1. Septuagint, Tobit, 3.6 (th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • Yhwh, mercy, Providence
Found in books: Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 262; Toloni (2022), The Story of Tobit: A Comparative Literary Analysis, 69, 73, 100, 145
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3.6 And now deal with me according to thy pleasure; command my spirit to be taken up, that I may depart and become dust. For it is better for me to die than to live, because I have heard false reproaches, and great is the sorrow within me. Command that I now be released from my distress to go to the eternal abode; do not turn thy face away from me."'' None |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 30.3, 32.39 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine/God,, Providence • God, providence • Yhwh, mercy, Providence • allowance, permission (of God or Providence) • divine providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 215; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 154; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 259; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 49; Schremer (2010), Brothers Estranged: Heresy, Christianity and Jewish Identity in Late Antiquity, 25; Toloni (2022), The Story of Tobit: A Comparative Literary Analysis, 71
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30.3 וְשָׁב יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת־שְׁבוּתְךָ וְרִחֲמֶךָ וְשָׁב וְקִבֶּצְךָ מִכָּל־הָעַמִּים אֲשֶׁר הֱפִיצְךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ שָׁמָּה׃
32.39 רְאוּ עַתָּה כִּי אֲנִי אֲנִי הוּא וְאֵין אֱלֹהִים עִמָּדִי אֲנִי אָמִית וַאֲחַיֶּה מָחַצְתִּי וַאֲנִי אֶרְפָּא וְאֵין מִיָּדִי מַצִּיל׃' ' None | sup>
30.3 that then the LORD thy God will turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will return and gather thee from all the peoples, whither the LORD thy God hath scattered thee.
32.39 See now that I, even I, am He, And there is no god with Me; I kill, and I make alive; I have wounded, and I heal; And there is none that can deliver out of My hand.' ' None |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.26-1.27, 4.5, 4.7, 11.1-11.9, 50.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine/God,, Providence • Pronoia (providence) archontic • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Sophia • Pronoia (providence) archontic, general • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Yhwh, mercy, Providence • allowance, permission (of God or Providence) • providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 211; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 199; Grypeou and Spurling (2009), The Exegetical Encounter between Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity, 103; Osborne (2001), Irenaeus of Lyons, 211; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 38, 41, 42, 217, 222, 227, 320; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 13, 92, 122, 155; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 178; Toloni (2022), The Story of Tobit: A Comparative Literary Analysis, 76, 82; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 99; Van der Horst (2014), Studies in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 103; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 20
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1.26 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃ 1.27 וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃
4.5 וְאֶל־קַיִן וְאֶל־מִנְחָתוֹ לֹא שָׁעָה וַיִּחַר לְקַיִן מְאֹד וַיִּפְּלוּ פָּנָיו׃
4.7 הֲלוֹא אִם־תֵּיטִיב שְׂאֵת וְאִם לֹא תֵיטִיב לַפֶּתַח חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ וְאֵלֶיךָ תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ וְאַתָּה תִּמְשָׁל־בּוֹ׃
11.1 אֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת שֵׁם שֵׁם בֶּן־מְאַת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת־אַרְפַּכְשָׁד שְׁנָתַיִם אַחַר הַמַּבּוּל׃
11.1 וַיְהִי כָל־הָאָרֶץ שָׂפָה אֶחָת וּדְבָרִים אֲחָדִים׃ 11.2 וַיְהִי בְּנָסְעָם מִקֶּדֶם וַיִּמְצְאוּ בִקְעָה בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר וַיֵּשְׁבוּ שָׁם׃ 11.2 וַיְחִי רְעוּ שְׁתַּיִם וּשְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת־שְׂרוּג׃ 11.3 וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ הָבָה נִלְבְּנָה לְבֵנִים וְנִשְׂרְפָה לִשְׂרֵפָה וַתְּהִי לָהֶם הַלְּבֵנָה לְאָבֶן וְהַחֵמָר הָיָה לָהֶם לַחֹמֶר׃ 11.3 וַתְּהִי שָׂרַי עֲקָרָה אֵין לָהּ וָלָד׃ 11.4 וַיֹּאמְרוּ הָבָה נִבְנֶה־לָּנוּ עִיר וּמִגְדָּל וְרֹאשׁוֹ בַשָּׁמַיִם וְנַעֲשֶׂה־לָּנוּ שֵׁם פֶּן־נָפוּץ עַל־פְּנֵי כָל־הָאָרֶץ׃ 11.5 וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה לִרְאֹת אֶת־הָעִיר וְאֶת־הַמִּגְדָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּנוּ בְּנֵי הָאָדָם׃ 11.6 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה הֵן עַם אֶחָד וְשָׂפָה אַחַת לְכֻלָּם וְזֶה הַחִלָּם לַעֲשׂוֹת וְעַתָּה לֹא־יִבָּצֵר מֵהֶם כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יָזְמוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת׃ 11.7 הָבָה נֵרְדָה וְנָבְלָה שָׁם שְׂפָתָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ אִישׁ שְׂפַת רֵעֵהוּ׃ 11.8 וַיָּפֶץ יְהוָה אֹתָם מִשָּׁם עַל־פְּנֵי כָל־הָאָרֶץ וַיַּחְדְּלוּ לִבְנֹת הָעִיר׃ 11.9 עַל־כֵּן קָרָא שְׁמָהּ בָּבֶל כִּי־שָׁם בָּלַל יְהוָה שְׂפַת כָּל־הָאָרֶץ וּמִשָּׁם הֱפִיצָם יְהוָה עַל־פְּנֵי כָּל־הָאָרֶץ׃' ' None | sup>
1.26 And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ 1.27 And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.
4.5 but unto Cain and to his offering He had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his countece fell.
4.7 If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up? and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it.’
11.1 And the whole earth was of one language and of one speech. 11.2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there. 11.3 And they said one to another: ‘Come, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly.’ And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar. 11.4 And they said: ‘Come, let us build us a city, and a tower, with its top in heaven, and let us make us a name; lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.’ 11.5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded. 11.6 And the LORD said: ‘Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is what they begin to do; and now nothing will be withholden from them, which they purpose to do. 11.7 Come, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.’ 11.8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth; and they left off to build the city. 11.9 Therefore was the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there aconfound the language of all the earth; and from thence did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
50.20 And as for you, ye meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.' ' None |
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4. Hebrew Bible, Job, 42.13, 42.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, Stoic type • Yhwh, mercy, Providence • allowance, permission (of God or Providence)
Found in books: Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 58; Toloni (2022), The Story of Tobit: A Comparative Literary Analysis, 77, 82, 95; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 180, 263
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42.13 וַיְהִי־לוֹ שִׁבְעָנָה בָנִים וְשָׁלוֹשׁ בָּנוֹת׃
42.16 וַיְחִי אִיּוֹב אַחֲרֵי־זֹאת מֵאָה וְאַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה וירא וַיִּרְאֶה אֶת־בָּנָיו וְאֶת־בְּנֵי בָנָיו אַרְבָּעָה דֹּרוֹת׃' ' None | sup>
42.13 He had also seven sons and three daughters.
42.16 And after this Job lived a hundred and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons’sons, even four generations.' ' None |
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5. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 8.35 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence of God • Providence, Stoic type • providence
Found in books: Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 199; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 161, 187, 235, 253, 271, 283, 285, 297
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8.35 כִּי מֹצְאִי מצאי מָצָא חַיִּים וַיָּפֶק רָצוֹן מֵיְהוָה׃'' None | sup>
8.35 For whoso findeth me findeth life, And obtaineth favour of the LORD.'' None |
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6. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 58.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Origen, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 294; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 22
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58.3 אַף־בְּלֵב עוֹלֹת תִּפְעָלוּן בָּאָרֶץ חֲמַס יְדֵיכֶם תְּפַלֵּסוּן׃'' None | sup>
58.3 Yea, in heart ye work wickedness; Ye weigh out in the earth the violence of your hands.'' None |
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7. None, None, nan (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type
Found in books: Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 44; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 19
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8. Hebrew Bible, Amos, 5.25 (8th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 244; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 44
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5.25 הַזְּבָחִים וּמִנְחָה הִגַּשְׁתֶּם־לִי בַמִּדְבָּר אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל׃'' None | sup>
5.25 Did ye bring unto Me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?'' None |
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9. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 40.26, 45.11 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • Divine/God,, Providence • Providence, Stoic type
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 36; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 63; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 229, 246
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40.26 שְׂאוּ־מָרוֹם עֵינֵיכֶם וּרְאוּ מִי־בָרָא אֵלֶּה הַמּוֹצִיא בְמִסְפָּר צְבָאָם לְכֻלָּם בְּשֵׁם יִקְרָא מֵרֹב אוֹנִים וְאַמִּיץ כֹּחַ אִישׁ לֹא נֶעְדָּר׃
45.11 כֹּה־אָמַר יְהוָה קְדוֹשׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיֹצְרוֹ הָאֹתִיּוֹת שְׁאָלוּנִי עַל־בָּנַי וְעַל־פֹּעַל יָדַי תְּצַוֻּנִי׃'' None | sup>
40.26 Lift up your eyes on high, And see: who hath created these? He that bringeth out their host by number, He calleth them all by name; By the greatness of His might, and for that He is strong in power, Not one faileth.
45.11 Thus saith the LORD, The Holy One of Israel, and his Maker: Ask Me of the things that are to come; Concerning My sons, and concerning the work of My hands, command ye Me.'' None |
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10. Xenophanes, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 93; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 117
| b24 He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over.'' None |
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11. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism/Stoics/Stoic on evil and providence • divine providence / care • god (theoi, θεοί) vs. providence • heaven and providence • legacy, of Plotinus' account of providence • providence • providence (pronoia, πρόνοια) • providence of the Demiurge • providence, Plotinus on
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 90, 92, 94; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 386; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 69; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 39; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 242
| 886a ΑΘ. πῶς; ΚΛ. πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶν διειλημμένα· καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς. ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαί γε, ὦ μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηρούς—οὐ γὰρ δή ποτε εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὥς γε αἰδοῦμαι—μή πως ἡμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλʼ ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατείᾳ μόνον ἡδονῶν τε 904a ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα πλήθεσιν ἄπειρʼ ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως· νῦν δʼ ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ. ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ΑΘ. ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες' ' None | 886a that gods exist? Ath. How so? Clin. First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the stars, and all the universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and then there is the further fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe in the existence of gods. Ath. My dear sir, these bad men cause me alarm—for I will never call it awe —lest haply they scoff at us. For the cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not aware of; since you imagine that it is solely by their incontinence in regard to pleasures and desire 904a then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy. Clin. How do you mean? Ath. Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal, as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed,' ' None |
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12. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence • providence (pronoia, πρόνοια)
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007), Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 554; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 86; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 44
| 62b καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἴσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης .'' None | 62b but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this? Yes, said Cebes,'' None |
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13. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • fate, and providence • gods, and providence • providence • providence, Apuleius on • providence, Calcidius on • providence, and god’s will
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 283, 298; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 405; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 198; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 11
| 248c λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε. ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ συνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, κἂν ἀεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδῃ, καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ, τότε νόμος ταύτην' ' None | 248c on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul' ' None |
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14. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence (pronoia, πρόνοια) • providence causes G/good(ness)
Found in books: Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 133; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 253
| 176a λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ . ΘΕΟ. εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατʼ ἀνθρώπους εἴη. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὔτʼ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε'' None | 176a THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind. SOC. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can;'' None |
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15. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Epicurus, as denying providence • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Plotinus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • allowance, permission (of God or Providence) • divine providence • divine providence / care • fate, justice of providence • god, identified with providence • providence • providence (pronoia) • providence, Apuleius’s doctrine on • providence, and fate • providence, and god’s will • providence, diverging levels of • providence, divine • providence, identified with god • providence, in Middle Platonism • providence, in the Timaeus • providence, rejected
Found in books: Athanassaki and Titchener (2022), Plutarch's Cities, 292; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 232, 282, 298; Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 146; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 35, 63, 64; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 386, 404, 405; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 231; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 19, 150, 194; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 38, 51; Osborne (2001), Irenaeus of Lyons, 85; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 227, 228; Russell and Nesselrath (2014), On Prophecy, Dreams and Human Imagination: Synesius, De insomniis, 63; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 332; Schultz and Wilberding (2022), Women and the Female in Neoplatonism, 46; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 32; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 39, 42; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 11
| 29e τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ΤΙ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην 30a παρʼ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτʼ ἄν. βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον. θέμις δʼ οὔτʼ ἦν οὔτʼ ἔστιν τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον· 30b λογισάμενος οὖν ηὕρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαί ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δʼ αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ. διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δʼ ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ 34a ὑπηρεσίας. ΤΙ. κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν· διὸ δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιαγαγὼν αὐτὸ ἐποίησε κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον, τὰς δὲ ἓξ ἁπάσας κινήσεις ἀφεῖλεν καὶ ἀπλανὲς ἀπηργάσατο ἐκείνων. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν περίοδον ταύτην ἅτʼ οὐδὲν ποδῶν δέον ἀσκελὲς καὶ ἄπουν αὐτὸ ἐγέννησεν. 34b ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθεὶς λεῖον καὶ ὁμαλὸν πανταχῇ τε ἐκ μέσου ἴσον καὶ ὅλον καὶ τέλεον ἐκ τελέων σωμάτων σῶμα ἐποίησεν· ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινεν καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν, καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησεν, διʼ ἀρετὴν δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον συγγίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου προσδεόμενον, γνώριμον δὲ καὶ φίλον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν αὑτῷ. διὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα εὐδαίμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο. 39e ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως. ΤΙ. εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ 41c αὑτῷ γένη ζῴων οὐχ ἕξει, δεῖ δέ, εἰ μέλλει τέλεος ἱκανῶς εἶναι. διʼ ἐμοῦ δὲ ταῦτα γενόμενα καὶ βίου μετασχόντα θεοῖς ἰσάζοιτʼ ἄν· ἵνα οὖν θνητά τε ᾖ τό τε πᾶν τόδε ὄντως ἅπαν ᾖ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζῴων δημιουργίαν, μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν. καὶ καθʼ ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τε ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀεὶ δίκῃ καὶ ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων ἕπεσθαι, σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος 47e ἐπιδεᾶ γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἕξιν ἐπίκουρος ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐδόθη. ΤΙ. μεμειγμένη γὰρ 48a οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη· νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτά τε διʼ ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατʼ ἀρχὰς συνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν. εἴ τις οὖν ᾗ γέγονεν κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἐρεῖ, μεικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, ᾗ φέρειν πέφυκεν· ὧδε οὖν πάλιν 90a διὸ φυλακτέον ὅπως ἂν ἔχωσιν τὰς κινήσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους. τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπʼ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὀρθότατα λέγοντες· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν' ' None | 29e constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself. Tim. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos. 30a For God desired that, so far as possible, all things should be good and nothing evil; wherefore, when He took over all that was visible, seeing that it was not in a state of rest but in a state of discordant and disorderly motion, He brought it into order out of disorder, deeming that the former state is in all ways better than the latter. For Him who is most good it neither was nor is permissible to perform any action save what is most fair. As He reflected, therefore, He perceived that of such creatures as are by nature visible, 30b none that is irrational will be fairer, comparing wholes with wholes, than the rational; and further, that reason cannot possibly belong to any apart from Soul. So because of this reflection He constructed reason within soul and soul within body as He fashioned the All, that so the work He was executing might be of its nature most fair and most good. Thus, then, in accordance with the likely account, we must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God. 34a Tim. For movement He assigned unto it that which is proper to its body, namely, that one of the seven motions which specially belongs to reason and intelligence; wherefore He spun it round uniformly in the same spot and within itself and made it move revolving in a circle; and all the other six motions He took away and fashioned it free from their aberrations. And seeing that for this revolving motion it had no need of feet, He begat it legless and footless. 34b which was one day to be existent, whereby He made it smooth and even and equal on all sides from the center, a whole and perfect body compounded of perfect bodies, And in the midst thereof He set Soul, which He stretched throughout the whole of it, and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body; and as a Circle revolving in a circle He established one sole and solitary Heaven, able of itself because of its excellence to company with itself and needing none other beside, sufficing unto itself as acquaintance and friend. And because of all this He generated it to be a blessed God. 39e Nature thereof. Tim. And these Forms are four,—one the heavenly kind of gods; 41c it is to be fully perfect. But if by my doing these creatures came into existence and partook of life, they would be made equal unto gods; in order, therefore, that they may be mortal and that this World-all may be truly All, do ye turn yourselves, as Nature directs, to the work of fashioning these living creatures, imitating the power showed by me in my generating of you. Now so much of them as it is proper to designate ’immortal,’ the part we call divine which rules supreme in those who are fain to follow justice always and yourselves, that part I will deliver unto you when I have sown it and given it origin. 47e deficient in grace, which exists in most of us, Rhythm also was bestowed upon us to be our helper by the same deities and for the same ends. Tim. 48a For, in truth, this Cosmos in its origin was generated as a compound, from the combination of Necessity and Reason. And inasmuch as Reason was controlling Necessity by persuading her to conduct to the best end the most part of the things coming into existence, thus and thereby it came about, through Necessity yielding to intelligent persuasion, that this Universe of ours was being in this wise constructed at the beginning. Wherefore if one is to declare how it actually came into being on this wise, he must include also the form of the Errant Cause, in the way that it really acts. To this point, therefore, we must return, 90a wherefore care must be taken that they have their motions relatively to one another in due proportion. And as regards the most lordly kind of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven. And herein we speak most truly; for it is by suspending our head and root from that region whence the substance of our soul first came that the Divine Power' ' None |
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16. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • divine providence / care • induction, as providing preliminary accounts • providence
Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 29; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 27; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 122; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 32
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17. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Philo of Alexandria, on divine providence • providence
Found in books: Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 236; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 132
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18. Cicero, On Divination, 1.118, 1.125 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence / πρόνοια • providence
Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020), Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in its contexts, 615; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 98, 110; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 126
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1.118 Sed distinguendum videtur, quonam modo. Nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. Ea quibus bene percepta sunt, ii non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia. Hoc autem posito atque concesso, esse quandam vim divinam hominum vitam continentem, non difficile est, quae fieri certe videmus, ea qua ratione fiant, suspicari. Nam et ad hostiam deligendam potest dux esse vis quaedam sentiens, quae est toto confusa mundo, et tum ipsum, cum immolare velis, extorum fieri mutatio potest, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; parvis enim momentis multa natura aut adfingit aut mutat aut detrahit.
1.125 Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat.'' None | sup>
1.118 But it seems necessary to settle the principle on which these signs depend. For, according to the Stoic doctrine, the gods are not directly responsible for every fissure in the liver or for every song of a bird; since, manifestly, that would not be seemly or proper in a god and furthermore is impossible. But, in the beginning, the universe was so created that certain results would be preceded by certain signs, which are given sometimes by entrails and by birds, sometimes by lightnings, by portents, and by stars, sometimes by dreams, and sometimes by utterances of persons in a frenzy. And these signs do not often deceive the persons who observe them properly. If prophecies, based on erroneous deductions and interpretations, turn out to be false, the fault is not chargeable to the signs but to the lack of skill in the interpreters.Assuming the proposition to be conceded that there is a divine power which pervades the lives of men, it is not hard to understand the principle directing those premonitory signs which we see come to pass. For it may be that the choice of a sacrificial victim is guided by an intelligent force, which is diffused throughout the universe; or, it may be that at the moment when the sacrifice is offered, a change in the vitals occurs and something is added or taken away; for many things are added to, changed, or diminished in an instant of time.
1.125 Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.'' None |
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19. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.4, 1.10, 1.18-1.20, 1.30-1.33, 1.35, 1.40, 1.50-1.51, 1.54-1.55, 1.121, 1.123, 2.3-2.4, 2.6-2.7, 2.13-2.22, 2.37, 2.45-2.49, 2.51, 2.56-2.59, 2.64, 2.66, 2.70, 2.73, 2.75-2.76, 2.78, 2.81-2.83, 2.85-2.88, 2.90, 2.93-2.118, 2.120-2.167, 3.42-3.47, 3.51-3.61, 3.65, 3.86, 3.88-3.90, 3.92-3.93 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Epictetus, on divine providence and human vocation • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on providence (πρόνοια) • Philo of Alexandria, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • Providence / πρόνοια • Providence, • Providence, Stoic concept of • Stoics, and providence • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • divine providence, and human vocation in Epictetus • imperial ideology, the emperor as a provider of hope • providence • providence (divine), absence of it in the DRN • providence (divine), in Plato and the Stoics • providence,
Found in books: Albrecht (2014), The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity, 317; Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 125, 141; Bowen and Rochberg (2020), Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in its contexts, 613; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 66, 74, 75, 285; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 176, 205, 207, 210, 211, 213, 217; Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 70, 92; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 147; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 1, 12, 13, 24, 64, 86, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 221; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 96; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 15, 16, 17, 18; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018), Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art, 263; Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 118, 119, 270, 271; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 36, 67, 80, 125, 126, 138; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 176; O'Brien (2015), The Demiurge in Ancient Thought, 10
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1.4 and in all probability the disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all the virtues. There are however other philosophers, and those of eminence and note, who believe that the whole world is ruled and governed by divine intelligence and reason; and not this only, but also that the gods' providence watches over the life of men; for they think that the cornº and other fruits of the earth, and also the weather and the seasons and the changes of the atmosphere by which all the products of the soil are ripened and matured, are the gift of the immortal gods to the human race; and they adduce a number of things, which will be recounted in the books that compose the present treatise, that are of such a nature as almost to appear to have been expressly constructed by the immortal gods for the use of man. This view was controverted at great length by Carneades, in such a manner as to arouse in persons of active mind a keen desire to discover the truth. " "
1.10 Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so, he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. " 1.18 Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato\'s Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render \'Providence\') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19 What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; ' "1.20 but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? " 1.30 The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31 Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32 Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33 And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss?
1.35 Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form.
1.40 He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity.
1.50 Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite. "You Stoics are also fond of asking us, Balbus, what is the mode of life of the gods and how they pass their days. 1.51 The answer is, their life is the happiest conceivable, and the one most bountifully furnished with all good things. God is entirely inactive and free from all ties of occupation; he toils not neither does he labour, but he takes delight in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows with absolute certainty that he will always enjoy pleasures at once consummate and everlasting.
1.54 whose intervention you assuredly would not require if you would but contemplate the measureless and boundless extent of space that stretches in every direction, into which when the mind projects and propels itself, it journeys onward far and wide without ever sighting any margin or ultimate point where it can stop. Well then, in this immensity of length and breadth and height there flits an infinite quantity of atoms innumerable, which though separated by void yet cohere together, and taking hold each of another form unions wherefrom are created those shapes and forms of things which you think cannot be created without the aid of bellows and anvils, and so have saddled us with an eternal master, whom day and night we are to fear; for who would not fear a prying busybody of a god, who foresees and thinks of and notices all things, and deems that everything is his concern? 1.55 An outcome of this theology was first of all your doctrine of Necessity or Fate, heimarmenē, as you termed it, the theory that every event is the result of an eternal truth and an unbroken sequence of causation. But what value can be assigned to a philosophy which thinks that everything happens by fate? it is a belief for old women, and ignorant old women at that. And next follows your doctrine of mantikē, or Divination, which would so steep us in superstition, if we consented to listen to you, that we should be the devotees of soothsayers, augurs, oracle-mongers, seers and interpreters of dreams.
1.121 for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells.
1.123 Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man\'s affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man\'s limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them.
2.3 Even if I had any clear view, I should still prefer to hear you speak in your turn, now that I have said so much myself." "Well," replied Balbus, "I will yield to your wish; and I shall be as brief as I can, for indeed when the errors of Epicurus have been refuted, my argument is robbed of all occasion for prolixity. To take a general view, the topic of the immortal gods which you raise is divided by our school into four parts: first they prove that the gods exist; next they explain their nature; then they show that the world is governed by them; and lastly that they care for the fortunes of mankind. In our present discourse however let us take the first two of these heads; the third and fourth, being questions of greater magnitude, had better I think be put off to another time." "No, no," cried Cotta, "we are at leisure now, and moreover the subjects which we are discussing might fitly claim precedence even of matters of business." 2.4 "The first point," resumed Lucilius, "seems not even to require arguing. For when we gaze upward to the sky and contemplate the heavenly bodies, what can be so obvious and so manifest as that there must exist some power possessing transcendent intelligence by whom these things are ruled? Were it not so, how comes it that the words of Ennius carry conviction to all readers — Behold this dazzling vault of heaven, which all mankind as Jove invoke, ay, and not only as Jove but as sovereign of the world, ruling all things with his nod, and as Ennius likewise says — father of gods and men, a deity omnipresent and omnipotent? If a man doubts this, I really cannot see why he should not also be capable of doubting the existence of the sun;
2.6 Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. 2.7 "Again, prophecies and premonitions of future events cannot but be taken as proofs that the future may appear or be foretold as a warning or portended or predicted to mankind — hence the very words \'apparition,\' \'warning,\' \'portent,\' \'prodigy.\' Even if we think that the stories of Mopsus, Tiresias, Amphiaraus, Calchas and Helenus are mere baseless fictions of romance (though their powers of divination would not even have been incorporated in the legends had they been entirely repugt to fact), shall not even the instances from our own native history teach us to acknowledge the divine power? shall we be unmoved by the story of the recklessness of Publius Claudius in the first Punic War? Claudius merely in jest mocked at the gods: when the chickens on being released from their cage refused to feed, he ordered them to be thrown into the water, so that as they would not eat they might drink; but the joke cost the jester himself many tears and the Roman people a great disaster, for the fleet was severely defeated. Moreover did not his colleague Junius during the same war lose his fleet in a storm after failing to comply with the auspices? In consequence of these disasters Claudius was tried and condemned for high treason and Junius committed suicide. ' "
2.13 As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; " "2.14 third, the awe inspired by lightning, storms, rain, snow, hail, floods, pestilences, earthquakes and occasionally subterranean rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops the colour of blood, also landslips and chasms suddenly opening in the ground, also unnatural monstrosities human and animal, and also the appearance of meteoric lights and what are called by the Greeks 'comets,' and in our language 'long-haired stars,' such as recently during the Octavian War appeared as harbingers of dire disasters, and the doubling of the sun, which my father told me had happened in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, the year in which the light was quenched of Publius Africanus, that second sun of Rome: all of which alarming portents have suggested to mankind the idea of the existence of some celestial and divine power. " '2.15 And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind. 2.16 "Extremely acute of intellect as is Chrysippus, nevertheless his utterance here might well appear to have been learnt from the very lips of Nature, and not discovered by himself. \'If (he says) there be something in the world that man\'s mind and human reason, strength and power are incapable of producing, that which produces it must necessarily be superior to man; now the heavenly bodies and all those things that display a never-ending regularity cannot be created by man; therefore that which creates them is superior to man; yet what better name is there for this than "god"? Indeed, if gods do not exist, what can there be in the universe superior to man? for he alone possesses reason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; but for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world superior to himself would be an insane piece of arrogance; therefore there is something superior to man; therefore God does exist.\ '2.17 Again, if you see a spacious and beautiful house, you could not be induced to believe, even though you could not see its master, that it was built by mice and weasels; if then you were to imagine that this elaborate universe, with all the variety and beauty of the heavenly bodies and the vast quantity and extent of sea and land, were your abode and not that of the gods, would you not be thought absolutely insane? Again, do we not understand that everything in a higher position is of greater value, and that the lowest thing, and is enveloped by a layer of the densest kind of air? Hence for the same reason what we observe to be the case with certain districts and cities, I mean that their inhabitants are duller-witted than the average owing to the more compressed quality of the atmosphere, has also befallen the human race as a whole owing to its being located on the earth, that is, in the densest region of the world. ' "2.18 Yet even man's intelligence must lead us to infer the existence of a mind in the universe, and that a mind of surpassing ability, and in fact divine. Otherwise, whence did man 'pick up' (as Socrates says in Xenophon) the intelligence that he possesses? If anyone asks the question, whence do we get the moisture and the heat diffused throughout the body, and the actual earthy substance of the flesh, and lastly the breath of life within us, it is manifest that we have derived the one from earth, the other from water, and the other from the air which we inhale in breathing. But where did we find, whence did we abstract, that other part of us which surpasses all of these, I mean our reason, or, if you like to employ several terms to denote it, our intelligence, deliberation, thought, wisdom? Is the world to contain each of the other elements but not this one, the most precious of them all? Yet beyond question nothing exists among all things that is superior to the world, nothing that is more excellent or more beautiful; and not merely does nothing superior to it exist, but nothing superior can even be conceived. And if there be nothing superior to reason and wisdom, these faculties must necessarily be possessed by that being which we admit to be superior to all others. " '2.19 Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit. 2.20 "When one expounds these doctrines in a fuller and more flowing style, as I propose to do, it is easier for them to evade the captious objections of the Academy; but when they are reduced to brief syllogistic form, as was the practice of Zeno, they lie more open to criticism. A running river can almost or quite entirely escape pollution, whereas an enclosed pool is easily sullied; similarly a flowing stream of eloquence sweeps aside the censures of the critic, but a closely reasoned argument defends itself with difficult. The thoughts that we expound at length Zeno used to compress into this form: ' "2.21 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: " "2.22 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? "
2.37 "In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly puts it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the cornº and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he is \'a small fragment of that which is perfect.\ 2.45 "It remains for us to consider the qualities of the divine nature; and on this subject nothing is more difficult than to divert the eye of the mind from following the practice of bodily sight. This difficulty has caused both uneducated people generally and those philosophers who resemble the uneducated to be unable to conceive of the immortal gods without setting before themselves the form of men: a shallow mode of thought which Cotta has exposed and which therefore calls for no discussion from me. But assuming that we have a definite and preconceived idea of a deity as, first, a living being, and secondly, a being unsurpassed in excellence by anything else in the whole of nature, I can see nothing that satisfies this preconception or idea of ours more fully than, first, the judgement that this world, which must necessarily be the most excellent of all things, is itself a living being and a god. 2.46 Let Epicurus jest at this notion as he will — and he is a person who jokes with difficulty, and has but the slightest smack of his native Attic wit, — let him protest his inability to conceive of god as a round and rotating body. Nevertheless he will never dislodge me from one belief which even he himself accepts: he holds that gods exist, on the ground that there must necessarily be some mode of being of outstanding and supreme excellence; now clearly nothing can be more excellent than the world. Nor can it be doubted that a living being endowed with sensation, reason and intelligence must excel a being devoid of those attributes; 2.47 hence it follows that the world is a living being and possesses sensation, intelligence and reason; and this argument leads to the conclusion that the world is god. "But these points will appear more readily a little later merely from a consideration of the creatures that the world produces. In the meantime, pray, Velleius, do not parade your school\'s utter ignorance of science. You say that you think a cone, a cylinder and a pyramid more beautiful than a sphere. Why, even in matters of taste you Epicureans have a criterion of your own! However, assuming that the figures which you mention are more beautiful to the eye — though for my part I don\'t think them so, for what can be more beautiful than the figure that encircles and encloses in itself all other figures, and that can possess no roughness or point of collision on its defence, no indentation of the concavity, no protuberance or depression? There are two forms that excel all others, among solid bodies the globe (for so we may translate the Greek sphaera), and among plane figures the round or circle, the Greek kyklos; well then, these two forms alone possess the property of absolute uniformity in all their parts and of having every point on the circumference equidistant from the centre; and nothing can be more compact than that. 2.48 Still, if you Epicureans cannot see this, as you have never meddled with that learned dust, could you not have grasped even so much of natural philosophy as to understand that the uniform motion and regular disposition of the heavenly bodies could not have been maintained with any other shape? Hence nothing could be more unscientific than your favourite assertion, that it is not certain that our world itself is round, since it may possibly have some other form, and there are countless numbers of worlds, all of different shapes. 2.49 Had but Epicurus learnt that twice two are four he certainly would not talk like that; but while making his palate the test of the chief good, he forgets to lift up his eyes to what Ennius calls \'the palate of the sky.\' "For there are two kinds of heavenly bodies, some that travel from east to west in unchanging paths, without ever making the slightest deviation in their course, while the others perform two unbroken revolutions in the same paths and courses. Now both of these facts indicate at once the rotatory motion of the firmament, which is only possible with a spherical shape, and the circular revolutions of the heavenly bodies. "Take first of all the sun, which is the chief of the celestial bodies. Its motion is such that it first fills the countries of the earth with a flood of light, and then leaves them in darkness now on one side and now on the other; for night is caused merely by the shadow of the earth, which intercepts the light of the sun. Its daily and nightly paths have the same regularity. Also the sun by at one time slightly approaching and at another time slightly receding causes a moderate variation of temperature. For the passage of about ¼ diurnal revolutions of the sun completes the circuit of a year; and by bending its course now towards the north and now towards the south the sun causes summers and winters and the two seasons of which one follows the waning of winter and the other that of summer. Thus from the changes of the four seasons are derived the origins and causes of all those creatures which come into existence on land and in the sea.
2.51 "Most marvellous are the motions of the five stars, falsely called planets or wandering stars — for a thing cannot be said to wander if it preserves for all eternity fixed and regular motions, forward, backward and in other directions. And this regularity is all the more marvellous in the case of the stars we speak of, because at one time they are hidden and at another they are uncovered again; now they approach, now retire; now precede, now follow; now move faster, now slower, now do not move at all but remain for a time stationary. On the diverse moons of the planets the mathematicians have based what they call the Great Year, which is completed when the sun, moon and five planets having all finished their courses have returned to the same positions relative to one another.
2.56 "In the heavens therefore there is nothing of chance or hazard, no error, no frustration, but absolute order, accuracy, calculation and regularity. whatever lacks these qualities, whatever is false and spurious and full of error, belongs to the region between the earth and the moon (the last of the heavenly bodies), and to the surface of the earth. Anyone therefore who thinks that the marvellous order and incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, which is the sole source of preservation and safety for all things, is not rational, himself cannot be deemed a rational thing. 2.57 "I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: \'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.\' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that \'craftsmanlike\' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is \'craftsmanlike,\' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, ' "2.58 the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. " '2.59 "We have discussed the world as a whole, and we have also discussed the heavenly bodies; so that there now stands fairly well revealed to our view a vast company of gods who are neither idle nor yet perform their activities with irksome and laborious toil. For they have no framework of veins and sinews and bones; nor do they consume such kinds of food and drink as to make them contract too sharp or too sluggish a condition of the humours; nor are their bodies such as to make them fear falls or blows or apprehend disease from exhaustion of their members — dangers which led Epicurus to invent his unsubstantial, do‑nothing gods. ' "
2.64 now these immoral fables enshrined a decidedly clever scientific theory. Their meaning was that the highest element of celestial ether or fire, which by itself generates all things, is devoid of that bodily part which requires union with another for the work of procreation. By Saturn again they denoted that being who maintains the course and revolution of seasons and periods of time, et deity actually so designated in Greek, for Saturn's Greek name is Kronos, which is the same as chronos, a space of time. The Latin designation 'Saturn' on the other hand is due to the fact that he is 'saturated' or 'satiated with years' (anni); the fable is that he was in the habit of devouring his sons — meaning that Time devours the ages and gorges himself insatiably with the years that are past. Saturn was bound by Jove in order that Time's courses might not be unlimited, and that Jove might fetter him by the bonds of the stars. But Jupiter himself — the name means 'the helping father,' whom with a change of inflexion we style Jove, from iuvare 'to help'; the poets call him 'father of gods and men,' and our ancestors entitled him 'best and greatest,' putting the title 'best,' that is most beneficent, before that of 'greatest,' because universal beneficence is greater, or at least more lovable, than the possession of great wealth — "
2.66 "The air, lying between the sea and sky, is according to the Stoic theory deified under the name belonging to Juno, sister and wife of Jove, because it resembles and is closely connected with the aether; they made it female and assigned it to Juno because of its extreme softness. (The name of Juno however I believe to be derived from iuvare \'to help\'). There remained water and earth, to complete the fabled partition of the three kingdoms. Accordingly the second kingdom, the entire realm of the sea, was assigned to Neptune, Jove\'s brother as they hold; his name is derived from nare \'to swim,\' with a slight alteration of the earlier letters and with the suffix seen in Portunus (the harbour god), derived from portus \'a harbour.\' The entire bulk and substance of the earth was dedicated to father Dis (that is, Dives, \'the rich,\' and so in Greek Plouton), because all things fall back into the earth and also arise from the earth. He is said to have married Proserpina (really a Greek name, for she is the same as the goddess called Persephone in Greek) — they think that she represents the seed of corn, and fable that she was hidden away, and sought for by her mother.
2.70 "Do you see therefore how from a true and valuable philosophy of nature has been evolved this imaginary and fanciful pantheon? The perversion has been a fruitful source of false beliefs, crazy errors and superstitions hardly above the level of old wives\' tales. We know what the gods look like and how old they are, their dress and their equipment, and also their genealogies, marriages and relationships, and all about them is distorted into the likeness of human frailty. They are actually represented as liable to passions and emotions — we hear of their being in love, sorrowful, angry; according to the myths they even engage in wars and battles, and that not only when as in Homer two armies and contending and the gods take sides and intervene on their behalf, but they actually fought wars of their own, for instance with the Titans and with the Giants. These stories and these beliefs are utterly foolish; they are stuffed with nonsense and absurdity of all sorts.
2.73 "Next I have to show that the world is governed by divine providence. This is of course a vast topic; the doctrine is hotly contested by your school, Cotta, and it is they no doubt that are my chief adversaries here. As for you and your friends, Velleius, you scarcely understand the vocabulary of the subject; for you only read your own writings, and are so enamoured of them that you pass judgement against all the other schools without giving them a hearing. For instance, you yourself told us yesterday that the Stoics present Pronoia or providence in the guise of an old hag of a fortune-teller; this was due to your mistaken notion that they imagine providence as a kind of special deity who rules and governs the universe. But as a matter of fact \'providence\' is an elliptical expression;
2.75 I therefore declare that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and have been governed for all time by converse providence: a thesis which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we feel at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial. 2.76 "In the first place therefore one must either deny the existence of the gods, which in a manner is done by Democritus when he represents them as \'apparitions\' and by Epicurus with his \'images\'; or anybody who admits that the gods exist must allow them activity, and activity of the most distinguished sort; now nothing can be more distinguished than the government of the world; therefore the world is governed by the wisdom of the gods. If this is not so, there must clearly be something better and more powerful than god, be it what it may, whether iimate nature or necessity speeding on with mighty force to create the supremely beautiful objects that we see; ' "
2.78 And yet from the fact of the gods' existence (assuming that they exist, as they certainly do) it necessarily follows that they are animate beings, and not only animate but possessed of reason and united together in a sort of social community or fellowship, ruling the one world as a united commonwealth or state. " 2.81 "Next I have to show that all things are under the sway of nature and are carried on by her in the most excellent manner. But first I must briefly explain the meaning of the term \'nature\' itself, to make our doctrine more easily intelligible. Some persons define nature as a non‑rational force that causes necessary motions in material bodies; others as a rational and ordered force, proceeding by method and plainly displaying the means that she takes to produce each result and the end at which she aims, and possessed of a skill that no handiwork of artist or craftsman can rival or reproduce. For a seed, they point out, has such potency that, tiny though it is in size, nevertheless if it falls into some substance that conceives and enfolds it, and obtains suitable material to foster its nurture and growth, it fashions and produces the various creatures after their kinds, some designed merely to absorb nourishment through their roots, and others capable of motion, sensation, appetition and reproduction of their species. ' "2.82 Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence — for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void, and the attributes of these. When we on the other hand speak of nature as the sustaining and governing principle of the world, we do not mean that the world is like a clod of earth or lump of stone or something else of that sort, which possesses only the natural principle of cohesion, but like a tree or an animal, displaying no haphazard structure, to be order and a certain semblance of design. " '2.83 "But if the plants fixed and rooted in the rather owe their life and vigour to nature\'s art, surely the earth herself must be sustained by the same power, inasmuch as when impregnated with seeds she brings forth from her womb all things in profusion, nourishes their roots in her bosom and causes them to grow, and herself in turn is nourished by the upper and outer elements. Her exhalations moreover give nourishment to the air, the ether and all the heavenly bodies. Thus if earth is upheld and invigorated by nature, the same principle must hold good of the rest of the world, for plants are rooted in the earth, animals are sustained by breathing air, and the air itself is our partner in seeing, hearing and uttering sounds, since none of these actions can be performed without its aid; nay, it even moves as we move, for wherever we go or move our limbs, it seems as it were to give place and retire before us.
2.85 And this world-structure must either be everlasting in this same form in which we see it or at all events extremely durable, and destined to endure for an almost immeasurably protracted period of time. Whichever alternative be true, the inference follows that the world is governed by nature. For consider the navigation of a fleet, the marshalling of an army, or (to return to instances from the processes of nature) the budding of a vien or of a tree, or even the shape and structure of the limbs of an animal — when do these ever evidence such a degree of skill in nature as the world itself? Either therefore there is nothing that is ruled by a sentient nature, or we must admit that the world is so ruled. ' "2.86 Indeed, how is it possible that the universe, which contains within itself all the other natures and their seeds, should not itself be governed by nature? Thus if anyone declared that a man's teeth and the hair on his body are a natural growth but that the man himself to whom they belong is not a natural organism, he would fail to see that things which produce something from within them must have more perfect natures than the things which are produced from them. But the sower and planter and begetter, so to speak, of all the things that nature governs, their trainer and nourisher, is the world; the world gives nutriment and sustece to all its limbs as it were, or parts. But if the parts of the world are governed by nature, the world itself must needs be governed by nature. Now the government of the world contains nothing that could possibly be censured; given the existing elements, the best that could be produced from them has been produced. " '2.87 Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things. "But if the structure of the world in all its parts is such that it could not have been better whether in point of utility or beauty, let us consider js is the result of chance, or whether on the contrary the parts of the world are in such a condition that they could not possibly have cohered together if they were not controlled by intelligence and by divine providence. If then that produces of nature are better than those of art, and if art produces nothing without reason, nature too cannot be deemed to be without reason. When you see a statue or a painting, you recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun‑dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason? 2.88 Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit.
2.90 Well then, even as the shepherd at the first sight thinks he sees some lifeless and iimate object, but afterwards is led by clearer indications to begin to suspect the true nature of the thing about which he had previously been uncertain, so it would have been the proper course for the philosophers, if it so happened that the first sight of the world perplexed them, afterwards when they had seen its definite and regular motions, and all its phenomena controlled by fixed system and unchanging uniformity, to infer the presence not merely of an inhabitant of this celestial and divine abode, but also of a ruler and governor, the architect as it were of this mighty and monumental structure. "But as it is they appear to me to have no suspicion even of the marvels of the celestial and terrestrial creation.
2.93 "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! ' "2.94 Yet according to the assertion of your friends, that out of particles of matter not endowed with heat, nor with any 'quality' (the Greek term poiotes), nor with sense, but colliding together at haphazard and by chance, the world has emerged complete, or rather a countless number of worlds are some of them being born and some perishing at every moment of time — yet if the clash of atoms can create a world, why can it not produce a colonnade, a temple, a house, a city, which are less and indeed much less difficult things to make? The fact is, they indulge in such random babbling about the world that for my part I cannot think that they have ever looked up at this marvellously beautiful sky — which is my next topic. " "2.95 So Aristotle says brilliantly: 'If there were beings who had always lived beneath the earth, in comfortable, well‑lit dwellings, decorated with statues and pictures and furnished with all the luxuries enjoyed by persons thought to be supremely happy, and who though they had never come forth above the ground had learnt by report and by hearsay of the existence of certain deities or divine powers; and then if at some time the jaws of the earth were opened and they were able to escape from their hidden abode and to come forth into the regions which we inhabit; when they suddenly had sight of the earth and the seas and the sky, and came to know of the vast clouds and mighty winds, and beheld the sun, and realized not only its size and beauty but also its Ptolemaic in causing the day by shedding light over all the sky, and, after night had darkened the earth, they then saw the whole sky spangled and adorned with stars, and the changing phases of the moon's light, now waxing and now waning, and the risings and settings of all these heavenly bodies and their courses fixed and changeless throughout all eternity, — when they saw these things, surely they would think that the gods exist and that these mighty marvels are their handiwork.' " '2.96 Thus far Aristotle; let us for our part imagine a darkness as dense as that which is said to have once covered the neighbouring districts on the occasion of an eruption of the volcano Etna, so that for two days no man could recognize his fellow, and when on the third day the sun shone upon them, they felt as if they had come to life again: well, suppose that after darkness had prevailed from the beginning of time, it similarly happened to ourselves suddenly to behold the light of day, what should we think of the splendour of the heavens? But daily recurrence and habit familiarize our indicates with the sight, and we feel no surprise or curiosity as to the reasons for things that we see always; just as if it were the novelty and not rather the importance of phenomena that ought to arouse us to inquire into their causes. 2.97 Who would not deny the name of human being to a man who, on seeing the regular motions of the heaven and the fixed order of the stars and the accurate interconnexion and interrelation of all things, can deny that these things possess any rational design, and can maintain that phenomena, the wisdom of whose ordering transcends the capacity of our wisdom to understand it, take place by chance? When we see something moved by machinery, like an orrery or clock or many other such things, we do not doubt that these contrivances are the work of reason; when therefore we behold the whole compass of the heaven moving with revolutions of marvellous velocity and executing with perfect regularity the annual changes of the seasons with absolute safety and security for all things, how can we doubt that all this is effected not merely by reason, but by a reason that is transcendent and divine? 2.98 "For we may now put aside elaborate argument and gaze as it were with our eyes upon the beauty of the creations of divine providence, as we declare them to be. And first let us behold the whole earth, situated in the centre of the world, a solid spherical mass gathered into a globe by the natural gravitation of all its parts, clothed with flowers and grass and trees and corn,º forms of vegetation all of them incredibly numerous and inexhaustibly varied and diverse. Add to these cool fountains ever flowing, transparent streams and rivers, their banks clad in brightest verdure, deep vaulted caverns, craggy rocks, sheer mountain heights and plains of immeasurable extent; add also the hidden veins of gold and silver, and marble in unlimited quantity. 2.99 Think of all the various species of animals, both tame and wild! think of the flights and songs of birds! of the pastures filled with cattle, and the teeming life of the woodlands! Then why need I speak of the race of men? who are as it were the appointed tillers of the soil, and who suffer it not to become a savage haunt of monstrous beasts of prey nor a barren waste of thickets and brambles, and whose industry diversifies and adorns the lands and islands and coasts with houses and cities. Could we but behold these things with our eyes as we can picture them in our minds, no one taking in the whole earth at one view could doubt the divine reason. 2.100 Then how great is the beauty of the sea! how glorious the aspect of its vast expanse! him many and how diverse its islands! how lovely the scenery of its coasts and shores! how numerous and how different the species of marine animals, some dwelling in the depths, some floating and swimming on the surface, some clinging in their own shells to the rocks! And the sea itself, yearning for the earth, sports against her shores in such a fashion that the two elements appear to be fused into one. 2.101 Next the air bordering on the sea undergoes the alternates of day and night, and now rises upward melt down rarefied, now is condensed and compressed into clouds and gathering mixture enriches the earth with rain, now flows forth in currents thenceforth and produces winds. Likewise it causes the yearly variations of cold and heat, and it also both supports the flight of birds and inhaled by breathing nourishes and sustains the animal race. There remains the element that is most distant and highest removed from our abodes, the all‑engirdling, all‑confining circuit of the sky, also named the aether, the farthest coast and frontier of the world, wherein those fiery shapes most marvellously trace out their ordered courses. 2.102 of these the sun, which many times surpasses the earth in magnitude, revolves about her, and by his rising and setting causes day and night, and now approaching, then again retiring, twice each year makes returns in opposite directions from his farthest point, and in the period of those returns at one time causes the face of the earth as it were to contract with a gloomy frown, and at another restores her to gladness til she seems to smile in sympathy with the sky. 2.103 Again the moon, which is, as the mathematicians prove, more than half the size of the earth, roams in the same courses as the sun, but at one time converging with the sun and at another diverging from it, both bestows upon the light that it has borrowed from the sun and itself undergoes divers changes of its light, and also at one time is in conjunction and hides the sun, darken ut light of its rays, at another itself comes into the shadow of the earth, being opposite to the sun, and owing to the interpose and interference of the earth is suddenly extinguished. And the so‑called wandering stars (planets) travel in the same courses round the earth, and rise and set in the same way, with motions now accelerated, now retarded, and sometimes even ceasing altogether. 2.104 Nothing can be more marvellous or more beautiful than this spectacle. Next comes the vast multitude of the fixed stars, grouped in constellations so clearly defined that they have received names derived from their resemblance to familiar objects." Here he looked at me and said, "I will make use of the poems of Aratus, as translated by yourself when quite a young man, which because of their Latin dress give me such pleasure that I retain many of them in memory. Well then, as we continually see with our own eyes, without any change or variation Swiftly the other heavenly bodies glide, All day and night travelling with the sky, ' "2.105 and no one who loves to contemplate the uniformity of nature can ever be tired of gazing at them. The furthest tip of either axle‑end Is called the pole. Round the poel circle the two Bears, which never set; One of these twain the Greeks call Cynosure, The other Helicē is named; and the latter's extremely bright stars, visible to us all night long, Our countrymen the Seven Triones call; " '2.106 and the little Cynosure consists of an equal number of stars similarly grouped, and revolves round the same pole: Phoenician sailors place in this their trust To guide their course by night; albeit the other Shines out before and with more radiant stars At earliest night-fall far and wide is seen, Yet small though this one is, the mariner On this relies, since it revolves upon An inner circle and a shorter path. Also the further to enhance the beauty of those constellations, Between them, like a river flowing swift, The fierce-eyed Serpent winds; in sinuous coils Over and under twines his snaky frame. ' "2.107 His whole appearance is very remarkable, but the most striking part of him is the shape of his head and the brilliance of his eyes: No single hindering star his head adorns, His brows are by a double radiance marked, And from his cruel eyes two lights flash out, The while his chin gleams with one flashing star; His graceful neck is bent, his head reclined, As if at gaze upon the Great Bear's tail. " '2.108 And while the rest of the Serpent\'s body is visible all night long, This head a moment sinks beneath the sea, Where meet its setting and its rise in one. Next to its head however The weary figure of a man in sorrow Revolts, which the Greeks Engónasin call, as travelling "on his knees." Here is the Crown, of radiance supreme. This is in the rear of the Serpent, while at its head is the Serpent-holder, 2.109 By Greeks called Ophiúchus, famous name! Firm between both his hands he "holds the Snake," Himself in bondage by its body held, For serpent round the waist engirdles men, Yet treads he firm and presses all his weight, Trampling upon the Scorpion\'s eyes and breast. After the Septentriones comes The Bear-ward, commonly Boötes called, Because he drives the Bear yoked to a pole. ' "2.110 And then the following lines: for with this Boötes beneath his bosom fixed appears A glittering star, Arcturus, famous name, and below his feet moves The Virgin bright, holding her ear of corn Resplendent. And the constellations are so accurately spaced out that their vast and ordered array clearly displays the skill of a divine creator: By the Bear's head you will descry the Twins, Beneath its belly the Crab, and in its claws The Lion's bulk emits a twinkling ray. The Charioteer Hidden beneath the Twins' left flank will glide; Him Helicē confronts with aspect fierce; At his left shoulder the bright She‑goat stands. And then the following: A constellation vast and brilliant she, Whereas the Kids emit a scanty light Upon mankind. Beneath her feet Crouches the hornéd Bull, a mighty frame. " "2.111 His head is bespangled with a multitude of stars: The Greeks were wont to call them Hyades, from their bringing rain, the Greek for which is hyein, while our nation stupidly names them the Sucking-pigs, as though the name Hyades were derived from the word for 'pig' and not from 'rain.' Behind the Lesser Septentrio follows Cepheus, with open hands outstretched; For close behind the Bear, the Cynosure, He wheels. Before him comes Cassiepia with her darkling stars, And next to her roams a bright shape, the sad Andromeda, shunning her mother's sight. The belly of the Horse touches her head, Proudly he tosses high his glittering mane; One common star holds their twin shapes conjoint And constellations linked indissolubly. Close by them stands the Ram with wreathéd horns: and next to him The Fishes gliding, one some space in front And nearer to the North Wind's shuddering breath. " "2.112 At the feet of Andromeda Perseus is outlined, Assailed by all the zenith's northern blasts; and by him at his left knee placed on every side The tiny Pleiads dim you will descry. And, slightly sloping, next the Lyre is seen, Next the winged Bird 'neath heaven's wide canopy. Close to the Horse's head is the right hand Aquarius, and then his whole figure. Next in the mighty zone comes capricorn, Half-brute, half‑man; his mighty bosom breathes An icy chill; and when the Titans sun Arrayeth him with never-ceasing light, He turns his car to climb the wintry sky. " '2.113 Here we behold How there appears the Scorpion rising high, His mighty tail trailing the bended Bow; Near which on soaring pinions wheels the Bird And near to this the burning Eagle flies. Then the Dolphin, And then Orion slopes his stooping frame. ' "2.114 Following him The glowing Dog‑star radiantly shines. After this follows the Hare, What never resteth weary from her race; At the Dog's tail meandering Argo glides. Her the Ram covers, and the scaly Fishes, And her bright breast touches the River's banks. Its long winding current you will observe, And in the zenith you will see the Chains That bind the Fishes, hanging at their tails. . . . Then you'll descry, near the bright Scorpion's sting, The Altar, fanned by Auster's gentle breath. And by it the Centaur Proceeds, in haste to join the Horse's parts Unto the Claws; extending his right hand, That grasps the mighty beast, he marches on And grimly strides towards the Altar bright. Here Hydra rises from the nether realms, her body widely outstretched; And in her midmost coil the Wine-bowl gleams, While pressing at her tail the feathered Crow Pecks with his beak; and here, hard by the Twins, The Hound's Forerunner, in Greek named Prokyon. " '2.115 Can any sane person believe that all this array of stars and this vast celestial adornment could have been created out of atoms rushing thenceforth fortuitously and at random? or could any other being devoid of intelligence and reason have created them? Not merely did their creation postulate intelligence, but it is impossible to understand their nature without intelligence of a high order. "but not only are these things marvellous, but nothing is more remarkable than the stability and coherence of the world, which is such that it is impossible even to imagine anything better adapted to endure. For all its parts in every direction gravitate with a uniform pressure towards the centre. Moreover busy conjoined maintain their union most permanently when they have some bond encompassing them to bind them together; and this function is fulfilled by that rational and intelligent substance which pervades the whole world as the efficient cause of all things and which draws and collects the outermost particles towards the centre. ' "2.116 Hence if the world is round and therefore all its parts are held together by and with each other in universal equilibrium, the same must be the case with the earth, so that all its parts must converge towards the centre (which in a sphere is the lowest point) without anything to break the continuity and so threaten its Bast complex of gravitational forces and masses with dissolution. And on the same principle the sea, although above the earth, nevertheless seeks the earth's centre and so is massed into a sphere uniform on all sides, and never floods its bounds and overflows. " "2.117 Its neighbour the air travels upward it is true in virtue of its lightness, but at the same time spreads horizontally in all directions; and thus while contiguous and conjoined with the sea it has a natural tendency to rise to the sky, and by receiving an admixture of the sky's tenuity and heat furnishes to living creatures the breath of life and health. The air is enfolded by the highest part of the sky, termed the ethereal part; this both retains its own tenuous warmth uncongealed by any admixture and unites with the outer surface of the air. In the aether the stars revolve in their courses; these maintain their spherical form by their own install gravitation, and also sustain their motions by virtue of their very shape and conformation; for they are round, and this is the shape, as I believe I remarked before, that is least capable of receiving injury. " '2.118 But the stars are of a fiery substance, and for this reason they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters, which are raised up by the sun out of the fields which it warms and out of the waters; and when nourished and renewed by these vapours the stars and the whole aether shed them back again, and then once more draw them up from the same source, with the loss of none of their matter, or only of an extremely small part which is consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the aether. As a consequence of this, so our school believe, though it used to be said that Panaetius questioned the doctrine, there will ultimately occur a conflagration of the whole while, because when the moisture has been used up neither can the earth be nourished nor will the air continue to flow, being unable to rise upward after it has drunk up all the water; thus nothing will remain but fire, by which, as a living being and a god, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before.
2.120 "To come now from things celestial to things terrestrial, which is there among these latter which does not clearly display the rational design of an intelligent being? In the first place, with the vegetation that springs from the earth, the stocks both give stability to the parts which they sustain and draw from the ground the sap to nourish the parts upheld by the roots; and the trunks are covered with bark or rind, the better to protect them against cold and heat. Again the vines cling to their props with their tendrils as with hands, and thus raise themselves erect like animals. Nay more, it is said that if planted near cabbages they shun them like pestle and noxious things, and will not touch them at any point. 2.121 Again what a variety tio animals, and what capacity they possess of persisting true to their various kinds! Some of them are protected by hides, others are clothed with fleeces, others bristle with spines; some we see covered with feathers, some with scales, some armed with horns, some equipped with wings to escape their foes. Nature, however, has provided with bounteous plenty for each species of animal that food which is suited to it. I might show in detail what provision has been made in the forms of the animals for appropriating and assimilating this food, how skilful and exact is the disposition of the various parts, how marvellous the structure of the limbs. For all the organs, at least those contained within the body, are so formed and so placed that none of them is superfluous or not necessary for the preservation of life. 2.122 But nature has also bestowed upon the beasts both sensation and desire, the one to arouse in them the impulse to appropriate their natural foods, the other to enable them to distinguish things harmful from things wholesome. Again, some animals approach their food by walking, some by crawling, some by flying, some by swimming; and some seize their nutriment with their gaping mouth and with the teeth themselves, others snatch it in the grasp of their claws, others with their curved beaks, some suck, others graze, some swallow it whole, others chew it. Also some are of such lately stature that they easily reach their food upon the ground with their jaws; 2.123 whereas the taller species, such as geese, swans, cranes and camels, are aided by the length of their necks; the elephant is even provided with a hand, because his body is so large that it was difficult for him to reach his food. Those beasts on the other hand whose mode of sustece was to feed on animals of another species received from nature the gift either of strength or swiftness. Upon certain creatures there was bestowed even a sort of craft or cunning: for instance, one species of the spider tribe weaves a kind of net, in order to dispatch anything that is caught in it; another in order to . . . steadily corps watch, and, snatching anything that falls into it, devours it. The mussel, or pina as it is called in Greek, is a large bivalve which enters into a sort of Penelope with the tiny shrimp to procure food, and so, when little fishes swim into the gaping shell, the shrimp draws the attention of the mussel and the mussel shuts up its shells with a snap; thus two very dissimilar creatures obtain their food in common. ' "2.124 In this case we are curious to know whether their association is due to a sort of mutual compact, or whether it was brought about by nature herself and goes back to the moment of their birth. Our wonder is also considerably excited by those aquatic animals which are born on land — crocodiles, for instance, and water-tortoises and certain snakes, which are born on dry land but as soon as they can first crawl make for the water. Again we often place ducks' eggs beneath hens, and the chicks that spring from the eggs are at first fed and mothered by the hens that hatched and reared them, but later on they leave their foster-mothers, and run away when they put up them, as soon as they have had the opportunity of seeing the water, their natural home. So powerful an instinct of self-preservation has nature implanted in living creatures. I have even read in a book that there is a bird called the spoonbill, which porticus its food by flying after those birds which dive in the sea, and upon their coming to the surface with a fish that they have caught, pressing their heads down with its beak until they drop their prey, which it pounces on for itself. It is also recorded of this bird that it is in the habit of gorging itself with shell-fish, which it digests by means of the heat of its stomach and then brings up again, and so picks out from them the parts that are good to eat. " "2.125 Sea‑frogs again are said to be in the habit of covering themselves with sand and creeping along at the water's edge, and then when fishes approach them thinking they are something to eat, these are killed and devoured by the frogs. The kite and the crow live in a state of natural war as it were with one another, and therefore each destroys the other's eggs wherever it finds them. Another fact (observed by Aristotle, from whom most of these cases are cited) cannot but awaken our supper, namely that cranes when crossing the seas on the way to warmer climates fly in a triangular formation. With the apex of the triangle they force aside the air in front of them, and then gradually on either side by means of their wings acting as oars the birds' on which flight is sustained, with the base of the triangle formed by the cranes gets the assistance of the wind when it is so to speak astern. The birds rest their necks and heads on the backs of those flying in front of them; and the leader, being himself unable to do this as he has no one to lean on, flies to the rear that he himself also may have a rest, while one of those already rested takes his place, and so they keep turns throughout the journey. " '2.126 I could adduce a number of similar instances, but you see the general idea. Another even better known classes of story illustrates the precautions taken by animals for their security, the watch they keep while feeding, their skill in hiding in their lairs. Other remarkable facts are that dogs cure themselves by vomiting and ibises in Egypt by purging — modes of treatment only recently, that is, a few generations ago, discovered by the talent of the medical profession. It has been reported that panthers, which in foreign countries are caught by means of poisoned meat, have a remedy which they employ to save themselves from dying; and that wild goats in Crete, when pierced with poisoned arrows, seek a herb called dittany, and on their swallowing this the arrows, it is said, drop out of their busy. 2.127 Does, shortly before giving birth to their young, thoroughly purge themselves with a herb called hartwort. Again we observe how various species defend themselves against violence and danger with their own weapons, bulls with their horns, boars with their tusks, lions with their bite; some species protect themselves by flight, some by hiding, the cuttle-fish by emitting an inky fluid, the sting‑ray by causing cramp, and also a number of creatures drive away their pursuers by their insufferably disgusting odour. "In order to secure the everlasting duration of the world-order, divine providence has made most careful provision to ensure the perpetuation of the families of animals and of trees and all the vegetable species. The latter all contain within them seed possessing the proprietor of multiplying the species; this seed is enclosed in the innermost part of the fruits that grow from each plant; and the same seeds supply mankind with an abundance of food, besides replenishing the earth with a fresh stock of plants of the same kind. ' "2.128 Why should I speak of the amount of rational design displayed in animals to secure the perpetual preservation of their kind? To begin with some are male and some female, a device of nature to perpetuate the species. Then parts of their busy are most skilfully contrived to serve the purposes of procreation and of conception, and both male and female possess marvellous desires for copulation. And when the seed has settled in its place, it draws almost all the nutriment to itself and hedged within it fashions a living creature; when this has been dropped from the womb and has emerged, in the mammalian species almost all the nourishment received by the mother turns to milk, and the young just born, untaught and by nature's guidance, seek for the teats and satisfy their cravings with their bounty. And to show to us that none of these things merely happens by chance and that all are the work of nature's providence and skill, species that produce large litters of offspring, such as swine and dogs, have bestowed upon them a large number of teats, while those animals which bear only a few young have only a few teats. " '2.129 Why should I describe the affection shown by animals in rearing and protecting the offspring to which they have given birth, up to the point when they are able to defend themselves? although fishes, it is said, abandon their eggs when they have laid them, since these easily float and hatch out in the water. Turtles and crocodiles are said to lay their eggs on land and bury them and then go away, leaving their young to hatch and rear themselves. Hens and other birds find a quiet place in which to lay, and build themselves nests to sit on, covering these with the softest possible bedding in order to preserve the eggs most easily; and when they have hatched out their chicks they protect them by cherishing them with their wings so that they may not be injured by cold, and by shading them against the heat of the sun. When the young birds are able to use their sprouting wings, their mothers escort them in their flights, but are released from any further tendance upon them.
2.130 Moreover the skill and industry of man also contribute to the preservation and security of certain animals and plants. For there are many species of both which could not survive without man\'s care. "Also a plentiful variety of conveniences is found in different regions for the productive cultivation of the soil by man. Egypt is watered by the Nile, which corps the land completely flooded all the summer and afterwards retires leaving the soil soft and covered with mud, in readiness for sowing. Mesopotamia is fertilized by the Euphrates, which as it were imports into it new fields every year. The Indus, the largest river in the world, not only manures and softens the soil but actually sows it with seed, for it is said to bring down with it a great quantity of seeds resembling corn.
2.131 And I could produce a number of other remarkable examples in a variety of places, and instance a variety of lands each prolific in a different kind of produce. But how great is the benevolence of nature, in giving birth to such an abundance and variety of delicious articles of food, and that not at one season only of the year, so that we have continually the delights of both novelty and plenty! How seasonable moreover and how some not for the human race alone but also for the animal and the various vegetable species is her gift of the Etesian winds! their breath moderates the excessive heat of summer, entirely also guide our ships across the sea upon a swift and steady course. Many instances must be passed over and yet many are given.
2.132 For it is impossible to recount the conveniences afforded by rivers, the ebb and flow . . . of the tides of the sea, the mountains clothed with forests, the salt-beds lying far inland from the sea‑coast, the copious stores of health-giving medicines that the earth contains, and all the countless arts necessary for livelihood and for life. Again the alternation of day and night contributes to the preservation of living creatures by affording one time for activity and another for repose. Thus every line of reasoning goes to prove that all things in this world of ours are marvellously governed by divine intelligence and wisdom for the safety and preservation of all.
2.133 "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature.
2.134 There are three things requisite for the maintece of animal life, food, drink and breath; and for the reception of all of these the mouth is most consummately adapted, receiving as it does an abundant supply of breath through the nostrils which communicate with it. The structure of the teeth within the mouth serves to chew the food, and it is divided up and softened by them. The front teeth are sharp, and bite our viands into pieces; the back teeth, called molars, masticate them, the process of mastication apparently being assisted also by the tongue.
2.135 Next to the tongue comes the gullet, which is attached to its roots, and into which in the first place pass that substances that have been received in the mouth. The gullet is adjacent to the tonsils on either side of it, and reaches as far as the back or innermost part of the palate. The action and movements of the tongue drive and thrust the food down into the gullet, which receives it and drives it further down, the parts of the gullet below the food that is being swallowed dilating and the parts above it contracting.
2.136 The windpipe, or trachea as it is termed by physicians, has an orifice attached to the roots of the tongue a little above the point where the tongue is joined to the gullet; it reaches to the lungs, and receives the air inhaled by breathing, and also exhales it and passes it out from the lungs; it is covered by a sort of lid, provided for the purpose of preventing a morsel of food from accidentally falling into it and impeding the breath. Below the gullet lies the stomach, which is constructed as the receptacle of food and drink, whereas breath is inhaled by the lungs and heart. The stomach performs a number of remarkable operations; its structure consists principally of muscular fibres, and it is manifold and twisted; it compresses and contains the dry or moist nutriment that it receives, enabling it to be assimilated and digested; at one moment is astricted and at another relaxed, thus pressing and mixing together all that is passed into it, so that by means of the abundant heat which it possesses, and by its crushing the food, and also by the op of the breath, everything is digested and worked up so as to be easily distributed throughout the rest of the body. The lungs on the contrary are soft and of a loose and spongy consistency, well adapted to absorb the breath; which they inhale and exhale by alternately contracting and expanding, to provide frequent draughts of that aerial nutriment which is the chief support of animal life.
2.137 The alimentary juice secreted from the rest of the food by the stomach flows from the bowels to the liver through certain ducts or channels reaching to the liver, to which they are attached, and connecting up what are called the doorways of the liver with the middle intestine. From the liver different channels pass in different directions, and through these falls the food passed down from the liver. From this food is secreted bile, and the liquids excreted by the kidneys; the residue turns into blood be flows to the aforesaid doorways of the liver, to which all its channels lead. Flowing through these doorways the food at this very point pours into the so‑called vena cava or hollow vein, and through this, being now completely worked up and digested, flows to the heart, and from the heart is distributed all over the body through a rather large number of veins that reach to every part of the frame. ' "
2.138 It would not be difficult to indicate the way in which the residue of the food is excreted by the alternate astriction and relaxation of the bowels; however this topic must be passed over lest my discourse should be somewhat offensive. Rather let me unfold the following instance of the incredible skilfulness of nature's handiwork. The air drawn into the lungs by breathing is warmed in the first instance by the breath itself and then by contact with the lungs; part of it is returned by the act of respiration, and part is received by a certain part of the heart called the cardiac ventricle, adjacent to which is a second similar vessel into which the blood flows from the liver three the vena cava mentioned above; and in this manner from these organs both the blood is diffused through the veins and the breath through the arteries all over the body. Both of these sets of vessels are very numerous and are closely interwoven with the tissues of the entire body; they testify to an extraordinary degree of skilful and divine craftsmanship. " 2.139 Why need I speak about the bones, which are the framework of the body? their marvellous cartilages are nicely adapted to secure stability, and fitted to end off the joints and to allow of movement and bodily activity of every sort. Add thereto the nerves or sinews which hold the joints together and whose ramifications pervade the entire body; like the veins and arteries these lead from the heart as their starting-point and pass to all parts of the body. 2.140 "Many further illustrations could be given of this wise and careful providence of nature, to illustrate the lavishness and splendour of the gifts bestowed by the gods on men. First, she has raised them from the ground to stand tall and upright, so that they might be able to behold the sky and so gain a knowledge of the gods. For men are sprung from the earth not as its inhabitants and denizens, but to be as it were the spectators of things supernal and heavenly, in the contemplation whereof no other species of animal participates. Next, the senses, posted in the citadel of the head as the reporters and messengers of the outer world, both in structure and position are marvellously adapted to their necessary services. The eyes as the watchmen have the highest station, to give them the widest outlook for the performance of their function. 2.141 The ears also, having the duty of perceiving sound, the nature of which is to rise, are rightly placed in the upper part of the body. The nostrils likewise are rightly placed high inasmuch as all smells travel upwards, but also, because they have much to do with discriminating food and drink, they have with good reason been brought into the neighbourhood of the mouth. Taste, which has the function of distinguishing the flavors of our various viands, is situated in that part of the face where nature has made an aperture for the passage of food and drink. The sense of touch is evenly diffused over all the body, to enable us to perceive all sorts of contacts and even the minutest impacts of both cold and heat. And just as architects relegate the drains of houses to the rear, away from the eyes and nose of the masters, since otherwise they would inevitably be somewhat offensive, so nature has banished the corresponding organs of the body far away from the neighbourhood of the senses. 2.142 "Again what artificer but nature, who is unsurpassed in her cunning, could have attained such skilfulness in the construction of the senses? First, she has clothed and walled the eyes with membranes of the finest texture, which she has made on the one hand transparent so that we may be able to see through them, and on the other hand firm of substance, to serve as the outer cover of the eye. The eyes she has made mobile and smoothly turning, so as both to avoid any threatened injury and to direct their gaze easily in any direction they desire. The actually organ of vision, called the pupil or \'little doll,\' is so small as easily to avoid objects that might injure it; and the lids, which are the covers of the eyes, are very soft to the touch so as not to hurt the pupil, and very neatly constructed as to be able both to shut the eyes in order that nothing may impinge upon them and to open them; and nature has provided that this process can be repeated again and again with extreme rapidity. 2.143 The eyelids are furnished with a palisade of hairs, whereby to ward off any impinging object while the eyes are open, and so that while they are closed in sleep, when we do not need the eyes for seeing, they may be as it were tucked up for repose. Moreover the eyes are in advantageously retired position, and shielded on all sides by surrounding prominences; for first the parts above them are covered by the eyebrows which prevent sweat from flowing down from the scalp and forehead; then the cheeks, which are placed beneath them and which slightly project, protect them from below; and the hose is so placed as to seem to be a wall separating the eyes from one another. 2.144 The organ of hearing on the other hand is always open, since we require this sense even when asleep, and when it receives a sound, we are aroused even from sleep. The auditory passage is winding, to prevent anything from being able to enter, as it might if the passage were clear and straight; it has further been provided that even the tiniest insect that may attempt to intrude may be caught in the sticky wax of the ears. On the outside project the organs which we call ears, which are constructed both to cover and protect the sense-organ and to prevent the sounds that reach them from sliding past and being lost before they strike the sense. The apertures of the ears are hard and gristly, and much convoluted, because things with these qualities reflect and amplify sound; this is why tortoise-shell or horn gives resoce to a lyre, and always why winding passages and enclosures have an echo which is louder than the original sound. 2.145 Similarly the nostrils, which to serve the purposes required of them have to be always open, have narrower apertures, to prevent the entrance of anything that may harm them; and they are always moist, which is useful to guard them against dust and many other things. The sense of taste is admirably shielded, being enclosed in the mouth in a manner well suited for the performance of its function and for its protection against harm. "And all the senses of man far excel those of the lower animals. In the first place our eyes have a finer perception of many things in the arts which appeal to the sense of sight, painting, modelling and sculpture, and also in bodily movements and gestures; since the eyes judge beauty and arrangement and so to speak propriety of colour and shape; and also other more important matters, for they also recognize virtues and vices, the angry and the friendly, the joyful and the sad, the brave man and the coward, the bold and the craven. 2.146 The ears are likewise marvellously skilful organs of discrimination; they judge differences of tone, of pitch and of key in the music of the voice and of wind and stringed instruments, and many different qualities of voice, sonorous and dull, smooth and rough, bass and treble, flexible and hard, distinctions discriminated by the human ear alone. Likewise the nostrils, the taste and in some measure the touch have highly sensitive faculties of discrimination. And the arts invented to appeal to and indulge these senses are even more numerous than I could wish. The developments of perfumery and of the meretricious adornment of the person are obvious examples. 2.147 "Coming now to the actual mind and intellect of man, his reason, wisdom and foresight, one who cannot see that these owe their perfection to divine providence must in my view himself be devoid of these very faculties. While discussing this topic I could wish, Cotta, that I had the gift of your eloquence. How could not you describe first our powers of understanding, and then our faculty of conjoining premisses and consequences in a single act of apprehension, the faculty I mean that enables us to judge what conclusion follows from any given propositions and to put the inference in syllogistic form, and also to delimit particular terms in a succinct definition; whence we arrive at an understanding of the potency and the nature of knowledge, which is the most excellent part even of the divine nature. Again, how remarkable are the faculties which you Academics invalidate and abolish, our sensory and intellectual perception and comprehension of external objects; 2.148 it is by collating and comparing our precepts that we also create the arts that serve either practical necessities or the purpose of amusement. Then take the gift of speech, the queen of arts as you are fond of calling it — what a glorious, what a divine faculty it is! In the first place it enables us both to learn things we do not know and to teach things we do know to others; secondly it is our instrument for exhortation and persuasion, for consoling the afflicted and assuaging the fears of the terrified, for curbing passion and quenching appetite and anger; it is this that has united us in the bonds of justice, law and civil order, this that has sped us from savagery and barbarism. ' "2.149 Now careful consideration will show that the mechanism of speech displays a skill on nature's part that surpasses belief. In the first place there is an artery passing from the lugns to the back of the mouth, which is the channel by which the voice, originating from the mind, is caught and uttered. Next, the tongue is placed in the mouth and confined by the teeth; it modulates and defines the inarticulate flow of the voice and renders its sounds district and clear by striking the teeth and other parts of the mouth. Accordingly my school is fond of comparing the tongue to the quill of a lyre, the teeth to the strings, and the nostrils to the horns which echo the notes of the strings when the instrument is played. " '2.150 "Then what clever servants for a great variety of arts are the hands which nature has bestowed on man! The flexibility of the joints enables the fingers to close and open with equal ease, and to perform every motion without difficulty. Thus by the manipulation of the fingers the hand is enabled to paint, to model, to carve, and to draw forth the notes of the lyre and of the flute. And beside these arts of recreation there are those of utility, I mean agriculture and building, the weaving and stitching of garments, and the various modes of working bronze and iron; hence we realize that it was by applying the hand of the artificer to the discoveries of thought and observations of the senses that all our conveniences were attained, and we were enabled to have shelter, clothing and protection, and possessed cities, fortifications, houses and temples. ' "2.151 Moreover men's industry, that is to say the work of their hands, porticus us also our food in variety and abundance. It is the hand that gathers the divers products of the fields, whether to be consumed immediately or to be stored in repositories for the days to come; and our diet also includes flesh, fish and fowl, obtained partly by the chase and partly by breeding. We also tame the four-footed animals to carry us on their backs, their swiftness and strength bestowing strength and swiftness upon ourselves. We cause certain beasts to bear our burdens or to carry a yoke, we divert to our service the marvellously acute senses of elephants and the keen scent of hounds; we collect from the caves of the earth the iron which we need for tilling the land, we discover the deeply hidden veins of copper, silver and gold which serve us both for use and for adornment; we cut up a multitude of trees both wild and cultivated for timber which we employ partly by setting fire to it to warm our busy and cook our food, partly for building so as to shelter ourselves with houses and banish heat and cold. " "2.152 Timber moreover is of great value for constructing ships, whose voyages supply an abundance of sustece of all sorts from all parts of the earth; and we alone have the power of controlling the most violent of nature's offspring, the sea and the winds, thanks to the science of navigation, and we use and enjoy many products of the sea. Likewise the entire command of the commodities produced on land is vested in mankind. We enjoy the fruits of the plains and of the mountains, the rivers and the lakes are ours, we sow corn, we plant trees, we fertilize the soil by irrigation, we confine the rivers and straighten or divert their courses. In fine, by means of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world within the world of nature. " '2.153 "Then moreover hasn\'t man\'s reason penetrated even to the sky? We alone of living creatures know the risings and settings and the courses of the stars, the human race has set limits to the day, the month and the year, and has learnt the eclipses of the sun and moon and foretold for all future time their occurrence, their extent and their dates. And contemplating the heavenly bodies the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, with its comrades justice and the rest of the virtues, the sources of a life of happiness that vies with and resembles the divine existence and leaves us inferior to the celestial beings in nothing else save immortality, which is immaterial for happiness. I think that my exposition of these matters has been sufficient to prove how widely man\'s nature surpasses all other living creatures; and this should make it clear that neither such a conformation and arrangement of the members nor such power of mind and intellect can possibly have been created by chance. 2.154 "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. 2.155 Again the revolutions of the sun and moon no other heavenly bodies, although also contributing to the maintece of the structure of the world, nevertheless also afford a spectacle for man to behold; for there is no sight of which it is more impossible to grow weary, none more beautiful nor displaying a more surpassing wisdom and skill; for by measuring the courses of the stars we know when the seasons will come round, and when their variations and changes will occur; and if these things are known to men alone, they must be judged to have been created for the sake of men. 2.156 Then the earth, teeming with grain and vegetables of various kinds, which she pours forth in lavish abundance — does she appear to give birth to this produce for the sake of the wild beasts or for the sake of men? What shall I say of the vines and olives, whose bounteous and delightful fruits do not concern the lower animals at all? In fact the beasts of the field are entirely ignorant of the arts of sowing and cultivating, and of reaping and gathering the fruits of the earth in due season and storing them in garners; all these products are both enjoyed and tended by men. 2.157 Just as therefore we are bound to say that lyres and flutes were made for the sake of those who can use them, so it must be agreed that the things of which I have spoken have been provided for those only who make use of them, and even if some portion of them is filched or plundered by some of the lower animals, we shall not admit that they were created for the sake of these animals also. Men do not store up corn for the sake of mice and ants but for their wives and children and households; so the animals share these fruits of the earth only by stealth as I have said, whereas the masters enjoy them openly and freely. ' "2.158 It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? " '2.159 Why should I speak of oxen? the very shape of their backs makes it clear that they were not destined to carry burdens, whereas their necks were born for the yoke and their broad powerful shoulders for drawing the plough. And as it was by their means that the earth was brought under tillage by breaking up its clods, no violence was ever used towards them, so the poets say, by the men of that Golden Age; But then the iron race sprang into being, And first did dare to forge the deadly sword, And taste the ox its hand had tamed to bondage. So valuable was deemed the service that man received from oxen that to eat their flesh was held a crime. "It would be a long story to tell of the services rendered by mules and asses, which were undoubtedly created for the use of men. ' "2.160 As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. " "2.161 The great beasts of the forest again we take by hunting, both for food and in order to exercise ourselves in the mimic warfare of the chase, and also, as in the case of elephants, to train and discipline them for our employment, and to procure from their busy a variety of medicines for diseases and wounds, as also we do from certain roots and herbs whose values we have learnt by long-continued use and trial. Let the mind's eye survey the whole earth and all the seas, and you will behold now fruitful plains of measureless extent and mountains thickly clad with forests and pastures filled with flocks, now vessels sailing with marvellous swiftness across the sea. " '2.162 Nor only on the surface of the earth, but also in its darkest recesses there lurks an abundance of commodities which were created for men\'s use and which men alone discover. "The next subject is one which each of you perhaps will seize upon for censure, Cotta because Carneades used to enjoy tilting at the Stoics, Velleius because nothing provokes the ridicule of Epicurus so much as the art of prophecy; but in my view it affords the very strongest proof that man\'s welfare is studied by divine providence. I refer of course to Divination, which we see practised in many regions and upon various matters and occasions both private and more especially public. 2.163 Many observations are made by those who inspect the victims at sacrifices, many events are foreseen by augurs or revealed in oracles and prophecies, dreams and portents, a knowledge of which has often led to the acquisition of many things gratifying men\'s wishes and requirements, and also to the avoidance of many dangers. This power or art or instinct therefore has clearly been bestowed by the immortal gods on man, and on no other creature, for the ascertainment of future events. "And if perchance these arguments separately fail to convince you, nevertheless in combination their collective weight will be bound to do so. 2.164 "Nor is the care and providence of the immortal gods bestowed only upon the human race in its entirety, but it is also wont to be extended to individuals. We may narrow down the entirety of the human race and bring it gradually down to smaller and smaller groups, and finally to single individuals. For if we believe, for the reasons that we have spoken of before, that the gods care for all human beings everywhere in every coast and region of the lands remote from this continent in which we dwell, then they care also for the men who inhabit with us these lands between the sunrise and the sunset. ' "2.165 But if they care for these who inhabit that sort of vast island which we call the round earth, they also care for those who occupy continue divisions of that island, Europe, Asia and Africa. Therefore they also cherish the divisions of those divisions, for instance Rome, Athens, Sparta and Rhodes; and they cherish the individual citizens of those cities regarded separately from the whole body collectively, for example, Curius, Fabricius and Coruncanius in the war with Pyrrhus, Calatinus, Duellius, Metellus and Lutatius in the First Punic War, and Maximus, Marcellus and Africanus in the Second, and at a later date Paulus, Gracchus and Cato, or in our fathers' time Scipio and Laelius; and many remarkable men besides both our own country and Greece have given birth to, none of whom would conceivably have been what he was save by god's aid. " '2.166 It was this reason which drove the poets, and especially Homer, to attach to their chief heroes, Ulysses, Diomede, Agamemnon or Achilles, certain gods as the companions of their perils and adventures; moreover the gods have often appeared to men in person, as in the cases which I have mentioned above, so testifying that they care both for communities and for individuals. And the same is proved by the portents of future occurrences that are vouchsafed to men sometimes when they are asleep and sometimes when they are awake. Moreover we receive a number of warnings by means of signs and of the entrails of victims, and by many other things that long-continued usage has noted in such a manner as to create the art of divination. ' "2.167 Therefore no great man ever existed who did not enjoy some portion of divine inspiration. Nor yet is this argument to be deprived by pointing to cases where a man's cornfields or vineyards have been damaged by a storm, or an accident has robbed him of some commodity of value, and inferring that the victim of one of these misfortunes is the object of god's hatred or neglect. The gods attend to great matters; they neglect small ones. Now great men always prosper in all their affairs, assuming that the teachers of our school and Socrates, the prince of philosophy, have satisfactorily discoursed upon the bounteous abundance of wealth that virtue bestows. " 3.42 Nevertheless I should like to know what particular Hercules it is that we worship; for we are told of several by the students of esoteric and recondite writings, the most ancient being the son of Jupiter, that is of the most ancient Jupiter likewise, for we find several Jupiters also in the early writings of the Greeks. That Jupiter then and Lysithoë were the parents of the Hercules who is recorded to have had a tussle with Apollo about a tripod! We hear of another in Egypt, a son of the Nile, who is said to have compiled the sacred books of Phrygia. A third comes from the Digiti of Mount Ida, who offer sacrifices at his tomb. A fourth is the son of Jupiter and Asteria, the sister of Latona; he is chiefly worshipped at Tyre, and is said to have been the father of the nymph Carthago. There is a fifth in India, named Belus. The sixth is our friend the son of Alcmena, whose male progenitor was Jupiter, that is Jupiter number three, since, as I will now explain, tradition tells us of several Jupiters also. 3.43 "For as my discourse has led me to this topic, I will show that I have learnt more about the proper way of worshipping the gods, according to pontifical law and the customs of our ancestors, from the poor little pots bequeathed to us by Numa, which Laelius discusses in that dear little golden speech of his, than from the theories of the Stoics. For if I adopt your doctrines, tell me what answer I am to make to one who questions me thus: \'If gods exist, are the nymphs also goddesses? if the nymphs are, the Pans and Satyrs also are gods; but they are not gods; therefore the nymphs also are not. Yet they possess temples viewed and dedicated to them by the nation; are the other gods also therefore who have hadded temples dedicated to them not gods either? Come tell me further: you reckon Jupiter and Neptune gods, therefore their brother orcus is also a god; and the fabled streams of the lower world, Acheron, Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon, and also Charon and also Cerberus are to be deemed gods. ' "3.44 No, you say, we must draw the line at that; well then, orcus is not a god either; what are you to say about his brothers then?' These arguments were advanced by Carneades, not with the object of establishing atheism (for what could less befit a philosopher?) but in order to prove the Stoic theology worthless; accordingly he used to pursue his inquiry thus: 'Well now,' he would say, 'if these brothers are included among the gods, can we deny the divinity of their father Saturation, who is held in the highest reverence by the common people in the west? And if he is a god, we must also admit that his father Caelus is a god. And if so, the parents of Caelus, the Aether and the Day, must be held to be gods, and their brothers and sisters, whom the ancient genealogists name Love, Guile, Dear, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favour, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Parcae, the Daughters of Hesperus, the Dreams: all of these are fabled to be the children of erebus and Night.' Either therefore you must accept these monstrosities or you must discard the first claimants also." '3.45 Again, if you call Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury and the rest gods, will you have doubts about Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor and Pollux? But these are worshipped just as much as those, and indeed in some places very much more than they. Are we then to deem these gods, the sons of mortal mothers? Well then, will not Aristaeus, the reputed discoverer of the olive, who was the son of Apollo, Theseus the son of Neptune, and all the other sons of gods, also be reckoned as gods? What about the sons of goddesses? I think they have an even better claim; for just as by the civil law one whose mother is a freewoman is a Freeman, so by the law of nature one whose mother is a goddess must be a god. And in the island of Astypalaea Achilles is most devoutly worshipped by the inhabitants on these grounds; but if Achilles is a god, so are Orpheus and Rhesus, whose mother was a Muse, unless perhaps a marriage at the bottom of the sea counts higher than a marriage on dry land! If these are not gods, because they are nowhere worshipped, how can the others be gods? ' "3.46 Is not the explanation this, that divine honours are paid to men's virtues, not to their immortality? as you too, Balbus, appeared to indicate. Then, if you think Latona a goddess, how can you not think that Hecate is one, who is the daughter of Latona's sister Asteria? Is Hecate a goddess too? we have seen altars and shrines belonging to her in Greece. But if Hecate is a goddess, why are not the Eumenides? and if they are goddesses, — and they have a temple at Athens, and the Grove ofurina at Rome, if I interpret that name aright, also belongs to them, — then the Furies are goddesses, presumably in their capacity of detectors and avengerss of crime and wickedness. " "3.47 And if it is the nature of the gods to intervene in man's affairs, the Birth-Spirit also must be deemed divine, to whom it is our custom to offer sacrifice when we make the round of the shrines in the Territory of Ardea: she is named Natio from the word for being born (nasci), because she is believed to watch over married women in travail. If she is divine, so are all those abstractions that you mentioned, Honour, Faith, Intellect, Concord, and therefore also Hope, the Spirit of Money and all the possible creations of our own imagination. If this supposition is unlikely, so also is the former one, from which all these instances flow. Then, if the traditional gods whom we worship are really divine, what reason can you give why we should not include Isis and Osiris in the same category? And if we do so, why should we repudiate the gods of the barbarians? We shall therefore have to admit to the list of gods oxen and horses, ibises, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fishes, dogs, wolves, cats and many beasts besides. Or if we reject these, we shall also reject those others from whom their claim springs. " 3.51 As for your deriving religion from the sky and stars, do you not see what a long way this takes you? You say that the sun and moon are deities, and the Greeks identify the former with Apollo and the latter with Diana. But if the Moon is a goddess, then Lucifer also and the rest of the planets will have to be counted gods; and if so, then the fixed stars as well. But why should not the glorious Rainbow be included among the gods? it is beautiful enough, and its marvellous loveliness has given rise the time of legend that Iris is the daughter of Thaumas. And if the rainbow is a divinity, what will you do about the clouds? The rainbow itself is caused by some colroation of the clouds; and also a cloud is fabled to have given birth to the Centaurs. But if you enroll the clouds among the gods, you will undoubtedly have to enroll the seasons, which have been deified in the national ritual of Rome. If so, then rain and tempest, storm and whirlwind must be deemed divine. At any rate it has been the custom of our generals when embarking on a sea‑voyage to sacrifice a victim to the waves. ' "3.52 Again, if the name of Ceres is derived from her bearing fruit, as you said, the earth itself is a goddess (and so she is believed to be, for she is the same as the deity Tellus). But if the earth is divine, so also is the sea, which you identified with Neptune; and therefore the rivers and springs too. This is borne out by the facts that Maso dedicated a Temple of Fons out of his Corsican spoils, and that the Augur's litany includes as we may see the names of Tiberinus, Spino, almo, Nodinus, and other rivers in the neighbourhood of Rome. Either therefore this process will go on indefinitely, or we shall admit none of these; nts unlimited claim of superstition will not be accepted; therefore none of these is to be accepted. " '3.53 "Accordingly, Balbus, we also ought to refute the theory that these gods, who are deified human beings, and who are the objects of our most devout and universal veneration, exist not in reality but in imagination . . . In the first place, the so‑called theologians enumerate three Jupiters, of whom the first and second were born, they say, in Arcadia, the father of one being Aether, who is also fabled to be the progenitor of Proserpine and Liber, and of the other Caelus, and this one is said to have begotten Minerva, the fabled patroness and originator of warfare; the third is the Cretan Jove, son of Saturn; his tomb is shown in that island. The Dioscuri also have a number of titles in Greece. The first set, called Anaces at Athens, the sons of the very ancient King Jupiter and Proserpine, are Tritopatreus, Eubuleus and Dionysus. The second set, the sons of the third Jove and Leda, are Castor and Pollux. The third are named by some people Alco, Melampus and Tmolus, and are the sons of Atreus the son of Pelops. ' "3.54 Again, the first set of Muses are four, the daughters of the second Jupiter, Thelxinoë, Aoede, Arche and Melete; the second set are the offspring of the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne, nine in number; the third set are the daughters of Pierus and Antiope, and are usually called by the poets the Pierides or Pierian Maidens; they are the same in number and have the same names as the next preceding set. The sun's name Sol you derive from his being sole of his kind, but the theologians produce a number even of Suns! One is the son of Jove and grandson of Aether; another is the son of Hyperion; the third of Vulcan the son of Nile — this is the one who the Egyptians say is lord of the city named Heliopolis; the fourth is the one to whom Acanthe is said to have given birth at Rhodes in the heroic age, the father of Ialysus, Camirus, Lindus and Rhodus; the fifth is the one said to have begotten Aeetes and Circe at Colchi." '3.55 There are also several Vulcans; the first, the son of the Sky, was reputed the father by Minerva of the Apollo said by the ancient historians to be the tutelary deity of Athens; the second, the son of Nile, is named by the Egyptians Phthas, and is deemed the guardian of Egypt; the third is the son of the third Jupiter and of Juno, and is fabled to have been taskmaster of a smithy at Lemnos; the fourth is the son of Memalius, and lord of the islands near Sicily which used to be named the Isles of Vulcan. 3.56 One Mercury has the Sky for father and the Day for mother; he is represented in a state of sexual excitation traditionally said to be due to passion inspired by the sight of Proserpine. Another is the son of Valens and Phoronis; this is the subterranean Mercury identified with Trophonius. The third, the son of the third Jove and of Maia, the legends make the father of Pan by Penelope. The fourth has Nile for father; the Egyptians deem it sinful to pronounce his name. The fifth, worshipped by the people of Pheneus, is said to have killed argus and consequently to have fled in exile to Egypt, where he gave the Egyptians their laws and letters. His Egyptian name is Theuth, which is also the name in the Egyptian calendar for the first month of year. 3.57 of the various Aesculapii the first is the son of Apollo, and is worshipped by the Arcadians; he is reputed to have invented the probe and to have been the first surgeon to employ splints. The second is the brother of the second Mercury; he is said to have been struck by lightning and buried at Cynosura. The third is the son of Arsippus and Arsinoë, and is said to have first invented the use of purges and the extraction of teeth; his tomb and grove are shown in Arcadia, not far from the river Lusius. The most ancient of the Apollos is the one whom I stated just before to be the son of Vulcan and the guardian of Athens. The second is the son of Corybas, and was born in Crete; tradition says that he fought with Jupiter himself for the possession of that island. The third is the son of the third Jupiter and of Latona, and is reputed to have come to Delphi from the Hyperboreans. The fourth belongs to Arcadia, and is called by the Arcadians Nomios, as being their traditional lawgiver. ' "3.58 Likewise there are several Dianas. The first, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine, is said to have given birth to the winged Cupid. The second is more celebrated; tradition makes her the daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The father of the third is recorded to have been Upis, and her mother Glauce; the Greeks often call her by her father's name of Upis. We have a number of Dionysi. The first is the son of Jupiter and Proserpine; the second of Nile — he is the fabled slayer of Nysa. The father of the third is Cabirus; it is stated that he was king over Asia, and the Sabazia were instituted in his honour. The fourth is the son of Jupiter and Luna; the Orphic rites are believed to be celebrated in his honour. The fifth is the son of Nisus and Thyone, and is believed to have established the Trieterid festival. " '3.59 The first Venus is the daughter of the Sky and the Day; I have seen her temple at Elis. The second was engendered from the sea‑foam, and as we are told became the mother by Mercury of the second Cupid. The third is the daughter of Jupiter and Dione, who wedded Vulcan, but who is said to have been the mother of Anteros by Mars. The fourth was conceived of Syria and Cyprus, and is called Astarte; it is recorded that she married Adonis. The first Minerva is the one whom we mentioned above as the mother of Apollo. The second sprang from the Nile, and is worshipped by the Egyptians of Sais. The third is she whom we mentioned above as begotten by Jupiter. The fourth is the daughter of Jupiter and Coryphe the daughter of Oceanus, and is called Koria by the Arcadians, who say that she was the inventor of the four-horse chariot. The fifth is Pallas, who is said to have slain her father when he attempted to violate her maidenhood; she is represented with wings attached to her ankles. 3.60 The first Cupid is said to be the son of Mercury and the first Diana, the second of Mercury and the second Venus, and the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus. "These and other similar fables have been culled from the ancient traditions of Greece; you are aware that we ought to combat them, so that religion may not be undermined. Your school however not merely do not refute them, but actually confirm them by interpreting their respective meanings. But let us now return to the point from which we digressed to this topic. 3.61 ". . . Do you then think that any more subtle argument is needed to refute these notions? Intelligence, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, safety, concord and the other things of this nature obviously abstractions, not personal deities. For they are either properties inherent in ourselves, for instance intelligence, hope, faith, virtue, concord, or objects of our desire, for instance honour, safety, victory. I see that they have value, and I am also aware that statues are dedicated to them; but why they should be held to possess divinity is a thing that I cannot understand without further enlightenment. Fortune has a very strong claim to be counted in this list, and nobody will dissociate fortune from inconstancy and haphazard action, which are certainly unworthy of a deity.
3.65 Now let us consider the next topics — first whether the world is ruled by divine providence, and then whether the gods have regard for the affairs of mankind. For these are the two that I have left of the heads into which you divided the subject; and if you gentlemen approve, I feel that they require a somewhat detailed discussion." "For my part," said Velleius, "I approve entirely, for I anticipate something more important still to come, and I also strongly agree with what has been said already." \'I do not want to interrupt you with questions," added Balbus, "we will take another time for that: I warrant I will bring you to agree. But . . . . . . . . Nay, \'twill not be; a struggle is in store, What, should I fawn on him and speak him fair, Save for my purpose —
3.86 " \'But,\' it may be objected, \'the gods disregard smaller matters, and do not pay attention to the petty farms and paltry vines of individuals, and any trifling damage done by blight or hail cannot have been a matter for the notice of Jupiter; even kings do not attend to all the petty affairs in their kingdoms\': this is how you argue. As if forsooth it was Publius Rutilius\'s estate at Formiae about which I complained a little time ago, and not his loss of all security! But this is the way with all mortals: their external goods, their vineyards, cornº-fields and olive-yards, with their abundant harvests and fruits, and in short all the comfort and prosperity of their lives, they think of as coming to them from the gods; but virtue no one ever imputed to a god\'s bounty. ' "
3.88 Nor did anyone ever vow to pay a tithe to Hercules if he became a wise man! It is true there is a story that Pythagoras used to sacrifice an ox to the Muses when he had made a new discovery in geometry! but I don't believe it, since Pythagoras refused even to sacrifice a victim to Apollo of Delos, for fear of sprinkling the altar with blood. However, to return to my point, it is the considered belief of all mankind that they must pray to god for fortune but obtain wisdom for themselves. Let us dedicate temples as we will to Intellect, Virtue and Faith, yet we perceive that these things are within ourselves; hope, safety, wealth, victory are blessings which we must seek from the gods. Accordingly the prosperity and good fortune of the wicked, as Diogenes used to say, disprove the might and power of the gods entirely." "3.89 'But sometimes good men come to good ends.' Yes, and we seize upon these cases and impute them with no reason to the immortal gods. Diagoras, named the Atheist, once came to Samothrace, and a certain friend said to him, 'You who think that the gods disregard men's affairs, do you not remark all the votive pictures that prove how many persons have escaped the violence of the storm, and come safe to port, by dint of vows to the gods? That is so,' replied Diagoras; 'it is because there are nowhere any pictures of those who have been shipwrecked and drowned at sea.' On another voyage he encountered a storm which threw the crew of the vessel into a panic, and in their terror they told him that they had brought it on themselves by having taken him on board their ship. He pointed out to them a never of other vessels making heavy weather on the same course, and inquired whether they supposed that those ships also had a Diagoras on board. The fact really is that your character and past life make no difference whatever as regards your fortune good or bad. " '3.90 " \'The gods do not take notice of everything, any more than do human rulers,\' says our friend. Where is the parallel? If human rulers knowingly overlook a fault they are greatly to blame; but as for god, he cannot even offer the excuse of ignorance. And how remarkably you champion his cause, when you declare that the divine power is such that even if a person has escaped punishment by dying, the punishment is visited on his children and grandchildren and their descendants! What a remarkable instance of the divine justice! Would any state tolerate a lawgiver who should enact that a son or grandson was to be sentenced for the transgression of a father or grandfather? Where shall the Tantalids\' vendetta end? What penalty for Myrtilus\' murder Shall ever glut the appetite of vengeance? ' "
3.92 But at all events a god could have come to the aid of those great and splendid cities and have preserved them — for you yourselves are fond of saying that there is nothing that a god cannot accomplish, and that without any toil; as man's limbs are effortlessly moved merely by his mind and will, so, as you say, the god's power can mould and move and alter all things. Nor do you say this as some superstitious fable or old wives' tale, but you give a scientific and systematic account of it: you allege that matter, which constitutes and contains all things, is in its entirety flexible and subject to change, so that there is nothing that cannot be moulded and transmuted out of it however suddenly, but the moulder and manipulator of this universal substance is divine providence, and therefore providence, whithersoever it moves, is able to perform whatever it will. Accordingly either providence does not know its own powers, or it does not regard human affairs, or it lacks power of judgement to discern what is the best. " '3.93 \'It does not care for individuals.\' This is no wonder; no more does it care for cities. Not for temple? Not for tribes or nations either. And if it shall appear that it despises even nations, what wonder is it that it has scorned the entire human race? But how can you both maintain that the gods do not pay attention to everything and also believe that dreams are distributed and doled out to men by the immortal gods? I argue this with you because the belief in the truth of dreams is a tenet of your school. And do you also say that it is proper for men to take vows upon themselves? Well, but vows are made by individuals; therefore the divine mind gives a hearing even to the concerns of individuals; do you see therefore that it is not so engrossed in business as you thought? Grant that it is distracted between moving the heavens and watching the earth and controlling the seas: why does it suffer so many gods to be idle and keep holiday? why does it not appoint some of leisured gods whose countless numbers you expounded, Balbus, to superintend human affairs? "This more or less is what I have to say about the nature of the gods; it is not my design to disprove it, but to bring you to understand how obscure it is and how difficult to explain." '" None |
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20. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 3.39, 4.6, 4.17, 5.16-5.17, 9.4-9.6, 9.10, 9.20, 9.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • predestination (προόρισις), providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 71; Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 149, 233; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 94, 95; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 47, 64, 65, 205, 235
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3.39 For he who has his dwelling in heaven watches over that place himself and brings it aid, and he strikes and destroys those who come to do it injury.'" "
4.6 For he saw that without the king's attention public affairs could not again reach a peaceful settlement, and that Simon would not stop his folly.'" 4.17 For it is no light thing to show irreverence to the divine laws -- a fact which later events will make clear."' "
5.16 He took the holy vessels with his polluted hands, and swept away with profane hands the votive offerings which other kings had made to enhance the glory and honor of the place.'" "5.17 Antiochus was elated in spirit, and did not perceive that the Lord was angered for a little while because of the sins of those who dwelt in the city, and that therefore he was disregarding the holy place.'" "
9.4 Transported with rage, he conceived the idea of turning upon the Jews the injury done by those who had put him to flight; so he ordered his charioteer to drive without stopping until he completed the journey. But the judgment of heaven rode with him! For in his arrogance he said, 'When I get there I will make Jerusalem a cemetery of Jews.'" "9.5 But the all-seeing Lord, the God of Israel, struck him an incurable and unseen blow. As soon as he ceased speaking he was seized with a pain in his bowels for which there was no relief and with sharp internal tortures --'" "9.6 and that very justly, for he had tortured the bowels of others with many and strange inflictions.'" 9.10 Because of his intolerable stench no one was able to carry the man who a little while before had thought that he could touch the stars of heaven."' "
9.20 If you and your children are well and your affairs are as you wish, I am glad. As my hope is in heaven,'" "
9.28 So the murderer and blasphemer, having endured the more intense suffering, such as he had inflicted on others, came to the end of his life by a most pitiable fate, among the mountains in a strange land.'"" None |
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21. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 14.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence
Found in books: Albrecht (2014), The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity, 205; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 95
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14.3 Their planting is rooted for ever; They shall not be plucked up all the days of heaven: For the portion and the inheritance of God is Israel.
14.3 but it is thy providence, O Father, that steers its course,because thou hast given it a path in the sea,and a safe way through the waves,'' None |
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22. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248
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23. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 15.878-15.879 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • gods, the absence of their providence in Lucan • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 164; Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 27
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15.878 ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama, 15.879 siquid habent veri vatum praesagia, vivam.'' None | sup>
15.878 after the ancient mode, and then he said, 15.879 “There is one here who will be king, if you'' None |
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24. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 7-9, 11, 13, 17-20, 24-25, 46, 88, 170-172 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on providence (πρόνοια) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on providence (πρόνοια) • Philo of Alexandria, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • creation, in Genesis, “one off,” vs. continuous providence • predestination (προόρισις), providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence • providence, • providence, Apuleius’s doctrine on
Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 219; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 88; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 291; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 341; Hirsch-Luipold (2022), Plutarch and the New Testament in Their Religio-Philosophical Contexts, 112, 222; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 134; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 301
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7 For some men, admiring the world itself rather than the Creator of the world, have represented it as existing without any maker, and eternal; and as impiously as falsely have represented God as existing in a state of complete inactivity, while it would have been right on the other hand to marvel at the might of God as the creator and father of all, and to admire the world in a degree not exceeding the bounds of moderation. 8 But Moses, who had early reached the very summits of philosophy, and who had learnt from the oracles of God the most numerous and important of the principles of nature, was well aware that it is indispensable that in all existing things there must be an active cause, and a passive subject; and that the active cause is the intellect of the universe, thoroughly unadulterated and thoroughly unmixed, superior to virtue and superior to science, superior even to abstract good or abstract beauty; 9 while the passive subject is something iimate and incapable of motion by any intrinsic power of its own, but having been set in motion, and fashioned, and endowed with life by the intellect, became transformed into that most perfect work, this world. And those who describe it as being uncreated, do, without being aware of it, cut off the most useful and necessary of all the qualities which tend to produce piety, namely, providence:
11 It is then a pernicious doctrine, and one for which no one should contend, to establish a system in this world, such as anarchy is in a city, so that it should have no superintendant, or regulator, or judge, by whom everything must be managed and governed. 13 And he says that the world was made in six days, not because the Creator stood in need of a length of time (for it is natural that God should do everything at once, not merely by uttering a command, but by even thinking of it); but because the things created required arrangement; and number is akin to arrangement; and, of all numbers, six is, by the laws of nature, the most productive: for of all the numbers, from the unit upwards, it is the first perfect one, being made equal to its parts, and being made complete by them; the number three being half of it, and the number two a third of it, and the unit a sixth of it, and, so to say, it is formed so as to be both male and female, and is made up of the power of both natures; for in existing things the odd number is the male, and the even number is the female; accordingly, of odd numbers the first is the number three, and of even numbers the first is two, and the two numbers multiplied together make six. 1
7 But that world which consists of ideas, it were impious in any degree to attempt to describe or even to imagine: but how it was created, we shall know if we take for our guide a certain image of the things which exist among us. When any city is founded through the exceeding ambition of some king or leader who lays claim to absolute authority, and is at the same time a man of brilliant imagination, eager to display his good fortune, then it happens at times that some man coming up who, from his education, is skilful in architecture, and he, seeing the advantageous character and beauty of the situation, first of all sketches out in his own mind nearly all the parts of the city which is about to be completed--the temples, the gymnasia, the prytanea, and markets, the harbour, the docks, the streets, the arrangement of the walls, the situations of the dwelling houses, and of the public and other buildings. 18 Then, having received in his own mind, as on a waxen tablet, the form of each building, he carries in his heart the image of a city, perceptible as yet only by the intellect, the images of which he stirs up in memory which is innate in him, and, still further, engraving them in his mind like a good workman, keeping his eyes fixed on his model, he begins to raise the city of stones and wood, making the corporeal substances to resemble each of the incorporeal ideas. 19 Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who, having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model. V. 20 As therefore the city, when previously shadowed out in the mind of the man of architectural skill had no external place, but was stamped solely in the mind of the workman, so in the same manner neither can the world which existed in ideas have had any other local position except the divine reason which made them; for what other place could there be for his powers which should be able to receive and contain, I do not say all, but even any single one of them whatever, in its simple form?
24 And if any one were to desire to use more undisguised terms, he would not call the world, which is perceptible only to the intellect, any thing else but the reason of God, already occupied in the creation of the world; for neither is a city, while only perceptible to the intellect, anything else but the reason of the architect, who is already designing to build one perceptible to the external senses, on the model of that which is so only to the intellect-- 25 this is the doctrine of Moses, not mine. Accordingly he, when recording the creation of man, in words which follow, asserts expressly, that he was made in the image of God--and if the image be a part of the image, then manifestly so is the entire form, namely, the whole of this world perceptible by the external senses, which is a greater imitation of the divine image than the human form is. It is manifest also, that the archetypal seal, which we call that world which is perceptible only to the intellect, must itself be the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the Reason of God. VII.
46 "Let them run over in their minds the first creation of the universe, when, before the sun or the moon existed, the earth brought forth all kinds of plants and all kinds of fruits: and seeing this in their minds let them hope that it will again also bring forth such, according to the appointment of the Father, when it shall seem good to him, without his having need of the aid of any of the sons of men beneath the heavens, to whom he has given powers, though not absolute ones." For as a charioteer holding the reigns or a helmsman with his hand upon the rudder, he guides everything as he pleases, in accordance with law and justice, needing no one else as his assistant; for all things are possible to God. XV.
88 for the charioteers sit behind their beasts of burden, and are placed at, their backs, and yet when they have the reins in their hands, they guide them wherever they choose, and at one time they urge them on to a swift pace, and at another time they hold them back, if they are going on at a speed greater than is desirable. And pilots again, sitting in the hindmost part of the ship, that is the stern are, as one may say, the most important of all the people in the ship, inasmuch as they have the safety of the ship and of all those who are in it, in their hands. And so the Creator has made man to be as it were a charioteer and pilot over all other animals, in order that he may hold the reins and direct the course of every thing upon earth, having the superintendence of all animals and plants, as a sort of viceroy of the principal and mighty King. XXX. 1
70 Such is the life of those who originally were men of innocence and simplicity, and also of those who have come to prefer vice to virtue, from whom one ought to keep aloof. And in his before mentioned account of the creation of the world, Moses teaches us also many other things, and especially five most beautiful lessons which are superior to all others. In the first place, for the sake of convicting the atheists, he teaches us that the Deity has a real being and existence. Now, of the atheists, some have only doubted of the existence of God, stating it to be an uncertain thing; but others, who are more audacious, have taken courage, and asserted positively that there is no such thing; but this is affirmed only by men who have darkened the truth with fabulous inventions. 1
71 In the second place he teaches us that God is one; having reference here to the assertors of the polytheistic doctrine; men who do not blush to transfer that worst of evil constitutions, ochlocracy, from earth to heaven. Thirdly, he teaches, as has been already related, that the world was created; by this lesson refuting those who think that it is uncreated and eternal, and who thus attribute no glory to God. In the fourth place we learn that the world also which was thus created is one, since also the Creator is one, and he, making his creation to resemble himself in its singleness, employed all existing essence in the creation of the universe. For it would not have been complete if it had not been made and composed of all parts which were likewise whole and complete. For there are some persons who believe that there are many worlds, and some who even fancy that they are boundless in extent, being themselves inexperienced and ignorant of the truth of those things of which it is desirable to have a correct knowledge. The fifth lesson that Moses teaches us is, that God exerts his providence for the benefit of the world. 1
72 For it follows of necessity that the Creator must always care for that which he has created, just as parents do also care for their children. And he who has learnt this not more by hearing it than by his own understanding, and has impressed on his own soul these marvellous facts which are the subject of so much contentionùnamely, that God has a being and existence, and that he who so exists is really one, and that he has created the world, and that he has created it one as has been stated, having made it like to himself in singleness; and that he exercises a continual care for that which he has created will live a happy and blessed life, stamped with the doctrines of piety and holiness. ' None |
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25. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.14 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence
Found in books: Albrecht (2014), The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity, 317; Hirsch-Luipold (2022), Plutarch and the New Testament in Their Religio-Philosophical Contexts, 206
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1.14 and the subjects being all the natures beneath the moon, hovering in the air and adjacent to the earth. But that the rulers aforesaid are not independent and absolute, but are the viceroys of one supreme Being, the Father of all, in imitation of whom they administer with propriety and success the charge committed to their care, as he also presides over all created things in strict accordance with justice and with law. Others, on the contrary, who have not discovered the supreme Governor, who thus rules everything, have attributed the causes of the different things which exist in the world to the subordinate powers, as if they had brought them to pass by their own independent act. '' None |
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26. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 47-48 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Philo of Alexandria, and providence • Providence, Stoic type • providence
Found in books: Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 345; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 29
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47 for that is the only quality in us which the Father, who created us, thought deserving of freedom; and, unloosing the bonds of necessity, he let it go unrestrained, bestowing on it that most admirable gift and most connected with himself, the power, namely, of spontaneous will, as far as he was able to receive it; for the irrational animals, in whose soul there is not that especial gift tending to freedom, namely, mind, are put under the yoke and have bridles put in their mouths, and so are given unto men to be their slaves, as servants are given to their masters. But man, who has had bestowed on him a voluntary and self-impelling intellect, and who for the most part puts forth his energies in accordance with deliberate purpose, very properly receives blame for the offences which he designedly commits, and praise for the good actions which he intentionally performs. '48 For, in the case of other plants and other animals, we cannot call either the good that is caused by them deserving of praise, nor the evil that they do deserving of blame; for all their motions in either direction, and, all their changes, have no design about them, but are involuntary. But the soul of man, being the only one which has received from God the power of voluntary motion, and which in this respect has been made to resemble God, and being as far as possible emancipated from the authority of that grievous and severe mistress, necessity, may rightly be visited with reproach if she does not pay due honour to the being who has emancipated her. And therefore, in such a case, she will most deservedly suffer the implacable punishment denounced against slavish and ungrateful minds. ' None |
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27. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 158; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 158
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28. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • providence (divine), absence of it in the DRN • providence (divine), in Plato and the Stoics
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 279; Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 91; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 17, 20
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29. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12.1-1.12.3, 4.7.6-4.7.7, 4.7.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epictetus, on divine providence and human vocation • divine providence, and human vocation in Epictetus • providence
Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 147, 149, 150; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 23, 36; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 393; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 171
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1.12.1 WITH respect to gods, there are some who say that a divine being does not exist: others say that it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no forethought about any thing; a third class say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say: I move not without thy knowledge (Iliad, x. 278). Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and good man then after considering all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I become free? For he is free to whom every thing happens according to his will, and whom no man can hinder. What then is freedom madness? Certainly not: for madness; in freedom do not consist. But, you say, I would have every thing result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man’s whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that every thing may happen as it does. And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution of things,—for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power,—but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen. For can we escape from men? and how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we change them? Who gives us the power? What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature? But you are unwilling to endure and are discontented: and if you are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call them knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. But you ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, and so accept all contentedly. What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly— Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he with the Moirae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put in order? Know you not how small apart you are compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts. Will you not then choose to place your good in that in which you are equal to the gods?—Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother.—What then, was it permitted to you to come forth and to select and to say: Let such a man at this moment unite with such a woman that I may be produced? It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. of what kind of parents? of such as they were. Well then, since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to you? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when colours were brought before them; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for every event that may happen, and you know not that you possess them, are you not more unfortunate and wretched? Things are brought close to you which are proportionate to the power which you possess, but you turn away this power most particularly at the very time when you ought to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these things which they have not placed in your power, and have made you accountable only for those which are in your power? As to your parents, the gods have left you free from responsibility; and so with respect to your brothers, and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For what then have they made you responsible? For that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself.
4.7.6 WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will ( συνφέλω ). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar’s chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar’s) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant’s head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher’s school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews ( νεῦρα ), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs there and follows (understands) the appearances of things. Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty ( ἡγεμονικόν ): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.
4.7.9 WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will ( συνφέλω ). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar’s chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar’s) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant’s head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher’s school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews ( νεῦρα ), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs there and follows (understands) the appearances of things. Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty ( ἡγεμονικόν ): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.'' None |
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30. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 1.14, 2.284-2.292, 2.330, 10.278, 13.171-13.173, 18.12-18.22 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Agrippa I (Jewish king), and divine providence • Divine Providence • Joseph (Genesis patriarch), and divine providence • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007), Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 532; Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 148, 151, 152, 179, 220, 233; Edwards (2023), In the Court of the Gentiles: Narrative, Exemplarity, and Scriptural Adaptation in the Court-Tales of Flavius Josephus, 124; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 213, 214; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 87, 96, 97; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 64; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 27, 30, 31
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1.14 Νῶχος μετὰ τὴν ἐπομβρίαν τῆς γῆς κατασταθείσης εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἐπ' ἔργα χωρεῖ καὶ καταφυτεύσας αὐτὴν ἀμπέλοις, ἡνίκα τοῦ καρποῦ τελεσφορηθέντος καθ' ὥραν ἐτρύγησε καὶ παρῆν εἰς χρῆσιν ὁ οἶνος, θύσας ἐν εὐωχίαις ἦν." "
1.14 τὸ σύνολον δὲ μάλιστά τις ἂν ἐκ ταύτης μάθοι τῆς ἱστορίας ἐθελήσας αὐτὴν διελθεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν θεοῦ γνώμῃ κατακολουθοῦσι καὶ τὰ καλῶς νομοθετηθέντα μὴ τολμῶσι παραβαίνειν πάντα κατορθοῦται πέρα πίστεως καὶ γέρας εὐδαιμονία πρόκειται παρὰ θεοῦ: καθ' ὅσον δ' ἂν ἀποστῶσι τῆς τούτων ἀκριβοῦς ἐπιμελείας, ἄπορα μὲν γίνεται τὰ πόριμα, τρέπεται δὲ εἰς συμφορὰς ἀνηκέστους ὅ τι ποτ' ἂν ὡς ἀγαθὸν δρᾶν σπουδάσωσιν," "
2.284 Χλευάσαντος δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως Μωυσῆς ἔργῳ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ βλέπειν τὰ σημεῖα τὰ κατὰ τὸ Σιναῖον ὄρος γενόμενα: ὁ δ' ἀγανακτήσας πονηρὸν μὲν αὐτὸν ἀπεκάλει καὶ πρότερον φυγόντα τὴν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δουλείαν καὶ νῦν ἐξ ἀπάτης αὐτοῦ τὴν ἄφιξιν πεποιημένον καὶ τερατουργίαις καὶ μαγείαις καταπλήξειν ἐπικεχειρηκότα." "2.285 καὶ ταῦθ' ἅμα λέγων κελεύει τοὺς ἱερεῖς τὰς αὐτὰς ὄψεις αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν ὁρᾶν, ὡς Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν ὄντων καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ὅτι μὴ μόνος αὐτὸς ἔμπειρος ὢν εἰς θεὸν δύναται τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ παράδοξον ἀναφέρων πιθανὸς ὥσπερ ἀπαιδεύτοις ὑπάρχειν. καὶ μεθεμένων ἐκείνων τὰς βακτηρίας δράκοντες ἦσαν." "2.286 Μωυσῆς δ' οὐ καταπλαγείς, “οὐδ' αὐτὸς μέν, εἶπεν, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τῆς Αἰγυπτίων σοφίας καταφρονῶ, τοσῷδε μέντοι κρείττονα τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πραττόμενα τῆς τούτων μαγείας καὶ τέχνης φημί, ὅσῳ τὰ θεῖα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων διαφέρει. δείξω δὲ οὐ κατὰ γοητείαν καὶ πλάνην τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης τἀμὰ, κατὰ δὲ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν καὶ δύναμιν φαινόμενα.”" "2.287 καὶ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν μεθίησιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν βακτηρίαν κελεύσας αὐτὴν εἰς ὄφιν μεταβαλεῖν: ἡ δ' ἐπείθετο καὶ τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων βακτηρίας, οἳ δράκοντες ἐδόκουν, περιιοῦσα κατήσθιε μέχρι πάσας ἀνήλωσεν: εἶτ' εἰς τὸ αὑτῆς σχῆμα μεταπεσοῦσαν κομίζεται Μωυσῆς." "2.288 ̔Ο δὲ βασιλεὺς οὐδὲν τούτῳ μᾶλλον πραχθέντι καταπλήττεται, προσοργισθεὶς δὲ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ προχωρήσειν εἰπὼν ἐκ τῆς κατ' Αἰγυπτίων σοφίας καὶ δεινότητος κελεύει τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ̔Εβραίων τεταγμένον μηδεμίαν αὐτοῖς ἄνεσιν παρέχειν τοῦ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ πλείοσι τῶν πρότερον κακοῖς αὐτοὺς καταναγκάζειν." "2.289 ὁ δὲ ἄχυρον αὐτοῖς παρέχων εἰς τὴν πλινθείαν πρότερον οὐκέτι παρεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἡμέρας μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ταλαιπωρεῖν ἐποίει, νυκτὸς δὲ συνάγειν τὸ ἄχυρον. καὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ διπλασίονος ὄντος αὐτοῖς ἐν αἰτίαις Μωυσῆν εἶχον, ὡς τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας δι' ἐκεῖνον χαλεπωτέρας γεγενημένης." "2.291 καὶ παραγενόμενος πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ἔπειθεν αὐτὸν ἀπολύειν τοὺς ̔Εβραίους ἐπὶ τὸ Σιναῖον ὄρος ἐκεῖ θύσοντας τῷ θεῷ, τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸν κεκελευκέναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἀντιπράττειν οἷς ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, τὴν δ' εὐμένειαν αὐτοῦ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενον συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἔξοδον, μὴ καὶ λάθῃ τούτων κωλυτὴς γενόμενος αὑτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι πάσχων ὅσα παθεῖν εἰκὸς τὸν ἀντιπράττοντα θεοῦ προστάγμασι:" "2.292 τοῖς γὰρ χόλον ἐπ' αὐτοὺς κινήσασι θεῖον ἐξ ἁπάντων φύεσθαι τὰ δεινὰ, καὶ οὔτε γῆ τούτοις οὔτε ἀὴρ φίλος οὔτε γοναὶ τέκνων κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐχθρὰ πάντα καὶ πολέμια. πειραθήσεσθαί τε τούτων Αἰγυπτίους ἔφασκε μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τὸν ̔Εβραίων λαὸν ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν ἀκόντων ἐκείνων." "
10.278 οἳ τήν τε πρόνοιαν ἐκβάλλουσι τοῦ βίου καὶ θεὸν οὐκ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπιτροπεύειν τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ἀφθάρτου πρὸς διαμονὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας κυβερνᾶσθαι τὰ σύμπαντα, ἄμοιρον δὲ ἡνιόχου καὶ ἀφρόντιστον τὸν κόσμον αὐτομάτως φέρεσθαι λέγουσιν." 13.171 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τρεῖς αἱρέσεις τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων ἦσαν, αἳ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων διαφόρως ὑπελάμβανον, ὧν ἡ μὲν Φαρισαίων ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ Σαδδουκαίων, ἡ τρίτη δὲ ̓Εσσηνῶν.' "13.172 οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἔργον εἶναι λέγουσιν, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνειν τε καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν ̓Εσσηνῶν γένος πάντων τὴν εἱμαρμένην κυρίαν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ μηδὲν ὃ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾶν." "13.173 Σαδδουκαῖοι δὲ τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς γινομένους καὶ τὰ χείρω παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀκριβεστέραν πεποίημαι δήλωσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βίβλῳ τῆς ̓Ιουδαϊκῆς πραγματείας." "
18.12 Οἵ τε γὰρ Φαρισαῖοι τὴν δίαιταν ἐξευτελίζουσιν οὐδὲν ἐς τὸ μαλακώτερον ἐνδιδόντες, ὧν τε ὁ λόγος κρίνας παρέδωκεν ἀγαθῶν ἕπονται τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ περιμάχητον ἡγούμενοι τὴν φυλακὴν ὧν ὑπαγορεύειν ἠθέλησεν. τιμῆς γε τοῖς ἡλικίᾳ προήκουσιν παραχωροῦσιν οὐδ' ἐπ' ἀντιλέξει τῶν εἰσηγηθέντων ταῦτα οἱ θράσει ἐπαιρόμενοι." 18.12 Οὐιτέλλιος δὲ παρασκευασάμενος ὡς εἰς πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς ̓Αρέταν δυσὶ τάγμασιν ὁπλιτῶν ὅσοι τε περὶ αὐτὰ ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππεῖς συμμαχοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ ̔Ρωμαίοις βασιλειῶν ἀγόμενος, ἐπὶ τῆς Πέτρας ἠπείγετο καὶ ἔσχε Πτολεμαί̈δα.' "18.13 ̔Ηρώδῃ τῷ μεγάλῳ θυγατέρες ἐκ Μαριάμμης τῆς ̔Υρκανοῦ θυγατρὸς γίνονται δύο, Σαλαμψιὼ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἣ γαμεῖται Φασαήλῳ τῷ αὐτῆς ἀνεψιῷ Φασαήλου παιδὶ ὄντι τοῦ ̔Ηρώδου ἀδελφοῦ δεδωκότος τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτήν, Κύπρος δὲ ̓Αντιπάτρῳ καὶ αὐτὴ ἀνεψιῷ ̔Ηρώδου παιδὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς Σαλώμης. 18.13 πράσσεσθαί τε εἱμαρμένῃ τὰ πάντα ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τὸ βουλόμενον τῆς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὁρμῆς ἀφαιροῦνται δοκῆσαν τῷ θεῷ κρίσιν γενέσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐκείνης βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθελήσαντι προσχωρεῖν μετ' ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας." '18.14 ̓Αλεξάνδρῳ δὲ Τιγράνης ὁμώνυμος τῷ ἀδελφῷ γίνεται παῖς καὶ βασιλεὺς ̓Αρμενίας ὑπὸ Νέρωνος ἐκπέμπεται υἱός τε ̓Αλέξανδρος αὐτῷ γίνεται. γαμεῖ δ' οὗτος ̓Αντιόχου τοῦ Κομμαγηνῶν βασιλέως θυγατέρα ̓Ιωτάπην, ἡσίοδός τε τῆς ἐν Κιλικίᾳ Οὐεσπασιανὸς αὐτὸν ἵσταται βασιλέα." "18.14 ἀθάνατόν τε ἰσχὺν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πίστις αὐτοῖς εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ χθονὸς δικαιώσεις τε καὶ τιμὰς οἷς ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἐπιτήδευσις ἐν τῷ βίῳ γέγονεν, καὶ ταῖς μὲν εἱργμὸν ἀίδιον προτίθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ ῥᾳστώνην τοῦ ἀναβιοῦν.' "18.15 καὶ δι' αὐτὰ τοῖς τε δήμοις πιθανώτατοι τυγχάνουσιν καὶ ὁπόσα θεῖα εὐχῶν τε ἔχεται καὶ ἱερῶν ποιήσεως ἐξηγήσει τῇ ἐκείνων τυγχάνουσιν πρασσόμενα. εἰς τοσόνδε ἀρετῆς αὐτοῖς αἱ πόλεις ἐμαρτύρησαν ἐπιτηδεύσει τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κρείσσονος ἔν τε τῇ διαίτῃ τοῦ βίου καὶ λόγοις." "18.15 οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖόν γε ̔Ηρώδης ἐνέμεινε τοῖς δεδογμένοις, καίτοι γε οὐδ' ὣς ἀρκοῦντα ἦν: ἐν γὰρ Τύρῳ παρὰ συνουσίαν ὑπὸ οἴνου γενομένων αὐτοῖς λοιδοριῶν, ἀνεκτὸν οὐχ ἡγησάμενος ̓Αγρίππας τοῦ ̔Ηρώδου τε ἐπονειδίσαντος εἰς ἀπορίαν καὶ τροφῆς ἀναγκαίας μετάδοσιν, ὡς Φλάκκον τὸν ὑπατικὸν εἴσεισιν φίλον ἐπὶ ̔Ρώμης τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῷ γεγονότα πρότερον: Συρίαν δὲ ἐν τῷ τότε διεῖπεν." '18.16 Σαδδουκαίοις δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ λόγος συναφανίζει τοῖς σώμασι, φυλακῇ δὲ οὐδαμῶς τινων μεταποίησις αὐτοῖς ἢ τῶν νόμων: πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς διδασκάλους σοφίας, ἣν μετίασιν, ἀμφιλογεῖν ἀρετὴν ἀριθμοῦσιν. 18.16 ἡ δὲ ὑπισχνεῖτο, καὶ ὁ ̓Αλέξανδρος πέντε τάλαντα αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ̓Αλεξανδρείᾳ δοὺς τὸ λοιπὸν ἐν Δικαιαρχείᾳ γενομένοις παρέξειν ἐπηγγέλλετο, δεδιὼς τοῦ ̓Αγρίππου τὸ εἰς τὰ ἀναλώματα ἕτοιμον. καὶ Κύπρος μὲν ἀπαλλάξασα τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπὶ τῆς ̓Ιταλίας πλευσούμενον αὐτὴ μετὰ τῶν τέκνων ἐπὶ ̓Ιουδαίας ἀνέζευξεν.' "18.17 εἰς ὀλίγους δὲ ἄνδρας οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀφίκετο, τοὺς μέντοι πρώτους τοῖς ἀξιώμασι, πράσσεταί τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν: ὁπότε γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρχὰς παρέλθοιεν, ἀκουσίως μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκας, προσχωροῦσι δ' οὖν οἷς ὁ Φαρισαῖος λέγει διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄλλως ἀνεκτοὺς γενέσθαι τοῖς πλήθεσιν." "18.17 οὔτε γὰρ πρεσβειῶν ὑποδοχὰς ἐκ τοῦ ὀξέος ἐποιεῖτο ἡγεμόσι τε ἢ ἐπιτρόποις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σταλεῖσιν οὐδεμία ἦν διαδοχή, ὁπότε μὴ φθαῖεν τετελευτηκότες: ὅθεν καὶ δεσμωτῶν ἀκροάσεως ἀπερίοπτος ἦν." '18.18 ̓Εσσηνοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν θεῷ καταλείπειν φιλεῖ τὰ πάντα ὁ λόγος, ἀθανατίζουσιν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς περιμάχητον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ δικαίου τὴν πρόσοδον. 18.18 τιμία δὲ ἦν ̓Αντωνία Τιβερίῳ εἰς τὰ πάντα συγγενείας τε ἀξιώματι, Δρούσου γὰρ ἦν ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ γυνή, καὶ ἀρετῇ τοῦ σώφρονος: νέα γὰρ χηρεύειν παρέμεινεν γάμῳ τε ἀπεῖπεν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον καίπερ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ κελεύοντός τινι γαμεῖσθαι, καὶ λοιδοριῶν ἀπηλλαγμένον διεσώσατο αὐτῆς τὸν βίον.' "18.19 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ Καῖσαρ περιοδεύσας τὸν ἱππόδρομον λαμβάνει τὸν ̓Αγρίππαν ἑστηκότα, “καὶ μὴν δή, φησίν, Μάκρων, τοῦτον εἶπον δεθῆναι”. τοῦ δὲ ἐπανερομένου ὅντινα, “̓Αγρίππαν γε” εἶπεν." "18.19 εἰς δὲ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀναθήματα στέλλοντες θυσίας ἐπιτελοῦσιν διαφορότητι ἁγνειῶν, ἃς νομίζοιεν, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ εἰργόμενοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τεμενίσματος ἐφ' αὑτῶν τὰς θυσίας ἐπιτελοῦσιν. βέλτιστοι δὲ ἄλλως ἄνδρες τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πᾶν πονεῖν ἐπὶ γεωργίᾳ τετραμμένοι." "18.21 καὶ οὔτε γαμετὰς εἰσάγονται οὔτε δούλων ἐπιτηδεύουσιν κτῆσιν, τὸ μὲν εἰς ἀδικίαν φέρειν ὑπειληφότες, τὸ δὲ στάσεως ἐνδιδόναι ποίησιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ζῶντες διακονίᾳ τῇ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ἐπιχρῶνται." '18.21 οὕτως ἀνεπαχθῶς ὡμίλησε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἐξ ὧν μέγα ὄφελος καὶ τῷ παιδὶ αὐτοῦ παρὰ πᾶσιν κατελέλειπτο τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα τὸ στρατιωτικὸν ἦρτο, ἀρετὴν ἀριθμοῦντες τὸ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνῳ περιγενησομένης, εἰ δεήσει, καὶ τελευτᾶν.' "18.22 ἀξιῶ δέ σε μηδὲν ἀμνημονεῖν ὁμιλήσαντα αὐτῇ μήτ' εὐνοίας τῆς ἐμῆς, ὃς εἰς τοσόνδε ἀξιώματος καθίστημι μέγεθος," 18.22 ἀποδέκτας δὲ τῶν προσόδων χειροτονοῦντες καὶ ὁπόσα ἡ γῆ φέροι ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς, ἱερεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσει σίτου τε καὶ βρωμάτων. ζῶσι δὲ οὐδὲν παρηλλαγμένως, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἐμφέροντες Δακῶν τοῖς πλείστοις λεγομένοις." "" None | sup>
1.14 3. Noah, when, after the deluge, the earth was resettled in its former condition, set about its cultivation; and when he had planted it with vines, and when the fruit was ripe, and he had gathered the grapes in their season, and the wine was ready for use, he offered sacrifice, and feasted,
1.14 Upon the whole, a man that will peruse this history, may principally learn from it, that all events succeed well, even to an incredible degree, and the reward of felicity is proposed by God; but then it is to those that follow his will, and do not venture to break his excellent laws: and that so far as men any way apostatize from the accurate observation of them, what was practicable before becomes impracticable; and whatsoever they set about as a good thing is converted into an incurable calamity.
2.284 3. But when the king derided Moses; he made him in earnest see the signs that were done at Mount Sinai. Yet was the king very angry with him and called him an ill man, who had formerly run away from his Egyptian slavery, and came now back with deceitful tricks, and wonders, and magical arts, to astonish him. 2.285 And when he had said this, he commanded the priests to let him see the same wonderful sights; as knowing that the Egyptians were skillful in this kind of learning, and that he was not the only person who knew them, and pretended them to be divine; as also he told him, that when he brought such wonderful sights before him, he would only be believed by the unlearned. Now when the priests threw down their rods, they became serpents. 2.286 But Moses was not daunted at it; and said, “O king, I do not myself despise the wisdom of the Egyptians, but I say that what I do is so much superior to what these do by magic arts and tricks, as divine power exceeds the power of man: but I will demonstrate that what I do is not done by craft, or counterfeiting what is not really true, but that they appear by the providence and power of God.” 2.287 And when he had said this, he cast his rod down upon the ground, and commanded it to turn itself into a serpent. It obeyed him, and went all round, and devoured the rods of the Egyptians, which seemed to be dragons, until it had consumed them all. It then returned to its own form, and Moses took it into his hand again. 2.288 4. However, the king was no more moved when was done than before; and being very angry, he said that he should gain nothing by this his cunning and shrewdness against the Egyptians;—and he commanded him that was the chief taskmaster over the Hebrews, to give them no relaxation from their labors, but to compel them to submit to greater oppressions than before; 2.289 and though he allowed them chaff before for making their bricks, he would allow it them no longer, but he made them to work hard at brick-making in the day-time, and to gather chaff in the night. Now when their labor was thus doubled upon them, they laid the blame upon Moses, because their labor and their misery were on his account become more severe to them. 2.291 So he went to the king, and persuaded him to let the Hebrews go to Mount Sinai, and there to sacrifice to God, because God had enjoined them so to do. He persuaded him also not to counterwork the designs of God, but to esteem his favor above all things, and to permit them to depart, lest, before he be aware, he lay an obstruction in the way of the divine commands, and so occasion his own suffering such punishments as it was probable any one that counterworked the divine commands should undergo, 2.292 ince the severest afflictions arise from every object to those that provoke the divine wrath against them; for such as these have neither the earth nor the air for their friends; nor are the fruits of the womb according to nature, but every thing is unfriendly and adverse towards them. He said further, that the Egyptians should know this by sad experience; and that besides, the Hebrew people should go out of their country without their consent.
10.278 who cast Providence out of human life, and do not believe that God takes care of the affairs of the world, nor that the universe is governed and continued in being by that blessed and immortal nature, but say that the world is carried along of its own accord, without a ruler and a curator;
13.171 9. At this time there were three sects among the Jews, who had different opinions concerning human actions; the one was called the sect of the Pharisees, another the sect of the Sadducees, and the other the sect of the Essenes. 13.172 Now for the Pharisees, they say that some actions, but not all, are the work of fate, and some of them are in our own power, and that they are liable to fate, but are not caused by fate. But the sect of the Essenes affirm, that fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination. 13.173 And for the Sadducees, they take away fate, and say there is no such thing, and that the events of human affairs are not at its disposal; but they suppose that all our actions are in our own power, so that we are ourselves the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from our own folly. However, I have given a more exact account of these opinions in the second book of the Jewish War.
18.12 3. Now, for the Pharisees, they live meanly, and despise delicacies in diet; and they follow the conduct of reason; and what that prescribes to them as good for them they do; and they think they ought earnestly to strive to observe reason’s dictates for practice. They also pay a respect to such as are in years; nor are they so bold as to contradict them in any thing which they have introduced;
18.12 3. So Vitellius prepared to make war with Aretas, having with him two legions of armed men; he also took with him all those of light armature, and of the horsemen which belonged to them, and were drawn out of those kingdoms which were under the Romans, and made haste for Petra, and came to Ptolemais. 18.13 4. Herod the Great had two daughters by Mariamne, the grand daughter of Hyrcanus; the one was Salampsio, who was married to Phasaelus, her first cousin, who was himself the son of Phasaelus, Herod’s brother, her father making the match; the other was Cypros, who was herself married also to her first cousin Antipater, the son of Salome, Herod’s sister. 18.13 and when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament, whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. 18.14 Alexander had a son of the same name with his brother Tigranes, and was sent to take possession of the kingdom of Armenia by Nero; he had a son, Alexander, who married Jotape, the daughter of Antiochus, the king of Commagena; Vespasian made him king of an island in Cilicia. 18.14 They also believe that souls have an immortal rigor in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards or punishments, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again; 18.15 Yet did not Herod long continue in that resolution of supporting him, though even that support was not sufficient for him; for as once they were at a feast at Tyre, and in their cups, and reproaches were cast upon one another, Agrippa thought that was not to be borne, while Herod hit him in the teeth with his poverty, and with his owing his necessary food to him. So he went to Flaccus, one that had been consul, and had been a very great friend to him at Rome formerly, and was now president of Syria. 18.15 on account of which doctrines they are able greatly to persuade the body of the people; and whatsoever they do about divine worship, prayers, and sacrifices, they perform them according to their direction; insomuch that the cities give great attestations to them on account of their entire virtuous conduct, both in the actions of their lives and their discourses also. 18.16 4. But the doctrine of the Sadducees is this: That souls die with the bodies; nor do they regard the observation of any thing besides what the law enjoins them; for they think it an instance of virtue to dispute with those teachers of philosophy whom they frequent: 18.16 o she undertook to repay it. Accordingly, Alexander paid them five talents at Alexandria, and promised to pay them the rest of that sum at Dicearchia Puteoli; and this he did out of the fear he was in that Agrippa would soon spend it. So this Cypros set her husband free, and dismissed him to go on with his navigation to Italy, while she and her children departed for Judea. 18.17 but this doctrine is received but by a few, yet by those still of the greatest dignity. But they are able to do almost nothing of themselves; for when they become magistrates, as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to be, they addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees, because the multitude would not otherwise bear them. 18.17 for he did not admit ambassadors quickly, and no successors were despatched away to governors or procurators of the provinces that had been formerly sent, unless they were dead; whence it was that he was so negligent in hearing the causes of prisoners; 18.18 5. The doctrine of the Essenes is this: That all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for; 18.18 Now Antonia was greatly esteemed by Tiberius on all accounts, from the dignity of her relation to him, who had been his brother Drusus’s wife, and from her eminent chastity; for though she was still a young woman, she continued in her widowhood, and refused all other matches, although Augustus had enjoined her to be married to somebody else; yet did she all along preserve her reputation free from reproach. 18.19 But when Caesar had gone round the hippodrome, he found Agrippa standing: “For certain,” said he, “Macro, this is the man I meant to have bound;” and when he still asked, “Which of these is to be bound?” he said “Agrippa.” 18.19 and when they send what they have dedicated to God into the temple, they do not offer sacrifices because they have more pure lustrations of their own; on which account they are excluded from the common court of the temple, but offer their sacrifices themselves; yet is their course of life better than that of other men; and they entirely addict themselves to husbandry. 18.21 and neither marry wives, nor are desirous to keep servants; as thinking the latter tempts men to be unjust, and the former gives the handle to domestic quarrels; but as they live by themselves, they minister one to another. 18.21 that it turned greatly to the advantage of his son among all; and, among others, the soldiery were so peculiarly affected to him, that they reckoned it an eligible thing, if need were, to die themselves, if he might but attain to the government. 18.22 They also appoint certain stewards to receive the incomes of their revenues, and of the fruits of the ground; such as are good men and priests, who are to get their corn and their food ready for them. They none of them differ from others of the Essenes in their way of living, but do the most resemble those Dacae who are called Polistae dwellers in cities. 18.22 and I desire thee never to be unmindful when thou comest to it, either of my kindness to thee, who set thee in so high a dignity,' ' None |
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31. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 2.119-2.129, 2.131-2.139, 2.141-2.149, 2.151-2.162, 2.164-2.166, 5.400, 5.403 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 151, 152, 155, 179, 211, 220; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 213, 214; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 94, 133; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 63; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 26, 27, 30
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2.119 Τρία γὰρ παρὰ ̓Ιουδαίοις εἴδη φιλοσοφεῖται, καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἱρετισταὶ Φαρισαῖοι, τοῦ δὲ Σαδδουκαῖοι, τρίτον δέ, ὃ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σεμνότητα ἀσκεῖν, ̓Εσσηνοὶ καλοῦνται, ̓Ιουδαῖοι μὲν γένος ὄντες, φιλάλληλοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλέον. 2.121 τὸν μὲν γάμον καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ διαδοχὴν οὐκ ἀναιροῦντες, τὰς δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀσελγείας φυλαττόμενοι καὶ μηδεμίαν τηρεῖν πεπεισμένοι τὴν πρὸς ἕνα πίστιν.' "2.122 Καταφρονηταὶ δὲ πλούτου, καὶ θαυμάσιον αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινωνικόν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν κτήσει τινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπερέχοντα: νόμος γὰρ τοὺς εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν εἰσιόντας δημεύειν τῷ τάγματι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥστε ἐν ἅπασιν μήτε πενίας ταπεινότητα φαίνεσθαι μήθ' ὑπεροχὴν πλούτου, τῶν δ' ἑκάστου κτημάτων ἀναμεμιγμένων μίαν ὥσπερ ἀδελφοῖς ἅπασιν οὐσίαν εἶναι." "2.123 κηλῖδα δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸ ἔλαιον, κἂν ἀλειφθῇ τις ἄκων, σμήχεται τὸ σῶμα: τὸ γὰρ αὐχμεῖν ἐν καλῷ τίθενται λευχειμονεῖν τε διαπαντός. χειροτονητοὶ δ' οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμεληταὶ καὶ ἀδιαίρετοι πρὸς ἁπάντων εἰς τὰς χρείας ἕκαστοι." "2.124 Μία δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν πόλις ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστῃ μετοικοῦσιν πολλοί. καὶ τοῖς ἑτέρωθεν ἥκουσιν αἱρετισταῖς πάντ' ἀναπέπταται τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἴδια, καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὐ πρότερον εἶδον εἰσίασιν ὡς συνηθεστάτους:" "2.125 διὸ καὶ ποιοῦνται τὰς ἀποδημίας οὐδὲν μὲν ὅλως ἐπικομιζόμενοι, διὰ δὲ τοὺς λῃστὰς ἔνοπλοι. κηδεμὼν δ' ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τοῦ τάγματος ἐξαιρέτως τῶν ξένων ἀποδείκνυται ταμιεύων ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια." '2.126 καταστολὴ δὲ καὶ σχῆμα σώματος ὅμοιον τοῖς μετὰ φόβου παιδαγωγουμένοις παισίν. οὔτε δὲ ἐσθῆτας οὔτε ὑποδήματα ἀμείβουσι πρὶν διαρραγῆναι τὸ πρότερον παντάπασιν ἢ δαπανηθῆναι τῷ χρόνῳ.' "2.127 οὐδὲν δ' ἐν ἀλλήλοις οὔτ' ἀγοράζουσιν οὔτε πωλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ χρῄζοντι διδοὺς ἕκαστος τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ παρ' ἐκείνου χρήσιμον ἀντικομίζεται: καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ἀκώλυτος ἡ μετάληψις αὐτοῖς παρ' ὧν ἂν θέλωσιν." '2.128 Πρός γε μὴν τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβεῖς ἰδίως: πρὶν γὰρ ἀνασχεῖν τὸν ἥλιον οὐδὲν φθέγγονται τῶν βεβήλων, πατρίους δέ τινας εἰς αὐτὸν εὐχὰς ὥσπερ ἱκετεύοντες ἀνατεῖλαι. 2.129 καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἃς ἕκαστοι τέχνας ἴσασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν διαφίενται, καὶ μέχρι πέμπτης ὥρας ἐργασάμενοι συντόνως πάλιν εἰς ἓν συναθροίζονται χωρίον, ζωσάμενοί τε σκεπάσμασιν λινοῖς οὕτως ἀπολούονται τὸ σῶμα ψυχροῖς ὕδασιν, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁγνείαν εἰς ἴδιον οἴκημα συνίασιν, ἔνθα μηδενὶ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἐπιτέτραπται παρελθεῖν: αὐτοί τε καθαροὶ καθάπερ εἰς ἅγιόν τι τέμενος παραγίνονται τὸ δειπνητήριον.' "
2.131 προκατεύχεται δ' ὁ ἱερεὺς τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ γεύσασθαί τινα πρὶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἀθέμιτον: ἀριστοποιησάμενος δ' ἐπεύχεται πάλιν: ἀρχόμενοί τε καὶ παυόμενοι γεραίρουσι θεὸν ὡς χορηγὸν τῆς ζωῆς. ἔπειθ' ὡς ἱερὰς καταθέμενοι τὰς ἐσθῆτας πάλιν ἐπ' ἔργα μέχρι δείλης τρέπονται." "2.132 δειπνοῦσι δ' ὁμοίως ὑποστρέψαντες συγκαθεζομένων τῶν ξένων, εἰ τύχοιεν αὐτοῖς παρόντες. οὔτε δὲ κραυγή ποτε τὸν οἶκον οὔτε θόρυβος μιαίνει, τὰς δὲ λαλιὰς ἐν τάξει παραχωροῦσιν ἀλλήλοις." "2.133 καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ὡς μυστήριόν τι φρικτὸν ἡ τῶν ἔνδον σιωπὴ καταφαίνεται, τούτου δ' αἴτιον ἡ διηνεκὴς νῆψις καὶ τὸ μετρεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς τροφὴν καὶ ποτὸν μέχρι κόρου." "2.134 Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι μὴ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν προσταξάντων ἐνεργοῦσι, δύο δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτοῖς αὐτεξούσια, ἐπικουρία καὶ ἔλεος: βοηθεῖν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἀξίοις, ὁπόταν δέωνται, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐφίεται καὶ τροφὰς ἀπορουμένοις ὀρέγειν. τὰς δὲ εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς μεταδόσεις οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιεῖσθαι δίχα τῶν ἐπιτρόπων." "2.135 ὀργῆς ταμίαι δίκαιοι, θυμοῦ καθεκτικοί, πίστεως προστάται, εἰρήνης ὑπουργοί. καὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἰσχυρότερον ὅρκου, τὸ δὲ ὀμνύειν αὐτοῖς περιίσταται χεῖρον τῆς ἐπιορκίας ὑπολαμβάνοντες: ἤδη γὰρ κατεγνῶσθαί φασιν τὸν ἀπιστούμενον δίχα θεοῦ." "2.136 σπουδάζουσι δ' ἐκτόπως περὶ τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν συντάγματα μάλιστα τὰ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐκλέγοντες: ἔνθεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς θεραπείαν παθῶν ῥίζαι τε ἀλεξητήριον καὶ λίθων ἰδιότητες ἀνερευνῶνται." "2.137 Τοῖς δὲ ζηλοῦσιν τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἡ πάροδος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔξω μένοντι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποτίθενται δίαιταν ἀξινάριόν τε καὶ τὸ προειρημένον περίζωμα καὶ λευκὴν ἐσθῆτα δόντες." '2.138 ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πεῖραν ἐγκρατείας δῷ, πρόσεισιν μὲν ἔγγιον τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ καθαρωτέρων τῶν πρὸς ἁγνείαν ὑδάτων μεταλαμβάνει, παραλαμβάνεται δὲ εἰς τὰς συμβιώσεις οὐδέπω. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τῆς καρτερίας ἐπίδειξιν δυσὶν ἄλλοις ἔτεσιν τὸ ἦθος δοκιμάζεται καὶ φανεὶς ἄξιος οὕτως εἰς τὸν ὅμιλον ἐγκρίνεται.' "2.139 πρὶν δὲ τῆς κοινῆς ἅψασθαι τροφῆς ὅρκους αὐτοῖς ὄμνυσι φρικώδεις, πρῶτον μὲν εὐσεβήσειν τὸ θεῖον, ἔπειτα τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια φυλάξειν καὶ μήτε κατὰ γνώμην βλάψειν τινὰ μήτε ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος, μισήσειν δ' ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀδίκους καὶ συναγωνιεῖσθαι τοῖς δικαίοις:" "
2.141 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀγαπᾶν ἀεὶ καὶ τοὺς ψευδομένους προβάλλεσθαι: χεῖρας κλοπῆς καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνοσίου κέρδους καθαρὰν φυλάξειν καὶ μήτε κρύψειν τι τοὺς αἱρετιστὰς μήθ' ἑτέροις αὐτῶν τι μηνύσειν, κἂν μέχρι θανάτου τις βιάζηται." '2.142 πρὸς τούτοις ὄμνυσιν μηδενὶ μὲν μεταδοῦναι τῶν δογμάτων ἑτέρως ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς μετέλαβεν, ἀφέξεσθαι δὲ λῃστείας καὶ συντηρήσειν ὁμοίως τά τε τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν βιβλία καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα. τοιούτοις μὲν ὅρκοις τοὺς προσιόντας ἐξασφαλίζονται.' "2.143 Τοὺς δ' ἐπ' ἀξιοχρέοις ἁμαρτήμασιν ἁλόντας ἐκβάλλουσι τοῦ τάγματος. ὁ δ' ἐκκριθεὶς οἰκτίστῳ πολλάκις μόρῳ διαφθείρεται: τοῖς γὰρ ὅρκοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐνδεδεμένος οὐδὲ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις τροφῆς δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν, ποηφαγῶν δὲ καὶ λιμῷ τὸ σῶμα τηκόμενος διαφθείρεται." '2.144 διὸ δὴ πολλοὺς ἐλεήσαντες ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἀναπνοαῖς ἀνέλαβον, ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν τὴν μέχρι θανάτου βάσανον ἡγούμενοι.' "2.145 Περὶ δὲ τὰς κρίσεις ἀκριβέστατοι καὶ δίκαιοι, καὶ δικάζουσι μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν ἑκατὸν συνελθόντες, τὸ δ' ὁρισθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀκίνητον. σέβας δὲ μέγα παρ' αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὸν θεὸν τοὔνομα τοῦ νομοθέτου, κἂν βλασφημήσῃ τις εἰς τοῦτον κολάζεται θανάτῳ." '2.146 τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις ὑπακούουσιν καὶ τοῖς πλείοσιν ἐν καλῷ: δέκα γοῦν συγκαθεζομένων οὐκ ἂν λαλήσειέν τις ἀκόντων τῶν ἐννέα.' "2.147 καὶ τὸ πτύσαι δὲ εἰς μέσους ἢ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος φυλάσσονται καὶ ταῖς ἑβδομάσιν ἔργων ἐφάπτεσθαι διαφορώτατα ̓Ιουδαίων ἁπάντων: οὐ μόνον γὰρ τροφὰς ἑαυτοῖς πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμέρας παρασκευάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ πῦρ ἐναύοιεν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σκεῦός τι μετακινῆσαι θαρροῦσιν οὐδὲ ἀποπατεῖν." "2.148 ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις ἡμέραις βόθρον ὀρύσσοντες βάθος ποδιαῖον τῇ σκαλίδι, τοιοῦτον γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διδόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀξινίδιον τοῖς νεοσυστάτοις, καὶ περικαλύψαντες θοιμάτιον, ὡς μὴ τὰς αὐγὰς ὑβρίζοιεν τοῦ θεοῦ, θακεύουσιν εἰς αὐτόν." "2.149 ἔπειτα τὴν ἀνορυχθεῖσαν γῆν ἐφέλκουσιν εἰς τὸν βόθρον: καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι τοὺς ἐρημοτέρους τόπους ἐκλεγόμενοι. καίπερ δὴ φυσικῆς οὔσης τῆς τῶν λυμάτων ἐκκρίσεως ἀπολούεσθαι μετ' αὐτὴν καθάπερ μεμιασμένοις ἔθιμον." "
2.151 καὶ μακρόβιοι μέν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑκατὸν παρατείνειν ἔτη, διὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς διαίτης ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν καὶ τὴν εὐταξίαν, καταφρονηταὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀλγηδόνας νικῶντες τοῖς φρονήμασιν, τὸν δὲ θάνατον, εἰ μετ' εὐκλείας πρόσεισι, νομίζοντες ἀθανασίας ἀμείνονα." "2.152 διήλεγξεν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἅπασιν τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ πρὸς ̔Ρωμαίους πόλεμος, ἐν ᾧ στρεβλούμενοί τε καὶ λυγιζόμενοι καιόμενοί τε καὶ κλώμενοι καὶ διὰ πάντων ὁδεύοντες τῶν βασανιστηρίων ὀργάνων, ἵν' ἢ βλασφημήσωσιν τὸν νομοθέτην ἢ φάγωσίν τι τῶν ἀσυνήθων, οὐδέτερον ὑπέμειναν παθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κολακεῦσαί ποτε τοὺς αἰκιζομένους ἢ δακρῦσαι." '2.153 μειδιῶντες δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ κατειρωνευόμενοι τῶν τὰς βασάνους προσφερόντων εὔθυμοι τὰς ψυχὰς ἠφίεσαν ὡς πάλιν κομιούμενοι.' "2.154 Καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν, καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος ὥσπερ εἱρκταῖς τοῖς σώμασιν ἴυγγί τινι φυσικῇ κατασπωμένας," "2.155 ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμῶν, οἷα δὴ μακρᾶς δουλείας ἀπηλλαγμένας τότε χαίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέρεσθαι. καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοδοξοῦντες παισὶν ̔Ελλήνων ἀποφαίνονται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὠκεανὸν δίαιταν ἀποκεῖσθαι καὶ χῶρον οὔτε ὄμβροις οὔτε νιφετοῖς οὔτε καύμασι βαρυνόμενον, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ πραὺ̈ς ἀεὶ ζέφυρος ἐπιπνέων ἀναψύχει: ταῖς δὲ φαύλαις ζοφώδη καὶ χειμέριον ἀφορίζονται μυχὸν γέμοντα τιμωριῶν ἀδιαλείπτων." "2.156 δοκοῦσι δέ μοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ̔́Ελληνες τοῖς τε ἀνδρείοις αὐτῶν, οὓς ἥρωας καὶ ἡμιθέους καλοῦσιν, τὰς μακάρων νήσους ἀνατεθεικέναι, ταῖς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ψυχαῖς καθ' ᾅδου τὸν ἀσεβῶν χῶρον, ἔνθα καὶ κολαζομένους τινὰς μυθολογοῦσιν, Σισύφους καὶ Ταντάλους ̓Ιξίονάς τε καὶ Τιτυούς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀιδίους ὑφιστάμενοι τὰς ψυχάς, ἔπειτα εἰς προτροπὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀποτροπήν." '2.157 τούς τε γὰρ ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμείνους ἐλπίδι τιμῆς καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν, τῶν τε κακῶν ἐμποδίζεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς δέει προσδοκώντων, εἰ καὶ λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν ἀθάνατον τιμωρίαν ὑφέξειν. 2.158 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ̓Εσσηνοὶ περὶ ψυχῆς θεολογοῦσιν ἄφυκτον δέλεαρ τοῖς ἅπαξ γευσαμένοις τῆς σοφίας αὐτῶν καθιέντες.' "2.159 Εἰσὶν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς οἳ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προγινώσκειν ὑπισχνοῦνται, βίβλοις ἱεραῖς καὶ διαφόροις ἁγνείαις καὶ προφητῶν ἀποφθέγμασιν ἐμπαιδοτριβούμενοι: σπάνιον δ' εἴ ποτε ἐν ταῖς προαγορεύσεσιν ἀστοχοῦσιν." "2.161 δοκιμάζοντες μέντοι τριετίᾳ τὰς γαμετάς, ἐπειδὰν τρὶς καθαρθῶσιν εἰς πεῖραν τοῦ δύνασθαι τίκτειν, οὕτως ἄγονται. ταῖς δ' ἐγκύμοσιν οὐχ ὁμιλοῦσιν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὸ μὴ δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ τέκνων χρείαν γαμεῖν. λουτρὰ δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἀμπεχομέναις ἐνδύματα, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν περιζώματι. τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔθη τοῦδε τοῦ τάγματος." '2.162 Δύο δὲ τῶν προτέρων Φαρισαῖοι μὲν οἱ μετὰ ἀκριβείας δοκοῦντες ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὴν πρώτην ἀπάγοντες αἵρεσιν εἱμαρμένῃ τε καὶ θεῷ προσάπτουσι πάντα,
2.164 Σαδδουκαῖοι δέ, τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα, τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην παντάπασιν ἀναιροῦσιν καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔξω τοῦ δρᾶν τι κακὸν ἢ ἐφορᾶν τίθενται:' "2.165 φασὶν δ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκλογῇ τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν προκεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ γνώμην ἑκάστου τούτων ἑκατέρῳ προσιέναι. ψυχῆς τε τὴν διαμονὴν καὶ τὰς καθ' ᾅδου τιμωρίας καὶ τιμὰς ἀναιροῦσιν." '2.166 καὶ Φαρισαῖοι μὲν φιλάλληλοί τε καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὁμόνοιαν ἀσκοῦντες, Σαδδουκαίων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ ἦθος ἀγριώτερον αἵ τε ἐπιμιξίαι πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπηνεῖς ὡς πρὸς ἀλλοτρίους. τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν ἐν ̓Ιουδαίοις φιλοσοφούντων εἶχον εἰπεῖν.' "
5.403 εἶτ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν ἀσεβηθέντα σύμμαχον προσδοκᾶτε; πάνυ γοῦν ἐστὲ δίκαιοι ἱκέται καὶ χερσὶ καθαραῖς τὸν βοηθὸν ὑμῶν παρακαλεῖτε." ' None | sup>
2.119 2. For there are three philosophical sects among the Jews. The followers of the first of which are the Pharisees; of the second, the Sadducees; and the third sect, which pretends to a severer discipline, are called Essenes. These last are Jews by birth, and seem to have a greater affection for one another than the other sects have. 2.121 They do not absolutely deny the fitness of marriage, and the succession of mankind thereby continued; but they guard against the lascivious behavior of women, and are persuaded that none of them preserve their fidelity to one man. 2.122 3. These men are despisers of riches, and so very communicative as raises our admiration. Nor is there anyone to be found among them who hath more than another; for it is a law among them, that those who come to them must let what they have be common to the whole order,—insomuch that among them all there is no appearance of poverty, or excess of riches, but every one’s possessions are intermingled with every other’s possessions; and so there is, as it were, one patrimony among all the brethren. 2.123 They think that oil is a defilement; and if anyone of them be anointed without his own approbation, it is wiped off his body; for they think to be sweaty is a good thing, as they do also to be clothed in white garments. They also have stewards appointed to take care of their common affairs, who every one of them have no separate business for any, but what is for the use of them all. 2.124 4. They have no one certain city, but many of them dwell in every city; and if any of their sect come from other places, what they have lies open for them, just as if it were their own; and they go in to such as they never knew before, as if they had been ever so long acquainted with them. 2.125 For which reason they carry nothing at all with them when they travel into remote parts, though still they take their weapons with them, for fear of thieves. Accordingly, there is, in every city where they live, one appointed particularly to take care of strangers, and to provide garments and other necessaries for them. 2.126 But the habit and management of their bodies is such as children use who are in fear of their masters. Nor do they allow of the change of garments, or of shoes, till they be first entirely torn to pieces or worn out by time. 2.127 Nor do they either buy or sell anything to one another; but every one of them gives what he hath to him that wanteth it, and receives from him again in lieu of it what may be convenient for himself; and although there be no requital made, they are fully allowed to take what they want of whomsoever they please. 2.128 5. And as for their piety towards God, it is very extraordinary; for before sunrising they speak not a word about profane matters, but put up certain prayers which they have received from their forefathers, as if they made a supplication for its rising. 2.129 After this every one of them are sent away by their curators, to exercise some of those arts wherein they are skilled, in which they labor with great diligence till the fifth hour. After which they assemble themselves together again into one place; and when they have clothed themselves in white veils, they then bathe their bodies in cold water. And after this purification is over, they every one meet together in an apartment of their own, into which it is not permitted to any of another sect to enter; while they go, after a pure manner, into the dining-room, as into a certain holy temple,
2.131 but a priest says grace before meat; and it is unlawful for anyone to taste of the food before grace be said. The same priest, when he hath dined, says grace again after meat; and when they begin, and when they end, they praise God, as he that bestows their food upon them; after which they lay aside their white garments, and betake themselves to their labors again till the evening; 2.132 then they return home to supper, after the same manner; and if there be any strangers there, they sit down with them. Nor is there ever any clamor or disturbance to pollute their house, but they give every one leave to speak in their turn; 2.133 which silence thus kept in their house appears to foreigners like some tremendous mystery; the cause of which is that perpetual sobriety they exercise, and the same settled measure of meat and drink that is allotted to them, and that such as is abundantly sufficient for them. 2.134 6. And truly, as for other things, they do nothing but according to the injunctions of their curators; only these two things are done among them at everyone’s own free will, which are to assist those that want it, and to show mercy; for they are permitted of their own accord to afford succor to such as deserve it, when they stand in need of it, and to bestow food on those that are in distress; but they cannot give any thing to their kindred without the curators. 2.135 They dispense their anger after a just manner, and restrain their passion. They are eminent for fidelity, and are the ministers of peace; whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury for they say that he who cannot be believed without swearing by God is already condemned. 2.136 They also take great pains in studying the writings of the ancients, and choose out of them what is most for the advantage of their soul and body; and they inquire after such roots and medicinal stones as may cure their distempers. 2.137 7. But now, if anyone hath a mind to come over to their sect, he is not immediately admitted, but he is prescribed the same method of living which they use, for a year, while he continues excluded; and they give him also a small hatchet, and the fore-mentioned girdle, and the white garment. 2.138 And when he hath given evidence, during that time, that he can observe their continence, he approaches nearer to their way of living, and is made a partaker of the waters of purification; yet is he not even now admitted to live with them; for after this demonstration of his fortitude, his temper is tried two more years; and if he appear to be worthy, they then admit him into their society. 2.139 And before he is allowed to touch their common food, he is obliged to take tremendous oaths, that, in the first place, he will exercise piety towards God, and then that he will observe justice towards men, and that he will do no harm to any one, either of his own accord, or by the command of others; that he will always hate the wicked, and be assistant to the righteous;
2.141 that he will be perpetually a lover of truth, and propose to himself to reprove those that tell lies; that he will keep his hands clear from theft, and his soul from unlawful gains; and that he will neither conceal anything from those of his own sect, nor discover any of their doctrines to others, no, not though anyone should compel him so to do at the hazard of his life. 2.142 Moreover, he swears to communicate their doctrines to no one any otherwise than as he received them himself; that he will abstain from robbery, and will equally preserve the books belonging to their sect, and the names of the angels or messengers. These are the oaths by which they secure their proselytes to themselves. 2.143 8. But for those that are caught in any heinous sins, they cast them out of their society; and he who is thus separated from them does often die after a miserable manner; for as he is bound by the oath he hath taken, and by the customs he hath been engaged in, he is not at liberty to partake of that food that he meets with elsewhere, but is forced to eat grass, and to famish his body with hunger, till he perish; 2.144 for which reason they receive many of them again when they are at their last gasp, out of compassion to them, as thinking the miseries they have endured till they came to the very brink of death to be a sufficient punishment for the sins they had been guilty of. 2.145 9. But in the judgments they exercise they are most accurate and just, nor do they pass sentence by the votes of a court that is fewer than a hundred. And as to what is once determined by that number, it is unalterable. What they most of all honor, after God himself, is the name of their legislator Moses, whom, if anyone blaspheme, he is punished capitally. 2.146 They also think it a good thing to obey their elders, and the major part. Accordingly, if ten of them be sitting together, no one of them will speak while the other nine are against it. 2.147 They also avoid spitting in the midst of them, or on the right side. Moreover, they are stricter than any other of the Jews in resting from their labors on the seventh day; for they not only get their food ready the day before, that they may not be obliged to kindle a fire on that day, but they will not remove any vessel out of its place, nor go to stool thereon. 2.148 Nay, on theother days they dig a small pit, a foot deep, with a paddle (which kind of hatchet is given them when they are first admitted among them); and covering themselves round with their garment, that they may not affront the Divine rays of light, they ease themselves into that pit, 2.149 after which they put the earth that was dug out again into the pit; and even this they do only in the more lonely places, which they choose out for this purpose; and although this easement of the body be natural, yet it is a rule with them to wash themselves after it, as if it were a defilement to them.
2.151 They are long-lived also, insomuch that many of them live above a hundred years, by means of the simplicity of their diet; nay, as I think, by means of the regular course of life they observe also. They condemn the miseries of life, and are above pain, by the generosity of their mind. And as for death, if it will be for their glory, they esteem it better than living always; 2.152 and indeed our war with the Romans gave abundant evidence what great souls they had in their trials, wherein, although they were tortured and distorted, burnt and torn to pieces, and went through all kinds of instruments of torment, that they might be forced either to blaspheme their legislator, or to eat what was forbidden them, yet could they not be made to do either of them, no, nor once to flatter their tormentors, or to shed a tear; 2.153 but they smiled in their very pains, and laughed those to scorn who inflicted the torments upon them, and resigned up their souls with great alacrity, as expecting to receive them again. 2.154 11. For their doctrine is this: That bodies are corruptible, and that the matter they are made of is not permanent; but that the souls are immortal, and continue forever; and that they come out of the most subtile air, and are united to their bodies as to prisons, into which they are drawn by a certain natural enticement; 2.155 but that when they are set free from the bonds of the flesh, they then, as released from a long bondage, rejoice and mount upward. And this is like the opinions of the Greeks, that good souls have their habitations beyond the ocean, in a region that is neither oppressed with storms of rain or snow, or with intense heat, but that this place is such as is refreshed by the gentle breathing of a west wind, that is perpetually blowing from the ocean; while they allot to bad souls a dark and tempestuous den, full of never-ceasing punishments. 2.156 And indeed the Greeks seem to me to have followed the same notion, when they allot the islands of the blessed to their brave men, whom they call heroes and demigods; and to the souls of the wicked, the region of the ungodly, in Hades, where their fables relate that certain persons, such as Sisyphus, and Tantalus, and Ixion, and Tityus, are punished; which is built on this first supposition, that souls are immortal; and thence are those exhortations to virtue, and dehortations from wickedness collected; 2.157 whereby good men are bettered in the conduct of their life by the hope they have of reward after their death; and whereby the vehement inclinations of bad men to vice are restrained, by the fear and expectation they are in, that although they should lie concealed in this life, they should suffer immortal punishment after their death. 2.158 These are the Divine doctrines of the Essenes about the soul, which lay an unavoidable bait for such as have once had a taste of their philosophy. 2.159 12. There are also those among them who undertake to foretell things to come, by reading the holy books, and using several sorts of purifications, and being perpetually conversant in the discourses of the prophets; and it is but seldom that they miss in their predictions. 2.161 However, they try their spouses for three years; and if they find that they have their natural purgations thrice, as trials that they are likely to be fruitful, they then actually marry them. But they do not use to accompany with their wives when they are with child, as a demonstration that they do not marry out of regard to pleasure, but for the sake of posterity. Now the women go into the baths with some of their garments on, as the men do with somewhat girded about them. And these are the customs of this order of Essenes. 2.162 14. But then as to the two other orders at first mentioned: the Pharisees are those who are esteemed most skillful in the exact explication of their laws, and introduce the first sect. These ascribe all to fate or providence, and to God,
2.164 But the Sadducees are those that compose the second order, and take away fate entirely, and suppose that God is not concerned in our doing or not doing what is evil; 2.165 and they say, that to act what is good, or what is evil, is at men’s own choice, and that the one or the other belongs so to every one, that they may act as they please. They also take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul, and the punishments and rewards in Hades. 2.166 Moreover, the Pharisees are friendly to one another, and are for the exercise of concord, and regard for the public; but the behavior of the Sadducees one towards another is in some degree wild, and their conversation with those that are of their own party is as barbarous as if they were strangers to them. And this is what I had to say concerning the philosophic sects among the Jews.
5.403 And, after all this, do you expect Him whom you have so impiously abused to be your supporter? To be sure then you have a right to be petitioners, and to call upon Him to assist you, so pure are your hands!' ' None |
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32. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 2.294 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • providence
Found in books: Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 117; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 205
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2.294 ἢ τί συμφορώτερον τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοεῖν καὶ μήτ' ἐν συμφοραῖς διίστασθαι μήτ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις στασιάζειν ἐξυβρίζοντας, ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν θανάτου καταφρονεῖν, ἐν εἰρήνῃ δὲ τέχναις ἢ γεωργίαις προσανέχειν, πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχοῦ πεπεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύοντα διέπειν;"" None | sup>
2.294 and what is more advantageous than mutual love and concord? and this so far that we are to be neither divided by calamities, nor to become injurious and seditious in prosperity; but to condemn death when we are in war, and in peace to apply ourselves to our mechanical occupations, or to our tillage of the ground; while we in all things and all ways are satisfied that God is the inspector and governor of our actions. '' None |
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33. Lucan, Pharsalia, 1.72-1.80, 1.642-1.645, 2.1-2.2, 2.4, 2.7-2.13, 7.444-7.455 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, • gods, the absence of their providence in Lucan • providence (divine), in Plato and the Stoics
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 175, 211, 212, 220; Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 8, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 16
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1.72 Through all the nations reign, and shut the gates That close the temple of the God of War. Be thou my help, to me e'en now divine! Let Delphi's steep her own Apollo guard, And Nysa keep her Bacchus, uninvoked. Rome is my subject and my muse art thou! First of such deeds I purpose to unfold The causes — task immense — what drove to arms A maddened nation, and from all the world Struck peace away. By envious fate's decrees " "1.80 Abide not long the mightiest lords of earth; Beneath too heavy a burden great the fall. Thus Rome o'ergrew her strength. So when that hour, The last in all the centuries, shall sound The world's disruption, all things shall revert To that primaeval chaos, stars on stars Shall crash; and fiery meteors from the sky Plunge in the ocean. Earth shall then no more Front with her bulwark the encroaching sea: The moon, indigt at her path oblique, " "
1.642 All fled the homesteads, frighted by the shade of Marius waking from his broken tomb. In such dismay they summon, as of yore, The Tuscan sages to the nation's aid. Aruns, the eldest, leaving his abode In desolate Luca, came, well versed in all The lore of omens; knowing what may mean The flight of hovering bird, the pulse that beats In offered victims, and the levin bolt. All monsters first, by most unnatural birth " "
2.1 Book 2 This was made plain the anger of the gods; The universe gave signs Nature reversed In monstrous tumult fraught with prodigies Her laws, and prescient spake the coming guilt. How seemed it just to thee, Olympus' king, That suffering mortals at thy doom should know By omens dire the massacre to come? Or did the primal parent of the world When first the flames gave way and yielding left " "
2.10 Matter unformed to his subduing hand, And realms unbalanced, fix by stern decree' Unalterable laws to bind the whole (Himself, too, bound by law), so that for aye All Nature moves within its fated bounds? Or, is Chance sovereign over all, and we The sport of Fortune and her turning wheel? Whate'er be truth, keep thou the future veiled From mortal vision, and amid their fears May men still hope. Thus known how great the woes " "
7.444 Think that the Senate hoar, too old for arms, With snowy locks outspread; and Rome herself, The world's high mistress, fearing now, alas! A despot — all exhort you to the fight. Think that the people that is and that shall be Joins in the prayer — in freedom to be born, In freedom die, their wish. If 'mid these vows Be still found place for mine, with wife and child, So far as Imperator may, I bend Before you suppliant — unless this fight " "7.449 Think that the Senate hoar, too old for arms, With snowy locks outspread; and Rome herself, The world's high mistress, fearing now, alas! A despot — all exhort you to the fight. Think that the people that is and that shall be Joins in the prayer — in freedom to be born, In freedom die, their wish. If 'mid these vows Be still found place for mine, with wife and child, So far as Imperator may, I bend Before you suppliant — unless this fight " '7.450 Be won, behold me exile, your disgrace, My kinsman\'s scorn. From this, \'tis yours to save. Then save! Nor in the latest stage of life, Let Magnus be a slave." Then burned their souls At these his words, indigt at the thought, And Rome rose up within them, and to die Was welcome. Thus alike with hearts aflame Moved either host to battle, one in fear And one in hope of empire. These hands shall do Such work as not the rolling centuries 7.455 Be won, behold me exile, your disgrace, My kinsman\'s scorn. From this, \'tis yours to save. Then save! Nor in the latest stage of life, Let Magnus be a slave." Then burned their souls At these his words, indigt at the thought, And Rome rose up within them, and to die Was welcome. Thus alike with hearts aflame Moved either host to battle, one in fear And one in hope of empire. These hands shall do Such work as not the rolling centuries '" None |
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34. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 2.7-2.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Providence • allowance, permission (of God or Providence)
Found in books: Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 41, 331; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 157
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2.7 ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ, τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην, ἣν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν· 2.8 ἣν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἔγνωκεν, εἰ γὰρ ἔγνωσαν, οὐκ ἂν τὸν κύριον τῆς δόξης ἐσταύρωσαν·'' None | sup>
2.7 But we speak God's wisdom in amystery, the wisdom that has been hidden, which God foreordained beforethe worlds to our glory," "2.8 which none of the rulers of this worldhas known. For had they known it, they wouldn't have crucified the Lordof glory."" None |
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35. New Testament, Acts, 1.8, 7.46, 17.23-17.25, 17.30-17.31, 24.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • Providence • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providence, πρόνοια/providentia • sufferings, rejoicing in providence of Isis
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 149, 185, 204, 244, 246; Edelmann-Singer et al. (2020), Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions, 186; Griffiths (1975), The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI), 252; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 205; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 26; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 283
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1.8 ἀλλὰ λήμψεσθε δύναμιν ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἔσεσθέ μου μάρτυρες ἔν τε Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ καὶ Σαμαρίᾳ καὶ ἕως ἐσχάτου τῆς γῆς.
7.46 ὃς εὗρεν χάριν ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ᾐτήσατο εὑρεῖν σκήνωμα τῷ θεῷ Ἰακώβ.
17.23 διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩ ΘΕΩ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν. 17.24 ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντατὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς ὑπάρχων κύριος οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ 17.25 οὐδὲ ὑπὸ χειρῶν ἀνθρωπίνων θεραπεύεται προσδεόμενός τινος, αὐτὸςδιδοὺς πᾶσι ζωὴν καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα·
17.30 τοὺς μὲν οὖν χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεριδὼν ὁ θεὸς τὰ νῦν ἀπαγγέλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντας πανταχοῦ μετανοεῖν, 17.31 καθότι ἔστησεν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾧ ὥρισεν, πίστιν παρασχὼν πᾶσιν ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν.
24.2 κληθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἤρξατο κατηγορεῖν ὁ Τέρτυλλος λέγων Πολλῆς εἰρήνης τυγχάνοντες διὰ σοῦ καὶ διορθωμάτων γινομένων τῷ ἔθνει τούτῳ διὰ τῆς σῆς προνοίας'' None | sup>
1.8 But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come on you. You will be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the uttermost parts of the earth."
7.46 who found favor in the sight of God, and asked to find a habitation for the God of Jacob. ' "
17.23 For as I passed along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: 'TO AN UNKNOWN GOD.' What therefore you worship in ignorance, this I announce to you. " '17.24 The God who made the world and all things in it, he, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands, ' "17.25 neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he himself gives to all life and breath, and all things. " 17.30 The times of ignorance therefore God overlooked. But now he commands that all men everywhere should repent, 17.31 because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he has ordained; whereof he has given assurance to all men, in that he has raised him from the dead."
24.2 When he was called, Tertullus began to accuse him, saying, "Seeing that by you we enjoy much peace, and that excellent measures are coming to this nation, '' None |
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36. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.3-1.11, 1.13, 2.8-2.9, 3.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Providence • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providentia, providence
Found in books: Albrecht (2014), The Divine Father: Religious and Philosophical Concepts of Divine Parenthood in Antiquity, 309; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 119; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 331; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 243; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 201; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 44; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 273, 293
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1.3 Εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ εὐλογήσας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ, 1.4 καθὼς ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, 1.5 προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἱοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, 1.6 εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἧς ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ, 1.7 ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων, 1.8 κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1.9 ἧς ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει γνωρίσας ἡμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ ἣν προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ 1.10 εἰς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ χριστῷ, τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· ἐν αὐτῷ, 1.11 ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκληρώθημεν προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ,
1.13 ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες, ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ,
2.8 καὶ τοῦτο 2.9 οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον· οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μή τις καυχήσηται.
3.9 καὶ φωτίσαι τίς ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τῷ θεῷ τῷ τὰ πάντα κτίσαντι,'' None | sup>
1.3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ; 1.4 even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and without blemish before him in love; 1.5 having predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his desire, 1.6 to the praise of the glory of his grace, by which he freely bestowed favor on us in the Beloved, 1.7 in whom we have our redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace, 1.8 which he made to abound toward us in all wisdom and prudence, 1.9 making known to us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him 1.10 to an administration of the fullness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things on the earth, in him; 1.11 in whom also we were assigned an inheritance, having been foreordained according to the purpose of him who works all things after the counsel of his will;
1.13 in whom you also, having heard the word of the truth, the gospel of your salvation, -- in whom, having also believed, you were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise,
2.8 for by grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, 2.9 not of works, that no one would boast.
3.9 and to make all men see what is the administration of the mystery which for ages has been hidden in God, who created all things through Jesus Christ; '' None |
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37. New Testament, Romans, 1.21-1.25, 5.12, 9.19, 9.21-9.23, 11.5-11.6, 11.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence of God • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providence, divine • providentia, providence
Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 248; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 117; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 57; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 131; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 201, 204; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 38, 148, 161, 164, 166, 169, 173, 178, 183, 187, 189, 204, 218, 219, 221, 248, 262, 271, 276, 285, 293, 297
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1.21 διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν, ἀλλὰ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία· 1.22 φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν, 1.23 καὶἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαντοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦἐν ὁμοιώματιεἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἑρπετῶν. 1.24 Διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, 1.25 οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν.
5.12 Διὰ τοῦτο ὥσπερ διʼ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν ἐφʼ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον-.
9.19 Ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν Τί ἔτι μέμφεται;
9.21 ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίανὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν; 9.22 εἰ δὲ θέλων ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦἤνεγκενἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳσκεύη ὀργῆςκατηρτισμέναεἰς ἀπώλειαν, 9.23 ἵνα γνωρίσῃ τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ σκεύη ἐλέους, ἃ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν,
11.5 οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ λίμμα κατʼ ἐκλογὴν χάριτος γέγονεν· 11.6 εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων, ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις.
11.8 καθάπερ γέγραπται Ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμα κατανύξεως, ὀφθαλμοὺς τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν καὶ ὦτα τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν, ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας.'' None | sup>
1.21 Because, knowing God, they didn't glorify him as God, neither gave thanks, but became vain in their reasoning, and their senseless heart was darkened. " '1.22 Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, 1.23 and traded the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed animals, and creeping things. 1.24 Therefore God also gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to uncleanness, that their bodies should be dishonored among themselves, 1.25 who exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.
5.12 Therefore, as sin entered into the world through one man, and death through sin; and so death passed to all men, because all sinned.
9.19 You will say then to me, "Why does he still find fault? For who withstands his will?"' "
9.21 Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? " '9.22 What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath made for destruction, 9.23 and that he might make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he prepared beforehand for glory,
11.5 Even so then at this present time also there is a remt according to the election of grace. 11.6 And if by grace, then it is no longer of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. But if it is of works, it is no longer grace; otherwise work is no longer work.
11.8 According as it is written, "God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, to this very day."'" None |
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38. New Testament, John, 1.1-1.2, 1.9, 1.12-1.14, 4.24, 6.66, 8.34, 15.26 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Divine Providence • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Providence • Providence of God • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • allowance, permission (of God or Providence) • providence
Found in books: Langworthy (2019), Gregory of Nazianzus’ Soteriological Pneumatology, 61; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 52; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 154, 157, 243, 259, 261, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 275, 279; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 173; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 47; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 30; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 108, 109, 114, 163, 177, 189, 221, 235, 293
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1.1 ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 1.2 Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.
1.9 Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.
1.12 ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ,
1.13 οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.
1.14 Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔
4.24 πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, καὶ τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ δεῖ προσκυνεῖν.
6.66 Ἐκ τούτου πολλοὶ ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω καὶ οὐκέτι μετʼ αὐτοῦ περιεπάτουν.
8.34 ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν δοῦλός ἐστιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας·
15.26 Ὅταν ἔλθῃ ὁ παράκλητος ὃν ἐγὼ πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται, ἐκεῖνος μαρτυρήσει περὶ ἐμοῦ· καὶ ὑμεῖς δὲ μαρτυρεῖτε,'' None | sup>
1.1 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 1.2 The same was in the beginning with God.
1.9 The true light that enlightens everyone was coming into the world. ' "
1.12 But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become God's children, to those who believe in his name: " 1.13 who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.
1.14 The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth.
4.24 God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth."
6.66 At this, many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him.
8.34 Jesus answered them, "Most assuredly I tell you, everyone who commits sin is the bondservant of sin.
15.26 "When the Counselor has come, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will testify about me. '' None |
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39. New Testament, Luke, 10.31, 21.34 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • providence, πρόνοια/providentia
Found in books: Crabb (2020), Luke/Acts and the End of History, 146, 185; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 53, 261
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10.31 κατὰ συγκυρίαν δὲ ἱερεύς τις κατέβαινεν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἐκείνῃ, καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἀντιπαρῆλθεν·
21.34 Προσέχετε δὲ ἑαυτοῖς μή ποτε βαρηθῶσιν αἱ καρδίαι ὑμῶν ἐν κρεπάλῃ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μερίμναις βιωτικαῖς, καὶ ἐπιστῇ ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς ἐφνίδιος ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη ὡς παγίς·'' None | sup>
10.31 By chance a certain priest was going down that way. When he saw him, he passed by on the other side.
21.34 "So be careful, or your hearts will be loaded down with carousing, drunkenness, and cares of this life, and that day will come on you suddenly. '' None |
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40. New Testament, Matthew, 7.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence of God • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al. (2020), Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions, 237; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 110
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7.7 Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν.'' None | sup>
7.7 "Ask, and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. '' None |
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41. Plutarch, On Isis And Osiris, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Plutarch of Chaeroneia, on providence • Providence, Plutarchs concept of • providence
Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 143; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 346; Hirsch-Luipold (2022), Plutarch and the New Testament in Their Religio-Philosophical Contexts, 79; O'Brien (2015), The Demiurge in Ancient Thought, 97
| 369d yet it is true that this terrestrial universe, including its moon as well, is irregular and variable and subject to all manner of changes. For if it is the law of nature that nothing comes into being without a cause, and if the good cannot provide a cause for evil, then it follows that Nature must have in herself the source and origin of evil, just as she contains the source and origin of good. The great majority and the wisest of men hold this opinion: they believe that there are two gods, rivals as it were, the one the Artificer of good and the other of evil. There are also those who call the better one a god and the other a daemon,' ' None |
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42. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.16, 107.10-107.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • Providence, • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • predestination (προόρισις), providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007), Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 554; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 27; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 208; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 99; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 270; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 346
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9.16 People may say: "But what sort of existence will the wise man have, if he be left friendless when thrown into prison, or when stranded in some foreign nation, or when delayed on a long voyage, or when cast upon a lonely shore?" His life will be like that of Jupiter, who, amid the dissolution of the world, when the gods are confounded together and Nature rests for a space from her work, can retire into himself and give himself over to his own thoughts.10 In some such way as this the sage will act; he will retreat into himself, and live with himself.
107.10 For this reason we should welcome our orders with energy and vigour, nor should we cease to follow the natural course of this most beautiful universe, into which all our future sufferings are woven. Let us address Jupiter, the pilot of this world-mass, as did our great Cleanthes in those most eloquent lines – lines which I shall allow myself to render in Latin, after the example of the eloquent Cicero. If you like them, make the most of them; if they displease you, you will understand that I have simply been following the practice of Cicero: 107.11 Lead me, O Master of the lofty heavens, My Father, whithersoever thou shalt wish. I shall not falter, but obey with speed. And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer, In sin and sorrow what I might have done In noble virtue. Aye, the willing soul Fate leads, but the unwilling drags along.2 '' None |
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43. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Providence of God
Found in books: Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 157; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 114
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44. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 100; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 119; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 172
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45. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 109; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 176
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46. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 254; Hirsch-Luipold (2022), Plutarch and the New Testament in Their Religio-Philosophical Contexts, 76
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47. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence
Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 246; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 246
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48. Clement of Alexandria, Excerpts From Theodotus, 78 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence
Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020), Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in its contexts, 561; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 414
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78 Until baptism, they say, Fate is real, but after it the astrologists are no longer right. But it is not only the washing that is liberating, but the knowledge of/who we were, and what we have become, where we were or where we were placed, whither we hasten, from what we are redeemed, what birth is and what rebirth.'' None |
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49. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.30.6-1.30.7, 1.30.9-1.30.10 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Sophia • Pronoia, Providence
Found in books: Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 13, 18, 115, 122, 153, 265; Thomassen (2023), Before Valentinus: The Gnostics of Irenaeus. 50, 56, 64, 66, 67, 77, 80, 85
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1.30.6 On this account, Ialdabaoth, becoming uplifted in spirit, boasted himself over all those things that were below him, and exclaimed, "I am father, and God, and above me there is no one." But his mother, hearing him speak thus, cried out against him, "Do not lie, Ialdabaoth: for the father of all, the first Anthropos (man), is above thee; and so is Anthropos the son of Anthropos." Then, as all were disturbed by this new voice, and by the unexpected proclamation, and as they were inquiring whence the noise proceeded, in order to lead them away and attract them to himself, they affirm that Ialdabaoth exclaimed, "Come, let us make man after our image." The six powers, on hearing this, and their mother furnishing them with the idea of a man (in order that by means of him she might empty them of their original power), jointly formed a man of immense size, both in regard to breadth and length. But as he could merely writhe along the ground, they carried him to their father; Sophia so labouring in this matter, that she might empty him (Ialdabaoth) of the light with which he had been sprinkled, so that he might no longer, though still powerful, be able to lift up himself against the powers above. They declare, then, that by breathing into man the spirit of life, he was secretly emptied of his power; that hence man became a possessor of nous (intelligence) and enthymesis (thought); and they affirm that these are the faculties which partake in salvation. He they further assert at once gave thanks to the first Anthropos (man), forsaking those who had created him. 1.30.7 But Ialdabaoth, feeling envious at this, was pleased to form the design of again emptying man by means of woman, and produced a woman from his own enthymesis, whom that Prunicus above mentioned laying hold of, imperceptibly emptied her of power. But the others coming and admiring her beauty, named her Eve, and falling in love with her, begat sons by her, whom they also declare to be the angels. But their mother (Sophia) cunningly devised a scheme to seduce Eve and Adam, by means of the serpent, to transgress the command of Ialdabaoth. Eve listened to this as if it had proceeded from a son of God, and yielded an easy belief. She also persuaded Adam to eat of the tree regarding which God had said that they should not eat of it. They then declare that, on their thus eating, they attained to the knowledge of that power which is above all, and departed from those who had created them. When Prunicus perceived that the powers were thus baffled by their own creature, she greatly rejoiced, and again cried out, that since the father was incorruptible, he (Ialdabaoth) who formerly called himself the father was a liar; and that, while Anthropos and the first woman (the Spirit) existed previously, this one (Eve) sinned by committing adultery.
1.30.9 Adam and Eve previously had light, and clear, and as it were spiritual bodies, such as they were at their creation; but when they came to this world, these changed into bodies more opaque, and gross, and sluggish. Their soul also was feeble and languid, inasmuch as they had received from their creator a merely mundane inspiration. This continued until Prunicus, moved with compassion towards them, restored to them the sweet savour of the besprinkling of light, by means of which they came to a remembrance of themselves, and knew that they were naked, as well as that the body was a material substance, and thus recognised that they bore death about with them. They thereupon became patient, knowing that only for a time they would be enveloped in the body. They also found out food, through the guidance of Sophia; and when they were satisfied, they had carnal knowledge of each other, and begat Cain, whom the serpent, that had been cast down along with his sons, immediately laid hold of and destroyed by filling him with mundane oblivion, and urging into folly and audacity, so that, by slaying his brother Abel, he was the first to bring to light envy and death. After these, they affirm that, by the forethought of Prunicus, Seth was begotten, and then Norea, from whom they represent all the rest of mankind as being descended. They were urged on to all kinds of wickedness by the inferior Hebdomad, and to apostasy, idolatry, and a general contempt for everything by the superior holy Hebdomad, since the mother was always secretly opposed to them, and carefully preserved what was peculiarly her own, that is, the besprinkling of light. They maintain, moreover, that the holy Hebdomad is the seven stars which they call planets; and they affirm that the serpent cast down has two names, Michael and Samael.' "1.30.10 Ialdabaoth, again, being incensed with men, because they did not worship or honour him as father and God, sent forth a deluge upon them, that he might at once destroy them all. But Sophia opposed him in this point also, and Noah and his family were saved in the ark by means of the besprinkling of that light which proceeded from her, and through it the world was again filled with mankind. Ialdabaoth himself chose a certain man named Abraham from among these, and made a covet with him, to the effect that, if his seed continued to serve him, he would give to them the earth for an inheritance. Afterwards, by means of Moses, he brought forth Abraham's descendants from Egypt, and gave them the law, and made them the Jews. Among that people he chose seven days, which they also call the holy Hebdomad. Each of these receives his own herald for the purpose of glorifying and proclaiming God; so that, when the rest hear these praises, they too may serve those who are announced as gods try the prophets."' None |
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50. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • providence (pronoia)
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al. (2020), Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions, 237; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 161; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020), Athens II: Athens in Late Antiquity, 207
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51. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • creation, in Genesis, “one off,” vs. continuous providence • demons, and god’s providence • fate, and providence • gods, and providence • move towards monotheism, on providence • providence (divine), in Plato and the Stoics • providence (pronoia) • providence, Apuleius on • providence, Apuleius’s doctrine on • providence, Calcidius on • providence, and divine hierarchy • providence, and fate • providence, and god’s will
Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 134, 151, 153, 156, 196, 197, 198, 199; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 15; Russell and Nesselrath (2014), On Prophecy, Dreams and Human Imagination: Synesius, De insomniis, 63
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52. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Gregory of Nyssa, on providence (πρόνοια) • Help, source of, name of high altar, helping providence of goddess, ibid., most helpful goddess • Isis, providence of, helping • Providence • Providence, of Isis, helping • providence
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 177; Fletcher (2023), The Ass of the Gods: Apuleius' Golden Ass, the Onos Attributed to Lucian, and Graeco-Roman Metamorphosis Literature, 106; Graverini (2012), Literature and Identity in The Golden Ass of Apuleius. 60, 61; Griffiths (1975), The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI), 233
| 11.16 After the great priest had prophesied in this manner, he, regaining his breath, made a conclusion of his words. Then I went amongst the rest of the company and followed the procession. Everyone of the people knew me and, pointing at me with their fingers, spoke in this way, “Behold him who was this day transformed into a man by the power of the sovereign goddess. Verily he is blessed and most blessed, who has merited such great grace from heaven both because of the innocence of his former life. He has been reborn in the service of the goddess. In the meantime, little by little we approached near to the sea cost, near that place where I lay the night before, still an ass. Thereafter the images and relics were disposed in order. The great priest was surrounded by various pictures according to the fashion of the Aegyptians. He dedicated and consecrated with certain prayers a fair ship made very cunningly, and purified it with a torch, an egg, and sulfur. The sail was of white linen cloth on which was written certain letters which testified that the navigation would be prosperous. The mast was of a great length, made of a pine tree, round and very excellent with a shining top. The cabin was covered over with coverings of gold, and the whole ship was made of citron tree, very fair. Then all the people, religious as well as profane, took a great number of baskets filled with odors and pleasant smells and threw them into the sea, mingled with milk, until the ship was filled with many gifts and prosperous devotions. Then, with a pleasant wind, the ship was launched out into the deep. But when they had lost the sight of the ship, every man carried again that he brought, and went toward the temple in like procession and order as they had come to the sea side.' ' None |
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53. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • providence
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 119, 130, 289; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 821; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 12
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54. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Origen, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 295; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 12
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55. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, • providence
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 216; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 175
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56. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dionysius of Halicarnassus, providence • providence
Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 249; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 249
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57. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • providence
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 278; Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 64, 70, 92, 93; Jonquière (2007), Prayer in Josephus Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 41; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 127, 133; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 12
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58. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.87-7.88, 7.149, 7.155 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 34, 35; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 207; Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 213; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222, 334
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7.87 This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88 And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
7.149 Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione, Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione. But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence.
7.155 They maintain that the parts of the world are arranged thus. The earth is in the middle answering to a centre; next comes the water, which is shaped like a sphere all round it, concentric with the earth, so that the earth is in water. After the water comes a spherical layer of air. There are five celestial circles: first, the arctic circle, which is always visible; second, the summer tropic; third, the circle of the equinox; fourth, the winter tropic; and fifth, the antarctic, which is invisible to us. They are called parallel, because they do not incline towards one another; yet they are described round the same centre. The zodiac is an oblique circle, as it crosses the parallel circles.'' None |
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59. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.74, 5.21, 6.26, 6.30 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Origen, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Pronoia (providence) archontic • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Barbelo/Hymn • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Sophia • Providence • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 279, 281, 294, 299; Hellholm et al. (2010), Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity, 1222; Ramelli (2013), The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, 176, 178; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 122, 156; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 70
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4.74 He next, in many words, blames us for asserting that God made all things for the sake of man. Because from the history of animals, and from the sagacity manifested by them, he would show that all things came into existence not more for the sake of man than of the irrational animals. And here he seems to me to speak in a similar manner to those who, through dislike of their enemies, accuse them of the same things for which their own friends are commended. For as, in the instance referred to, hatred blinds these persons from seeing that they are accusing their very dearest friends by the means through which they think they are slandering their enemies; so in the same way, Celsus also, becoming confused in his argument, does not see that he is bringing a charge against the philosophers of the Porch, who, not amiss, place man in the foremost rank, and rational nature in general before irrational animals, and who maintain that Providence created all things mainly on account of rational nature. Rational beings, then, as being the principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in the womb, while irrational and soulless beings hold that of the envelope which is created along with the child. I think, too, that as in cities the superintendents of the goods and market discharge their duties for the sake of no other than human beings, while dogs and other irrational animals have the benefit of the superabundance; so Providence provides in a special manner for rational creatures; while this also follows, that irrational creatures likewise enjoy the benefit of what is done for the sake of man. And as he is in error who alleges that the superintendents of the markets make provision in no greater degree for men than for dogs, because dogs also get their share of the goods; so in a far greater degree are Celsus and they who think with him guilty of impiety towards the God who makes provision for rational beings, in asserting that His arrangements are made in no greater degree for the sustece of human beings than for that of plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns.
5.21 The disciples of Pythagoras, too, and of Plato, although they appear to hold the incorruptibility of the world, yet fall into similar errors. For as the planets, after certain definite cycles, assume the same positions, and hold the same relations to one another, all things on earth will, they assert, be like what they were at the time when the same state of planetary relations existed in the world. From this view it necessarily follows, that when, after the lapse of a lengthened cycle, the planets come to occupy towards each other the same relations which they occupied in the time of Socrates, Socrates will again be born of the same parents, and suffer the same treatment, being accused by Anytus and Melitus, and condemned by the Council of Areopagus! The learned among the Egyptians, moreover, hold similar views, and yet they are treated with respect, and do not incur the ridicule of Celsus and such as he; while we, who maintain that all things are administered by God in proportion to the relation of the free-will of each individual, and are ever being brought into a better condition, so far as they admit of being so, and who know that the nature of our free-will admits of the occurrence of contingent events (for it is incapable of receiving the wholly unchangeable character of God), yet do not appear to say anything worthy of a testing examination.
6.26 It is in the precincts of Jerusalem, then, that punishments will be inflicted upon those who undergo the process of purification, who have received into the substance of their soul the elements of wickedness, which in a certain place is figuratively termed lead, and on that account iniquity is represented in Zechariah as sitting upon a talent of lead. But the remarks which might be made on this topic are neither to be made to all, nor to be uttered on the present occasion; for it is not unattended with danger to commit to writing the explanation of such subjects, seeing the multitude need no further instruction than that which relates to the punishment of sinners; while to ascend beyond this is not expedient, for the sake of those who are with difficulty restrained, even by fear of eternal punishment, from plunging into any degree of wickedness, and into the flood of evils which result from sin. The doctrine of Geenna, then, is unknown both to the diagram and to Celsus: for had it been otherwise, the framers of the former would not have boasted of their pictures of animals and diagrams, as if the truth were represented by these; nor would Celsus, in his treatise against the Christians, have introduced among the charges directed against them statements which they never uttered instead of what was spoken by some who perhaps are no longer in existence, but have altogether disappeared, or been reduced to a very few individuals, and these easily counted. And as it does not beseem those who profess the doctrines of Plato to offer a defense of Epicurus and his impious opinions, so neither is it for us to defend the diagram, or to refute the accusations brought against it by Celsus. We may therefore allow his charges on these points to pass as superfluous and useless, for we would censure more severely than Celsus any who should be carried away by such opinions.
6.30 He next returns to the subject of the Seven ruling Demons, whose names are not found among Christians, but who, I think, are accepted by the Ophites. We found, indeed, that in the diagram, which on their account we procured a sight of, the same order was laid down as that which Celsus has given. Celsus says that the goat was shaped like a lion, not mentioning the name given him by those who are truly the most impious of individuals; whereas we discovered that He who is honoured in holy Scripture as the angel of the Creator is called by this accursed diagram Michael the Lion-like. Again, Celsus says that the second in order is a bull; whereas the diagram which we possessed made him to be Suriel, the bull-like. Further, Celsus termed the third an amphibious sort of animal, and one that hissed frightfully; while the diagram described the third as Raphael, the serpent-like. Moreover, Celsus asserted that the fourth had the form of an eagle; the diagram representing him as Gabriel, the eagle-like. Again, the fifth, according to Celsus, had the countece of a bear; and this, according to the diagram, was Thauthabaoth, the bear-like. Celsus continues his account, that the sixth was described as having the face of a dog; and him the diagram called Erataoth. The seventh, he adds, had the countece of an ass, and was named Thaphabaoth or Onoel; whereas we discovered that in the diagram he is called Onoel, or Thartharaoth, being somewhat asinine in appearance. We have thought it proper to be exact in stating these matters, that we might not appear to be ignorant of those things which Celsus professed to know, but that we Christians, knowing them better than he, may demonstrate that these are not the words of Christians, but of those who are altogether alienated from salvation, and who neither acknowledge Jesus as Saviour, nor God, nor Teacher, nor Son of God. '' None |
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60. Origen, On First Principles, 2.9.7, 3.1.13-3.1.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence of God • Providence, • Providence, Stoic type • providence
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 307; Hellholm et al. (2010), Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity, 1222; Ramelli (2013), The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, 177; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 15, 68
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2.9.7 But even holy Scripture does not appear to me to be altogether silent on the nature of this secret, as when the Apostle Paul, in discussing the case of Jacob and Esau, says: For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of Him who calls, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. And after that, he answers himself, and says, What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? And that he might furnish us with an opportunity of inquiring into these matters, and of ascertaining how these things do not happen without a reason, he answers himself, and says, God forbid. For the same question, as it seems to me, which is raised concerning Jacob and Esau, may be raised regarding all celestial and terrestrial creatures, and even those of the lower world as well. And in like manner it seems to me, that as he there says, The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, so it might also be said of all other things, When they were not yet created, neither had yet done any good or evil, that the decree of God according to election may stand, that (as certain think) some things on the one hand were created heavenly, some on the other earthly, and others, again, beneath the earth, not of works (as they think), but of Him who calls, what shall we say then, if these things are so? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. As, therefore, when the Scriptures are carefully examined regarding Jacob and Esau, it is not found to be unrighteousness with God that it should be said, before they were born, or had done anything in this life, the elder shall serve the younger; and as it is found not to be unrighteousness that even in the womb Jacob supplanted his brother, if we feel that he was worthily beloved by God, according to the deserts of his previous life, so as to deserve to be preferred before his brother; so also is it with regard to heavenly creatures, if we notice that diversity was not the original condition of the creature, but that, owing to causes that have previously existed, a different office is prepared by the Creator for each one in proportion to the degree of his merit, on this ground, indeed, that each one, in respect of having been created by God an understanding, or a rational spirit, has, according to the movements of his mind and the feelings of his soul, gained for himself a greater or less amount of merit, and has become either an object of love to God, or else one of dislike to Him; while, nevertheless, some of those who are possessed of greater merit are ordained to suffer with others for the adorning of the state of the world, and for the discharge of duty to creatures of a lower grade, in order that by this means they themselves may be participators in the endurance of the Creator, according to the words of the apostle: For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who has subjected the same in hope. Keeping in view, then, the sentiment expressed by the apostle, when, speaking of the birth of Esau and Jacob, he says, Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid, I think it right that this same sentiment should be carefully applied to the case of all other creatures, because, as we formerly remarked, the righteousness of the Creator ought to appear in everything. And this, it appears to me, will be seen more clearly at last, if each one, whether of celestial or terrestrial or infernal beings, be said to have the causes of his diversity in himself, and antecedent to his bodily birth. For all things were created by the Word of God, and by His Wisdom, and were set in order by His Justice. And by the grace of His compassion He provides for all men, and encourages all to the use of whatever remedies may lead to their cure, and incites them to salvation.
3.1.13 It is not without reason, then, that he who is abandoned, is abandoned to the divine judgment, and that God is long-suffering with certain sinners; but because it will be for their advantage, with respect to the immortality of the soul and the unending world, that they be not quickly brought into a state of salvation, but be conducted to it more slowly, after having experienced many evils. For as physicians, who are able to cure a man quickly, when they suspect that a hidden poison exists in the body, do the reverse of healing, making this more certain through their very desire to heal, deeming it better for a considerable time to retain the patient under inflammation and sickness, in order that he may recover his health more surely, than to appear to produce a rapid recovery, and afterwards to cause a relapse, and (thus) that hasty cure last only for a time; in the same way, God also, who knows the secret things of the heart, and foresees future events, in His long-suffering, permits (certain events to occur), and by means of those things which happen from without extracts the secret evil, in order to cleanse him who through carelessness has received the seeds of sin, that having vomited them forth when they came to the surface, although he may have been deeply involved in evils, he may afterwards obtain healing after his wickedness, and be renewed. For God governs souls not with reference, let me say, to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to an illimitable age: for He made the thinking principle immortal in its nature, and kindred to Himself; and the rational soul is not, as in this life, excluded from cure.' "
3.1.13 It is therefore by the sentence of God that he is abandoned who deserves to be so, while over some sinners God exercises forbearance; not, however, without a definite principle of action. Nay, the very fact that He is long-suffering conduces to the advantage of those very persons, since the soul over which He exercises this providential care is immortal; and, as being immortal and everlasting, it is not, although not immediately cared for, excluded from salvation, which is postponed to a more convenient time. For perhaps it is expedient for those who have been more deeply imbued with the poison of wickedness to obtain this salvation at a later period. For as medical men sometimes, although they could quickly cover over the scars of wounds, keep back and delay the cure for the present, in the expectation of a better and more perfect recovery, knowing that it is more salutary to retard the treatment in the cases of swellings caused by wounds, and to allow the maligt humours to flow off for a while, rather than to hasten a superficial cure, by shutting up in the veins the poison of a morbid humour, which, excluded from its customary outlets, will undoubtedly creep into the inner parts of the limbs, and penetrate to the very vitals of the viscera, producing no longer mere disease in the body, but causing destruction to life; so, in like manner, God also, who knows the secret things of the heart, and foreknows the future, in much forbearance allows certain events to happen, which, coming from without upon men, cause to come forth into the light the passions and vices which are concealed within, that by their means those may be cleansed and cured who, through great negligence and carelessness, have admitted within themselves the roots and seeds of sins, so that, when driven outwards and brought to the surface, they may in a certain degree be cast forth and dispersed. And thus, although a man may appear to be afflicted with evils of a serious kind, suffering convulsions in all his limbs, he may nevertheless, at some future time, obtain relief and a cessation from his trouble; and, after enduring his afflictions to satiety, may, after many sufferings, be restored again to his (proper) condition. For God deals with souls not merely with a view to the short space of our present life, included within sixty years or more, but with reference to a perpetual and never-ending period, exercising His providential care over souls that are immortal, even as He Himself is eternal and immortal. For He made the rational nature, which He formed in His own image and likeness, incorruptible; and therefore the soul, which is immortal, is not excluded by the shortness of the present life from the divine remedies and cures. 3.1.14 But let us take from the Gospels also the similitudes of those things which we have mentioned, in which is described a certain rock, having on it a little superficial earth, on which, when a seed falls, it is said quickly to spring up; but when sprung up, it withers as the sun ascends in the heavens, and dies away, because it did not cast its root deeply into the ground. Now this rock undoubtedly represents the human soul, hardened on account of its own negligence, and converted into stone because of its wickedness. For God gave no one a stony heart by a creative act; but each individual's heart is said to become stony through his own wickedness and disobedience. As, therefore, if one were to blame a husbandman for not casting his seed more quickly upon rocky ground, because seed cast upon other rocky soil was seen to spring up speedily, the husbandman would certainly say in reply: I sow this soil more slowly, for this reason, that it may retain the seed which it has received; for it suits this ground to be sown somewhat slowly, lest perhaps the crop, having sprouted too rapidly, and coming forth from the mere surface of a shallow soil, should be unable to withstand the rays of the sun. Would not he who formerly found fault acquiesce in the reasons and superior knowledge of the husbandman, and approve as done on rational grounds what formerly appeared to him as founded on no reason? And in the same way, God, the thoroughly skilled husbandman of all His creation, undoubtedly conceals and delays to another time those things which we think ought to have obtained health sooner, in order that not the outside of things, rather than the inside, may be cured. But if any one now were to object to us that certain seeds do even fall upon rocky ground, i.e., on a hard and stony heart, we should answer that even this does not happen without the arrangement of Divine Providence; inasmuch as, but for this, it would not be known what condemnation was incurred by rashness in hearing and indifference in investigation, nor, certainly, what benefit was derived from being trained in an orderly manner. And hence it happens that the soul comes to know its defects, and to cast the blame upon itself, and, consistently with this, to reserve and submit itself to training, i.e., in order that it may see that its faults must first be removed, and that then it must come to receive the instruction of wisdom. As, therefore, souls are innumerable, so also are their manners, and purposes, and movements, and appetencies, and incitements different, the variety of which can by no means be grasped by the human mind; and therefore to God alone must be left the art, and the knowledge, and the power of an arrangement of this kind, as He alone can know both the remedies for each individual soul, and measure out the time of its cure. It is He alone then who, as we said, recognises the ways of individual men, and determines by what way He ought to lead Pharaoh, that through him His name might be named in all the earth, having previously chastised him by many blows, and finally drowning him in the sea. By this drowning, however, it is not to be supposed that God's providence as regards Pharaoh was terminated; for we must not imagine, because he was drowned, that therefore he had immediately completely perished: for in the hand of God are both we and our words; all wisdom, also, and knowledge of workmanship, as Scripture declares. But these points we have discussed according to our ability, treating of that chapter of Scripture in which it is said that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and agreeably to the statement, He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens." "3.1.14 Come now, and let us use the following image from the Gospel. There is a certain rock, with a little surface-soil, on which, if seeds fall, they quickly spring up; but when sprung up, as not having root, they are burned and withered when the sun has arisen. Now this rock is a human soul, hardened on account of its negligence, and converted to stone because of its wickedness; for no one receives from God a heart created of stone, but it becomes such in consequence of wickedness. If one, then, were to find fault with the husbandman for not sowing his seed sooner upon the rocky soil, when he saw other rocky ground which had received seed flourishing, the husbandman would reply, I shall sow this ground more slowly, casting in seeds that will be able to retain their hold, this slower method being better for the ground, and more secure than that which receives the seed in a more rapid manner, and more upon the surface. (The person finding fault) would yield his assent to the husbandman, as one who spoke with sound reason, and who acted with skill: so also the great Husbandman of all nature postpones that benefit which might be deemed premature, that it may not prove superficial. But it is probable that here some one may object to us with reference to this: Why do some of the seeds fall upon the earth that has superficial soil, the soul being, as it were, a rock? Now we must say, in answer to this, that it was better for this soul, which desired better things precipitately, and not by a way which led to them, to obtain its desire, in order that, condemning itself on this account, it may, after a long time, endure to receive the husbandry which is according to nature. For souls are, as one may say, innumerable; and their habits are innumerable, and their movements, and their purposes, and their assaults, and their efforts, of which there is only one admirable administrator, who knows both the season, and the fitting helps, and the avenues, and the ways, viz., the God and Father of all things, who knows how He conducts even Pharaoh by so great events, and by drowning in the sea, with which latter occurrence His superintendence of Pharaoh does not cease. For he was not annihilated when drowned: For in the hand of God are both we and our words; all wisdom also, and knowledge of workmanship. And such is a moderate defense with regard to the statement that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and that God has mercy upon whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens."' None |
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61. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 24 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence, Stoic type
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 113; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 33
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24 No god is responsible for a man's evils, for he has chosen his lot himself. The prayer which is accompanied by base actions is impure, and |45 therefore not acceptable to God; but that which is accompanied by noble actions is pure, and at the same time acceptable. There are four first principles that must be upheld concerning God—faith, truth, love, hope. We must have faith that our only salvation is in turning to God. And having faith, we must strive with all our might to know the truth about God. And when we know this, we must love Him we do know. And when we love Him we must nourish our souls on good hopes for our life, for it is by their good hopes good men are superior to bad ones. Let then these four principles be firmly held."" None |
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62. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • fate, and providence • gods, and providence • providence • providence, Apuleius on • providence, Calcidius on • providence, and god’s will
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 126; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 98; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 197, 198, 200
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63. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Epicurus, as denying providence • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • providence, rejected
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 129, 276; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 38
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64. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic • Pronoia (providence) archontic, Sophia • Pronoia, Providence • providence
Found in books: Estes (2020), The Tree of Life, 257, 267, 269, 270; Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 115, 140, 141; Thomassen (2023), Before Valentinus: The Gnostics of Irenaeus. 67
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65. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia (providence) archontic, general • Pronoia, Providence
Found in books: Rasimus (2009), Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Ophite Evidence, 92; Thomassen (2023), Before Valentinus: The Gnostics of Irenaeus. 80
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66. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pronoia, Providence • providence
Found in books: Estes (2020), The Tree of Life, 257; Thomassen (2023), Before Valentinus: The Gnostics of Irenaeus. 67
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67. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • providence • providence, distinguished from love in Origen
Found in books: Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 183; Ramelli (2013), The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, 176
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68. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Origen, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Plotinus, and providence • Plotinus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • fate, justice of providence • god, identified with providence • legacy, of Plotinus' account of providence • providence • providence (πρόννια), and fate • providence, Plotinus on • providence, for the All • providence, identified with god • providence, includes us as we are • providence, not responsible for evil • providence, recognised • soul, providing identity
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 126, 130, 231, 232, 266, 295, 298; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 59, 236, 388, 389, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 422; Hirsch-Luipold (2022), Plutarch and the New Testament in Their Religio-Philosophical Contexts, 206; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 186; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 47, 61, 62, 68, 69, 133, 157, 158, 163, 164; Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 133; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 166; Osborne (2001), Irenaeus of Lyons, 63; Ramelli (2013), The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, 123; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 223, 332, 350, 352; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 32, 33, 34
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69. Augustine, Confessions, 3.7, 7.14 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence of God • Providence, Stoic type • providence
Found in books: Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 187, 204; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 126, 128
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3.7 12. For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, as it were, violently moved to give my support to foolish deceivers, when they asked me, Whence is evil? - and, Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs and nails?- and, Are they to be esteemed righteous who had many wives at once and did kill men, and sacrificed living creatures? 1 Kings 18:40 At which things I, in my ignorance, was much disturbed, and, retreating from the truth, I appeared to myself to be going towards it; because as yet I knew not that evil was naught but a privation of good, until in the end it ceases altogether to be; which how should I see, the sight of whose eyes saw no further than bodies, and of my mind no further than a phantasm? And I knew not God to be a Spirit, John 4:24 not one who has parts extended in length and breadth, nor whose being was bulk; for every bulk is less in a part than in the whole, and, if it be infinite, it must be less in such part as is limited by a certain space than in its infinity; and cannot be wholly everywhere, as Spirit, as God is. And what that should be in us, by which we were like God, and might rightly in Scripture be said to be after the image of God, I was entirely ignorant. 13. Nor had I knowledge of that true inner righteousness, which does not judge according to custom, but out of the most perfect law of God Almighty, by which the manners of places and times were adapted to those places and times - being itself the while the same always and everywhere, not one thing in one place, and another in another; according to which Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and Moses, and David, and all those commended by the mouth of God were righteous, Hebrews 11:8-40 but were judged unrighteous by foolish men, judging out of man's judgment, 1 Corinthians 4:3 and gauging by the petty standard of their own manners the manners of the whole human race. Like as if in an armoury, one knowing not what were adapted to the several members should put greaves on his head, or boot himself with a helmet, and then complain because they would not fit. Or as if, on some day when in the afternoon business was forbidden, one were to fume at not being allowed to sell as it was lawful to him in the forenoon. Or when in some house he sees a servant take something in his hand which the butler is not permitted to touch, or something done behind a stable which would be prohibited in the dining-room, and should be indigt that in one house, and one family, the same thing is not distributed everywhere to all. Such are they who cannot endure to hear something to have been lawful for righteous men in former times which is not so now; or that God, for certain temporal reasons, commanded them one thing, and these another, but both obeying the same righteousness; though they see, in one man, one day, and one house, different things to be fit for different members, and a thing which was formerly lawful after a time unlawful - that permitted or commanded in one corner, which done in another is justly prohibited and punished. Is justice, then, various and changeable? Nay, but the times over which she presides are not all alike, because they are times. But men, whose days upon the earth are few, Job 14:1 because by their own perception they cannot harmonize the causes of former ages and other nations, of which they had no experience, with these of which they have experience, though in one and the same body, day, or family, they can readily see what is suitable for each member, season, part, and person - to the one they take exception, to the other they submit. 14. These things I then knew not, nor observed. They met my eyes on every side, and I saw them not. I composed poems, in which it was not permitted me to place every foot everywhere, but in one metre one way, and in another, nor even in any one verse the same foot in all places. Yet the art itself by which I composed had not different principles for these different cases, but comprised all in one. Still I saw not how that righteousness, which good and holy men submitted to, far more excellently and sublimely comprehended in one all those things which God commanded, and in no part varied, though in varying times it did not prescribe all things at once, but distributed and enjoined what was proper for each. And I, being blind, blamed those pious fathers, not only for making use of present things as God commanded and inspired them to do, but also for foreshowing things to come as God was revealing them. " " None |
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70. Augustine, The City of God, 5.8-5.9, 5.11, 14.16, 21.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence, Stoic type • providence • providence (πρόννια), divine
Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 150; Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 110; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 187, 199; Van Nuffelen (2012), Orosius and the Rhetoric of History, 202; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 38, 41; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 192, 195, 196
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5.8 But, as to those who call by the name of fate, not the disposition of the stars as it may exist when any creature is conceived, or born, or commences its existence, but the whole connection and train of causes which makes everything become what it does become, there is no need that I should labor and strive with them in a merely verbal controversy, since they attribute the so-called order and connection of causes to the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly and most truly believed to know all things before they come to pass, and to leave nothing unordained; from whom are all powers, although the wills of all are not from Him. Now, that it is chiefly the will of God most high, whose power extends itself irresistibly through all things which they call fate, is proved by the following verses, of which, if I mistake not, Ann us Seneca is the author:- Father supreme, You ruler of the lofty heavens, Lead me where'er it is Your pleasure; I will give A prompt obedience, making no delay, Lo! Here I am. Promptly I come to do Your sovereign will; If your command shall thwart my inclination, I will still Follow You groaning, and the work assigned, With all the suffering of a mind repugt, Will perform, being evil; which, had I been good, I should have undertaken and performed, though hard, With virtuous cheerfulness. The Fates do lead the man that follows willing; But the man that is unwilling, him they drag. Most evidently, in this last verse, he calls that fate which he had before called the will of the Father supreme, whom, he says, he is ready to obey that he may be led, being willing, not dragged, being unwilling, since the Fates do lead the man that follows willing, but the man that is unwilling, him they drag. The following Homeric lines, which Cicero translates into Latin, also favor this opinion:- Such are the minds of men, as is the light Which Father Jove himself does pour Illustrious o'er the fruitful earth. Not that Cicero wishes that a poetical sentiment should have any weight in a question like this; for when he says that the Stoics, when asserting the power of fate, were in the habit of using these verses from Homer, he is not treating concerning the opinion of that poet, but concerning that of those philosophers, since by these verses, which they quote in connection with the controversy which they hold about fate, is most distinctly manifested what it is which they reckon fate, since they call by the name of Jupiter him whom they reckon the supreme god, from whom, they say, hangs the whole chain of fates. " "5.9 The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him). But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events. For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, The fool has said in his heart, There is no God. That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods, he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defense of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied. But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it was this - that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge - both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how so? Says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order:- If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God - for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes, - but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events. Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, God has spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongs unto God. Also unto You, O God, belongs mercy: for You will render unto every man according to his works. Now the expression, Once has He spoken, is to be understood as meaning immovably, that is, unchangeably has He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that God exists, - which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book De Natura Deorum, - or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just the fool saying in his heart there is no God? For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate. " 5.11 Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one), one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy through verity and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting of soul and body, who, when he sinned, neither permitted him to go unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value; from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the irrational soul has given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to these, has given intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts - that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence.
14.16 Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved. ' " None |
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71. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence of God • Providence, Judaeo-Christian type • Providence, Stoic type • providentia, providence
Found in books: DeMarco, (2021), Augustine and Porphyry: A Commentary on De ciuitate Dei 10, 289; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 28; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 110, 187
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72. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence of God • providence
Found in books: Van Nuffelen (2012), Orosius and the Rhetoric of History, 191, 202; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 219
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73. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • fate (heimarmenê, εἱμαρμένη) vs. providence
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 155; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 134
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74. None, None, nan (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Providence • Providence, Stoic type • providence
Found in books: DeMarco, (2021), Augustine and Porphyry: A Commentary on De ciuitate Dei 10, 289; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 201; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 27, 132, 201
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75. Strabo, Geography, 5.3.8, 17.1.36
Tagged with subjects: • Dionysius of Halicarnassus, providence • providence
Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 247, 248, 249; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 247, 248, 249
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5.3.8 These advantages accrued to the city from the nature of the country; but the foresight of the Romans added others besides. The Grecian cities are thought to have flourished mainly on account of the felicitous choice made by their founders, in regard to the beauty and strength of their sites, their proximity to some port, and the fineness of the country. But the Roman prudence was more particularly employed on matters which had received but little attention from the Greeks, such as paving their roads, constructing aqueducts, and sewers, to convey the sewage of the city into the Tiber. In fact, they have paved the roads, cut through hills, and filled up valleys, so that the merchandise may be conveyed by carriage from the ports. The sewers, arched over with hewn stones, are large enough in some parts for waggons loaded with hay to pass through; while so plentiful is the supply of water from the aqueducts, that rivers may be said to flow through the city and the sewers, and almost every house is furnished with water-pipes and copious fountains. To effect which Marcus Agrippa directed his special attention; he likewise bestowed upon the city numerous ornaments. We may remark, that the ancients, occupied with greater and more necessary concerns, paid but little attention to the beautifying of Rome. But their successors, and especially those of our own day, without neglecting these things, have at the same time embellished the city with numerous and splendid objects. Pompey, divus Caesar, and Augustus, with his children, friends, wife, and sister, have surpassed all others in their zeal and munificence in these decorations. The greater number of these may be seen in the Campus Martius, which to the beauties of nature adds those of art. The size of the plain is marvellous, permitting chariot-races and other feats of horsemanship without impediment, and multitudes to exercise themselves at ball, in the circus and the palaestra. The structures which surround it, the turf covered with herbage all the year round, the summits of the hills beyond the Tiber, extending from its banks with panoramic effect, present a spectacle which the eye abandons with regret. Near to this plain is another surrounded with columns, sacred groves, three theatres, an amphitheatre, and superb temples in close contiguity to each other; and so magnificent, that it would seem idle to describe the rest of the city after it. For this cause the Romans, esteeming it as the most sacred place, have there erected funeral monuments to the most illustrious persons of either sex. The most remarkable of these is that designated as the Mausoleum, which consists of a mound of earth raised upon a high foundation of white marble, situated near the river, and covered to the top with ever-green shrubs. Upon the summit is a bronze statue of Augustus Caesar, and beneath the mound are the ashes of himself, his relatives, and friends. Behind is a large grove containing charming promenades. In the centre of the plain, is the spot where this prince was reduced to ashes; it is surrounded with a double enclosure, one of marble, the other of iron, and planted within with poplars. If from hence you proceed to visit the ancient forum, which is equally filled with basilicas, porticos, and temples, you will there behold the Capitol, the Palatium, with the noble works which adorn them, and the promenade of Livia, each successive place causing you speedily to forget what you have before seen. Such is Rome.
17.1.36 We have treated these subjects at length in the First Book of the Geography. At present we shall make a few remarks on the operations of nature and of Providence conjointly. On the operations of nature, that all things converge to a point, namely, the centre of the whole, and assume a spherical shape around it. The earth is the densest body, and nearer the centre than all others: the less dense and next to it is water; but both land and water are spheres, the first solid, the second hollow, containing the earth within it.— On the operations of Providence, that it has exercised a will, is disposed to variety, and is the artificer of innumerable works. In the first rank, as greatly surpassing all the rest, is the generation of animals, of which the most excellent are gods and men, for whose sake the rest were formed. To the gods Providence assigned heaven; and the earth to men, the extreme parts of the world; for the extreme parts of the sphere are the centre and the circumference. But since water encompasses the earth, and man is not an aquatic, but a land-animal, living in the air, and requiring much light, Providence formed many eminences and cavities in the earth, so that these cavities should receive the whole or a great part of the water which covers the land beneath it; and that the eminences should rise and conceal the water beneath them, except so much as was necessary for the use of the human race, the animals and plants about it.But as all things are in constant motion, and undergo great changes, (for it is not possible that things of such a nature, so numerous and vast, could be otherwise regulated in the world,) we must not suppose the earth or the water always to continue in this state, so as to retain perpetually the same bulk, without increase or diminution, or that each preserves the same fixed place, particularly as the reciprocal change of one into the other is most consot to nature from their proximity; but that much of the land is changed into water, and a great portion of water becomes land, just as we observe great differences in the earth itself. For one kind of earth crumbles easily, another is solid and rocky, and contains iron; and so of others. There is also a variety in the quality of water; for some waters are saline, others sweet and potable, others medicinal, and either salutary or noxious, others cold or hot Is it therefore surprising that some parts of the earth which are now inhabited should formerly have been occupied by sea, and that what are now seas should formerly have been inhabited land ? so also fountains once existing have failed, and others have burst forth; and similarly in the case of rivers and lakes: again, mountains and plains have been converted reciprocally one into the other. On this subject I have spoken before at length, and now let this be said:'' None |
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76. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on providence (πρόνοια) • Celsus, on providence (πρόνοια) • Origen, on providence (πρόνοια) • Philo of Alexandria, on providence (πρόνοια) • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence / πρόνοια • Providence, • Stoicism, Providence • Stoics, and providence • Stoics/Stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • predestination (προόρισις), providence (πρόνοια, providentia) • providence • providence, denial of
Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 101; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 27, 34, 35, 75, 119, 121, 278, 294; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 207, 211, 216; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 24, 64; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 265; Konig and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 246; König and Wiater (2022), Late Hellenistic Greek Literature in Dialogue, 246; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 274; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 125, 138; Merz and Tieleman (2012), Ambrosiaster's Political Theology, 176; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 222, 228, 234, 235, 334, 346; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 414
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77. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Platonists/Platonism/Plato, on providence (πρόνοια) • Providence, Stoic type • providence, Apuleius’s doctrine on • providence, and fate
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 117, 119; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 153; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 293
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