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198 results for "stoic"
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.26, 2.6-2.7, 17.1-17.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 211, 212; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 217, 229
1.26. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃", 2.6. "וְאֵד יַעֲלֶה מִן־הָאָרֶץ וְהִשְׁקָה אֶת־כָּל־פְּנֵי־הָאֲדָמָה׃", 2.7. "וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃", 17.1. "זֹאת בְּרִיתִי אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְרוּ בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם וּבֵין זַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר׃", 17.1. "וַיְהִי אַבְרָם בֶּן־תִּשְׁעִים שָׁנָה וְתֵשַׁע שָׁנִים וַיֵּרָא יְהוָה אֶל־אַבְרָם וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו אֲנִי־אֵל שַׁדַּי הִתְהַלֵּךְ לְפָנַי וֶהְיֵה תָמִים׃", 17.2. "וּלְיִשְׁמָעֵאל שְׁמַעְתִּיךָ הִנֵּה בֵּרַכְתִּי אֹתוֹ וְהִפְרֵיתִי אֹתוֹ וְהִרְבֵּיתִי אֹתוֹ בִּמְאֹד מְאֹד שְׁנֵים־עָשָׂר נְשִׂיאִם יוֹלִיד וּנְתַתִּיו לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל׃", 17.2. "וְאֶתְּנָה בְרִיתִי בֵּינִי וּבֵינֶךָ וְאַרְבֶּה אוֹתְךָ בִּמְאֹד מְאֹד׃", 1.26. "And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’", 2.6. "but there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground.", 2.7. "Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.", 17.1. "And when Abram was ninety years old and nine, the LORD appeared to Abram, and said unto him: ‘I am God Almighty; walk before Me, and be thou wholehearted.", 17.2. "And I will make My covet between Me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly.’",
2. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 138.7-138.8 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 142, 217
138.7. "אִם־אֵלֵךְ בְּקֶרֶב צָרָה תְּחַיֵּנִי עַל אַף אֹיְבַי תִּשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ וְתוֹשִׁיעֵנִי יְמִינֶךָ׃", 138.8. "יְהוָה יִגְמֹר בַּעֲדִי יְהוָה חַסְדְּךָ לְעוֹלָם מַעֲשֵׂי יָדֶיךָ אַל־תֶּרֶף׃", 138.7. "Though I walk in the midst of trouble, Thou quickenest me; Thou stretchest forth Thy hand against the wrath of mine enemies, And Thy right hand doth save me.", 138.8. "The LORD will accomplish that which concerneth me; Thy mercy, O LORD, endureth for ever; Forsake not the work of Thine own hands.",
3. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 53, 52 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 217
4. Homer, Iliad, 22.395-22.404 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 14
22.395. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.396. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.397. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.398. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.399. / He spake, and devised foul entreatment for goodly Hector. The tendons of both his feet behind he pierced from heel to ankle, and made fast therethrough thongs of oxhide, and bound them to his chariot, but left the head to trail. Then when he had mounted his car and had lifted therein the glorious armour, 22.400. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.401. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.402. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.403. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land. 22.404. / he touched the horses with the lash to start thiem, and nothing loath the pair sped onward. And from Hector as he was dragged the dust rose up, and on either side his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was before so fair; but now had Zeus given him over to his foes to suffer foul entreatment in his own native land.
5. Homer, Odyssey, 27 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 238
6. Parmenides, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 158
7. Euripides, Alcestis, 16, 15 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 98
8. Sophocles, Oedipus At Colonus, 1333 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 101
9. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 145
10. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
11. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 255
245c. παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε. 245c. is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows: Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also
12. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 160
273b. αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν. κατʼ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον· τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως σύντροφον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κέκτηται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν 273b. over itself and all within itself, and remembering and practising the teachings of the Creator and Father to the extent of its power, at first more accurately and at last more carelessly; and the reason for this was the material element in its composition, because this element, which was inherent in the primeval nature, was infected with great disorder before the attainment of the existing orderly universe. For from its Composer the universe has received only good things; but from its previous condition it retains in itself and creates in the animals all the elements of harshness and injustice
13. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252
14. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 160
15. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
16. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •matter, as principle in stoic thought Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 13
17. Chaeremon Tragicus, Fragments, 1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254
18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
19. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
20. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.3, 5.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 164, 252
4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 4.3.  "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows — but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 5.13.  Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight.
21. Cicero, On Laws, 1.53 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 253
22. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.28, 2.58, 3.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 164
1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. 3.28. And so I fully agreed with the part of your discourse that dealt with nature's punctual regularity, and what you termed its concordant interconnexion and correlation; but I could not accept your assertion that this could not have come about were it not held together by a single divine breath. On the contrary, the system's coherence and persistence is due to nature's forces and not to drive power; she does possess that 'concord' (the Greek term is sympatheia) of which you spoke, but the greater this is as a spontaneous growth, the less possible is it to suppose that it was created by divine reason.
23. Cicero, On Duties, 1.22, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •ζῷον λογικόν, gods and human beings as, in stoic thought •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 47; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
1.22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.22.  But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
24. Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 11.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •children, in stoic and popular thought Found in books: Huebner and Laes (2019), Aulus Gellius and Roman Reading Culture: Text, Presence and Imperial Knowledge in the 'Noctes Atticae', 18
25. Cicero, Pro Marcello, 4.9.2, 9.16.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28
26. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.12, 3.20, 3.24-3.25, 3.40, 3.64-3.71, 3.76, 3.80, 3.83, 4.11-4.16, 4.18, 4.38-4.47, 4.56, 4.59-4.62, 4.65, 4.76, 4.79, 4.82-4.83, 5.105 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought •nature, central to stoic thought •stoic thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 15; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 36, 233, 253; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 164
3.12. Cadere, opinor, in sapientem aegritudinem tibi dixisti videri. Et vero ita existimo. Humanum id quidem, quod ita existumas. non enim silice nati sumus, sed est naturale in animis tenerum e ante silice add. V c non male naturabile X sed bi exp. V 1 ( cf. animabili codd. nat. deor. 2,91 ) natura Lb. quiddam quidam R 1 V 1 ( corr. 1 ) -ddā in r. G 2 atque molle, quod quod quā G 1 aegritudine quasi tempestate quatiatur, sed humanum... 22 quatiatur H nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in in om. X add. s V rec nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, minime inquit inquid G 1 adsentior is qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae quae V 2 B qui X nec potest ulla ulle G 1 esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; sim s si inquit (inquid G 1 P cf. 2 ) fuerat X ( fuat V 2 si exp. et ss. V rec ) corr. Sey. cf. Ps. Plut. Cons. ad Ap. 102c, qui primum ou) ga\r sumfe/romai — e)/cw kai\ tou= dunatou= kai\ tou= sumfe/rontos ou)=san ut sua profert, paulo post addit : ' mh\ ga\r nosoi=men ', fhsi\n o( a)kadhmaiko\s Kra/ntwr, ' nosh/sasi de\ parei/h tis ai)/sqhsis ' ktl . inquit ut 303, 21 ergo, inquit al. si debet nec aegrotassem. Si X (a apertum post t in V) c exp. V 2? ne aegrotus inquit fuero, sin quid fuerit Vict. sensus adsit, adsit d in r. G 2 absit V c sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere dolere ex dolore K 1 R 1 ex dobere (b= lo) V 1 contigit G 1 non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. non sine... 7 corpore Aug. civ. 14, 9 3.20. Etenim si sapiens in aegritudinem aegritudinem -ne G incidere posset, posset semel R 1 posset etiam in misericordiam, posset in invidentiam (non dixi invidiam, quae tum tum (cum G) etiam Bouh., alii aliter, Ciceronem corrigentes est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ut et fug. Non. ambiguum nomen invidiae. posset (posse codd. ) etiam... 12 invidiae Non. 443,15 (10 in invidiam. non dixi in invidentia 11 invidia) quod verbum ductum dictum G 1 K 1 ( cf. Isidor. 10,134 ) est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo: quisnam florem Acc. fr. 424 (unde aut quis mortalis fl. Non. 500, 13 num quis non mortalis fl. Ri. num quisnam poetae sit, dubium ) quasnam G 1 liberum invidit meum? male Latine videtur, sed praeclare Accius; ut enim videre, sic invidere florem flore X florē K 2 R c? rectius quam flori . nos consuetudine prohibemur; 3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto\n timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.16. Sed singulis in singulis G ( exp. 2 ) perturbationibus partes eiusdem generis plures subiciuntur, ut aegritudini invidentia— utendum est enim docendi dicendi V 1 causa verbo minus usitato, quoniam invidia non in eo qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur ut... 369, 3 invidetur Non. 443, 19 —, aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aerumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adflictatio, adflectatio K 1 R 1 desperatio, et si quae sunt de genere eodem. sub metum autem subiecta sunt pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, examinatio GK 1 conturbatio, formido, voluptati voluptatis X -ti s vol uptatis V ( ss. rec ) malivolentia... 9 similia Non. 16, 24 s. l. lactare ( sed in textu laetans) malev. hic 370, 21 et 395, 6 X maliv. hic Non. ( 370, 21 R 2 ) malivolentia laetans laetari H malo alieno, laet. m. al. addit C., ut appareat cur mal. voluptati subiciatur delectatio, iactatio et similia, lubidini libidinis V rec inimicitiae Non. ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, ludisne ira... inimicitiae discordia Non. 103, 12 indigentia, desiderium et cetera eius modi. Haec St. fr. 3, 415. 410. 403. 398 cf. om- nino fr. 391–416, quae graecas harum definitionum formas exhibent. autem definiunt hoc modo: invidentiam esse dicunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. 4.18. misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria iniuria K laborantis (nemo enim parricidae patricidae G 1 V aut proditoris supplicio subpl. KH misericordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit interitu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio adflictio V (G 1 in lemmate mg. ) aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum. Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris,. 4.38. atque idem eidem GRV 1 ita acrem in omnis partis aciem intendit, ut semper videat sedem sibi ac locum sine molestia atque angore vivendi, ut, quemcumque casum fortuna invexerit, hunc apte et quiete ferat. quod qui faciet, non aegritudine solum vacabit, sed etiam perturbationibus reliquis omnibus. his autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute obsolute K 1 R beatos adhibeant V (-ant in r. c ) efficit, idemque concitatus et abstractus ab integra certaque ratione non constantiam solum amittit, verum etiam sanitatem. Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. 4.39. modum tu adhibes vitio? an vitium nullum est non parere rationi? an ratio parum praecipit nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardenter aut aut B s V 3 ut X adeptus ecferas te insolenter, nec porro malum, quo aut oppressus iaceas aut, iaceas aut aut in r. V 1 ne opprimare, mente vix constes? eaque omnia aut nimis tristia tristitia V 1 aut nimis laeta errore fieri, qui si si del. Mue. ad Seyfferti Lael. p. 253. an si = sc. error secl.? error stultis extenuetur die, ut, cum res eadem maneat, aliter ferant maneat ... ferant s maneant... ferat X (eaedem maneant M s ) cf. p. 345, 2 inveterata aliter recentia, sapientis ne attingat quidem omnino? 4.40. Etenim quis erit tandem modus iste? quaeramus enim modum aegritudinis, in qua quo VB opere X operae plurimum ponitur. aegre tulisse P. Rupilium P. Rupilium Man. ex Fastis Cap. cf. Lael. 73 fratris repulsam prutilium X (p exp. in RV, primum u in r. in V) consulatus scriptum apud Fannium est. sed fr. 6 ( p. 88 P. ) tamen transisse videtur modum, quippe qui ob eam causam a vita recesserit; moderatius moderatus G 1 V 1 igitur ferre debuit. quid, si, cum id ferret modice, mors liberorum accessisset? nata esset aegritudo nova, sed ea modica. dist. Se. magna tamen facta esset accessio. quid, si deinde dolores graves corporis, si bonorum amissio, si caecitas, si exilium? si pro singulis malis aegritudines accederent, summa ea fieret, quae non sustineretur. sustineretur eretur in r. V c 4.41. Qui modum igitur vitio quaerit, similiter facit, ut si posse putet eum qui se e Leucata praecipitaverit sustinere se, cum velit. ut enim id non potest, sic animus perturbatus et incitatus nec cohibere neccoloco K se potest nec, quo loco n eqoloco G 1 necquiloco R 1 ( corr. 2 ) vult, insistere. omninoque, quae crescentia omnino quaeque cr. X (quaequae K) pernitiosa GRV perniciosa sunt, eadem sunt vitiosa nascentia; 4.42. aegritudo autem ceteraeque perturbationes amplificatae certe pestiferae sunt: igitur pestiferunt ig. K 1 etiam susceptae continuo in magna pestis parte versantur. etenim ipsae ipse GV se impellunt, ubi semel a ratione discessum est, ipsaque sibi imbecillitas inb. G indulget in altumque provehitur imprudens nec reperit repperit X locum consistendi. quam ob rem nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes adprobent an moderatam iniustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam; qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum; quod cum ipsum per se odiosum est, tum eo molestius, quia sunt in lubrico incitataque semel proclivi labuntur sustinerique sustineri quae X (qu e V) nullo modo possunt. Quid, quod idem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos nos V c s non X extirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas? 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 4.44. Nec vero nevero G 1 solum hanc libidinem laudant—est enim ira, ut modo modo cf. p. 371, 7 321, 18 Lact. ira 17, 20 definivi, ulciscendi libido—, sed ipsum illud genus vel alt. vel om. KR libidinis vel cupiditatis ad summam utilitatem esse dicunt a natura datum; nihil enim quemquam nisi quod lubeat praeclare facere posse. noctu sqq. Val. Max. 8, 14 ext. 1 ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset, posset: indicatur non externa ambulandi causa, sed ratio qua adductus adulescens inquietus consilium ambulandi ceperit (cum pro quod Sey. ) quaerentibusque respondebat Miltiadis militiadis ( alt. i del. V 3 ) trophaeis GR( corr. R 1 )V militia adstropheis K (tropea miliciadis Val. Max. ) tropaeis se e somno suscitari. suscitare X corr. V rec s cui non sunt auditae Demosthenis demostenis X dolore GR 1 V 1 vigiliae? qui dolere se aiebat, agebat K si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria. philosophiae denique ipsius principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoran Democritum Platonem accepimus. ubi enim quicquid quiquid G 1 esset esse G 1 K quod disci dici GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) posset, eo veniendum iudicaverunt. num num nam R 1 putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse? 4.45. Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et inmanem beluam fugiendam fugienda X (-ā V c ) diximus, diximus p. 330, 10 non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines homines s omnes X castigationes V 1 castigationibus reprehensionibus ignominiis adfici se adfici se adficisse X ( corr. V 3 ) in delicto dolerent. impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore; morderi est melius conscientia. ex quo est illud e vita ductum evicta d. V Afr. fr.409 ab Afranio: nam cum dissolutus filius: heu me miserum! eume K tum severus pater: dum modo doleat aliquid, doleat quidlubet. 4.46. Reliquas quoque partis aegritudinis utilis esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam et calamitates calamitates post indignorum rep. X del. V 3 hominum indignorum sublevandas; ipsum illud aemulari obtrectare non esse inutile, cum aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se; metum vero si qui quis GV rec sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis esse K qui leges, qui magistratus, qui leges qui magistratus in r. V c qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. tenerent K Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optumam existiment. existimant s quae cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur an aliquid dicere? Mihi vero dicere aliquid, itaque expecto, quid ad ista. ista ( eras. m) K Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante: 4.47. videsne, quanta fuerit apud Academicos verecundia? plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat: Peripateticis Peripateticis haec igitur continent quae Academici ( qui verecunde nihil ipsi adfirmant ) dicunt Ciceroque ipse ut Aca- demicus amplectitur ( cf. p. 364, 4 ) respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse nisi, ubi sit illud, quod veri simillimum videatur, anquirere. quid est igitur quod occurrat in hac quaestione, e quo e quo B 2 s aequa X (e qua V rec ) possit attingi aliquid veri simile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? definitio perturbationis, qua quae KV 1 Zeno fr. 205 recte Zenonem usum puto. ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa a a GrB s om. X ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit adpetitus vehementior, vehementior vehementior semel in X autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia. 4.56. At etiam etiam enim Sey. sed cf. p. 383, 14 aemulari utile est, obtrectare, obtrectari X misereri. cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis opt. G autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? qui qui s quis GKCRV quid K 1 (quis id M) app. V c id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam nam B s non X solum habere velle summa dementia est. Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.60. sed omnis eius modi perturbatio animi animi enim V 1 placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec nec s V 3 et X bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut aut V et G 1 libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ut aut R 1 V ipsam ipsa GRV 1 aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus obicibus GKR maerentibus imbecillitatem inbecil itatem G animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque gravitate constantiaque GRV 1 laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur. quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda ferendum K tamen aequo animo arbitrantur. arbitratur GRV 1 putat puta GRV 1 aliquis aliquid K idem fuit fort. in R (aliqui esse) esse voluptatem bonum, alius autem pecuniam; tamen et ille ab intemperantia et hic ab avaritia hic abaritia V 1 avocari potest. illa autem altera ratio et oratio, et oratio om. V quae simul et opinionem falsam falsa GRV 1 tollit et et om. K 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GRV 1 detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad volgus adhibenda. 4.61. quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa ulla V rec medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is is ex si G 2 agatur G 1 quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, vitiosas om. V 3 ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae quae ex quem V 3 metum aegritudinemve, vel vel ...17 vel Bentl. nec ... nec bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem spernentem Anon. ap. Lb. illum esse, quem prementem (praem. GKH)X ( vix Cice- ronianum, licet Sen. de ira 3, 6, 1 dicat : animus quietus semper, omnia infra se premens cf. Tusc. p. 405, 20 omnia subter se habet) praemeditantem Se. magimum et fortem virum virum add. G 3 dicimus. talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus quae ventus G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 3 ) humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt. ducunt s di- cunt X 4.62. Quare omnium philosophorum, ut aut V ( exp. 3 ) ante dixi, una St. fr. 3, 488 cf. 474 ratio est medendi, ut nihil, quale sit illud quod perturbet animum, sed de ipsa sit sit add. G 2 perturbatione dicendum. itaque primum in ipsa cupiditate, cum id solum agitur ut ea tollatur, non est quaerendum, bonum illud necne sit quod lubidinem lib. H ( bis ) K 1 priore loco moveat, sed lubido ipsa tollenda est, ut, sive, sive ex sine V 3 quod honestum est, id sit summum bonum sive voluptas sive horum utrumque coniunctum sive tria illa genera bonorum, tamen, etiamsi etiamsi si H virtus KRH virtutis ipsius vehementior adpetitus sit, eadem sit sit add. G 1 omnibus ad deterrendum adhibenda oratio. continet autem omnem sedationem animi humana in conspectu posita natura; quae quo facilius expressa cernatur, explicanda est oratione communis condicio lexque vitae. constantem ... 393, 15 vitae H 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.82. Sed cognita iam causa perturbationum, quae omnes oriuntur ex iudiciis opinionum et voluntatibus, sit iam huius disputationis modus. scire autem nos nos s vos X oportet cognitis, quoad quoad R 1 V rec quod ad GKR 2 V 1 cognosci ab homine R 1 ( corr. c? ) K possunt ab homine cognosci, bonorum et malorum finibus nihil a a om. K philosophia posse aut maius aut utilius optari quam haec, quae a nobis hoc quadriduo disputata sunt. morte enim contempta et dolore ad patiendum levato adiunximus sedationem aegritudinis, qua nullum homini malum maius est. etsi enim omnis animi perturbatio gravis est nec multum differt ab amentia, tamen ita del. Lb. tamen ita ut ditt. verbi amentia del. Nissen fort. rectius ceteros, cum sunt in aliqua perturbatione aut metus aut laetitiae laetitia V (-ae 3 ) aut cupiditatis, commotos commotus V 1 modo et perturbatos dicere solemus, at eos, qui se qui se ex quis V 2 qua s G 1 aegritudini aegritudinis G 1 ( corr. 1 )K 1 ( corr. c ) V 1 (s eras. ) dediderunt, miseros adflictos affl. KR aerumnosos calamitosos. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur. 5.105. universos ait Ephesios esse morte multandos, quod, cum civitate expellerent Hermodorum, ita locuti sint: sint ex sunt G 1 nemo de nobis unus excellat; sin quis extiterit, alio in loco et apud alios sit. an hoc non ita fit omni in populo? nonne omnem exsuperantiam virtutis oderunt? quid? Aristides—malo enim Graecorum quam nostra proferre—nonne ob eam causam expulsus est patria, quod praeter modum iustus esset? quantis igitur molestiis vacant, qui nihil omnino cum populo contrahunt! quid est enim dulcius otio litterato? litterato ex literato G 2? is dico litteris, quibus infinitatem rerum atque naturae et in hoc ipso mundo caelum terras maria cognoscimus. infinitatem ... 24 cognoscimus Non. 122, 21 Contempto igitur honore, contempta etiam pecunia quid relinquitur quod extimescendum sit? contempto . .. 26 sit in mg. G eodem atramento, sed fort. 2
27. Philodemus, (Pars I) \ On Piety, 1, 7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
28. Cicero, Academica, 1.13, 1.69, 2.11, 2.18, 2.67, 2.77-2.78, 2.118, 2.131-2.132, 2.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 164, 251, 252
1.13. Tum ille: 'Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. sed de te ipso quid est' inquit quod audio? Quanam inquam de re? VA. Relictam a te veterem Academiam Academiam Bentl. iam *g*d inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid ergo inquam Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, pholo *g magnus vir ut tu existimas estimas vel ex(s)t- *g ipse, †negaret negat Dav. negare solet Pl. in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit. VA. Est inquit ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit. scripsit gf
29. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 18.13-18.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 229
18.13. For though they had disbelieved everything because of their magic arts,yet, when their first-born were destroyed,they acknowledged thy people to be Gods son. 18.14. For while gentle silence enveloped all things,and night in its swift course was now half gone,
30. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 18.13-18.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 229
18.13. The compassion of man is for his neighbor,but the compassion of the Lord is for all living beings. He rebukes and trains and teaches them,and turns them back, as a shepherd his flock. 18.14. He has compassion on those who accept his discipline and who are eager for his judgments.
31. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 255
32. Cicero, On Divination, 1.5-1.6, 1.112, 1.127, 2.8, 2.28-2.36, 2.124, 2.142 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 163, 164
1.5. Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissumis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii, qui ab eo essent profecti, manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurumisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque, familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit. 1.6. Sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse dividi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur? praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius. 1.112. Animadverterat fortasse quadam scientia olearum ubertatem fore. Et quidem idem primus defectionem solis, quae Astyage regte facta est, praedixisse fertur. Multa medici, multa gubernatores, agricolae etiam multa praesentiunt, sed nullam eorum divinationem voco, ne illam quidem, qua ab Anaximandro physico moniti Lacedaemonii sunt, ut urbem et tecta linquerent armatique in agro excubarent, quod terrae motus instaret, tum cum et urbs tota corruit et e monte Taygeto extrema montis quasi puppis avolsa est. Ne Pherecydes quidem, ille Pythagorae magister, potius divinus habebitur quam physicus, quod, cum vidisset haustam aquam de iugi puteo, terrae motus dixit instare. 1.127. Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium. 2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. 2.28. Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo. Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti. Inspiciamus, si placet, exta primum. Persuaderi igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse ab haruspicibus observatione diuturna? Quam diuturna ista fuit? aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? aut quo modo est conlatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam. 2.29. Et certe, si est in extis aliqua vis, quae declaret futura, necesse est eam aut cum rerum natura esse coniunctam aut conformari quodam modo numine deorum vique divina. Cum rerum natura tanta tamque praeclara in omnes partes motusque diffusa quid habere potest commune non dicam gallinaceum fel (sunt enim, qui vel argutissima haec exta esse dicant), sed tauri opimi iecur aut cor aut pulmo quid habet naturale, quod declarare possit, quid futurum sit? 2.30. Democritus tamen non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil adrogantius: Quód est ante pedes, némo spectat, caéli scrutantúr plagas. Verum is tamen habitu extorum et colore declarari censet haec dumtaxat: pabuli genus et earum rerum, quas terra procreet, vel ubertatem vel tenuitatem; salubritatem etiam aut pestilentiam extis significari putat. O mortalem beatum! cui certo scio ludum numquam defuisse; huncine hominem tantis delectatum esse nugis, ut non videret tum futurum id veri simile, si omnium pecudum exta eodem tempore in eundem habitum se coloremque converterent? Sed si eadem hora aliae pecudis iecur nitidum atque plenum est, aliae horridum et exile, quid est, quod declarari possit habitu extorum et colore? 2.31. an hoc eiusdem modi est, quale Pherecydeum illud, quod est a te dictum? qui cum aquam ex puteo vidisset haustam, terrae motum dixit futurum. Parum, credo, inpudenter, quod, cum factus est motus, dicere audent, quae vis id effecerit; etiamne futurum esse aquae iugis colore praesentiunt? Multa istius modi dicuntur in scholis, sed credere omnia vide ne non sit necesse. 2.32. Verum sint sane ista Democritea vera; quando ea nos extis exquirimus? aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audivimus? Ab aqua aut ab igni pericula monent; tum hereditates, tum damna denuntiant; fissum familiare et vitale tractant; caput iecoris ex omni parte diligentissime considerant; si vero id non est inventum, nihil putant accidere potuisse tristius. 2.33. Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. Sunt igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum; cum rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxume, qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? Si enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. Nonne pudet physicos haec dicere? Ut enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum contagio, quam esse concedo (multa enim Stoici colligunt; nam et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicuntur augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die, et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina malorum, quae in iis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere, iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios, ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere, ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant, arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur. 2.34. Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubertur. Sescenta licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat)—demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam sumpa/qeian Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura? Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero; 2.35. sed tamen eo concesso qui evenit, ut is, qui impetrire velit, convenientem hostiam rebus suis immolet? Hoc erat, quod ego non rebar posse dissolvi. At quam festive dissolvitur! pudet me non tui quidem, cuius etiam memoriam admiror, sed Chrysippi, Antipatri, Posidonii, qui idem istuc quidem dicunt, quod est dictum a te, ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quae toto confusa mundo sit. Illud vero multo etiam melius, quod et a te usurpatum est et dicitur ab illis: cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; 2.36. deorum enim numini parere omnia. Haec iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant. An censes, eundem vitulum si alius delegerit, sine capite iecur inventurum; si alius, cum capite? Haec decessio capitis aut accessio subitone fieri potest, ut se exta ad immolatoris fortunam accommodent? non perspicitis aleam quandam esse in hostiis deligendis, praesertim cum res ipsa doceat? Cum enim tristissuma exta sine capite fuerunt, quibus nihil videtur esse dirius, proxuma hostia litatur saepe pulcherrime. Ubi igitur illae minae superiorum extorum? aut quae tam subito facta est deorum tanta placatio? Sed adfers in tauri opimi extis immolante Caesare cor non fuisse; id quia non potuerit accidere, ut sine corde victuma illa viveret, iudicandum esse tum interisse cor, cum immolaretur. 2.124. Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint; nunc interiora videamus. Aut enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit, aut coniectores ex quadam convenientia et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant sumpa/qeian, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt, aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. Primum igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum; nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus. 2.142. Nunc quidem propter intermissionem forensis operae et lucubrationes detraxi et meridiationes addidi, quibus uti antea non solebam, nec tam multum dormiens ullo somnio sum admonitus, tantis praesertim de rebus, nec mihi magis umquam videor, quam cum aut in foro magistratus aut in curia senatum video, somniare. Etenim (ex divisione hoc secundum est) quae est continuatio coniunctioque naturae, quam, ut dixi, vocant sumpa/qeian, eius modi, ut thensaurus ex ovo intellegi debeat? Nam medici ex quibusdam rebus et advenientis et crescentis morbos intellegunt, non nullas etiam valetudinis significationes, ut hoc ipsum, pleni enectine simus, ex quodam genere somniorum intellegi posse dicunt. Thensaurus vero et hereditas et honos et victoria et multa generis eiusdem qua cum somniis naturali cognatione iunguntur? 1.5. Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest. 1.6. The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics — much against their will I grant you — permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school? 1.112. Perhaps he had observed, from some personal knowledge he had on the subject, that the crop would be abundant. And, by the way, he is said to have been the first man to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages.[50] There are many things foreseen by physicians, pilots, and also by farmers, but I do not call the predictions of any of them divination. I do not even call that a case of divination when Anaximander, the natural philosopher, warned the Spartans to leave the city and their homes and to sleep in the fields under arms, because an earthquake was at hand. Then the whole city fell down in ruins and the extremity of Mount Taygetus was torn away like the stern of a ship in a storm. Not even Pherecydes, the famous teacher of Pythagoras, will be considered a prophet because he predicted an earthquake from the appearance of some water drawn from an unfailing well. 1.127. Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena. 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.28. In discussing separately the various methods of divination, I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state religion. But we are alone and for that reason we may, without causing ill-will, make an earnest inquiry into the truth of soothsaying — certainly I can do so, since in most things my philosophy is that of doubt. In the first place, then, if you please, let us make an inspection of entrails! Now can anybody be induced to believe that the things said to be predicted by means of entrails were learned by the soothsayers through long-continued observation? How long, pray, did the observations last? How could the observations have continued for a long time? How did the soothsayers manage to agree among themselves what part of the entrails was unfavourable, and what part favourable; or what cleft in the liver indicated danger and what promised some advantage? Are the soothsayers of Etruria, Elis, Egypt, and of Carthage in accord on these matters? Apart from such an agreement being impossible in fact, it is impossible even to imagine; and, moreover, we see some nations interpreting entrails in one way and some in another; hence there is no uniformity of practice. 2.29. Surely if entrails have any prophetic force, necessarily that force either is in accord with the laws of nature, or is fashioned in some way by the will and power of the gods. But between that divine system of nature whose great and glorious laws pervade all space and regulate all motion what possible connexion can there be with — I shall not say the gall of a chicken, whose entrails, some men assert, give very clear indications of the future, but — the liver, heart, and lungs of a sacrificial ox? And what natural quality is there in the entrails which enables them to indicate the future? [13] 2.30. Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher — and there is no more arrogant class — when he says:No one regards the things before his feet,But views with care the regions of the sky.And yet Democritus gives his approval to divination by means of entrails only to the extent of believing that their condition and colour indicate whether hay and other crops will be abundant or the reverse, and he even thinks that the entrails give signs of future health or sickness. O happy mortal! He never failed to have his joke — that is absolutely certain. But was he so amused with petty trifles as to fail to see that his theory would be plausible only on the assumption that the entrails of all cattle changed to the same colour and condition at the same time? But if at the same instant the liver of one ox is smooth and full and that of another is rough and shrunken, what inference can be drawn from the condition and colour of the entrails? 2.31. Equally amusing is your story about Pherecydes, who, after looking at some water just drawn from a well, foretold an earthquake. It would be presumptuous enough, I think, for natural philosophers to attempt to explain the cause of an earthquake after it had happened; but can they actually tell, from looking at fresh water, that an earthquake is going to happen? Such nonsense is often heard in the schools, but one does not have to believe everything one hears. 2.32. But grant that these absurdities of Democritus are true — when do we ever consult entrails to learn about crops or health, or when have we acquired information on these particulars from a soothsayer after he had made an inspection of entrails? The soothsayers warn us of dangers by fire and flood and sometimes they prophesy the inheritance, sometimes the loss, of money: they discuss the favourable and the unfavourable cleft; they view the head of the liver with the utmost care from every side. If, perchance, the livers head should be wanting they regard it as the most unpropitious sign that could have happened. [14] 2.33. Such signs, as I have shown before, certainly could not come within your classification of the kinds of divination dependent on observation. Therefore they are not the result of immemorial usage, but they are the inventions of art — if there can be any art in the occult. But what relationship have they with the laws of nature? Assuming that all the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole (which, I observe, is the view of the natural philosophers and especially of those men who maintain that the universe is a unit), what connexion can there be between the universe and the finding of a treasure? For instance, if the entrails foretell an increase in my fortune and they do so in accordance with some law of nature, then, in the first place, there is some relationship between them and the universe, and in the second place, my ficial gain is regulated by the laws of nature. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to utter such nonsense? And yet a certain contact between the different parts of nature may be admitted and I concede it. The Stoics have collected much evidence to prove it. They claim, for example, that the livers of mice become larger in winter; that the dry pennyroyal blooms the very day of the winter solstice, and that its seed-pods become inflated and burst and the seeds enclosed thither are sent in various directions; that at times when certain strings of the lyre are struck others sound; that it is the habit of oysters and of all shell-fish to grow with the growth of the moon and to become smaller as it wanes; and that trees are considered easiest to cut down in winter and in the dark of the moon, because they are then free from sap. 2.34. There is no need to go on and mention the seas and straits with their tides, whose ebb and flow are governed by the motion of the moon. Innumerable instances of the same kind may be given to prove that some natural connexion does exist between objects apparently unrelated. Concede that it does exist; it does not contravene the point I make, that no sort of a cleft in a liver is prophetic of ficial gain. What natural tie, or what symphony, so to speak, or association, or what sympathy, as the Greeks term it, can there be between a cleft in a liver and a petty addition to my purse? Or what relationship between my miserable money-getting, on the one hand, and heaven, earth, and the laws of nature on the other?[15] However, I will concede even this if you wish, though it will greatly weaken my case to admit that there is any connexion between nature and the condition of the entrails; 2.35. yet, suppose the concession is made, how is it brought about that the man in search of favourable signs will find a sacrifice suitable to his purpose? I thought the question insoluble. But what a fine solution is offered! I am not ashamed of you — I am actually astonished at your memory; but I am ashamed of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius who say exactly what you said: The choice of the sacrificial victim is directed by the sentient and divine power which pervades the entire universe.But even more absurd is that other pronouncement of theirs which you adopted: At the moment of sacrifice a change in the entrails takes place; something is added or something taken away; for all things are obedient to the Divine Will. 2.36. Upon my word, no old woman is credulous enough now to believe such stuff! Do you believe that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will have a liver without a head, and if chosen by another will have a liver with a head? And is it possible that this sudden going or coming of the livers head occurs so that the entrails may adapt themselves to the situation of the person who offers the sacrifice? Do you Stoics fail to see in choosing the victim it is almost like a throw of the dice, especially as facts prove it? For when the entrails of the first victim have been without a head, which is the most fatal of all signs, it often happens that the sacrifice of the next victim is altogether favourable. Pray what became of the warnings of the first set of entrails? And how was the favour of the gods so completely and so suddenly gained?[16] But, you say, Once, when Caesar was offering a sacrifice, there was no heart in the entrails of the sacrificial bull; and, and, since it would have been impossible for the victim to live without a heart, the heart must have disappeared at the moment of immolation. 2.124. But, though the conclusion just stated is obvious, let us now look deeper into the question. Surely you must assume, either that there is a Divine Power which, in planning for our good, gives us information by means of dreams; or that, because of some natural connexion and association — the Greeks call it συμπάθεια — interpreters of dreams know what sort of a dream is required to fit any situation and what sort of a result will follow any dream; or that neither of these suppositions is true, but that the usual result or consequence of every dream is known by a consistent system of rules based on long-continued observation. In the first place, then, it must be understood that there is no divine power which creates dreams. And indeed it is perfectly clear that none of the visions seen in dreams have their origin in the will of the gods; for the gods, for our sakes, would so interpose that we might be able to foresee the future. 2.142. Moreover, at the present time, owing to the interruption of my public labours, I have ceased my nocturnal studies, and (contrary to my former practice) I have added afternoon naps. Yet despite all this time spent in sleep I have not received a single prophecy in a dream, certainly not one about the great events now going on. Indeed, I never seem to be dreaming more than when I see the magistrates in the forum and the Senate in its chamber.[69] Coming now to the second branch of the present topic, is there some such natural connecting link, which, as I said before, the Greeks call συμπάθεια, that the finding of a treasure must be deduced from dreaming of an egg? of course physicians, from certain symptoms, know the incipiency and progress of a disease; and it is claimed that from some kinds of dreams they even can gather certain indications as to a patients health, as whether the internal humours of the body are excessive or deficient. But what natural bond of union is there between dreams, on the one hand, and treasures, legacies, public office, victory and many other things of the same kind, on the other?
33. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.170-1.171, 1.257, 1.277, 4.100-4.120, 4.122-4.123 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 213
1.170. And on the seventh day he doubles the number of victims to be offered, giving equal honour to equal things, inasmuch as he looks upon the seventh day as equal in dignity to eternity, since he has recorded it as being the birthday of the whole world. On which account he has thought fit to make the sacrifice to be offered on the seventh day, equal to the continuation of what is usually sacrificed in one day. 1.171. Moreover, the most fragrant of all incenses are offered up twice every day in the fire, being burnt within the veil, both when the sun rises and sets, before the morning and after the evening sacrifice, so that the sacrifices of blood display our gratitude for ourselves as being composed of blood, but the offerings of incense show our thankfulness for the domit part within us, our rational spirit, which was fashioned after the archetypal model of the divine image. 1.257. The law chooses that a person who brings a sacrifice shall be pure, both in body and soul; --pure in soul from all passions, and diseases, and vices, which can be displayed either in word or deed; and pure in body from all such things as a body is usually defiled by. 1.277. And this command is a symbol of nothing else but of the fact that in the eyes of God it is not the number of things sacrificed that is accounted valuable, but the purity of the rational spirit of the sacrificer. Unless, indeed, one can suppose that a judge who is anxious to pronounce a holy judgment will never receive gifts from any of those whose conduct comes before his tribunal, or that, if he does receive such presents, he will be liable to an accusation of corruption; and that a good man will not receive gifts from a wicked person, not even though he may be poor and the other rich, and he himself perhaps in actual want of what he would so receive; and yet that God can be corrupted by bribes, who is most all-sufficient for himself and who has no need of any thing created; who, being himself the first and most perfect good thing, the everlasting fountain of wisdom, and justice, and of every virtue, rejects the gifts of the wicked. 4.100. Moreover, Moses has not granted an unlimited possession and use of all other animals to those who partake in his sacred constitution, but he has forbidden with all his might all animals, whether of the land, or of the water, or that fly through the air, which are most fleshy and fat, and calculated to excite treacherous pleasure, well knowing that such, attracting as with a bait that most slavish of all the outward senses, namely, taste, produce insatiability, an incurable evil to both souls and bodies, for insatiability produces indigestion, which is the origin and source of all diseases and weaknesses. 4.101. Now of land animals, the swine is confessed to be the nicest of all meats by those who eat it, and of all aquatic animals the most delicate are the fish which have no scales; and Moses is above all other men skilful in training and inuring persons of a good natural disposition to the practice of virtue by frugality and abstinence, endeavouring to remove costly luxury from their characters, 4.102. at the same time not approving of unnecessary rigour, like the lawgiver of Lacedaemon, nor undue effeminacy, like the man who taught the Ionians and the Sybarites lessons of luxury and license, but keeping a middle path between the two courses, so that he has relaxed what was over strict, and tightened what was too loose, mingling the excesses which are found at each extremity with moderation, which lies between the two, so as to produce an irreproachable harmony and consistency of life, on which account he has laid down not carelessly, but with minute particularity, what we are to use and what to avoid. 4.103. One might very likely suppose it to be just that those beasts which feed upon human flesh should receive at the hands of men similar treatment to that which they inflict on men, but Moses has ordained that we should abstain from the enjoyment of all such things, and with a due consideration of what is becoming to the gentle soul, he proposes a most gentle and most pleasant banquet; for though it is proper that those who inflict evils should suffer similar calamities themselves, yet it may not be becoming to those whom they ill treated to retaliate, lest without being aware of it they become brutalized by anger, which is a savage passion; 4.104. and he takes such care to guard against this, that being desirous to banish as far as possible all desire for those animals abovementioned, he forbids with all his energy the eating of any carnivorous animal at all, selecting the herbivorous animals out of those kinds which are domesticated, since they are tame by nature, feeding on that gentle food which is supplied by the earth, and having no disposition to plot evil against anything.WHAT QUADRUPEDS ARE CLEANXVIII. 4.105. The animals which are clean and lawful to be used as food are ten in number; the heifer, the lamb, the goat, the stag, the antelope, the buffalo, the roebuck, the pygarga, the wildox, and the chamois, {19}{#de 14:4.} for he always adheres to that arithmetical subtilty which, as he originally devised it with the minutest accuracy possible, he extends to all existing things, so that he establishes no ordices, whether important or unimportant, without taking and as it were adapting this number to it as closely connected with the regulations which he is ordaining. Now of all the numbers beginning from the unit, the most perfect is the number ten, and as Moses says, it is the most sacred of all and a holy number, and by it he now limits the races of animals that are clean, wishing to assign the use of them to all those who partake of the constitution which he is establishing. 4.106. And he gives two tests and criteria of the ten animals thus Enumerated{20}{#le 11:3.} by two signs, first, that they must part the hoof, secondly, that they must chew the cud; for those which do neither, or only one of these things, are unclean. And these signs are both of them symbols of instruction and of the most scientific learning, by which the better is separated from the worse, so that all confusion between them is prevented; 4.107. for as the animal which chews the cud, while it is masticating its food draws it down its throat, and then by slow degrees kneads and softens it, and then after this process again sends it down into the belly, in the same manner the man who is being instructed, having received the doctrines and speculations of wisdom in at his ears from his instructor, derives a considerable amount of learning from him, but still is not able to hold it firmly and to embrace it all at once, until he has resolved over in his mind everything which he has heard by the continued exercise of his memory (and this exercise of memory is the cement which connects idea 4.108. But as it seems the firm conception of such ideas is of no advantage to him unless he is able to discriminate between and to distinguish which of contrary things it is right to choose and which to avoid, of which the parting of the hoof is the symbol; since the course of life is twofold, the one road leading to wickedness and the other to virtue, and since we ought to renounce the one and never to forsake the other.WHAT BEASTS ARE NOT CLEANXIX. 4.109. For this reason all animals with solid hoofs, and all with many toes are spoken of by implication as unclean; the one because, being so, they imply that the nature of good and evil is one and the same; which is just as if one were to say that the nature of a concave and a convex surface, or of a road up hill and down hill, was the same. And the other, because it shows that there are many roads, though, indeed, they have no right to be called roads at all, which lead the life of man to deceit; for it is not easy among a variety of paths to choose that which is the most desirable and the most excellent.WHAT AQUATIC ANIMALS ARE CLEANXX. 4.110. Having laid down these definitions with respect to land animals, he proceeds to describe what aquatic creatures are clean and lawful to be used for food; distinguishing them also by two characteristics as having fins or Scales.{21}{#le 11:9.} For those which have neither one nor the other, and those which have only one of the two, he rejects and Prohibits.{22}{#de 14:10.} And he must state the cause, which is not destitute of sense and propriety; 4.111. for all those creatures which are destitute of both, or even of one of the two, are sucked down by the current, not being able to resist the force of the stream; but those which have both these characteristics can stem the water, and oppose it in front, and strive against it as against an adversary, and struggle with invincible good will and courage, so that if they are pushed they push in their turn; and if they are pursued they turn upon their foe and pursue it in their turn, making themselves broad roads in a pathless district, so as to have an easy passage to and fro. 4.112. Now both these things are symbols; the former of a soul devoted to pleasure, and the latter of one which loves perseverance and temperance. For the road which leads to pleasure is a down-hill one and very easy, being rather an absorbing gulf than a path. But the path which leads to temperance is up hill and laborious, but above all other roads advantageous. And the one leads men downwards, and prevents those who travel by it from retracing their steps until they have arrived at the very lowest bottom, but the other leads to heaven; making those who do not weary before they reach it immortal, if they are only able to endure its rugged and difficult ascent.ABOUT Reptile 4.113. And adhering to the same general idea the lawgiver asserts that those reptiles which have no feet, and which crawl onwards, dragging themselves along the ground on their bellies, or those which have four legs, or many feet, are all unclean as far as regards their being eaten. And here, again, when he mentions reptiles he intimates under a figurative form of expression those who are devoted to their bellies, gorging themselves like cormorants, and who are continually offering up tribute to their miserable belly, tribute, that is, of strong wine, and confections, and fish, and, in short, all the superfluous delicacies which the skill and labour of bakers and confectioners are able to devise, inventing all sorts of rare viands, to stimulate and set on fire the insatiable and unappeasable appetites of man. And when he speaks of animals with four legs and many feet, he intends to designate the miserable slaves not of one single passion, appetite, but of all the passions; the genera of which were four in number; but in their subordinate species they are innumerable. Therefore, the despotism of one is very grievous, but that of many is most terrible, and as it seems intolerable. 4.114. Again, in the case of those reptiles who have legs above their feet, so that they are able to take leaps from the ground, those Moses speaks of as clean; as, for instance, the different kinds of locusts, and that animal called the serpentfighter, here again intimating by figurative expressions the manners and habits of the rational soul. For the weight of the body being naturally heavy, drags down with it those who are but of small wisdom, strangling it and pressing it down by the weight of the flesh. 4.115. But blessed are they to whose lot it has fallen, inasmuch as they have been well and solidly instructed in the rules of sound education, to resist successfully the power of mere strength, so as to be able, by reason of what they have learnt, to spring up from the earth and all low things, to the air and the periodical revolutions of the heaven, the very sight of which is to be admired and earnestly striven for by those who come to it of their own accord with no indolence or indifference.CONCERNING FLYING Creature 4.116. Having, therefore, in his ordices already gone through all the different kinds of land animals and of those who live in the water, and having distinguished them in his code of laws as accurately as it was possible, Moses begins to investigate the remaining class of animals in the air; the innumerable kinds of flying creatures, rejecting all those which prey upon one another or upon man, all carnivorous birds, in short, all animals which are venomous, and all which have any power of plotting against others. 4.117. But doves, and pigeons, and turtle-doves, and all the flocks of cranes, and geese, and birds of that kind, he numbers in the class of domestic, and tame, and eatable creatures, allowing every one who chooses to partake of them with impunity. 4.118. Thus, in each of the parts of the universe, earth, water, and air, he refuses some kinds of each description of animal, whether terrestrial, or aquatic, or a'rial, to our use; and thus, taking as it were fuel from the fire, he causes the extinction of appetite.CONCERNING CARCASSES AND BODIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TORN BY WILDBEASTSXXIII. 4.119. Moreover, Moses Commands{25}{#le 5:2.} that no man shall take of any dead carcass, or of any body which has been torn by wild beasts; partly because it is not fitting that man should share a feast with untameable beasts, so as to become almost a fellow reveller in their carnivorous festivals; and partly because perhaps it is injurious and likely to cause disease if the juice of the dead body becomes mingled with the blood, and perhaps, also, because it is proper to preserve that which has been pre-occupied and seized beforehand by death untouched, having a respect to the necessities of nature by which it has been seized. 4.120. Now many of the lawgivers both among the Greeks and barbarians, praise those who are skilful in hunting, and who seldom fail in their pursuit or miss their aim, and who pride themselves on their successful hunts, especially when they divide the limbs of the animals which they have caught with the huntsmen and the hounds, as being not only brave hunters but men of very sociable dispositions. But any one who was a sound interpreter of the sacred constitution and code of laws would very naturally blame them, since the lawgiver of that code has expressly forbidden any enjoyment of carcasses or of bodies torn by beasts for the reasons before mentioned. 4.122. But some men, with open mouths, carry even the excessive luxury and boundless intemperance of Sardanapalus to such an indefinite and unlimited extent, being wholly absorbed in the invention of senseless pleasures, that they prepare sacrifices which ought never be offered, strangling their victims, and stifling the essence of life, {26}{#le 17:11.} which they ought to let depart free and unrestrained, burying the blood, as it were, in the body. For it ought to have been sufficient for them to enjoy the flesh by itself, without touching any of those parts which have an connection with the soul or life. 4.123. On which account Moses, in another passage, establishes a law concerning blood, that one may not eat the blood nor the Fat.{27}{#le 3:17.} The blood, for the reason which I have already mentioned, that it is the essence of the life; not of the mental and rational life, but of that which exists in accordance with the outward senses, to which it is owing that both we and irrational animals also have a common existence.CONCERNING THE SOUL OR LIFE OF MANXXIV. For the essence of the soul of man is the breath of God, especially if we follow the account of Moses, who, in his history of the creation of the world, says that God breathed into the first man, the founder of our race, the breath of life; breathing it into the principal part of his body, namely the face, where the outward senses are established, the body-guards of the mind, as if it were the great king. And that which was thus breathed into his face was manifestly the breath of the air, or whatever else there may be which is even more excellent than the breath of the air, as being a ray emitted from the blessed and thricehappy nature of God.
34. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 167 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic, thought Found in books: MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 140
167. But he who is truly God is perceived, and felt, and recognised, not only by means of one's ears, but also by the eyes of our mind, through his mighty works which are done in the world, and through the rapidity of his operations; on which account in the great song it is said (the speaker assuming the character of God), "Behold! behold! it is I!" as if that real existing God could be more easily conceived by the mind than proved by verbal demonstration;
35. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 131, 134, 140, 142-144, 3, 135 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 211
135. But he asserts that the formation of the individual man, perceptible by the external senses is a composition of earthy substance, and divine spirit. For that the body was created by the Creator taking a lump of clay, and fashioning the human form out of it; but that the soul proceeds from no created thing at all, but from the Father and Ruler of all things. For when he uses the expression, "he breathed into," etc., he means nothing else than the divine spirit proceeding form that happy and blessed nature, sent to take up its habitation here on earth, for the advantage of our race, in order that, even if man is mortal according to that portion of him which is visible, he may at all events be immortal according to that portion which is invisible; and for this reason, one may properly say that man is on the boundaries of a better and an immortal nature, partaking of each as far as it is necessary for him; and that he was born at the same time, both mortal and the immortal. Mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his intellect. XLVII.
36. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
37. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.57 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 105
38. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 55 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 213
55. For since the soul is spoken of in two ways, first of all as a whole, secondly, as to the domit part of it, which, to speak properly, is the soul of the soul, just as the eye is both the whole orb, and also the most important part of that orb, that namely by which we see; it seemed good to the law-giver that the essence of the soul should likewise be two-fold; blood being the essence of the entire soul, and the divine Spirit being the essence of the domit part of it; accordingly he says, in express words, "The soul of all flesh is the blood Thereof."
39. Plutarch, Numa Pompilius, 25.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
40. New Testament, Galatians, 3.26-3.28, 5.13-5.26 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 229, 247
3.26. Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστὲ διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 3.27. ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε· 3.28. οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 5.13. μόνον μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις· 5.14. ὁ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ πεπλήρωται, ἐν τῷἈγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν. 5.15. εἰ δὲ ἀλλήλους δάκνετε καὶ κατεσθίετε, βλέπετε μὴ ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων ἀναλωθῆτε. 5.16. Λέγω δέ, πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς οὐ μὴ τελέσητε. 5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε. 5.18. εἰ δὲ πνεύματι ἄγεσθε, οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον. 5.19. φανερὰ δέ ἐστιν τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός, ἅτινά ἐστιν πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, ἀσέλγεια, 5.20. εἰδωλολατρία, φαρμακία, ἔχθραι, ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθίαι, διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσεις, 5.21. φθόνοι, μέθαι, κῶμοι, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις, ἃ προλέγω ὑμῖν καθὼς προεῖπον ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες βασιλείαν θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν. 5.22. ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη, χαρά, εἰρήνη, μακροθυμία, χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη, πίστις, 5.23. πραΰτης, ἐγκράτεια· κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος. 5.24. οἱ δὲ τοῦ χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. 5.25. Εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν. 5.26. μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι, ἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες. 3.26. For you are all sons ofGod, through faith in Christ Jesus. 3.27. For as many of you as werebaptized into Christ have put on Christ. 3.28. There is neither Jewnor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither malenor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 5.13. For you, brothers, were called for freedom. Only don't useyour freedom for gain to the flesh, but through love be servants to oneanother. 5.14. For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, in this:"You shall love your neighbor as yourself." 5.15. But if you bite anddevour one another, be careful that you don't consume one another. 5.16. But I say, walk by the Spirit, and you won't fulfill the lust ofthe flesh. 5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. 5.18. But if you are led by theSpirit, you are not under the law. 5.19. Now the works of the fleshare obvious, which are: adultery, sexual immorality, uncleanness,lustfulness, 5.20. idolatry, sorcery, hatred, strife, jealousies,outbursts of anger, rivalries, divisions, heresies, 5.21. envyings,murders, drunkenness, orgies, and things like these; of which Iforewarn you, even as I also forewarned you, that those who practicesuch things will not inherit the Kingdom of God. 5.22. But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience,kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 5.23. gentleness, and self-control.Against such things there is no law. 5.24. Those who belong to Christhave crucified the flesh with its passions and lusts. 5.25. If we liveby the Spirit, let's also walk by the Spirit. 5.26. Let's not becomeconceited, provoking one another, and envying one another.
41. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.22-1.23, 4.1-4.16, 4.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 244
1.22. καὶ πάντα ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδωκεν κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 1.23. ἥτις ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου. 4.1. Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος ἐν κυρίῳ ἀξίως περιπατῆσαι τῆς κλήσεως ἧς ἐκλήθητε, 4.2. μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης καὶ πραΰτητος, μετὰ μακροθυμίας, ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀγάπῃ, 4.3. σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης· 4.4. ἓν σῶμα καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα, καθὼς [καὶ] ἐκλήθητε ἐν μιᾷ ἐλπίδι τῆς κλήσεως ὑμῶν· 4.5. εἷς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἓν βάπτισμα· εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, 4.6. ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν. 4.7. Ἑνὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐδόθη [ἡ] χάρις κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς δωρεᾶς τοῦ χριστοῦ. 4.8. διὸ λέγει Ἀναβὰς εἰς ὕψος ᾐχμαλώτευσεν αἰχμαλωσίαν, [καὶ] ἔδωκεν δόματα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. 4.9. τὸ δέ Ἀνέβη τί ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ὅτι καὶ κατέβη εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς; 4.10. ὁ καταβὰς αὐτός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ ἀναβὰς ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν, ἵνα πληρώσῃ τὰ πάντα. 4.11. καὶ αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν τοὺς μὲν ἀποστόλους, τοὺς δὲ προφήτας, τοὺς δὲ εὐαγγελιστάς, τοὺς δὲ ποιμένας καὶ διδασκάλους, 4.12. πρὸς τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, 4.13. μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον, εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, 4.14. ἵνα μηκέτι ὦμεν νήπιοι, κλυδωνιζόμενοι καὶ περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ τῆς διδασκαλίας ἐν τῇ κυβίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν πανουργίᾳ πρὸς τὴν μεθοδίαν τῆς πλάνης, 4.15. ἀληθεύοντες δὲ ἐν ἀγάπῃ αὐξήσωμεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλή, Χριστός, 4.16. ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον καὶ συνβιβαζόμενον διὰ πάσης ἁφῆς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἐν μέτρῳ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μέρους τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖται εἰς οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ. 4.25. Διὸ ἀποθέμενοι τὸ ψεῦδος λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος μετὰ τοῦ πλησίον αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων μέλη. 1.22. He put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things for the assembly, 1.23. which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all. 4.1. I therefore, the prisoner in the Lord, beg you to walk worthily of the calling with which you were called, 4.2. with all lowliness and humility, with longsuffering, bearing with one another in love; 4.3. being eager to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. 4.4. There is one body, and one Spirit, even as you also were called in one hope of your calling; 4.5. one Lord, one faith, one baptism, 4.6. one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in us all. 4.7. But to each one of us was the grace given according to the measure of the gift of Christ. 4.8. Therefore he says, "When he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men." 4.9. Now this, "He ascended," what is it but that he also first descended into the lower parts of the earth? 4.10. He who descended is the one who also ascended far above all the heavens, that he might fill all things. 4.11. He gave some to be apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, shepherds and teachers; 4.12. for the perfecting of the saints, to the work of serving, to the building up of the body of Christ; 4.13. until we all attain to the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to a full grown man, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ; 4.14. that we may no longer be children, tossed back and forth and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the trickery of men, in craftiness, after the wiles of error; 4.15. but speaking truth in love, we may grow up in all things into him, who is the head, Christ; 4.16. from whom all the body, being fitted and knit together through that which every joint supplies, according to the working in measure of each individual part, makes the body increase to the building up of itself in love. 4.25. Therefore, putting away falsehood, speak truth each one with his neighbor. For we are members one of another.
42. New Testament, Acts, 19.28 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 144
19.28. ἀκούσαντες δὲ καὶ γενόμενοι πλήρεις θυμοῦ ἔκραζον λέγοντες Μεγάλη ἡ Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων. 19.28. When they heard this they were filled with anger, and cried out, saying, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!"
43. New Testament, 2 Peter, 3.11-3.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
3.11. Τούτων οὕτως πάντων λυομένων ποταποὺς δεῖ ὑπάρχειν [ὑμᾶς] ἐν ἁγίαις ἀναστροφαῖς καὶ εὐσεβείαις, 3.12. προσδοκῶντας καὶ σπεύδοντας τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμέρας, διʼ ἣνοὐρανοὶπυρούμενοι λυθήσονται καὶ στοιχεῖα καυσούμενα τήκεται· 3.11. Therefore since all these things are thus to be destroyed, what manner of persons ought you to be in holy living and godliness, 3.12. looking for and earnestly desiring the coming of the day of God, by reason of which the heavens being on fire will be dissolved, and the elements will melt with fervent heat?
44. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 7.31, 12.12-12.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233, 244, 245
7.31. καὶ οἱ χρώμενοι τὸν κόσμον ὡς μὴ καταχρώμενοι· παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου. 12.12. Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χριστός· 12.13. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες, εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν. 12.14. καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν μέλος ἀλλὰ πολλά. ἐὰν εἴπῃ ὁ πούς 12.15. Ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ χείρ, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· καὶ ἐὰν εἴπῃ τὸ οὖς 12.16. Ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ ὀφθαλμός, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· 12.17. εἰ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα ὀφθαλμός, ποῦ ἡ ἀκοή; εἰ ὅλον ἀκοή, ποῦ ἡ ὄσφρησις; 12.18. νῦν δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἔθετο τὰ μέλη, ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἐν τῷ σώματι καθὼς ἠθέλησεν. 12.19. εἰ δὲ ἦν [τὰ] πάνταἓν μέλος, ποῦ τὸ σῶμα; 12.20. νῦν δὲ πολλὰ μέλη, ἓν δὲ σῶμα. οὐ δύναται [δὲ] ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰπεῖν τῇ χειρί 12.21. Χρείαν σου οὐκ ἔχω, ἢ πάλιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῖς ποσίν Χρείαν ὑμῶν οὐκ ἔχω· 12.22. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὰ δοκοῦντα μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν, 12.23. καὶ ἃ δοκοῦμεν ἀτιμότερα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος, τούτοις τιμὴν περισσοτέραν περιτίθεμεν, καὶ τὰ ἀσχήμονα ἡμῶν εὐσχημοσύνην περισσοτέραν ἔχει, 12.24. τὰ δὲ εὐσχήμονα ἡμῶν οὐ χρείαν ἔχει. ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα, τῷ ὑστερουμένῳ περισσοτέραν δοὺς τιμήν, 12.25. ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσι τὰ μέλη. 12.26. καὶ εἴτε πάσχει ἓν μέλος, συνπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη· εἴτε δοξάζεται μέλος, συνχαίρει πάντα τὰ μέλη. 12.27. ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους. 12.28. Καὶ οὓς μὲν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ πρῶτον ἀποστόλους, δεύτερον προφήτας, τρίτον διδασκάλους, ἔπειτα δυνάμεις, ἔπειτα χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, ἀντιλήμψεις, κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν. 12.29. μὴ πάντες ἀπόστολοι; μὴ πάντες προφῆται; μὴ πάντες διδάσκαλοι; μὴ πάντες δυνάμεις; 12.30. μὴ πάντες χαρίσματα ἔχουσιν ἰαμάτων; μὴ πάντες γλώσσαις λαλοῦσιν; μὴ πάντες διερμηνεύουσιν; 12.31. ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα. 7.31. and those who use the world, as not using it to the fullest. Forthe mode of this world passes away. 12.12. For as the body is one, and has many members, and all themembers of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. 12.13. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whetherJews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all given to drink intoone Spirit. 12.14. For the body is not one member, but many. 12.15. If the foot would say, "Because I'm not the hand, I'm not part of thebody," it is not therefore not part of the body. 12.16. If the earwould say, "Because I'm not the eye, I'm not part of the body," it'snot therefore not part of the body. 12.17. If the whole body were aneye, where would the hearing be? If the whole were hearing, where wouldthe smelling be? 12.18. But now God has set the members, each one ofthem, in the body, just as he desired. 12.19. If they were all onemember, where would the body be? 12.20. But now they are many members,but one body. 12.21. The eye can't tell the hand, "I have no need foryou," or again the head to the feet, "I have no need for you." 12.22. No, much rather, those members of the body which seem to be weaker arenecessary. 12.23. Those parts of the body which we think to be lesshonorable, on those we bestow more abundant honor; and ourunpresentable parts have more abundant propriety; 12.24. whereas ourpresentable parts have no such need. But God composed the bodytogether, giving more abundant honor to the inferior part, 12.25. thatthere should be no division in the body, but that the members shouldhave the same care for one another. 12.26. When one member suffers,all the members suffer with it. Or when one member is honored, all themembers rejoice with it. 12.27. Now you are the body of Christ, and members individually. 12.28. God has set some in the assembly: first apostles, secondprophets, third teachers, then miracle workers, then gifts of healings,helps, governments, and various kinds of languages. 12.29. Are allapostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Are all miracle workers? 12.30. Do all have gifts of healings? Do all speak with variouslanguages? Do all interpret? 12.31. But earnestly desire the bestgifts. Moreover, I show a most excellent way to you.
45. New Testament, 1 John, 2.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
2.17. καὶ ὁ κόσμος παράγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία [αὐτοῦ], ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. 2.17. The world is passing away with its lusts, but he who does God's will remains forever.
46. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 12, 38, 9, 15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huebner and Laes (2019), Aulus Gellius and Roman Reading Culture: Text, Presence and Imperial Knowledge in the 'Noctes Atticae', 17, 18
47. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 13
48. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 1.2.6, 1.3.15, 2.179 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96, 238
2.179. 20. And this very thing it is that principally creates such a wonderful agreement of minds amongst us all; for this entire agreement of ours in all our notions concerning God, and our having no difference in our course of life and manners, procures among us the most excellent concord of these our manners that is any where among mankind;
49. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 1.24 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 238
1.24. I exhort, therefore, my readers to examine this whole undertaking in that view; for thereby it will appear to them, that there is nothing therein disagreeable either to the majesty of God, or to his love to mankind; for all things have here a reference to the nature of the universe; while our legislator speaks some things wisely, but enigmatically, and others under a decent allegory, but still explains such things as required a direct explication plainly and expressly.
50. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nature, central to stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
51. Plutarch, Romulus, 28.10, 33.3-33.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100, 129, 153
52. Ignatius, To The Smyrnaeans, 1.2, 11.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 245
53. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
54. Plutarch, Solon, 32.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 101
32.1. ὡς δὲ χώρας καλῆς ἔδαφος ὁ Πλάτων ἔρημον, αὐτῷ δέ πως κατὰ συγγένειαν προσῆκον, ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ διακοσμῆσαι φιλοτιμούμενος τὴν Ἀτλαντικὴν ὑπόθεσιν, πρόθυρα μὲν μεγάλα καὶ περιβόλους καὶ αὐλὰς τῇ ἀρχῇ περιέθηκεν, οἷα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἔσχεν οὐδὲ μῦθος οὐδὲ ποίησις, 32.1. Plato, ambitious to elaborate and adorn the subject of the lost Atlantis, as if it were the soil of a fair estate unoccupied, but appropriately his by virtue of some kinship with Solon, Plato mentions the relationship of Critias, his maternal uncle, with Solon ( Plat. Charm. 155a ). began the work by laying out great porches, enclosures, and courtyards, such as no story, tale, or poesy ever had before.
55. Plutarch, Lives of The Ten Orators, 4.4, 26.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
56. Plutarch, Demetrius, 42.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 138
57. New Testament, Romans, 10.16-10.18, 12.3-12.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 217, 244
10.16. Ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ· Ἠσαίας γὰρ λέγειΚύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; 10.17. ἄρα ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ διὰ ῥήματος Χριστοῦ. 10.18. ἀλλὰ λέγω, μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; μενοῦνγε 12.3. Λέγω γὰρ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δοθείσης μοι παντὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν ὑμῖν μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρʼ ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἑκάστῳ ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐμέρισεν μέτρον πίστεως. 12.4. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι πολλὰ μέλη ἔχομεν, τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει πρᾶξιν, 12.5. οὕτως οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ, τὸ δὲ καθʼ εἷς ἀλλήλων μέλη. 12.6. Ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα, εἴτε προφητείαν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως, 12.7. εἴτε διακονίαν ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ, εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, 12.8. εἴτε ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει, ὁ μεταδιδοὺς ἐν ἁπλότητι, ὁ προϊστάμενος ἐν σπουδῇ, ὁ ἐλεῶν ἐν ἱλαρότητι. 10.16. But they didn't all listen to the glad news. For Isaiah says, "Lord, who has believed our report?" 10.17. So faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God. 10.18. But I say, didn't they hear? Yes, most assuredly, "Their sound went out into all the earth, Their words to the ends of the world." 12.3. For I say, through the grace that was given me, to every man who is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think reasonably, as God has apportioned to each person a measure of faith. 12.4. For even as we have many members in one body, and all the members don't have the same function, 12.5. so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another. 12.6. Having gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us, if prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of our faith; 12.7. or service, let us give ourselves to service; or he who teaches, to his teaching; 12.8. or he who exhorts, to his exhorting: he who gives, let him do it with liberality; he who rules, with diligence; he who shows mercy, with cheerfulness.
58. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 17.11, 20.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
20.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰρήνην συνθέμενοι πρὸς μόνους Θηβαίους ἐξήνεγκαν τὸν πόλεμον, ἐνεβεβλήκει δὲ Κλεόμβροτος ὁ βασιλεύς ἄγων ὁπλίτας μυρίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ χιλίους, ὁ δὲ κίνδυνος οὐ περὶ ὧν πρότερον ἦν Θηβαίοις, ἀλλʼ ἄντικρυς ἀπειλὴ καὶ καταγγελία διοικισμοῦ, καὶ φόβος οἷος οὔπω τὴν Βοιωτίαν κατεῖχεν, ἐξιὼν μὲν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας ὁ Πελοπίδας, καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐν τῷ προπέμπειν δακρυούσης καὶ παρακαλούσης σῴζειν ἑαυτόν, 20.1. But now the Lacedaemonians made peace with all the other Greeks and directed the war against the Thebans alone; In 371 B.C. Cleombrotus their king invaded Boeotia with a force of ten thousand men-at-arms and a thousand horse; a new peril confronted the Thebans, since they were openly threatened with downright dispersion; and an unprecedented fear reigned in Boeotia. It was at this time that Pelopidas, on leaving his house, when his wife followed him on his way in tears and begging him not to lose his life, said:
59. Plutarch, Cicero, 49.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 129
60. New Testament, Luke, 3.1-3.2, 21.33 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •spirit, stoic thought •stoic thought Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 585; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
3.1. ΕΝ ΕΤΕΙ δὲ πεντεκαιδεκάτῳ τῆς ἡγεμονίας Τιβερίου Καίσαρος, ἡγεμονεύοντος Ποντίου Πειλάτου τῆς Ἰουδαίας, καὶ τετρααρχοῦντος τῆς Γαλιλαίας Ἡρῴδου, Φιλίππου δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ τετρααρχοῦντος τῆς Ἰτουραίας καὶ Τραχωνίτιδος χώρας, καὶ Λυσανίου τῆς Ἀβειληνῆς τετρααρχοῦντος, 3.2. ἐπὶ ἀρχιερέως Ἅννα καὶ Καιάφα, ἐγένετο ῥῆμα θεοῦ ἐπὶ Ἰωάνην τὸν Ζαχαρίου υἱὸν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ. 21.33. ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρελεύσονται, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μου οὐ μὴ παρελεύσονται. 3.1. Now in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, and his brother Philip tetrarch of the region of Ituraea and Trachonitis, and Lysanias tetrarch of Abilene, 3.2. in the high priesthood of Annas and Caiaphas, the word of God came to John, the son of Zacharias, in the wilderness. 21.33. Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will by no means pass away.
61. Plutarch, Philopoemen, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 160
15.4. διὸ καὶ τὴν Νάβιδος οἰκίαν καὶ οὐσίαν ἐξαργυρισθεῖσαν καὶ γενομένην εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων ἐψηφίσαντο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ δοῦναι, πρεσβείαν ὑπὲρ τούτων πέμψαντες. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ διεφάνη καθαρῶς ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐ δοκῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὢν ἄριστος, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐβούλετο τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ διαλέγεσθαι περὶ δωροδοκίας, ἀλλὰ δεδοικότες καὶ ἀναδυόμενοι προεβάλοντο τὸν ξένον αὐτοῦ Τιμόλαον. 15.4.
62. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 101
63. Plutarch, Marius, 1.4, 46.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100, 101
46.1. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἤδη πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾶν γενόμενος ὕμνει τὸν αὐτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα Ἕλλην, οὐ βάρβαρος οὐδὲ ἄλογον τῇ φύσει θηρίον γένοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι τοῖς Σωκράτους χρόνοις ἀπήντησεν ἡ γένεσις αὐτοῦ. 46.1.
64. Plutarch, Coriolanus, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 138
3.3. τοῦτον γὰρ ὁ νόμος τῷ πολίτην ὑπερασπίσαντι τὸν στέφανον ἀποδέδωκεν, εἴτε δὴ μάλιστα τιμήσας διʼ Ἀρκάδας τὴν δρῦν βαλανηφάγους ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χρησμῷ προσαγορευθέντας, εἴτε ὡς ταχὺ καὶ πανταχοῦ δρυὸς οὖσαν εὐπορίαν στρατευομένοις, εἴτε Διὸς Πολιέως ἱερὸν ὄντα τὸν τῆς δρυὸς στέφανον οἰόμενος ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πολίτου δίδοσθαι πρεπόντως. ἔστι δὲ ἡ δρῦς τῶν μὲν ἀγρίων καλλικαρπότατον, τῶν δὲ τιθασῶν ἰσχυρότατον. 3.3. or because they could speedily find an abundance of oak wherever they fought; or because it was thought that the garland of oak leaves, being sacred to Jupiter, the city’s guardian, was fittingly bestowed upon one who saved the life of a citizen. The oak, moreover, has the most beautiful fruit of all wild trees, and is the sturdiest of all trees under cultivation.
65. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.7.33 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 212
66. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 2.1-2.4, 2.13, 2.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 158
67. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 35.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 101
35.1. ἦσαν γὰρ αὐτῷ τέσσαρες υἱοί, δύο μὲν εἰς ἑτέρας ἀπῳκισμένοι συγγενείας, ὡς ἤδη λέλεκται, Σκηπίων καὶ Φάβιος, δύο δὲ παῖδες ἔτι τὴν ἡλικίαν, οὓς ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας εἶχε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γεγονότας ἐξ ἑτέρας γυναικός, 35.1. For Aemilius had four sons, of whom two, as I have already said, Cf. chapter v. 3. had been adopted into other families, namely, Scipio and Fabius; and two sons still boys, the children of a second wife, whom he had in his own house.
68. Plutarch, Agesilaus, 5.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 160
69. Plutarch, Fragments, 23.21-23.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 153
70. Plutarch, Eumenes, 20.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
71. Plutarch, Fragments, 178 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 153
72. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 28.1, 47.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
28.1. καθόλου δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς βαρβάρους σοβαρὸς ἦν καὶ σφόδρα πεπεισμένῳ περὶ τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ γενέσεως καὶ τεκνώσεως ὅμοιος, τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι μετρίως καὶ ὑποφειδομένως ἑαυτὸν ἐξεθείαζε πλὴν περὶ Σάμου γράφων Ἀθηναίοις, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν, φησὶν, ὑμῖν ἐλευθέραν πόλιν ἔδωκα καὶ ἔνδοξον ἔχετε δὲ αὐτὴν λαβόντες παρὰ τοῦ τότε κυρίου καὶ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ προσαγορευομένου, λέγων τὸν Φίλιππον. 28.1. In general, he bore himself haughtily towards the Barbarians, and like one fully persuaded of his divine birth and parentage, but with the Greeks it was within limits and somewhat rarely that he assumed his own divinity. However, in writing to the Athenians concerning Samos, he said: I cannot have given you that free and illustrious city; for ye received it from him who was then your master and was called my father, meaning Philip.
73. Plutarch, Dialogue On Love, 768 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •children, in stoic and popular thought Found in books: Huebner and Laes (2019), Aulus Gellius and Roman Reading Culture: Text, Presence and Imperial Knowledge in the 'Noctes Atticae', 18
74. Plutarch, Julius Caesar, 15.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
75. Plutarch, Pompey, 25.3-25.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100
25.3. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑλέσθαι πεντεκαίδεκα πρεσβευτὰς αὐτὸν ἐκ βουλῆς ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμονίας, χρήματα δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῶν ταμιείων καὶ παρὰ τῶν τελωνῶν ὅσα βούλοιτο καὶ ναῦς διακοσίας, κύριον ὄντα πλήθους καὶ καταλόγου στρατιᾶς καὶ πληρωμάτων ἐρετικῶν. ἀναγνωσθέντων δὲ τούτων ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὑπερφυῶς ἐδέξατο, τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου τοῖς μεγίστοις καὶ δυνατωτάτοις ἔδοξε μεῖζον μὲν φθόνου, φόβου δὲ ἄξιον εἶναι τὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἀπερίληπτον καὶ ἀόριστον. 25.4. ὅθεν ἐνίσταντο τῷ νόμῳ, πλὴν Καίσαρος οὗτος δὲ συνηγόρει τῷ νόμῳ, Πομπηΐου μὲν ἐλάχιστα φροντίζων, ὑποδυόμενος δὲ τὸν δῆμον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἑαυτῷ καὶ κτώμενος, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πομπηΐου σφοδρῶς καθήπτοντο. καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπάτων ἅτερος, εἰπὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι Ῥωμύλον ζηλῶν οὐ φεύξεται ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ τέλος, ἐκινδύνευσεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους διαφθαρῆναι· 25.5. Κάτλου δὲ κατὰ τοῦ νόμου προσελθόντος, πολλὴν μὲν αἰδούμενος ὁ δῆμος ἡσυχίαν παρεῖχεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὰ μετὰ τιμῆς ἀνεπιφθόνως ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πομπηΐου διελθὼν συνεβούλευε φείδεσθαι καὶ μὴ προβάλλειν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα κινδύνοις ἐπαλλήλοις καὶ πολέμοις, ἢ τίνα εἶπεν, ἕξετε ἄλλον, ἂν ἀπολέσητε τοῦτον; ἐκ μιᾶς γνώμης ὑπεφώνησαν ἅπαντες, σὲ αὐτόν. 25.3. 25.4. 25.5.
76. New Testament, Matthew, 24.35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
24.35. ὸ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρελεύσεται, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μου οὐ μὴ παρέλθωσιν. 24.35. Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away.
77. New Testament, Mark, 13.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
13.31. ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρελεύσονται, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μου οὐ παρελεύσονται. 13.31. Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away.
78. New Testament, John, 12.38 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 217
12.38. ἵνα ὁ λόγος Ἠσαίου τοῦ προφήτου πληρωθῇ ὃν εἶπεν Κύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; καὶ ὁ βραχίων Κυρίου τίνι ἀπεκαλύφθη; 12.38. that the word of Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spoke, "Lord, who has believed our report? To whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?"
79. Plutarch, Dion, 1.1, 10.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 100, 160
80. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 4.34 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nature, central to stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
81. Xenophon of Ephesus, The Ephesian Story of Anthica And Habrocomes, 4.3.3, 5.13.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 144
82. Epictetus, Fragments, 9.85-9.86 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
83. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 33.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation •stoic thought Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 13; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 97
84. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.9.1-1.9.7, 1.9.11, 1.9.13, 1.9.22, 1.9.25, 1.11.12-1.11.13, 1.12.24, 1.13.2-1.13.5, 1.14, 1.14.1-1.14.2, 1.14.4-1.14.6, 1.14.9-1.14.10, 1.14.12, 1.14.14, 1.14.16, 1.19.11-1.19.15, 2.5.26, 2.6.9-2.6.10, 2.8.11, 2.9.19-2.9.20, 2.10.3, 2.10.5, 2.16.42, 2.18.19, 2.19.26, 2.20, 2.22.15, 2.23.42, 2.24.20-2.24.26, 3.3.2-3.3.4, 3.5.8-3.5.10, 3.9.14, 3.22.30-3.22.44, 3.22.53-3.22.54, 3.22.81-3.22.82, 3.24.11-3.24.12, 4.7.6-4.7.7, 4.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation •nature, central to stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 13, 252; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96, 97, 98, 118, 121, 138, 142, 144, 163, 164, 244, 250
85. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 3.15.4-3.15.8, 20.1.1-20.1.12, 20.2.8-20.2.9, 30.2.3-30.2.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 122
86. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, a b c d\n0 36.30 36.30 36 30\n1 48.14 48.14 48 14\n2 40.39 40.39 40 39\n3 40.38 40.38 40 38\n4 12.75 12.75 12 75\n.. ... ... .. ..\n153 36.48 36.48 36 48\n154 36.47 36.47 36 47\n155 36.46 36.46 36 46\n156 36.45 36.45 36 45\n157 36.44 36.44 36 44\n\n[158 rows x 4 columns] (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 98, 142, 162, 171
36.30.  for that the same thing is both a city and a living being is a proposition that, I imagine, no one would readily consent to entertain. Yet the present orderly constitution of the universe ever since the whole has been separated and divided into a considerable number of forms of plants and animals, mortal and immortal, yes, and into air and earth and water and fire, being nevertheless by nature in all these forms one thing and governed by one spirit and force — this orderly constitution, I say, the Stoics do in one way or another liken to a city because of the multitude of the creatures that are constantly either being born or else ending their existence in it, and, furthermore, because of the arrangement and orderliness of its administration.
87. Tacitus, Agricola, 42.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •flattery (adulatio), in stoic thought Found in books: Edwards (2023), In the Court of the Gentiles: Narrative, Exemplarity, and Scriptural Adaptation in the Court-Tales of Flavius Josephus, 134
88. Suetonius, Domitianus, 10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28
89. Statius, Thebais, 8.751-8.766 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 14
90. Cornutus, De Natura Deorum, 28, 35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 253
91. Tacitus, Annals, 14.12, 15.65, 16.22.1, 16.33.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28
14.12. Miro tamen certamine procerum decernuntur supplicationes apud omnia pulvinaria, utque Quinquatrus quibus apertae insidiae essent ludis annuis celebrarentur; aureum Minervae simulacrum in curia et iuxta principis imago statuerentur; dies natalis Agrippinae inter nefastos esset. Thrasea Paetus silentio vel brevi adsensu priores adulationes transmittere solitus exiit tum senatu ac sibi causam periculi fecit, ceteris libertatis initium non praebuit. prodigia quoque crebra et inrita intercessere: anguem enixa mulier et alia in concubitu mariti fulmine exanimata; iam sol repente obscu- ratus et tactae de caelo quattuordecim urbis regiones. quae adeo sine cura deum eveniebant ut multos post annos Nero imperium et scelera continuaverit. ceterum quo gravaret invidiam matris eaque demota auctam lenitatem suam testificaretur, feminas inlustris Iuniam et Calpurniam, praetura functos Valerium Capitonem et Licinium Gabolum sedibus patriis reddidit, ab Agrippina olim pulsos. etiam Lolliae Paulinae cineres reportari sepulcrumque extrui permisit; quosque ipse nuper relegaverat, Iturium et Calvisium poena exolvit. nam Silana fato functa erat, longinquo ab exilio Tarentum regressa labante iam Agrippina, cuius inimicitiis conciderat, vel mitigata. 15.65. Fama fuit Subrium Flavum cum centurionibus occulto consilio neque tamen ignorante Seneca destinavisse ut post occisum opera Pisonis Neronem Piso quoque interficeretur tradereturque imperium Senecae, quasi insontibus claritudine virtutum ad summum fastigium delecto. quin et verba Flavi vulgabantur, non referre dedecori si citharoedus demoveretur et tragoedus succederet, quia ut Nero cithara, ita Piso tragico ornatu canebat. 14.12.  However, with a notable spirit of emulation among the magnates, decrees were drawn up: thanksgivings were to be held at all appropriate shrines; the festival of Minerva, on which the conspiracy had been brought to light, was to be celebrated with annual games; a golden statue of the goddess, with an effigy of the emperor by her side, was to be erected in the curia, and Agrippina's birthday included among the inauspicious dates. Earlier sycophancies Thrasea Paetus had usually allowed to pass, either in silence or with a curt assent: this time he walked out of the senate, creating a source of danger for himself, but implanting no germ of independence in his colleagues. Portents, also, frequent and futile made their appearance: a woman gave birth to a serpent, another was killed by a thunderbolt in the embraces of her husband; the sun, again, was suddenly obscured, and the fourteen regions of the capital were struck by lightning — events which so little marked the concern of the gods that Nero continued for years to come his empire and his crimes. However, to aggravate the feeling against his mother, and to furnish evidence that his own mildness had increased with her removal, he restored to their native soil two women of high rank, Junia and Calpurnia, along with the ex-praetors Valerius Capito and Licinius Gabolus — all of them formerly banished by Agrippina. He sanctioned the return, even, of the ashes of Lollia Paulina, and the erection of a tomb: Iturius and Calvisius, whom he had himself relegated some little while before, he now released from the penalty. As to Silana, she had died a natural death at Tarentum, to which she had retraced her way, when Agrippina, by whose enmity she had fallen, was beginning to totter or to relent. 15.65.  It was rumoured that Subrius Flavus and the centurions had decided in private conference, though not without Seneca's knowledge, that, once Nero had been struck down by the agency of Piso, Piso should be disposed of in his turn, and the empire made over to Seneca; who would thus appear to have been chosen for the supreme power by innocent men, as a consequence of his distinguished virtues. More than this, there was a saying of Flavus in circulation, that "so far as disgrace went, it was immaterial if a harper was removed, and a tragic actor took his place"; for Nero singing to his instrument was matched by Piso singing in his stage costume.
92. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 12.10-12.11, 21.7-21.9, 41.2, 83.1, 85.3-85.4, 117.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •spirit, stoic thought •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 15; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 585; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 250, 253
93. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 15.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28
94. Clement of Rome, 1 Clement, 20.1-20.3, 20.10-20.11, 21.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 234
20.1. Οἱ οὐρανοὶ τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ σαλευόμενοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ ὑποτάσσονται αὐτῷ. 20.2. ἡμέρα τε καὶ νὺξ τὸν τεταγμένον ὑπ̓ αὐτοῦ δρόμον διανύουσιν, μηδὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐμποδίζοντα. 20.3. ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη, ἀστέρων τε χοροὶ κατὰ τὴν διαταγὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ δίχα πάσης παρεκβάσεως ἐξελίσσουσιν τοὺς ἐπιτεταγμένους αὐτοῖς ὁρισμούς. 20.10. ἀνέμων σταθμοὶ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον καιρὸν τὴν λειτουργίαν αὐτῶν ἀπροσκόπως ἐπιτελοῦσιν: ἀέναοί τε πηγαί, πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ὑγείαν δημιουργηθεῖσαι, δίχα ἐλλείψεως παρέχονται τοὺς πρὸς ζωῆς ἀνθρώποις μαζούς: τά τε ἐλάχιστα τῶν ζώων τὰς συνελεύσεις αὐτῶν ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ εἰρήνῃ ποιοῦνται. 20.11. ταῦτα πάντα ὁ μέγας δημιουργὸς καὶ δεσπότης τῶν ἁπάντων ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ προσέταξεν εἶναι, εὐεργετῶν τὰ πάντα, ὑπερεκπερισσῶς δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς προσπεφευγότας τοῖς οἰκτιρμοῖς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 21.1. Ὁρᾶτε, ἀγαπητοί, μὴ αἱ εὐεργεσίαι αὐτοῦ αἱ πολλαὶ γένωνται εἰς κρίμα A(C) read kri/ma pa=sin h(mi=n. ἡμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἀξίως αὐτοῦ πολιτευόμενοι τὰ καλὰ καὶ εὐάρεστα ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν μεθ̓ ὁμονοίας.
95. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28
96. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.8, 1.11, 2.2.2, 2.3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 14; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
97. Clement of Rome, 2 Clement, 14.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 244
14.2. οὐκ οἴομαι δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι Eph. 1, 23. ἐκκλησία ζῶσα σῶμά ἐστιν Χριστοῦ: λέγει γὰρ ἡ Gen 1, 27 γραφή: Ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἅνθρωπον ἅρσεν καὶ θῆλυ: τὸ ἄρσεν ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός, τὸ θῆλυ ἡ ἐκκλησία: καὶ ἔτι e)/ti C, "and moreover" (e)/ti) S. τὰ βιβλία καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν οὐ νῦν εἶναι λέγουσιν le/gousi om. C. Some such sord is necessary to the grammar of the sentence, and is implied by S, but shether it sas le/gousi or fasi/, and its exact place in the sentence is of course uncertain. S also adds "of the prophets" after "the books." ἀλλὰ I Pet. 1, 20 ἄνωθεν. ἦν γὰρ πνευματική, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἡμῶν, ἐφανερώθη δὲ ἐπ̓ ἐσχάτων τῶν ἡμερῶν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς σώσῃ.
98. Aelius Aristides, Orations, 23.5-23.7, 23.12, 23.76, 42.4, 48.21, 48.24, 50.51, 50.56, 50.103-50.104, 50.106-50.107 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 143, 241, 245
99. Philostratus The Athenian, Lives of The Sophists, 493-494, 500, 531, 602-603, 557 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 150
100. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 4.8.1 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 247
101. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 229
102. Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation To The Greeks, 1.2.4, 1.4.3, 1.4.5, 1.6.1, 5.66.3, 8.77.1, 10.99.4, 12.120.2-12.120.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 234
103. Athenagoras, The Resurrection of The Dead, 4.3-4.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
104. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 10.33-10.34 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 241
10.33. To Trajan. While I was visiting a distant part of the province a most desolating fire broke out at Nicomedia and destroyed a number of private houses and two public buildings, the almshouse * and temple of Isis, although a road ran between them. The fire was allowed to spread farther than it need have done, first, owing to the violence of the wind, and, secondly, to the laziness of the inhabitants, it being generally agreed that they stood idly by without moving and merely watched the catastrophe. Moreover, there is not a single public fire-engine ** or bucket in the place, and not one solitary appliance for mastering an outbreak of fire. However, these will be provided in accordance with the orders I have already given. But, Sir, I would have you consider whether you think a guild of firemen, of about 150 men, should be instituted. I will take care that no one who is not a genuine fireman should be admitted, and that the guild should not misapply the charter granted to it, and there would be no difficulty in keeping an eye on so small a body. 0 10.34. Trajan to Pliny. You have conceived the idea that a guild of firemen might be formed in Nicomedia on the model of various others already existing. But it is to be remembered that your province of Bithynia, and especially city states like Nicomedia, are the prey of factions. Whatever name we may give to those who form an association, and whatever the reason of the association may be, they will soon degenerate into secret societies. It is better policy to provide appliances for mastering conflagrations and encourage property owners to make use of them, and, if occasion demands, press the crowd which collects into the same service.
105. Athenagoras, Apology Or Embassy For The Christians, 4.2, 10.4, 11.1-12.1, 22.2, 24.1, 25.2, 25.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 244
106. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 62.15, 62.24-62.25, 65.13.2, 71.1.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought •stoic thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 28; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 150
62.15. 7.  When many of those who had assembled at Antium perished, Nero made this an occasion for a festival.,1a. A certain Thrasea expressed the opinion that for a senator the extreme penalty should be exile.,1.  To such lengths did Nero's licence go that he actually drove chariots in public. And on one occasion after exhibiting a wild-beast hunt he immediately piped water into the theatre and produced a sea-fight; then he let the water out again and arranged a gladiatorial combat. Last of all, he flooded the place once more and gave a costly public banquet.,2.  Tigellinus had been appointed director of the banquet and everything had been provided on a lavish scale. The arrangements were made as follows. In the centre of the lake there had first been lowered the great wooden casks used for holding wine, and on top of these, planks had been fastened,,3.  while round about this platform taverns and booths had been erected. Thus Nero and Tigellinus and their fellow-banqueters occupied the centre, where they held their feast on purple rugs and soft cushions, while all the rest made merry in the taverns.,4.  They would also enter the brothels and without let or hindrance have intercourse with any of the women who were seated there, among whom were the most beautiful and distinguished in the city, both slaves and free, courtesans and virgins and married women; and these were not merely of the common people but also of the very noblest families, both girls and grown women.,5.  Every man had the privilege of enjoying whichever one he wished, as the women were not allowed to refuse anyone. Consequently, indiscriminate rabble as the throng was, they not only drank greedily but also wantoned riotously; and now a slave would debauch his mistress in the presence of his master, and now a gladiator would debauch a girl of noble family before the eyes of her father.,6.  The pushing and fighting and general uproar that took place, both on the part of those who were actually going in and on the part of those who were standing around outside, were disgraceful. Many men met their death in these encounters, and many women, too, some of the latter being suffocated and some being seized and carried off. 62.24. 1.  Seneca, however, and Rufus, the prefect, and some other prominent men formed a plot against Nero; for they could no longer endure his disgraceful behaviour, his licentiousness, and his cruelty. They desired, therefore, to rid themselves of these evils and at the same time to free Nero from them — as indeed, Sulpicius Asper, a centurion, and Subrius Flavius, a military tribune, both belonging to the body-guards, admitted outright to Nero himself.,2.  Asper, when asked by the emperor the reason for his attempt, replied: "I could help you in no other way." And the response of Flavius was: "I have both loved and hated you above all men. I loved you, hoping that you would prove a good emperor; I have hated you because you do so-and‑so. I can not be a slave to a charioteer or lyre-player." Information was lodged against these men, then, and they were punished, and many others likewise on their account.,3.  For everything in the nature of a complaint that could be entertained against anyone for excessive joy or grief, for words or gestures, was brought forward and was believed; and not one of these complaints, even if fictitious, could be refused credence in view of Nero's actual deeds.,4.  Hence faithless friends and house servants of some men flourished exceedingly; for, whereas persons were naturally on their guard against strangers and foes, by reason of their suspicions, they were bound to lay bare their thoughts to their associates whether they would or not. 62.25. 1.  It would be no small task to speak of all the others that perished, but the fate of Seneca calls for a few words. It was his wish to end the life of his wife Paulina at the same time with his own, for he declared that he had taught her both to despise death and to desire to leave the world in company with him. So he opened her veins as well as his own.,2.  But as he died hard, his end was hastened by the soldiers; and she was still alive when he passed away, and thus survived. He did not lay hands upon himself, however, until he had revised the book which he was writing and had deposited his other books with some friends, fearing that they would otherwise fall into Nero's hands and be destroyed.,3.  Thus died Seneca, notwithstanding that he had on the pretext of illness abandoned the society of the emperor and had bestowed upon him his entire property, ostensibly to help to pay for the buildings he was constructing. His brothers, too, perished after him.
107. Albinus, Introduction To Plato, 6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 250
108. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254
109. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254
110. Tertullian, Prescription Against Heretics, 7.9, 7.11 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 238
111. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 229
112. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 223.25-223.36 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 212
113. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 10.33-10.34 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 241
10.33. To Trajan. While I was visiting a distant part of the province a most desolating fire broke out at Nicomedia and destroyed a number of private houses and two public buildings, the almshouse * and temple of Isis, although a road ran between them. The fire was allowed to spread farther than it need have done, first, owing to the violence of the wind, and, secondly, to the laziness of the inhabitants, it being generally agreed that they stood idly by without moving and merely watched the catastrophe. Moreover, there is not a single public fire-engine ** or bucket in the place, and not one solitary appliance for mastering an outbreak of fire. However, these will be provided in accordance with the orders I have already given. But, Sir, I would have you consider whether you think a guild of firemen, of about 150 men, should be instituted. I will take care that no one who is not a genuine fireman should be admitted, and that the guild should not misapply the charter granted to it, and there would be no difficulty in keeping an eye on so small a body. 0 10.34. Trajan to Pliny. You have conceived the idea that a guild of firemen might be formed in Nicomedia on the model of various others already existing. But it is to be remembered that your province of Bithynia, and especially city states like Nicomedia, are the prey of factions. Whatever name we may give to those who form an association, and whatever the reason of the association may be, they will soon degenerate into secret societies. It is better policy to provide appliances for mastering conflagrations and encourage property owners to make use of them, and, if occasion demands, press the crowd which collects into the same service.
114. Tertullian, On The Pallium, 2.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
115. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 152.6-152.23, 170.1-170.2, 183.18 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 250
116. Tatian, Oration To The Greeks, 6.1, 11.2, 12.2-12.3, 15.3, 26.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 172, 217, 233, 234, 244
117. Tertullian, On The Soul, 5.6, 8.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 238
118. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 42.3, 74.2-74.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 217, 245
78. He proves that this prophecy harmonizes with Christ alone, from what is afterwards written Justin: Now this king Herod, at the time when the Magi came to him from Arabia, and said they knew from a star which appeared in the heavens that a King had been born in your country, and that they had come to worship Him, learned from the elders of your people that it was thus written regarding Bethlehem in the prophet: 'And you, Bethlehem, in the land of Judah, art by no means least among the princes of Judah; for out of you shall go forth the leader who shall feed my people.' Micah 5:2 Accordingly the Magi from Arabia came to Bethlehem and worshipped the Child, and presented Him with gifts, gold and frankincense, and myrrh; but returned not to Herod, being warned in a revelation after worshipping the Child in Bethlehem. And Joseph, the spouse of Mary, who wished at first to put away his betrothed Mary, supposing her to be pregt by intercourse with a man, i.e., from fornication, was commanded in a vision not to put away his wife; and the angel who appeared to him told him that what is in her womb is of the Holy Ghost. Then he was afraid, and did not put her away; but on the occasion of the first census which was taken in Judæa, under Cyrenius, he went up from Nazareth, where he lived, to Bethlehem, to which he belonged, to be enrolled; for his family was of the tribe of Judah, which then inhabited that region. Then along with Mary he is ordered to proceed into Egypt, and remain there with the Child until another revelation warn them to return into Judæa. But when the Child was born in Bethlehem, since Joseph could not find a lodging in that village, he took up his quarters in a certain cave near the village; and while they were there Mary brought forth the Christ and placed Him in a manger, and here the Magi who came from Arabia found Him. I have repeated to you what Isaiah foretold about the sign which foreshadowed the cave; but for the sake of those who have come with us today, I shall again remind you of the passage. Then I repeated the passage from Isaiah which I have already written, adding that, by means of those words, those who presided over the mysteries of Mithras were stirred up by the devil to say that in a place, called among them a cave, they were initiated by him. So Herod, when the Magi from Arabia did not return to him, as he had asked them to do, but had departed by another way to their own country, according to the commands laid on them; and when Joseph, with Mary and the Child, had now gone into Egypt, as it was revealed to them to do; as he did not know the Child whom the Magi had gone to worship, ordered simply the whole of the children then in Bethlehem to be massacred. And Jeremiah prophesied that this would happen, speaking by the Holy Ghost thus: 'A voice was heard in Ramah, lamentation and much wailing, Rachel weeping for her children; and she would not be comforted, because they are not.' Jeremiah 31:15 Therefore, on account of the voice which would be heard from Ramah, i.e., from Arabia (for there is in Arabia at this very time a place called Rama), wailing would come on the place where Rachel the wife of Jacob called Israel, the holy patriarch, has been buried, i.e., on Bethlehem; while the women weep for their own slaughtered children, and have no consolation by reason of what has happened to them. For that expression of Isaiah 'He shall take the power of Damascus and spoils of Samaria,' foretold that the power of the evil demon that dwelt in Damascus should be overcome by Christ as soon as He was born; and this is proved to have happened. For the Magi, who were held in bondage for the commission of all evil deeds through the power of that demon, by coming to worship Christ, shows that they have revolted from that dominion which held them captive; and this [dominion] the Scripture has showed us to reside in Damascus. Moreover, that sinful and unjust power is termed well in parable, Samaria. And none of you can deny that Damascus was, and is, in the region of Arabia, although now it belongs to what is called Syrophœnicia. Hence it would be becoming for you, sirs, to learn what you have not perceived, from those who have received grace from God, namely, from us Christians; and not to strive in every way to maintain your own doctrines, dishonouring those of God. Therefore also this grace has been transferred to us, as Isaiah says, speaking to the following effect: 'This people draws near to Me, they honour Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me; but in vain they worship Me, teaching the commands and doctrines of men. Therefore, behold, I will proceed to remove this people, and I shall remove them; and I shall take away the wisdom of their wise men, and bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent men.' Isaiah 29:13-14
119. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.15-4.2.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 15
120. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7, 19.1.14 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought •stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120
121. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.155-7.157 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 252
122. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.235 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 252
123. Pollux, Onomasticon, 1.152-1.153, 8.134-8.135, 8.152-8.154 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 247
124. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 1.9.3, 1.14.1-1.14.3, 1.17.11, 2.3.2, 2.4.2, 2.9, 2.11.5-2.11.6, 2.16.1, 3.4.7, 3.9, 4.1.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.5, 4.3.9-4.3.11, 4.4, 4.27, 4.36, 4.39-4.40, 4.46.3, 4.47-4.48, 4.48.3-4.48.4, 4.51, 5.4, 5.8.10, 5.8.12, 5.10.6-5.10.7, 5.16, 5.21.1, 5.26-5.27, 5.29-5.30, 5.34, 6.1.1, 6.10, 6.16.9-6.16.10, 6.38-6.39, 6.41, 6.44.5, 6.58, 7.9, 7.11, 7.13, 7.18-7.19, 7.19.1, 7.23.1, 7.25, 7.48, 7.56, 7.66.3, 8.1-8.2, 8.1.3, 8.7.1, 8.34-8.35, 8.39, 9.1.1-9.1.9, 9.9.2, 9.9.6-9.9.12, 9.16, 9.28.3, 10.1.3, 10.2, 10.25.2, 10.28, 11.8, 11.16, 11.18.1, 12.11, 12.30, 12.36.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •ζῷον λογικόν, gods and human beings as, in stoic thought Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 44, 46, 47, 48; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120, 121, 144, 150, 153, 164, 165, 171, 172, 233, 244
125. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 5.4, 8.8, 11.5, 11.12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 142, 144, 244
126. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.10.1, 2.2.4, 2.15.3, 3.5.3, 3.11.8, 3.12.1, 3.16.6, 3.18.5-3.18.6, 3.19.3, 4.4.3, 4.20.4, 4.22.1, 4.24.1, 4.28.2, 4.38.3, 4.40.2, 5.6.2, 5.36.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 172, 217, 233, 234, 244, 245
127. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 255
128. Lucian, Philosophies For Sale, 11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 256
129. Justin, First Apology, 26.1-26.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 255
130. Plotinus, Enneads, 4.8.1(1-11), 5.8.10(31-43), 6.9.7 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252
131. Origen, On First Principles, 2.6 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
132. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45, 8.51 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought •nature, central to stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233, 253
4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits. 8.51. In the next place, he expresses his approval of those who hope that eternal life shall be enjoyed with God by the soul or mind, or, as it is variously called, the spiritual nature, the reasonable soul, intelligent, holy, and blessed; and he allows the soundness of the doctrine, that those who had a good life shall be happy, and the unrighteous shall suffer eternal punishments. And yet I wonder at what follows, more than at anything that Celsus has ever said; for he adds, And from this doctrine let not them or any one ever swerve. For certainly in writing against Christians, the very essence of whose faith is God, and the promises made by Christ to the righteous, and His warnings of punishment awaiting the wicked, he must see that, if a Christian were brought to renounce Christianity by his arguments against it, it is beyond doubt that, along with his Christian faith, he would cast off the very doctrine from which he says that no Christian and no man should ever swerve. But I think Celsus has been far surpassed in consideration for his fellow-men by Chrysippus in his treatise, On the Subjugation of the Passions. For when he sought to apply remedies to the affections and passions which oppress and distract the human spirit, after employing such arguments as seemed to himself to be strong, he did not shrink from using in the second and third place others which he did not himself approve of. For, says he, if it were held by any one that there are three kinds of good, we must seek to regulate the passions in accordance with that supposition; and we must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away. And he adds, Thus, supposing that pleasure were the highest good, or that he was of that opinion whose mind was under the dominion of passion, we should not the less give him help, and show that, even on the principle that pleasure is the highest and final good of man, all passion is disallowed. And Celsus, in like manner, after having embraced the doctrine, that the righteous shall be blessed, and the wicked shall suffer eternal punishments, should have followed out his subject; and, after having advanced what seemed to him the chief argument, he should have proceeded to prove and enforce by further reasons the truth that the unjust shall surely suffer eternal punishment, and those who lead a good life shall be blessed.
133. Origen, Commentary On Matthew, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
134. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 13.13.35 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
135. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.23 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
3.23. Since, therefore, the leading men among the philosophers are themselves discovered to be of such emptiness, what shall we think of those lesser ones, who are accustomed never to appear to themselves so wise, as when they boast of their contempt of money? Brave spirit! But I wait to see their conduct, and what are the results of that contempt. They avoid as an evil, and abandon the property handed down to them from their parents. And lest they should suffer shipwreck in a storm, they plunge headlong of their own accord in a calm, being resolute not by virtue, but by perverse fear; as those who, through fear of being slain by the enemy, slay themselves, that by death they may avoid death. So these men, without honour and without influence, throw away the means by which they might have acquired the glory of liberality. Democritus is praised because he abandoned his fields, and suffered them to become public pastures. I should approve of it, if he had given them. But nothing is done wisely which is useless and evil if it is done by all. But this negligence is tolerable. What shall I say of him who changed his possessions into money, which he threw into the sea? I doubt whether he was in his senses, or deranged. Away, he says, you evil desires, into the deep. I will cast you away, lest I myself should be cast away by you. If you have so great a contempt for money, employ it in acts of kindness and humanity, bestow it upon the poor; this, which you are about to throw away, may be a succour to many, so that they may not die through famine, or thirst, or nakedness. Imitate at least the madness and fury of Tuditanus; scatter abroad your property to be seized by the people. You have it in your power both to escape the possession of money, and yet to lay it out to advantage; for whatever has been profitable to many is securely laid out. But who approves of the equality of faults as laid down by Zeno? But let us omit that which is always received with derision by all. This is sufficient to prove the error of this madman, that he places pity among vices and diseases. He deprives us of an affection, which involves almost the whole course of human life. For since the nature of man is more feeble than that of the other animals, which divine providence has armed with natural means of protection, either to endure the severity of the seasons or to ward off attacks from their bodies, because none of these things has been given to man, he has received in the place of all these things the affection of pity, which is truly called humanity, by which we might mutually protect each other. For if a man were rendered savage by the sight of another man, which we see happen in the case of those animals which are of a solitary nature, there would be no society among men, no care or system in the building of cities; and thus life would not even be safe, since the weakness of men would both be exposed to the attacks of the other animals, and they would rage among themselves after the manner of wild beasts. Nor is his madness less in other things. For what can be said respecting him who asserted that snow was black? How naturally it followed, that he should also assert that pitch was white! This is he who said that he was born for this purpose, that he might behold the heaven and the sun, who beheld nothing on the earth when the sun was shining. Xenophanes most foolishly believed mathematicians who said that the orb of the moon was eighteen times larger than the earth; and, as was consistent with this folly, he said that within the concave surface of the moon there was another earth, and that there another race of men live in a similar manner to that in which we live on this earth. Therefore these lunatics have another moon, to hold forth to them a light by night, as this does to us. And perhaps this globe of ours may be a moon to another earth below this. Seneca says that there was one among the Stoics who used to deliberate whether he should assign to the sun also its own inhabitants; he acted foolishly in doubting. For what injury would he have inflicted if he had assigned them? But I believe the heat deterred him, so as not to imperil so great a multitude; lest, if they should perish through excessive heat, so great a calamity should be said to have happened by his fault.
136. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.21, 7.86-7.89, 7.110-7.111, 7.135-7.136, 7.138, 7.140, 7.142-7.143, 9.19 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •ζῷον λογικόν, gods and human beings as, in stoic thought •nature, central to stoic thought •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation •matter, as principle in stoic thought Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 45, 46; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202, 233, 253; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 13; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120, 121, 164, 256
7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved. 7.138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena, a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods, book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. 7.140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii. But these, it is added [i.e. sympathy and tension], are likewise bodies. 7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. 7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite. 9.19. Seven and sixty are now the years that have been tossing my cares up and down the land of Greece; and there were then twenty and five years more from my birth up, if I know how to speak truly about these things.He holds that there are four elements of existent things, and worlds unlimited in number but not overlapping [in time]. Clouds are formed when the vapour from the sun is carried upwards and lifts them into the surrounding air. The substance of God is spherical, in no way resembling man. He is all eye and all ear, but does not breathe; he is the totality of mind and thought, and is eternal. Xenophanes was the first to declare that everything which comes into being is doomed to perish, and that the soul is breath.
137. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Marcus Antoninus, 3.2-3.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120, 150
138. Theodoret of Cyrus, Cure of The Greek Maladies, 1.75 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 126
139. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 35, 38, 81, 84, 89, 91 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
140. Gregory of Nyssa, Dialogus De Anima Et Resurrectione, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
141. Augustine, Confessions, 7.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252
7.3. 4. But I also, as yet, although I said and was firmly persuaded, that Thou our Lord, the true God, who made not only our souls but our bodies, and not our souls and bodies alone, but all creatures and all things, were uncontaminable and inconvertible, and in no part mutable: yet understood I not readily and clearly what was the cause of evil. And yet, whatever it was, I perceived that it must be so sought out as not to constrain me by it to believe that the immutable God was mutable, lest I myself should become the thing that I was seeking out. I sought, therefore, for it free from care, certain of the untruthfulness of what these asserted, whom I shunned with my whole heart; for I perceived that through seeking after the origin of evil, they were filled with malice, in that they liked better to think that Your Substance did suffer evil than that their own did commit it. 5. And I directed my attention to discern what I now heard, that free will was the cause of our doing evil, and Your righteous judgment of our suffering it. But I was unable clearly to discern it. So, then, trying to draw the eye of my mind from that pit, I was plunged again therein, and trying often, was as often plunged back again. But this raised me towards Your light, that I knew as well that I had a will as that I had life: when, therefore, I was willing or unwilling to do anything, I was most certain that it was none but myself that was willing and unwilling; and immediately I perceived that there was the cause of my sin. But what I did against my will I saw that I suffered rather than did, and that judged I not to be my fault, but my punishment; whereby, believing You to be most just, I quickly confessed myself to be not unjustly punished. But again I said: Who made me? Was it not my God, who is not only good, but goodness itself? Whence came I then to will to do evil, and to be unwilling to do good, that there might be cause for my just punishment? Who was it that put this in me, and implanted in me the root of bitterness, seeing I was altogether made by my most sweet God? If the devil were the author, whence is that devil? And if he also, by his own perverse will, of a good angel became a devil, whence also was the evil will in him whereby he became a devil, seeing that the angel was made altogether good by that most Good Creator? By these reflections was I again cast down and stifled; yet not plunged into that hell of error (where no man confesses unto You), to think that You allow evil, rather than that man does it.
142. Methodius of Olympus, De Resurrectione, 1.20.4-1.20.5 (4th cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 233
143. Macrobius, Commentary On The Dream of Scipio, 1.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254
144. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •matter, as principle in stoic thought Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 13
145. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 252
146. Jerome, Commentary On Ezekiel, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
147. Jerome, Commentaria In Epistolam Ad Ephesios, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
148. Jerome, Commentaria In Matthaeum (Commentaria In Evangelium S. Matthaei), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
149. Jerome, Letters, 79.9 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
150. Damaskios, De Principiis, 2.117 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •matter, as principle in stoic thought Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 11, 13
151. Aetius, Opinions of The Philosophers, 1.7.33  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 212
152. Chaeremon of Alexandria, Fragments, 1  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254
153. Anon., Suda, σέξστος  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 150
154. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.380, 2.465, 2.525, 2.527-2.528, 2.641, 2.645, 2.937, 2.1129-2.1130, 2.1176, 2.1178, 3.43, 3.462, 3.578-3.580  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought •belief/s, as misconceptions on stoic lines of thought Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 15; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96, 98, 121, 144, 145, 160, 162, 171
155. Photius, Bibliotheca (Library, Bibl.), 58  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120
156. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
158. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Providentia, None  Tagged with subjects: •matter, as principle in stoic thought Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 13
159. Pseudo‐Makarios, Logia, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
160. Seneca The Younger, On Nature, 2.45  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 144
161. Stoiocorum Veterum Fragmenta, Stoiocorum Veterum Fragmenta, 2.441, 2.1027  Tagged with subjects: •judaism, pneuma in stoic thought •judaism, stoic thought compared Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 212
162. Epigraphy, Sb, 5.8444.2.7  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96
163. Anon., Herculaneum Papyrus, 1577 / 1579  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
164. Cicero, Posterior Academics, 1.38  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233
165. Origen, Commentary On Ephesians, 19.68-19.75  Tagged with subjects: •orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
168. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, None  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
170. Plato, Book, None  Tagged with subjects: •nature, central to stoic thought Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
173. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Monks, None  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
174. John Climacus, Ladder, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
176. Lactantius, Ep.Ad Pentad., None  Tagged with subjects: •attention, prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in stoic self-interrogation Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
177. Origen, Pg, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 239
178. Papyri, P.Oxy., 3781  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96
179. Epigraphy, Ogis, 2.669.7  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96
180. Epigraphy, Cig, 3.4857.7  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 96
181. Various, Fr., 23.50  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 145
182. Diogenes of Oinoanda, Nf, 127.2.13-127.2.14  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 122
184. M. Cornelius Fronto, To His Friends, 1.1  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 120
185. Origen, Against Kelsos, 1.14, 3.13  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 254, 255
186. Athenagoras, Barnabas, 10  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 255
187. Ps.-Justin, Mon., 1.2  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 234
188. Epigraphy, Crai, 468-480, 482-490, 481  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 242
189. Epigraphy, Sylloge Inscriptionum Religionis Isiacae Et Sarapiacae, 357  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 144
190. Plato, Horoi, None  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 251
191. Hermetic Corpus, Asclepius, 1, 10-12, 16, 18-19, 2, 20-23, 25-26, 29, 3, 30-32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 6-9  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 145, 155
192. Pseudo-Aristotle, Peri Tou Kosmou, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 244
193. Epigraphy, Inschriften Des Asklepieions, 63  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 143
194. Various, Corpus Hermeticum, 1.6, 1.14-1.16, 1.19, 1.24, 1.26, 2.12-2.17, 3.4, 4.1, 5.1-5.11, 6.1, 6.3-6.6, 7.2-7.3, 8.1-8.5, 9.1-9.2, 9.5-9.9, 10.1-10.11, 10.14-10.15, 10.19-10.22, 10.24, 11.1-11.10, 11.14-11.21, 12.3-12.4, 12.10-12.11, 12.15-12.16, 12.18-12.21, 12.23, 16.3, 16.19  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 125, 145, 155, 170, 244, 253
195. Arrianus, Atticus, 2-3, 8  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 250
196. Epicurus, Deperditorum Librorum Reliquiae, 296  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 158
197. Philon of Larisa, Philon of Larisa, 251-252  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 252
198. Various, Doxographi Graeci, 464.20-464.21, 465.15  Tagged with subjects: •stoic thought Found in books: Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 121