1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 23.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 345| 23.3. "וַיָּקָם אַבְרָהָם מֵעַל פְּנֵי מֵתוֹ וַיְדַבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי־חֵת לֵאמֹר׃", | 23.3. "And Abraham rose up from before his dead, and spoke unto the children of Heth, saying:", |
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2. Homer, Iliad, 22.395-22.404, 24.80-24.82 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium •zeno of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 14; Long (2006) 91 | 22.395. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.396. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.397. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.398. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.399. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.400. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.401. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.402. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.403. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.404. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 24.80. / Down sped she to the depths hike a plummet of lead, the which, set upon the horn of an ox of the field, goeth down bearing death to the ravenous fishes. And she found Thetis in the hollow cave, and round about her other goddesses of the sea sat in a throng, and she in their midst 24.81. / Down sped she to the depths hike a plummet of lead, the which, set upon the horn of an ox of the field, goeth down bearing death to the ravenous fishes. And she found Thetis in the hollow cave, and round about her other goddesses of the sea sat in a throng, and she in their midst 24.82. / Down sped she to the depths hike a plummet of lead, the which, set upon the horn of an ox of the field, goeth down bearing death to the ravenous fishes. And she found Thetis in the hollow cave, and round about her other goddesses of the sea sat in a throng, and she in their midst |
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| 3. Homer, Odyssey, 5.346-5.347 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 91 |
| 4. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, republic •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 185 |
| 5. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, republic •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 185 |
| 6. Aeschylus, Libation-Bearers, 1.7.17, 1.7.33, 4.21.2, 5.4.1 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 136, 138, 149 |
| 7. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1.7.33, 2.32.4 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 271, 272 |
| 8. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
9. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 233| 263e. καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων. ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ. ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν. | 263e. and the several differences between them. Theaet. Give me an opportunity. Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true? Theaet. Certainly. Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech? Theaet. True. Str. And in speech we know there is just— Theaet. What? Str. Affirmation and negation Theaet. Yes, we know that. |
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10. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 324| 530d. ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἕξει εἰπεῖν· ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν προφανῆ, δύο. | 530d. according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man, but even to us two of them are apparent.” “What are they?” “In addition to astronomy, its counterpart, I replied.” “What is that?” “We may venture to suppose,” I said, “that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed, for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences, as the Pythagoreans affirm and we admit, do we not, Glaucon?” “We do,” he said. |
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| 11. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 64 |
| 12. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 290 |
13. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bett (2019) 56| 230a. τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἆρʼ οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφʼ ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς; | 230a. when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us? |
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| 14. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 15. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 16. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 134 |
17. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on moral end Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 | 280e. Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them? Soc. |
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| 18. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 225 |
| 19. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 82 |
20. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72| 402a. ΣΩ. γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχον. ΕΡΜ. τίνα ταύτην; ΣΩ. τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαίʼ ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. ΕΡΜ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. | 402a. Socrates. It sounds absurd, but I think there is some probability in it. Hermogenes. What is this probability? Socrates. I seem to have a vision of Heracleitus saying some ancient words of wisdom as old as the reign of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer said too. Hermogenes. What do you mean by that? Socrates. Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream. Hermogenes. True. |
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| 21. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 307, 320, 322 |
22. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 70| 21d. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δʼ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλον ᾖα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καί | 21d. he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either. From him I went to another of those who were reputed |
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23. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.2, 1.4, 1.4.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, biography •zeno of citium, influence from cynicism •zeno of citium, interest in socrates •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 211; Inwood and Warren (2020) 127; Wardy and Warren (2018) 261| 1.4.8. σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα διʼ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; | 1.4.8. Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity? |
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| 24. Xenophon, Symposium, 8.9-8.13 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 278 |
| 25. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 26. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 27. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 64 |
28. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 80| 33c. πᾶν ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ ἀπηκριβοῦτο πολλῶν χάριν. ὀμμάτων τε γὰρ ἐπεδεῖτο οὐδέν, ὁρατὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπελείπετο ἔξωθεν, οὐδʼ ἀκοῆς, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκουστόν· πνεῦμά τε οὐκ ἦν περιεστὸς δεόμενον ἀναπνοῆς, οὐδʼ αὖ τινος ἐπιδεὲς ἦν ὀργάνου σχεῖν ᾧ τὴν μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸ τροφὴν δέξοιτο, τὴν δὲ πρότερον ἐξικμασμένην ἀποπέμψοι πάλιν. ἀπῄει τε γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ προσῄειν αὐτῷ ποθεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν—αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον καὶ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφʼ | 33c. For of eyes it had no need, since outside of it there was nothing visible left over; nor yet of hearing, since neither was there anything audible; nor was there any air surrounding it which called for respiration; nor, again, did it need any organ whereby it might receive the food that entered and evacuate what remained undigested. For nothing went out from it or came into it from any side, since nothing existed; for it was so designed as to supply its own wastage as food for itself, |
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| 29. Septuagint, Prayer of Azariah, 1.62, 1.193, 1.237 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 30. Isocrates, To Demonicus, '44 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 178 |
| 31. Hippocrates, The Epidemics, 17.5, 17.7 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 42, 87 |
| 32. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 33. Euripides, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197 |
| 34. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 35. Aristotle, Meteorology, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, cometary theory of Found in books: Williams (2012) 277 |
| 36. Menander, Aspis, 410, 336 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 17 |
| 37. Aristotle, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 271 |
| 38. Crates, Letters, 16, 23 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 178 |
| 39. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 129 |
| 40. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 194, 241, 308, 327 |
| 41. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 42. Aristotle, Memory And Reminiscence, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 43. Aristotle, Generation And Corruption, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan |
| 44. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 79; Graver (2007) 225 |
| 45. Aristotle, Heavens, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 77 |
| 46. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72 |
| 47. Menander, Dyscolus, 713-714 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 17 |
| 48. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bett (2019) 56 |
| 49. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 50. Timocles Comicus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224, 292 |
| 51. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 80 |
| 52. Aristotle, History of Animals, 1.8-1.10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 255 |
| 53. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 291 |
| 54. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Pinheiro et al (2015) 54; Sorabji (2000) 224, 277, 289, 292, 320, 322 |
| 55. Aristotle, Categories, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 304 |
| 56. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 135, 233, 237, 241, 290, 298, 322, 323; Wolfsdorf (2020) 403 |
| 57. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 77; Sorabji (2000) 320, 322 |
| 58. Timon of Phlius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 89 |
| 59. Menander, Monostichoi, 105, 124, 2, 236, 384, 438, 50, 512, 515, 528, 563, 565, 588-589, 611, 65, 68, 684, 69, 749, 777, 806, 843, 863, 436 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 18 |
| 60. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 61. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 62. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 63. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 64. Theophrastus, De Pietate, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 114 |
| 65. Theophrastus, On The Senses, 51, 50 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 229 |
| 66. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221 |
| 67. Timocles Comicus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224, 292 |
| 68. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 255, 258, 264 |
| 69. Numenius Heracleensis, Fragments, 25 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, epistemology of Found in books: Long (2006) 223 |
| 70. Democritus Ephesius, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 71. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 72. Philodemus of Gadara, De Morte \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 73. Cicero, Orator, 3.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 71 |
| 74. Cicero, Lucullus, 131-132, 18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 65 |
| 75. Cicero, Hortensius, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188 |
| 76. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 9.4.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 101 |
| 77. Cicero, Letters, 12.14-12.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 177 |
78. Cicero, Republic, 1.21.34, 2.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 23, 29| 2.43. Nam in qua re publica est unus aliquis perpetua potestate, praesertim regia, quamvis in ea sit et senatus, ut tum fuit Romae, cum erant reges, ut Spartae Lycurgi legibus, et ut sit aliquod etiam populi ius, ut fuit apud nostros reges, tamen illud excellit regium nomen, neque potest eius modi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari. Ea autem forma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob causam, quod unius vitio praecipitata in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit. Nam ipsum regale genus civitatis non modo non est reprehendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum, si ullum probarem simplex rei publicae genus, sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet. Is est autem status, ut unius perpetua potestate et iustitia omnique sapientia regatur salus et aequabilitas et otium civium. Desunt omnino ei populo multa, qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas, quae non in eo est, ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nul lo | |
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79. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.58.236, 3.61, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium Found in books: Maso (2022) 138; Sorabji (2000) 290; Wolfsdorf (2020) 403| 3.61. Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent. Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur. 3.95. Quamquam non haec ita statuo atque decerno, ut desperem Latine ea, de quibus disputavimus, tradi ac perpoliri posse, patitur enim et lingua nostra et natura rerum veterem illam excellentemque prudentiam Graecorum ad nostrum usum moremque transferri, sed hominibus opus est eruditis, qui adhuc in hoc quidem genere nostri nulli fuerunt; sin quando exstiterint, etiam Graecis erunt anteponendi. | |
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80. Cicero, On Duties, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 162| 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; | 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. |
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81. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.3-1.4, 1.10-1.11, 1.16, 1.18, 1.23, 1.25-1.43, 2.2, 2.6-2.7, 2.12-2.22, 2.29-2.30, 2.36-2.39, 2.44-2.49, 2.54, 2.56-2.59, 2.61-2.62, 2.64, 2.66, 2.70, 2.73-2.76, 2.81-2.88, 2.93, 2.95, 2.118, 2.127-2.134, 2.154-2.162, 2.168, 3.5-3.6, 3.18, 3.23, 3.27-3.34, 3.52, 3.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno, of citium •zeno of citium, politics of •zeno of citium, •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Agri (2022) 17; Del Lucchese (2019) 176, 210, 211, 242, 246; Erler et al (2021) 71; Frede and Laks (2001) 97, 98, 102, 112; Graver (2007) 233; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 133, 135, 141; Long (2006) 119, 121, 122, 127, 130, 271, 346; Long (2019) 82, 83; Maso (2022) 117, 118, 129, 130, 131, 132, 138; Vazques and Ross (2022) 206, 212; Wardy and Warren (2018) 270; Williams and Vol (2022) 210; Wolfsdorf (2020) 403; Wynne (2019) 117, 123, 148, 156, 282 | 1.3. For there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever. But if their opinion is the true one, how can piety, reverence or religion exist? For all these are tributes which it is our duty to render in purity and holiness to the divine powers solely on the assumption that they take notice of them, and that some service has been rendered by the immortal gods to the race of men. But if on the contrary the gods have neither the power nor the will to aid us, if they pay no heed to us at all and take no notice of our actions, if they can exercise no possible influence upon the life of men, what ground have we for rendering any sort of worship, honour or prayer to the immortal gods? Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; 1.4. and in all probability the disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all the virtues. There are however other philosophers, and those of eminence and note, who believe that the whole world is ruled and governed by divine intelligence and reason; and not this only, but also that the gods' providence watches over the life of men; for they think that the cornº and other fruits of the earth, and also the weather and the seasons and the changes of the atmosphere by which all the products of the soil are ripened and matured, are the gift of the immortal gods to the human race; and they adduce a number of things, which will be recounted in the books that compose the present treatise, that are of such a nature as almost to appear to have been expressly constructed by the immortal gods for the use of man. This view was controverted at great length by Carneades, in such a manner as to arouse in persons of active mind a keen desire to discover the truth. 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools. 1.16. "Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine. 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; 1.25. "So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? 1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. 1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. 1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 2.2. "For my part," rejoined Balbus, "I had rather listen to Cotta again, using the same eloquence that he employed in abolishing false gods to present a picture of the true ones. A philosopher, a pontiff and a Cotta should possess not a shifting and unsettled conception of the immortal gods, like the Academics, but a firm and definite one like our school. As for refuting Epicurus, that has been accomplished and more than achieved already. But I am eager to hear what you think yourself, Cotta." "Have you forgotten," said Cotta, "what I said at the outset, that I find it more easy, especially on such subjects as these, to say what I don't think than what I do? 2.6. Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. 2.7. "Again, prophecies and premonitions of future events cannot but be taken as proofs that the future may appear or be foretold as a warning or portended or predicted to mankind — hence the very words 'apparition,' 'warning,' 'portent,' 'prodigy.' Even if we think that the stories of Mopsus, Tiresias, Amphiaraus, Calchas and Helenus are mere baseless fictions of romance (though their powers of divination would not even have been incorporated in the legends had they been entirely repugt to fact), shall not even the instances from our own native history teach us to acknowledge the divine power? shall we be unmoved by the story of the recklessness of Publius Claudius in the first Punic War? Claudius merely in jest mocked at the gods: when the chickens on being released from their cage refused to feed, he ordered them to be thrown into the water, so that as they would not eat they might drink; but the joke cost the jester himself many tears and the Roman people a great disaster, for the fleet was severely defeated. Moreover did not his colleague Junius during the same war lose his fleet in a storm after failing to comply with the auspices? In consequence of these disasters Claudius was tried and condemned for high treason and Junius committed suicide. 2.12. The augur's office is one of high dignity; surely the soothsayer's art also is divinely inspired. Is not one who considers these and countless similar facts compelled to admit that the gods exist? If there be persons who interpret the will of certain beings, it follows that those beings must themselves exist; but there are persons who interpret the will of the gods; therefore we must admit that the gods exist. But perhaps it may be argued that not all prophecies come true. Nor do all sick persons get well, but that does not prove that there is no art of medicine. Signs of future events are manifested by the gods; men may have mistaken these signs, but the fault lay with man's powers of inference, not with the divine nature. "Hence the main issue is agreed among all men of all nations, inasmuch as all have engraved in their minds an innate belief that the gods exist. 2.13. As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; 2.14. third, the awe inspired by lightning, storms, rain, snow, hail, floods, pestilences, earthquakes and occasionally subterranean rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops the colour of blood, also landslips and chasms suddenly opening in the ground, also unnatural monstrosities human and animal, and also the appearance of meteoric lights and what are called by the Greeks 'comets,' and in our language 'long-haired stars,' such as recently during the Octavian War appeared as harbingers of dire disasters, and the doubling of the sun, which my father told me had happened in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, the year in which the light was quenched of Publius Africanus, that second sun of Rome: all of which alarming portents have suggested to mankind the idea of the existence of some celestial and divine power. 2.15. And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind. 2.16. "Extremely acute of intellect as is Chrysippus, nevertheless his utterance here might well appear to have been learnt from the very lips of Nature, and not discovered by himself. 'If (he says) there be something in the world that man's mind and human reason, strength and power are incapable of producing, that which produces it must necessarily be superior to man; now the heavenly bodies and all those things that display a never-ending regularity cannot be created by man; therefore that which creates them is superior to man; yet what better name is there for this than "god"? Indeed, if gods do not exist, what can there be in the universe superior to man? for he alone possesses reason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; but for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world superior to himself would be an insane piece of arrogance; therefore there is something superior to man; therefore God does exist.' 2.17. Again, if you see a spacious and beautiful house, you could not be induced to believe, even though you could not see its master, that it was built by mice and weasels; if then you were to imagine that this elaborate universe, with all the variety and beauty of the heavenly bodies and the vast quantity and extent of sea and land, were your abode and not that of the gods, would you not be thought absolutely insane? Again, do we not understand that everything in a higher position is of greater value, and that the lowest thing, and is enveloped by a layer of the densest kind of air? Hence for the same reason what we observe to be the case with certain districts and cities, I mean that their inhabitants are duller-witted than the average owing to the more compressed quality of the atmosphere, has also befallen the human race as a whole owing to its being located on the earth, that is, in the densest region of the world. 2.18. Yet even man's intelligence must lead us to infer the existence of a mind in the universe, and that a mind of surpassing ability, and in fact divine. Otherwise, whence did man 'pick up' (as Socrates says in Xenophon) the intelligence that he possesses? If anyone asks the question, whence do we get the moisture and the heat diffused throughout the body, and the actual earthy substance of the flesh, and lastly the breath of life within us, it is manifest that we have derived the one from earth, the other from water, and the other from the air which we inhale in breathing. But where did we find, whence did we abstract, that other part of us which surpasses all of these, I mean our reason, or, if you like to employ several terms to denote it, our intelligence, deliberation, thought, wisdom? Is the world to contain each of the other elements but not this one, the most precious of them all? Yet beyond question nothing exists among all things that is superior to the world, nothing that is more excellent or more beautiful; and not merely does nothing superior to it exist, but nothing superior can even be conceived. And if there be nothing superior to reason and wisdom, these faculties must necessarily be possessed by that being which we admit to be superior to all others. 2.19. Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit. 2.20. "When one expounds these doctrines in a fuller and more flowing style, as I propose to do, it is easier for them to evade the captious objections of the Academy; but when they are reduced to brief syllogistic form, as was the practice of Zeno, they lie more open to criticism. A running river can almost or quite entirely escape pollution, whereas an enclosed pool is easily sullied; similarly a flowing stream of eloquence sweeps aside the censures of the critic, but a closely reasoned argument defends itself with difficult. The thoughts that we expound at length Zeno used to compress into this form: 2.21. 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: 2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? 2.29. "There is therefore an element that holds the whole world together and preserves it, and this an element possessed of sensation and reason; since every natural object that is not a homogeneous and simple substance but a complex and composite one must contain within it some ruling principle, for example in man the intelligence, in the lower animals something resembling intelligence that is the source of appetition. With trees and plants the ruling principle is believed to be located in the roots. I use the term 'ruling principle' as the equivalent of the Greek hēgemonikon, meaning that part of anything which must and ought to have supremacy in a thing of that sort. Thus it follows that the element which contains the ruling principle of the whole of nature must also be the most excellent of all things and the most deserving of authority and sovereignty over all things. 2.30. Now we observe that the parts of the world (and nothing exists in all the world which is not a part of the whole world) possess sensation and reason. Therefore it follows that that part which contains the ruling principle of the world must necessarily possess sensation and reason, and these in a more intense and higher form. Hence it follows that the world possesses wisdom, and that the element which holds all things in its embrace is pre‑eminently and perfectly rational, and therefore that the world is god, and all the forces of the world are held together by the divine nature. "Moreover that glowing heat of the world is far purer and more brilliant and far more mobile, and therefore more stimulating to the senses, than this warmth of ours by which the things that we know are preserved and vitalized. 2.36. Now this is the grade on which universal nature stands; and since she is of such a character as to be superior to all things and incapable of frustration by any, it follows of necessity that the world is an intelligent being, and indeed also a wise being. "Again, what can be more illogical than to deny that the being which embraces all things must be the best of all things, or, admitting this, to deny that it must be, first, possessed of life, secondly, rational and intelligent, and lastly, endowed with wisdom? How else can it be the best of all things? If it resembles plants or even animals, so far from being highest, it must be reckoned lowest in the scale of being. If again it be capable of reason yet has not been wise from the beginning, the world must be in a worse condition than mankind; for a man can become wise, but if in all the eternity of past time the world has been foolish, obviously it will never attain wisdom; and so it will be inferior to man, which is absurd. Therefore the world must be deemed to have been wise from the beginning, and divine. 2.37. "In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly puts it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the cornº and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he is 'a small fragment of that which is perfect.' 2.38. The world on the contrary, since it embraces all things and since nothing exists which is not within it, is entirely perfect; how then can it fail to possess that which is the best? but there is nothing better than intelligence and reason; the world therefore cannot fail to possess them. Chrysippus therefore also well shows by the aid of illustrations that in the perfect and mature specimen of its kind everything is better than in the imperfect, for instance in a horse than in a foal, in a dog than in a puppy, in a man than in a boy; and that similarly a perfect and complete being is bound to possess that which is the best thing in all the world; 2.39. but no being is more perfect than the world, and nothing is better than virtue; therefore virtue is an essential attribute of the world. Again, man's nature is not perfect, yet virtue may be realized in man; how much more readily then in the world! therefore the world possesses virtue. Therefore it is wise, and consequently divine. "Having thus perceived the divinity of the world, we must also assign the same divinity to the stars, which are formed from the most mobile and the purest part of the aether, and are not compounded of any other element besides; they are of a fiery heat and translucent throughout. Hence they too have the fullest right to be pronounced to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence. 2.44. Aristotle is also to be commended for his view that the motion of all living bodies is due to one of three causes, nature, force, or will; now the sun and moon and all the stars are in motion, and bodies moved by nature travel either downwards owing to their weight or upwards owing to their lightness; but neither (he argued) is the case with the heavenly bodies, because their motion is revolution in a circle; nor yet can it be said that some stronger force compels the heavenly bodies to travel in a manner contrary to their nature, for what stronger force can there be? it remains therefore that the motion of the heavenly bodies is voluntary. "Anyone who sees this truth would show not only ignorance but wickedness if he denied the existence of the gods. Nor indeed does it make much difference whether he denies their existence or deprives them entirely of providential care and of activity; since to my mind an entirely inactive being cannot be said to exist at all. Therefore the existence of the gods is so manifest that I can scarcely deem one who denies it to be of sound mind. 2.45. "It remains for us to consider the qualities of the divine nature; and on this subject nothing is more difficult than to divert the eye of the mind from following the practice of bodily sight. This difficulty has caused both uneducated people generally and those philosophers who resemble the uneducated to be unable to conceive of the immortal gods without setting before themselves the form of men: a shallow mode of thought which Cotta has exposed and which therefore calls for no discussion from me. But assuming that we have a definite and preconceived idea of a deity as, first, a living being, and secondly, a being unsurpassed in excellence by anything else in the whole of nature, I can see nothing that satisfies this preconception or idea of ours more fully than, first, the judgement that this world, which must necessarily be the most excellent of all things, is itself a living being and a god. 2.46. Let Epicurus jest at this notion as he will — and he is a person who jokes with difficulty, and has but the slightest smack of his native Attic wit, — let him protest his inability to conceive of god as a round and rotating body. Nevertheless he will never dislodge me from one belief which even he himself accepts: he holds that gods exist, on the ground that there must necessarily be some mode of being of outstanding and supreme excellence; now clearly nothing can be more excellent than the world. Nor can it be doubted that a living being endowed with sensation, reason and intelligence must excel a being devoid of those attributes; 2.47. hence it follows that the world is a living being and possesses sensation, intelligence and reason; and this argument leads to the conclusion that the world is god. "But these points will appear more readily a little later merely from a consideration of the creatures that the world produces. In the meantime, pray, Velleius, do not parade your school's utter ignorance of science. You say that you think a cone, a cylinder and a pyramid more beautiful than a sphere. Why, even in matters of taste you Epicureans have a criterion of your own! However, assuming that the figures which you mention are more beautiful to the eye — though for my part I don't think them so, for what can be more beautiful than the figure that encircles and encloses in itself all other figures, and that can possess no roughness or point of collision on its defence, no indentation of the concavity, no protuberance or depression? There are two forms that excel all others, among solid bodies the globe (for so we may translate the Greek sphaera), and among plane figures the round or circle, the Greek kyklos; well then, these two forms alone possess the property of absolute uniformity in all their parts and of having every point on the circumference equidistant from the centre; and nothing can be more compact than that. 2.48. Still, if you Epicureans cannot see this, as you have never meddled with that learned dust, could you not have grasped even so much of natural philosophy as to understand that the uniform motion and regular disposition of the heavenly bodies could not have been maintained with any other shape? Hence nothing could be more unscientific than your favourite assertion, that it is not certain that our world itself is round, since it may possibly have some other form, and there are countless numbers of worlds, all of different shapes. 2.49. Had but Epicurus learnt that twice two are four he certainly would not talk like that; but while making his palate the test of the chief good, he forgets to lift up his eyes to what Ennius calls 'the palate of the sky.' "For there are two kinds of heavenly bodies, some that travel from east to west in unchanging paths, without ever making the slightest deviation in their course, while the others perform two unbroken revolutions in the same paths and courses. Now both of these facts indicate at once the rotatory motion of the firmament, which is only possible with a spherical shape, and the circular revolutions of the heavenly bodies. "Take first of all the sun, which is the chief of the celestial bodies. Its motion is such that it first fills the countries of the earth with a flood of light, and then leaves them in darkness now on one side and now on the other; for night is caused merely by the shadow of the earth, which intercepts the light of the sun. Its daily and nightly paths have the same regularity. Also the sun by at one time slightly approaching and at another time slightly receding causes a moderate variation of temperature. For the passage of about ¼ diurnal revolutions of the sun completes the circuit of a year; and by bending its course now towards the north and now towards the south the sun causes summers and winters and the two seasons of which one follows the waning of winter and the other that of summer. Thus from the changes of the four seasons are derived the origins and causes of all those creatures which come into existence on land and in the sea. 2.54. "This regularity therefore in the stars, this exact punctuality throughout all eternity notwithstanding the great variety of their courses, is to me incomprehensible without rational intelligence and purpose. And if we observe these attributes in the planets, we cannot fail to enrol even them among the number of the gods. "Moreover the so‑called fixed stars also indicate the same intelligence and wisdom. Their revolutions recur daily with exact regularity. It is not the case that they are carried along by the aether or that their courses are fixed in the firmament, as most people ignorant of natural philosophy aver; for the aether is not of such a nature as to hold the stars and cause them to revolve by its own force, since being rare and translucent and of uniform diffused heat, the aether does not appear to be well adapted to contain the stars. 2.56. "In the heavens therefore there is nothing of chance or hazard, no error, no frustration, but absolute order, accuracy, calculation and regularity. whatever lacks these qualities, whatever is false and spurious and full of error, belongs to the region between the earth and the moon (the last of the heavenly bodies), and to the surface of the earth. Anyone therefore who thinks that the marvellous order and incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, which is the sole source of preservation and safety for all things, is not rational, himself cannot be deemed a rational thing. 2.57. "I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: 'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that 'craftsmanlike' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is 'craftsmanlike,' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, 2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. 2.59. "We have discussed the world as a whole, and we have also discussed the heavenly bodies; so that there now stands fairly well revealed to our view a vast company of gods who are neither idle nor yet perform their activities with irksome and laborious toil. For they have no framework of veins and sinews and bones; nor do they consume such kinds of food and drink as to make them contract too sharp or too sluggish a condition of the humours; nor are their bodies such as to make them fear falls or blows or apprehend disease from exhaustion of their members — dangers which led Epicurus to invent his unsubstantial, do‑nothing gods. 2.61. In other cases some exceptionally potent force is itself designated by a title of convey, for example Faith and Mind; we see the shrines on the Capitol lately dedicated to them both by Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, and Faith had previously been deified by Aulus Atilius Calatinus. You see the temple of Virtue, restored as the temple of Honour by Marcus Marcellus, but founded many years before by Quintus Maximus in the time of the Ligurian war. Again, there are the temples of Wealth, Safety, Concord, Liberty and Victory, all of which things, being so powerful as necessarily to imply divine goverce, were themselves designated as gods. In the same class the names of Desire, Pleasure and Venus Lubentina have been deified — things vicious and unnatural (although Velleius thinks otherwise), yet the urge of these vices often overpowers natural instinct. 2.62. Those gods therefore who were the authors of various benefits owned their deification to the value of the benefits which they bestowed, and indeed the names that I just now enumerated express the various powers of the gods that bear them. "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon of distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber (I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated with Ceres and Libera, the import of which joint consecration may be gathered from the mysteries; but Liber and Libera were so named as Ceres' offspring, that being the meaning of our Latin word liberi — a use which has survived in the case of Libera but not of Liber) — and this is also the origin of Romulus, who is believed to be the same as Quirinus. And these benefactors were duly deemed divine, as being both supremely good and immortal, because their souls survived and enjoyed eternal life. 2.64. now these immoral fables enshrined a decidedly clever scientific theory. Their meaning was that the highest element of celestial ether or fire, which by itself generates all things, is devoid of that bodily part which requires union with another for the work of procreation. By Saturn again they denoted that being who maintains the course and revolution of seasons and periods of time, et deity actually so designated in Greek, for Saturn's Greek name is Kronos, which is the same as chronos, a space of time. The Latin designation 'Saturn' on the other hand is due to the fact that he is 'saturated' or 'satiated with years' (anni); the fable is that he was in the habit of devouring his sons — meaning that Time devours the ages and gorges himself insatiably with the years that are past. Saturn was bound by Jove in order that Time's courses might not be unlimited, and that Jove might fetter him by the bonds of the stars. But Jupiter himself — the name means 'the helping father,' whom with a change of inflexion we style Jove, from iuvare 'to help'; the poets call him 'father of gods and men,' and our ancestors entitled him 'best and greatest,' putting the title 'best,' that is most beneficent, before that of 'greatest,' because universal beneficence is greater, or at least more lovable, than the possession of great wealth — 2.66. "The air, lying between the sea and sky, is according to the Stoic theory deified under the name belonging to Juno, sister and wife of Jove, because it resembles and is closely connected with the aether; they made it female and assigned it to Juno because of its extreme softness. (The name of Juno however I believe to be derived from iuvare 'to help'). There remained water and earth, to complete the fabled partition of the three kingdoms. Accordingly the second kingdom, the entire realm of the sea, was assigned to Neptune, Jove's brother as they hold; his name is derived from nare 'to swim,' with a slight alteration of the earlier letters and with the suffix seen in Portunus (the harbour god), derived from portus 'a harbour.' The entire bulk and substance of the earth was dedicated to father Dis (that is, Dives, 'the rich,' and so in Greek Plouton), because all things fall back into the earth and also arise from the earth. He is said to have married Proserpina (really a Greek name, for she is the same as the goddess called Persephone in Greek) — they think that she represents the seed of corn, and fable that she was hidden away, and sought for by her mother. 2.70. "Do you see therefore how from a true and valuable philosophy of nature has been evolved this imaginary and fanciful pantheon? The perversion has been a fruitful source of false beliefs, crazy errors and superstitions hardly above the level of old wives' tales. We know what the gods look like and how old they are, their dress and their equipment, and also their genealogies, marriages and relationships, and all about them is distorted into the likeness of human frailty. They are actually represented as liable to passions and emotions — we hear of their being in love, sorrowful, angry; according to the myths they even engage in wars and battles, and that not only when as in Homer two armies and contending and the gods take sides and intervene on their behalf, but they actually fought wars of their own, for instance with the Titans and with the Giants. These stories and these beliefs are utterly foolish; they are stuffed with nonsense and absurdity of all sorts. 2.73. "Next I have to show that the world is governed by divine providence. This is of course a vast topic; the doctrine is hotly contested by your school, Cotta, and it is they no doubt that are my chief adversaries here. As for you and your friends, Velleius, you scarcely understand the vocabulary of the subject; for you only read your own writings, and are so enamoured of them that you pass judgement against all the other schools without giving them a hearing. For instance, you yourself told us yesterday that the Stoics present Pronoia or providence in the guise of an old hag of a fortune-teller; this was due to your mistaken notion that they imagine providence as a kind of special deity who rules and governs the universe. But as a matter of fact 'providence' is an elliptical expression; 2.74. when one says 'the Athenian state is ruled by the council,' the words 'of the Areopagus' are omitted: so when we speak of the world as governed by providence, you must understand the words 'of the gods' zzz conceive that the full and complete statement would be 'the world is governed by the providence of the gods.' So do not you and your friends waste your wit on making fun of us, — your tribe is none too well off for that commodity. Indeed if your school would take my advice you would give up all attempts at humour; it sits ill upon you, for it is not your forte and you can't bring it off. This does not, it is true, apply to you in particular, — you have the polished manners of your family and the urbanity of a Roman; but it does apply to all the rest of you, and especially to the parent of the system, an uncultivated, illiterate person, who tilts at everybody and is entirely devoid of penetration, authority or charm. 2.75. I therefore declare that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and have been governed for all time by converse providence: a thesis which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we feel at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial. 2.76. "In the first place therefore one must either deny the existence of the gods, which in a manner is done by Democritus when he represents them as 'apparitions' and by Epicurus with his 'images'; or anybody who admits that the gods exist must allow them activity, and activity of the most distinguished sort; now nothing can be more distinguished than the government of the world; therefore the world is governed by the wisdom of the gods. If this is not so, there must clearly be something better and more powerful than god, be it what it may, whether iimate nature or necessity speeding on with mighty force to create the supremely beautiful objects that we see; 2.81. "Next I have to show that all things are under the sway of nature and are carried on by her in the most excellent manner. But first I must briefly explain the meaning of the term 'nature' itself, to make our doctrine more easily intelligible. Some persons define nature as a non‑rational force that causes necessary motions in material bodies; others as a rational and ordered force, proceeding by method and plainly displaying the means that she takes to produce each result and the end at which she aims, and possessed of a skill that no handiwork of artist or craftsman can rival or reproduce. For a seed, they point out, has such potency that, tiny though it is in size, nevertheless if it falls into some substance that conceives and enfolds it, and obtains suitable material to foster its nurture and growth, it fashions and produces the various creatures after their kinds, some designed merely to absorb nourishment through their roots, and others capable of motion, sensation, appetition and reproduction of their species. 2.82. Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence — for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void, and the attributes of these. When we on the other hand speak of nature as the sustaining and governing principle of the world, we do not mean that the world is like a clod of earth or lump of stone or something else of that sort, which possesses only the natural principle of cohesion, but like a tree or an animal, displaying no haphazard structure, to be order and a certain semblance of design. 2.83. "But if the plants fixed and rooted in the rather owe their life and vigour to nature's art, surely the earth herself must be sustained by the same power, inasmuch as when impregnated with seeds she brings forth from her womb all things in profusion, nourishes their roots in her bosom and causes them to grow, and herself in turn is nourished by the upper and outer elements. Her exhalations moreover give nourishment to the air, the ether and all the heavenly bodies. Thus if earth is upheld and invigorated by nature, the same principle must hold good of the rest of the world, for plants are rooted in the earth, animals are sustained by breathing air, and the air itself is our partner in seeing, hearing and uttering sounds, since none of these actions can be performed without its aid; nay, it even moves as we move, for wherever we go or move our limbs, it seems as it were to give place and retire before us. 2.84. And those things which travel towards the centre of the earth which is its lowest point, those which move from the centre upwards, and those which rotate in circles round the centre, constitute the one continuous nature of the world. Again the continuum of the world's nature is constituted by the cyclic transmutations of the four kinds of matter. For earth turns into water, water into air, air into aether, and then the process is reversed, and aether becomes air, air water, and water earth, the lowest of the four. Thus the parts of the world are held in union by the constant passage up and down, thenceforth, of these four elements of which all things are composed. 2.85. And this world-structure must either be everlasting in this same form in which we see it or at all events extremely durable, and destined to endure for an almost immeasurably protracted period of time. Whichever alternative be true, the inference follows that the world is governed by nature. For consider the navigation of a fleet, the marshalling of an army, or (to return to instances from the processes of nature) the budding of a vien or of a tree, or even the shape and structure of the limbs of an animal — when do these ever evidence such a degree of skill in nature as the world itself? Either therefore there is nothing that is ruled by a sentient nature, or we must admit that the world is so ruled. 2.86. Indeed, how is it possible that the universe, which contains within itself all the other natures and their seeds, should not itself be governed by nature? Thus if anyone declared that a man's teeth and the hair on his body are a natural growth but that the man himself to whom they belong is not a natural organism, he would fail to see that things which produce something from within them must have more perfect natures than the things which are produced from them. But the sower and planter and begetter, so to speak, of all the things that nature governs, their trainer and nourisher, is the world; the world gives nutriment and sustece to all its limbs as it were, or parts. But if the parts of the world are governed by nature, the world itself must needs be governed by nature. Now the government of the world contains nothing that could possibly be censured; given the existing elements, the best that could be produced from them has been produced. 2.87. Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things. "But if the structure of the world in all its parts is such that it could not have been better whether in point of utility or beauty, let us consider js is the result of chance, or whether on the contrary the parts of the world are in such a condition that they could not possibly have cohered together if they were not controlled by intelligence and by divine providence. If then that produces of nature are better than those of art, and if art produces nothing without reason, nature too cannot be deemed to be without reason. When you see a statue or a painting, you recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun‑dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason? 2.88. Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit. 2.93. "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! 2.95. So Aristotle says brilliantly: 'If there were beings who had always lived beneath the earth, in comfortable, well‑lit dwellings, decorated with statues and pictures and furnished with all the luxuries enjoyed by persons thought to be supremely happy, and who though they had never come forth above the ground had learnt by report and by hearsay of the existence of certain deities or divine powers; and then if at some time the jaws of the earth were opened and they were able to escape from their hidden abode and to come forth into the regions which we inhabit; when they suddenly had sight of the earth and the seas and the sky, and came to know of the vast clouds and mighty winds, and beheld the sun, and realized not only its size and beauty but also its Ptolemaic in causing the day by shedding light over all the sky, and, after night had darkened the earth, they then saw the whole sky spangled and adorned with stars, and the changing phases of the moon's light, now waxing and now waning, and the risings and settings of all these heavenly bodies and their courses fixed and changeless throughout all eternity, — when they saw these things, surely they would think that the gods exist and that these mighty marvels are their handiwork.' 2.118. But the stars are of a fiery substance, and for this reason they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters, which are raised up by the sun out of the fields which it warms and out of the waters; and when nourished and renewed by these vapours the stars and the whole aether shed them back again, and then once more draw them up from the same source, with the loss of none of their matter, or only of an extremely small part which is consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the aether. As a consequence of this, so our school believe, though it used to be said that Panaetius questioned the doctrine, there will ultimately occur a conflagration of the whole while, because when the moisture has been used up neither can the earth be nourished nor will the air continue to flow, being unable to rise upward after it has drunk up all the water; thus nothing will remain but fire, by which, as a living being and a god, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before. 2.127. Does, shortly before giving birth to their young, thoroughly purge themselves with a herb called hartwort. Again we observe how various species defend themselves against violence and danger with their own weapons, bulls with their horns, boars with their tusks, lions with their bite; some species protect themselves by flight, some by hiding, the cuttle-fish by emitting an inky fluid, the sting‑ray by causing cramp, and also a number of creatures drive away their pursuers by their insufferably disgusting odour. "In order to secure the everlasting duration of the world-order, divine providence has made most careful provision to ensure the perpetuation of the families of animals and of trees and all the vegetable species. The latter all contain within them seed possessing the proprietor of multiplying the species; this seed is enclosed in the innermost part of the fruits that grow from each plant; and the same seeds supply mankind with an abundance of food, besides replenishing the earth with a fresh stock of plants of the same kind. 2.128. Why should I speak of the amount of rational design displayed in animals to secure the perpetual preservation of their kind? To begin with some are male and some female, a device of nature to perpetuate the species. Then parts of their busy are most skilfully contrived to serve the purposes of procreation and of conception, and both male and female possess marvellous desires for copulation. And when the seed has settled in its place, it draws almost all the nutriment to itself and hedged within it fashions a living creature; when this has been dropped from the womb and has emerged, in the mammalian species almost all the nourishment received by the mother turns to milk, and the young just born, untaught and by nature's guidance, seek for the teats and satisfy their cravings with their bounty. And to show to us that none of these things merely happens by chance and that all are the work of nature's providence and skill, species that produce large litters of offspring, such as swine and dogs, have bestowed upon them a large number of teats, while those animals which bear only a few young have only a few teats. 2.129. Why should I describe the affection shown by animals in rearing and protecting the offspring to which they have given birth, up to the point when they are able to defend themselves? although fishes, it is said, abandon their eggs when they have laid them, since these easily float and hatch out in the water. Turtles and crocodiles are said to lay their eggs on land and bury them and then go away, leaving their young to hatch and rear themselves. Hens and other birds find a quiet place in which to lay, and build themselves nests to sit on, covering these with the softest possible bedding in order to preserve the eggs most easily; and when they have hatched out their chicks they protect them by cherishing them with their wings so that they may not be injured by cold, and by shading them against the heat of the sun. When the young birds are able to use their sprouting wings, their mothers escort them in their flights, but are released from any further tendance upon them. 2.130. Moreover the skill and industry of man also contribute to the preservation and security of certain animals and plants. For there are many species of both which could not survive without man's care. "Also a plentiful variety of conveniences is found in different regions for the productive cultivation of the soil by man. Egypt is watered by the Nile, which corps the land completely flooded all the summer and afterwards retires leaving the soil soft and covered with mud, in readiness for sowing. Mesopotamia is fertilized by the Euphrates, which as it were imports into it new fields every year. The Indus, the largest river in the world, not only manures and softens the soil but actually sows it with seed, for it is said to bring down with it a great quantity of seeds resembling corn. 2.131. And I could produce a number of other remarkable examples in a variety of places, and instance a variety of lands each prolific in a different kind of produce. But how great is the benevolence of nature, in giving birth to such an abundance and variety of delicious articles of food, and that not at one season only of the year, so that we have continually the delights of both novelty and plenty! How seasonable moreover and how some not for the human race alone but also for the animal and the various vegetable species is her gift of the Etesian winds! their breath moderates the excessive heat of summer, entirely also guide our ships across the sea upon a swift and steady course. Many instances must be passed over [and yet many are given]. 2.132. For it is impossible to recount the conveniences afforded by rivers, the ebb and flow . . . of the tides of the sea, the mountains clothed with forests, the salt-beds lying far inland from the sea‑coast, the copious stores of health-giving medicines that the earth contains, and all the countless arts necessary for livelihood and for life. Again the alternation of day and night contributes to the preservation of living creatures by affording one time for activity and another for repose. Thus every line of reasoning goes to prove that all things in this world of ours are marvellously governed by divine intelligence and wisdom for the safety and preservation of all. 2.133. "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature. 2.134. There are three things requisite for the maintece of animal life, food, drink and breath; and for the reception of all of these the mouth is most consummately adapted, receiving as it does an abundant supply of breath through the nostrils which communicate with it. The structure of the teeth within the mouth serves to chew the food, and it is divided up and softened by them. The front teeth are sharp, and bite our viands into pieces; the back teeth, called molars, masticate them, the process of mastication apparently being assisted also by the tongue. 2.154. "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. 2.155. Again the revolutions of the sun and moon no other heavenly bodies, although also contributing to the maintece of the structure of the world, nevertheless also afford a spectacle for man to behold; for there is no sight of which it is more impossible to grow weary, none more beautiful nor displaying a more surpassing wisdom and skill; for by measuring the courses of the stars we know when the seasons will come round, and when their variations and changes will occur; and if these things are known to men alone, they must be judged to have been created for the sake of men. 2.156. Then the earth, teeming with grain and vegetables of various kinds, which she pours forth in lavish abundance — does she appear to give birth to this produce for the sake of the wild beasts or for the sake of men? What shall I say of the vines and olives, whose bounteous and delightful fruits do not concern the lower animals at all? In fact the beasts of the field are entirely ignorant of the arts of sowing and cultivating, and of reaping and gathering the fruits of the earth in due season and storing them in garners; all these products are both enjoyed and tended by men. 2.157. Just as therefore we are bound to say that lyres and flutes were made for the sake of those who can use them, so it must be agreed that the things of which I have spoken have been provided for those only who make use of them, and even if some portion of them is filched or plundered by some of the lower animals, we shall not admit that they were created for the sake of these animals also. Men do not store up corn for the sake of mice and ants but for their wives and children and households; so the animals share these fruits of the earth only by stealth as I have said, whereas the masters enjoy them openly and freely. 2.158. It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? 2.159. Why should I speak of oxen? the very shape of their backs makes it clear that they were not destined to carry burdens, whereas their necks were born for the yoke and their broad powerful shoulders for drawing the plough. And as it was by their means that the earth was brought under tillage by breaking up its clods, no violence was ever used towards them, so the poets say, by the men of that Golden Age; But then the iron race sprang into being, And first did dare to forge the deadly sword, And taste the ox its hand had tamed to bondage. So valuable was deemed the service that man received from oxen that to eat their flesh was held a crime. "It would be a long story to tell of the services rendered by mules and asses, which were undoubtedly created for the use of men. 2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. 2.161. The great beasts of the forest again we take by hunting, both for food and in order to exercise ourselves in the mimic warfare of the chase, and also, as in the case of elephants, to train and discipline them for our employment, and to procure from their busy a variety of medicines for diseases and wounds, as also we do from certain roots and herbs whose values we have learnt by long-continued use and trial. Let the mind's eye survey the whole earth and all the seas, and you will behold now fruitful plains of measureless extent and mountains thickly clad with forests and pastures filled with flocks, now vessels sailing with marvellous swiftness across the sea. 2.162. Nor only on the surface of the earth, but also in its darkest recesses there lurks an abundance of commodities which were created for men's use and which men alone discover. "The next subject is one which each of you perhaps will seize upon for censure, Cotta because Carneades used to enjoy tilting at the Stoics, Velleius because nothing provokes the ridicule of Epicurus so much as the art of prophecy; but in my view it affords the very strongest proof that man's welfare is studied by divine providence. I refer of course to Divination, which we see practised in many regions and upon various matters and occasions both private and more especially public. 2.168. "These are more or less the things that occurred to me which I thought proper to be said upon the subject of the nature of the gods. And for your part, Cotta, would you but listen to me, you would plead the same cause, and reflect that you are a leading citizen and a pontife, and you would take advantage of the liberty enjoyed by your school of arguing both pro and contra to choose to espouse my side, and preferably to devote to this purpose those powers of eloquence which your rhetorical exercises have bestowed upon you and which the Academy has fostered. For the habit of arguing in support of atheism, whether it be done from conviction or in pretence, is a wicked and impious practice." 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.6. There, Balbus, is the opinion of a Cotta and a pontife; now oblige me by letting me know yours. You are a philosopher, and I ought to receive from you a proof of your religion, whereas I must believe the word of our ancestors even without proof." "What proof then do you require of me, Cotta?" replied Balbus. "You divided your discourse under four heads," said Cotta; "first you designed to prove the existence of the gods; secondly, to describe their nature; thirdly, to show that the world is governed by them; and lastly, that they care for the welfare of men. These, if I remember rightly, were the headings that you laid down." "You are quite right," said Balbus; "but now tell me what it is that you want to know." 3.18. and we defer to the same time the argument which you attributed to Chrysippus, that since there exists something in the universe which could not be created by man, some being must exist of a higher order than man; as also your comparison of the beautiful furniture in a house with the beauty of the world, and your reference to the harmony and common purpose of the whole world; and Zeno's terse and pointed little syllogisms we will postpone to that part of my discourse which I have just mentioned; and at the same time all your arguments of a scientific nature about the fiery force and heat which you alleged to be the universal source of generation shall be examined in their place; and all that you said the day before yesterday, when attempting to prove the divine existence, to show that both the world as a whole and the sun and moon and stars possess sensation and intelligence, I will keep for the same occasion. 3.23. If you accept this conclusion, you will go on to prove that the world is perfectly able to read a book; for following in Zeno's footsteps you will be able to construct a syllogism as follows: 'That which is literate is superior to that which is illiterate; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world is literate.' By this mode of reasoning the world will also be an orator, and even a mathematician, a musician, and in fact an expert in every branch of learning, in fine a philosopher. You kept repeating that the world is the sole source of all created things, and that nature's capacity does not include the power to create things unlike herself: am I to admit that the world is not only a living being, and wise, but also a harper and a flute-player, because it gives birth also to men skilled in these arts? Well then, your father of the Stoic school really adduces no reason why we should think that the world is rational, or even alive. Therefore the world is not god; and nevertheless there is nothing superior to the world, for there is nothing more beautiful than it, nothing more conducive to our health, nothing more ornate to the view, or more regular in motion. "And if the world as a whole isn't god, neither are the stars, which in all are countless numbers you wanted to reckon as gods, enlarging with delight upon their uniform and everlasting movements, and I protest with good reason, for they display a marvellous and extraordinary regularity. 3.27. "But then you tell me that Socrates in Xenophon asks the question, if the world contains no rational soul, where did we pick up ours? And I too ask the question, where did we get the faculty of speech, the knowledge of numbers, the art of music? unless indeed we suppose that the sun holds conversation with the moon when their courses approximate, or that the world makes a harmonious music, as Pythagoras believes. These faculties, Balbus, the gifts of nature — not nature 'walking in craftsmanlike manner' as Zeno says (and what this means we will consider in a moment), but nature by its own motions and mutations imparting motion and activity to all things. 3.28. And so I fully agreed with the part of your discourse that dealt with nature's punctual regularity, and what you termed its concordant interconnexion and correlation; but I could not accept your assertion that this could not have come about were it not held together by a single divine breath. On the contrary, the system's coherence and persistence is due to nature's forces and not to drive power; she does possess that 'concord' (the Greek term is sympatheia) of which you spoke, but the greater this is as a spontaneous growth, the less possible is it to suppose that it was created by divine reason. 3.29. "Then, how does your school refute the following arguments of Carneades? If no body is not liable to death, no body can be everlasting; but no body is not liable to death, nor even indiscerptible nor incapable of decomposition and dissolution. And every living thing is by its nature capable of feeling; therefore there is no living thing that can escape unavoidable liability to undergo impressions from without, that is to suffer and to feel; and if every living thing is liable to suffering, no living thing is not liable to death. Therefore likewise, if every living thing can be cut up into parts, no living thing is indivisible, and none is everlasting. But every living thing is so constructed as to be liable to undergo and to suffer violence from without; it therefore follows that every living thing is liable to death and dissolution, and is divisible. 3.30. For just as, if all wax were capable of change, nothing made of wax would be incapable of change, and likewise nothing made of silver or bronze if silver and bronze were substances capable of change, therefore similarly, if all the elements of which all things are composed are liable to change, there can be no body not liable to change; but the elements of which, according to your school, all things are composed are liable to change; therefore every body is liable to change. But if any body were not liable to death, then not every body would be liable to change. Hence incessant follows that every body is liable to death. In fact every body consists of either water or air or fierce or earth, or of a combination of these elements or some of them; but none of these lets is exempt from destruction; 3.31. for everything of an earthy nature is divisible, and also liquid substance is soft and therefore easily crushed and broken up, while fire and air are by readily impelled by impacts of all kinds, and are of a consistency that is extremely yielding and easily dissipated; and besides, all these elements perish when they undergo transmutation, which occurs when earth turns into water, and when from water arises air, and from air aether, and when alternately the same processes are reversed; but if those elements of which every living thing consists can perish, no living thing is everlasting. 3.32. And, to drop this line of argument, nevertheless no living thing can be found which either was never born or will live for ever. For every living thing has sensation; therefore it perceives both heat and cold, both sweetness and sourness — it cannot through any of the senses receive pleasant sensations and not receive their opposites; if therefore it is capable of feeling pleasure, it is also capable of feeling pain; but a being which can experience pleasure mt necessity also be liable to destruction; therefore it must be admitted that every living thing is liable to death. 3.33. Besides, if there be anything that cannot feel either pleasure or pain, this cannot be a living thing, and if on the other hand anything is alive, this must necessarily feel pleasure and pain; and that which feels pleasure and pain cannot be everlasting; and every living thing feels them; therefore no living thing is everlasting. Besides, there can be no living thing which does not possess natural instincts of appetition and avoidance; but the objects of appetition are the things which are in accordance with nature, and the objects of avoidance are the contrary; ne v living thing seeks certain things and flees from certain things, but that which it flees from is contrary to nature, and that which is contrary to nature has the power of destruction; therefore every living thing must of necessity perish. 3.34. There are proofs too numerous to count by which it can be irrefragably established that there is nothing possessed of sensation that does not perish; in fact the actual objects of sensation, such as cold and heat, pleasure and pain, and the rest, when felt in an intense degree cause destruction; nor is any living thing devoid of sensation; therefore no living thing is everlasting. For every living thing must either be of a simple substance, and composed of either earth or fire or breath or moisture — and such an animal is inconceivable —, or else of a substance compounded of several elements, each having its own place towards which it travels by natural inclination, one to the bottom, another to the top and another to the middle; such elements can cohere for a certain time, but cannot possibly do so for ever, for each must of necessity be borne away by nature to its own place; therefore no living thing is everlasting. 3.52. Again, if the name of Ceres is derived from her bearing fruit, as you said, the earth itself is a goddess (and so she is believed to be, for she is the same as the deity Tellus). But if the earth is divine, so also is the sea, which you identified with Neptune; and therefore the rivers and springs too. This is borne out by the facts that Maso dedicated a Temple of Fons out of his Corsican spoils, and that the Augur's litany includes as we may see the names of Tiberinus, Spino, almo, Nodinus, and other rivers in the neighbourhood of Rome. Either therefore this process will go on indefinitely, or we shall admit none of these; nts unlimited claim of superstition will not be accepted; therefore none of these is to be accepted. 3.77. These are fables of the poets, whereas we aim at being philosophers, who set down facts, not fictions. And all the same, even these gods of poetry would be held guilty of mistaken kindness if they knew that their gifts would bring their sons disaster. Just as, if a favourite saying of Aristo of Chios was true, that philosophers are harmful to their hearers when the hearers put a bad interpretation on doctrines good in themselves (for he allowed it was possible to leave the school of Aristippus a profligate, or that of Zeno cantankerous), then clearly, if their pupils were likely to go away depraved because they misinterpreted the philosophers' discourses, it would be better for the philosophers to keep silence than to do harm to those who heard them: |
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| 82. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 83. Varro, On The Latin Language, 5.59 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137 |
| 84. Philodemus of Gadara, De Musica \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 165 |
85. Cicero, Topica, 31, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022) 132| 30. partitionum autem autem secl. Lambinus et divisionum genus quale esset ostendimus, sed quid inter se differant planius dicendum est. In partitione quasi membra sunt, ut corporis caput umeri manus latera crura pedes et cetera; in divisione formae, quas Graeci ei)/dh vocant, nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant, non pessime id quidem sed inutiliter ad mutandos casus in dicendo. Nolim enim, ne si Latine quidem dici possit, specierum et speciebus dicere; et saepe his casibus utendum est; at formis et formarum velim. Cum autem utroque verbo idem significetur, com- moditatem in dicendo non arbitror neglegendam. | |
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86. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 273| 5.34. quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse ipsa X corr. V 2 viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus. Et si Zeno Citieus, ticieus R cici eus K 1 advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se se om. Non. in antiquam philosophiam videtur, advena... 3 videtur Non. 457, 25 huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum. velut velud KR in Gorgia Gorg. 470 d Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum arcelaum hic X (arcael.G) Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret, haud scio inquit; | |
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| 87. Cicero, On Invention, 115, 118, 14-16, 32, 72-75, 13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 67, 70 |
| 88. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 89. Philodemus, De Libertate Dicendi, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
90. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 71| 2.2. sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando percontando A 2 percun- tando NV percunctando A 1 BE per cunctando R atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, ea haec R quae ii ii hi BER hii A hij NV respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas archesilas A acesilaos N achesilas V eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum eum om. RNV qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam etiam om. BER in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum', perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri sibi aliquid (aliquit E) videri BE aliquid videri sibi V dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus. | 2.2. But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The wouldâbe learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. |
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91. Cicero, De Finibus, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 47; Tsouni (2019) 50 | 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. |
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| 92. Cicero, On Fate, 6.12-8.16, 7, 8, 9, 9.17, 9.18, 9.20, 10, 11.23, 40, 42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 171, 249 |
93. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 1.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan | 1.5. For a holy and disciplined spirit will flee from deceit,and will rise and depart from foolish thoughts,and will be ashamed at the approach of unrighteousness. |
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94. Cicero, On Divination, 1.64, 1.82-1.84, 1.125, 2.4, 2.9, 2.36, 2.41, 2.97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 246; Frede and Laks (2001) 98; Long (2006) 130, 260; Long (2019) 83; Wynne (2019) 156| 1.64. Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somniare, uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus ae+r sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur. Idque, ut modo dixi, facilius evenit adpropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur. 1.82. Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus, quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines aut, quid eventurum sit, ignorant aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire, quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus, quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt; at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea, quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt, (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus) neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscere; 1.83. non igitur sunt di nec significant futura; sunt autem di; significant ergo; et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent), nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio. 1.84. Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. Quid est igitur, cur dubitandum sit, quin sint ea, quae disputavi, verissima, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi philosophi, si poe+- tae, si sapientissimi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An, dum bestiae loquantur, exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus? 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 2.4. Cumque Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate, tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum referendi videntur. Ita tres erunt de oratore, quartus Brutus, quintus orator. Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem? his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refreda atque coe+rcenda sit. 2.9. Etenim me movet illud, quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset, earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur. At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. Num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra, dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? Ad nullam igitur earum rerum, quae sensu accipiuntur, divinatio adhibetur. Atqui ne in iis quidem rebus, quae arte tractantur, divinatione opus est. Etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere, nec vero, qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt, ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. 2.36. deorum enim numini parere omnia. Haec iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant. An censes, eundem vitulum si alius delegerit, sine capite iecur inventurum; si alius, cum capite? Haec decessio capitis aut accessio subitone fieri potest, ut se exta ad immolatoris fortunam accommodent? non perspicitis aleam quandam esse in hostiis deligendis, praesertim cum res ipsa doceat? Cum enim tristissuma exta sine capite fuerunt, quibus nihil videtur esse dirius, proxuma hostia litatur saepe pulcherrime. Ubi igitur illae minae superiorum extorum? aut quae tam subito facta est deorum tanta placatio? Sed adfers in tauri opimi extis immolante Caesare cor non fuisse; id quia non potuerit accidere, ut sine corde victuma illa viveret, iudicandum esse tum interisse cor, cum immolaretur. 2.41. Cur igitur vos induitis in eas captiones, quas numquam explicetis? Ita enim, cum magis properant, concludere solent: Si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di; est ergo divinatio. Multo est probabilius: non est autem divinatio; non sunt ergo di. Vide, quam temere committant, ut, si nulla sit divinatio, nulli sint di. Divinatio enim perspicue tollitur, deos esse retinendum est. 2.97. Ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus ad nascendum valere. Nam quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiundisque pueris, quicumque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim esset factitatum, non esset desitum; neminem autem habemus auctorem, qui id aut fieri dicat aut factum sciat. Videsne me non ea dicere, quae Carneades, sed ea, quae princeps Stoicorum Panaetius dixerit? Ego autem etiam haec requiro: omnesne, qui Cannensi pugna ceciderint, uno astro fuerint; exitus quidem omnium unus et idem fuit. Quid? qui ingenio atque animo singulares, num astro quoque uno? quod enim tempus, quo non innumerabiles nascantur? at certe similis nemo Homeri. | 1.64. Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future. 1.82. The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; 1.83. therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs — otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination. [39] 1.84. Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same reasoning. Then what ground is there to doubt the absolute truth of my position? For I have on my side reason, facts, peoples, and races, both Greek and barbarian, our own ancestors, the unvarying belief of all ages, the greatest philosophers, the poets, the wisest men, the builders of cities, and the founders of republics. Are we not satisfied with the uimous judgement of men, and do we wait for beasts to give their testimony too? 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. 2.4. Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator.[2] I have named the philosophic works so far written: to the completion of the remaining books of this series I was hastening with so much ardour that if some most grievous cause had not intervened there would not now be any phase of philosophy which I had failed to elucidate and make easily accessible in the Latin tongue. For what greater or better service can I render to the commonwealth than to instruct and train the youth — especially in view of the fact that our young men have gone so far astray because of the present moral laxity that the utmost effort will be needed to hold them in check and direct them in the right way? 2.9. I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades used to begin his discussions: What are the things within the scope of divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distinguish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the senses.Nor is there any need of divination even in matters within the domain of science and of art. For, when people are sick, we, as a general rule, do not summon a prophet or a seer, but we call in a physician. Again, persons who want to learn to play on the harp or on the flute take lessons, not from a soothsayer, but from a musician. 2.36. Upon my word, no old woman is credulous enough now to believe such stuff! Do you believe that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will have a liver without a head, and if chosen by another will have a liver with a head? And is it possible that this sudden going or coming of the livers head occurs so that the entrails may adapt themselves to the situation of the person who offers the sacrifice? Do you Stoics fail to see in choosing the victim it is almost like a throw of the dice, especially as facts prove it? For when the entrails of the first victim have been without a head, which is the most fatal of all signs, it often happens that the sacrifice of the next victim is altogether favourable. Pray what became of the warnings of the first set of entrails? And how was the favour of the gods so completely and so suddenly gained?[16] But, you say, Once, when Caesar was offering a sacrifice, there was no heart in the entrails of the sacrificial bull; and, and, since it would have been impossible for the victim to live without a heart, the heart must have disappeared at the moment of immolation. 2.41. Why then do you Stoics involve yourselves in these sophistries, which you can never explain? Members of your school, when they are more hurried than usual, generally give us this syllogism: If there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination. A more logical one would be this: There is no divination, therefore there are no gods. Observe how rashly they commit themselves to the proposition, if there is no divination, there are no gods. I say rashly, for it is evident that divination has been destroyed and yet we must hold on to the gods. [18] 2.97. Hence it is evident that ones birth is more affected by local environment than by the condition of the moon. of course, the statement quoted by you that the Babylonians for 470, years had taken the horoscope of every child and had tested it by the results, is untrue; for if this had been their habit they would not have abandoned it. Moreover we find no writer who says that the practice exists or who knows that it ever did exist.[47] You observe that I am not repeating the arguments of Carneades, but those of Panaetius, the head of the Stoic school. But now on my own initiative I put the following questions: Did all the Romans who fell at Cannae have the same horoscope? Yet all had one and the same end. Were all the men eminent for intellect and genius born under the same star? Was there ever a day when countless numbers were not born? And yet there never was another Homer. |
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95. Cicero, Academica, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 270| 1.19. VA. Pergamus igitur inquit, inquit om. *gx 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio rat. phil. p 1 triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum uerum et *d quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve prauumue accedit s quid consentiens consentiens sit Goer. quid repugnet repugnat s -ans s -ans esset Mue. iudicando. Ac primum primam *d illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum summum illud psmn bonum quo omnia referrentur, referrentur *d*g -ere- *g constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura omn. e nat. Om. *g et animo anima *g et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem; | |
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| 96. Cicero, On Laws, 1.12.23, 1.18, 1.24, 2.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137; Long (2019) 202; Sorabji (2000) 184; Wynne (2019) 148 |
97. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.91 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 1.91. Why so? Because, even if the mind, fancying that though it does wrong it can escape the notice of the Deity as not being able to see everything, should sin secretly and in dark places, and should after that, either by reason of its own notions or through the suggestions of some one else, conceive that it is impossible that anything should be otherwise than clear to God, and should disclose itself and all its actions, and should bring them forward, as it were, out of the light of the sun, and display them to the governor of the universe, saying, that it repents of the perverse conduct which it formerly exhibited when under the influence of foolish opinion (for that nothing is indistinct before God, but all things are known and clear to him, not merely such as have been done, but even such are merely hoped or designed, by reason of the boundless character of his wisdom), it then is purified and benefited, and it propitiates the chastiser who was ready to punish it, namely, conscience, who was previously filled with just anger towards it, and who now admits repentance as the younger brother of perfect innocence and freedom from sin. XVI. |
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| 98. Seneca The Younger, Quaestiones Naturales, 2.45, 2.45.1 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 101 |
99. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.44-1.49, 1.159-1.160, 1.1088-1.1091, 2.1-2.13, 2.251-2.293, 2.646-2.651, 3.31-3.93, 3.288-3.315, 3.830-3.1094, 4.886-4.887, 4.1058-4.1072, 4.1084-4.1120, 4.1160-4.1170, 4.1175-4.1184, 4.1190-4.1191, 4.1209-4.1287, 5.43, 5.1218-5.1240, 6.379-6.422 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 79, 82; Sorabji (2000) 222, 224, 228, 229, 235, 236, 237, 241, 243, 248, 264, 265, 267, 275, 283, 320, 333, 334; Yona (2018) 119| 1.44. omnis enim per se divum natura necessest 1.45. immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 1.46. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 1.47. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 1.48. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 1.49. nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira. 1.159. Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus 1.160. omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret. 1.1088. et calidos simul a medio differrier ignis, 1.1089. atque ideo totum circum tremere aethera signis 1.1090. et solis flammam per caeli caerula pasci, 1.1091. quod calor a medio fugiens se ibi conligat omnis, 2.1. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis 2.2. e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 2.3. non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 2.4. sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest. 2.5. per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli; 2.6. suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri 2.7. sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 2.8. edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 2.9. despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 2.10. errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 2.11. certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 2.12. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 2.13. ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 2.251. Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis 2.252. et vetere exoritur motus novus ordine certo 2.253. nec declido faciunt primordia motus 2.254. principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, 2.255. ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 2.256. libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, 2.257. unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, 2.258. per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas, 2.259. declinamus item motus nec tempore certo 2.260. nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 2.261. nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 2.262. principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur. 2.263. nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore puncto 2.264. carceribus non posse tamen prorumpere equorum 2.265. vim cupidam tam de subito quam mens avet ipsa? 2.266. omnis enim totum per corpus materiai 2.267. copia conciri debet, concita per artus 2.268. omnis ut studium mentis conixa sequatur; 2.269. ut videas initum motus a corde creari 2.270. ex animique voluntate id procedere primum, 2.271. inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus. 2.272. nec similest ut cum inpulsi procedimus ictu 2.273. viribus alterius magnis magnoque coactu; 2.274. nam tum materiem totius corporis omnem 2.275. perspicuumst nobis invitis ire rapique, 2.276. donec eam refrenavit per membra voluntas. 2.277. iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multos 2.278. pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe 2.279. praecipitesque rapi, tamen esse in pectore nostro 2.280. quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit? 2.281. cuius ad arbitrium quoque copia materiai 2.282. cogitur inter dum flecti per membra per artus 2.283. et proiecta refrenatur retroque residit. 2.284. quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest, 2.285. esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam 2.286. motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas, 2.287. de nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. 2.288. pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant 2.289. externa quasi vi; sed ne res ipsa necessum 2.290. intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis 2.291. et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique, 2.292. id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum 2.293. nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 2.646. omnis enim per se divom natura necessest 2.647. inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 2.648. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 2.649. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 2.650. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 2.651. nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira. 3.31. Et quoniam docui, cunctarum exordia rerum 3.32. qualia sint et quam variis distantia formis 3.33. sponte sua volitent aeterno percita motu, 3.34. quove modo possint res ex his quaeque creari, 3.35. hasce secundum res animi natura videtur 3.36. atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse 3.37. et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, 3.38. funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo 3.39. omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam 3.40. esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit. 3.41. nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos 3.42. infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti 3.43. et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse, 3.44. aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, 3.45. nec prosum quicquam nostrae rationis egere, 3.46. hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis 3.47. iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur. 3.48. extorres idem patria longeque fugati 3.49. conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 3.50. omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt, 3.51. et quo cumque tamen miseri venere parentant 3.52. et nigras mactant pecudes et manibus divis 3.53. inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 3.54. acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 3.55. quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 3.56. convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit; 3.57. nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo 3.58. eliciuntur et eripitur persona amanare. 3.59. denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido, 3.60. quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 3.61. iuris et inter dum socios scelerum atque ministros 3.62. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 3.63. ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 3.64. non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 3.65. turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 3.66. semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 3.67. et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante; 3.68. unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 3.69. effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 3.70. sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 3.71. conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 3.72. crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 3.73. et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.78. intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo. 3.79. et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae 3.80. percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 3.81. ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum 3.82. obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem: 3.83. hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai 3.84. rumpere et in summa pietate evertere suadet: 3.85. nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 3.86. prodiderunt vitare Acherusia templa petentes. 3.87. nam vel uti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 3.88. in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 3.89. inter dum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 3.90. quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 3.91. hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 3.92. non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 3.93. discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 3.288. est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira 3.289. cum fervescit et ex oculis micat acrius ardor; 3.290. est et frigida multa, comes formidinis, aura, 3.291. quae ciet horrorem membris et concitat artus; 3.292. est etiam quoque pacati status aeris aëris ille, 3.293. pectore tranquillo fit qui voltuque sereno. 3.294. sed calidi plus est illis quibus acria corda 3.295. iracundaque mens facile effervescit in ira, 3.296. quo genere in primis vis est violenta leonum, 3.297. pectora qui fremitu rumpunt plerumque gementes 3.298. nec capere irarum fluctus in pectore possunt. 3.299. at ventosa magis cervorum frigida mens est 3.300. et gelidas citius per viscera concitat auras, 3.301. quae tremulum faciunt membris existere motum. 3.302. at natura boum placido magis aere aëre vivit 3.303. nec nimis irai fax umquam subdita percit 3.304. fumida, suffundens caecae caliginis umbra, 3.305. nec gelidis torpet telis perfixa pavoris; 3.306. interutrasque sitast cervos saevosque leones. 3.307. sic hominum genus est: quamvis doctrina politos 3.308. constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit 3.309. naturae cuiusque animi vestigia prima. 3.310. nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst, 3.311. quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acris, 3.312. ille metu citius paulo temptetur, at ille 3.313. tertius accipiat quaedam clementius aequo. 3.314. inque aliis rebus multis differre necessest 3.315. naturas hominum varias moresque sequacis; 3.830. Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 3.831. quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur. 3.832. et vel ut ante acto nihil tempore sensimus aegri, 3.833. ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, 3.834. omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu 3.835. horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, 3.836. in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum 3.837. omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, 3.838. sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 3.839. discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, 3.840. scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 3.841. accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.842. non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo. 3.843. et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 3.844. distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, 3.845. nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 3.846. corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 3.847. nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 3.848. post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, 3.849. atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, 3.850. pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 3.851. interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. 3.852. et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante 3.853. qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor. 3.854. nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne 3.855. praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 3.856. multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis, 3.857. semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta 3.858. haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. 3.859. nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente; 3.860. inter enim iectast vitai pausa vageque 3.861. deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. 3.862. debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst; 3.863. ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit 3.864. accidere. id quoniam mors eximit, esseque prohibet 3.865. illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 3.866. scire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum 3.867. nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum 3.868. differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, 3.869. mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit. 3.870. Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 3.871. post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto 3.872. aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum, 3.873. scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse 3.874. caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse 3.875. credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum; 3.876. non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde 3.877. nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, 3.878. sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. 3.879. vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, 3.880. corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 3.881. ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim 3.882. nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum 3.883. se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans. 3.884. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum 3.885. nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 3.886. qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum 3.887. stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. 3.888. nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum 3.889. tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum 3.890. ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis 3.891. aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere 3.892. frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi, 3.893. urgerive superne obrutum pondere terrae. 3.894. 'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor 3.895. optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 3.896. praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 3.897. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 3.898. praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 3.899. una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.' 3.900. illud in his rebus non addunt 'nec tibi earum 3.901. iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.' 3.902. quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, 3.903. dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. 3.904. 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 3.905. quod super est cunctis privatus doloribus aegris; 3.906. at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 3.907. insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 3.908. nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.' 3.909. illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari 3.910. tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem, 3.911. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 3.950. quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 3.951. naturam et veram verbis exponere causam? 3.952. grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur 3.953. atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo, 3.954. non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri: 3.955. 'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas. 3.956. omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 3.957. sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 3.958. inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 3.959. et nec opiti mors ad caput adstitit ante 3.960. quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 3.961. nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte 3.962. aequo animoque, age dum, magnis concede necessis?' 3.963. iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque; 3.964. cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas 3.965. semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. 3.966. Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra; 3.967. materies opus est, ut crescant postera saecla; 3.968. quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; 3.969. nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere cadentque. 3.970. sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri 3.971. vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 3.972. respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas 3.973. temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. 3.974. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 3.975. temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 3.976. numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 3.977. quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? 3.978. Atque ea ni mirum quae cumque Acherunte profundo 3.979. prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. 3.980. nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere aëre saxum 3.981. Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; 3.982. sed magis in vita divom metus urget iis 3.983. mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors. 3.984. nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem 3.985. nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 3.986. perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto. 3.987. quam libet immani proiectu corporis exstet, 3.988. qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris 3.989. optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem, 3.990. non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 3.991. nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper. 3.992. sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem 3.993. quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 3.994. aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.995. Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 3.996. qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 3.997. imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 3.998. nam petere imperium, quod iest nec datur umquam, 3.999. atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 3.1000. hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 3.1001. saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rusum 3.1002. volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 3.1003. deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 3.1004. atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam, 3.1005. quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 3.1006. cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 3.1007. nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam, 3.1008. hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas 3.1009. quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 3.1010. quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 3.1011. Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas, 3.1012. Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus! 3.1013. qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto; 3.1014. sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 3.1015. est insignibus insignis scelerisque luela, 3.1016. carcer et horribilis de saxo iactus deorsum, 3.1017. verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 3.1018. quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 3.1019. praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 3.1020. nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 3.1021. possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 3.1022. atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 3.1023. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. 3.1024. Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis. 3.1025. 'lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit, 3.1026. qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. 3.1027. inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes 3.1028. occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt. 3.1029. ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum 3.1030. stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 3.1031. ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas 3.1032. et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti, 3.1033. lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit. 3.1034. Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, 3.1035. ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 3.1036. adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum, 3.1037. adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus 3.1038. sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitus quietest. 3.1039. denique Democritum post quam matura vetustas 3.1040. admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 3.1041. sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse. 3.1042. ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 3.1043. qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 3.1044. restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. 3.1045. tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 3.1046. mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti, 3.1047. qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi, 3.1048. et viligans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 3.1049. sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 3.1050. nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 3.1051. ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 3.1052. atque animo incerto fluitans errore vagaris.' 3.1053. Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 3.1054. pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget, 3.1055. e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 3.1056. tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet, 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1068. hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, 3.1069. effugere haut potis est: ingratius haeret et odit 3.1070. propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 3.1071. quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis 3.1072. naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum, 3.1073. temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 3.1074. ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis 3.1075. aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manendo. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 4.886. ergo animus cum sese ita commovet ut velit ire 4.887. inque gredi, ferit extemplo quae in corpore toto 4.1058. Haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen Amoris, 4.1059. hinc illaec primum Veneris dulcedinis in cor 4.1060. stillavit gutta et successit frigida cura; 4.1061. nam si abest quod ames, praesto simulacra tamen sunt 4.1062. illius et nomen dulce obversatur ad auris. 4.1063. sed fugitare decet simulacra et pabula amoris 4.1064. absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem 4.1065. et iacere umorem coniectum in corpora quaeque 4.1066. nec retinere semel conversum unius amore 4.1067. et servare sibi curam certumque dolorem; 4.1068. ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo 4.1069. inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit, 4.1070. si non prima novis conturbes volnera plagis 4.1071. volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures 4.1072. aut alio possis animi traducere motus. 4.1084. sed leviter poenas frangit Venus inter amorem 4.1085. blandaque refrenat morsus admixta voluptas. 4.1086. namque in eo spes est, unde est ardoris origo, 4.1087. restingui quoque posse ab eodem corpore flammam. 4.1088. quod fieri contra totum natura repugnat; 4.1089. unaque res haec est, cuius quam plurima habemus, 4.1090. tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus. 4.1091. nam cibus atque umor membris adsumitur intus; 4.1092. quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis, 4.1093. hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido. 4.1094. ex hominis vero facie pulchroque colore 4.1095. nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra fruendum 4.1096. tenvia; quae vento spes raptast saepe misella. 4.1097. ut bibere in somnis sitiens quom quaerit et umor 4.1098. non datur, ardorem qui membris stinguere possit, 4.1099. sed laticum simulacra petit frustraque laborat 4.1100. in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans, 4.1101. sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis, 4.1102. nec satiare queunt spectando corpora coram 4.1103. nec manibus quicquam teneris abradere membris 4.1104. possunt errantes incerti corpore toto. 4.1105. denique cum membris conlatis flore fruuntur 4.1106. aetatis, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus 4.1107. atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat arva, 4.1108. adfigunt avide corpus iunguntque salivas 4.1109. oris et inspirant pressantes dentibus ora, 4.1110. ne quiquam, quoniam nihil inde abradere possunt 4.1111. nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto; 4.1112. nam facere inter dum velle et certare videntur. 4.1113. usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent, 4.1114. membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt. 4.1115. tandem ubi se erupit nervis coniecta cupido, 4.1116. parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper. 4.1117. inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit, 4.1118. cum sibi quod cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt, 4.1119. nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat. 4.1120. usque adeo incerti tabescunt volnere caeco. 4.1160. nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, 4.1161. caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, 4.1162. parvula, pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, 4.1163. magna atque inmanis cataplexis plenaque honoris. 4.1164. balba loqui non quit, traulizi, muta pudens est; 4.1165. at flagrans, odiosa, loquacula Lampadium fit. 4.1166. ischnon eromenion tum fit, cum vivere non quit 4.1167. prae macie; rhadine verost iam mortua tussi. 4.1168. at nimia et mammosa Ceres est ipsa ab Iaccho, 4.1169. simula Silena ac Saturast, labeosa philema. 4.1170. cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 4.1175. et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 4.1176. quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachint. 4.1177. at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 4.1178. floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 4.1179. unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 4.1180. quem si iam ammissum venientem offenderit aura 4.1181. una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 4.1182. et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella 4.1183. stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 4.1184. plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 4.1190. et, si bello animost et non odiosa, vicissim 4.1191. praetermittere et humanis concedere rebus. 4.1209. Et commiscendo quom semine forte virilem 4.1210. femina vim vicit subita vi corripuitque, 4.1211. tum similes matrum materno semine fiunt, 4.1212. ut patribus patrio. sed quos utriusque figurae 4.1213. esse vides, iuxtim miscentes vulta parentum, 4.1214. corpore de patrio et materno sanguine crescunt, 4.1215. semina cum Veneris stimulis excita per artus 4.1216. obvia conflixit conspirans mutuus ardor, 4.1217. et neque utrum superavit eorum nec superatumst. 4.1218. fit quoque ut inter dum similes existere avorum 4.1219. possint et referant proavorum saepe figuras, 4.1220. propterea quia multa modis primordia multis 4.1221. mixta suo celant in corpore saepe parentis, 4.1222. quae patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta. 4.1223. inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras, 4.1224. maiorumque refert voltus vocesque comasque; 4.1225. quandoquidem nihilo magis haec de semine certo 4.1226. fiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis. 4.1227. et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclum 4.1228. maternoque mares existunt corpore creti; 4.1229. semper enim partus duplici de semine constat, 4.1230. atque utri similest magis id quod cumque creatur, 4.1231. eius habet plus parte aequa; quod cernere possis, 4.1232. sive virum suboles sivest muliebris origo. 4.1233. Nec divina satum genitalem numina cuiquam 4.1234. absterrent, pater a gnatis ne dulcibus umquam 4.1235. appelletur et ut sterili Venere exigat aevom; 4.1236. quod plerumque putant et multo sanguine maesti 4.1237. conspergunt aras adolentque altaria donis, 4.1238. ut gravidas reddant uxores semine largo; 4.1239. ne quiquam divom numen sortisque fatigant; 4.1240. nam steriles nimium crasso sunt semine partim, 4.1241. et liquido praeter iustum tenuique vicissim. 4.1242. tenve locis quia non potis est adfigere adhaesum, 4.1243. liquitur extemplo et revocatum cedit abortu. 4.1244. crassius hinc porro quoniam concretius aequo 4.1245. mittitur, aut non tam prolixo provolat ictu 4.1246. aut penetrare locos aeque nequit aut penetratum 4.1247. aegre admiscetur muliebri semine semen. 4.1248. nam multum harmoniae Veneris differre videntur. 4.1249. atque alias alii complent magis ex aliisque 4.1250. succipiunt aliae pondus magis inque gravescunt. 4.1251. et multae steriles Hymenaeis ante fuerunt 4.1252. pluribus et nactae post sunt tamen unde puellos 4.1253. suscipere et partu possent ditescere dulci. 4.1254. et quibus ante domi fecundae saepe nequissent 4.1255. uxoris parere, inventast illis quoque compar 4.1256. natura, ut possent gnatis munire senectam. 4.1257. usque adeo magni refert, ut semina possint 4.1258. seminibus commisceri genitaliter apta 4.1259. crassaque conveniant liquidis et liquida crassis. 4.1260. atque in eo refert quo victu vita colatur; 4.1261. namque aliis rebus concrescunt semina membris 4.1262. atque aliis extenvantur tabentque vicissim. 4.1263. et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas. 4.1264. id quoque permagni refert; nam more ferarum 4.1265. quadrupedumque magis ritu plerumque putantur 4.1266. concipere uxores, quia sic loca sumere possunt 4.1267. pectoribus positis sublatis semina lumbis. 4.1268. nec molles opus sunt motus uxoribus hilum. 4.1269. nam mulier prohibet se concipere atque repugnat, 4.1270. clunibus ipsa viri Venerem si laeta retractat 4.1271. atque exossato ciet omni pectore fluctus; 4.1272. eicit enim sulcum recta regione viaque 4.1273. vomeris atque locis avertit seminis ictum. 4.1274. idque sua causa consuerunt scorta moveri, 4.1275. ne complerentur crebro gravidaeque iacerent, 4.1276. et simul ipsa viris Venus ut concinnior esset; 4.1277. coniugibus quod nil nostris opus esse videtur. 4.1278. Nec divinitus inter dum Venerisque sagittis 4.1279. deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur; 4.1280. nam facit ipsa suis inter dum femina factis 4.1281. morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, 4.1282. ut facile insuescat secum te degere vitam. 4.1283. quod super est, consuetudo concinnat amorem; 4.1284. nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 4.1285. vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. 4.1286. nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis 4.1287. umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa? 5.43. at nisi purgatumst pectus, quae proelia nobis 5.1218. praeterea cui non animus formidine divum 5.1219. contrahitur, cui non correpunt membra pavore, 5.1220. fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus 5.1221. contremit et magnum percurrunt murmura caelum? 5.1222. non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi 5.1223. corripiunt divum percussi membra timore, 5.1224. ne quod ob admissum foede dictumve superbe 5.1225. poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adauctum? 5.1226. summa etiam cum vis violenti per mare venti 5.1227. induperatorem classis super aequora verrit 5.1228. cum validis pariter legionibus atque elephantis, 5.1229. non divom pacem votis adit ac prece quaesit 5.1230. ventorum pavidus paces animasque secundas? 5.1231. ne quiquam, quoniam violento turbine saepe 5.1232. correptus nihilo fertur minus ad vada leti. 5.1233. usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam 5.1234. opterit et pulchros fascis saevasque secures 5.1235. proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur. 5.1236. denique sub pedibus tellus cum tota vacillat 5.1237. concussaeque cadunt urbes dubiaeque mitur, 5.1238. quid mirum si se temnunt mortalia saecla 5.1239. atque potestatis magnas mirasque relinquunt 5.1240. in rebus viris divum, quae cuncta gubernent? 6.379. Hoc est igniferi naturam fulminis ipsam 6.380. perspicere et qua vi faciat rem quamque videre, 6.381. non Tyrrhena retro volventem carmina frustra 6.382. indicia occultae divum perquirere mentis, 6.383. unde volans ignis pervenerit aut in utram se 6.384. verterit hinc partim, quo pacto per loca saepta 6.385. insinuarit, et hinc dominatus ut extulerit se, 6.386. quidve nocere queat de caelo fulminis ictus. 6.387. quod si Iuppiter atque alii fulgentia divi 6.388. terrifico quatiunt sonitu caelestia templa 6.389. et iaciunt ignem quo cuiquest cumque voluntas, 6.390. cur quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumquest 6.391. non faciunt icti flammas ut fulguris halent 6.392. pectore perfixo, documen mortalibus acre, 6.393. et potius nulla sibi turpi conscius in re 6.394. volvitur in flammis innoxius inque peditur 6.395. turbine caelesti subito correptus et igni? 6.396. cur etiam loca sola petunt frustraque laborant? 6.397. an tum bracchia consuescunt firmantque lacertos? 6.398. in terraque patris cur telum perpetiuntur 6.399. optundi? cur ipse sinit neque parcit in hostis? 6.400. denique cur numquam caelo iacit undique puro 6.401. Iuppiter in terras fulmen sonitusque profundit? 6.402. an simul ac nubes successere, ipse in eas tum 6.403. descendit, prope ut hinc teli determinet ictus? 6.404. in mare qua porro mittit ratione? quid undas 6.405. arguit et liquidam molem camposque natantis? 6.406. praeterea si vult caveamus fulminis ictum, 6.407. cur dubitat facere ut possimus cernere missum? 6.408. si nec opitis autem volt opprimere igni, 6.409. cur tonat ex illa parte, ut vitare queamus, 6.410. cur tenebras ante et fremitus et murmura concit? 6.411. et simul in multas partis qui credere possis 6.412. mittere? an hoc ausis numquam contendere factum, 6.413. ut fierent ictus uno sub tempore plures? 6.414. at saepest numero factum fierique necessest, 6.415. ut pluere in multis regionibus et cadere imbris, 6.416. fulmina sic uno fieri sub tempore multa. 6.417. postremo cur sancta deum delubra suasque 6.418. discutit infesto praeclaras fulmine sedes 6.419. et bene facta deum frangit simulacra suisque 6.420. demit imaginibus violento volnere honorem? 6.421. altaque cur plerumque petit loca plurimaque eius 6.422. montibus in summis vestigia cernimus ignis? | |
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| 100. Horace, Sermones, 1.1.9, 1.1.28, 1.1.80-1.1.87, 1.3.96, 1.10.54, 2.2.65, 2.6.28-2.6.31, 2.7.118 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 33, 42, 87, 119 |
| 101. Horace, Letters, 1.1.14, 1.4.26-1.4.30 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 318; Yona (2018) 42 |
102. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 121 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 | 121. These then, to speak with strict propriety are the prices to be paid for the preserving and ransoming of the soul which is desirous of freedom. And may we not say that in this way a very necessary doctrine is brought forward? Namely that every wise man is a ransom for a worthless one, who would not be able to last for even a short time, if the wise man by the exertion of mercy and prudence did not take thought for his lasting; as a physician opposing himself to the infirmities of an invalid, and either rendering them slighter, or altogether removing them unless the disease comes on with irresistible violence, and surmounts all the ingenuity of medical skill. |
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| 103. Catullus, Poems, 7.3, 7.7 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 119 |
| 104. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.19-1.23, 1.30-1.34, 1.39-1.42, 2.131 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 46, 47, 49, 79 |
| 105. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
106. Philo of Alexandria, On The Eternity of The World, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 125 | 76. But some of those who used to hold a different opinion, being overpowered by truth, have changed their doctrine; for beauty has a power which is very attractive, and the truth is beyond all things beautiful, as falsehood on the contrary is enormously ugly; therefore Boethus, and Posidonius, and Panaetius, men of great learning in the Stoic doctrines, as if seized with a sudden inspiration, abandoning all the stories about conflagrations and regeneration, have come over to the more divine doctrine of the incorruptibility of the world; |
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107. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 256-257, 26 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 26. But we must not be ignorant that repentance occupies the second place only, next after perfection, just as the change from sickness to convalescence is inferior to perfect uninterrupted health. Therefore, that which is continuous and perfect in virtues is very near divine power, but that condition which is improvement advancing in process of time is the peculiar blessing of a welldisposed soul, which does not continue in its childish pursuits, but by more vigorous thoughts and inclinations, such as really become a man, seeks a tranquil steadiness of soul, and which attains to it by its conception of what is good. V. |
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| 108. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 345, 385 |
| 109. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 1.29, 2.4, 2.57, 4.74, 4.177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe •zeno of citium Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 148; Sorabji (2000) 345, 346, 385 |
| 110. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 10.5.2, 10.12.11, 37.2.31, 37.3.61 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, ethics of Found in books: Long (2006) 11; Sorabji (2000) 213 |
| 111. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 2.8, 3.128-3.134, 3.140-3.147 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385, 386 |
| 112. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 17.109 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246 |
| 113. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 34, 111 |
114. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.103, 2.115, 2.138, 3.113 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 276, 386 | 1.103. For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers become united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts. For the scars and impressions of their old offences remain not the less in the souls of those who repent. 2.115. And at the same time it sympathises with the man who is in too great a state of indigence to do so, and bestows its compassion on him, giving him back his former property with the exception of any fields which have been consecrated by a vow, and are so placed in the class of offerings to God. And it is contrary to divine law that any thing which has been offered to God should ever by lapse of time become profane. On which account it is commanded that the accurate value of those fields shall be fully exacted, without showing any favour to the man who dedicated the offering.XXIII. 2.138. Secondly, it shows mercy and compassion on those who have been treated unjustly, whose burden of distress it lightens by giving them a share in grace and gift; for the double portion of the inheriting son was no less likely to please the mother, who will be encouraged by the kindness of the law, which did not permit her and her offspring to be totally overcome by their enemies. 3.113. for those men are devoted to pleasure who are not influenced by the wish of propagating children, and of perpetuating their race, when they have connection with women, but who are only like boars or he-goats seeking the enjoyment that arises from such a connection. Again, who can be greater haters of their species than those who are the implacable and ferocious enemies of their own children? Unless, indeed, any one is so foolish as to imagine that these men can be humane to strangers who act in a barbarous manner to those who are united to them by ties of blood. |
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115. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 67, 137 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 | 137. Come, and at once abandoning all other things, learn to know yourselves, and tell us plainly what ye yourselves are in respect of your bodies, in respect of your souls, in respect of your external senses, and in respect of your reason. Tell us now with respect to one, and that the smallest, perhaps, of the senses, what sight is, and how it is that you see; tell us what hearing is, and how it is that you hear; tell us what taste is, what touch is, what smell is, and how it is that you exercise the energies of each of these faculties; and what the sources of them are from which they originate. |
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| 116. Ovid, Tristia, 5.4.7-5.4.8, 5.4.15-5.4.20 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Williams and Vol (2022) 281 |
117. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 2.31-2.32, 3.273-3.274 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 273| 2.31. Inde loco medius rerum novitate paventem 2.32. Sol oculis iuvenem, quibus adspicit omnia, vidit 3.273. Surgit ab his solio fulvaque recondita nube 3.274. limen adit Semeles. Nec nubes ante removit, | |
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118. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 1.35-1.40, 2.501, 2.657-2.662, 3.41, 3.771 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 222, 279; Williams and Vol (2022) 127| 1.35. Principio, quod amare velis, reperire labora, 1.36. rend= 1.37. Proximus huic labor est placitam exorare puellam: 1.38. rend= 1.39. Hic modus, haec nostro signabitur area curru: 1.40. rend= 2.501. Qui sibi notus erit, solus sapienter amabit, 2.657. Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur, 2.658. rend= 2.659. Si straba, sit Veneri similis: si rava, Minervae: 2.660. rend= 2.661. Dic habilem, quaecumque brevis, quae turgida, plenam, 2.662. rend= 3.41. Quid vos perdiderit, dicam? nescistis amare: 3.771. Nota sibi sit quaeque: modos a corpore certos | |
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| 119. Hirtius, Commentarius De Bello Alexandrino, 1.21.3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2019) 83 |
120. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 144, 177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 177. For absolutely never to do anything wrong at all is a peculiar attribute of God, and perhaps one may also say of a God-like man. But when one has erred, then to change so as to adopt a blameless course of life for the future is the part of a wise man, and of one who is not altogether ignorant of what is expedient. |
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| 121. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 82 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 122. Herodotus Medicus, Fragments, 3.154, 9.109 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 273 |
| 123. Plutarch, How To Tell A Flatterer From A Friend, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 218 |
124. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 36.55, 48.14-48.16, 80.3 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Long (2006) 272; Long (2019) 202; Malherbe et al (2014) 765 | 36.55. For indeed, when the mind alone had been left and had filled with itself immeasurable space, since it had poured itself evenly in all directions and nothing in it remained dense but complete porosity prevailed â at which time it becomes most beautiful â having obtained the purest nature of unadulterated light, it immediately longed for the existence that it had at first. Accordingly, becoming enamoured of that control and goverce and concord which it once maintained not only over the three natures of sun and moon and the other stars, but also over absolutely all animals and plants, it became eager to generate and distribute everything and to make the orderly universe then existent once more far better and more resplendent because newer. 48.14. My concern is partly indeed for you, but partly also for myself. For if, when a philosopher has taken a government in hand, he proves unable to produce a united city, this is indeed a shocking state of affairs, one admitting no escape, just as if a shipwright while sailing in a ship should fail to render the ship seaworthy, or as if a man who claimed to be a pilot should swerve toward the wave itself, or as if a builder should obtain a house and, seeing that it was falling to decay, should disregard this fact but, giving it a coat of stucco and a wash of colour, should imagine that he is achieving something. If my purpose on this occasion were to speak in behalf of concord, I should have had a good deal to say about not only human experiences but celestial also, to the effect that these divine and grand creations, as it happens, require concord and friendship; otherwise there is danger of ruin and destruction for this beautiful work of the creator, the universe. 48.15. But perhaps I am talking too long, when I should instead go and call the proconsul to our meeting. Accordingly I shall say only this much more â is it not disgraceful that bees are of one mind and no one has ever seen a swarm that is factious and fights against itself, but, on the contrary, they both work and live together, providing food for one another and using it as well? "What!" some one objects, "do we not find there too bees that are called drones, annoying creatures which devour the honey?" Yes, by Heaven, we do indeed; but still the farmers often tolerate even them, not wishing to disturb the hive, and believe it better to waste some of the honey rather than to throw all the bees into confusion. 48.16. But at Prusa, it may be, there are no lazy drones, buzzing in impotence, sipping the honey. Again, it is a great delight to observe the ants, how they go forth from the nest, how they aid one another with their loads, and how they yield the trails to one another. Is it not disgraceful, then, as I was saying, that human beings should be more unintelligent than wild creatures which are so tiny and unintelligent? Now this which I have been saying is in a way just idle talk. And civil strife does not deserve even to be named among us, and let no man mention it. 80.3. As for myself, however, I regard it as a splendid and blessed state of being, if in the midst of slaves one can be a free man and in the midst of subjects be independent. To attain this state many wars were waged by the Lydians against the Phrygians and by the Phrygians against the Lydians, and many, too, by both Ionians and Dorians and, in fact, by all peoples, yet no one has ever, because he was enamoured of independence in the spiritual sense, undertaken to use his own personal laws; instead they all wrangle over the laws of Solon and Draco and Numa and Zaleucus, bent on following the one code but not the other, though, on the other hand, not even one of these law-givers had framed the sort of laws he should. Why, Solon himself, according to report, declared that he was proposing for the Athenians, not what satisfied himself, but rather what he assumed they would accept. |
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| 125. Plutarch, Sulla, 26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 267 |
| 126. Epictetus, Discourses, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 127. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.9.16, 1.9.20, 1.24.19-1.24.20, 2.2, 3.26.29, 19.2, 31.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2019) 202; Sorabji (2000) 214 |
| 128. Epictetus, Fragments, 9.85-9.86 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 129. Heraclitus of Ephesus (Attributed Author), Letters, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 619 |
| 130. Plutarch, Table Talk, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 131. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 132. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 133. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.7.29, 1.28.4, 4.2.5, 4.23.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 47, 98; Inwood and Warren (2020) 21; Sorabji (2000) 254 |
| 134. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 64 |
| 135. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, republic •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 136. Plutarch, Cato The Younger, 37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 29 |
| 137. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 138. Plutarch, Consolation To His Wife, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 139. Plutarch, How To Profit By One'S Enemies, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 140. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 197, 235, 236 |
| 141. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 73, 74, 75 |
| 142. Plutarch, On Being A Busybody, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 |
| 143. Plutarch, On The Obsolescence of Oracles, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 134 |
144. New Testament, Matthew, 4.1-4.11, 5.7, 5.28, 13.24, 15.19, 26.37, 26.39, 26.41 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 219, 317, 320, 346, 349, 351, 353, 354, 372, 391, 397| 4.1. Τότε [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς ἀνήχθη εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. 4.2. καὶ νηστεύσας ἡμέρας τεσσεράκοντα καὶ νύκτας τεσσεράκοντα ὕστερον ἐπείνασεν. 4.3. Καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ πειράζων εἶπεν αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὸν ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται. 4.4. ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν Γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ. 4.5. Τότε παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν, καὶ ἔστησεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ, 4.6. καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν κάτω· γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι Τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε, μή ποτε προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου. 4.7. ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Πάλιν γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου. 4.8. Πάλιν παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν λίαν, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ πάσας τὰς βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, 4.9. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ταῦτά σοι πάντα δώσω ἐὰν πεσὼν προσκυνήσῃς μοι. 4.10. τότε λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ὕπαγε, Σατανᾶ· γέγραπται γάρ Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις. 4.11. Τότε ἀφίησιν αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄγγελοι προσῆλθον καὶ διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 5.7. μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. 5.28. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι [αὐτὴν] ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. 13.24. Ἄλλην παραβολὴν παρέθηκεν αὐτοῖς λέγων Ὡμοιώθη ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀνθρώπῳ σπείραντι καλὸν σπέρμα ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ αὐτοῦ. 15.19. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς καρδίας ἐξέρχονται διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί, φόνοι, μοιχεῖαι, πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, ψευδομαρτυρίαι, βλασφημίαι. 26.37. καὶ παραλαβὼν τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς δύο υἱοὺς Ζεβεδαίου ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν. 26.39. καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλʼ ὡς σύ. 26.41. γρηγορεῖτε καὶ προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς πειρασμόν· τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής. | 4.1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil. 4.2. When he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was hungry afterward. 4.3. The tempter came and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread." 4.4. But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God.'" 4.5. Then the devil took him into the holy city. He set him on the pinnacle of the temple, 4.6. and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge concerning you.' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, So that you don't dash your foot against a stone.'" 4.7. Jesus said to him, "Again, it is written, 'You shall not test the Lord, your God.'" 4.8. Again, the devil took him to an exceedingly high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and their glory. 4.9. He said to him, "I will give you all of these things, if you will fall down and worship me." 4.10. Then Jesus said to him, "Get behind me, Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.'" 4.11. Then the devil left him, and behold, angels came and ministered to him. 5.7. Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy. 5.28. but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. 13.24. He set another parable before them, saying, "The Kingdom of Heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field, 15.19. For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, sexual sins, thefts, false testimony, and blasphemies. 26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled. 26.39. He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire." 26.41. Watch and pray, that you don't enter into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." |
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145. New Testament, Mark, 1.12-1.13, 7.21-7.22, 14.33, 14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320, 346, 350, 353, 369| 1.12. Καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν ἐκβάλλει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον. 1.13. καὶ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρας πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ, καὶ ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων, καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 7.21. ἔσωθεν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ διαλογισμοὶ οἱ κακοὶ ἐκπορεύονται, πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, φόνοι, 7.22. μοιχεῖαι, πλεονεξίαι, πονηρίαι, δόλος, ἀσέλγεια, ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός, βλασφημία, ὑπερηφανία, ἀφροσύνη· 14.33. καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τὸν Ἰάκωβον καὶ τὸν Ἰωάνην μετʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἤρξατο ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν, 14.36. καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ. | 1.12. Immediately the Spirit drove him out into the wilderness. 1.13. He was there in the wilderness forty days tempted by Satan. He was with the wild animals; and the angels ministered to him. 7.21. For from within, out of the hearts of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, sexual sins, murders, thefts, 7.22. covetings, wickedness, deceit, lustful desires, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, and foolishness. 14.33. He took with him Peter, James, and John, and began to be greatly troubled and distressed. 14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire." |
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146. New Testament, Luke, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353| 4.4. καὶ ἀπεκρίθη πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰησοῦς Γέγραπται ὅτι Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. | 4.4. Jesus answered him, saying, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God.'" |
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147. New Testament, Romans, 6.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 350| 6.10. ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ· | 6.10. For the death that he died, he died to sin one time; but the life that he lives, he lives to God. |
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| 148. Plutarch, Platonic Questions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 138 |
149. New Testament, Hebrews, 2.13-2.14, 4.15, 5.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349, 351, 352| 2.13. καὶ πάλιν 2.14. ἐπεὶ οὖντὰ παιδίακεκοινώνηκεν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός, καὶ αὐτὸς παραπλησίως μετέσχεν τῶν αὐτῶν, ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸν διάβολον, 4.15. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἀρχιερέα μὴ δυνάμενον συνπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν, πεπειρασμένον δὲ κατὰ πάντα καθʼ ὁμοιότητα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. 5.7. ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, δεήσεις τε καὶ ἱκετηρίας πρὸς τὸν δυνάμενον σώζειν αὐτὸν ἐκ θανάτου μετὰ κραυγῆς ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ δακρύων προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας, | 2.13. Again, "I will put my trust in him." Again, "Behold, here am I and the children whom God has given me." 2.14. Since then the children have shared in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death he might bring to nothing him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, 4.15. For we don't have a high priest who can't be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one who has been in all points tempted like we are, yet without sin. 5.7. He, in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and petitions with strong crying and tears to him who was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear, |
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| 150. Plutarch, On The E At Delphi, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 245, 247, 248 |
151. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.26, 6.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349| 4.26. ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε· ὁ ἥλιος μὴ ἐπιδυέτω ἐπὶ παροργισμῷ ὑμῶν, 6.12. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. | 4.26. "Be angry, and don't sin." Don't let the sun go down on your wrath, 6.12. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world's rulers of the darkness of this age, and against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places. |
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152. New Testament, Acts, 17.18 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765| 17.18. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων καὶ Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καί τινες ἔλεγον Τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; οἱ δέ Ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι· | 17.18. Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers also encountered him. Some said, "What does this babbler want to say?"Others said, "He seems to be advocating foreign demons," because he preached Jesus and the resurrection. |
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153. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 2.02.00, 4.1, 4.1-5.11, 4.2, 4.02.00 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 178| 4.2. οἴδατε γὰρ τίνας παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν ὑμῖν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ. | 4.2. For you know what charge we gave you through the Lord Jesus. |
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| 154. Plutarch, On The Face Which Appears In The Orb of The Moon, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 130 |
| 155. Plutarch, On The Sign of Socrates, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 |
| 156. Plutarch, On Disease And Grief, 6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 215 |
| 157. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72; Long (2006) 10 |
| 158. Plutarch, Advice About Keeping Well, 125 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 159. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 160. Lucan, Pharsalia, 7.444-7.455 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 211 |
| 161. Juvenal, Satires, 5.36-5.37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 29 |
162. Plutarch, Lycurgus, 15.14-15.16, 31.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Beneker et al. (2022) 233| 31.2. ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαβε τῆς πολιτείας ὑπόθεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ πάντες ὅσοι τι περὶ τούτων ἐπιχειρήσαντες εἰπεῖν ἐπαινοῦνται, γράμματα καὶ λόγους ἀπολιπόντες μόνον, ὁ δὲ οὐ γράμματα καὶ λόγους, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ πολιτείαν ἀμίμητον εἰς φῶς προενεγκάμενος, καὶ τοῖς ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι τὴν λεγομένην περὶ τὸν σοφὸν διάθεσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιδείξας ὅλην τὴν πόλιν φιλοσοφοῦσαν, εἰκότως ὑπερῆρε τῇ δόξῃ τοὺς πώποτε πολιτευσαμένους ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι. | 31.2. His design for a civil polity was adopted by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and by all those who have won approval for their treatises on this subject, although they left behind them only writings and words. Lycurgus, on the other hand, produced not writings and words, but an actual polity which was beyond imitation, and because he gave, to those who maintain that the much talked of natural disposition to wisdom exists only in theory, an example of an entire city given to the love of wisdom, his fame rightly transcended that of all who ever founded polities among the Greeks. |
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| 163. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
164. New Testament, Galatians, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315| 5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε. | 5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. |
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| 165. Achilles Tatius, On The Sphere, 13-14 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 134 |
| 166. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, a b c d\n0 '5.11.6 '5.11.6 '5 11\n1 6.3.82 6.3.82 6 3 \n2 6.3.8 6.3.8 6 3 \n3 6.3.7 6.3.7 6 3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 693 |
| 167. Statius, Thebais, 8.751-8.766, 10.703-10.711 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 14, 73 |
| 168. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 192, 390 |
| 169. Seneca The Younger, Thyestes, 390 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 23 |
| 170. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.6, 5.16, 6.1, 9, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 10, 11, 11.1, 12.4, 12.5-16.4, 12.5, 19.1, 20.2, 20.3, 23, 24, 24.5-25.3, 26, 26.6, 26.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 171. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Polybium (Ad Polybium De Consolatione) (Dialogorum Liber Xi), 18.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 172. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 173. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 174. Seneca The Younger, De Otio Sapientis (Dialogorum Liber Viii), 2.1, 3.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 318 |
| 175. Arrian, Epicteti Dissertationes, 1.6.32 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 204 |
| 176. Seneca The Younger, Apocolocyntosis, 8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 177. Aspasius, Nicomachian Ethics, 42.27-47.2, 42.31-43.2, 42.33-44.8, 43.30, 43.31, 44.21, 44.22, 44.33-45.10, 45.31-46.3, 46.4, 46.5, 46.10, 46.11, 46.12, 46.27, 46.28, 46.29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 136 |
| 178. Seneca The Younger, De Providentia (Dialogorum Liber I), 2.9-2.12, 6.6-6.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, suicide Found in books: Agri (2022) 29; Sorabji (2000) 214 |
| 179. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 1.2, 1.5, 2.3, 13.2-13.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 182, 218, 219 |
| 180. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 16.3, 22.1, 22.4, 23.5, 24.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170, 171, 172, 184 |
181. Tosefta, Shekalim, 1.238, 2.15-2.16, 2.29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, tripartite philosophy Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 178, 809| 2.15. "ג' גזברין מה הן עושין [בהן] היו פודין את הערכין ואת החרמים ואת ההקדשות [ואת מעשר שני] וכל מלאכת הקדש בהן היתה נעשית שבעה אמרכלים מה הן עושין שבעה מפתחות העזרה בידן רצה אחד מהן לפתוח אינו יכול עד [שיתכנסו] כולן [נתכנסו כולן] אמרכלין פותחין וגזברין נכנסין ויוצאין ולפי כבוד [הנכנסין] היו יוצאין א\"ר יהודה למה נקרא שמו אמרכל מפני שמר על הכל היו כשרין בכהנים [בלוים] ובישראלים מי שיש [לו] בן ואח בן קודם [אח ובן] אח קודם כל הקודם בנחלה קודם בשררה ובלבד שינהג כמנהג אבותיו.", 2.16. "ד' חותמות היו במקדש חוטא היה מביא לוגו עמו חוטא דל כדברי בן עזאי היה מביא לוגו עמו. כשם שהיה לשכת חשאין במקדש כך היתה בכל עיר ועיר מפני שעניים בני טובים מתפרנסין מתוכה בחשאי.", | |
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| 182. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, a b c d\n0 '5.11.6 '5.11.6 '5 11\n1 6.3.82 6.3.82 6 3 \n2 6.3.8 6.3.8 6 3 \n3 6.3.7 6.3.7 6 3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 693 |
| 183. Clement of Rome, 1 Clement, '20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765 |
| 184. Appian, Civil Wars, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
185. Tacitus, Annals, 14.57, 16.22, 16.33.5, 16.34-16.55 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 29| 14.57. Perculso Seneca promptum fuit Rufum Faenium imminuere Agrippinae amicitiam in eo crimitibus. validiorque in dies Tigellinus et malas artes, quibus solis pollebat, gratiores ratus si principem societate scelerum obstringeret, metus eius rimatur; compertoque Plautum et Sullam maxime timeri, Plautum in Asiam, Sullam in Galliam Narbonensem nuper amotos, nobilitatem eorum et propinquos huic Orientis, illi Germaniae exercitus commemorat. non se, ut Burrum, diversas spes sed solam incolumitatem Neronis spectare; cui caveri utcumque ab urbanis insidiis praesenti opera: longinquos motus quonam modo comprimi posse? erectas Gallias ad nomen dictatorium nec minus suspensos Asiae populos claritudine avi Drusi. Sullam inopem, unde praecipuam audaciam, et simulatorem segnitiae dum temeritati locum reperiret. Plautum magnis opibus ne fingere quidem cupidinem otii sed veterum Romanorum imitamenta praeferre, adsumpta etiam Stoicorum adrogantia sectaque quae turbidos et negotiorum adpetentis faciat. nec ultra mora. Sulla sexto die pervectis Massiliam percussoribus ante metum et rumorem interficitur cum epulandi causa discumberet. relatum caput eius inlusit Nero tamquam praematura canitie deforme. 16.22. Quin et illa obiectabat, principio anni vitare Thraseam sollemne ius iurandum; nuncupationibus votorum non adesse, quamvis quindecimvirali sacerdotio praeditum; numquam pro salute principis aut caelesti voce immolavisse; adsiduum olim et indefessum, qui vulgaribus quoque patrum consultis semet fautorem aut adversarium ostenderet, triennio non introisse curiam; nuperrimeque, cum ad coercendos Silanum et Veterem certatim concurreretur, privatis potius clientium negotiis vacavisse. secessionem iam id et partis et, si idem multi audeant, bellum esse. 'ut quondam C. Caesarem' inquit 'et M. Catonem, ita nunc te, Nero, et Thraseam avida discordiarum civitas loquitur. et habet sectatores vel potius satellites, qui nondum contumaciam sententiarum, sed habitum vultumque eius sectantur, rigidi et tristes, quo tibi lasciviam exprobrent. huic uni incolumitas tua sine cura, artes sine honore. prospera principis respuit: etiamne luctibus et doloribus non satiatur? eiusdem animi est Poppaeam divam non credere, cuius in acta divi Augusti et divi Iuli non iurare. spernit religiones, abrogat leges. diurna populi Romani per provincias, per exercitus curatius leguntur, ut noscatur quid Thrasea non fecerit. aut transeamus ad illa instituta, si potiora sunt, aut nova cupientibus auferatur dux et auctor. ista secta Tuberones et Favonios, veteri quoque rei publicae ingrata nomina, genuit. ut imperium evertant libertatem praeferunt: si perverterint, libertatem ipsam adgredientur. frustra Cassium amovisti, si gliscere et vigere Brutorum aemulos passurus es. denique nihil ipse de Thrasea scripseris: disceptatorem senatum nobis relinque.' extollit ira promptum Cossutiani animum Nero adicitque Marcellum Eprium acri eloquentia. 16.34. Tum ad Thraseam in hortis agentem quaestor consulis missus vesperascente iam die. inlustrium virorum feminarumque coetus frequentis egerat, maxime intentus Demetrio Cynicae institutionis doctori, cum quo, ut coniectare erat intentione vultus et auditis, si qua clarius proloquebantur, de natura animae et dissociatione spiritus corporisque inquirebat, donec advenit Domitius Caecilianus ex intimis amicis et ei quid senatus censuisset exposuit. igitur flentis queritantisque qui aderant facessere propere Thrasea neu pericula sua miscere cum sorte damnati hortatur, Arriamque temptantem mariti suprema et exemplum Arriae matris sequi monet retinere vitam filiaeque communi subsidium unicum non adimere. 16.35. Tum progressus in porticum illic a quaestore reperitur, laetitiae propior, quia Helvidium generum suum Italia tantum arceri cognoverat. accepto dehinc senatus consulto Helvidium et Demetrium in cubiculum inducit; porrectisque utriusque brachii venis, postquam cruorem effudit, humum super spargens, propius vocato quaestore 'libamus' inquit 'Iovi liberatori. specta, iuvenis; et omen quidem dii prohibeant, ceterum in ea tempora natus es quibus firmare animum expediat constantibus exemplis.' post lentitudine exitus gravis cruciatus adferente, obversis in Demetrium | 14.57. With Seneca brought low, it was a simple matter to undermine Faenius Rufus, the charge in his case being friendship with Agrippina. Tigellinus, too, growing stronger with every day, and convinced that the mischievous arts, which were his one source of power, would be all the more acceptable, could he bind the emperor to himself by a partnership in crime, probed his fears, and, discovering the main objects of his alarm to be Plautus and Sulla â both lately removed, the former to Asia, the latter to Narbonese Gaul â began to draw attention to their distinguished lineage and their nearness, respectively, to the armies of the East and of Germany. "Unlike Burrus," he said, "he had not in view two irreconcilable hopes, but purely the safety of Nero. In the capital, where he could work on the spot, the imperial security was more or less provided for; but how were outbreaks at a distance to be stifled? Gaul was alert at the sound of the Dictator's name; and equally the peoples of Asia were unbalanced by the glory of such a grandsire as Drusus. Sulla was indigent, therefore greatly daring, and wore the mask of lethargy only till he could find an occasion for temerity. Plautus, with his great fortune, did not even affect a desire for peace, but, not content to parade his mimicries of the ancient Romans, had taken upon himself the Stoic arrogance and the mantle of a sect which inculcated sedition and an appetite for politics." There was no further delay. On the sixth day following, the slayers had made the crossing to Massilia, and Sulla, who had taken his place at the dinner-table, was despatched before a whisper of alarm had reached him. The head was carried back to Rome, where the premature grey hairs disfiguring it provoked the merriment of Nero. 16.22. He preferred other charges as well:â "At the beginning of the year, Thrasea evaded the customary oath; though the holder of a quindecimviral priesthood, he took no part in the national vows; he had never offered a sacrifice for the welfare of the emperor or for his celestial voice. Once a constant and indefatigable member, who showed himself the advocate or the adversary of the most commonplace resolutions of the Fathers, for three years he had not set foot within the curia; and but yesterday, when his colleagues were gathering with emulous haste to crush Silanus and Vetus, he had preferred to devote his leisure to the private cases of his clients. Matters were come already to a schism and to factions: if many made the same venture, it was war! 'As once,' he said, 'this discord-loving state prated of Caesar and Cato, so now, Nero, it prates of yourself and Thrasea. And he has his followers â his satellites, rather â who affect, not as yet the contumacity of his opinions, but his bearing and his looks, and whose stiffness and austerity are designed for an impeachment of your wantonness. To him alone your safety is a thing uncared for, your talents a thing unhonoured. The imperial happiness he cannot brook: can he not even be satisfied with the imperial bereavements and sorrows? Not to believe Poppaea deity bespeaks the same temper that will not swear to the acts of the deified Augustus and the deified Julius. He contemns religion, he abrogates law. The journal of the Roman people is scanned throughout the provinces and armies with double care for news of what Thrasea has not done! Either let us pass over to his creed, if it is the better, or let these seekers after a new world lose their chief and their instigator. It is the sect that produced the Tuberones and the Favonii â names unloved even in the old republic. In order to subvert the empire, they make a parade of liberty: the empire overthrown, they will lay hands on liberty itself. You have removed Cassius to little purpose, if you intend to allow these rivals of the Bruti to multiply and flourish! A word in conclusion: write nothing yourself about Thrasea â leave the senate to decide between us!' " Nero fanned still more the eager fury of Cossutianus, and reinforced him with the mordant eloquence of Eprius Marcellus. 16.34. The consul's quaestor was then sent to Thrasea: he was spending the time in his gardens, and the day was already closing in for evening. He had brought together a large party of distinguished men and women, his chief attention been given to Demetrius, a master of the Cynic creed; with whom â to judge from his serious looks and the few words which caught the ear, when they chanced to raise their voices â he was debating the nature of the soul and the divorce of spirit and body. At last, Domitius Caecilianus, an intimate friend, arrived, and informed him of the decision reached by the senate. Accordingly, among the tears and expostulations of the company, Thrasea urged them to leave quickly, without linking their own hazardous lot to the fate of a condemned man. Arria, who aspired to follow her husband's ending and the precedent set by her mother and namesake, he advised to keep her life and not deprive the child of their union of her one support. 16.35. He now walked on to the colonnade; where the quaestor found him nearer to joy than to sorrow, because he had ascertained that Helvidius, his son-inâlaw, was merely debarred from Italy. Then, taking the decree of the senate, he led Helvidius and Demetrius into his bedroom, offered the arteries of both arms to the knife, and, when the blood had begun to flow, sprinkled it upon the ground, and called the quaestor nearer: "We are making a libation," he said, "to Jove the Liberator. Look, young man, and â may Heaven, indeed, avert the omen, but you have been born into times now it is expedient to steel the mind with instances of firmness." Soon, as the slowness of his end brought excruciating pain, turning his gaze upon Demetrius . . . |
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| 186. Suetonius, Domitianus, 10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 29 |
| 187. Seneca The Younger, Letters, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022) 131; Wardy and Warren (2018) 318 |
| 188. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Williams (2012) 277 |
| 189. Cebes of Thebes, Cebetis Tabula, 18.4-18.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 190. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 1.6.2, 2.20.2, 4.7-4.8, 4.39, 7.2.4-7.2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, republic •zeno, of citium •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Agri (2022) 29, 101; Sorabji (2000) 219, 235; Wynne (2019) 164 |
| 191. Apuleius, On Plato, 2.20.247 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 196 |
| 192. Apuleius, Apology, 15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, suicide Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 175, 214 |
| 193. Tertullian, On Patience, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 194. Tertullian, On The Soul, 20.5, 21.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 195. Tatian, Oration To The Greeks, '19 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765 |
| 196. Apuleius, Florida, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 403 |
| 197. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, None (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
| 198. Aelius Aristides, Orations, 23, 26, 1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Borg (2008) 14 |
| 199. Hierocles Stoicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.30 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137 |
| 200. Hierocles Stoicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.30 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137 |
| 201. Hierocles Stoicus, , 4.38-4.53 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007) 24 |
| 202. Censorinus, De Die Natali, 4.10 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137 |
| 203. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 809 |
| 204. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1, 2.1.13, 2.10.90-2.10.102 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 216, 276, 284, 389 |
| 205. Lucian, Demonax, 21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 619 |
206. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 55.3, 62.24-62.25, 65.13, 65.13.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 29; Wardy and Warren (2018) 318 | 55.3. 2. and in order that they might have no other excuse for being absent, he commanded that no court or other meeting which required their attendance should be held at that time. He also fixed by law the number of senators necessary for passing decrees, according to the several kinds of decrees, â to state only the chief points of the matter; and he increased the fines of those who without good excuse stayed away from the sessions.,3. And since many such offences had regularly gone unpunished owing to the large number of those who were liable to punishment, he commanded that if many were guilty, they should draw lots and one out of every five, according as the lot should fall, should incur the fine. He had the names of all the senators entered on a tablet and posted; and this practice, originating with him, is still observed each year.,4. Such were the measures he took to compel the attendance of the senators; but if on any occasion, as the result of some accident, fewer assembled than the occasion demanded, â and it should be explained that at every session, except when the emperor himself was present, the number of those in attendance was accurately counted, both at that time and later, for practically every matter of business, â the senators would proceed with their deliberations and their decision would be recorded, though it would not go into effect as if regularly passed, but instead, their action was what was termed auctoritas, the purpose of which was to make known their will.,5. For such is the general force of this word; to translate it into Greek by a term that will always be applicable is impossible. This same custom prevailed in case they ever assembled in haste at any but the usual place, or on any but the appointed day, or without a legal summons, or if by reason of the opposition of some of the tribunes a decree could not be passed and yet they were unwilling that their opinion should remain unknown; afterwards the resolution would be ratified according to established precedent and would receive the name of a decree.,6. This method, strictly followed for a long period by the men of old time, has in a way already become null and void, as has also the special privilege of the praetors. For they, becoming indigt that they could bring no proposal before the senate, though they outranked the tribunes, received from Augustus the right to do so, but in the course of time were deprived of it. These and the other laws which Augustus enacted at this time he had inscribed on tablets and posted in the senate before bringing them up for consideration, and he allowed the senators to enter the chamber in groups of two and read them, so that if any provision did not please them, or if they could advise anything better, they might speak. 62.24. 1. Seneca, however, and Rufus, the prefect, and some other prominent men formed a plot against Nero; for they could no longer endure his disgraceful behaviour, his licentiousness, and his cruelty. They desired, therefore, to rid themselves of these evils and at the same time to free Nero from them â as indeed, Sulpicius Asper, a centurion, and Subrius Flavius, a military tribune, both belonging to the body-guards, admitted outright to Nero himself.,2. Asper, when asked by the emperor the reason for his attempt, replied: "I could help you in no other way." And the response of Flavius was: "I have both loved and hated you above all men. I loved you, hoping that you would prove a good emperor; I have hated you because you do so-andâso. I can not be a slave to a charioteer or lyre-player." Information was lodged against these men, then, and they were punished, and many others likewise on their account.,3. For everything in the nature of a complaint that could be entertained against anyone for excessive joy or grief, for words or gestures, was brought forward and was believed; and not one of these complaints, even if fictitious, could be refused credence in view of Nero's actual deeds.,4. Hence faithless friends and house servants of some men flourished exceedingly; for, whereas persons were naturally on their guard against strangers and foes, by reason of their suspicions, they were bound to lay bare their thoughts to their associates whether they would or not. 62.25. 1. It would be no small task to speak of all the others that perished, but the fate of Seneca calls for a few words. It was his wish to end the life of his wife Paulina at the same time with his own, for he declared that he had taught her both to despise death and to desire to leave the world in company with him. So he opened her veins as well as his own.,2. But as he died hard, his end was hastened by the soldiers; and she was still alive when he passed away, and thus survived. He did not lay hands upon himself, however, until he had revised the book which he was writing and had deposited his other books with some friends, fearing that they would otherwise fall into Nero's hands and be destroyed.,3. Thus died Seneca, notwithstanding that he had on the pretext of illness abandoned the society of the emperor and had bestowed upon him his entire property, ostensibly to help to pay for the buildings he was constructing. His brothers, too, perished after him. |
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| 207. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, a b c d\n0 '11.18.4 '11.18.4 '11 18\n1 2.1 2.1 2 1 \n2 7.69 7.69 7 69\n3 2.5 2.5 2 5 \n4 11.26 11.26 11 26\n5 4.50 4.50 4 50\n6 12.3 12.3 12 3 \n7 12.1 12.1 12 1 \n8 9.6 9.6 9 6 \n9 8.36 8.36 8 36\n10 7.29 7.29 7 29\n11 6.32 6.32 6 32\n12 2.14 2.14 2 14\n13 3.12 3.12 3 12\n14 9.28 9.28 9 28\n15 3.2 3.2 3 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 693 |
| 208. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 27.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 196 |
| 209. Athenagoras, Apology Or Embassy For The Christians, a b c d\n0 '3.1 '3.1 '3 1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, tripartite philosophy Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 809 |
| 210. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Pinheiro et al (2015) 54 |
| 211. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 24.67-24.73 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 134 |
| 212. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 24.67-24.73 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 134 |
| 213. Clement of Alexandria, A Discourse Concerning The Salvation of Rich Men, 12.1, 21.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 214. Sextus Empiricus, Against The Logicians, 7.264, 7.433 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Bett (2019) 56 |
| 215. Justin, Second Apology, '3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765 |
| 216. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.228-7.231, 7.234, 7.236, 7.373, 7.377-7.380, 8.400, 9.71-9.72, 9.110 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, on impressions •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 75, 76, 79; Graver (2007) 25, 225 |
| 217. Justin, First Apology, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 218. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.2.2, 1.5.5, 1.29.4, 21.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 206; Sorabji (2000) 315, 334 |
| 219. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 21.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 206 |
| 220. Hippolytus, Apostolic Tradition, 15-16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 401 |
| 221. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 2.118, 10.14, 10.15, 10.16, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19, 10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 10.25, 10.26, 12.16, 12.17, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 24.4, 24.5, 24.18-25.9, 24.18, 24.19, 24.20, 24.21, 24.22, 24.23, 25.2, 25.3, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 25.7, 25.8, 25.9, 26.7, 26.8, 26.9, 26.10, 26.11, 26.12, 26.13, 26.14, 26.15, 26.16, 26.17, 26.18, 26.19, 26.20, 26.21, 26.22, 26.23, 26.24, 26.25, 26.26, 26.27, 26.28, 26.29, 26.30, 72.26-73.2, 76.14-77.8, 94.7-100.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 249 |
| 222. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 191 |
| 223. Galen, On Prognosis From The Pulse, 2.8.48 (166.12-14) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 73 |
| 224. Aelian, Varia Historia, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 273 |
| 225. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 50 |
| 226. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 6.171, 13, 33, 182.8-20, 199.19, 199.20, 205.15-22 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 249 |
| 227. Galen, That The Qualities of The Mind Depend On The Temperament of The Body, 4, 36.12, 36.13, 36.14, 36.15, 36.16, 39, 41, 42.11-43.19, 44.7, 44.8, 44.12, 44.13, 44.14, 44.15, 44.16, 44.17, 44.18, 44.19, 44.20, 45, 47, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64.19, 64.19-65.1, 64.20, 64.21, 64.22, 64.23, 64.24, 64.25, 64.26, 64.27, 64.28, 64.29, 64.30, 64.31, 64.32, 64.33, 64.34, 64.35, 64.36, 64.37, 64.38, 64.39, 64.40, 64.41, 64.42, 64.43, 64.44, 64.45, 64.46, 64.47, 64.48, 64.49, 64.50, 64.51, 64.52, 64.53, 64.54, 64.55, 64.56, 64.57, 64.58, 64.59, 64.60, 64.61, 64.62, 64.63, 64.64, 64.65, 67.2, 67.3, 67.4, 67.5, 67.6, 67.7, 67.8, 67.9, 67.10, 67.11, 67.12, 67.13, 67.14, 67.15, 67.16, 70.11, 70.12, 70.13, 70.14, 71.19-72.18, 73.3, 73.6, 73.7, 73.8, 73.9, 73.10, 73.11, 73.12, 73.13-74.21, 74.21-75.1, 74.21-77.1, 75.1, 76.1-77.1, 77.17-79.2, 78.2, 78.3, 78.4, 78.5, 78.6, 78.7, 78.8, 78.9, 78.10, 78.11, 78.12, 78.13, 78.14, 78.15, 78.16, 78.17, 78.18, 78.19, 79, 79.4, 79.5, 79.6, 79.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 148 |
| 228. Gellius, Attic Nights, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 65, 233 |
| 229. Galen, On Affected Parts, 6.15 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, random sex advocated and communal female partners Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 230. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.25-1.30, 2.31, 3.235-3.237 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 182, 198, 199, 200, 254, 271 |
| 231. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 3.216, 10.224 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 232. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 269 |
| 233. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary On Aristotle'S Prior Analytics I, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 243 |
| 234. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 235. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries On Aristotle'S Meteorologica, 11, 34-62, 61 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan |
| 236. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries On Eight Books of Aristotle'S Topics, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 281 |
| 237. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 238. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 71, 72, 74, 76; Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 148 |
| 239. Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, 16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 |
| 240. Papyri, Papyri Graecae Magicae, 4.538 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
241. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 | 7.13. I have made it evident, as I think, that the soul is not subject to dissolution. It remains that I bring forward witnesses by whose authority my arguments may be confirmed. And I will not now allege the testimony of the prophets, whose system and divination consist in this alone, the teaching that man was created for the worship of God, and for receiving immortality from Him; but I will rather bring forward those whom they who reject the truth cannot but believe. Hermes, describing the nature of man, that he might show how he was made by God, introduced this statement: And the same out of two natures- the immortal and the mortal - made one nature, that of man, making the same partly immortal, and partly mortal; and bringing this, he placed it in the midst, between that nature which was divine and immortal, and that which was mortal and changeable, that seeing all things, he may admire all things. But some one may perhaps reckon him in the number of the philosophers, although he has been placed among the gods, and honoured by the Egyptians under the name of Mercury, and may give no more authority to him than to Plato or Pythagoras. Let us therefore seek for greater testimony. A certain Polites asked Apollo of Miletus whether the soul remains after death or goes to dissolution; and he replied in these verses:- As long as the soul is bound by fetters to the body, perceiving corruptible sufferings, it yields to mortal pains; but when, after the wasting of the body, it has found a very swift dissolution of mortality, it is altogether borne into the air, never growing old, and it remains always uninjured; for the first-born providence of God made this disposition.What do the Sibylline poems say? Do they not declare that this is so, when they say that the time will come when God will judge the living and the dead?- whose authority we will hereafter bring forward. Therefore the opinion entertained by Democritus, and Epicurus, and Dic archus concerning the dissolution of the soul is false; and they would not venture to speak concerning the destruction of souls, in the presence of any magician, who knew that souls are called forth from the lower regions by certain incantations, and that they are at hand, and afford themselves to be seen by human eyes, and speak, and foretell future events; and if they should thus venture, they would be overpowered by the fact itself, and by proofs presented to them. But because they did not comprehend the nature of the soul, which is so subtle that it escapes the eyes of the human mind, they said that it perishes. What of Aristoxenus, who denied that there is any soul at all, even while it lives in the body? But as on the lyre harmonious sound, and the strain which musicians call harmony, is produced by the tightening of the strings, so he thought that the power of perception existed in bodies from the joining together of the vitals, and from the vigour of the limbs; than which nothing can be said more senseless. Truly he had his eyes uninjured, but his heart was blind, with which he did not see that he lived, and had the mind by which he had conceived that very thought. But this has happened to many philosophers, that they did not believe in the existence of any object which is not apparent to the eyes; whereas the sight of the mind ought to be much clearer than that of the body, for perceiving those things the force and nature of which are rather felt than seen. |
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242. Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 40 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 | 40. He advised special regard to two times; that when we go to sleep, and that when we awake. At each of these we should consider our past actions, and those that are to come. We ought to require of ourselves an account of our past deeds, while of the future we should have a providential care. Therefore he advised everybody to repeat to himself the following verses before he fell asleep: "Nor suffer sleep to close thine eyes Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast run o'er;How slipt? What deeds? What duty left undone?" On rising: "As soon as ere thou wakest, in order lay The actions to be done that following day" SPAN |
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| 243. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 3.13, 9.47, 15.64-15.66, 16.68-16.70, 24.106, 25.110, 30.186, 31.187, 31.196-31.197, 31.217 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213, 235, 241, 271, 277, 285, 297 |
| 244. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, a b c d\n0 '4.16 '4.16 '4 16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765 |
| 245. Athanasius, Life of Anthony, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220, 348, 361 |
| 246. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
247. Origen, On First Principles, 1.3.8, 3.1.4, 3.1.8, 3.1.18, 3.1.20, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 3.4.1-3.4.5, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315, 320, 343, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 359, 388, 397, 398 | 1.3.8. Having made these declarations regarding the Unity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, let us return to the order in which we began the discussion. God the Father bestows upon all, existence; and participation in Christ, in respect of His being the word of reason, renders them rational beings. From which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because capable of virtue and vice. On this account, therefore, is the grace of the Holy Ghost present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be rendered holy by participating in it. Seeing, then, that firstly, they derive their existence from God the Father; secondly, their rational nature from the Word; thirdly, their holiness from the Holy Spirit — those who have been previously sanctified by the Holy Spirit are again made capable of receiving Christ, in respect that He is the righteousness of God; and those who have earned advancement to this grade by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, will nevertheless obtain the gift of wisdom according to the power and working of the Spirit of God. And this I consider is Paul's meaning, when he says that to some is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit. And while pointing out the individual distinction of gifts, he refers the whole of them to the source of all things, in the words, There are diversities of operations, but one God who works all in all. Whence also the working of the Father, which confers existence upon all things, is found to be more glorious and magnificent, while each one, by participation in Christ, as being wisdom, and knowledge, and sanctification, makes progress, and advances to higher degrees of perfection; and seeing it is by partaking of the Holy Spirit that any one is made purer and holier, he obtains, when he is made worthy, the grace of wisdom and knowledge, in order that, after all stains of pollution and ignorance are cleansed and taken away, he may make so great an advance in holiness and purity, that the nature which he received from God may become such as is worthy of Him who gave it to be pure and perfect, so that the being which exists may be as worthy as He who called it into existence. For, in this way, he who is such as his Creator wished him to be, will receive from God power always to exist, and to abide forever. That this may be the case, and that those whom He has created may be unceasingly and inseparably present with Him, Who IS, it is the business of wisdom to instruct and train them, and to bring them to perfection by confirmation of His Holy Spirit and unceasing sanctification, by which alone are they capable of receiving God. In this way, then, by the renewal of the ceaseless working of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in us, in its various stages of progress, shall we be able at some future time perhaps, although with difficulty, to behold the holy and the blessed life, in which (as it is only after many struggles that we are able to reach it) we ought so to continue, that no satiety of that blessedness should ever seize us; but the more we perceive its blessedness, the more should be increased and intensified within us the longing for the same, while we ever more eagerly and freely receive and hold fast the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But if satiety should ever take hold of any one of those who stand on the highest and perfect summit of attainment, I do not think that such an one would suddenly be deposed from his position and fall away, but that he must decline gradually and little by little, so that it may sometimes happen that if a brief lapsus take place, and the individual quickly repent and return to himself, he may not utterly fall away, but may retrace his steps, and return to his former place, and again make good that which had been lost by his negligence. 3.1.4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an external cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is impossible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or evil, let the holder of this opinion turn his attention for a little upon himself, and carefully inspect the movements of his own mind, unless he has discovered already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that, after the statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the judgment of reason. For, to take an illustration: if, to a man who has determined to live continently and chastely, and to keep himself free from all pollution with women, a woman should happen to present herself, inciting and alluring him to act contrary to his purpose, that woman is not a complete and absolute cause or necessity of his transgressing, since it is in his power, by remembering his resolution, to bridle the incitements to lust, and by the stern admonitions of virtue to restrain the pleasure of the allurement that solicits him; so that, all feeling of indulgence being driven away, his determination may remain firm and enduring. Finally, if to any men of learning, strengthened by divine training, allurements of that kind present themselves, remembering immediately what they are, and calling to mind what has long been the subject of their meditation and instruction, and fortifying themselves by the support of a holier doctrine, they reject and repel all incitement to pleasure, and drive away opposing lusts by the interposition of the reason implanted within them. 3.1.4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect cause of annulling his determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined himself ), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons. 3.1.18. Let us now look to the expression, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For our opponents assert, that if it does not depend upon him that wills, nor on him that runs, but on God that shows mercy, that a man be saved, our salvation is not in our own power. For our nature is such as to admit of our either being saved or not, or else our salvation rests solely on the will of Him who, if He wills it, shows mercy, and confers salvation. Now let us inquire, in the first place, of such persons, whether to desire blessings be a good or evil act; and whether to hasten after good as a final aim be worthy of praise. If they were to answer that such a procedure was deserving of censure, they would evidently be mad; for all holy men both desire blessings and run after them, and certainly are not blameworthy. How, then, is it that he who is not saved, if he be of an evil nature, desires blessing, and runs after them, but does not find them? For they say that a bad tree does not bring forth good fruits, whereas it is a good fruit to desire blessings. And how is the fruit of a bad tree good? And if they assert that to desire blessings, and to run after them, is an act of indifference, i.e., neither good nor bad, we shall reply, that if it be an indifferent act to desire blessings, and to run after them, then the opposite of that will also be an indifferent act, viz., to desire evils, and to run after them; whereas it is certain that it is not an indifferent act to desire evils, and to run after them, but one that is manifestly wicked. It is established, then, that to desire and follow after blessings is not an indifferent, but a virtuous proceeding. 3.1.18. Let us look next at the passage: So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For they who find fault say: If it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement made by Him who has formed us such as we are, or on the purpose of Him who shows mercy when he pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer; since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things; for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give (perhaps) a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent, and neither beautiful nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz., to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defense which I think we can offer to the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the Song of Degrees is his, from which we shall quote the words): Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman wakes in vain: not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong, it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the (mere) human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus — for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God — it is well said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters; but God that gives the increase. Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing; for it is not completed by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds, and the mildness of the air, and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour? — since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the Churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also (to attempt) to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage. 3.1.20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad, since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz., that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but (He makes) those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes (which operated) in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes (at work) in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and (in supposing) that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca? 3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance. 3.2.4. With respect to the thoughts which proceed from our heart, or the recollection of things which we have done, or the contemplation of any things or causes whatever, we find that they sometimes proceed from ourselves, and sometimes are originated by the opposing powers; not seldom also are they suggested by God, or by the holy angels. Now such a statement will perhaps appear incredible, unless it be confirmed by the testimony of holy Scripture. That, then, thoughts arise within ourselves, David testifies in the Psalms, saying, The thought of a man will make confession to You, and the rest of the thought shall observe to You a festival day. That this, however, is also brought about by the opposing powers, is shown by Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes in the following manner: If the spirit of the ruler rise up against you, leave not your place; for soundness restrains great offenses. The Apostle Paul also will bear testimony to the same point in the words: Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalted itself against the knowledge of Christ. That it is an effect due to God, nevertheless, is declared by David, when he says in the Psalms, Blessed is the man whose help is in You, O Lord, Your ascents (are) in his heart. And the apostle says that God put it into the heart of Titus. That certain thoughts are suggested to men's hearts either by good or evil angels, is shown both by the angel that accompanied Tobias, and by the language of the prophet, where he says, And the angel who spoke in me answered. The book of the Shepherd declares the same, saying that each individual is attended by two angels; that whenever good thoughts arise in our hearts, they are suggested by the good angel; but when of a contrary kind, they are the instigation of the evil angel. The same is declared by Barnabas in his Epistle, where he says there are two ways, one of light and one of darkness, over which he asserts that certain angels are placed — the angels of God over the way of light, the angels of Satan over the way of darkness. We are not, however, to imagine that any other result follows from what is suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, save a (mental) commotion only, and an incitement instigating us either to good or evil. For it is quite within our reach, when a maligt power has begun to incite us to evil, to cast away from us the wicked suggestions, and to resist the vile inducements, and to do nothing that is at all deserving of blame. And, on the other hand, it is possible, when a divine power calls us to better things, not to obey the call; our freedom of will being preserved to us in either case. We said, indeed, in the foregoing pages, that certain recollections of good or evil actions were suggested to us either by the act of divine providence or by the opposing powers, as is shown in the book of Esther, when Artaxerxes had not remembered the services of that just man Mordecai, but, when wearied out with his nightly vigils, had it put into his mind by God to require that the annals of his great deeds should be read to him; whereon, being reminded of the benefits received from Mordecai, he ordered his enemy Haman to be hanged, but splendid honours to be conferred on him, and impunity from the threatened danger to be granted to the whole of the holy nation. On the other hand, however, we must suppose that it was through the hostile influence of the devil that the suggestion was introduced into the minds of the high priests and the scribes which they made to Pilate, when they came and said, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again. The design of Judas, also, respecting the betrayal of our Lord and Saviour, did not originate in the wickedness of his mind alone. For Scripture testifies that the devil had already put it into his heart to betray Him. And therefore Solomon rightly commanded, saying, Keep your heart with all diligence. And the Apostle Paul warns us: Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest perhaps we should let them slip. And when he says, Neither give place to the devil, he shows by that injunction that it is through certain acts, or a kind of mental slothfulness, that room is made for the devil, so that, if he once enter our heart, he will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not obtained the entire mastery over it, by casting on us his fiery darts; and by these we are sometimes deeply wounded, and sometimes only set on fire. Seldom indeed, and only in a few instances, are these fiery darts quenched, so as not to find a place where they may wound, i.e., when one is covered by the strong and mighty shield of faith. The declaration, indeed, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places, must be so understood as if we meant, I Paul, and you Ephesians, and all who have not to wrestle against flesh and blood: for such have to struggle against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, not like the Corinthians, whose struggle was as yet against flesh and blood, and who had been overtaken by no temptation but such as is common to man. 3.4.1. And now the subject of human temptations must not, in my opinion, be passed over in silence, which take their rise sometimes from flesh and blood, or from the wisdom of flesh and blood, which is said to be hostile to God. And whether the statement be true which certain allege, viz., that each individual has as it were two souls, we shall determine after we have explained the nature of those temptations, which are said to be more powerful than any of human origin, i.e., which we sustain from principalities and powers, and from the rulers of the darkness of this world, and from spiritual wickedness in high places, or to which we are subjected from wicked spirits and unclean demons. Now, in the investigation of this subject, we must, I think, inquire according to a logical method whether there be in us human beings, who are composed of soul and body and vital spirit, some other element, possessing an incitement of its own, and evoking a movement towards evil. For a question of this kind is wont to be discussed by some in this way: whether, viz., as two souls are said to co-exist within us, the one is more divine and heavenly and the other inferior; or whether, from the very fact that we inhere in bodily structures which according to their own proper nature are dead, and altogether devoid of life (seeing it is from us, i.e., from our souls, that the material body derives its life, it being contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn on and enticed to the practice of those evils which are agreeable to the body; or whether, thirdly (which was the opinion of some of the Greek philosophers), although our soul is one in substance, it nevertheless consists of several elements, and one portion of it is called rational and another irrational, and that which is termed the irrational part is again separated into two affections — those of covetousness and passion. These three opinions, then, regarding the soul, which we have stated above, we have found to be entertained by some, but that one of them, which we have mentioned as being adopted by certain Grecian philosophers, viz., that the soul is tripartite, I do not observe to be greatly confirmed by the authority of holy Scripture; while with respect to the remaining two there is found a considerable number of passages in the holy Scriptures which seem capable of application to them. 3.4.2. Now, of these opinions, let us first discuss that which is maintained by some, that there is in us a good and heavenly soul, and another earthly and inferior; and that the better soul is implanted within us from heaven, such as was that which, while Jacob was still in the womb, gave him the prize of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in the case of Jeremiah was sanctified from his birth, and in that of John was filled by the Holy Spirit from the womb. Now, that which they term the inferior soul is produced, they allege, along with the body itself out of the seed of the body, whence they say it cannot live or subsist beyond the body, on which account also they say it is frequently termed flesh. For the expression, The flesh lusts against the Spirit, they take to be applicable not to the flesh, but to this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words, moreover, they endeavour notwithstanding to make good the declaration in Leviticus: The life of all flesh is the blood thereof. For, from the circumstance that it is the diffusion of the blood throughout the whole flesh which produces life in the flesh, they assert that this soul, which is said to be the life of all flesh, is contained in the blood. This statement, moreover, that the flesh struggles against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the further statement, that the life of all flesh is the blood thereof, is, according to these writers, simply calling the wisdom of the flesh by another name, because it is a kind of material spirit, which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires. And it is with respect to this that they think the apostle uttered the words: I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. And if one were to object to them that these words were spoken of the nature of the body, which indeed, agreeably to the peculiarity of its nature, is dead, but is said to have sensibility, or wisdom which is hostile to God, or which struggles against the spirit; or if one were to say that, in a certain degree, the flesh itself was possessed of a voice, which should cry out against the endurance of hunger, or thirst, or cold, or of any discomfort arising either from abundance or poverty, — they would endeavour to weaken and impair the force of such (arguments), by showing that there were many other mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul, as it were, of which we have spoken above, and which is generated from the seed by a process of traducianism. They are accustomed also to adduce, in support of their assertion, the declaration of the apostle, Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, poisonings, hatred, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrelling, dissensions, heresies, sects, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and the like; asserting that all these do not derive their origin from the habits or pleasures of the flesh, so that all such movements are to be regarded as inherent in that substance which has not a soul, i.e., the flesh. The declaration, moreover, For you see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men among you according to the flesh are called, would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom, carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: Since the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the things that we would. What are these things now respecting which he says, that we cannot do the things that we would? It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be intended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant, because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains, then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself with the spirit, it produces men of the Spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual. And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, But you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit. 3.4.3. But since the subject of discussion on which we have entered is one of great profundity, which it is necessary to consider in all its bearings, let us see whether some such point as this may not be determined: that as it is better for the soul to follow the spirit when the latter has overcome the flesh, so also, if it seem to be a worse course for the former to follow the flesh in its struggles against the spirit, when the latter would recall the soul to its influence, it may nevertheless appear a more advantageous procedure for the soul to be under the mastery of the flesh than to remain under the power of its own will. For, since it is said to be neither hot nor cold, but to continue in a sort of tepid condition, it will find conversion a slow and somewhat difficult undertaking. If indeed it clung to the flesh, then, satiated at length, and filled with those very evils which it suffers from the vices of the flesh, and wearied as it were by the heavy burdens of luxury and lust, it may sometimes be converted with greater ease and rapidity from the filthiness of matter to a desire for heavenly things, and (to a taste for) spiritual graces. And the apostle must be supposed to have said, that the Spirit contends against the flesh, and the flesh against the Spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would (those things, undoubtedly, which are designated as being beyond the will of the spirit, and the will of the flesh), meaning (as if we were to express it in other words) that it is better for a man to be either in a state of virtue or in one of wickedness, than in neither of these; but that the soul, before its conversion to the spirit, and its union with it, appears during its adherence to the body, and its meditation of carnal things, to be neither in a good condition nor in a manifestly bad one, but resembles, so to speak, an animal. It is better, however, for it, if possible, to be rendered spiritual through adherence to the spirit; but if that cannot be done, it is more expedient for it to follow even the wickedness of the flesh, than, placed under the influence of its own will, to retain the position of an irrational animal. 3.4.4. Let us now see what answer is usually returned to these statements by those who maintain that there is in us one movement, and one life, proceeding from one and the same soul, both the salvation and the destruction of which are ascribed to itself as a result of its own actions. And, in the first place, let us notice of what nature those commotions of the soul are which we suffer, when we feel ourselves inwardly drawn in different directions; when there arises a kind of contest of thoughts in our hearts, and certain probabilities are suggested us, agreeably to which we lean now to this side, now to that, and by which we are sometimes convicted of error, and sometimes approve of our acts. It is nothing remarkable, however, to say of wicked spirits, that they have a varying and conflicting judgment, and one out of harmony with itself, since such is found to be the case in all men, whenever, in deliberating upon an uncertain event, council is taken, and men consider and consult what is to be chosen as the better and more useful course. It is not therefore surprising that, if two probabilities meet, and suggest opposite views, they should drag the mind in contrary directions. For example, if a man be led by reflection to believe and to fear God, it cannot then be said that the flesh contends against the Spirit; but, amidst the uncertainty of what may be true and advantageous, the mind is drawn in opposite directions. So, also, when it is supposed that the flesh provokes to the indulgence of lust, but better counsels oppose allurements of that kind, we are not to suppose that it is one life which is resisting another, but that it is the tendency of the nature of the body, which is eager to empty out and cleanse the places filled with seminal moisture; as, in like manner, it is not to be supposed that it is any opposing power, or the life of another soul, which excites within us the appetite of thirst, and impels us to drink, or which causes us to feel hunger, and drives us to satisfy it. But as it is by the natural movements of the body that food and drink are either desired or rejected, so also the natural seed, collected together in course of time in the various vessels, has an eager desire to be expelled and thrown away, and is so far from never being removed, save by the impulse of some exciting cause, that it is even sometimes spontaneously emitted. When, therefore, it is said that the flesh struggles against the Spirit, these persons understand the expression to mean that habit or necessity, or the delights of the flesh, arouse a man, and withdraw him from divine and spiritual things. For, owing to the necessity of the body being drawn away, we are not allowed to have leisure for divine things, which are to be eternally advantageous. So again, the soul, devoting itself to divine and spiritual pursuits, and being united to the spirit, is said to fight against the flesh, by not permitting it to be relaxed by indulgence, and to become unsteady through the influence of those pleasures for which it feels a natural delight. In this way, also, they claim to understand the words, The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God, not that the flesh really has a soul, or a wisdom of its own. But as we are accustomed to say, by an abuse of language, that the earth is thirsty, and wishes to drink in water, this use of the word wishes is not proper, but catachrestic — as if we were to say again, that this house wants to be rebuilt, and many other similar expressions; so also is the wisdom of the flesh to be understood, or the expression, that the flesh lusts against the Spirit. They generally connect with these the expression, The voice of your brother's blood cries unto Me from the ground. For what cries unto the Lord is not properly the blood which was shed; but the blood is said improperly to cry out, vengeance being demanded upon him who had shed it. The declaration also of the apostle, I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, they so understand as if he had said, That he who wishes to devote himself to the word of God is, on account of his bodily necessities and habits, which like a sort of law are ingrained in the body, distracted, and divided, and impeded, lest, by devoting himself vigorously to the study of wisdom, he should be enabled to behold the divine mysteries. 3.4.5. With respect, however, to the following being ranked among the works of the flesh, viz., heresies, and envyings, and contentions, or other (vices), they so understand the passage, that the mind, being rendered grosser in feeling, from its yielding itself to the passions of the body, and being oppressed by the mass of its vices, and having no refined or spiritual feelings, is said to be made flesh, and derives its name from that in which it exhibits more vigour and force of will. They also make this further inquiry, Who will be found, or who will be said to be, the creator of this evil sense, called the sense of the flesh? Because they defend the opinion that there is no other creator of soul and flesh than God. And if we were to assert that the good God created anything in His own creation that was hostile to Himself, it would appear to be a manifest absurdity. If, then, it is written, that carnal wisdom is enmity against God, and if this be declared to be a result of creation, God Himself will appear to have formed a nature hostile to Himself, which cannot be subject to Him nor to His law, as if it were (supposed to be) an animal of which such qualities are predicated. And if this view be admitted, in what respect will it appear to differ from that of those who maintain that souls of different natures are created, which, according to their natures, are destined either to be lost or saved? But this is an opinion of the heretics alone, who, not being able to maintain the justice of God on grounds of piety, compose impious inventions of this kind. And now we have brought forward to the best of our ability, in the person of each of the parties, what might be advanced by way of argument regarding the several views, and let the reader choose out of them for himself that which he thinks ought to be preferred. |
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248. Origen, Against Celsus, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 | 4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits. |
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| 249. Origen, Commentary On Matthew, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 250. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 251. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 252. Origen, Commentary On John, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 253. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 254. Origen, Commentary On The Song of Songs, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 346 |
| 255. Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 220, 296-297, 295 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 134 |
| 256. Origen, Homilies On Luke, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 365 |
| 257. Origen, Fragments On Psalms 1-150, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 350, 351 |
| 258. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 285 |
| 259. Porphyry, Aids To The Study of The Intelligibles, 32 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, sexual dreams, freedom from Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197, 285, 414 |
| 260. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.1.6, 1.1.5(17-21), 1.1.7(16-24), 1.1.10, 1.1.11(1-8), 1.1.11(7), 1.1.11(5-8), 1.2.2(14-18), 1.2.3(20), 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.6(25-7), 1.2.5(5-24), 1.2.2(13-18), 1.4.10, 1.5.7(10-23), 1.5.7(23-5), 1.5.8, 1.5.9, 1.6.7(17), 1.6.7(12-28), 1.8.4, 2.2.2(4-18), 2.3.9, 2.9.2(4-18), 3.6.4, 3.6.5, 3.7.11(15-16), 3.8.8(32-6), 4.3.32, 4.4.1, 4.4.5(23-7), 4.4.5(22-3), 4.4.5(11-31), 4.4.2(1-3), 4.4.1(1-14), 4.8.1(1-11), 5.1.1(1-22), 5.1.1, 5.3.14(1-3), 5.3.13(36), 5.3.10(28-51), 5.3.3(34-9), 5.5.12(35-6), 5.5.12(16), 5.8.11(4), 5.8.10(31-43), 6.1.20(8-9), 6.4.15(37), 6.5.7(3-6), 6.5.12(15-26), 6.7.41(38), 6.7.40(1), 6.7.39(17-20), 6.7.35(43-5), 6.7.35(29-30), 6.7.35(24-6), 6.7.35, 6.7.34, 6.7.35(26), 6.7.6(15-18), 6.7.33(23), 6.7.6(18), 6.8.1, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4, 6.8.5, 6.8.6, 6.8.5(30-2), 6.8, 6.9.11(11), 6.9.10(7-21), 6.9.4(1-6), 6.9.4(16-23), 6.9.7 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 203 |
261. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bett (2019) 69; Long (2006) 16; Wardy and Warren (2018) 248, 251, 255 | 7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo. |
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| 262. Alexander of Lycopolis, Tractatus De Placitis Manichaeorum, 2.2-4, 12.19 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
263. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 24, 28, 33, 35, 31 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 26 | 31. But wisdom and knowledge have no part in chance. It is not painful to lack the gifts of chance, but rather to endure the unprofitable toil caused by vain opinions. Every disturbance and unprofitable desire is removed by the love of true philosophy. Vain is the word of that philosopher who can ease no mortal trouble. As there is no profit in the physician's art unless it cure the diseases of the body, so there is none in philosophy, unless it expel the |50 troubles of the soul. These and other like commands are laid on us by the law of our nature. |
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264. Porphyry, On Abstinence, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271, 284, 287 | 1.32. 32.But this departure [from sense, imagination, and irrationality,] may be effected by violence, and also by persuasion and by reason, through the wasting away, and, as it may be said, oblivion and death of the passions; which, indeed, is the best kind of departure, since it is accomplished without oppressing that from which we are divulsed. For, in sensibles, a divulsion by force is not effected without either a laceration of a part, or a vestige of avulsion. But this separation is introduced by a continual negligence of the passions. And this negligence is produced by an abstinence from those sensible perceptions which excite the passions, and by a persevering attention to intelligibles. And among these passions or perturbations, those which arise from food are to be enumerated. SPAN |
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| 265. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum (Homiliae 15), None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 393 |
| 266. Hermeias of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia,, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283 |
| 267. Augustine, Sermons, 43.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 337 |
| 268. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 10.10.14-10.10.16, 11.2.2, 11.2.5, 11.3.1, 11.3.6, 11.10.17, 12.12-12.13, 14.9.2, 14.10.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, sexual dreams, freedom from Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 242, 270, 337, 348, 356, 373, 374, 375, 382, 414 |
| 269. Augustine, De Sermone Domini In Monte Secundum Matthaeum, 1.9, 1.12, 1.12.33-1.12.34, 1.34.12, 2.7.25 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, sexual dreams, freedom from Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 346, 372, 373, 374, 414 |
| 270. Augustine, De Nuptiis Et Concupiscentia, 1.13.12, 2.30.15, 2.37.22 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276, 416 |
| 271. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
272. Augustine, Confessions, 1.6-1.7, 3.1, 3.6-3.7, 4.2.2, 4.4, 4.6.12, 4.8.13, 4.15-4.16, 6.11.20, 6.13.23, 6.14.24, 6.15.25, 7.1, 7.3, 7.3.5, 7.7.11, 7.17, 8.5-8.6, 8.9-8.10, 8.9.21, 8.11.26-8.11.27, 8.12, 9.2-9.3, 9.6, 9.10, 10.14, 10.21.30, 10.30, 10.33, 10.35.55, 11.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 205 | 11.9. 11. In this Beginning, O God, have You made heaven and earth - in Your Word, in Your Son, in Your Power, in Your Wisdom, in Your Truth, wondrously speaking and wondrously making. Who shall comprehend? Who shall relate it? What is that which shines through me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I am unlike it; and I burn inasmuch as I am like it. It is Wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness, which again overwhelms me, fainting from it, in the darkness and amount of my punishment. For my strength is brought down in need, so that I cannot endure my blessings, until Thou, O Lord, who hast been gracious to all mine iniquities, heal also all mine infirmities; because You shall also redeem my life from corruption, and crown me with Your loving-kindness and mercy, and shall satisfy my desire with good things, because my youth shall be renewed like the eagle's. For by hope we are saved; and through patience we await Your promises. Romans 8:24-25 Let him that is able hear You discoursing within. I will with confidence cry out from Your oracle, How wonderful are Your works, O Lord, in Wisdom have You made them all. And this Wisdom is the Beginning, and in that Beginning have You made heaven and earth. |
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| 273. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 2.13, 3.38 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, biography •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, and arcesilaus •zeno of citium, and platos theaetetus •zeno of citium, epistemology of Found in books: Long (2006) 102, 224; Long (2019) 82; Wardy and Warren (2018) 245 |
| 274. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, 1.17.35 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 408 |
| 275. Augustine, Reply To Faustus, 22.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277, 400 |
| 276. Augustine, Against Julian, 1.68, 1.70, 2.5.13, 2.7.20, 2.8.23, 2.56, 2.83, 2.85, 2.88, 2.122, 2.179, 3.1.2, 3.13.27, 3.14.28, 3.20.38, 3.21.43, 3.21.49, 4.1.29, 4.3.29, 4.4.34, 4.5.35, 4.8.52, 4.11.57, 4.13.62, 4.14.67, 4.14.69, 4.14.72, 4.19, 4.24, 4.41, 4.43-4.44, 4.43.8, 4.79, 4.104, 5.5.20-5.5.23, 5.10.42, 5.14, 5.16, 6.22, 6.24.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, sexual dreams, freedom from •zeno of citium, stoic, random sex advocated and communal female partners Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 274, 276, 277, 335, 353, 373, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 413, 415, 416 |
| 277. Augustine, On The Good of Marriage, 2.2, 5.5 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 402, 403, 406 |
| 278. Augustine, On Care To Be Had For The Dead, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 279. Augustine, On Genesis Against The Manichaeans, 2.21.32 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 406 |
280. Cassian, Institutiones, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220, 348, 371 | 5.32. of the letters which were burnt without being read. Nor do I think it less needful to relate this act of a brother who was intent on purity of heart, and extremely anxious with regard to the contemplation of things divine. When after an interval of fifteen years a large number of letters had been brought to him from his father and mother and many friends in the province of Pontus, he received the huge packet of letters, and turning over the matter in his own mind for some time, What thoughts, said he, will the reading of these suggest to me, which will incite me either to senseless joy or to useless sadness! For how many days will they draw off the attention of my heart from the contemplation I have set before me, by the recollection of those who wrote them! How long will it take for the disturbance of mind thus created to be calmed, and what an effort will it cost for that former state of peacefulness to be restored, if the mind is once moved by the sympathy of the letters, and by recalling the words and looks of those whom it has left for so long begins once more in thought and spirit to revisit them, to dwell among them and to be with them. And it will be of no use to have forsaken them in the body, if one begins to look on them with the heart, and readmits and revives that memory which on renouncing this world every one gave up, as if he were dead. Turning this over in his mind, he determined not only not to read a single letter, but not even to open the packet, for fear lest, at the sight of the names of the writers, or on recalling their appearance, the purpose of his spirit might give way. And so he threw it into the fire to be burnt, all tied up just as he had received it, crying, Away, O you thoughts of my home, be burnt up, and try no further to recall me to those things from which I have fled. 12.7. That the evil of pride is so great that it rightly has even God Himself as its adversary. How great is the evil of pride, that it rightly has no angel, nor other virtues opposed to it, but God Himself as its adversary! Since it should be noted that it is never said of those who are entangled in other sins that they have God resisting them; I mean it is not said that God is opposed to the gluttonous, fornicators, passionate, or covetous, but only to the proud. For those sins react only on those who commit them, or seem to be committed against those who share in them, i.e., against other men; but this one has more properly to do with God, and therefore it is especially right that it should have Him opposed to it. |
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| 281. Gregory of Nyssa, Dialogus De Anima Et Resurrectione, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389, 393 |
| 282. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 165, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246, 392 |
| 283. Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, 32.22-32.31, 37.21 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, and involves akrasia Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254, 303 |
| 284. Evagrius, On Discrimination In Respect of Passions And Thoughts, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 365 |
| 285. John Chrysostom, Homilies On Hebrews, 2.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 286. Cassian, Conferences, 5.3, 5.6, 5.16 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 369, 386 |
| 287. Evagrius Ponticus, On Evil Thoughts, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 411 |
| 288. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 140, 2, 261, 269, 28, 300-302, 6, 62, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236, 391, 393, 394, 395 |
| 289. Anon., Alphabetical Collection, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 370 |
| 290. Augustine, Questions On The Heptateuch, 1.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 355, 379, 380, 385 |
| 291. Augustine, Retractiones, 1.7.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 398 |
| 292. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 165, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246, 392 |
293. Augustine, The City of God, 2.4-2.6, 2.26, 4.15, 5.11, 6.10, 9.4-9.6, 10.23, 12.14, 14.6, 14.8-14.10, 14.13, 14.16-14.24 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, appetite and fear as reaching and leaning away •zeno of citium, republic •zeno of citium, on erotic love •zeno of citium, stoic, sexual dreams, freedom from •zeno of citium, stoic, random sex advocated and communal female partners Found in books: Graver (2007) 252; Sorabji (2000) 35, 109, 112, 165, 191, 206, 207, 243, 274, 287, 316, 334, 335, 336, 337, 344, 349, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 394, 398, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 411, 413 | 2.4. First of all, we would ask why their gods took no steps to improve the morals of their worshippers. That the true God should neglect those who did not seek His help, that was but justice; but why did those gods, from whose worship ungrateful men are now complaining that they are prohibited, issue no laws which might have guided their devotees to a virtuous life? Surely it was but just, that such care as men showed to the worship of the gods, the gods on their part should have to the conduct of men. But, it is replied, it is by his own will a man goes astray. Who denies it? But none the less was it incumbent on these gods, who were men's guardians, to publish in plain terms the laws of a good life, and not to conceal them from their worshippers. It was their part to send prophets to reach and convict such as broke these laws, and publicly to proclaim the punishments which await evil-doers, and the rewards which may be looked for by those that do well. Did ever the walls of any of their temples echo to any such warning voice? I myself, when I was a young man, used sometimes to go to the sacrilegious entertainments and spectacles; I saw the priests raving in religious excitement, and heard the choristers; I took pleasure in the shameful games which were celebrated in honor of gods and goddesses, of the virgin Cœlestis, and Berecynthia, the mother of all the gods. And on the holy day consecrated to her purification, there were sung before her couch productions so obscene and filthy for the ear - I do not say of the mother of the gods, but of the mother of any senator or honest man - nay, so impure, that not even the mother of the foul-mouthed players themselves could have formed one of the audience. For natural reverence for parents is a bond which the most abandoned cannot ignore. And, accordingly, the lewd actions and filthy words with which these players honored the mother of the gods, in presence of a vast assemblage and audience of both sexes, they could not for very shame have rehearsed at home in presence of their own mothers. And the crowds that were gathered from all quarters by curiosity, offended modesty must, I should suppose, have scattered in the confusion of shame. If these are sacred rites, what is sacrilege? If this is purification, what is pollution? This festivity was called the Tables, as if a banquet were being given at which unclean devils might find suitable refreshment. For it is not difficult to see what kind of spirits they must be who are delighted with such obscenities, unless, indeed, a man be blinded by these evil spirits passing themselves off under the name of gods, and either disbelieves in their existence, or leads such a life as prompts him rather to propitiate and fear them than the true God. 2.5. In this matter I would prefer to have as my assessors in judgment, not those men who rather take pleasure in these infamous customs than take pains to put an end to them, but that same Scipio Nasica who was chosen by the senate as the citizen most worthy to receive in his hands the image of that demon Cybele, and convey it into the city. He would tell us whether he would be proud to see his own mother so highly esteemed by the state as to have divine honors adjudged to her; as the Greeks and Romans and other nations have decreed divine honors to men who had been of material service to them, and have believed that their mortal benefactors were thus made immortal, and enrolled among the gods. Surely he would desire that his mother should enjoy such felicity were it possible. But if we proceeded to ask him whether, among the honors paid to her, he would wish such shameful rites as these to be celebrated, would he not at once exclaim that he would rather his mother lay stone-dead, than survive as a goddess to lend her ear to these obscenities? Is it possible that he who was of so severe a morality, that he used his influence as a Roman senator to prevent the building of a theatre in that city dedicated to the manly virtues, would wish his mother to be propitiated as a goddess with words which would have brought the blush to her cheek when a Roman matron? Could he possibly believe that the modesty of an estimable woman would be so transformed by her promotion to divinity, that she would suffer herself to be invoked and celebrated in terms so gross and immodest, that if she had heard the like while alive upon earth, and had listened without stopping her ears and hurrying from the spot, her relatives, her husband, and her children would have blushed for her? Therefore, the mother of the gods being such a character as the most profligate man would be ashamed to have for his mother, and meaning to enthral the minds of the Romans, demanded for her service their best citizen, not to ripen him still more in virtue by her helpful counsel, but to entangle him by her deceit, like her of whom it is written, The adulteress will hunt for the precious soul. Proverbs 6:26 Her intent was to puff up this high-souled man by an apparently divine testimony to his excellence, in order that he might rely upon his own eminence in virtue, and make no further efforts after true piety and religion, without which natural genius, however brilliant, vapors into pride and comes to nothing. For what but a guileful purpose could that goddess demand the best man seeing that in her own sacred festivals she requires such obscenities as the best men would be covered with shame to hear at their own tables? 2.6. This is the reason why those divinities quite neglected the lives and morals of the cities and nations who worshipped them, and threw no dreadful prohibition in their way to hinder them from becoming utterly corrupt, and to preserve them from those terrible and detestable evils which visit not harvests and vintages, not house and possessions, not the body which is subject to the soul, but the soul itself, the spirit that rules the whole man. If there was any such prohibition, let it be produced, let it be proved. They will tell us that purity and probity were inculcated upon those who were initiated in the mysteries of religion, and that secret incitements to virtue were whispered in the ear of the élite; but this is an idle boast. Let them show or name to us the places which were at any time consecrated to assemblages in which, instead of the obscene songs and licentious acting of players, instead of the celebration of those most filthy and shameless Fugalia (well called Fugalia, since they banish modesty and right feeling), the people were commanded in the name of the gods to restrain avarice, bridle impurity, and conquer ambition; where, in short, they might learn in that school which Persius vehemently lashes them to, when he says: Be taught, you abandoned creatures, and ascertain the causes of things; what we are, and for what end we are born; what is the law of our success in life; and by what art we may turn the goal without making shipwreck; what limit we should put to our wealth, what we may lawfully desire, and what uses filthy lucre serves; how much we should bestow upon our country and our family; learn, in short, what God meant you to be, and what place He has ordered you to fill. Let them name to us the places where such instructions were wont to be communicated from the gods, and where the people who worshipped them were accustomed to resort to hear them, as we can point to our churches built for this purpose in every land where the Christian religion is received. 2.26. Seeing that this is so - seeing that the filthy and cruel deeds, the disgraceful and criminal actions of the gods, whether real or feigned, were at their own request published, and were consecrated, and dedicated in their honor as sacred and stated solemnities; seeing they vowed vengeance on those who refused to exhibit them to the eyes of all, that they might be proposed as deeds worthy of imitation, why is it that these same demons, who by taking pleasure in such obscenities, acknowledge themselves to be unclean spirits, and by delighting in their own villanies and iniquities, real or imaginary, and by requesting from the immodest, and extorting from the modest, the celebration of these licentious acts, proclaim themselves instigators to a criminal and lewd life - why, I ask, are they represented as giving some good moral precepts to a few of their own elect, initiated in the secrecy of their shrines? If it be so, this very thing only serves further to demonstrate the malicious craft of these pestilent spirits. For so great is the influence of probity and chastity, that all men, or almost all men, are moved by the praise of these virtues; nor is any man so depraved by vice, but he has some feeling of honor left in him. So that, unless the devil sometimes transformed himself, as Scripture says, into an angel of light, 2 Corinthians 11:14 he could not compass his deceitful purpose. Accordingly, in public, a bold impurity fills the ear of the people with noisy clamor; in private, a feigned chastity speaks in scarce audible whispers to a few: an open stage is provided for shameful things, but on the praiseworthy the curtain falls: grace hides disgrace flaunts: a wicked deed draws an overflowing house, a virtuous speech finds scarce a hearer, as though purity were to be blushed at, impurity boasted of. Where else can such confusion reign, but in devils' temples? Where, but in the haunts of deceit? For the secret precepts are given as a sop to the virtuous, who are few in number; the wicked examples are exhibited to encourage the vicious, who are countless. Where and when those initiated in the mysteries of Cœlestis received any good instructions, we know not. What we do know is, that before her shrine, in which her image is set, and amidst a vast crowd gathering from all quarters, and standing closely packed together, we were intensely interested spectators of the games which were going on, and saw, as we pleased to turn the eye, on this side a grand display of harlots, on the other the virgin goddess; we saw this virgin worshipped with prayer and with obscene rites. There we saw no shame-faced mimes, no actress over-burdened with modesty; all that the obscene rites demanded was fully complied with. We were plainly shown what was pleasing to the virgin deity, and the matron who witnessed the spectacle returned home from the temple a wiser woman. Some, indeed, of the more prudent women turned their faces from the immodest movements of the players, and learned the art of wickedness by a furtive regard. For they were restrained, by the modest demeanor due to men, from looking boldly at the immodest gestures; but much more were they restrained from condemning with chaste heart the sacred rites of her whom they adored. And yet this licentiousness - which, if practised in one's home, could only be done there in secret - was practised as a public lesson in the temple; and if any modesty remained in men, it was occupied in marvelling that wickedness which men could not unrestrainedly commit should be part of the religious teaching of the gods, and that to omit its exhibition should incur the anger of the gods. What spirit can that be, which by a hidden inspiration stirs men's corruption, and goads them to adultery, and feeds on the full-fledged iniquity, unless it be the same that finds pleasure in such religious ceremonies, sets in the temples images of devils, and loves to see in play the images of vices; that whispers in secret some righteous sayings to deceive the few who are good, and scatters in public invitations to profligacy, to gain possession of the millions who are wicked? 4.15. Let them ask, then, whether it is quite fitting for good men to rejoice in extended empire. For the iniquity of those with whom just wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom, which would certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being thus more happy, all kingdoms would have been small, rejoicing in neighborly concord; and thus there would have been very many kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are very many houses of citizens in a city. Therefore, to carry on war and extend a kingdom over wholly subdued nations seems to bad men to be felicity, to good men necessity. But because it would be worse that the injurious should rule over those who are more righteous, therefore even that is not unsuitably called felicity. But beyond doubt it is greater felicity to have a good neighbor at peace, than to conquer a bad one by making war. Your wishes are bad, when you desire that one whom you hate or fear should be in such a condition that you can conquer him. If, therefore, by carrying on wars that were just, not impious or unrighteous, the Romans could have acquired so great an empire, ought they not to worship as a goddess even the injustice of foreigners? For we see that this has cooperated much in extending the empire, by making foreigners so unjust that they became people with whom just wars might be carried on, and the empire increased. And why may not injustice, at least that of foreign nations, also be a goddess, if Fear and Dread and Ague have deserved to be Roman gods? By these two, therefore - that is, by foreign injustice, and the goddess Victoria, for injustice stirs up causes of wars, and Victoria brings these same wars to a happy termination - the empire has increased, even although Jove has been idle. For what part could Jove have here, when those things which might be thought to be his benefits are held to be gods, called gods, worshipped as gods, and are themselves invoked for their own parts? He also might have some part here, if he himself might be called Empire, just as she is called Victory. Or if empire is the gift of Jove, why may not victory also be held to be his gift? And it certainly would have been held to be so, had he been recognized and worshipped, not as a stone in the Capitol, but as the true King of kings and Lord of lords. 5.11. Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one), one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy through verity and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting of soul and body, who, when he sinned, neither permitted him to go unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value; from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the irrational soul has given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to these, has given intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts - that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence. 6.10. That liberty, in truth, which this man wanted, so that he did not dare to censure that theology of the city, which is very similar to the theatrical, so openly as he did the theatrical itself, was, though not fully, yet in part possessed by Ann us Seneca, whom we have some evidence to show to have flourished in the times of our apostles. It was in part possessed by him, I say, for he possessed it in writing, but not in living. For in that book which he wrote against superstition, he more copiously and vehemently censured that civil and urban theology than Varro the theatrical and fabulous. For, when speaking concerning images, he says, They dedicate images of the sacred and inviolable immortals in most worthless and motionless matter. They give them the appearance of man, beasts, and fishes, and some make them of mixed sex, and heterogeneous bodies. They call them deities, when they are such that if they should get breath and should suddenly meet them, they would be held to be monsters. Then, a while afterwards, when extolling the natural theology, he had expounded the sentiments of certain philosophers, he opposes to himself a question, and says, Here some one says, Shall I believe that the heavens and the earth are gods, and that some are above the moon and some below it? Shall I bring forward either Plato or the peripatetic Strato, one of whom made God to be without a body, the other without a mind? In answer to which he says, And, really, what truer do the dreams of Titus Tatius, or Romulus, or Tullus Hostilius appear to you? Tatius declared the divinity of the goddess Cloacina; Romulus that of Picus and Tiberinus; Tullus Hostilius that of Pavor and Pallor, the most disagreeable affections of men, the one of which is the agitation of the mind under fright, the other that of the body, not a disease, indeed, but a change of color. Will you rather believe that these are deities, and receive them into heaven? But with what freedom he has written concerning the rites themselves, cruel and shameful! One, he says, castrates himself, another cuts his arms. Where will they find room for the fear of these gods when angry, who use such means of gaining their favor when propitious? But gods who wish to be worshipped in this fashion should be worshipped in none. So great is the frenzy of the mind when perturbed and driven from its seat, that the gods are propitiated by men in a manner in which not even men of the greatest ferocity and fable-renowned cruelty vent their rage. Tyrants have lacerated the limbs of some; they never ordered any one to lacerate his own. For the gratification of royal lust, some have been castrated; but no one ever, by the command of his lord, laid violent hands on himself to emasculate himself. They kill themselves in the temples. They supplicate with their wounds and with their blood. If any one has time to see the things they do and the things they suffer, he will find so many things unseemly for men of respectability, so unworthy of freemen, so unlike the doings of sane men, that no one would doubt that they are mad, had they been mad with the minority; but now the multitude of the insane is the defense of their sanity. He next relates those things which are wont to be done in the Capitol, and with the utmost intrepidity insists that they are such things as one could only believe to be done by men making sport, or by madmen. For having spoken with derision of this, that in the Egyptian sacred rites Osiris, being lost, is lamented for, but straightway, when found, is the occasion of great joy by his reappearance, because both the losing and the finding of him are feigned; and yet that grief and that joy which are elicited thereby from those who have lost nothing and found nothing are real - having I say, so spoken of this, he says, Still there is a fixed time for this frenzy. It is tolerable to go mad once in the year. Go into the Capitol. One is suggesting divine commands to a god; another is telling the hours to Jupiter; one is a lictor; another is an anointer, who with the mere movement of his arms imitates one anointing. There are women who arrange the hair of Juno and Minerva, standing far away not only from her image, but even from her temple. These move their fingers in the manner of hairdressers. There are some women who hold a mirror. There are some who are calling the gods to assist them in court. There are some who are holding up documents to them, and are explaining to them their cases. A learned and distinguished comedian, now old and decrepit, was daily playing the mimic in the Capitol, as though the gods would gladly be spectators of that which men had ceased to care about. Every kind of artificers working for the immortal gods is dwelling there in idleness. And a little after he says, Nevertheless these, though they give themselves up to the gods for purposes superflous enough, do not do so for any abominable or infamous purpose. There sit certain women in the Capitol who think they are beloved by Jupiter; nor are they frightened even by the look of the, if you will believe the poets, most wrathful Juno. This liberty Varro did not enjoy. It was only the poetical theology he seemed to censure. The civil, which this man cuts to pieces, he was not bold enough to impugn. But if we attend to the truth, the temples where these things are performed are far worse than the theatres where they are represented. Whence, with respect to these sacred rites of the civil theology, Seneca preferred, as the best course to be followed by a wise man, to feign respect for them in act, but to have no real regard for them at heart. All which things, he says, a wise man will observe as being commanded by the laws, but not as being pleasing to the gods. And a little after he says, And what of this, that we unite the gods in marriage, and that not even naturally, for we join brothers and sisters? We marry Bellona to Mars, Venus to Vulcan, Salacia to Neptune. Some of them we leave unmarried, as though there were no match for them, which is surely needless, especially when there are certain unmarried goddesses, as Populonia, or Fulgora, or the goddess Rumina, for whom I am not astonished that suitors have been awanting. All this ignoble crowd of gods, which the superstition of ages has amassed, we ought, he says, to adore in such a way as to remember all the while that its worship belongs rather to custom than to reality. Wherefore, neither those laws nor customs instituted in the civil theology that which was pleasing to the gods, or which pertained to reality. But this man, whom philosophy had made, as it were, free, nevertheless, because he was an illustrious senator of the Roman people, worshipped what he censured, did what he condemned, adored what he reproached, because, forsooth, philosophy had taught him something great - namely, not to be superstitious in the world, but, on account of the laws of cities and the customs of men, to be an actor, not on the stage, but in the temples, - conduct the more to be condemned, that those things which he was deceitfully acting he so acted that the people thought he was acting sincerely. But a stage-actor would rather delight people by acting plays than take them in by false pretences. 9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi , and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears. 9.5. We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consot with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of C sar, when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. 9.6. Deferring for the present the question about the holy angels, let us examine the opinion of the Platonists, that the demons who mediate between gods and men are agitated by passions. For if their mind, though exposed to their incursion, still remained free and superior to them, Apuleius could not have said that their hearts are tossed with passions as the sea by stormy winds. Their mind, then - that superior part of their soul whereby they are rational beings, and which, if it actually exists in them, should rule and bridle the turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul - this mind of theirs, I say, is, according to the Platonist referred to, tossed with a hurricane of passions. The mind of the demons, therefore, is subject to the emotions of fear, anger, lust, and all similar affections. What part of them, then, is free, and endued with wisdom, so that they are pleasing to the gods, and the fit guides of men into purity of life, since their very highest part, being the slave of passion and subject to vice, only makes them more intent on deceiving and seducing, in proportion to the mental force and energy of desire they possess? 10.23. Even Porphyry asserts that it was revealed by divine oracles that we are not purified by any sacrifices to sun or moon, meaning it to be inferred that we are not purified by sacrificing to any gods. For what mysteries can purify, if those of the sun and moon, which are esteemed the chief of the celestial gods, do not purify? He says, too, in the same place, that principles can purify, lest it should be supposed, from his saying that sacrificing to the sun and moon cannot purify, that sacrificing to some other of the host of gods might do so. And what he as a Platonist means by principles, we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak as they have a mind to, and in the most difficult matters do not scruple to offend religious ears; but we are bound to speak according to a certain rule, lest freedom of speech beget impiety of opinion about the matters themselves of which we speak. 12.14. What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will, created man, who had never before been, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, You shall keep us, O Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation for ever, and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness adds immediately, The wicked walk in a circle. Then, as if it were said to him, What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity -God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness? the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, According to the depth of Your wisdom You have multiplied the children of men. Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but You have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will. 14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord; Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them? Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added good things, to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you. For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications - luxurious banquets, for example - on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, good does not occur, but only, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them, and, as I believe, because good is already included in the word would; for He does not say desire. Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord. And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, Be unwilling to make any manner of lie, Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, Peace on earth, of good will to men. Luke 2:14 For good is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that it rejoices not in iniquity, unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful. And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said I will rather than I desire, because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, I will nothing else than Philumena. That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more! And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations - Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are content The same author had also used the expression, the evil contentments of the mind. So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you! 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible. 14.10. But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness. Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman: Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart. Matthew 5:28 As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, Increase and multiply, Genesis 1:28 the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels - a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things. 14.13. Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of sin. Sirach 10:13 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then - that is to say, the trangression of eating the forbidden fruit - was committed by persons who were already wicked. That evil fruit Matthew 7:18 could be brought forth only by a corrupt tree. But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: You cast them down when they lifted up themselves. For he does not say, when they had been lifted up, as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but when they lifted up themselves even then they were cast down - that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God. The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, You shall be as gods, Genesis 3:5 which they would much more readily have accomplished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light - this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, Pride goes before destruction, and before honor is humility; Proverbs 18:12 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God's prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Your name, O Lord; that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with You in seeking Your glory. 14.16. Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible , to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved. 14.17. Justly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called shameful. Their condition was different before sin. For as it is written, They were naked and were not ashamed, Genesis 2:25 - not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those members without the will's consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man. For they were not created blind, as the unenlightened vulgar fancy; for Adam saw the animals to whom he gave names, and of Eve we read, The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes. Genesis 3:6 Their eyes, therefore were open, but were not open to this, that is to say, were not observant so as to recognize what was conferred upon them by the garment of grace, for they had no consciousness of their members warring against their will. But when they were stripped of this grace, that their disobedience might be punished by fit retribution, there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them ashamed. And therefore, after they violated God's command by open transgression, it is written: And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. Genesis 3:7 The eyes of them both were opened, not to see, for already they saw, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. And therefore also the tree itself which they were forbidden to touch was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from this circumstance, that if they ate of it it would impart to them this knowledge. For the discomfort of sickness reveals the pleasure of health. They knew, therefore, that they were naked,- naked of that grace which prevented them from being ashamed of bodily nakedness while the law of sin offered no resistance to their mind. And thus they obtained a knowledge which they would have lived in blissful ignorance of, had they, in trustful obedience to God, declined to commit that offense which involved them in the experience of the hurtful effects of unfaithfulness and disobedience. And therefore, being ashamed of the disobedience of their own flesh, which witnessed to their disobedience while it punished it, they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons, that is, cinctures for their privy parts; for some interpreters have rendered the word by succinctoria. Campestria is, indeed, a Latin word, but it is used of the drawers or aprons used for a similar purpose by the young men who stripped for exercise in the campus; hence those who were so girt were commonly called campestrati. Shame modestly covered that which lust disobediently moved in opposition to the will, which was thus punished for its own disobedience. Consequently all nations, being propagated from that one stock, have so strong an instinct to cover the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not uncover them even in the bath, but wash with their drawers on. In the dark solitudes of India also, though some philosophers go naked, and are therefore called gymnosophists, yet they make an exception in the case of these members and cover them. 14.18. Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! Does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin? 14.19. Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions - that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring - these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife. 14.20. It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin - that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice. 14.21. Far be it, then, from us to suppose that our first parents in Paradise felt that lust which caused them afterwards to blush and hide their nakedness, or that by its means they should have fulfilled the benediction of God, Increase and multiply and replenish the earth; Genesis 1:28 for it was after sin that lust began. It was after sin that our nature, having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it. But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the procreation of children might be recognized as part of the glory of marriage, and not of the punishment of sin. But now, men being ignorant of the blessedness of Paradise, suppose that children could not have been begotten there in any other way than they know them to be begotten now, i.e., by lust, at which even honorable marriage blushes; some not simply rejecting, but sceptically deriding the divine Scriptures, in which we read that our first parents, after they sinned, were ashamed of their nakedness, and covered it; while others, though they accept and honor Scripture, yet conceive that this expression, Increase and multiply, refers not to carnal fecundity, because a similar expression is used of the soul in the words, You will multiply me with strength in my soul; and so, too, in the words which follow in Genesis, And replenish the earth, and subdue it, they understand by the earth the body which the soul fills with its presence, and which it rules over when it is multiplied in strength. And they hold that children could no more then than now be begotten without lust, which, after sin, was kindled, observed, blushed for, and covered; and even that children would not have been born in Paradise, but only outside of it, as in fact it turned out. For it was after they were expelled from it that they came together to beget children, and begot them. 14.22. But we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before man sinned, when He created them male and female - in other words, two sexes manifestly distinct. And it was this work of God on which His blessing was pronounced. For no sooner had Scripture said, Male and female created He them, Genesis 1:27-28 than it immediately continues, And God blessed them, and God said to them, Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, etc. And though all these things may not unsuitably be interpreted in a spiritual sense, yet male and female cannot be understood of two things in one man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact. It was not of the spirit which commands and the body which obeys, nor of the rational soul which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor of the contemplative virtue which is supreme and the active which is subject, nor of the understanding of the mind and the sense of the body, but plainly of the matrimonial union by which the sexes are mutually bound together, that our Lord, when asked whether it were lawful for any cause to put away one's wife (for on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given), answered and said, Have you not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more two, but one flesh. What, therefore, God has joined together, let not man put asunder. Matthew 19:4-5 It is certain, then, that from the first men were created, as we see and know them to be now, of two sexes, male and female, and that they are called one, either on account of the matrimonial union, or on account of the origin of the woman, who was created from the side of the man. And it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to love their own wives in particular. Ephesians 5:25 14.23. But he who says that there should have been neither copulation nor generation but for sin, virtually says that man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints. For if these two by not sinning should have continued to live alone, because, as is supposed, they could not have begotten children had they not sinned, then certainly sin was necessary in order that there might be not only two but many righteous men. And if this cannot be maintained without absurdity, we must rather believe that the number of the saints fit to complete this most blessed city would have been as great though no one had sinned, as it is now that the grace of God gathers its citizens out of the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated. Luke 20:34 And therefore that marriage, worthy of the happiness of Paradise, should have had desirable fruit without the shame of lust, had there been no sin. But how that could be, there is now no example to teach us. Nevertheless, it ought not to seem incredible that one member might serve the will without lust then, since so many serve it now. Do we now move our feet and hands when we will to do the things we would by means of these members? Do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants of the will, both in our own case and in that of others, and especially of artisans employed in mechanical operations, by which the weakness and clumsiness of nature become, through industrious exercise, wonderfully dexterous? And shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will, so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award of disobedience, had been awanting? Did not Cicero, in discussing the difference of governments in his De Republica, adopt a simile from human nature, and say that we command our bodily members as children, they are so obedient; but that the vicious parts of the soul must be treated as slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority? And no doubt, in the order of nature, the soul is more excellent than the body; and yet the soul commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless this lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the members under the control of the will; for if they were thus ruled, there should be no shame. But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should resist its authority. For in the resistance experienced by the soul in the other emotions there is less shame, because the resistance is from itself, and thus, when it is conquered by itself, itself is the conqueror, although the conquest is inordinate and vicious, because accomplished by those parts of the soul which ought to be subject to reason, yet, being accomplished by its own parts and energies, the conquest is, as I say, its own. For when the soul conquers itself to a due subordination, so that its unreasonable motions are controlled by reason, while it again is subject to God, this is a conquest virtuous and praiseworthy. Yet there is less shame when the soul is resisted by its own vicious parts than when its will and order are resisted by the body, which is distinct from and inferior to it, and dependent on it for life itself. But so long as the will retains under its authority the other members, without which the members excited by lust to resist the will cannot accomplish what they seek, chastity is preserved, and the delight of sin foregone. And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will. The field of generation should have been sown by the organ created for this purpose, as the earth is sown by the hand. And whereas now, as we essay to investigate this subject more exactly, modesty hinders us, and compels us to ask pardon of chaste ears, there would have been no cause to do so, but we could have discoursed freely, and without fear of seeming obscene, upon all those points which occur to one who meditates on the subject. There would not have been even words which could be called obscene, but all that might be said of these members would have been as pure as what is said of the other parts of the body. Whoever, then, comes to the perusal of these pages with unchaste mind, let him blame his disposition, not his nature; let him brand the actings of his own impurity, not the words which necessity forces us to use, and for which every pure and pious reader or hearer will very readily pardon me, while I expose the folly of that scepticism which argues solely on the ground of its own experience, and has no faith in anything beyond. He who is not scandalized at the apostle's censure of the horrible wickedness of the women who changed the natural use into that which is against nature, Romans 1:26 will read all this without being shocked, especially as we are not, like Paul, citing and censuring a damnable uncleanness, but are explaining, so far as we can, human generation, while with Paul we avoid all obscenity of language. 14.24. The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we move at will not only those members which are furnished with joints of solid bone, as the hands, feet, and fingers, but we move also at will those which are composed of slack and soft nerves: we can put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist them, or contract and stiffen them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face. The lungs, which are the very tenderest of the viscera except the brain, and are therefore carefully sheltered in the cavity of the chest, yet for all purposes of inhaling and exhaling the breath, and of uttering and modulating the voice, are obedient to the will when we breathe, exhale, speak, shout, or sing, just as the bellows obey the smith or the organist. I will not press the fact that some animals have a natural power to move a single spot of the skin with which their whole body is covered, if they have felt on it anything they wish to drive off - a power so great, that by this shivering tremor of the skin they can not only shake off flies that have settled on them, but even spears that have fixed in their flesh. Man, it is true, has not this power; but is this any reason for supposing that God could not give it to such creatures as He wished to possess it? And therefore man himself also might very well have enjoyed absolute power over his members had he not forfeited it by his disobedience; for it was not difficult for God to form him so that what is now moved in his body only by lust should have been moved only at will. We know, too, that some men are differently constituted from others, and have some rare and remarkable faculty of doing with their body what other men can by no effort do, and, indeed, scarcely believe when they hear of others doing. There are persons who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are some who, without moving the head, can bring the hair down upon the forehead, and move the whole scalp backwards and forwards at pleasure. Some, by lightly pressing their stomach, bring up an incredible quantity and variety of things they have swallowed, and produce whatever they please, quite whole, as if out of a bag. Some so accurately mimic the voices of birds and beasts and other men, that, unless they are seen, the difference cannot be told. Some have such command of their bowels, that they can break wind continuously at pleasure, so as to produce the effect of singing. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is well known that some weep when they please, and shed a flood of tears. But far more incredible is that which some of our brethren saw quite recently. There was a presbyter called Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian Church, who, as often as he pleased (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), on some one imitating the wailings of mourners, became so insensible, and lay in a state so like death, that not only had he no feeling when they pinched and pricked him, but even when fire was applied to him, and he was burned by it, he had no sense of pain except afterwards from the wound. And that his body remained motionless, not by reason of his self-command, but because he was insensible, was proved by the fact that he breathed no more than a dead man; and yet he said that, when any one spoke with more than ordinary distinctness, he heard the voice, but as if it were a long way off. Seeing, then, that even in this mortal and miserable life the body serves some men by many remarkable movements and moods beyond the ordinary course of nature, what reason is there for doubting that, before man was involved by his sin in this weak and corruptible condition, his members might have served his will for the propagation of offspring without lust? Man has been given over to himself because he abandoned God, while he sought to be self-satisfying; and disobeying God, he could not obey even himself. Hence it is that he is involved in the obvious misery of being unable to live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself blessed; but he could not be so if he lived wickedly. |
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| 294. Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae In Hexaemeron, 3.5-3.6 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 295. Paulinus of Nola, Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 296. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 297. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 298. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 10-17, 19-25, 27-28, 30-31, 35-38, 40, 43-45, 47, 50-51, 56-59, 6, 60, 71, 74-75, 80-81, 84, 86-87, 89, 91, 49 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 411 |
| 299. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 140, 2, 261, 269, 28, 300-302, 6, 62, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236, 391, 393, 394, 395 |
| 300. Theodoret of Cyrus, Cure of The Greek Maladies, 5.25 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 138 |
| 301. Themistius, Orations, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197 |
| 302. Augustine, Enchiridion, 28.105 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 407 |
| 303. Augustine, Commentary On Genesis, 6.25.36, 9.4.8, 9.10.16, 9.10.18-9.10.19, 9.14.25, 10.25, 11.41.56, 12.15.31, 12.17.34, 13.21.33 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 381, 414, 415 |
| 304. Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Librum Commentarius, 143.8-143.11 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 134 |
| 305. Jerome, Commentaria In Epistolam Ad Ephesios, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 355 |
| 306. Philoponus John, In Aristotelis Libros De Generatione Et Corruptione Commentaria, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 267, 269 |
| 307. Jerome, Commentary On Ezekiel, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 352, 353, 354 |
| 308. Jerome, Commentaria In Jeremiam, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 397 |
| 309. Jerome, Commentaria In Matthaeum (Commentaria In Evangelium S. Matthaei), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 349, 352, 353, 354, 396 |
| 310. Jerome, Dialogi Contra Pelagianos (Dialogus Adversus Pelagianos.), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 311. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 312. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 161 |
| 313. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 314. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 315. John Philoponus, In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria, 51.13-52.1, 51.13-52.12, 141.22, 141.23, 141.24, 141.25, 141.26, 141.27, 141.28, 141.29, 439.35-440.3 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 269 |
| 316. Philoponus John, In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 267 |
| 317. Damaskios, In Parmenidem, 252.11, 252.12, 252.13, 252.27-253.11, 253.23, 253.24, 253.25, 253.26, 266.25, 266.26, 266.27, 266.28 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206 |
| 318. Damaskios, In Philebum, 13.5-13.12, 87.1-87.4 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 205 |
| 319. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.76.1-1.76.2 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 49 |
| 320. Boethius, De Consolatione, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 167 |
| 321. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 303, 315 |
| 322. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.212.22, 2.72.14, 3.334.3-3.334.15, 3.335.10-3.335.14, 3.338.6-3.338.13, 3.340.14-3.340.17 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206, 266 |
| 323. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 133.18, 226.12-227.2 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 279 |
| 324. David, Prolegomena Philosophiae, 14.15-15.22 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 325. Menander Protector, Fragments, 215 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 326. Maximus The Confessor, Quaestiones Ad Thalassium , None (6th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 348 |
| 327. Augustine, Letters, None (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 405, 407, 412 |
| 328. Philo of Alexandria, Prou., 2.48 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 211 |
| 329. Galen, Phil. Hist., 16 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 206 |
| 330. Pseudo-Plutarchus, De Fato, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Maso (2022) 138 |
| 331. Cicero, Luc., 104, 17-18, 39, 77, 37 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022) 131, 132 |
| 332. [Andronicus], De Passionibus, 1 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 32 |
| 333. Plotinus (Cont.), Plotinus (Cont.), 6.1.26 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 206 |
| 334. Priscian, 2.199.8-9 Keil, 2.199.8-2.199.9 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Williams and Vol (2022) 127 |
| 335. Cicero, Varr., 40, 42, 45, 41 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022) 129, 130 |
| 336. Posidonius, Writings, 15, 14 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 206 |
| 337. Anon., Pachomius, Vita Graecae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 338. Plut., Comm. Not., 1084 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Maso (2022) 132 |
| 339. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 340. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 382, 410, 415 |
| 341. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 68, 73 |
| 342. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, 82 (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 269 |
343. Vergil, Georgics, 2.490 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Williams and Vol (2022) 281| 2.490. Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, | |
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| 344. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197, 235 |
| 345. Valerius Flaccus Gaius, Argonautica, 1.563, 2.381, 3.183, 4.43 Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 101 |
| 346. Suidas Thessalius, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bianchetti et al (2015) 134 |
347. Strabo, Geography, 1.1.16, 1.1.19, 1.2.2, 1.2.34, 1.15, 2.5.2, 2.5.34, 13.54, 13.614, 16.2.4 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium •zeno of citium, biography •zeno of citium, and arcesilaus Found in books: Bianchetti et al (2015) 132, 134; Long (2006) 107; Wardy and Warren (2018) 246, 247, 248, 267 | 1.1.16. To the various subjects which it embraces let us add natural history, or the history of the animals, plants, and other different productions of the earth and sea, whether serviceable or useless, and my original statement will, I think, carry perfect conviction with it. That he who should undertake this work would be a benefactor to mankind, reason and the voice of antiquity agree. The poets feign that they were the wisest heroes who travelled and wandered most in foreign climes: and to be familiar with many countries, and the disposition of the inhabitants, is, according to them, of vast importance. Nestor prides himself on having associated with the Lapithae, to whom he went, having been invited thither from the Apian land afar. So does Menelaus: — Cyprus, Phoenicia, Sidon, and the shores of Egypt, roaming without hope I reach'd; In distant Ethiopia thence arrived, And Libya, where the lambs their foreheads show With budding horns defended soon as yean'd. [Od. iv. 83.] Adding as a peculiarity of the country, There thrice within the year the flocks produce. [Od. iv. 86.] And of Egypt: — Where the sustaining earth is most prolific. And Thebes, the city with an hundred gates, Whence twenty thousand chariots rush to war. Iliad ix. 383 Such information greatly enlarges our sphere of knowledge, by informing us of the nature of the country, its botanical and zoological peculiarities. To these should be added its marine history; for we are in a certain sense amphibious, not exclusively connected with the land, but with the sea as well. Hercules, on account of his vast experience and observation, was described as skilled in mighty works. All that we have previously stated is confirmed both by the testimony of antiquity and by reason. One consideration however appears to bear in a peculiar manner on the case in point; viz. the importance of geography in a political view. For the sea and the earth in which we dwell furnish theatres for action; limited, for limited actions; vast, for grander deeds; but that which contains them all, and is the scene of the greatest undertakings, constitutes what we term the habitable earth; and they are the greatest generals who, subduing nations and kingdoms under one sceptre, and one political administration, have acquired dominion over land and sea. It is clear then, that geography is essential to all the transactions of the statesman, informing us, as it does, of the position of the continents, seas, and oceans of the whole habitable earth. Information of especial interest to those who are concerned to know the exact truth of such particulars, and whether the places have been explored or not: for government will certainly be better administered where the size and position of the country, its own peculiarities, and those of the surrounding districts, are understood. Forasmuch as there are many sovereigns who rule in different regions, and some stretch their dominion over others' territories, and undertake the government of different nations and kingdoms, and thus enlarge the extent of their dominion, it is not possible that either themselves, nor yet writers on geography, should be equally acquainted with the whole, but to both there is a great deal more or less known. Indeed, were the whole earth under one government and one administration, it is hardly possible that we should be informed of every locality in an equal degree; for even then we should be most acquainted with the places nearest us: and after all, it is better that we should have a more perfect description of these, since, on account of their proximity, there is greater reed for it. We see there is no reason to be surprised that there should be one chorographer for the Indians, another for the Ethiopians, and a third for the Greeks and Romans. What use would it be to the Indians if a geographer should thus describe Boeotia to them, in the words of Homer: — The dwellers on the rocks of Aulis follow'd, with the hardy clans of Hyria, Schoenus, Scolus. Iliad ii. 496. To us this is of value, while to be acquainted with the Indies and their various territorial divisions would be useless, as it could lead to no advantage, which is the only criterion of the worth of such knowledge. 1.1.19. But even the theoretical portion of geography is by no means contemptible. On the one hand, it embraces the arts, mathematics, and natural science; on the other, history and fable. Not that this latter can have any distinct advantage: for instance, if any one should relate to us the wanderings of Ulysses, Menelaus, and Jason, he would not seem to have added directly to our fund of practical knowledge thereby, (which is the only thing men of the world are interested in,) unless he should convey useful examples of what those wanderers were compelled to suffer, and at the same time afford matter of rational amusement to those who interest themselves in the places which gave birth to such fables. Practical men interest themselves in these pursuits, since they are at once commendable, and afford them pleasure; but yet not to any great extent. In this class, too, will be found those whose main object in life is pleasure and respectability: but these by no means constitute the majority of mankind, who naturally prefer that which holds out some direct advantage. The geographer should therefore chiefly devote himself to what is practically important. He should follow the same rule in regard to history and the mathematics, selecting always that which is most useful, most intelligible, and most authentic. 1.2.2. Let us first examine Eratosthenes, reviewing at the same time what Hipparchus has advanced against him. Eratosthenes is much too creditable an historian for us to believe what Polemon endeavours to charge against him, that he had not even seen Athens. At the same time he does not merit that unbounded confidence which some seem to repose in him, although, as he himself tells us, he passed much of his time with first-rate [characters]. Never, says he, at one period, and in one city, were there so many philosophers flourishing together as in my time. In their number was Ariston and Arcesilaus. This, however, it seems is not sufficient, but you must also be able to choose who are the real guides whom it is your interest to follow. He considers Arcesilaus and Ariston to be the coryphaei of the philosophers who flourished in his time, and is ceaseless in his eulogies of Apelles and Bion, the latter of whom, says he, was the first to deck himself in the flowers of philosophy, but concerning whom one is often likewise tempted to exclaim, How great is Bion in spite of his rags! It is in such instances as the following that the mediocrity of his genius shows itself. Although at Athens he became a disciple of Zeno of Citium, he makes no mention of his followers; while those who opposed that philosopher, and of whose sect not a trace remains, he thinks fit to set down amongst the [great characters] who flourished in his time. His real character appears in his Treatise on Moral Philosophy, his Meditations, and some similar productions. He seems to have held a middle course between the man who devotes himself to philosophy, and the man who cannot make up his mind to dedicate himself to it: and to have studied the science merely as a relief from his other pursuits, or as a pleasing and instructive recreation. In his other writings he is just the same; but let these things pass. We will now proceed as well as we can to the task of rectifying his geography. First, then, let us return to the point which we lately deferred. 1.2.34. Many conjectures have been hazarded as to who the Erembi were: they who suppose the Arabs are intended, seem to deserve the most credit. Our Zeno reads the passage thus: — I came to the Ethiopians, the Sidonians, and the Arabians. But there is no occasion to tamper with the text, which is of great antiquity; it is a far preferable course to suppose a change in the name itself, which is of frequent and ordinary occurrence in every nation: and in fact certain grammarians establish this view by a comparison of the radical letters. Posidonius seems to me to adopt the better plan after all, in looking for the etymology of names in nations of one stock and community; thus between the Armenians, Syrians, and Arabians there is a strong affinity both in regard to dialect, mode of life, peculiarities of physical conformation, and above all in the contiguity of the countries. Mesopotamia, which is a motley of the three nations, is a proof of this; for the similarity amongst these three is very remarkable. And though in consequence of the various latitudes there may be some difference between those who dwell in the north and those of the south, and again between each of these and the inhabitants of the middle region, still the same characteristics are domit in all. Also the Assyrians and Arians have a great affinity both to these people and to each other. And [Posidonius] believes there is a similarity in the names of these different nations. Those whom we call Syrians style themselves Armenians and Arammaeans, names greatly like those of the Armenians, Arabs, and Erembi. Perhaps this [last] term is that by which the Greeks anciently designated the Arabs; the etymon of the word certainly strengthens the idea. Many deduce the etymology of the Erembi from ἔραν ἐμβαίνειν, (to go into the earth,) which [they say] was altered by the people of a later generation into the more intelligible name of Troglodytes, by which are intended those Arabs who dwell on that side of the Arabian Gulf next to Egypt and Ethiopia. It is probable then that the poet describes Menelaus as having visited these people in the same way that he says he visited the Ethiopians; for they are likewise near to the Thebaid; and he mentions them not on account of any commerce or gain, (for of these there was not much,) but probably to enhance the length of the journey and his meed of praise: for such distant travelling was highly thought of. For example, — Discover'd various cities, and the mind And manners learn'd of men in lands remote. [Od. i. 3.] And again: After numerous toils And perilous wanderings o'er the stormy deep, In the eighth year at last I brought them home. [Od. iv. 81.] Hesiod, in his Catalogue, writes, And the daughter of Arabus, whom gracious Hermes and Thronia, descended from king Belus, brought forth. Thus, too, says Stesichorus. Whence it seems that at that time the country was from him named Arabia, though it is not likely this was the case in the heroic period. 2.5.2. Those who write on the science of Geography should trust entirely for the arrangement of the subject they are engaged on to the geometers, who have measured the whole earth; they in their turn to astronomers; and these again to natural philosophers. Now natural philosophy is one of the perfect sciences. The perfect sciences they define as those which, depending on no external hypothesis, have their origin, and the evidence of their propositions, in themselves. Here are a few of the facts established by natural philosophers. The earth and heavens are spheroidal. The tendency of all bodies having weight, is to a centre. Further, the earth being spheroidal, and having the same centre as the heavens, is motionless, as well as the axis which passes through both it and the heavens. The heavens turn round both the earth and its axis, from east to west. The fixed stars turn round with it, at the same rate as the whole. These fixed stars follow in their course parallel circles; the principal of which are, the equator, the two tropics, and the arctic circles. While the planets, the sun, and the moon, describe certain oblique circles comprehended within the zodiac. Admitting these points in whole or in part, astronomers proceed to treat of other matters, [such as] the motions [of the stars], their revolutions, eclipses, size, relative distance, and a thousand similar particulars. On their side, geometers, when measuring the size of the entire earth, avail themselves of the data furnished by the natural philosopher and astronomer; and the geographer on his part makes use of those of the geometer. 2.5.34. It now remains for us to speak of the climata. of these too we shall give but a general description, commencing with those lines which we have denominated elementary, namely, those which determine the greatest length and breadth of the [habitable earth], but especially its breadth. To enter fully into this subject is the duty of astronomers. This has been done by Hipparchus, who has noted down (as he says) the differences of the heavenly appearances for every degree of that quarter of the globe in which our habitable earth is situated, namely, from the equator to the north pole. What is beyond our habitable earth it is not however the business of the geographer to consider. Nor yet even in regard to the various parts of the habitable earth must too minute and numerous differences be noticed, since to the man of the world they are perplexing; it will suffice to give the most striking and simple of the statements of Hipparchus. Assuming, as he does himself after the assertion of Eratosthenes, that the circumference of the earth is 252,000 stadia, the differences of the [celestial] phenomena will not be great for each [degree] within the limits between which the habitable earth is contained. Supposing we cut the grand circle of the earth into 360 divisions, each of these divisions will consist of 700 stadia. This is the calculation adopted by [Hipparchus] to fix the distances, which [as we said] should be taken under the before-mentioned meridian of Meroe. He commences at the regions situated under the equator, and stopping from time to time at every 700 stadia along the whole length of the meridian above mentioned, proceeds to describe the celestial phenomena as they appear from each. But the equator is not the place for us to start from. For even if there be there a habitable region, as some suppose, it forms a habitable earth to itself, a narrow slip enclosed by the regions uninhabitable on account of the heat; and can be no part of our habitable earth. Now the geographer should attend to none but our own habitable earth, which is confined by certain boundaries; on the south by the parallel which passes over the Cinnamon Country; on the north by that which passes over Ierna. But keeping in mind the scheme of our geography, we have no occasion to mark all the places comprehended within this distance, nor yet all the celestial phenomena. We must however commence, as Hipparchus does, with the southern regions. 16.2.4. Seleucis is the best of the above-mentioned portions of Syria. It is called and is a Tetrapolis, and derives its name from the four distinguished cities which it contains; for there are more than four cities, but the four largest are Antioch Epidaphne, Seleuceia in Pieria, Apameia, and Laodiceia. They were called Sisters from the concord which existed between them. They were founded by Seleucus Nicator. The largest bore the name of his father, and the strongest his own. of the others, Apameia had its name from his wife Apama, and Laodiceia from his mother.In conformity with its character of Tetrapolis, Seleucis, according to Poseidonius, was divided into four satrapies; Coele-Syria into the same number, but [Commagene, like] Mesopotamia, consisted of one.Antioch also is a Tetrapolis, consisting (as the name implies) of four portions, each of which has its own, and all of them a common wall.[Seleucus] Nicator founded the first of these portions, transferring thither settlers from Antigonia, which a short time before Antigonus, son of Philip, had built near it. The second was built by the general body of settlers; the third by Seleucus, the son of Callinicus; the fourth by Antiochus, the son of Epiphanes. |
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| 348. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, 241.7 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206 |
| 349. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214, 233, 297 |
| 350. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 243 |
| 351. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis De Caelo Libros Commentaria, 303.34 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 77 |
| 352. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 134; Wardy and Warren (2018) 180 |
| 353. Sextus, The Sentences of Sextus, 116, 13, 70, 87, 97, 232 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 354. Isaiah The Solitary, On Guarding The Intellect, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 355. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 18, 2, 29, 3, 1 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 356. Photius, Bibliotheca (Library, Bibl.), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
| 357. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 98 |
| 358. Stobaeus, 2.7.9 [86 W], 2.7.9 Tagged with subjects: •zeno, of citium Found in books: Agri (2022) 73 |
| 359. Manilius, Astronomica, 1.247-1.254, 2.60-2.81 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 130 |
| 360. Calcidius, In Tim., 144, 292, 29 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Vazques and Ross (2022) 10 |
| 361. Plutarch, Sr, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Vazques and Ross (2022) 10 |
| 362. Eunapius, Vitae Sophistarum Et Philosophorum, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 10.3, 19.1, 20.1, 21.1, 22.1, 23.1, 23.3, 24.1 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231, 238 |
| 363. Julius Pollux, Onomasticon, 1.96, 3.12 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231 |
| 364. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 365. Hrd., Hist., 48, 52, 71 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022) 129 |
| 366. Papyri, On Property Management, 9.32-9.38, 13.8-13.11, 13.32-13.33, 22.17-22.31, 23.1-23.11, 23.15-23.16, 23.27-23.28 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 42, 87 |
| 367. Plutarch, According To Epicurus It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 33 |
| 368. Sextus Empiricus, Against The Grammarians, 7.213-7.214 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Yona (2018) 119 |
| 369. Palladius of Aspuna, Lausiac History, 25.5 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 361, 371 |
| 370. Papyri, P.Oxy., 2035, 930, 3808 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231 |
| 371. Origen, Commentary On Joshua, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 346, 387 |
| 372. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 373. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 12 |
| 374. Philodemus, History of The Stoics, 9, 8 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona (2018) 33 |
| 375. Anon., Herculaneum Papyrus, 1577 / 1579 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 376. Epiphanius, On The Faith, 9.40 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2019) 83 |
| 378. Maimonides, Hilkhot De'Ot, 1.4-1.5, 2.3 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385, 386 |
| 379. Maimonides, Guide For The Perplexed, 1.54 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 380. Maimonides, Commentary On The Misnah, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385 |
| 381. Isaiah The Solitary, Logoi, 2.1-2.2 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 382. John Climacus, Ladder, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 383. Gregory The Great, Pope, Moralia, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 370 |
| 384. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Virgins, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 370 |
| 387. Philodemus, On Envy, Ed.Guerra, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 388. Philodemus, On Arrogance, Ed.Jensen, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 391. Antiphon, On Emotions, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 392. Basil of Caesarea, On The Eucharist, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 391 |
| 394. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Monks, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389, 395 |
| 395. Pseudo‐Ocellus, Commentary On Plato'S Phaedo, Ed.Westerink, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172, 226 |
| 396. Posidonius, Ed.Edelstein–Kidd (See Also Galen, Php, Books 4–5), Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 101 |
| 397. Augustine, On The Catholic And Manichaean Ways of Life, 1.27.53-1.27.54, 2.17, 18.15, 18.65 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277, 397, 400 |
| 400. Aristotle, Protrepticus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 250 |
| 402. Galen, Commentary On Hippocrates, Epidemics, Ed.Kühn, 3.1.4 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 284 |
| 403. Anon., Epicurea, Ed.Usener, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283, 410 |
| 404. Philodemus, On Choices And Avoidances, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201, 284 |
| 405. Pseudo‐Ocellus, In Alcibiadem I, 6.6-7.8, 54.15-55.11, 145.12-146.11 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221, 299 |
| 406. Pseudo‐Maximus, Centuries, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 348 |
| 408. Pseudo‐John of Damascus, On The Virtues And The Vices, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 368 |
| 411. Augustine, Expositions of The Psalms, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 413. Philodemus, On Conversation (Cronache Ercolanesi 5), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 218 |
| 414. Plutarch, Erotikos, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277 |
| 415. Basil of Caesarea, Ascetic Sermons, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214 |
| 416. Gregory of Nyssa, On Placilla, Ed.Jaeger Et Al., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 418. John Chrysostom, Pseudo‐Augustine, De Consolatione Mortuorum, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 419. Crates of Thebes, Fragments, 3, 7 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 420. Bion of Boysthenes, Fr., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 81 |
| 421. Timaeus, Theaetetus, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 271 |
| 422. Plutarch, On Desire And Illness, 5 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 21 |
| 423. Plutarch, On Virtue of Character, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 169 |
| 425. Rufus of Ephesus, Scholia In Hom. Iliad, 2.857 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 149 |
| 426. Ps.-Aristotle, Problemata, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 264 |
| 427. Demetrius of Laconia, Pherc., 42.9-42.10 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 100 |
| 428. Epigraphy, Seg, 23.116, 26.125, 43.24 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231 |
| 429. Epigraphy, Ig Ii2, 1099, 11551, 3571, 3801, 13162 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231 |
| 430. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 2.11, 3.7-3.12, 11.27-11.31, 71.12-71.35 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, and platos theaetetus •zeno of citium, epistemology of •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 76, 80, 82; Long (2006) 232 |
| 431. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 14 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 432. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 35-36, 51-52, 49 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 227 |
| 433. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 126-127, 131-133, 136, 135 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 10; Sorabji (2000) 217 |
| 434. Epicurus, On Nature, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 327 |
| 436. Philodemus, Academicorum Historia, 18 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Long (2006) 97 |
| 438. Clearchus of Soli, Apud Josephus, C. Ap., 0.626388889 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 178 |
| 440. Ambrose, On The Death of His Brother (Csel 73, Pp.207–325), 1.70-1.71, 2.11 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 441. Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 317 |
| 442. Musonius Rufus, Ed.Hense, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 215 |
| 443. Epiphanius, On Faith, 9.46 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 107 |
| 444. Libanius, Preliminary Exercises, 3.4.1-3.4.3 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 279 |
| 445. Athenaeus, Sophists At Dinner, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209, 279 |
| 446. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Creation of Man, 16.11, 16.14 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 324 |
| 447. Porphyry, On The Faculties of The Soul, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315 |
| 450. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209, 311 |
| 451. Pseudo‐Plutarch, Is The Emotional Element In Humans A Part Or A Capacity of The Soul?, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 120 |
| 453. Iamblichus, Letters, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, and involves akrasia •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 303 |
| 455. Jovianus, De Viris Illustribus, '23 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoicism founder Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 765 |
| 456. Paulinus of Nola, Epithalamium Carmen, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 459. Mark The Ascetic, On The Spiritual Law, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 368 |
| 460. Philodemus, On The Stoics (Dorandi), 13 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 71 |
| 463. Julianus Imperator, Orationes, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 82 |
| 465. Aristotle, De Philosophia, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 79 |
| 467. Apollinaris Sidonius, Letters, 1.6.3, 4.8.5, 9.9 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 49 |
| 469. Sextus Empiricus, Against The Physicists, 9.18, 9.41, 10.31 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Bett (2019) 56 |
| 471. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Life of Moses (Pg 44), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 240 |
| 472. Stephanus, In Artem Rhetoricam, 325.15 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 169 |
| 473. Maximus The Confessor, Letter To Marinus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 338, 339 |
| 474. Barlaam of Seminaria, Ethics According To The Stoics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209 |
| 475. Seneca The Younger, On The Shortness of Life, 10 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 231 |
| 476. Hierocles Historicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.30 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 137 |
| 481. Galen, Medical Introduction, 14.726 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 482. Origen, Pg, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 486. Clement, Pedagogue, 3.11.74 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, republic •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 490. Epictetus, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 3.21.19 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, biography •zeno of citium, founder of stoicism Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 242 |
| 493. Aelian, Aëtius, 1.7.33 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, biography •zeno of citium, founder of stoicism •zeno of citium, writings Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 244 |
| 494. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 139 |
| 495. Cicero, Academic Books, 17, 20, 30-32, 34-35, 38-39, 41, 19 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 44 |
| 496. Strabo, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, politeia Found in books: Pinheiro et al (2015) 54 |
| 498. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Rerum Monachalium Rationes, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 369 |
| 499. Basil of Caesarea, Constitutiones Monasticae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 369 |
| 500. Pseudo‐Diogenes (The Cynic), Letters, Ed.Malherbe, 44 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, random sex advocated and communal female partners Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 501. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, 4-5 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 241 |
| 502. Porphyry, On What Is Up To Us, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320 |
| 503. Pseudo‐Makarios, Logia, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 504. Lactantius, Ep.Ad Pentad., None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 505. Anon., Scholium On Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283, 410 |
| 507. Pseudo‐Nilus, Handbook (Edition of Epictetus), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 390 |
| 508. Evagrius, 'Frag.From Sayings of The Fathers (Apophthegmata Patrum), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 390 |
| 510. Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary On The Song of Songs (Pg 44), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 240, 388 |
| 512. Proclus, Psalms, 2.2, 4.4, 34.17 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349, 352, 354 |
| 513. Photius, Epitome, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 190 |
| 516. Justinian, Letter To Menna, Ed Mansi, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 517. Council of Constantinople, Second, Anathemas, 10 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 518. Aristo of Ceos, On Freeing From Pride, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221 |
| 519. Cicero, Posterior Academics, 1.38 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on causes of emotion •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 62, 233 |
| 521. Pseudo‐Ocellus, On The Nature of The Universe, 4 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 522. Pseudo‐Crates (The Cynic), Letters, Ed.Malherbe, 28 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, stoic, random sex advocated and communal female partners Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 523. Pseudo‐Elias (Pseudo‐David), Lectures On Porphyry'S Isagoge, Ed.Westerink, 13.1-13.17 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 524. David, Prolegomena (Cag 18.2), 32.11-33.26 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 526. Augustine, On Free Choice of The Will, 2.1.1 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 528. Pseudo-Plato, 'Axiochus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 529. Pseudo‐Aristotle, Problems, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 242 |
| 530. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, To Anatolius, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 396 |
| 533. Augustine, Exposition of 84 Propositions In The Epistle To The Romans, 61, 60 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 337 |
| 534. Bible.O.T., Wisdom, 8.21 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 383 |
| 535. Jerome, On Guarding The Intellect, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224 |
| 536. Pseudo‐Iamblichus (Nicomachus of Gerasa), Theologoumena Arithmeticae, Ed.De Falco, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334 |
| 538. Valerius Pinianus, Life of Saint Melania, Ed.Gorce, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 539. Augustine, New Sermon, Mainz, Ed.Dolbeau, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
