtue decks, always comprises infinitely more good than evil? Who does say this? The Stoics, you suppose? Not at all; but the very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain, do not these cry aloud that the Wise Man always has more things that he likes than that he dislikes? When therefore so much importance is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it did not produce pleasure, what are we to do, who say that the smallest amount you like to mention of mental excellence surpasses all the goods of the body, and renders them completely imperceptible? For who is there who would venture to say that it would become the Wise Man to discard virtue for ever (were this possible) for the sake of securing absolute freedom from pain? Who of our school (which is not ashamed to call evils what the Stoics term 'hardships') was ever known to say that it is better to commit a pleasant sin than to do the painful right? 5.94.  We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all. 5.95.  "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." 5.96.  "For my part," remarked Quintus, "I think the position has been satisfactorily defended, and I am delighted that the philosophy whose homely gear I already valued more highly than the estates of the other schools (I deemed her rich enough for me to find in her all that I coveted in our studies), I rejoice, I say, that this philosophy has been found to be also subtler than the rest, — a quality in which she was said by some to be deficient." "Not subtler than ours at all events," said Pomponius playfully; but I protest I was most delighted by your discourse. You have expounded ideas that I thought it impossible to express in Latin, and you have expressed them as lucidly as do the Greeks, and in apt language. But our time is up, if you please; let us make straight for my quarters." At these words, as it was felt there had been enough discussion, we all proceeded to the town to Pomponius's house.
32. Cicero, On Fate, 48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 100
33. Horace, Sermones, 1.1.1-1.1.3, 1.1.50, 1.4.31-1.4.32, 1.4.110, 1.5.101 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9, 74
34. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.526-3.1094, 4.1037-4.1287 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 74
3.526. Denique saepe hominem paulatim cernimus ire 3.527. et membratim vitalem deperdere sensum; 3.528. in pedibus primum digitos livescere et unguis, 3.529. inde pedes et crura mori, post inde per artus 3.530. ire alios tractim gelidi vestigia leti. 3.531. scinditur atque animae haec quoniam natura nec uno 3.532. tempore sincera existit, mortalis habendast. 3.533. quod si forte putas ipsam se posse per artus 3.534. introsum trahere et partis conducere in unum 3.535. atque ideo cunctis sensum diducere membris, 3.536. at locus ille tamen, quo copia tanta animai 3.537. cogitur, in sensu debet maiore videri; 3.538. qui quoniam nusquamst, ni mirum, ut diximus ante , 3.539. dilaniata foras dispargitur, interit ergo. 3.540. quin etiam si iam libeat concedere falsum 3.541. et dare posse animam glomerari in corpore eorum, 3.542. lumina qui lincunt moribundi particulatim, 3.543. mortalem tamen esse animam fateare necesse 3.544. nec refert utrum pereat dispersa per auras 3.545. an contracta suis e partibus obbrutescat, 3.546. quando hominem totum magis ac magis undique sensus 3.547. deficit et vitae minus et minus undique restat. 3.548. Et quoniam mens est hominis pars una locoque 3.549. fixa manet certo, vel ut aures atque oculi sunt 3.550. atque alii sensus qui vitam cumque gubert, 3.551. et vel uti manus atque oculus naresve seorsum 3.552. secreta ab nobis nequeunt sentire neque esse, 3.553. sed tamen in parvo lincuntur tempore tali, 3.554. sic animus per se non quit sine corpore et ipso 3.555. esse homine, illius quasi quod vas esse videtur, 3.556. sive aliud quid vis potius coniunctius ei 3.557. fingere, quandoquidem conexu corpus adhaeret. 3.558. Denique corporis atque animi vivata potestas 3.559. inter se coniuncta valent vitaque fruuntur; 3.560. nec sine corpore enim vitalis edere motus 3.561. sola potest animi per se natura nec autem 3.562. cassum anima corpus durare et sensibus uti. 3.563. scilicet avolsus radicibus ut nequit ullam 3.564. dispicere ipse oculus rem seorsum corpore toto, 3.565. sic anima atque animus per se nil posse videtur. 3.566. ni mirum quia per venas et viscera mixtim, 3.567. per nervos atque ossa tenentur corpore ab omni 3.568. nec magnis intervallis primordia possunt 3.569. libera dissultare, ideo conclusa moventur 3.570. sensiferos motus, quos extra corpus in auras 3.571. aeris aëris haut possunt post mortem eiecta moveri 3.572. propterea quia non simili ratione tenentur; 3.573. corpus enim atque animans erit aer aër , si cohibere 3.574. sese anima atque in eos poterit concludere motus, 3.575. quos ante in nervis et in ipso corpore agebat. 3.576. quare etiam atque etiam resoluto corporis omni 3.577. tegmine et eiectis extra vitalibus auris 3.578. dissolui sensus animi fateare necessest 3.579. atque animam, quoniam coniunctast causa duobus. 3.580. Denique cum corpus nequeat perferre animai 3.581. discidium, quin in taetro tabescat odore, 3.582. quid dubitas quin ex imo penitusque coorta 3.583. emanarit uti fumus diffusa animae vis, 3.584. atque ideo tanta mutatum putre ruina 3.585. conciderit corpus, penitus quia mota loco sunt 3.586. fundamenta foras mat animaeque per artus 3.587. perque viarum omnis flexus, in corpore qui sunt, 3.588. atque foramina? multimodis ut noscere possis 3.589. dispertitam animae naturam exisse per artus 3.590. et prius esse sibi distractam corpore in ipso, 3.591. quam prolapsa foras enaret in aeris aëris auras. 3.592. Quin etiam finis dum vitae vertitur intra, 3.593. saepe aliqua tamen e causa labefacta videtur 3.594. ire anima ac toto solui de corpore tota 3.595. et quasi supremo languescere tempore voltus 3.596. molliaque exsangui cadere omnia corpore membra. 3.597. quod genus est, animo male factum cum perhibetur 3.598. aut animam liquisse; ubi iam trepidatur et omnes 3.599. extremum cupiunt vitae reprehendere vinclum; 3.600. conquassatur enim tum mens animaeque potestas 3.601. omnis. et haec ipso cum corpore conlabefiunt, 3.602. ut gravior paulo possit dissolvere causa. 3.603. Quid dubitas tandem quin extra prodita corpus 3.604. inbecilla foras in aperto, tegmine dempto, 3.605. non modo non omnem possit durare per aevom, 3.606. sed minimum quodvis nequeat consistere tempus? 3.607. nec sibi enim quisquam moriens sentire videtur 3.608. ire foras animam incolumem de corpore toto, 3.609. nec prius ad iugulum et supera succedere fauces, 3.610. verum deficere in certa regione locatam; 3.611. ut sensus alios in parti quemque sua scit 3.612. dissolui. quod si inmortalis nostra foret mens, 3.613. non tam se moriens dissolvi conquereretur, 3.614. sed magis ire foras vestemque relinquere, ut anguis. 3.615. Denique cur animi numquam mens consiliumque 3.616. gignitur in capite aut pedibus manibusve, sed unis 3.617. sedibus et certis regionibus omnibus haeret, 3.618. si non certa loca ad nascendum reddita cuique 3.619. sunt, et ubi quicquid possit durare creatum 3.620. atque ita multimodis partitis artubus esse, 3.621. membrorum ut numquam existat praeposterus ordo? 3.622. usque adeo sequitur res rem, neque flamma creari 3.623. fluminibus solitast neque in igni gignier algor. 3.624. Praeterea si inmortalis natura animaist 3.625. et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro, 3.626. quinque, ut opinor, eam faciundum est sensibus auctam. 3.627. nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis 3.628. possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare. 3.629. pictores itaque et scriptorum saecla priora 3.630. sic animas intro duxerunt sensibus auctas. 3.631. at neque sorsum oculi neque nares nec manus ipsa 3.632. esse potest animae neque sorsum lingua neque aures; 3.633. haud igitur per se possunt sentire neque esse. 3.634. Et quoniam toto sentimus corpore inesse 3.635. vitalem sensum et totum esse animale videmus, 3.636. si subito medium celeri praeciderit ictu 3.637. vis aliqua, ut sorsum partem secernat utramque, 3.638. dispertita procul dubio quoque vis animai 3.639. et discissa simul cum corpore dissicietur. 3.640. at quod scinditur et partis discedit in ullas, 3.641. scilicet aeternam sibi naturam abnuit esse. 3.642. falciferos memorant currus abscidere membra 3.643. saepe ita de subito permixta caede calentis, 3.644. ut tremere in terra videatur ab artubus id quod 3.645. decidit abscisum, cum mens tamen atque hominis vis 3.646. mobilitate mali non quit sentire dolorem; 3.647. et simul in pugnae studio quod dedita mens est, 3.648. corpore relicuo pugnam caedesque petessit, 3.649. nec tenet amissam laevam cum tegmine saepe 3.650. inter equos abstraxe rotas falcesque rapaces, 3.651. nec cecidisse alius dextram, cum scandit et instat. 3.652. inde alius conatur adempto surgere crure, 3.653. cum digitos agitat propter moribundus humi pes. 3.654. et caput abscisum calido viventeque trunco 3.655. servat humi voltum vitalem oculosque patentis, 3.656. donec reliquias animai reddidit omnes. 3.657. quin etiam tibi si, lingua vibrante, miti 3.658. serpentis cauda, procero corpore, utrumque 3.659. sit libitum in multas partis discidere ferro, 3.660. omnia iam sorsum cernes ancisa recenti 3.661. volnere tortari et terram conspargere tabo, 3.662. ipsam seque retro partem petere ore priorem, 3.663. volneris ardenti ut morsu premat icta dolore. 3.664. omnibus esse igitur totas dicemus in illis 3.665. particulis animas? at ea ratione sequetur 3.666. unam animantem animas habuisse in corpore multas. 3.667. ergo divisast ea quae fuit una simul cum 3.668. corpore; quapropter mortale utrumque putandumst, 3.669. in multas quoniam partis disciditur aeque. 3.670. Praeterea si inmortalis natura animai 3.671. constat et in corpus nascentibus insinuatur, 3.672. cur super ante actam aetatem meminisse nequimus 3.673. nec vestigia gestarum rerum ulla tenemus? 3.674. nam si tanto operest animi mutata potestas, 3.675. omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum, 3.676. non, ut opinor, id ab leto iam longius errat; 3.677. qua propter fateare necessest quae fuit ante 3.678. interiisse, et quae nunc est nunc esse creatam. 3.679. Praeterea si iam perfecto corpore nobis 3.680. inferri solitast animi vivata potestas 3.681. tum cum gignimur et vitae cum limen inimus, 3.682. haud ita conveniebat uti cum corpore et una 3.683. cum membris videatur in ipso sanguine cresse, 3.684. sed vel ut in cavea per se sibi vivere solam 3.685. convenit, ut sensu corpus tamen affluat omne. 3.686. quare etiam atque etiam neque originis esse putandumst 3.687. expertis animas nec leti lege solutas; 3.688. nam neque tanto opere adnecti potuisse putandumst 3.689. corporibus nostris extrinsecus insinuatas, 3.690. quod fieri totum contra manifesta docet res 3.691. aenamque ænamque ita conexa est per venas viscera nervos 3.692. ossaque, uti dentes quoque sensu participentur; 3.693. morbus ut indicat et gelidai stringor aquai 3.694. et lapis oppressus subitis e frugibus asperae asperæ 3.695. nec, tam contextae cum sint, exire videntur 3.696. incolumes posse et salvas exsolvere sese 3.697. omnibus e nervis atque ossibus articulisque, 3.698. quod si forte putas extrinsecus insinuatam 3.699. permanare animam nobis per membra solere, 3.700. tanto quique magis cum corpore fusa peribit; 3.701. quod permanat enim, dissolvitur, interit ergo; 3.702. dispertitur enim per caulas corporis omnis. 3.703. ut cibus, in membra atque artus cum diditur omnis, 3.704. disperit atque aliam naturam sufficit ex se, 3.705. sic anima atque animus quamvis est integra recens in 3.706. corpus eunt, tamen in mado dissoluuntur, 3.707. dum quasi per caulas omnis diduntur in artus 3.708. particulae quibus haec animi natura creatur, 3.709. quae nunc in nostro dominatur corpore nata 3.710. ex illa quae tunc periit partita per artus. 3.711. quapropter neque natali privata videtur 3.712. esse die natura animae nec funeris expers. 3.713. Semina praeterea linquontur necne animai 3.714. corpore in exanimo? quod si lincuntur et insunt, 3.715. haut erit ut merito inmortalis possit haberi, 3.716. partibus amissis quoniam libata recessit. 3.717. sin ita sinceris membris ablata profugit, 3.718. ut nullas partis in corpore liquerit ex se, 3.719. unde cadavera rancenti iam viscere vermes 3.720. expirant atque unde animantum copia tanta 3.721. exos et exanguis tumidos perfluctuat artus? 3.722. quod si forte animas extrinsecus insinuari? 3.723. vermibus et privas in corpora posse venire 3.724. credis nec reputas cur milia multa animarum 3.725. conveniant unde una recesserit, hoc tamen est ut 3.726. quaerendum videatur et in discrimen agendum, 3.727. utrum tandem animae venentur semina quaeque 3.728. vermiculorum ipsaeque sibi fabricentur ubi sint, 3.729. an quasi corporibus perfectis insinuentur. 3.730. at neque cur faciant ipsae quareve laborent 3.731. dicere suppeditat. neque enim, sine corpore cum sunt, 3.732. sollicitae volitant morbis alguque fameque; 3.733. corpus enim magis his vitiis adfine laborat, 3.734. et mala multa animus contage fungitur eius. 3.735. sed tamen his esto quamvis facere utile corpus, 3.736. cum subeant; at qua possint via nulla videtur. 3.737. haut igitur faciunt animae sibi corpora et artus. 3.738. nec tamen est ut qui cum perfectis insinuentur 3.739. corporibus; neque enim poterunt suptiliter esse 3.740. conexae neque consensu contagia fient. 3.741. Denique cur acris violentia triste leonum 3.742. seminium sequitur, volpes dolus, et fuga cervos? 3.743. a patribus datur et a patrius pavor incitat artus, 3.744. et iam cetera de genere hoc cur omnia membris 3.745. ex ineunte aevo generascunt ingenioque, 3.746. si non, certa suo quia semine seminioque 3.747. vis animi pariter crescit cum corpore quoque? 3.748. quod si inmortalis foret et mutare soleret 3.749. corpora, permixtis animantes moribus essent, 3.750. effugeret canis Hyrcano de semine saepe 3.751. cornigeri incursum cervi tremeretque per auras 3.752. aeris aëris accipiter fugiens veniente columba, 3.753. desiperent homines, saperent fera saecla ferarum. 3.754. illud enim falsa fertur ratione, quod aiunt 3.755. inmortalem animam mutato corpore flecti; 3.756. quod mutatur enim, dissolvitur, interit ergo; 3.757. traiciuntur enim partes atque ordine migrant; 3.758. quare dissolui quoque debent posse per artus, 3.759. denique ut intereant una cum corpore cunctae. 3.760. sin animas hominum dicent in corpora semper 3.761. ire humana, tamen quaeram cur e sapienti 3.762. stulta queat fieri, nec prudens sit puer ullus, 3.763. si non, certa suo quia semine seminioque 3.764. nec tam doctus equae pullus quam fortis equi vis. 3.765. scilicet in tenero tenerascere corpore mentem 3.766. confugient. quod si iam fit, fateare necessest 3.767. mortalem esse animam, quoniam mutata per artus 3.768. tanto opere amittit vitam sensumque priorem. 3.769. quove modo poterit pariter cum corpore quoque 3.770. confirmata cupitum aetatis tangere florem 3.771. vis animi, nisi erit consors in origine prima? 3.772. quidve foras sibi vult membris exire senectis? 3.773. an metuit conclusa manere in corpore putri 3.774. et domus aetatis spatio ne fessa vetusto 3.775. obruat? at non sunt immortali ulla pericla. 3.776. Denique conubia ad Veneris partusque ferarum 3.777. esse animas praesto deridiculum esse videtur, 3.778. expectare immortalis mortalia membra 3.779. innumero numero certareque praeproperanter 3.780. inter se quae prima potissimaque insinuetur; 3.781. si non forte ita sunt animarum foedera pacta, 3.782. ut quae prima volans advenerit insinuetur 3.783. prima neque inter se contendant viribus hilum. 3.784. Denique in aethere non arbor, non aequore in alto 3.785. nubes esse queunt nec pisces vivere in arvis 3.786. nec cruor in lignis neque saxis sucus inesse. 3.787. certum ac dispositumst ubi quicquid crescat et insit. 3.788. sic animi natura nequit sine corpore oriri 3.789. sola neque a nervis et sanguine longius esse. 3.790. quod si posset enim, multo prius ipsa animi vis 3.791. in capite aut umeris aut imis calcibus esse 3.792. posset et innasci quavis in parte soleret, 3.793. tandem in eodem homine atque in eodem vase manere. 3.794. quod quoniam nostro quoque constat corpore certum 3.795. dispositumque videtur ubi esse et crescere possit 3.796. sorsum anima atque animus, tanto magis infitiandum 3.797. totum posse extra corpus durare genique. 3.798. quare, corpus ubi interiit, periisse necessest 3.799. confiteare animam distractam in corpore toto. 3.800. quippe etenim mortale aeterno iungere et una 3.801. consentire putare et fungi mutua posse 3.802. desiperest; quid enim diversius esse putandumst 3.803. aut magis inter se disiunctum discrepitansque, 3.804. quam mortale quod est inmortali atque perenni 3.805. iunctum in concilio saevas tolerare procellas? 3.806. praeterea quaecumque manent aeterna necessest 3.807. aut quia sunt solido cum corpore respuere ictus 3.808. nec penetrare pati sibi quicquam quod queat artas 3.809. dissociare intus partis, ut materiai 3.810. corpora sunt, quorum naturam ostendimus ante, 3.811. aut ideo durare aetatem posse per omnem, 3.812. plagarum quia sunt expertia sicut iest, 3.813. quod manet intactum neque ab ictu fungitur hilum, 3.814. aut etiam quia nulla loci sit copia circum, 3.815. quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique, 3.816. sicut summarum summast aeterna, neque extra 3.817. quis locus est quo diffugiant neque corpora sunt quae 3.818. possint incidere et valida dissolvere plaga. 3.819. Quod si forte ideo magis inmortalis habendast, 3.820. quod vitalibus ab rebus munita tenetur, 3.821. aut quia non veniunt omnino aliena salutis, 3.822. aut quia quae veniunt aliqua ratione recedunt 3.823. pulsa prius quam quid noceant sentire queamus, 3.824. praeter enim quam quod morbis cum corporis aegret, 3.825. advenit id quod eam de rebus saepe futuris 3.826. macerat inque metu male habet curisque fatigat, 3.827. praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent. 3.828. adde furorem animi proprium atque oblivia rerum, 3.829. adde quod in nigras lethargi mergitur undas. 3.830. Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 3.831. quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur. 3.832. et vel ut ante acto nihil tempore sensimus aegri, 3.833. ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, 3.834. omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu 3.835. horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, 3.836. in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum 3.837. omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, 3.838. sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 3.839. discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, 3.840. scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 3.841. accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.842. non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo. 3.843. et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 3.844. distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, 3.845. nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 3.846. corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 3.847. nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 3.848. post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, 3.849. atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, 3.850. pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 3.851. interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. 3.852. et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante 3.853. qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor. 3.854. nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne 3.855. praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 3.856. multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis, 3.857. semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta 3.858. haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. 3.859. nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente; 3.860. inter enim iectast vitai pausa vageque 3.861. deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. 3.862. debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst; 3.863. ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit 3.864. accidere. id quoniam mors eximit, esseque prohibet 3.865. illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 3.866. scire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum 3.867. nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum 3.868. differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, 3.869. mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit. 3.870. Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 3.871. post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto 3.872. aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum, 3.873. scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse 3.874. caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse 3.875. credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum; 3.876. non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde 3.877. nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, 3.878. sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. 3.879. vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, 3.880. corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 3.881. ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim 3.882. nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum 3.883. se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans. 3.884. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum 3.885. nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 3.886. qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum 3.887. stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. 3.888. nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum 3.889. tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum 3.890. ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis 3.891. aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere 3.892. frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi, 3.893. urgerive superne obrutum pondere terrae. 3.894. 'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor 3.895. optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 3.896. praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 3.897. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 3.898. praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 3.899. una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.' 3.900. illud in his rebus non addunt 'nec tibi earum 3.901. iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.' 3.902. quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, 3.903. dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. 3.904. 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 3.905. quod super est cunctis privatus doloribus aegris; 3.906. at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 3.907. insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 3.908. nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.' 3.909. illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari 3.910. tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem, 3.911. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 3.950. quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 3.951. naturam et veram verbis exponere causam? 3.952. grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur 3.953. atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo, 3.954. non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri: 3.955. 'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas. 3.956. omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 3.957. sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 3.958. inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 3.959. et nec opiti mors ad caput adstitit ante 3.960. quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 3.961. nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte 3.962. aequo animoque, age dum, magnis concede necessis?' 3.963. iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque; 3.964. cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas 3.965. semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. 3.966. Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra; 3.967. materies opus est, ut crescant postera saecla; 3.968. quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; 3.969. nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere cadentque. 3.970. sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri 3.971. vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 3.972. respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas 3.973. temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. 3.974. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 3.975. temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 3.976. numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 3.977. quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? 3.978. Atque ea ni mirum quae cumque Acherunte profundo 3.979. prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. 3.980. nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere aëre saxum 3.981. Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; 3.982. sed magis in vita divom metus urget iis 3.983. mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors. 3.984. nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem 3.985. nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 3.986. perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto. 3.987. quam libet immani proiectu corporis exstet, 3.988. qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris 3.989. optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem, 3.990. non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 3.991. nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper. 3.992. sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem 3.993. quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 3.994. aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.995. Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 3.996. qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 3.997. imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 3.998. nam petere imperium, quod iest nec datur umquam, 3.999. atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 3.1000. hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 3.1001. saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rusum 3.1002. volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 3.1003. deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 3.1004. atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam, 3.1005. quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 3.1006. cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 3.1007. nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam, 3.1008. hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas 3.1009. quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 3.1010. quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 3.1011. Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas, 3.1012. Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus! 3.1013. qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto; 3.1014. sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 3.1015. est insignibus insignis scelerisque luela, 3.1016. carcer et horribilis de saxo iactus deorsum, 3.1017. verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 3.1018. quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 3.1019. praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 3.1020. nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 3.1021. possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 3.1022. atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 3.1023. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. 3.1024. Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis. 3.1025. 'lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit, 3.1026. qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. 3.1027. inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes 3.1028. occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt. 3.1029. ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum 3.1030. stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 3.1031. ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas 3.1032. et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti, 3.1033. lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit. 3.1034. Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, 3.1035. ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 3.1036. adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum, 3.1037. adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus 3.1038. sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitus quietest. 3.1039. denique Democritum post quam matura vetustas 3.1040. admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 3.1041. sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse. 3.1042. ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 3.1043. qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 3.1044. restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. 3.1045. tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 3.1046. mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti, 3.1047. qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi, 3.1048. et viligans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 3.1049. sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 3.1050. nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 3.1051. ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 3.1052. atque animo incerto fluitans errore vagaris.' 3.1053. Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 3.1054. pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget, 3.1055. e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 3.1056. tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet, 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1068. hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, 3.1069. effugere haut potis est: ingratius haeret et odit 3.1070. propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 3.1071. quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis 3.1072. naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum, 3.1073. temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 3.1074. ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis 3.1075. aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manendo. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 4.1037. Sollicitatur id in nobis, quod diximus ante, 4.1038. semen, adulta aetas cum primum roborat artus. 4.1039. namque alias aliud res commovet atque lacessit; 4.1040. ex homine humanum semen ciet una hominis vis. 4.1041. quod simul atque suis eiectum sedibus exit, 4.1042. per membra atque artus decedit corpore toto, 4.1043. in loca conveniens nervorum certa cietque 4.1044. continuo partis genitalis corporis ipsas. 4.1045. inritata tument loca semine fitque voluntas 4.1046. eicere id quo se contendit dira lubido, 4.1047. incitat inritans loca turgida semine multo 4.1048. idque petit corpus, mens unde est saucia amore; 4.1049. namque omnes plerumque cadunt in vulnus et illam 4.1050. emicat in partem sanguis, unde icimur ictu, 4.1051. et si comminus est, hostem ruber occupat umor. 4.1052. sic igitur Veneris qui telis accipit ictus, 4.1053. sive puer membris muliebribus hunc iaculatur 4.1054. seu mulier toto iactans e corpore amorem, 4.1055. unde feritur, eo tendit gestitque coire 4.1056. et iacere umorem in corpus de corpore ductum; 4.1057. namque voluptatem praesagit muta cupido. 4.1058. Haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen Amoris, 4.1059. hinc illaec primum Veneris dulcedinis in cor 4.1060. stillavit gutta et successit frigida cura; 4.1061. nam si abest quod ames, praesto simulacra tamen sunt 4.1062. illius et nomen dulce obversatur ad auris. 4.1063. sed fugitare decet simulacra et pabula amoris 4.1064. absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem 4.1065. et iacere umorem coniectum in corpora quaeque 4.1066. nec retinere semel conversum unius amore 4.1067. et servare sibi curam certumque dolorem; 4.1068. ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo 4.1069. inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit, 4.1070. si non prima novis conturbes volnera plagis 4.1071. volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures 4.1072. aut alio possis animi traducere motus. 4.1073. Nec Veneris fructu caret is qui vitat amorem, 4.1074. sed potius quae sunt sine poena commoda sumit; 4.1075. nam certe purast sanis magis inde voluptas 4.1076. quam miseris; etenim potiundi tempore in ipso 4.1077. fluctuat incertis erroribus ardor amantum 4.1078. nec constat quid primum oculis manibusque fruantur. 4.1079. quod petiere, premunt arte faciuntque dolorem 4.1080. corporis et dentes inlidunt saepe labellis 4.1081. osculaque adfigunt, quia non est pura voluptas 4.1082. et stimuli subsunt, qui instigant laedere id ipsum, 4.1083. quod cumque est, rabies unde illaec germina surgunt. 4.1084. sed leviter poenas frangit Venus inter amorem 4.1085. blandaque refrenat morsus admixta voluptas. 4.1086. namque in eo spes est, unde est ardoris origo, 4.1087. restingui quoque posse ab eodem corpore flammam. 4.1088. quod fieri contra totum natura repugnat; 4.1089. unaque res haec est, cuius quam plurima habemus, 4.1090. tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus. 4.1091. nam cibus atque umor membris adsumitur intus; 4.1092. quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis, 4.1093. hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido. 4.1094. ex hominis vero facie pulchroque colore 4.1095. nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra fruendum 4.1096. tenvia; quae vento spes raptast saepe misella. 4.1097. ut bibere in somnis sitiens quom quaerit et umor 4.1098. non datur, ardorem qui membris stinguere possit, 4.1099. sed laticum simulacra petit frustraque laborat 4.1100. in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans, 4.1101. sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis, 4.1102. nec satiare queunt spectando corpora coram 4.1103. nec manibus quicquam teneris abradere membris 4.1104. possunt errantes incerti corpore toto. 4.1105. denique cum membris conlatis flore fruuntur 4.1106. aetatis, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus 4.1107. atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat arva, 4.1108. adfigunt avide corpus iunguntque salivas 4.1109. oris et inspirant pressantes dentibus ora, 4.1110. ne quiquam, quoniam nihil inde abradere possunt 4.1111. nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto; 4.1112. nam facere inter dum velle et certare videntur. 4.1113. usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent, 4.1114. membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt. 4.1115. tandem ubi se erupit nervis coniecta cupido, 4.1116. parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper. 4.1117. inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit, 4.1118. cum sibi quod cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt, 4.1119. nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat. 4.1120. usque adeo incerti tabescunt volnere caeco. 4.1121. Adde quod absumunt viris pereuntque labore, 4.1122. adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas, 4.1123. languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans. 4.1124. labitur interea res et Babylonia fiunt 4.1125. unguenta et pulchra in pedibus Sicyonia rident, 4.1126. scilicet et grandes viridi cum luce zmaragdi 4.1127. auro includuntur teriturque thalassina vestis 4.1128. adsidue et Veneris sudorem exercita potat. 4.1129. et bene parta patrum fiunt anademata, mitrae, 4.1130. inter dum in pallam atque Alidensia Ciaque vertunt. 4.1131. eximia veste et victu convivia, ludi, 4.1132. pocula crebra, unguenta, coronae, serta parantur, 4.1133. ne quiquam, quoniam medio de fonte leporum 4.1134. surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat, 4.1135. aut cum conscius ipse animus se forte remordet 4.1136. desidiose agere aetatem lustrisque perire, 4.1137. aut quod in ambiguo verbum iaculata reliquit, 4.1138. quod cupido adfixum cordi vivescit ut ignis, 4.1139. aut nimium iactare oculos aliumve tueri 4.1140. quod putat in voltuque videt vestigia risus. 4.1141. Atque in amore mala haec proprio summeque secundo 4.1142. inveniuntur; in adverso vero atque inopi sunt, 4.1143. prendere quae possis oculorum lumine operto. 4.1144. innumerabilia; ut melius vigilare sit ante, 4.1145. qua docui ratione, cavereque, ne inliciaris. 4.1146. nam vitare, plagas in amoris ne iaciamur, 4.1147. non ita difficile est quam captum retibus ipsis 4.1148. exire et validos Veneris perrumpere nodos. 4.1149. et tamen implicitus quoque possis inque peditus 4.1150. effugere infestum, nisi tute tibi obvius obstes 4.1151. et praetermittas animi vitia omnia primum 4.1152. aut quae corporis sunt eius, quam praepetis ac vis. 4.1153. nam faciunt homines plerumque cupidine caeci 4.1154. et tribuunt ea quae non sunt his commoda vere. 4.1155. multimodis igitur pravas turpisque videmus 4.1156. esse in deliciis summoque in honore vigere. 4.1157. atque alios alii inrident Veneremque suadent 4.1158. ut placent, quoniam foedo adflictentur amore, 4.1159. nec sua respiciunt miseri mala maxima saepe. 4.1160. nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, 4.1161. caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, 4.1162. parvula, pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, 4.1163. magna atque inmanis cataplexis plenaque honoris. 4.1164. balba loqui non quit, traulizi, muta pudens est; 4.1165. at flagrans, odiosa, loquacula Lampadium fit. 4.1166. ischnon eromenion tum fit, cum vivere non quit 4.1167. prae macie; rhadine verost iam mortua tussi. 4.1168. at nimia et mammosa Ceres est ipsa ab Iaccho, 4.1169. simula Silena ac Saturast, labeosa philema. 4.1170. cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 4.1171. sed tamen esto iam quantovis oris honore, 4.1172. cui Veneris membris vis omnibus exoriatur; 4.1173. nempe aliae quoque sunt; nempe hac sine viximus ante; 4.1174. nempe eadem facit et scimus facere omnia turpi 4.1175. et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 4.1176. quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachint. 4.1177. at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 4.1178. floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 4.1179. unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 4.1180. quem si iam ammissum venientem offenderit aura 4.1181. una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 4.1182. et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella 4.1183. stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 4.1184. plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 4.1185. nec Veneres nostras hoc fallit; quo magis ipsae 4.1186. omnia summo opere hos vitae poscaenia celant, 4.1187. quos retinere volunt adstrictosque esse in amore, 4.1188. ne quiquam, quoniam tu animo tamen omnia possis 4.1189. protrahere in lucem atque omnis inquirere risus 4.1190. et, si bello animost et non odiosa, vicissim 4.1191. praetermittere et humanis concedere rebus. 4.1192. Nec mulier semper ficto suspirat amore, 4.1193. quae conplexa viri corpus cum corpore iungit 4.1194. et tenet adsuctis umectans oscula labris; 4.1195. nam facit ex animo saepe et communia quaerens 4.1196. gaudia sollicitat spatium decurrere amoris. 4.1197. nec ratione alia volucres armenta feraeque 4.1198. et pecudes et equae maribus subsidere possent, 4.1199. si non, ipsa quod illarum subat, ardet abundans 4.1200. natura et Venerem salientum laeta retractat. 4.1201. nonne vides etiam quos mutua saepe voluptas 4.1202. vinxit, ut in vinclis communibus excrucientur, 4.1203. in triviis cum saepe canes discedere aventis 4.1204. divorsi cupide summis ex viribus tendunt, 4.1205. quom interea validis Veneris compagibus haerent? 4.1206. quod facerent numquam, nisi mutua gaudia nossent, 4.1207. quae iacere in fraudem possent vinctosque tenere. 4.1208. quare etiam atque etiam, ut dico, est communis voluptas. 4.1209. Et commiscendo quom semine forte virilem 4.1210. femina vim vicit subita vi corripuitque, 4.1211. tum similes matrum materno semine fiunt, 4.1212. ut patribus patrio. sed quos utriusque figurae 4.1213. esse vides, iuxtim miscentes vulta parentum, 4.1214. corpore de patrio et materno sanguine crescunt, 4.1215. semina cum Veneris stimulis excita per artus 4.1216. obvia conflixit conspirans mutuus ardor, 4.1217. et neque utrum superavit eorum nec superatumst. 4.1218. fit quoque ut inter dum similes existere avorum 4.1219. possint et referant proavorum saepe figuras, 4.1220. propterea quia multa modis primordia multis 4.1221. mixta suo celant in corpore saepe parentis, 4.1222. quae patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta. 4.1223. inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras, 4.1224. maiorumque refert voltus vocesque comasque; 4.1225. quandoquidem nihilo magis haec de semine certo 4.1226. fiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis. 4.1227. et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclum 4.1228. maternoque mares existunt corpore creti; 4.1229. semper enim partus duplici de semine constat, 4.1230. atque utri similest magis id quod cumque creatur, 4.1231. eius habet plus parte aequa; quod cernere possis, 4.1232. sive virum suboles sivest muliebris origo. 4.1233. Nec divina satum genitalem numina cuiquam 4.1234. absterrent, pater a gnatis ne dulcibus umquam 4.1235. appelletur et ut sterili Venere exigat aevom; 4.1236. quod plerumque putant et multo sanguine maesti 4.1237. conspergunt aras adolentque altaria donis, 4.1238. ut gravidas reddant uxores semine largo; 4.1239. ne quiquam divom numen sortisque fatigant; 4.1240. nam steriles nimium crasso sunt semine partim, 4.1241. et liquido praeter iustum tenuique vicissim. 4.1242. tenve locis quia non potis est adfigere adhaesum, 4.1243. liquitur extemplo et revocatum cedit abortu. 4.1244. crassius hinc porro quoniam concretius aequo 4.1245. mittitur, aut non tam prolixo provolat ictu 4.1246. aut penetrare locos aeque nequit aut penetratum 4.1247. aegre admiscetur muliebri semine semen. 4.1248. nam multum harmoniae Veneris differre videntur. 4.1249. atque alias alii complent magis ex aliisque 4.1250. succipiunt aliae pondus magis inque gravescunt. 4.1251. et multae steriles Hymenaeis ante fuerunt 4.1252. pluribus et nactae post sunt tamen unde puellos 4.1253. suscipere et partu possent ditescere dulci. 4.1254. et quibus ante domi fecundae saepe nequissent 4.1255. uxoris parere, inventast illis quoque compar 4.1256. natura, ut possent gnatis munire senectam. 4.1257. usque adeo magni refert, ut semina possint 4.1258. seminibus commisceri genitaliter apta 4.1259. crassaque conveniant liquidis et liquida crassis. 4.1260. atque in eo refert quo victu vita colatur; 4.1261. namque aliis rebus concrescunt semina membris 4.1262. atque aliis extenvantur tabentque vicissim. 4.1263. et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas. 4.1264. id quoque permagni refert; nam more ferarum 4.1265. quadrupedumque magis ritu plerumque putantur 4.1266. concipere uxores, quia sic loca sumere possunt 4.1267. pectoribus positis sublatis semina lumbis. 4.1268. nec molles opus sunt motus uxoribus hilum. 4.1269. nam mulier prohibet se concipere atque repugnat, 4.1270. clunibus ipsa viri Venerem si laeta retractat 4.1271. atque exossato ciet omni pectore fluctus; 4.1272. eicit enim sulcum recta regione viaque 4.1273. vomeris atque locis avertit seminis ictum. 4.1274. idque sua causa consuerunt scorta moveri, 4.1275. ne complerentur crebro gravidaeque iacerent, 4.1276. et simul ipsa viris Venus ut concinnior esset; 4.1277. coniugibus quod nil nostris opus esse videtur. 4.1278. Nec divinitus inter dum Venerisque sagittis 4.1279. deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur; 4.1280. nam facit ipsa suis inter dum femina factis 4.1281. morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, 4.1282. ut facile insuescat secum te degere vitam. 4.1283. quod super est, consuetudo concinnat amorem; 4.1284. nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 4.1285. vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. 4.1286. nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis 4.1287. umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa?
35. Horace, Odes, 1.24 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9
36. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 111
37. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714
38. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 2.3, 3.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 107
39. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.2.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 105
40. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.22.18-1.22.19 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714
41. Plutarch, Cicero, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 10
42. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
43. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
44. Seneca The Younger, Letters, a b c d\n0 '95.35 '95.35 '95 35\n1 94.51 94.51 94 51\n2 '52.3 '52.3 '52 3 \n3 94.52 94.52 94 52\n4 94.50 94.50 94 50\n5 87.31 87.31 87 31\n6 87.35 87.35 87 35\n7 87.32 87.32 87 32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714
45. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 27.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
46. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 97.1-97.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 102
47. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 195
48. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 30.184.20-30.184.36, 32.186.15-32.186.24 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
49. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 64, 106
50. Gellius, Attic Nights, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 107
51. Apuleius, On Plato, 2.20.247 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
52. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.433 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Nijs (2023), The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus. 223
53. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 288
7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.
54. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 6.16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 195
6.16. But I think that the Peripatetics did not even approach the truth, who allow that they are vices, but regulate them with moderation. For we must be free even from moderate vices; yea, rather, it ought to have been at first effected that there should be no vices. For nothing can be born vicious; but if we make a bad use of the affections they become vices, if we use them well they become virtues. Then it must be shown that the causes of the affections, and not the affections themselves, must be moderated. We must not, they say, rejoice with excessive joy, but moderately and temperately. This is as though they should say that we must not run swiftly, but walk quietly. But it is possible that he who walks may err, and that he who runs may keep the right path. What if I show that there is a case in which it is vicious not only to rejoice moderately, but even in the smallest degree; and that there is another case, on the contrary, in which even to exult with transports of joy is by no means faulty? What then, I pray, will this mediocrity profit us? I ask whether they think that a wise man ought to rejoice if he sees any evil happening to his enemy; or whether he ought to curb his joy, if by the conquest of enemies, or the overthrow of a tyrant, liberty and safety have been acquired by his countrymen. No one doubts but that in the former case to rejoice a little, and in the latter to rejoice too little, is a very great crime. We may say the same respecting the other affections. But, as I have said, the object of wisdom does not consist in the regulation of these, but of their causes, since they are acted upon from without; nor was it befitting that these themselves should be restrained; since they may exist in a small degree with the greatest criminality, and in the greatest degree without any criminality. But they ought to have been assigned to fixed times, and circumstances, and places, that they may not be vices, when it is permitted us to make a right use of them. For as to walk in the right course is good, but to wander from it is evil, so to be moved by the affections to that which is right is good, but to that which is corrupt is evil. For sensual desire, if it does not wander from its lawful object, although it be ardent, yet is without fault. But if it desires an unlawful object, although it be moderate, yet it is a great vice. Therefore it is not a disease to be angry, nor to desire, nor to be excited by lust; but to be passionate, to be covetous or licentious, is a disease. For he who is passionate is angry even with him with whom he ought not to be angry or at times when he ought not. He who is covetous desires even that which is unnecessary. He who is licentious pursues even that which is forbidden by the laws. The whole matter ought to have turned on this, that since the impetuosity of these things cannot be restrained, nor is it right that it should be, because it is necessarily implanted for maintaining the duties of life, it might rather be directed into the right way, where it may be possible even to run without stumbling and danger.
55. Augustine, The City of God, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 112, 206
14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
56. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 226.12-227.2 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206
57. Stobaeus, Anthology, 3.20.53, 3.50 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196
58. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 3.334.3-3.334.15, 3.335.10-3.335.14, 3.338.6-3.338.13, 3.340.14-3.340.17 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206
59. Damaskios, In Parmenidem, 252.11, 252.12, 252.13, 252.27-253.11, 253.23, 253.24, 253.25, 253.26, 266.25, 266.26, 266.27, 266.28 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206
61. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, 241.7 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206
62. Strabo, Geography, 16.2.29  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 30
16.2.29. In the interval is Gadaris, which the Jews have appropriated to themselves, then Azotus and Ascalon. From Iamneia to Azotus and Ascalon are about 200 stadia. The country of the Ascalonitae produces excellent onions; the town is small. Antiochus the philosopher, who lived a little before our time, was a native of this place. Philodemus the Epicurean was a native of Gadara, as also Meleagrus, Menippus the satirist, and Theodorus the rhetorician, my contemporary.
63. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., None  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 209
64. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 64
65. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 135  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon, epicurean Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 217
66. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 35-37, 63, 66, 38  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 279
68. Demetrius of Laconia, Pherc., 42.6-42.10, 43.4-43.6, 46.3  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 102, 103
69. Philodemus of Gadara, Columns, None  Tagged with subjects: •zeno of sidon Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714
70. Epiphanius, On Faith, 9.46  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 107
76. Horace, Art of Poetry, 438-442, 444, 443  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 9
77. Posidonius, Ed.Edelstein–Kidd (See Also Galen, Php, Books 4–5), Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 98, 106
78. Philodemus of Gadara, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 714