1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 4.6, 33.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Tremors • natural law • natural law, in rabbinic thought • natural law, in the Bible
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 53, 104; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 29, 39, 335, 367; Pomeroy (2021), Chrysostom as Exegete: Scholarly Traditions and Rhetorical Aims in the Homilies on Genesis, 96
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4.6 וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם כִּי הִוא חָכְמַתְכֶם וּבִינַתְכֶם לְעֵינֵי הָעַמִּים אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁמְעוּן אֵת כָּל־הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה וְאָמְרוּ רַק עַם־חָכָם וְנָבוֹן הַגּוֹי הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה׃
33.2 וַיֹּאמַר יְהוָה מִסִּינַי בָּא וְזָרַח מִשֵּׂעִיר לָמוֹ הוֹפִיעַ מֵהַר פָּארָן וְאָתָה מֵרִבְבֹת קֹדֶשׁ מִימִינוֹ אשדת אֵשׁ דָּת לָמוֹ׃
33.2 וּלְגָד אָמַר בָּרוּךְ מַרְחִיב גָּד כְּלָבִיא שָׁכֵן וְטָרַף זְרוֹעַ אַף־קָדְקֹד׃' ' None | sup>
4.6 Observe therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, that, when they hear all these statutes, shall say: ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.’
33.2 And he said: The LORD came from Sinai, And rose from Seir unto them; He shined forth from mount Paran, And He came from the myriads holy, At His right hand was a fiery law unto them.' ' None |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 3.14, 7.8-7.9, 14.21, 14.31, 15.8, 15.16, 19.6, 20.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Biblical Nature, see also Deuteronomy, Allusions • Faith, Nature of • Fear, of Natural Forces • Isaac, nature and • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Rain • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Tremors • Natural philosophy, natural philosophers • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • death (natural, physical) • language, natural • natural world, • nature, Isaac and • nature, of God/gods • nature, overturned • the three visitors, incorporeal nature of
Found in books: Bay (2022), Biblical Heroes and Classical Culture in Christian Late Antiquity: The Historiography, Exemplarity, and Anti-Judaism of Pseudo-Hegesippus, 101; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 99, 112, 196, 201, 203; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 48, 52, 53, 290; Gera (2014), Judith, 449, 467; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 54; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 193; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 232; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 184; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 123; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 62, 168; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 472
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3.14 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־מֹשֶׁה אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶהְיֶה שְׁלָחַנִי אֲלֵיכֶם׃
7.8 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל־אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר׃ 7.9 כִּי יְדַבֵּר אֲלֵכֶם פַּרְעֹה לֵאמֹר תְּנוּ לָכֶם מוֹפֵת וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל־אַהֲרֹן קַח אֶת־מַטְּךָ וְהַשְׁלֵךְ לִפְנֵי־פַרְעֹה יְהִי לְתַנִּין׃
14.21 וַיֵּט מֹשֶׁה אֶת־יָדוֹ עַל־הַיָּם וַיּוֹלֶךְ יְהוָה אֶת־הַיָּם בְּרוּחַ קָדִים עַזָּה כָּל־הַלַּיְלָה וַיָּשֶׂם אֶת־הַיָּם לֶחָרָבָה וַיִּבָּקְעוּ הַמָּיִם׃
14.31 וַיַּרְא יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת־הַיָּד הַגְּדֹלָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה יְהוָה בְּמִצְרַיִם וַיִּירְאוּ הָעָם אֶת־יְהוָה וַיַּאֲמִינוּ בַּיהוָה וּבְמֹשֶׁה עַבְדּוֹ׃
15.8 וּבְרוּחַ אַפֶּיךָ נֶעֶרְמוּ מַיִם נִצְּבוּ כְמוֹ־נֵד נֹזְלִים קָפְאוּ תְהֹמֹת בְּלֶב־יָם׃
15.16 תִּפֹּל עֲלֵיהֶם אֵימָתָה וָפַחַד בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן עַד־יַעֲבֹר עַמְּךָ יְהוָה עַד־יַעֲבֹר עַם־זוּ קָנִיתָ׃
19.6 וְאַתֶּם תִּהְיוּ־לִי מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים וְגוֹי קָדוֹשׁ אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר תְּדַבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃
20.5 לֹא־תִשְׁתַּחְוֶה לָהֶם וְלֹא תָעָבְדֵם כִּי אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֵל קַנָּא פֹּקֵד עֲוֺן אָבֹת עַל־בָּנִים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִים לְשֹׂנְאָי׃'' None | sup>
3.14 And God said unto Moses: ‘I AM THAT I AM’; and He said: ‘Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: I AM hath sent me unto you.’
7.8 And the LORD spoke unto Moses and unto Aaron, saying: 7.9 ’When Pharaoh shall speak unto you, saying: Show a wonder for you; then thou shalt say unto Aaron: Take thy rod, and cast it down before Pharaoh, that it become a serpent.’
14.21 And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and the LORD caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided.
14.31 And Israel saw the great work which the LORD did upon the Egyptians, and the people feared the LORD; and they believed in the LORD, and in His servant Moses.
15.8 And with the blast of Thy nostrils the waters were piled up— The floods stood upright as a heap; The deeps were congealed in the heart of the sea.
15.16 Terror and dread falleth upon them; By the greatness of Thine arm they are as still as a stone; Till Thy people pass over, O LORD, Till the people pass over that Thou hast gotten.
19.6 and ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation. These are the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel.’
20.5 thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me;'' None |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.1-1.5, 1.14-1.18, 1.26-1.28, 1.31, 2.4-2.9, 2.15-2.17, 2.21-2.22, 2.24-2.25, 3.1, 3.5-3.7, 3.9, 3.16, 3.19, 3.22-3.24, 4.7-4.16, 4.26, 5.1, 6.2-6.5, 6.12, 8.9, 9.1-9.7, 9.16, 9.20, 9.24-9.25, 11.3, 12.15, 12.17, 12.19, 15.6, 16.3, 18.11-18.14, 18.19, 22.2, 22.12, 25.2, 26.5, 32.31, 32.33 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Baptism of Jesus, Problematic nature • Church, Nature of • De Universi Natura (Ocellus Lucanus) • Double dreams and visions, differing use of natural features • Faith, Nature of • Fear, of Natural Forces • Gnosticism, nature of • Humanity, Nature • Isaac, nature and • Judaism, Levitical nature of • Law (Mosaic), nature, lex naturae • Law, Natural • Masculine (Culture) versus Feminine (Nature) • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Rain • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Snow • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • Nature • Nature, inner, salvation by • Nature, technological mastery of nature • Paradise, Nature of • Torah, and Levitical nature of Judaism • angel, intellectual nature • angels, incorporeal nature of • common concepts, natural concepts • creation-narrative, paradigmatic, nature of • culture, nature and • death (natural, physical) • determinism, determinists, necessity (of nature) • devil, nature of • dietary laws natural interpretation of • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • heaven, as intelligible nature • homosexual behavior, as contrary to nature • human being, views of, dual nature of • human nature, human condition • human nature, perfected in Abraham • human, nature • knowledge, “natural” vs. “sacred,” • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, Sodomites abandoning • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, death as • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, procreation as • law of nature, vs. irrational desire • law, natural/of nature • natura • natural • natural ability • natural history • natural law • natural law, in rabbinic thought • natural law, in the Bible • natural world, • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, and culture • nature, and impurity • nature, defect in • nature, human • nature, indigenous notions of • nature, laws not at variance with • nature, of God/gods • nature, overturned • nature, unwritten • nature, “heaven” as intelligible • reproduction, as law of nature • scala naturae, in Stoic cosmology • terrestrial nature • the three visitors, incorporeal nature of • virtue, peaceable nature of • weakness, of human nature
Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Bay (2022), Biblical Heroes and Classical Culture in Christian Late Antiquity: The Historiography, Exemplarity, and Anti-Judaism of Pseudo-Hegesippus, 101; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 7, 48, 99, 111, 136, 159, 161, 162, 182, 193, 196, 199, 200, 201, 247, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259, 278, 305, 307, 308, 375, 377, 390, 396, 407; Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 88, 210; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 335, 338; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 180, 212; Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 40; Engberg-Pedersen (2010), Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit, 28; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 917, 920; Feder (2022), Purity and Pollution in the Hebrew Bible: From Embodied Experience to Moral Metaphor, 266; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 74, 76, 103, 105, 106, 107, 199; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 6, 10, 23, 27, 65, 68, 69, 71, 109, 217, 225, 270, 279; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 128, 161, 162, 245, 246; Gera (2014), Judith, 224, 237, 466; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 3, 7, 16, 56, 59, 60, 99, 110, 111, 116, 122, 125, 139, 140, 170; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 103, 104; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 26, 27, 28, 38, 331, 332, 333, 338, 340, 341, 342, 344, 348, 354, 362; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 241; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 27, 29, 92, 299, 321, 328; Kosman (2012), Gender and Dialogue in the Rabbinic Prism, 206; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 193; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 122; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 230; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 107, 108; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 319; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 223; Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 19, 110, 131, 146, 205; Neusner (2004), The Idea of History in Rabbinic Judaism, 199; Neusner Green and Avery-Peck (2022), Judaism from Moses to Muhammad: An Interpretation: Turning Points and Focal Points, 14, 44; Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 98, 173; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 36, 38, 39, 42, 56, 190, 222, 232, 349, 350, 351, 353, 355, 358, 361, 372, 373, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 387, 391, 398; Pomeroy (2021), Chrysostom as Exegete: Scholarly Traditions and Rhetorical Aims in the Homilies on Genesis, 96, 142, 158, 160, 161; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 547, 550; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5, 129, 135; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 472, 580; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 126, 146, 167; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 75, 76, 84; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 122, 243
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1.1 בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ׃
1.1 וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהִים לַיַּבָּשָׁה אֶרֶץ וּלְמִקְוֵה הַמַּיִם קָרָא יַמִּים וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים כִּי־טוֹב׃ 1.2 וְהָאָרֶץ הָיְתָה תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ וְחֹשֶׁךְ עַל־פְּנֵי תְהוֹם וְרוּחַ אֱלֹהִים מְרַחֶפֶת עַל־פְּנֵי הַמָּיִם׃ 1.2 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יִשְׁרְצוּ הַמַּיִם שֶׁרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה וְעוֹף יְעוֹפֵף עַל־הָאָרֶץ עַל־פְּנֵי רְקִיעַ הַשָּׁמָיִם׃ 1.3 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר וַיְהִי־אוֹר׃ 1.3 וּלְכָל־חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ וּלְכָל־עוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל רוֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה אֶת־כָּל־יֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב לְאָכְלָה וַיְהִי־כֵן׃ 1.4 וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאוֹר כִּי־טוֹב וַיַּבְדֵּל אֱלֹהִים בֵּין הָאוֹר וּבֵין הַחֹשֶׁךְ׃ 1.5 וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהִים לָאוֹר יוֹם וְלַחֹשֶׁךְ קָרָא לָיְלָה וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם אֶחָד׃
1.14 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי מְאֹרֹת בִּרְקִיעַ הַשָּׁמַיִם לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַיּוֹם וּבֵין הַלָּיְלָה וְהָיוּ לְאֹתֹת וּלְמוֹעֲדִים וּלְיָמִים וְשָׁנִים׃
1.15 וְהָיוּ לִמְאוֹרֹת בִּרְקִיעַ הַשָּׁמַיִם לְהָאִיר עַל־הָאָרֶץ וַיְהִי־כֵן׃
1.16 וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים אֶת־שְׁנֵי הַמְּאֹרֹת הַגְּדֹלִים אֶת־הַמָּאוֹר הַגָּדֹל לְמֶמְשֶׁלֶת הַיּוֹם וְאֶת־הַמָּאוֹר הַקָּטֹן לְמֶמְשֶׁלֶת הַלַּיְלָה וְאֵת הַכּוֹכָבִים׃
1.17 וַיִּתֵּן אֹתָם אֱלֹהִים בִּרְקִיעַ הַשָּׁמָיִם לְהָאִיר עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
1.18 וְלִמְשֹׁל בַּיּוֹם וּבַלַּיְלָה וּלֲהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הָאוֹר וּבֵין הַחֹשֶׁךְ וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים כִּי־טוֹב׃
1.26 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃ 1.27 וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃ 1.28 וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם אֱלֹהִים פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְכִבְשֻׁהָ וּרְדוּ בִּדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבְכָל־חַיָּה הָרֹמֶשֶׂת עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
1.31 וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהִנֵּה־טוֹב מְאֹד וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם הַשִּׁשִּׁי׃
2.4 אֵלֶּה תוֹלְדוֹת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְהָאָרֶץ בְּהִבָּרְאָם בְּיוֹם עֲשׂוֹת יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶרֶץ וְשָׁמָיִם׃ 2.5 וְכֹל שִׂיחַ הַשָּׂדֶה טֶרֶם יִהְיֶה בָאָרֶץ וְכָל־עֵשֶׂב הַשָּׂדֶה טֶרֶם יִצְמָח כִּי לֹא הִמְטִיר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים עַל־הָאָרֶץ וְאָדָם אַיִן לַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה׃ 2.6 וְאֵד יַעֲלֶה מִן־הָאָרֶץ וְהִשְׁקָה אֶת־כָּל־פְּנֵי־הָאֲדָמָה׃ 2.7 וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃ 2.8 וַיִּטַּע יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים גַּן־בְעֵדֶן מִקֶּדֶם וַיָּשֶׂם שָׁם אֶת־הָאָדָם אֲשֶׁר יָצָר׃ 2.9 וַיַּצְמַח יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים מִן־הָאֲדָמָה כָּל־עֵץ נֶחְמָד לְמַרְאֶה וְטוֹב לְמַאֲכָל וְעֵץ הַחַיִּים בְּתוֹךְ הַגָּן וְעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע׃
2.15 וַיִּקַּח יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם וַיַּנִּחֵהוּ בְגַן־עֵדֶן לְעָבְדָהּ וּלְשָׁמְרָהּ׃ 2.16 וַיְצַו יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים עַל־הָאָדָם לֵאמֹר מִכֹּל עֵץ־הַגָּן אָכֹל תֹּאכֵל׃ 2.17 וּמֵעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְךָ מִמֶּנּוּ מוֹת תָּמוּת׃
2.21 וַיַּפֵּל יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים תַּרְדֵּמָה עַל־הָאָדָם וַיִּישָׁן וַיִּקַּח אַחַת מִצַּלְעֹתָיו וַיִּסְגֹּר בָּשָׂר תַּחְתֶּנָּה׃ 2.22 וַיִּבֶן יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הַצֵּלָע אֲשֶׁר־לָקַח מִן־הָאָדָם לְאִשָּׁה וַיְבִאֶהָ אֶל־הָאָדָם׃
2.24 עַל־כֵּן יַעֲזָב־אִישׁ אֶת־אָבִיו וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ וְדָבַק בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד׃ 2.25 וַיִּהְיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲרוּמִּים הָאָדָם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְלֹא יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ׃
3.1 וְהַנָּחָשׁ הָיָה עָרוּם מִכֹּל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אַף כִּי־אָמַר אֱלֹהִים לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן׃
3.1 וַיֹּאמֶר אֶת־קֹלְךָ שָׁמַעְתִּי בַּגָּן וָאִירָא כִּי־עֵירֹם אָנֹכִי וָאֵחָבֵא׃
3.5 כִּי יֹדֵעַ אֱלֹהִים כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְכֶם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנִפְקְחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם וִהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע׃ 3.6 וַתֵּרֶא הָאִשָּׁה כִּי טוֹב הָעֵץ לְמַאֲכָל וְכִי תַאֲוָה־הוּא לָעֵינַיִם וְנֶחְמָד הָעֵץ לְהַשְׂכִּיל וַתִּקַּח מִפִּרְיוֹ וַתֹּאכַל וַתִּתֵּן גַּם־לְאִישָׁהּ עִמָּהּ וַיֹּאכַל׃ 3.7 וַתִּפָּקַחְנָה עֵינֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם וַיֵּדְעוּ כִּי עֵירֻמִּם הֵם וַיִּתְפְּרוּ עֲלֵה תְאֵנָה וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם חֲגֹרֹת׃
3.9 וַיִּקְרָא יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶל־הָאָדָם וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ אַיֶּכָּה׃
3.16 אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אָמַר הַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה עִצְּבוֹנֵךְ וְהֵרֹנֵךְ בְּעֶצֶב תֵּלְדִי בָנִים וְאֶל־אִישֵׁךְ תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ וְהוּא יִמְשָׁל־בָּךְ׃
3.19 בְּזֵעַת אַפֶּיךָ תֹּאכַל לֶחֶם עַד שׁוּבְךָ אֶל־הָאֲדָמָה כִּי מִמֶּנָּה לֻקָּחְתָּ כִּי־עָפָר אַתָּה וְאֶל־עָפָר תָּשׁוּב׃
3.22 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים הֵן הָאָדָם הָיָה כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ לָדַעַת טוֹב וָרָע וְעַתָּה פֶּן־יִשְׁלַח יָדוֹ וְלָקַח גַּם מֵעֵץ הַחַיִּים וְאָכַל וָחַי לְעֹלָם׃ 3.23 וַיְשַׁלְּחֵהוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים מִגַּן־עֵדֶן לַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר לֻקַּח מִשָּׁם׃ 3.24 וַיְגָרֶשׁ אֶת־הָאָדָם וַיַּשְׁכֵּן מִקֶּדֶם לְגַן־עֵדֶן אֶת־הַכְּרֻבִים וְאֵת לַהַט הַחֶרֶב הַמִּתְהַפֶּכֶת לִשְׁמֹר אֶת־דֶּרֶךְ עֵץ הַחַיִּים׃
4.7 הֲלוֹא אִם־תֵּיטִיב שְׂאֵת וְאִם לֹא תֵיטִיב לַפֶּתַח חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ וְאֵלֶיךָ תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ וְאַתָּה תִּמְשָׁל־בּוֹ׃ 4.8 וַיֹּאמֶר קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיְהִי בִּהְיוֹתָם בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיָּקָם קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיַּהַרְגֵהוּ׃ 4.9 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־קַיִן אֵי הֶבֶל אָחִיךָ וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא יָדַעְתִּי הֲשֹׁמֵר אָחִי אָנֹכִי׃' '4.11 וְעַתָּה אָרוּר אָתָּה מִן־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר פָּצְתָה אֶת־פִּיהָ לָקַחַת אֶת־דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ מִיָּדֶךָ׃ 4.12 כִּי תַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה לֹא־תֹסֵף תֵּת־כֹּחָהּ לָךְ נָע וָנָד תִּהְיֶה בָאָרֶץ׃ 4.13 וַיֹּאמֶר קַיִן אֶל־יְהוָה גָּדוֹל עֲוֺנִי מִנְּשֹׂא׃ 4.14 הֵן גֵּרַשְׁתָּ אֹתִי הַיּוֹם מֵעַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה וּמִפָּנֶיךָ אֶסָּתֵר וְהָיִיתִי נָע וָנָד בָּאָרֶץ וְהָיָה כָל־מֹצְאִי יַהַרְגֵנִי׃ 4.15 וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ יְהוָה לָכֵן כָּל־הֹרֵג קַיִן שִׁבְעָתַיִם יֻקָּם וַיָּשֶׂם יְהוָה לְקַיִן אוֹת לְבִלְתִּי הַכּוֹת־אֹתוֹ כָּל־מֹצְאוֹ׃ 4.16 וַיֵּצֵא קַיִן מִלִּפְנֵי יְהוָה וַיֵּשֶׁב בְּאֶרֶץ־נוֹד קִדְמַת־עֵדֶן׃
4.26 וּלְשֵׁת גַּם־הוּא יֻלַּד־בֵּן וַיִּקְרָא אֶת־שְׁמוֹ אֱנוֹשׁ אָז הוּחַל לִקְרֹא בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה׃
5.1 וַיְחִי אֱנוֹשׁ אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת־קֵינָן חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת׃
5.1 זֶה סֵפֶר תּוֹלְדֹת אָדָם בְּיוֹם בְּרֹא אֱלֹהִים אָדָם בִּדְמוּת אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֹתוֹ׃
6.2 וַיִּרְאוּ בְנֵי־הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת־בְּנוֹת הָאָדָם כִּי טֹבֹת הֵנָּה וַיִּקְחוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר בָּחָרוּ׃
6.2 מֵהָעוֹף לְמִינֵהוּ וּמִן־הַבְּהֵמָה לְמִינָהּ מִכֹּל רֶמֶשׂ הָאֲדָמָה לְמִינֵהוּ שְׁנַיִם מִכֹּל יָבֹאוּ אֵלֶיךָ לְהַחֲיוֹת׃ 6.3 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לֹא־יָדוֹן רוּחִי בָאָדָם לְעֹלָם בְּשַׁגַּם הוּא בָשָׂר וְהָיוּ יָמָיו מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה׃ 6.4 הַנְּפִלִים הָיוּ בָאָרֶץ בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם וְגַם אַחֲרֵי־כֵן אֲשֶׁר יָבֹאוּ בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים אֶל־בְּנוֹת הָאָדָם וְיָלְדוּ לָהֶם הֵמָּה הַגִּבֹּרִים אֲשֶׁר מֵעוֹלָם אַנְשֵׁי הַשֵּׁם׃ 6.5 וַיַּרְא יְהוָה כִּי רַבָּה רָעַת הָאָדָם בָּאָרֶץ וְכָל־יֵצֶר מַחְשְׁבֹת לִבּוֹ רַק רַע כָּל־הַיּוֹם׃
6.12 וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי־הִשְׁחִית כָּל־בָּשָׂר אֶת־דַּרְכּוֹ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
8.9 וְלֹא־מָצְאָה הַיּוֹנָה מָנוֹחַ לְכַף־רַגְלָהּ וַתָּשָׁב אֵלָיו אֶל־הַתֵּבָה כִּי־מַיִם עַל־פְּנֵי כָל־הָאָרֶץ וַיִּשְׁלַח יָדוֹ וַיִּקָּחֶהָ וַיָּבֵא אֹתָהּ אֵלָיו אֶל־הַתֵּבָה׃
9.1 וְאֵת כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר אִתְּכֶם בָּעוֹף בַּבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ אִתְּכֶם מִכֹּל יֹצְאֵי הַתֵּבָה לְכֹל חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ׃
9.1 וַיְבָרֶךְ אֱלֹהִים אֶת־נֹחַ וְאֶת־בָּנָיו וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ׃ 9.2 וַיָּחֶל נֹחַ אִישׁ הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּטַּע כָּרֶם׃ 9.2 וּמוֹרַאֲכֶם וְחִתְּכֶם יִהְיֶה עַל כָּל־חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ וְעַל כָּל־עוֹף הַשָּׁמָיִם בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּרְמֹשׂ הָאֲדָמָה וּבְכָל־דְּגֵי הַיָּם בְּיֶדְכֶם נִתָּנוּ׃ 9.3 כָּל־רֶמֶשׂ אֲשֶׁר הוּא־חַי לָכֶם יִהְיֶה לְאָכְלָה כְּיֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב נָתַתִּי לָכֶם אֶת־כֹּל׃ 9.4 אַךְ־בָּשָׂר בְּנַפְשׁוֹ דָמוֹ לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ׃ 9.5 וְאַךְ אֶת־דִּמְכֶם לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם אֶדְרֹשׁ מִיַּד כָּל־חַיָּה אֶדְרְשֶׁנּוּ וּמִיַּד הָאָדָם מִיַּד אִישׁ אָחִיו אֶדְרֹשׁ אֶת־נֶפֶשׁ הָאָדָם׃ 9.6 שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ כִּי בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת־הָאָדָם׃ 9.7 וְאַתֶּם פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ שִׁרְצוּ בָאָרֶץ וּרְבוּ־בָהּ׃
9.16 וְהָיְתָה הַקֶּשֶׁת בֶּעָנָן וּרְאִיתִיהָ לִזְכֹּר בְּרִית עוֹלָם בֵּין אֱלֹהִים וּבֵין כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה בְּכָל־בָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
9.24 וַיִּיקֶץ נֹחַ מִיֵּינוֹ וַיֵּדַע אֵת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה־לוֹ בְּנוֹ הַקָּטָן׃ 9.25 וַיֹּאמֶר אָרוּר כְּנָעַן עֶבֶד עֲבָדִים יִהְיֶה לְאֶחָיו׃
11.3 וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ הָבָה נִלְבְּנָה לְבֵנִים וְנִשְׂרְפָה לִשְׂרֵפָה וַתְּהִי לָהֶם הַלְּבֵנָה לְאָבֶן וְהַחֵמָר הָיָה לָהֶם לַחֹמֶר׃
11.3 וַתְּהִי שָׂרַי עֲקָרָה אֵין לָהּ וָלָד׃
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2.15 וַיִּרְאוּ אֹתָהּ שָׂרֵי פַרְעֹה וַיְהַלְלוּ אֹתָהּ אֶל־פַּרְעֹה וַתֻּקַּח הָאִשָּׁה בֵּית פַּרְעֹה׃
12.17 וַיְנַגַּע יְהוָה אֶת־פַּרְעֹה נְגָעִים גְּדֹלִים וְאֶת־בֵּיתוֹ עַל־דְּבַר שָׂרַי אֵשֶׁת אַבְרָם׃
12.19 לָמָה אָמַרְתָּ אֲחֹתִי הִוא וָאֶקַּח אֹתָהּ לִי לְאִשָּׁה וְעַתָּה הִנֵּה אִשְׁתְּךָ קַח וָלֵךְ׃
15.6 וְהֶאֱמִן בַּיהוָה וַיַּחְשְׁבֶהָ לּוֹ צְדָקָה׃
16.3 וַתִּקַּח שָׂרַי אֵשֶׁת־אַבְרָם אֶת־הָגָר הַמִּצְרִית שִׁפְחָתָהּ מִקֵּץ עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים לְשֶׁבֶת אַבְרָם בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן וַתִּתֵּן אֹתָהּ לְאַבְרָם אִישָׁהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה׃
18.11 וְאַבְרָהָם וְשָׂרָה זְקֵנִים בָּאִים בַּיָּמִים חָדַל לִהְיוֹת לְשָׂרָה אֹרַח כַּנָּשִׁים׃ 18.12 וַתִּצְחַק שָׂרָה בְּקִרְבָּהּ לֵאמֹר אַחֲרֵי בְלֹתִי הָיְתָה־לִּי עֶדְנָה וַאדֹנִי זָקֵן׃ 18.13 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־אַבְרָהָם לָמָּה זֶּה צָחֲקָה שָׂרָה לֵאמֹר הַאַף אֻמְנָם אֵלֵד וַאֲנִי זָקַנְתִּי׃ 18.14 הֲיִפָּלֵא מֵיְהוָה דָּבָר לַמּוֹעֵד אָשׁוּב אֵלֶיךָ כָּעֵת חַיָּה וּלְשָׂרָה בֵן׃
18.19 כִּי יְדַעְתִּיו לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה אֶת־בָּנָיו וְאֶת־בֵּיתוֹ אַחֲרָיו וְשָׁמְרוּ דֶּרֶךְ יְהוָה לַעֲשׂוֹת צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט לְמַעַן הָבִיא יְהוָה עַל־אַבְרָהָם אֵת אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר עָלָיו׃
22.2 וַיְהִי אַחֲרֵי הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה וַיֻּגַּד לְאַבְרָהָם לֵאמֹר הִנֵּה יָלְדָה מִלְכָּה גַם־הִוא בָּנִים לְנָחוֹר אָחִיךָ׃
22.2 וַיֹּאמֶר קַח־נָא אֶת־בִּנְךָ אֶת־יְחִידְךָ אֲשֶׁר־אָהַבְתָּ אֶת־יִצְחָק וְלֶךְ־לְךָ אֶל־אֶרֶץ הַמֹּרִיָּה וְהַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה עַל אַחַד הֶהָרִים אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיךָ׃
22.12 וַיֹּאמֶר אַל־תִּשְׁלַח יָדְךָ אֶל־הַנַּעַר וְאַל־תַּעַשׂ לוֹ מְאוּמָּה כִּי עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי־יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה וְלֹא חָשַׂכְתָּ אֶת־בִּנְךָ אֶת־יְחִידְךָ מִמֶּנִּי׃
25.2 וַיְהִי יִצְחָק בֶּן־אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה בְּקַחְתּוֹ אֶת־רִבְקָה בַּת־בְּתוּאֵל הָאֲרַמִּי מִפַּדַּן אֲרָם אֲחוֹת לָבָן הָאֲרַמִּי לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה׃
25.2 וַתֵּלֶד לוֹ אֶת־זִמְרָן וְאֶת־יָקְשָׁן וְאֶת־מְדָן וְאֶת־מִדְיָן וְאֶת־יִשְׁבָּק וְאֶת־שׁוּחַ׃
26.5 עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר־שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֺתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי׃
32.31 וַיִּקְרָא יַעֲקֹב שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם פְּנִיאֵל כִּי־רָאִיתִי אֱלֹהִים פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים וַתִּנָּצֵל נַפְשִׁי׃
32.33 עַל־כֵּן לֹא־יֹאכְלוּ בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת־גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה אֲשֶׁר עַל־כַּף הַיָּרֵךְ עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה כִּי נָגַע בְּכַף־יֶרֶךְ יַעֲקֹב בְּגִיד הַנָּשֶׁה׃'' None | sup>
1.1 In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. 1.2 Now the earth was unformed and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters. 1.3 And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there was light. 1.4 And God saw the light, that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness. 1.5 And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day.
1.14 And God said: ‘Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years;
1.15 and let them be for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth.’ And it was so.
1.16 And God made the two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; and the stars.
1.17 And God set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth,
1.18 and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness; and God saw that it was good.
1.26 And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ 1.27 And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them. 1.28 And God blessed them; and God said unto them: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth.’
1.31 And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day.
2.4 These are the generations of the heaven and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the LORD God made earth and heaven. 2.5 No shrub of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up; for the LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the ground; 2.6 but there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground. 2.7 Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. 2.8 And the LORD God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed. 2.9 And out of the ground made the LORD God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
2.15 And the LORD God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. 2.16 And the LORD God commanded the man, saying: ‘of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; 2.17 but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.’
2.21 And the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the place with flesh instead thereof. 2.22 And the rib, which the LORD God had taken from the man, made He a woman, and brought her unto the man.
2.24 Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh. 2.25 And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.
3.1 Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman: ‘Yea, hath God said: Ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?’
3.5 for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.’ 3.6 And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. 3.7 And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves girdles.
3.9 And the LORD God called unto the man, and said unto him: ‘Where art thou?’
3.16 Unto the woman He said: ‘I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.’
3.19 In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.’
3.22 And the LORD God said: ‘Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.’ 3.23 Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. 3.24 So He drove out the man; and He placed at the east of the garden of Eden the cherubim, and the flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way to the tree of life.
4.7 If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up? and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it.’ 4.8 And Cain spoke unto Abel his brother. And it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him. 4.9 And the LORD said unto Cain: ‘Where is Abel thy brother?’ And he said: ‘I know not; am I my brother’s keeper?’ 4.10 And He said: ‘What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto Me from the ground. 4.11 And now cursed art thou from the ground, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother’s blood from thy hand. 4.12 When thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a wanderer shalt thou be in the earth.’ 4.13 And Cain said unto the LORD: ‘My punishment is greater than I can bear. 4.14 Behold, Thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the land; and from Thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer in the earth; and it will come to pass, that whosoever findeth me will slay me.’ 4.15 And the LORD said unto him: ‘Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.’ And the LORD set a sign for Cain, lest any finding him should smite him. 4.16 And Cain went out from the presence of the LORD, and dwelt in the land of Nod, on the east of Eden.
4.26 And to Seth, to him also there was born a son; and he called his name Enosh; then began men to call upon the name of the LORD.
5.1 This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him;
6.2 that the sons of nobles saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them wives, whomsoever they chose. 6.3 And the LORD said: ‘My spirit shall not abide in man for ever, for that he also is flesh; therefore shall his days be a hundred and twenty years.’ 6.4 The Nephilim were in the earth in those days, and also after that, when the sons of nobles came in unto the daughters of men, and they bore children to them; the same were the mighty men that were of old, the men of renown. 6.5 And the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.
6.12 And God saw the earth, and, behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth. .
8.9 But the dove found no rest for the sole of her foot, and she returned unto him to the ark, for the waters were on the face of the whole earth; and he put forth his hand, and took her, and brought her in unto him into the ark.
9.1 And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth. 9.2 And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all wherewith the ground teemeth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are they delivered. 9.3 Every moving thing that liveth shall be for food for you; as the green herb have I given you all. 9.4 Only flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat. 9.5 And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man’s brother, will I require the life of man. 9.6 Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man. 9.7 And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply; swarm in the earth, and multiply therein.’ .
9.16 And the bow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may remember the everlasting covet between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth.’
9.20 And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.
9.24 And Noah awoke from his wine, and knew what his youngest son had done unto him. 9.25 And he said: Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren.
11.3 And they said one to another: ‘Come, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly.’ And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar.
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2.15 And the princes of Pharaoh saw her, and praised her to Pharaoh; and the woman was taken into Pharaoh’s house.
12.17 And the LORD plagued Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai Abram’s wife.
12.19 Why saidst thou: She is my sister? so that I took her to be my wife; now therefore behold thy wife, take her, and go thy way.’
15.6 And he believed in the LORD; and He counted it to him for righteousness.
16.3 And Sarai Abram’s wife took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, and gave her to Abram her husband to be his wife.
18.11 Now Abraham and Sarah were old, and well stricken in age; it had ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of women.— 18.12 And Sarah laughed within herself, saying: ‘After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?’ 18.13 And the LORD said unto Abraham: ‘Wherefore did Sarah laugh, saying: Shall I of a surety bear a child, who am old? 18.14 Is any thing too hard for the LORD. At the set time I will return unto thee, when the season cometh round, and Sarah shall have a son.’
18.19 For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the LORD, to do righteousness and justice; to the end that the LORD may bring upon Abraham that which He hath spoken of him.’
22.2 And He said: ‘Take now thy son, thine only son, whom thou lovest, even Isaac, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.’
22.12 And he said: ‘Lay not thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him; for now I know that thou art a God-fearing man, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from Me.’
25.2 And she bore him Zimran, and Jokshan, and Medan, and Midian, and Ishbak, and Shuah.
26.5 because that Abraham hearkened to My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws.’
32.31 And Jacob called the name of the place Peniel: ‘for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved.’
32.33 Therefore the children of Israel eat not the sinew of the thigh-vein which is upon the hollow of the thigh, unto this day; because he touched the hollow of Jacob’s thigh, even in the sinew of the thigh-vein.' ' None |
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4. Hebrew Bible, Job, 37.6, 40.19, 41.10 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Snow • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • angel, intellectual nature • beasts, the, as natural animals
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 199; Sneed (2022), Taming the Beast: A Reception History of Behemoth and Leviathan, 91, 216; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 461, 463; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 75
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37.6 כִּי לַשֶּׁלַג יֹאמַר הֱוֵא אָרֶץ וְגֶשֶׁם מָטָר וְגֶשֶׁם מִטְרוֹת עֻזּוֹ׃
40.19 הוּא רֵאשִׁית דַּרְכֵי־אֵל הָעֹשׂוֹ יַגֵּשׁ חַרְבּוֹ׃' ' None | sup>
37.6 For He saith to the snow: ‘Fall thou on the earth’; Likewise to the shower of rain, and to the showers of His mighty rain.
40.19 He is the beginning of the ways of God; He only that made him can make His sword to approach unto him.
41.10 His sneezings flash forth light, and his eyes are like the eyelids of the morning.'' None |
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5. Hebrew Bible, Jonah, 1.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Fear, of Natural Forces • nature, overturned
Found in books: Gera (2014), Judith, 237; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 477
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1.7 וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ לְכוּ וְנַפִּילָה גוֹרָלוֹת וְנֵדְעָה בְּשֶׁלְּמִי הָרָעָה הַזֹּאת לָנוּ וַיַּפִּלוּ גּוֹרָלוֹת וַיִּפֹּל הַגּוֹרָל עַל־יוֹנָה׃'' None | sup>
1.7 And they said every one to his fellow: ‘Come, and let us cast lots, that we may know for whose cause this evil is upon us.’ So they cast lots, and the lot fell upon Jonah.'' None |
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6. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 12.4-12.5, 18.23, 19.19, 19.23-19.25 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Rain • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • law\n, natural law • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • natural law • nature, • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, as active
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 7, 161, 162; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 105; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 66, 245; Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 130, 131, 146, 234; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 326; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 22; Witter et al. (2021), Torah, Temple, Land: Constructions of Judaism in Antiquity, 142
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12.4 וּשְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וּשְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים תֵּשֵׁב בִּדְמֵי טָהֳרָה בְּכָל־קֹדֶשׁ לֹא־תִגָּע וְאֶל־הַמִּקְדָּשׁ לֹא תָבֹא עַד־מְלֹאת יְמֵי טָהֳרָהּ׃ 12.5 וְאִם־נְקֵבָה תֵלֵד וְטָמְאָה שְׁבֻעַיִם כְּנִדָּתָהּ וְשִׁשִּׁים יוֹם וְשֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תֵּשֵׁב עַל־דְּמֵי טָהֳרָה׃
18.23 וּבְכָל־בְּהֵמָה לֹא־תִתֵּן שְׁכָבְתְּךָ לְטָמְאָה־בָהּ וְאִשָּׁה לֹא־תַעֲמֹד לִפְנֵי בְהֵמָה לְרִבְעָהּ תֶּבֶל הוּא׃
19.19 אֶת־חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא־תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא־תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם וּבֶגֶד כִּלְאַיִם שַׁעַטְנֵז לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ׃
19.23 וְכִי־תָבֹאוּ אֶל־הָאָרֶץ וּנְטַעְתֶּם כָּל־עֵץ מַאֲכָל וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עָרְלָתוֹ אֶת־פִּרְיוֹ שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים יִהְיֶה לָכֶם עֲרֵלִים לֹא יֵאָכֵל׃ 19.24 וּבַשָּׁנָה הָרְבִיעִת יִהְיֶה כָּל־פִּרְיוֹ קֹדֶשׁ הִלּוּלִים לַיהוָה׃ 19.25 וּבַשָּׁנָה הַחֲמִישִׁת תֹּאכְלוּ אֶת־פִּרְיוֹ לְהוֹסִיף לָכֶם תְּבוּאָתוֹ אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם׃'' None | sup>
12.4 And she shall continue in the blood of purification three and thirty days; she shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the sanctuary, until the days of her purification be fulfilled. 12.5 But if she bear a maid-child, then she shall be unclean two weeks, as in her impurity; and she shall continue in the blood of purification threescore and six days.
18.23 And thou shalt not lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith; neither shall any woman stand before a beast, to lie down thereto; it is perversion.
19.19 Ye shall keep My statutes. Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind; thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed; neither shall there come upon thee a garment of two kinds of stuff mingled together.
19.23 And when ye shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then ye shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden; three years shall it be as forbidden unto you; it shall not be eaten. 19.24 And in the fourth year all the fruit thereof shall be holy, for giving praise unto the LORD. 19.25 But in the fifth year may ye eat of the fruit thereof, that it may yield unto you more richly the increase thereof: I am the LORD your God.'' None |
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7. Hebrew Bible, Malachi, 1.2, 1.6, 2.10, 3.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Fear, of Natural Forces • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • Son, the, by nature • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • law, natural • natural law, in the Bible • nature
Found in books: Bezzel and Pfeiffer (2021), Prophecy and Hellenism, 8, 144, 152; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 31; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 238; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 472; Widdicombe (2000), The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, 221, 238; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 122
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1.2 אָהַבְתִּי אֶתְכֶם אָמַר יְהוָה וַאֲמַרְתֶּם בַּמָּה אֲהַבְתָּנוּ הֲלוֹא־אָח עֵשָׂו לְיַעֲקֹב נְאֻם־יְהוָה וָאֹהַב אֶת־יַעֲקֹב׃
1.6 בֵּן יְכַבֵּד אָב וְעֶבֶד אֲדֹנָיו וְאִם־אָב אָנִי אַיֵּה כְבוֹדִי וְאִם־אֲדוֹנִים אָנִי אַיֵּה מוֹרָאִי אָמַר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת לָכֶם הַכֹּהֲנִים בּוֹזֵי שְׁמִי וַאֲמַרְתֶּם בַּמֶּה בָזִינוּ אֶת־שְׁמֶךָ׃' 3.6 כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה לֹא שָׁנִיתִי וְאַתֶּם בְּנֵי־יַעֲקֹב לֹא כְלִיתֶם׃'' None | sup>
1.2 I have loved you, saith the LORD. Yet ye say: ‘Wherein hast Thou loved us?’ Was not Esau Jacob’s brother? Saith the LORD; Yet I loved Jacob;
1.6 A son honoureth his father, And a servant his master; If then I be a father, Where is My honour? And if I be a master, Where is My fear? Saith the LORD of hosts Unto you, O priests, that despise My name. And ye say: ‘Wherein have we despised Thy name?’
2.10 Have we not all one father? Hath not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother, Profaning the covet of our fathers?
3.6 For I the LORD change not; and ye, O sons of Jacob, are not consumed.'' None |
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8. Hebrew Bible, Nahum, 1.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Rain • Natural/Meterological Phenomena
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 52; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 463
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1.6 לִפְנֵי זַעְמוֹ מִי יַעֲמוֹד וּמִי יָקוּם בַּחֲרוֹן אַפּוֹ חֲמָתוֹ נִתְּכָה כָאֵשׁ וְהַצֻּרִים נִתְּצוּ מִמֶּנּוּ׃'' None | sup>
1.6 Who can stand before His indignation? And who can abide in the fierceness of His anger? His fury is poured out like fire, And the rocks are broken asunder before Him.'' None |
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9. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 19.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • nature, Euro-American ideas of • resurrection, nature of (relationship to embodiment)
Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 245; Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 98
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19.14 זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה אָדָם כִּי־יָמוּת בְּאֹהֶל כָּל־הַבָּא אֶל־הָאֹהֶל וְכָל־אֲשֶׁר בָּאֹהֶל יִטְמָא שִׁבְעַת יָמִים׃'' None | sup>
19.14 This is the law: when a man dieth in a tent, every one that cometh into the tent, and every thing that is in the tent, shall be unclean seven days.'' None |
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10. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 3.19, 8.35 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Gnosticism, nature of • Nature • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • human nature, human condition • natural law, in the Bible • piyyut, piyyutim, exegetical nature of
Found in books: Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 920; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 29, 30, 31; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 289; Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 43; Pachoumi (2017), The Concepts of the Divine in the Greek Magical Papyri, 106; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 160, 161
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3.19 יְהוָה בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד־אָרֶץ כּוֹנֵן שָׁמַיִם בִּתְבוּנָה׃
8.35 כִּי מֹצְאִי מצאי מָצָא חַיִּים וַיָּפֶק רָצוֹן מֵיְהוָה׃' ' None | sup>
3.19 The LORD by wisdom founded the earth; By understanding He established the heavens.
8.35 For whoso findeth me findeth life, And obtaineth favour of the LORD.' ' None |
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11. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 14.4, 18.8, 23.2, 103.3, 103.17, 110.5, 147.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Fear, of Natural Forces • Gnosticism, nature of • God, Nature of • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Snow • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • Scripture (nature of) • determinism, determinists, necessity (of nature) • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • natura • natural law • natural world, in the Shivata for Dew • nature, overturned • piyyut, piyyutim, exegetical nature of
Found in books: Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 920; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 84, 199; Gera (2014), Judith, 467; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 55; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 205; Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 41, 305; Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 162; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 325; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 463, 472; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 200; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 21
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14.4 הֲלֹא יָדְעוּ כָּל־פֹּעֲלֵי אָוֶן אֹכְלֵי עַמִּי אָכְלוּ לֶחֶם יְהוָה לֹא קָרָאוּ׃
18.8 וַתִּגְעַשׁ וַתִּרְעַשׁ הָאָרֶץ וּמוֹסְדֵי הָרִים יִרְגָּזוּ וַיִּתְגָּעֲשׁוּ כִּי־חָרָה לוֹ׃
23.2 בִּנְאוֹת דֶּשֶׁא יַרְבִּיצֵנִי עַל־מֵי מְנֻחוֹת יְנַהֲלֵנִי׃
103.3 הַסֹּלֵחַ לְכָל־עֲוֺנֵכִי הָרֹפֵא לְכָל־תַּחֲלֻאָיְכִי׃
103.17 וְחֶסֶד יְהוָה מֵעוֹלָם וְעַד־עוֹלָם עַל־יְרֵאָיו וְצִדְקָתוֹ לִבְנֵי בָנִים׃
110.5 אֲדֹנָי עַל־יְמִינְךָ מָחַץ בְּיוֹם־אַפּוֹ מְלָכִים׃
147.17 מַשְׁלִיךְ קַרְחוֹ כְפִתִּים לִפְנֵי קָרָתוֹ מִי יַעֲמֹד׃' ' None | sup>
14.4 ’Shall not all the workers of iniquity know it, who eat up My people as they eat bread, and call not upon the LORD?'" 18.8 Then the earth did shake and quake, the foundations also of the mountains did tremble; they were shaken, because He was wroth.
23.2 He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He leadeth me beside the still waters.
103.3 Who forgiveth all thine iniquity; Who healeth all Thy diseases;' "
103.17 But the mercy of the LORD is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him, And His righteousness unto children's children;" 110.5 The Lord at thy right hand Doth crush kings in the day of His wrath.
147.17 He casteth forth His ice like crumbs; Who can stand before His cold?' " None |
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12. Hebrew Bible, 1 Kings, 8.35-8.36 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • God, Nature of • Natural/Meterological Phenomena
Found in books: Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 202; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 461
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8.35 בְּהֵעָצֵר שָׁמַיִם וְלֹא־יִהְיֶה מָטָר כִּי יֶחֶטְאוּ־לָךְ וְהִתְפַּלְלוּ אֶל־הַמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה וְהוֹדוּ אֶת־שְׁמֶךָ וּמֵחַטָּאתָם יְשׁוּבוּן כִּי תַעֲנֵם׃ 8.36 וְאַתָּה תִּשְׁמַע הַשָּׁמַיִם וְסָלַחְתָּ לְחַטַּאת עֲבָדֶיךָ וְעַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּי תוֹרֵם אֶת־הַדֶּרֶךְ הַטּוֹבָה אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ־בָהּ וְנָתַתָּה מָטָר עַל־אַרְצְךָ אֲשֶׁר־נָתַתָּה לְעַמְּךָ לְנַחֲלָה׃'' None | sup>
8.35 When heaven is shut up, and there is no rain, when they do sin against Thee; if they pray toward this place, and confess Thy name, and turn from their sin, when Thou dost afflict them; 8.36 then hear Thou in heaven, and forgive the sin of Thy servants, and of Thy people Israel, when Thou teachest them the good way wherein they should walk; and send rain upon Thy land, which Thou hast given to Thy people for an inheritance.'' None |
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13. Hebrew Bible, Habakkuk, 3.6 (8th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Tremors • natural law, in rabbinic thought
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 65; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 368, 369
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3.6 עָמַד וַיְמֹדֶד אֶרֶץ רָאָה וַיַּתֵּר גּוֹיִם וַיִּתְפֹּצְצוּ הַרְרֵי־עַד שַׁחוּ גִּבְעוֹת עוֹלָם הֲלִיכוֹת עוֹלָם לוֹ׃'' None | sup>
3.6 He standeth, and shaketh the earth, He beholdeth, and maketh the nations to tremble; And the everlasting mountains are dashed in pieces, The ancient hills do bow; His goings are as of old.'' None |
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14. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 1.2, 6.1-6.4, 14.14, 40.26, 55.10-55.11, 63.9, 63.19, 65.4 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Baptism of Jesus, Problematic nature • Biblical Nature, see also Deuteronomy, Allusions • Biblical Nature, see also Deuteronomy, Spirit of the Hebrew Bible • Dream imagery, contrary to nature, law or custom • God, nature and • Montanism, nature of • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Rain • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Tremors • Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, on Gods influence on nature • Scripture (nature of) • Son, the, by nature • Superstition, supra-confessional nature • Trophonios (and Trophonion), nature of revelatory experience • adoption as sons, by nature • angel, intellectual nature • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • mother of seven sons narrative, nature, Gods influence on • natural law, in the Bible • nature • nature, overturned
Found in books: Bezzel and Pfeiffer (2021), Prophecy and Hellenism, 101; Bickerman and Tropper (2007), Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 935; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 939; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 48, 69, 71, 74, 106; Gera (2014), Judith, 224, 466; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 28; Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 327; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 199; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 547; Renberg (2017), Where Dreams May Come: Incubation Sanctuaries in the Greco-Roman World, 109; Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 62, 63, 312; Stern (2004), From Rebuke to Consolation: Exegesis and Theology in the Liturgical Anthology of the Ninth of Av Season, 63, 64; Widdicombe (2000), The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, 137, 220, 221; Wiebe (2021), Fallen Angels in the Theology of St Augustine, 28; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 21
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1.2 וְאִם־תְּמָאֲנוּ וּמְרִיתֶם חֶרֶב תְּאֻכְּלוּ כִּי פִּי יְהוָה דִּבֵּר׃
1.2 שִׁמְעוּ שָׁמַיִם וְהַאֲזִינִי אֶרֶץ כִּי יְהוָה דִּבֵּר בָּנִים גִּדַּלְתִּי וְרוֹמַמְתִּי וְהֵם פָּשְׁעוּ בִי׃
6.1 בִּשְׁנַת־מוֹת הַמֶּלֶךְ עֻזִּיָּהוּ וָאֶרְאֶה אֶת־אֲדֹנָי יֹשֵׁב עַל־כִּסֵּא רָם וְנִשָּׂא וְשׁוּלָיו מְלֵאִים אֶת־הַהֵיכָל׃
6.1 הַשְׁמֵן לֵב־הָעָם הַזֶּה וְאָזְנָיו הַכְבֵּד וְעֵינָיו הָשַׁע פֶּן־יִרְאֶה בְעֵינָיו וּבְאָזְנָיו יִשְׁמָע וּלְבָבוֹ יָבִין וָשָׁב וְרָפָא לוֹ׃ 6.2 שְׂרָפִים עֹמְדִים מִמַּעַל לוֹ שֵׁשׁ כְּנָפַיִם שֵׁשׁ כְּנָפַיִם לְאֶחָד בִּשְׁתַּיִם יְכַסֶּה פָנָיו וּבִשְׁתַּיִם יְכַסֶּה רַגְלָיו וּבִשְׁתַּיִם יְעוֹפֵף׃ 6.3 וְקָרָא זֶה אֶל־זֶה וְאָמַר קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת מְלֹא כָל־הָאָרֶץ כְּבוֹדוֹ׃ 6.4 וַיָּנֻעוּ אַמּוֹת הַסִּפִּים מִקּוֹל הַקּוֹרֵא וְהַבַּיִת יִמָּלֵא עָשָׁן׃
14.14 אֶעֱלֶה עַל־בָּמֳתֵי עָב אֶדַּמֶּה לְעֶלְיוֹן׃
40.26 שְׂאוּ־מָרוֹם עֵינֵיכֶם וּרְאוּ מִי־בָרָא אֵלֶּה הַמּוֹצִיא בְמִסְפָּר צְבָאָם לְכֻלָּם בְּשֵׁם יִקְרָא מֵרֹב אוֹנִים וְאַמִּיץ כֹּחַ אִישׁ לֹא נֶעְדָּר׃' '55.11 כֵּן יִהְיֶה דְבָרִי אֲשֶׁר יֵצֵא מִפִּי לֹא־יָשׁוּב אֵלַי רֵיקָם כִּי אִם־עָשָׂה אֶת־אֲשֶׁר חָפַצְתִּי וְהִצְלִיחַ אֲשֶׁר שְׁלַחְתִּיו׃
63.9 בְּכָל־צָרָתָם לא לוֹ צָר וּמַלְאַךְ פָּנָיו הוֹשִׁיעָם בְּאַהֲבָתוֹ וּבְחֶמְלָתוֹ הוּא גְאָלָם וַיְנַטְּלֵם וַיְנַשְּׂאֵם כָּל־יְמֵי עוֹלָם׃
63.19 הָיִינוּ מֵעוֹלָם לֹא־מָשַׁלְתָּ בָּם לֹא־נִקְרָא שִׁמְךָ עֲלֵיהֶם לוּא־קָרַעְתָּ שָׁמַיִם יָרַדְתָּ מִפָּנֶיךָ הָרִים נָזֹלּוּ׃
65.4 הַיֹּשְׁבִים בַּקְּבָרִים וּבַנְּצוּרִים יָלִינוּ הָאֹכְלִים בְּשַׂר הַחֲזִיר ופרק וּמְרַק פִּגֻּלִים כְּלֵיהֶם׃'' None | sup>
1.2 Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth, For the LORD hath spoken: Children I have reared, and brought up, And they have rebelled against Me.
6.1 In the year that king Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and His train filled the temple. 6.2 Above Him stood the seraphim; each one had six wings: with twain he covered his face and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. 6.3 And one called unto another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, is the LORD of hosts; The whole earth is full of His glory. 6.4 And the posts of the door were moved at the voice of them that called, and the house was filled with smoke.
14.14 I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High.’
40.26 Lift up your eyes on high, And see: who hath created these? He that bringeth out their host by number, He calleth them all by name; By the greatness of His might, and for that He is strong in power, Not one faileth.
55.10 For as the rain cometh down and the snow from heaven, And returneth not thither, Except it water the earth, And make it bring forth and bud, And give seed to the sower and bread to the eater; 55.11 So shall My word be that goeth forth out of My mouth: It shall not return unto Me void, Except it accomplish that which I please, And make the thing whereto I sent it prosper.
63.9 In all their affliction He was afflicted, and the angel of His presence saved them; in His love and in His pity He redeemed them; And He bore them, and carried them all the days of old. .
63.19 We are become as they over whom Thou never borest rule, As they that were not called by Thy name. Oh, that Thou wouldest rend the heavens, that Thou wouldest come down, That the mountains might quake at Thy presence,
65.4 That sit among the graves, and lodge in the vaults; that eat swine’s flesh, and broth of abominable things is in their vessels;' ' None |
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15. Hebrew Bible, Jeremiah, 25.31, 31.31, 31.33 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Law, Natural • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud • death (natural, physical) • determinism, determinists, necessity (of nature) • natural law • natural world, in the Shivata for Dew • nature, overturned
Found in books: Cheuk-Yin Yam (2019), Trinity and Grace in Augustine, 449; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 84; Gera (2014), Judith, 143; Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 305; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 179; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 62
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25.31 בָּא שָׁאוֹן עַד־קְצֵה הָאָרֶץ כִּי רִיב לַיהוָה בַּגּוֹיִם נִשְׁפָּט הוּא לְכָל־בָּשָׂר הָרְשָׁעִים נְתָנָם לַחֶרֶב נְאֻם־יְהוָה׃
31.31 הִנֵּה יָמִים בָּאִים נְאֻם־יְהוָה וְכָרַתִּי אֶת־בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת־בֵּית יְהוּדָה בְּרִית חֲדָשָׁה׃
31.33 כִּי זֹאת הַבְּרִית אֲשֶׁר אֶכְרֹת אֶת־בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֲרֵי הַיָּמִים הָהֵם נְאֻם־יְהוָה נָתַתִּי אֶת־תּוֹרָתִי בְּקִרְבָּם וְעַל־לִבָּם אֶכְתֲּבֶנָּה וְהָיִיתִי לָהֶם לֵאלֹהִים וְהֵמָּה יִהְיוּ־לִי לְעָם׃'' None | sup>
25.31 A noise is come even to the end of the earth; For the LORD hath a controversy with the nations, He doth plead with all flesh; As for the wicked, He hath given them to the sword, Saith the LORD.
31.31 Behold, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will make a new covet with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah;
31.33 But this is the covet that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the LORD, I will put My law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people;'' None |
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16. Hebrew Bible, Judges, 5.4-5.5, 5.20-5.21 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud • nature, overturned
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 84; Gera (2014), Judith, 449, 466
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5.4 יְהוָה בְּצֵאתְךָ מִשֵּׂעִיר בְּצַעְדְּךָ מִשְּׂדֵה אֱדוֹם אֶרֶץ רָעָשָׁה גַּם־שָׁמַיִם נָטָפוּ גַּם־עָבִים נָטְפוּ מָיִם׃ 5.5 הָרִים נָזְלוּ מִפְּנֵי יְהוָה זֶה סִינַי מִפְּנֵי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃' '5.21 נַחַל קִישׁוֹן גְּרָפָם נַחַל קְדוּמִים נַחַל קִישׁוֹן תִּדְרְכִי נַפְשִׁי עֹז׃'' None | sup>
5.4 Lord, when Thou didst go out of Se῾ir, when Thou didst march out of the field of Edom, the earth trembled, and the heavens dropped, the clouds also dropped water. 5.5 The mountains melted from before the Lord, that Sinay before the Lord God of Yisra᾽el.
5.20 They fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera. 5.21 The wadi of Qishon swept them away, that ancient brook, the brook of Qishon. O my soul, march on in strength.'' None |
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17. Hesiod, Works And Days, 100-103, 200, 276-281, 287-289 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Isaac, nature and • external appearance, and internal nature • intellect, as essential to human nature • natural virtue • nature • nature against, by or according to • nature, Isaac and • nature, human nature • scala naturae • statues, dichotomy of external appearance and internal nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 199; Clay and Vergados (2022), Teaching through Images: Imagery in Greco-Roman Didactic Poetry, 44; Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 160, 161; Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 215; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 105; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 126
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100 ἄλλα δὲ μυρία λυγρὰ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους ἀλάληται·'101 πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα· 102 νοῦσοι δʼ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφʼ ἡμέρῃ, αἳ δʼ ἐπὶ νυκτὶ 103 αὐτόματοι φοιτῶσι κακὰ θνητοῖσι φέρουσαι
200 Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέμεσις· τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ
276 τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων 277 ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς 278 ἐσθέμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετʼ αὐτοῖς· 279 ἀνθρώποισι δʼ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη 280 γίγνεται· εἰ γάρ τίς κʼ ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαιʼ ἀγορεῦσαι 281 γιγνώσκων, τῷ μέν τʼ ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·
287 τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι 288 ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δʼ ἐγγύθι ναίει· 289 τῆς δʼ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν ' None | sup>
100 Which brought the Death-Gods. Now in misery'101 Men age. Pandora took out of the jar 102 Grievous calamity, bringing to men 103 Dreadful distress by scattering it afar.
200 That’s given to the honest, just and kind.
276 For evil. You who hold supremacy 277 And swallow bribes, beware of this and shun 278 All crooked laws and deal in what is best. 279 Who hurts another hurts himself. When one 280 Makes wicked plans, he’ll be the most distressed. 281 All-seeing Zeus sees all there is to see
287 Perses, remember this, serve righteousne 288 And wholly sidestep the iniquity 289 of force. The son of Cronus made this act ' None |
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18. Hesiod, Theogony, 49, 385-388 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hesiod, on gods and natural, psychological and social phenomena • nature
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 21; Tor (2017), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, 58
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49 ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν κράτεί τε μέγιστος.
385 καὶ Κράτος ἠδὲ Βίην ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα,'386 τῶν οὐκ ἔστʼ ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δόμος, οὐδέ τις ἕδρη, 387 οὐδʼ ὁδός, ὅππη μὴ κείνοις θεὸς ἡγεμονεύῃ, 388 ἀλλʼ αἰεὶ πὰρ Ζηνὶ βαρυκτύπῳ ἑδριόωνται. ' None | sup>
49 Through the immortals’ homes. They glorify,
385 The Haliacmon, the Heptaporus,'386 The Nessus, Rhodius, the Granicus, 387 The holy Simois, the Aesepus, 388 The Peneus, Hermus, the fair Caïcus, ' None |
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19. Homer, Iliad, 1.104, 2.4-2.75, 2.554, 4.279, 14.321, 14.323-14.325, 16.384-16.392 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Erechtheus, earthborn nature • Lucretius, natura in • Myus, natural elements • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, in literary settings • Natural dreaming, theoretical discussion in literary settings • Pericles, nature of • gods and goddesses, universal and local nature of • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natura • nature • nature (φύσις) • oracles, natural vs. technical methods
Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 83; Bernabe et al. (2013), Redefining Dionysos, 10; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 224; Clay and Vergados (2022), Teaching through Images: Imagery in Greco-Roman Didactic Poetry, 253; Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 11, 481; Gale (2000), Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition, 69, 237; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 84; Jouanna (2018), Sophocles: A Study of His Theater in Its Political and Social Context, 336; Konig (2022), The Folds of Olympus: Mountains in Ancient Greek and Roman Culture, 44; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 173; Sweeney (2013), Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia, 92
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1.104 πίμπλαντʼ, ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐΐκτην·
2.4 τιμήσῃ, ὀλέσῃ δὲ πολέας ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν. 2.5 ἥδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή, 2.6 πέμψαι ἐπʼ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι οὖλον ὄνειρον· 2.7 καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα· 2.8 βάσκʼ ἴθι οὖλε ὄνειρε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν· 2.9 ἐλθὼν ἐς κλισίην Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο 2.10 πάντα μάλʼ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορευέμεν ὡς ἐπιτέλλω· 2.11 θωρῆξαί ἑ κέλευε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς 2.12 πανσυδίῃ· νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοι πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν 2.13 Τρώων· οὐ γὰρ ἔτʼ ἀμφὶς Ὀλύμπια δώματʼ ἔχοντες 2.14 ἀθάνατοι φράζονται· ἐπέγναμψεν γὰρ ἅπαντας 2.15 Ἥρη λισσομένη, Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδεʼ ἐφῆπται. 2.16 ὣς φάτο, βῆ δʼ ἄρʼ ὄνειρος ἐπεὶ τὸν μῦθον ἄκουσε· 2.17 καρπαλίμως δʼ ἵκανε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν, 2.18 βῆ δʼ ἄρʼ ἐπʼ Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα· τὸν δὲ κίχανεν 2.19 εὕδοντʼ ἐν κλισίῃ, περὶ δʼ ἀμβρόσιος κέχυθʼ ὕπνος. 2.20 στῆ δʼ ἄρʼ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς Νηληΐῳ υἷι ἐοικώς 2.21 Νέστορι, τόν ῥα μάλιστα γερόντων τῖʼ Ἀγαμέμνων· 2.22 τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσεφώνεε θεῖος ὄνειρος· 2.23 εὕδεις Ἀτρέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἱπποδάμοιο· 2.24 οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα 2.25 ᾧ λαοί τʼ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλε· 2.26 νῦν δʼ ἐμέθεν ξύνες ὦκα· Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι, 2.27 ὃς σεῦ ἄνευθεν ἐὼν μέγα κήδεται ἠδʼ ἐλεαίρει. 2.28 θωρῆξαί σε κέλευσε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς 2.29 πανσυδίῃ· νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοις πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν 2.32 Ἥρη λισσομένη, Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδεʼ ἐφῆπται 2.33 ἐκ Διός· ἀλλὰ σὺ σῇσιν ἔχε φρεσί, μηδέ σε λήθη 2.34 αἱρείτω εὖτʼ ἄν σε μελίφρων ὕπνος ἀνήῃ. 2.35 ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπεβήσετο, τὸν δὲ λίπʼ αὐτοῦ 2.36 τὰ φρονέοντʼ ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἅ ῥʼ οὐ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον· 2.37 φῆ γὰρ ὅ γʼ αἱρήσειν Πριάμου πόλιν ἤματι κείνῳ 2.38 νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ᾔδη ἅ ῥα Ζεὺς μήδετο ἔργα· 2.39 θήσειν γὰρ ἔτʼ ἔμελλεν ἐπʼ ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε
2.40 Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι διὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας.
2.41 ἔγρετο δʼ ἐξ ὕπνου, θείη δέ μιν ἀμφέχυτʼ ὀμφή·
2.42 ἕζετο δʼ ὀρθωθείς, μαλακὸν δʼ ἔνδυνε χιτῶνα
2.43 καλὸν νηγάτεον, περὶ δὲ μέγα βάλλετο φᾶρος·
2.44 ποσσὶ δʼ ὑπὸ λιπαροῖσιν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα,
2.45 ἀμφὶ δʼ ἄρʼ ὤμοισιν βάλετο ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον·
2.46 εἵλετο δὲ σκῆπτρον πατρώϊον ἄφθιτον αἰεὶ
2.47 σὺν τῷ ἔβη κατὰ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων·
2.48 ἠὼς μέν ῥα θεὰ προσεβήσετο μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον
2.49 Ζηνὶ φόως ἐρέουσα καὶ ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισιν· 2.50 αὐτὰρ ὃ κηρύκεσσι λιγυφθόγγοισι κέλευσε 2.51 κηρύσσειν ἀγορὴν δὲ κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιούς· 2.52 οἳ μὲν ἐκήρυσσον, τοὶ δʼ ἠγείροντο μάλʼ ὦκα· 2.53 βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἷζε γερόντων 2.54 Νεστορέῃ παρὰ νηῒ Πυλοιγενέος βασιλῆος· 2.55 τοὺς ὅ γε συγκαλέσας πυκινὴν ἀρτύνετο βουλήν· 2.56 κλῦτε φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος 2.57 ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα· μάλιστα δὲ Νέστορι δίῳ 2.58 εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τʼ ἄγχιστα ἐῴκει· 2.59 στῆ δʼ ἄρʼ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καί με πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν· 2.61 οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα, 2.64 ὃς σεῦ ἄνευθεν ἐὼν μέγα κήδεται ἠδʼ ἐλεαίρει· 2.70 ἐκ Διός· ἀλλὰ σὺ σῇσιν ἔχε φρεσίν· ὣς ὃ μὲν εἰπὼν 2.71 ᾤχετʼ ἀποπτάμενος, ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν. 2.72 ἀλλʼ ἄγετʼ αἴ κέν πως θωρήξομεν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν· 2.73 πρῶτα δʼ ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι, ἣ θέμις ἐστί, 2.74 καὶ φεύγειν σὺν νηυσὶ πολυκλήϊσι κελεύσω· 2.75 ὑμεῖς δʼ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος ἐρητύειν ἐπέεσσιν.
2.554 κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας·
4.279 ῥίγησέν τε ἰδών, ὑπό τε σπέος ἤλασε μῆλα·
14.321 οὐδʼ ὅτε Φοίνικος κούρης τηλεκλειτοῖο,
14.323 οὐδʼ ὅτε περ Σεμέλης οὐδʼ Ἀλκμήνης ἐνὶ Θήβῃ, 14.324 ἥ ῥʼ Ἡρακλῆα κρατερόφρονα γείνατο παῖδα· 14.325 ἣ δὲ Διώνυσον Σεμέλη τέκε χάρμα βροτοῖσιν·
16.384 ὡς δʼ ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθὼν 16.385 ἤματʼ ὀπωρινῷ, ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ 16.386 Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥʼ ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ, 16.387 οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας, 16.388 ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες· 16.389 τῶν δέ τε πάντες μὲν ποταμοὶ πλήθουσι ῥέοντες, 16.390 πολλὰς δὲ κλιτῦς τότʼ ἀποτμήγουσι χαράδραι, 16.391 ἐς δʼ ἅλα πορφυρέην μεγάλα στενάχουσι ῥέουσαι 16.392 ἐξ ὀρέων ἐπικάρ, μινύθει δέ τε ἔργʼ ἀνθρώπων·'' None | sup>
1.104 When he had thus spoken he sat down, and among them arose the warrior, son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon, deeply troubled. With rage his black heart was wholly filled, and his eyes were like blazing fire. To Calchas first of all he spoke, and his look threatened evil:
2.4 Now all the other gods and men, lords of chariots, slumbered the whole night through, but Zeus was not holden of sweet sleep, for he was pondering in his heart how he might do honour to Achilles and lay many low beside the ships of the Achaeans. And this plan seemed to his mind the best, 2.5 to send to Agamemnon, son of Atreus, a baneful dream. So he spake, and addressed him with winged words:Up, go, thou baneful Dream, unto the swift ships of the Achaeans, and when thou art come to the hut of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, 2.10 tell him all my word truly, even as I charge thee. Bid him arm the long-haired Achaeans with all speed, since now he may take the broad-wayed city of the Trojans. For the immortals, that have homes upon Olympus, are no longer divided in counsel, 2.15 ince Hera hath Vent the minds of all by her supplication, and over the Trojans hang woes. So spake he, and the Dream went his way, when he had heard this saying. Forthwith he came to the swift ships of the Achaeans, and went his way to Agamemnon, son of Atreus, and found him sleeping in his hut, and over him was shed ambrosial slumber. 2.20 So he took his stand above his head, in the likeness of the son of Neleus, even Nestor, whom above all the elders Agamemnon held in honour; likening himself to him, the Dream from heaven spake, saying:Thou sleepest, son of wise-hearted Atreus, the tamer of horses. To sleep the whole night through beseemeth not a man that is a counsellor, 2.25 to whom a host is entrusted, and upon whom rest so many cares. But now, hearken thou quickly unto me, for I am a messenger to thee from Zeus, who, far away though he be, hath exceeding care for thee and pity. He biddeth thee arm the long-haired Achaeans with all speed, since now thou mayest take the broad-wayed city of the Trojans. 2.30 For the immortals that have homes upon Olympus are no longer divided in counsel, since Hera hath bent the minds of all by her supplication, and over the Trojans hang woes by the will of Zeus. But do thou keep this in thy heart, nor let forgetfulness lay hold of thee, whenso honey-hearted sleep shall let thee go. 2.34 For the immortals that have homes upon Olympus are no longer divided in counsel, since Hera hath bent the minds of all by her supplication, and over the Trojans hang woes by the will of Zeus. But do thou keep this in thy heart, nor let forgetfulness lay hold of thee, whenso honey-hearted sleep shall let thee go. 2.35 So spoke the Dream, and departed, and left him there, pondering in his heart on things that were not to be brought to pass. For in sooth he deemed that he should take the city of Priam that very day, fool that he was! seeing he knew not what deeds Zeus was purposing,
2.40 who was yet to bring woes and groanings on Trojans alike and Danaans throughout the course of stubborn fights. Then he awoke from sleep, and the divine voice was ringing in his ears. He sat upright and did on his soft tunic, fair and glistering, and about him cast his great cloak, and beneath his shining feet he bound his fair sandals,
2.45 and about his shoulders flung his silver-studded sword; and he grasped the sceptre of his fathers, imperishable ever, and therewith took his way along the ships of the brazen-coated Achaeans.Now the goddess Dawn went up to high Olympus, to announce the light to Zeus and the other immortals, 2.50 but Agamemnon bade the clear-voiced heralds summon to the place of gathering the long-haired Achaeans. And they made summons, and the men gathered full quickly.But the king first made the council of the great-souled elders to sit down beside the ship of Nestor, the king Pylos-born. 2.55 And when he had called them together, he contrived a cunning plan, and said:Hearken, my friends, a Dream from heaven came to me in my sleep through the ambrosial night, and most like was it to goodly Nestor, in form and in stature and in build. It took its stand above my head, and spake to me, saying: 2.60 ‘Thou sleepest, son of wise-hearted Atreus, the tamer of horses. To sleep the whole night through beseemeth not a man that is a counsellor, to whom a host is entrusted, and upon whom rest so many cares. But now, hearken thou quickly unto me, for I am a messenger to thee from Zeus, who, far away though he be, hath exceeding care for thee and pity. 2.65 He biddeth thee arm the long-haired Achaeans with all speed, since now thou mayest take the broad-wayed city of the Trojans. For the immortals that have homes upon Olympus are no longer divided in counsel, since Hera hath bent the minds of all by her supplication, and over the Trojans hang woes by the will of Zeus. 2.70 But do thou keep this in thy heart.’ So spake he, and was flown away, and sweet sleep let me go. Nay, come now, if in any wise we may, let us arm the sons of the Achaeans; but first will I make trial of them in speech, as is right, and will bid them flee with their benched ships; 2.75 but do you from this side and from that bespeak them, and strive to hold them back.
2.554 and there the youths of the Athenians, as the years roll on in their courses, seek to win his favour with sacrifices of bulls and rams;—these again had as leader Menestheus, son of Peteos. Like unto him was none other man upon the face of the earth for the marshalling of chariots and of warriors that bear the shield.
4.279 these were arming them for battle, and a cloud of footmen followed with them. Even as when from some place of outlook a goatherd seeth a cloud coming over the face of the deep before the blast of the West Wind, and to him being afar off it seemeth blacker than pitch as it passeth over the face of the deep, and it bringeth a mighty whirlwind; and he shuddereth at sight of it, and driveth his flock beneath a cave;
14.321 who bare Perseus, pre-eminent above all warriors; nor of the daughter of far-famed Phoenix, that bare me Minos and godlike Rhadamanthys; nor of Semele, nor of Alcmene in Thebes, and she brought forth Heracles, her son stout of heart, 14.325 and Semele bare Dionysus, the joy of mortals; nor of Demeter, the fair-tressed queen; nor of glorious Leto; nay, nor yet of thine own self, as now I love thee, and sweet desire layeth hold of me. Then with crafty mind the queenly Hera spake unto him:
16.384 And straight over the trench leapt the swift horses—the immortal horses that the gods gave as glorious gifts to Peleus—in their onward flight, and against Hector did the heart of Patroclus urge him on, for he was fain to smite him; but his swift horses ever bare Hector forth. And even as beneath a tempest the whole black earth is oppressed, 16.385 on a day in harvest-time, when Zeus poureth forth rain most violently, whenso in anger he waxeth wroth against men that by violence give crooked judgments in the place of gathering, and drive justice out, recking not of the vengeance of the gods; and all their rivers flow in flood, 16.390 and many a hillside do the torrents furrow deeply, and down to the dark sea they rush headlong from the mountains with a mighty roar, and the tilled fields of men are wasted; even so mighty was the roar of the mares of Troy as they sped on. 16.392 and many a hillside do the torrents furrow deeply, and down to the dark sea they rush headlong from the mountains with a mighty roar, and the tilled fields of men are wasted; even so mighty was the roar of the mares of Troy as they sped on. '' None |
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20. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, in literary settings • Nature • Plutarch, on divine nature of statuary • Soter, and divine nature • Tullius Cicero, M., on sacred nature of statuary • animals, in relation to the natural slave • culture and nature blended • deception, and naturalism • naturalism, and deception • nature • nature (transience of) • nature and culture, blended • nature, of God/gods • physis, nature • slaves, according to Theognis and Xenophon, regarded as inferior by nature • statuary, sacred nature of
Found in books: Elsner (2007), Roman Eyes: Visuality and Subjectivity in Art and Text, 126; Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 244; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 19; Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 187; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 276; Jim (2022), Saviour Gods and Soteria in Ancient Greece, 152; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 174; Pachoumi (2017), The Concepts of the Divine in the Greek Magical Papyri, 79; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 13; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 10; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 108; Zachhuber (2022), Time and Soul: From Aristotle to St. Augustine. 10
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21. Hebrew Bible, Ezekiel, 32.5-32.6 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Tremors • nature, overturned
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 65; Gera (2014), Judith, 143, 223
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32.5 וְנָתַתִּי אֶת־בְּשָׂרְךָ עַל־הֶהָרִים וּמִלֵּאתִי הַגֵּאָיוֹת רָמוּתֶךָ׃ 32.6 וְהִשְׁקֵיתִי אֶרֶץ צָפָתְךָ מִדָּמְךָ אֶל־הֶהָרִים וַאֲפִקִים יִמָּלְאוּן מִמֶּךָּ׃'' None | sup>
32.5 And I will lay thy flesh upon the mountains, And fill the valleys with thy foulness. 32.6 I will also water with thy blood the land wherein thou swimmest, even to the mountains; And the channels shall be full of thee.'' None |
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22. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • ruler cult, ludic,fictional nature of • soteria (in Greek antiquity), multivalent nature of
Found in books: Jim (2022), Saviour Gods and Soteria in Ancient Greece, 33; Versnel (2011), Coping with the Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology, 463
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23. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Parmenides, Doxa, its scope and nature • myth of Er, nature (physis) • nature
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 31; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 57; Tor (2017), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, 164
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24. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • nature and culture • worship, as orientation to mortal nature
Found in books: Eisenfeld (2022), Pindar and Greek Religion Theologies of Mortality in the Victory Odes, 142; Gagne (2021), Cosmography and the Idea of Hyperborea in Ancient Greece, 15
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25. Euripides, Bacchae, 221 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • divinization of nature • gods, nature divinized • nature • nature divinized • religions, Roman, nature divinized
Found in books: Bernabe et al. (2013), Redefining Dionysos, 172; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 248
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221 πλήρεις δὲ θιάσοις ἐν μέσοισιν ἑστάναι'' None | sup>
221 this new deity Dionysus, whoever he is. I hear that mixing-bowls stand full in the midst of their assemblies, and that they each creep off different ways into secrecy to serve the beds of men, on the pretext that they are Maenads worshipping;'' None |
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26. Euripides, Hippolytus, 27, 392 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aphrodite, dual anthropomorphic and cosmic nature of • Irrational impulses, and human nature • Necessity (in Thucydides), and nature (φύσις)
Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 132, 136; Pucci (2016), Euripides' Revolution Under Cover: An Essay, 53
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27 ἰδοῦσα Φαίδρα καρδίαν κατέσχετο392 ἐπεί μ' ἔρως ἔτρωσεν, ἐσκόπουν ὅπως" '" None | sup>
27 to witness the solemn mystic rites and be initiated therein in Pandion’s land, i.e. Attica. Phaedra, his father’s noble wife, caught sight of him, and by my designs she found her heart was seized with wild desire.392 and make me think the contrary. And I will tell thee too the way my judgment went. When love wounded me, I bethought me how I best might bear the smart. So from that day forth I began to hide in silence what I suffered. ' None |
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27. Herodotus, Histories, 1.44.2, 1.55.2, 2.10, 4.36, 4.67, 4.172, 7.144, 9.122 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Alcibiades, and human nature • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Herodotus\n, and women as a natural resource • Herodotus, cyclical nature of history • Herodotus, paratactic nature of narrative structure • Mandoulis, inquiry regarding Mandouliss solar nature • Mytilene, natural, causes of disease • Myus, natural elements • Ovid, natural philosophy in exilic corpus • Pausanias, imitation of Herodotus, nature of • nature • nature (physis),, temporal dimension of • oracles, natural vs. technical methods
Found in books: Bosak-Schroeder (2020), Other Natures: Environmental Encounters with Ancient Greek Ethnography, 49, 73; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 237; Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 481; Gorman, Gorman (2014), Corrupting Luxury in Ancient Greek Literature. 90; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 81; Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 212; Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 106; Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022), The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography, 133; Kirkland (2022), Herodotus and Imperial Greek Literature: Criticism, Imitation, Reception, 301, 303; Renberg (2017), Where Dreams May Come: Incubation Sanctuaries in the Greco-Roman World, 560; Sweeney (2013), Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia, 93; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 237; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 251
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2.10 ταύτης ὦν τῆς χώρης τῆς εἰρημένης ἡ πολλή, κατά περ οἱ ἱρέες ἔλεγον, ἐδόκεε καὶ αὐτῷ μοι εἶναι ἐπίκτητος Αἰγυπτίοισι. τῶν γὰρ ὀρέων τῶν εἰρημένων τῶν ὑπὲρ Μέμφιν πόλιν κειμένων τὸ μεταξὺ ἐφαίνετό μοι εἶναι κοτὲ κόλπος θαλάσσης, ὥσπερ γε τὰ περὶ Ἴλιον καὶ Τευθρανίην καὶ Ἔφεσόν τε καὶ Μαιάνδρου πεδίον, ὥς γε εἶναι σμικρὰ ταῦτα μεγάλοισι συμβαλεῖν· τῶν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ χωρία προσχωσάντων ποταμῶν ἑνὶ τῶν στομάτων τοῦ Νείλου, ἐόντος πενταστόμου, οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν πλήθεος πέρι ἄξιος συμβληθῆναι ἐστί. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ποταμοί, οὐ κατὰ τὸν Νεῖλον ἐόντες μεγάθεα, οἵτινες ἔργα ἀποδεξάμενοι μεγάλα εἰσί· τῶν ἐγὼ φράσαι ἔχω οὐνόματα καὶ ἄλλων καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα Ἀχελῴου, ὃς ῥέων διʼ Ἀκαρνανίης καὶ ἐξιεὶς ἐς θάλασσαν τῶν Ἐχινάδων νήσων τὰς ἡμισέας ἤδη ἤπειρον πεποίηκε.
4.36 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Ὑπερβορέων πέρι εἰρήσθω· τὸν γὰρ περὶ Ἀβάριος λόγον τοῦ λεγομένου εἶναι Ὑπερβορέου οὐ λέγω, ὡς 1 τὸν ὀιστὸν περιέφερε κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν οὐδὲν σιτεόμενος. εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ ὑπερβόρεοι τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, εἰσὶ καὶ ὑπερνότιοι ἄλλοι. γελῶ δὲ ὁρέων γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νοονεχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον· οἳ Ὠκεανόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεύντων ἴσην. ἐν ὀλίγοισι γὰρ ἐγὼ δηλώσω μέγαθός τε ἑκάστης αὐτέων καὶ οἵη τις ἐστὶ ἐς γραφὴν ἑκάστη.
4.67 μάντιες δὲ Σκυθέων εἰσὶ πολλοί, οἳ μαντεύονται ῥάβδοισι ἰτεΐνῃσι πολλῇσι ὧδε· ἐπεὰν φακέλους ῥάβδων μεγάλους ἐνείκωνται, θέντες χαμαὶ διεξειλίσσουσι αὐτούς, καὶ ἐπὶ μίαν ἑκάστην ῥάβδον τιθέντες θεσπίζουσι, ἅμα τε λέγοντες ταῦτα συνειλέουσι τὰς ῥάβδους ὀπίσω καὶ αὖτις κατὰ μίαν συντιθεῖσι. αὕτη μὲν σφι ἡ μαντικὴ πατρωίη ἐστί. οἱ δὲ Ἐνάρεες οἱ ἀνδρόγυνοι τὴν Ἀφροδίτην σφίσι λέγουσι μαντικὴν δοῦναι· φιλύρης δʼ ὧν φλοιῷ μαντεύονται· ἐπεὰν τὴν φιλύρην τρίχα σχίσῃ, διαπλέκων ἐν τοῖσι δακτύλοισι τοῖσι ἑωυτοῦ καὶ διαλύων χρᾷ.
4.172 Αὐσχισέων δὲ τούτων τὸ πρὸς ἑσπέρης ἔχονται Νασαμῶνες, ἔθνος ἐὸν πολλόν, οἳ τὸ θέρος καταλείποντες ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ τὰ πρόβατα ἀναβαίνουσι ἐς Αὔγιλα χῶρον ὀπωριεῦντες τοὺς φοίνικας. οἳ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέες πεφύκασι, πάντες ἐόντες καρποφόροι. τοὺς δὲ ἀττελέβους ἐπεὰν θηρεύσωσι, αὐήναντες πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καταλέουσι καὶ ἔπειτα ἐπὶ γάλα ἐπιπάσσοντες πίνουσι. γυναῖκας δὲ νομίζοντες πολλὰς ἔχειν ἕκαστος ἐπίκοινον αὐτέων τὴν μῖξιν ποιεῦνται τρόπῳ παραπλησίῳ τῷ καὶ Μασσαγέται· ἐπεὰν σκίπωνα προστήσωνται, μίσγονται. πρῶτον δὲ γαμέοντος Νασαμῶνος ἀνδρὸς νόμος ἐστὶ τὴν νύμφην νυκτὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διὰ πάντων διεξελθεῖν τῶν δαιτυμόνων μισγομένην· τῶν δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος οἱ μιχθῇ, διδοῖ δῶρον τὸ ἂν ἔχῃ φερόμενος ἐξ οἴκου. ὁρκίοισι δὲ καὶ μαντικῇ χρέωνται τοιῇδε· ὀμνύουσι μὲν τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι ἄνδρας δικαιοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους λεγομένους γενέσθαι, τούτους, τῶν τύμβων ἁπτόμενοι· μαντεύονται δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων φοιτέοντες τὰ σήματα, καὶ κατευξάμενοι ἐπικατακοιμῶνται· τὸ δʼ ἂν ἴδη ἐν τῇ, ὄψι ἐνύπνιον, τούτῳ χρᾶται. πίστισι δὲ τοιῇσιδε χρέωνται· ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς διδοῖ πιεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου πίνει. ἢν δὲ μὴ ἔχωσι ὑγρὸν μηδέν, οἳ δὲ τῆς χαμᾶθεν σποδοῦ λαβόντες λείχουσι.
7.144 ἑτέρη τε Θεμιστοκλέι γνώμη ἔμπροσθε ταύτης ἐς καιρὸν ἠρίστευσε, ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφι προσῆλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἔμελλον λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς· τότε Θεμιστοκλέης ἀνέγνωσε Ἀθηναίους τῆς διαιρέσιος ταύτης παυσαμένους νέας τούτων τῶν χρημάτων ποιήσασθαι διηκοσίας ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τὸν πρὸς Αἰγινήτας λέγων. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστὰς ἔσωσε ἐς τὸ τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους. αἳ δὲ ἐς τὸ μὲν ἐποιήθησαν οὐκ ἐχρήσθησαν, ἐς δέον δὲ οὕτω τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐγένοντο. αὗταί τε δὴ αἱ νέες τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι προποιηθεῖσαι ὑπῆρχον, ἑτέρας τε ἔδεε προσναυπηγέεσθαι. ἔδοξέ τέ σφι μετὰ τὸ χρηστήριον βουλευομένοισι ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὸν βάρβαρον δέκεσθαι τῇσι νηυσὶ πανδημεί, τῷ θεῷ πειθομένους, ἅμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι.
9.122 τούτου δὲ Ἀρταΰκτεω τοῦ ἀνακρεμασθέντος προπάτωρ Ἀρτεμβάρης ἐστὶ ὁ Πέρσῃσι ἐξηγησάμενος λόγον τὸν ἐκεῖνοι ὑπολαβόντες Κύρῳ προσήνεικαν λέγοντα τάδε. “ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς Πέρσῃσι ἡγεμονίην διδοῖ, ἀνδρῶν δὲ σοὶ Κῦρε, κατελὼν Ἀστυάγην, φέρε, γῆν γὰρ ἐκτήμεθα ὀλίγην καὶ ταύτην τρηχέαν, μεταναστάντες ἐκ ταύτης ἄλλην σχῶμεν ἀμείνω. εἰσὶ δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀστυγείτονες πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἑκαστέρω, τῶν μίαν σχόντες πλέοσι ἐσόμεθα θωμαστότεροι. οἰκὸς δὲ ἄνδρας ἄρχοντας τοιαῦτα ποιέειν· κότε γὰρ δὴ καὶ παρέξει κάλλιον ἢ ὅτε γε ἀνθρώπων τε πολλῶν ἄρχομεν πάσης τε τῆς Ἀσίης; ” Κῦρος δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας καὶ οὐ θωμάσας τὸν λόγον ἐκέλευε ποιέειν ταῦτα, οὕτω δὲ αὐτοῖσι παραίνεε κελεύων παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς οὐκέτι ἄρξοντας ἀλλʼ ἀρξομένους· φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπόν τε θωμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια. ὥστε συγγνόντες Πέρσαι οἴχοντο ἀποστάντες, ἑσσωθέντες τῇ γνώμῃ πρὸς Κύρου, ἄρχειν τε εἵλοντο λυπρὴν οἰκέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ πεδιάδα σπείροντες ἄλλοισι δουλεύειν.' ' None | sup>
1.44.2 and in his great and terrible grief at this mischance he called on Zeus by three names—Zeus the Purifier, Zeus of the Hearth, Zeus of Comrades: the first, because he wanted the god to know what evil his guest had done him; the second, because he had received the guest into his house and thus unwittingly entertained the murderer of his son; and the third, because he had found his worst enemy in the man whom he had sent as a protector.
1.55.2
2.10 The greater portion, then, of this country of which I have spoken was land deposited for the Egyptians as the priests told me, and I myself formed the same judgment; all that lies between the ranges of mountains above Memphis to which I have referred seemed to me to have once been a gulf of the sea, just as the country about Ilion and Teuthrania and Ephesus and the plain of the Maeander, to compare these small things with great. ,For of the rivers that brought down the stuff to make these lands, there is none worthy to be compared for greatness with even one of the mouths of the Nile, and the Nile has five mouths. ,There are also other rivers, not so great as the Nile, that have had great effects; I could rehearse their names, but principal among them is the Achelous, which, flowing through Acaria and emptying into the sea, has already made half of the Echinades Islands mainland.
4.36 I have said this much of the Hyperboreans, and let it suffice; for I do not tell the story of that Abaris, alleged to be a Hyperborean, who carried the arrow over the whole world, fasting all the while. But if there are men beyond the north wind, then there are others beyond the south. ,And I laugh to see how many have before now drawn maps of the world, not one of them reasonably; for they draw the world as round as if fashioned by compasses, encircled by the Ocean river, and Asia and Europe of a like extent. For myself, I will in a few words indicate the extent of the two, and how each should be drawn.
4.67 There are many diviners among the Scythians, who divine by means of many willow wands as I will show. They bring great bundles of wands, which they lay on the ground and unfasten, and utter their divinations as they lay the rods down one by one; and while still speaking, they gather up the rods once more and place them together again; ,this manner of divination is hereditary among them. The Enarees, who are hermaphrodites, say that Aphrodite gave them the art of divination, which they practise by means of lime-tree bark. They cut this bark into three portions, and prophesy while they braid and unbraid these in their fingers.
4.172 Next west of these Auschisae is the populous country of the Nasamones, who in summer leave their flocks by the sea and go up to the land called Augila to gather dates from the palm-trees that grow there in great abundance and all bear fruit. They hunt locusts, which they dry in the sun, and after grinding sprinkle them into milk and drink it. ,It is their custom for every man to have many wives; their intercourse with women is promiscuous, as among the Massagetae; a staff is placed before the dwelling, and then they have intercourse. When a man of the Nasamones weds, on the first night the bride must by custom lie with each of the whole company in turn; and each man after intercourse gives her whatever gift he has brought from his house. ,As for their manner of swearing and divination, they lay their hands on the graves of the men reputed to have been the most just and good among them, and by these men they swear; their practice of divination is to go to the tombs of their ancestors, where after making prayers they lie down to sleep, and take for oracles whatever dreams come to them. ,They give and receive pledges by each drinking from the hand of the other party; and if they have nothing liquid, they take the dust of the earth and lick it up. ' "
7.144 The advice of Themistocles had prevailed on a previous occasion. The revenues from the mines at Laurium had brought great wealth into the Athenians' treasury, and when each man was to receive ten drachmae for his share, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to make no such division but to use the money to build two hundred ships for the war, that is, for the war with Aegina. ,This was in fact the war the outbreak of which saved Hellas by compelling the Athenians to become seamen. The ships were not used for the purpose for which they were built, but later came to serve Hellas in her need. These ships, then, had been made and were already there for the Athenians' service, and now they had to build yet others. ,In their debate after the giving of the oracle they accordingly resolved that they would put their trust in the god and meet the foreign invader of Hellas with the whole power of their fleet, ships and men, and with all other Greeks who were so minded. " 9.122 This Artayctes who was crucified was the grandson of that Artembares who instructed the Persians in a design which they took from him and laid before Cyrus; this was its purport: ,“Seeing that Zeus grants lordship to the Persian people, and to you, Cyrus, among them, let us, after reducing Astyages, depart from the little and rugged land which we possess and occupy one that is better. There are many such lands on our borders, and many further distant. If we take one of these, we will all have more reasons for renown. It is only reasonable that a ruling people should act in this way, for when will we have a better opportunity than now, when we are lords of so many men and of all Asia?” ,Cyrus heard them, and found nothing to marvel at in their design; “Go ahead and do this,” he said; “but if you do so, be prepared no longer to be rulers but rather subjects. Soft lands breed soft men; wondrous fruits of the earth and valiant warriors grow not from the same soil.” ,The Persians now realized that Cyrus reasoned better than they, and they departed, choosing rather to be rulers on a barren mountain side than dwelling in tilled valleys to be slaves to others.'' None
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28. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Diogenes of Sinope xx, xxv, and the natural • Nature (φύσις)
Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 170; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 656
| 492d ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ'' None | 492d Soc. Far from ignoble, at any rate, Callicles, is the frankness with which you develop your thesis: for you are now stating in clear terms what the rest of the world think indeed, but are loth to say. So I beg you not to give up on any account, that it may be made really evident how one ought to live. Now tell me: do you say the desires are not to be chastened if a man would be such as he ought to be, but he should let them be as great as possible and provide them with satisfaction from some source or other, and this is virtue?'' None |
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29. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Law (Mosaic), nature, lex naturae • death (natural, physical) • law of nature, death as • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natural theology
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 390; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 9, 13; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 28; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 343; Tor (2017), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, 37; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 9, 13
| 67d ἔπειτα μόνην καθ’ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; unit="para"/παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς. /λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος: ἢ οὔ; unit="para"/φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα 96a ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη: ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις 118a ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἔφη. ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας: καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. unit="para"/ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν — ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο — ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων : ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν: ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.' ' None | 67d and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters? Certainly, said he. Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body? Exactly so, said he. But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not? Obviously. Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly 96a Phaedo. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty. Certainly, said Cebes, I wish to hear your experiences. Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; 118a his thighs; and passing upwards in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words— Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it. That, said Crito, shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say. To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.' ' None |
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30. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Nature/nature (phusis, φύσις) as image • art (technê, τέχνη) imitating nature and life • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, Stoic concept of • law, as the force pervading cosmic nature • nature • nature, laws not at variance with • nature, pervaded by law • nature, theory of, Diocles on • theoretical nature of medicine
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 151; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 90; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 107, 108; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 279, 284; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 24
| 245a τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὑρομένη. ΣΩ. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει· ὃς δʼ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.' 250c μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι. ' None | 245a ills is found. Socrates. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.' 250c the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell. So much, then, in honor of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, ' None |
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31. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature (φύσις), human • Virtue, natural • human nature • nature
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 87; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 114; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 60
| 588c What sort of an image? he said. One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, said I, as that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one. Yes, they do tell of them. Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.' ' None |
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32. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature • external appearance, and internal nature • informal oaths, conversational nature • nature, of humans • statues, dichotomy of external appearance and internal nature
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 89, 98; Pachoumi (2017), The Concepts of the Divine in the Greek Magical Papyri, 91; Sommerstein and Torrance (2014), Oaths and Swearing in Ancient Greece, 318; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 132
| 192e συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε δύʼ ὄντας ἕνα γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τʼ ἂν ζῆτε, ὡς ἕνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἕνα εἶναι κοινῇ τεθνεῶτε· ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε· ταῦτʼ ἀκούσας ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἐξαρνηθείη οὐδʼ ἄλλο τι ἂν φανείη βουλόμενος, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτʼ ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα ἐπεθύμει, συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεὶς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις ἡμῶν ἦν αὕτη καὶ ἦμεν ὅλοι· τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ'207a δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιθυμεῖν μετὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι. 219c δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὅλην. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι. ποιήσαντος δὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ οὗτος τοσοῦτον περιεγένετό τε καὶ κατεφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ ὕβρισεν—καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ᾤμην τὶ εἶναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί· δικασταὶ γάρ ἐστε τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερηφανίας—εὖ γὰρ ἴστε μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς, οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδαρθηκὼς ' None | 192e by night or by day? If that is your craving, I am ready to fuse and weld you together in a single piece, that from being two you may be made one; that so long as you live, the pair of you, being as one, may share a single life; and that when you die you may also in Hades yonder be one instead of two, having shared a single death. Bethink yourselves if this is your heart’s desire, and if you will be quite contented with this lot. No one on hearing this, we are sure, would demur to it or would be found wishing for anything else: each would unreservedly deem that he had been offered just what he was yearning for all the time, namely, to be so joined and fused with his beloved that the two might be made one. The cause of it all is this, that our original form was as I have described, and we were entire; and the craving and pursuit'207a From what has been admitted, we needs must yearn for immortality no less than for good, since love loves good to be one’s own for ever. And hence it necessarily follows that love is of immortality. 219c wound my arms about this truly spiritual and miraculous creature; and lay thus all the night long. Here too, Socrates, you are unable to give me the lie. When I had done all this, he showed such superiority and contempt, laughing my youthful charms to scorn, and flouting the very thing on which I prided myself, gentlemen of the jury—for you are here to try Socrates for his lofty disdain: you may be sure, by gods—and goddesses—that when I arose I had in no more particular sense slept a night ' None |
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33. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on nature (physis) • Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods • Law (Mosaic), nature, lex naturae • Limit (peras, πέρας)/limit in nature • Natural Receptive Capacity • Nature • Nature/nature (phusis, φύσις) as image • actions, how they differ from natural processes • death (natural, physical) • determinism, determinists, necessity (of nature) • human nature and human beings • myth of Er, nature (physis) • naturalistic accounts, nature, concept of • nature • nature (φύσις) • nature, as conceived by Aristotle • order of Nature/nature (phusis, φύσις), as argument for Forms • philosophy, natural, sceptical treatments of • time, according to nature’s pattern • toils (ponoi), natural
Found in books: Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 123; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 173; Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 479, 484, 486, 491; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 87; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 71, 188; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 100, 118, 145, 161; Lloyd (1989), The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, 322; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 39; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 276, 343, 349, 350, 353, 355; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 41, 45; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 287; Schultz and Wilberding (2022), Women and the Female in Neoplatonism, 83; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 663; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 157, 242, 284
| 28a ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δʼ αὖ δόξῃ μετʼ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπʼ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης 29a ἀπηργάζετο, πότερον πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἢ πρὸς τὸ γεγονός. εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν· εἰ δὲ ὃ μηδʼ εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός. παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δʼ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται· 29d ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν. ΣΩ. ἄριστα, ὦ Τίμαιε, παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις ἀποδεκτέον· τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. ΤΙ. λέγωμεν δὴ διʼ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν 29e τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ΤΙ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην 40a πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπηργάζετο, ὅπως ὅτι λαμπρότατον ἰδεῖν τε κάλλιστον εἴη, τῷ δὲ παντὶ προσεικάζων εὔκυκλον ἐποίει, τίθησίν τε εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν ἐκείνῳ συνεπόμενον, νείμας περὶ πάντα κύκλῳ τὸν οὐρανόν, κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθʼ ὅλον. κινήσεις δὲ δύο προσῆψεν ἑκάστῳ, τὴν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτά, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ 42b τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα· ὧν εἰ μὲν κρατήσοιεν, δίκῃ βιώσοιντο, κρατηθέντες δὲ ἀδικίᾳ. καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἕξοι, σφαλεὶς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ 42d καὶ γῆς, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα, λόγῳ κρατήσας εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως. διαθεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος, ἔσπειρεν τοὺς μὲν εἰς γῆν, τοὺς δʼ εἰς σελήνην, τοὺς δʼ εἰς τἆλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸν σπόρον τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκεν θεοῖς σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, τό τʼ ἐπίλοιπον, ὅσον ἔτι ἦν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δέον 47a δεδώρηται, μετὰ τοῦτο ῥητέον. ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη μήτε ἄστρα μήτε ἥλιον μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. νῦν δʼ ἡμέρα τε καὶ νὺξ ὀφθεῖσαι μῆνές τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι καὶ ἰσημερίαι καὶ τροπαὶ μεμηχάνηνται μὲν ἀριθμόν, χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν περί τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν· ἐξ ὧν 47c ἐκείναις οὔσας, ἀταράκτοις τεταραγμένας, ἐκμαθόντες δὲ καὶ λογισμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθότητος μετασχόντες, μιμούμενοι τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεῖς οὔσας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν πεπλανημένας καταστησαίμεθα. φωνῆς τε δὴ καὶ ἀκοῆς πέρι πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα παρὰ θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι. λόγος τε γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τέτακται, τὴν μεγίστην συμβαλλόμενος εἰς αὐτὰ μοῖραν, ὅσον τʼ αὖ μουσικῆς 68e ΤΙ. διὸ δὴ χρὴ δύʼ αἰτίας εἴδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἅπασιν ζητεῖν' ' None | 28a and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. Again, everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity 29a Was it after that which is self-identical and uniform, or after that which has come into existence; Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good, it is plain that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal; but if otherwise (which is an impious supposition), his gaze was on that which has come into existence. But it is clear to everyone that his gaze was on the Eternal; for the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence, and He the best of all the Causes. So having in this wise come into existence, it has been constructed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and thought and is self-identical. 29d and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it. Soc. Excellent, Timaeus! We must by all means accept it, as you suggest; and certainly we have most cordially accepted your prelude; so now, we beg of you, proceed straight on with the main theme. Tim. Let us now state the Cause wherefore He that constructed it 29e constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself. Tim. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos. 40a another the winged kind which traverses the air; thirdly, the class which inhabits the waters; and fourthly, that which goes on foot on dry land. The form of the divine class He wrought for the most part out of fire, that this kind might be as bright as possible to behold and as fair; and likening it to the All He made it truly spherical; and He placed it in the intelligence of the Supreme to follow therewith, distributing it round about over all the Heaven, to be unto it a veritable adornment cunningly traced over the whole. And each member of this class He endowed with two motions, whereof the one is uniform motion in the same spot, whereby it conceives always identical thoughts about the same objects, 42b and all such emotions as are naturally allied thereto, and all such as are of a different and opposite character. And if they shall master these they will live justly, but if they are mastered, unjustly. And he that has lived his appointed time well shall return again to his abode in his native star, and shall gain a life that is blessed and congenial but whoso has failed therein shall be changed into woman’s nature at the second birth; and if, in that shape, he still refraineth not from wickedne 42d and earth and air, a mass tumultuous and irrational, returns again to the semblance of his first and best state. 47a benefit effected by them, for the sake of which God bestowed them upon us. Vision, in my view, is the cause of the greatest benefit to us, inasmuch as none of the accounts now given concerning the Universe would ever have been given if men had not seen the stars or the sun or the heaven. But as it is, the vision of day and night and of months and circling years has created the art of number and has given us not only the notion of Time but also means of research into the nature of the Universe. From these we have procured Philosophy in all its range, 47c the perturbable to the imperturbable; and that, through learning and sharing in calculations which are correct by their nature, by imitation of the absolutely unvarying revolutions of the God we might stabilize the variable revolutions within ourselves. 68e Tim. Wherefore one ought to distinguish two kinds of causes, the necessary and the divine, and in all things to seek after the divine for the sake of gaining a life of blessedness, so far as our nature admits thereof,' ' None |
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34. Sophocles, Antigone, 450-460, 791-792, 992-993, 1058-1059, 1075 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aphrodite, dual anthropomorphic and cosmic nature of • Aristotle, on natural law • Law, Natural • Nature, • Pericles, nature of • Rhetoric (Aristotle), on natural law • gods and goddesses, universal and local nature of • nature, of Antigone • schesis, nature of • unwritten law, and law of nature
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 43; Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 14; Jouanna (2018), Sophocles: A Study of His Theater in Its Political and Social Context, 336, 347, 397; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 7; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 92; Pucci (2016), Euripides' Revolution Under Cover: An Essay, 49; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 10
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450 Yes, since it was not Zeus that published me that edict, and since not of that kind are the laws which Justice who dwells with the gods below established among men. Nor did I think that your decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten 455 and unfailing statutes given us by the gods. For their life is not of today or yesterday, but for all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth. Not for fear of any man’s pride was I about to owe a penalty to the gods for breaking these. 460 Die I must, that I knew well (how could I not?). That is true even without your edicts. But if I am to die before my time, I count that a gain. When anyone lives as I do, surrounded by evils, how can he not carry off gain by dying?
791 You seize the minds of just men and drag them to injustice, to their ruin. You it is who have incited this conflict of men whose flesh and blood are one.
992 I will tell you. You, obey the seer. 993 It was not my habit before, at any rate, to stand apart from your will.
1058 I am aware, since through me you have saved this city.'1059 You are a wise seer, but fond of doing injustice.
1075 the Furies of Hades and of the gods, lie in ambush for you, waiting to seize you in these same sufferings. And look closely if I tell you this with a silvered palm. A time not long to be delayed will reveal in your house wailing over men and over women. ' None |
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35. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.22.4, 2.22.1, 3.82, 3.82.2, 5.87, 5.89, 5.105.2, 6.24.3 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on natural slavery • Codex Vaticanus Graecus, human nature, view of • Desire, and human nature • Diogenes of Sinope xx, xxv, and the natural • Irrational impulses, and human nature • Nature • Nature (φύσις), and Hippocratic Corpus • Nature (φύσις), and νόμος • Nature (φύσις), as agent • Nature (φύσις), continuous with moral order • Nature (φύσις), two perspectives on • Nature (φύσις), vs. national character • Necessity (in Thucydides), and nature (φύσις) • Pericles, nature of • human nature • human nature and human beings • nature (φύσις) • soteria (in Greek antiquity), multivalent nature of • universal rule, and Greeks, said to be a law of nature
Found in books: Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 319; Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 52; Faure (2022), Conceptions of Time in Greek and Roman Antiquity, 177, 187; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 114; Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 181, 182; Jim (2022), Saviour Gods and Soteria in Ancient Greece, 34, 35, 43; Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 18, 65, 106, 109, 116, 117, 137, 153, 188, 191, 253, 296, 298, 299; Jouanna (2018), Sophocles: A Study of His Theater in Its Political and Social Context, 336; Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 74; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 655
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1.22.4 καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.
2.22.1 Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι’ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν.
3.82.2 καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
5.105.2 ΑΘ. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν: καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό.
6.24.3 καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ’ ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν.' ' None | sup>
1.22.4 The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.
2.22.1 He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and confident of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly, he addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible, ' "
3.82.2 The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their fortunes. " 5.105.2 of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.
6.24.3 All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. ' ' None |
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36. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.2-1.1.4, 1.1.11-1.1.14, 1.4, 1.4.2-1.4.9, 1.4.13-1.4.17, 1.6.10, 4.4.19-4.4.21 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Law, Natural • Socrates, and natural philosophical tradition • Xenophon, on Socrates and natural philosophy • common concepts, natural concepts • hierarchy, of being (scala naturae) • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natural • natural philosophy, Socrates and prior tradition • natural regularities • nature, • toils (ponoi), natural
Found in books: Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 27; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 28; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 181; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 98; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 282; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 39; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 106; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 55, 56, 57, 424, 663
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1.1.2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, ποίῳ ποτʼ ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. 1.1.3 ὁ δʼ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. 1.
1.4 ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δʼ ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.
1.1.11 οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε. 1.1.12 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. 1.1.13 ἐθαύμαζε δʼ εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 1.1.14 τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδʼ ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδʼ ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὔθʼ ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτʼ ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, τοῖς δʼ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δʼ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὔτʼ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολεῖσθαι.
1.4.2 λέξω δὲ πρῶτον ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
1.4.3 καὶ ὅς, λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦξιν.
1.4.4 πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἴδωλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῷα ἔμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; πολὺ νὴ Δία οἱ ζῷα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχῃ τινί, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκα ἔστι καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα.
1.4.5 οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς διʼ ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ὥσθʼ ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δὲ ὥστʼ ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δʼ ἂν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καὶ δριμέων καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνειργάσθη;
1.4.6 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τάδε προνοίας ἔργοις ἐοικέναι, τὸ ἐπεὶ ἀσθενὴς μέν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, βλεφάροις αὐτὴν θυρῶσαι, ἅ, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῇ χρῆσθαί τι δέῃ, ἀναπετάννυται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ συγκλείεται, ὡς δʼ ἂν μηδὲ ἄνεμοι βλάπτωσιν, ἡθμὸν βλεφαρίδας ἐμφῦσαι, ὀφρύσι τε ἀπογεισῶσαι τὰ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὡς μηδʼ ὁ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἱδρὼς κακουργῇ· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν πάσας φωνάς, ἐμπίμπλασθαι δὲ μήποτε· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας πᾶσι ζῴοις οἵους τέμνειν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους οἵους παρὰ τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καὶ στόμα μέν, διʼ οὗ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τὰ ζῷα εἰσπέμπεται, πλησίον ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ῥινῶν καταθεῖναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῆ, ἀποστρέψαι τοὺς τούτων ὀχετοὺς καὶ ἀπενεγκεῖν ᾗ δυνατὸν προσωτάτω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν;
1.4.7 οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῴου τεχνήμασι. τὸ δὲ ἐμφῦσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου.
1.4.8 σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα διʼ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν;
1.4.9 μὰ Δίʼ οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τοὺς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημιουργούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σαυτοῦ σύγε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲν γνώμῃ, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις.
1.4.13 οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζῴου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ᾔσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φῦλον ἄλλο ἢ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι;
1.4.14 οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατʼ ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθʼ ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δʼ ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν;
1.4.15 ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδʼ ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδʼ ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;
1.4.16 οἴει δʼ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτʼ ἂν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται;
1.4.17 ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
1.6.10 ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δʼ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.
4.4.19 ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, νόμους; τούς γʼ ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομιζομένους. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἵ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεοὺς σέβειν. 4.4.20 οὐκοῦν καὶ γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ μήτε γονέας παισὶ μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν; οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος εἶναι. τί δή; ἔφη. ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰσθάνομαί τινας παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν. 4.4.21 καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἔφη, παρανομοῦσιν· ἀλλὰ δίκην γέ τοι διδόασιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἣν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην διδόναι, οἱ μὲν λανθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ βιαζόμενοι.' ' None | sup>
1.1.2 First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by the deity: That immanent divine something, as Cicero terms it, which Socrates claimed as his peculiar possession. it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. 1.1.3 He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men’s belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates ’ belief too. 1.
1.4 Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret.
1.1.11 He did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, the Nature of the Universe : and avoided speculation on the so-called Cosmos of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one’s mind with such problems is sheer folly. 1.1.12 In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? 1.1.13 Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. 1.1.14 As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with Universal Nature. Some hold that What is is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die.
1.4.2 I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of those who did so, he said: Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom? I do, he answered.
1.4.3 Tell us their names. In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis.
1.4.4 Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings? Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance. Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature’s existence, and obvious that another’s serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design? Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.
1.4.5 Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odours again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them?
1.4.6 Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design? No, of course not.
1.4.7 When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving creator. What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death? Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures.
1.4.8 Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?
1.4.9 Yes; for I don’t see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this world. Neither do you see your own soul, Cyropaedia VIII. Vii. 17. which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance. Here Aristodemus exclaimed:
1.4.13 Nor was the deity content to care for man’s body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature’s soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man’s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned?
1.4.14 For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you?
1.4.15 I will believe when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying, Do this, avoid that. But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect?
1.4.16 Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious?
1.4.17 Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god’s eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god’s thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once.
1.6.10 You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; Cyropaedia VIII. iii. 40. to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.
4.4.19 Do you know what is meant by unwritten laws, Hippias? Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country. Could you say that men made them? Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language? Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose? I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods. 4.4.20 Is not the duty of honouring parents another universal law? Yes, that is another. And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents? Cyropaedia V. i. 10. No, I don’t think that is a law of God. Why so? Because I notice that some transgress it. 4.4.21 Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence. ' ' None |
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37. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Diogenes of Sinope xx, xxv, and the natural • Laws of nature.
Found in books: Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 421; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 655
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38. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature • Socrates, and natural philosophical tradition • Xenophon, on Socrates and natural philosophy • natural philosophy, Socrates and prior tradition
Found in books: Faure (2022), Conceptions of Time in Greek and Roman Antiquity, 57; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 56
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39. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Socrates, and natural philosophical tradition • Xenophon, on Socrates and natural philosophy • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natural philosophy, Socrates and prior tradition
Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 275; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 56
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40. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hippocrates, works,, Nature of Man • Mytilene, natural, causes of disease • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, in literary settings • Nature • human, nature of disease • psychic, vital, natural
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 75; Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 100, 241; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 174; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 51, 52
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41. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • human nature • order of Nature/nature (phusis, φύσις), as argument for Forms
Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 270; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 242
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42. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Isaac, nature and • ingenium/natura, doctrina, usus • nature, Isaac and
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 190, 194; Cheuk-Yin Yam (2019), Trinity and Grace in Augustine, 305
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43. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Lucretius, laws of nature in • numinousness, of nature
Found in books: Gale (2000), Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition, 84; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 224
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44. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • belief/s, nature of • chance, and natural causal relations • human nature • lex naturae, • motion, natural/forced • natural • natural end/purpose • nature, human nature • scala naturae
Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 45; Bay (2022), Biblical Heroes and Classical Culture in Christian Late Antiquity: The Historiography, Exemplarity, and Anti-Judaism of Pseudo-Hegesippus, 262; Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 48, 220; Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 127; Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 189; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 124; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 109, 122; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 233
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45. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on nature • art (techne), of nature • naturalistic accounts, nature, concept of • nature, concept of • nature, works of in Aristotle
Found in books: Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 309; Lloyd (1989), The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, 188
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46. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • chance, and natural causal relations • nature, • substances, natural • teleology, nature does nothing in vain
Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 50; Dimas Falcon and Kelsey (2022), Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption Book II Introduction, Translation, and Interpretative Essays, 47, 199, 231; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021), The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 198
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47. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle,, views on teleology, craftsmanlike Nature and divine cause • Nature • natural virtue • naturalistic accounts, nature, concept of • scala naturae
Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 178; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 82; Lloyd (1989), The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, 323; Singer and van Eijk (2018), Galen: Works on Human Nature: Volume 1, Mixtures (De Temperamentis), 10
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48. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • city-state (polis), and its natural generation/existence • irrational, nature • nature • nature, and goodness • nature, human nature • nature, of human beings • toils (ponoi), natural
Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 215; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 70, 111; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 663; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 238, 239, 240, 246, 257
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49. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Natural and necessary emotions • Christology, natures of Christ, Augustine • Christology, natures of Christ, Basil of Caesarea • Christology, natures of Christ, Jerome • Christology, natures of Christ, Origen and Rufinus • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Sex natural but necessary and tends to harm • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Natural, necessary, Desire • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Nature • Nature (φύσις), human • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Virtue, natural • actions, how they differ from natural processes • common concepts, natural concepts • human nature • intellect, as essential to human nature • justice, natural justice • law, natural law • natural end/purpose • natural virtue • natural virtues • nature • nature and convention • nature, • nature, and goodness • nature, contrary to • nature, human nature • nature, living in accordance with • nature, of human beings • nature, of humans • scala naturae • virtue, natural • virtues, natural
Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 118, 170, 176, 177, 179; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 209, 217; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 81, 82; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 114, 266, 415; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 157; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 59, 60; Liatsi (2021), Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond, 93, 94; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 359; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 318; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 127, 180, 216; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 106, 118, 122; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201, 283, 399; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021), The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 210; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 263; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 215
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50. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, on nature and the self • analogy, between nature and craft • craft (art, skill, technē), analogy with nature • foedera naturae • more natural science • natural end/purpose • natural regularities • natural wealth acquisition • nature • nature, • nature, and purposiveness • nature, as a kind of cause • nature, personification of • substances, natural
Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020), Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in its contexts, 74; Dimas Falcon and Kelsey (2022), Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption Book II Introduction, Translation, and Interpretative Essays, 127; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 168; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 165, 173; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 71; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021), The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 198; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 296
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51. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, De natura deorum • nature and culture
Found in books: Gagne (2021), Cosmography and the Idea of Hyperborea in Ancient Greece, 15; Johnston and Struck (2005), Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination, 149
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52. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on natural slavery • Greeks, said to be natural rulers of the barbarians • history natural vs. human, of utopian thought • justice, natural justice • law, natural law • natural slavery, Aristotle on • slaves, according to Theognis and Xenophon, the same by nature as barbarians • virtues, natural
Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 116; Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 177; Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 36; Liatsi (2021), Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond, 93, 94; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 127
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53. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hippocrates, works,, Nature of Man • natural, temperament • nature, as distinct from illness • nature, human • talent, natural • virtue, natural
Found in books: Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 240, 241, 337; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 157, 232
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54. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on natural law • Natural law • Rhetoric (Aristotle), on natural law • law, natural law
Found in books: Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 423; Jouanna (2018), Sophocles: A Study of His Theater in Its Political and Social Context, 397; Liatsi (2021), Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond, 83, 85, 95
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55. Anon., 1 Enoch, 2.1-2.2, 5.3-5.4, 18.15, 21.3-21.10, 76.14, 80.4-80.8 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Fear, of Natural Forces • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • human, nature • natural law, in 1 Enoch • nature, human • resurrection, nature of (relationship to embodiment) • wisdom, and/or correlation with Torah and natural order
Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 17; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 98, 99, 100, 101; Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 17; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 453, 458, 461, 474, 477
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2.1 Observe ye everything that takes place in the heaven, how they do not change their orbits, and the luminaries which are in the heaven, how they all rise and set in order each in its season, and 2.2 transgress not against their appointed order. Behold ye the earth, and give heed to the things which take place upon it from first to last, how steadfast they are, how none of the things upon earth
5.3 And behold how the sea and the rivers in like manner accomplish and change not their tasks from His commandments\'." 5.4 But ye -ye have not been steadfast, nor done the commandments of the Lord, But ye have turned away and spoken proud and hard words With your impure mouths against His greatness. Oh, ye hard-hearted, ye shall find no peace.
18.15 I saw the treasuries of all the winds: I saw how He had furnished with them the whole creation",and the firm foundations of the earth. And I saw the corner-stone of the earth: I saw the four",winds which bear the earth and the firmament of the heaven. And I saw how the winds stretch out the vaults of heaven, and have their station between heaven and earth: these are the pillars,of the heaven. I saw the winds of heaven which turn and bring the circumference of the sun and",all the stars to their setting. I saw the winds on the earth carrying the clouds: I saw the paths",of the angels. I saw at the end of the earth the firmament of the heaven above. And I proceeded and saw a place which burns day and night, where there are seven mountains of magnificent stones,,three towards the east, and three towards the south. And as for those towards the east, was of coloured stone, and one of pearl, and one of jacinth, and those towards the south of red stone.,But the middle one reached to heaven like the throne of God, of alabaster, and the summit of the,throne was of sapphire. And I saw a flaming fire. And beyond these mountains Is a region the end of the great earth: there the heavens were completed. And I saw a deep abyss, with columns of heavenly fire, and among them I saw columns of fire fall, which were beyond measure alike towards,the height and towards the depth. And beyond that abyss I saw a place which had no firmament of the heaven above, and no firmly founded earth beneath it: there was no water upon it, and no,birds, but it was a waste and horrible place. I saw there seven stars like great burning mountains,,and to me, when I inquired regarding them, The angel said: \'This place is the end of heaven and earth: this has become a prison for the stars and the host of heaven. And the stars which roll over the fire are they which have transgressed the commandment of the Lord in the beginning of,their rising, because they did not come forth at their appointed times. And He was wroth with them, and bound them till the time when their guilt should be consummated (even) for ten thousand years.\'
21.3 a heaven above nor a firmly founded earth, but a place chaotic and horrible. And there I saw 21.4 even stars of the heaven bound together in it, like great mountains and burning with fire. Then' "21.5 I said: 'For what sin are they bound, and on what account have they been cast in hither' Then said Uriel, one of the holy angels, who was with me, and was chief over them, and said: 'Enoch, why" '21.6 dost thou ask, and why art thou eager for the truth These are of the number of the stars of heaven, which have transgressed the commandment of the Lord, and are bound here till ten thousand years,' "21.7 the time entailed by their sins, are consummated.' And from thence I went to another place, which was still more horrible than the former, and I saw a horrible thing: a great fire there which burnt and blazed, and the place was cleft as far as the abyss, being full of great descending columns of" "21.8 fire: neither its extent or magnitude could I see, nor could I conjecture. Then I said: 'How" "21.9 fearful is the place and how terrible to look upon!' Then Uriel answered me, one of the holy angels who was with me, and said unto me: 'Enoch, why hast thou such fear and affright' And" '21.10 And I proceeded to where things were chaotic. And I saw there something horrible: I saw neither",a heaven above nor a firmly founded earth, but a place chaotic and horrible. And there I saw,seven stars of the heaven bound together in it, like great mountains and burning with fire. Then,I said: \'For what sin are they bound, and on what account have they been cast in hither\' Then said Uriel, one of the holy angels, who was with me, and was chief over them, and said: \'Enoch, why,dost thou ask, and why art thou eager for the truth These are of the number of the stars of heaven, which have transgressed the commandment of the Lord, and are bound here till ten thousand years,,the time entailed by their sins, are consummated.\' And from thence I went to another place, which was still more horrible than the former, and I saw a horrible thing: a great fire there which burnt and blazed, and the place was cleft as far as the abyss, being full of great descending columns of,fire: neither its extent or magnitude could I see, nor could I conjecture. Then I said: \'How,fearful is the place and how terrible to look upon!\' Then Uriel answered me, one of the holy angels who was with me, and said unto me: \'Enoch, why hast thou such fear and affright\' And,I answered: \'Because of this fearful place, and because of the spectacle of the pain.\' And he said unto me: \'This place is the prison of the angels, and here they will be imprisoned for ever.\'
76.14 And at the ends of the earth I saw twelve portals open to all the quarters (of the heaven), from,which the winds go forth and blow over the earth. Three of them are open on the face (i.e. the east) of the heavens, and three in the west, and three on the right (i.e. the south) of the heaven, and,three on the left (i.e. the north). And the three first are those of the east, and three are of the,north, and three after those on the left of the south, and three of the west. Through four of these come winds of blessing and prosperity, and from those eight come hurtful winds: when they are sent, they bring destruction on all the earth and on the water upon it, and on all who dwell thereon, and on everything which is in the water and on the land.,And the first wind from those portals, called the east wind, comes forth through the first portal which is in the east, inclining towards the south: from it come forth desolation, drought, heat,,and destruction. And through the second portal in the middle comes what is fitting, and from it there come rain and fruitfulness and prosperity and dew; and through the third portal which lies toward the north come cold and drought.,And after these come forth the south winds through three portals: through the first portal of",them inclining to the east comes forth a hot wind. And through the middle portal next to it there",come forth fragrant smells, and dew and rain, and prosperity and health. And through the third portal lying to the west come forth dew and rain, locusts and desolation.,And after these the north winds: from the seventh portal in the east come dew and rain, locusts and desolation. And from the middle portal come in a direct direction health and rain and dew and prosperity; and through the third portal in the west come cloud and hoar-frost, and snow and rain, and dew and locusts.,And after these four are the west winds: through the first portal adjoining the north come forth dew and hoar-frost, and cold and snow and frost. And from the middle portal come forth dew and rain, and prosperity and blessing; and through the last portal which adjoins the south come forth drought and desolation, and burning and destruction. And the twelve portals of the four quarters of the heaven are therewith completed, and all their laws and all their plagues and all their benefactions have I shown to thee, my son Methuselah.
80.4 And the moon shall alter her order, And not appear at her time. 80.5 And in those days the sun shall be seen and he shall journey in the evening on the extremity of the great chariot in the west And shall shine more brightly than accords with the order of light." 80.6 And many chiefs of the stars shall transgress the order (prescribed). And these shall alter their orbits and tasks, And not appear at the seasons prescribed to them. 80.7 And the whole order of the stars shall be concealed from the sinners, And the thoughts of those on the earth shall err concerning them, And they shall be altered from all their ways, Yea, they shall err and take them to be gods.' "80.8 And evil shall be multiplied upon them, And punishment shall come upon them So as to destroy all.'" '102 In those days when He hath brought a grievous fire upon you, Whither will ye flee, and where will ye find deliverance And when He launches forth His Word against you Will you not be affrighted and fear,And all the luminaries shall be affrighted with great fear, And all the earth shall be affrighted and tremble and be alarmed.,And all the angels shall execute their commandst And shall seek to hide themselves from the presence of the Great Glory, And the children of earth shall tremble and quake; And ye sinners shall be cursed for ever, And ye shall have no peace.,Fear ye not, ye souls of the righteous, And be hopeful ye that have died in righteousness.,And grieve not if your soul into Sheol has descended in grief, And that in your life your body fared not according to your goodness, But wait for the day of the judgement of sinners And for the day of cursing and chastisement.,And yet when ye die the sinners speak over you: ' As we die, so die the righteous, And what benefit do they reap for their deeds,Behold, even as we, so do they die in grief and darkness, And what have they more than we From henceforth we are equal.,And what will they receive and what will they see for ever Behold, they too have died, And henceforth for ever shall they see no light.,I tell you, ye sinners, ye are content to eat and drink, and rob and sin, and strip men naked, and,acquire wealth and see good days. Have ye seen the righteous how their end falls out, that no manner,of violence is found in them till their death ' Nevertheless they perished and became as though they had not been, and their spirits descended into Sheol in tribulation."103 Now, therefore, I swear to you, the righteous, by the glory of the Great and Honoured and,Mighty One in dominion, and by His greatness I swear to you. I know a mystery And have read the heavenly tablets, And have seen the holy books, And have found written therein and inscribed regarding them:,That all goodness and joy and glory are prepared for them, And written down for the spirits of those who have died in righteousness, And that manifold good shall be given to you in recompense for your labours, And that your lot is abundantly beyond the lot of the living.,And the spirits of you who have died in righteousness shall live and rejoice, And their spirits shall not perish, nor their memorial from before the face of the Great One Unto all the generations of the world: wherefore no longer fear their contumely.,Woe to you, ye sinners, when ye have died, If ye die in the wealth of your sins, And those who are like you say regarding you: \' Blessed are the sinners: they have seen all their days.,And how they have died in prosperity and in wealth, And have not seen tribulation or murder in their life; And they have died in honour, And judgement has not been executed on them during their life.,Know ye, that their souls will be made to descend into Sheol And they shall be wretched in their great tribulation.,And into darkness and chains and a burning flame where there is grievous judgement shall your spirits enter; And the great judgement shall be for all the generations of the world. Woe to you, for ye shall have no peace.,Say not in regard to the righteous and good who are in life: \' In our troubled days we have toiled laboriously and experienced every trouble, And met with much evil and been consumed, And have become few and our spirit small.,And we have been destroyed and have not found any to help us even with a word: We have been tortured and destroyed, and not hoped to see life from day to day.,We hoped to be the head and have become the tail: We have toiled laboriously and had no satisfaction in our toil; And we have become the food of the sinners and the unrighteous, And they have laid their yoke heavily upon us.,They have had dominion over us that hated us and smote us; And to those that hated us we have bowed our necks But they pitied us not.",We desired to get away from them that we might escape and be at rest, But found no place whereunto we should flee and be safe from them.,And are complained to the rulers in our tribulation, And cried out against those who devoured us, But they did not attend to our cries And would not hearken to our voice.,And they helped those who robbed us and devoured us and those who made us few; and they concealed their oppression, and they did not remove from us the yoke of those that devoured us and dispersed us and murdered us, and they concealed their murder, and remembered not that they had lifted up their hands against us. 104 I swear unto you, that in heaven the angels remember you for good before the glory of the Great,One: and your names are written before the glory of the Great One. Be hopeful; for aforetime ye were put to shame through ill and affliction; but now ye shall shine as the lights of heaven,,ye shall shine and ye shall be seen, and the portals of heaven shall be opened to you. And in your cry, cry for judgement, and it shall appear to you; for all your tribulation shall be visited on the,rulers, and on all who helped those who plundered you. Be hopeful, and cast not away your hopes for ye shall have great joy as the angels of heaven. What shall ye be obliged to do Ye shall not have to hide on the day of the great judgement and ye shall not be found as sinners, and the eternal,judgement shall be far from you for all the generations of the world. And now fear not, ye righteous, when ye see the sinners growing strong and prospering in their ways: be not companions with them,,but keep afar from their violence; for ye shall become companions of the hosts of heaven. And, although ye sinners say: \' All our sins shall not be searched out and be written down, nevertheless",they shall write down all your sins every day. And now I show unto you that light and darkness,,day and night, see all your sins. Be not godless in your hearts, and lie not and alter not the words of uprightness, nor charge with lying the words of the Holy Great One, nor take account of your,idols; for all your lying and all your godlessness issue not in righteousness but in great sin. And now I know this mystery, that sinners will alter and pervert the words of righteousness in many ways, and will speak wicked words, and lie, and practice great deceits, and write books concerning,their words. But when they write down truthfully all my words in their languages, and do not change or minish ought from my words but write them all down truthfully -all that I first testified,concerning them. Then, I know another mystery, that books will be given to the righteous and the,wise to become a cause of joy and uprightness and much wisdom. And to them shall the books be given, and they shall believe in them and rejoice over them, and then shall all the righteous who have learnt therefrom all the paths of uprightness be recompensed.\'' "' None |
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56. Cicero, On Divination, 1.5-1.6, 1.11-1.12, 1.23, 1.25, 1.29-1.30, 1.34, 1.39-1.49, 1.51-1.65, 1.72, 1.82-1.84, 1.87, 1.109-1.111, 1.117-1.118, 1.122, 1.124, 1.127-1.128, 2.13, 2.26-2.27, 2.40, 2.137, 2.146 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cotta (character in De natura deorum), • Divination (Greek and Roman), natural vs. artificial • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, body and health • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • Natural dreaming, food and drink • Natural dreaming, hunger • Natural dreaming, morality and character • Natural dreaming, prescience and cognition • Prescience, as natural faculty • artificial vs. natural divination • cognition, natural • craftsman, nature as • divination, natural • myths, natural divination • natural • nature, of God/gods • nature, of soul • nature, of things • oracles, natural vs. technical methods • theology, natural
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 139; Bowen and Rochberg (2020), Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in its contexts, 615; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 230, 233; Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 478; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 85; Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 9; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 181, 362; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 130; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 342; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 168, 170, 171; Renberg (2017), Where Dreams May Come: Incubation Sanctuaries in the Greco-Roman World, 3, 5; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 9, 10; Struck (2016), Divination and Human Nature: A Cognitive History of Intuition in Classical Antiquity, 195, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 230, 233; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 185, 202, 218, 261
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1.5 Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissumis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii, qui ab eo essent profecti, manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurumisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque, familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit. 1.6 Sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse dividi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur? praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius.
1.11 Ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud, quod lubenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire, de divinatione quid sentias. Nihil, inquit, equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu conprobatam sequor. Duo sunt enim dividi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. 1.12 Quae est autem gens aut quae civitas, quae non aut extispicum aut monstra aut fulgora interpretantium aut augurum aut astrologorum aut sortium (ea enim fere artis sunt) aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur) praedictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quam causas quaeri oportere. Est enim vis et natura quaedam, quae tum observatis longo tempore significationibus, tum aliquo instinctu inflatuque divino futura praenuntiat. Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius requirens, Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera canere iussisset. Observata sunt haec tempore inmenso et in significatione eventis animadversa et notata. Nihil est autem, quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque adsequi possit.
1.23 Quid? quaeris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint? Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. Casu, inquis. Itane vero? quicquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? Quattuor tali iacti casu Venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum Venerios, si quadringentos talos ieceris, casu futuros putas? Aspersa temere pigmenta in tabula oris liniamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuita putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram inpresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi? Fingebat Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput extitisse Panisci; credo, aliquam non dissimilem figuram, sed certe non talem, ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim se profecto res habet, ut numquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.
1.25 Ea fallit fortasse non numquam, sed tamen ad veritatem saepissime derigit; est enim ab omni aeternitate repetita, in qua cum paene innumerabiliter res eodem modo evenirent isdem signis antegressis, ars est effecta eadem saepe animadvertendo ac notando. Auspicia vero vestra quam constant! quae quidem nunc a Romanis auguribus ignorantur (bona hoc tua venia dixerim), a Cilicibus, Pamphyliis, Pisidis, Lyciis tenentur.
1.29 Ut P. Claudius, Appii Caeci filius, eiusque collega L. Iunius classis maxumas perdiderunt, cum vitio navigassent. Quod eodem modo evenit Agamemnoni; qui, cum Achivi coepissent . inter se strépere aperteque ártem obterere extíspicum, Sólvere imperát secundo rúmore adversáque avi. Sed quid vetera? M. Crasso quid acciderit, videmus, dirarum obnuntiatione neglecta. In quo Appius, collega tuus, bonus augur, ut ex te audire soleo, non satis scienter virum bonum et civem egregium censor C. Ateium notavit, quod ementitum auspicia subscriberet. Esto; fuerit hoc censoris, si iudicabat ementitum; at illud minime auguris, quod adscripsit ob eam causam populum Romanum calamitatem maximam cepisse. Si enim ea causa calamitatis fuit, non in eo est culpa, qui obnuntiavit, sed in eo, qui non paruit. Veram enim fuisse obnuntiationem, ut ait idem augur et censor, exitus adprobavit; quae si falsa fuisset, nullam adferre potuisset causam calamitatis. Etenim dirae, sicut cetera auspicia, ut omina, ut signa, non causas adferunt, cur quid eveniat, sed nuntiant eventura, nisi provideris.
1.34 Iis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. Est enim ars in iis, qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. Carent autem arte ii, qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticitibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea. Cuius generis oracla etiam habenda sunt, non ea, quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa, quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si et auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant, fieri credo posse divinitus. Quorum omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poe+tarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere.
1.39 Sed omittamus oracula; veniamus ad somnia. De quibus disputans Chrysippus multis et minutis somniis colligendis facit idem, quod Antipater ea conquirens, quae Antiphontis interpretatione explicata declarant illa quidem acumen interpretis, sed exemplis grandioribus decuit uti. Dionysii mater, eius qui Syracosiorum tyrannus fuit, ut scriptum apud Philistum est, et doctum hominem et diligentem et aequalem temporum illorum, cum praegs hunc ipsum Dionysium alvo contineret, somniavit se peperisse Satyriscum. Huic interpretes portentorum, qui Galeotae tum in Sicilia nominabantur, responderunt, ut ait Philistus, eum, quem illa peperisset, clarissimum Graeciae diuturna cum fortuna fore. 1.41 Exin compellare pater me voce videtur His verbis: "O gnata, tibi sunt ante gerendae Aerumnae, post ex fluvio fortuna resistet." Haec ecfatus pater, germana, repente recessit Nec sese dedit in conspectum corde cupitus, Quamquam multa manus ad caeli caerula templa Tendebam lacrumans et blanda voce vocabam. Vix aegro tum corde meo me somnus reliquit.” 1.42 Haec, etiamsi ficta sunt a poe+ta, non absunt tamen a consuetudine somniorum. Sit sane etiam illud commenticium, quo Priamus est conturbatus, quia . máter gravida párere ex se ardentém facem Visást in somnis Hécuba; quo factó pater Rex ípse Priamus sómnio mentís metu Percúlsus curis súmptus suspirántibus Exsácrificabat hóstiis balántibus. Tum cóniecturam póstulat pacém petens, Ut se édoceret, óbsecrans Apóllinem, Quo sése vertant tántae sortes sómnium. Ibi éx oraclo vóce divina édidit Apóllo, puerum, prímus Priamo quí foret Postílla natus, témperaret tóllere; Eum ésse exitium Tróiae, pestem Pérgamo. 1.43 Sint haec, ut dixi, somnia fabularum, hisque adiungatur etiam Aeneae somnium, quod in nostri Fabii Pictoris Graecis annalibus eius modi est, ut omnia, quae ab Aenea gesta sunt quaeque illi acciderunt, ea fuerint, quae ei secundum quietem visa sunt. Sed propiora videamus. Cuiusnam modi est Superbi Tarquinii somnium, de quo in Bruto Accii loquitur ipse? 1.44 Quoniám quieti córpus nocturno ínpetu Dedí sopore plácans artus lánguidos, Visúst in somnis pástor ad me appéllere Pecús lanigerum exímia puchritúdine; Duós consanguineos árietes inde éligi Praeclárioremque álterum immoláre me; Deinde eíus germanum córnibus conítier, In me árietare, eoque íctu me ad casúm dari; Exín prostratum térra, graviter saúcium, Resupínum in caelo cóntueri máximum ac Mirifícum facinus: déxtrorsum orbem flámmeum Radiátum solis líquier cursú novo. Eius igitur somnii a coniectoribus quae sit interpretatio facta, videamus: 1.45 Réx, quae in vita usúrpant homines, cógitant, curánt, vident, Quaéque agunt vigilántes agitantque, éa, cui in somno áccidunt, Mínus mirandum est; dí rem tantam haud témere inproviso ófferunt. Próin vide ne, quém tu esse hebetem députes aeque ác pecus, Ís sapientiá munitum péctus egregié gerat Téque regno expéllat; nam id, quod dé sole ostentúmst tibi, Pópulo commutátionem rérum portendít fore Pérpropinquam. Haec béne verruncent pópulo. Nam quod ad déxteram Cépit cursum ab laéva signum praépotens, pulchérrume Aúguratum est rém Romanam públicam summám fore. Age nunc ad externa redeamus. 1.46 Matrem Phalaridis scribit Ponticus Heraclides, doctus vir, auditor et discipulus Platonis, visam esse videre in somnis simulacra deorum, quae ipsa domi consecravisset; ex iis Mercurium e patera, quam dextera manu teneret, sanguinem visum esse fundere; qui cum terram attigisset, refervescere videretur sic, ut tota domus sanguine redundaret. Quod matris somnium inmanis filii crudelitas conprobavit. Quid ego, quae magi Cyro illi principi interpretati sint, ex Dinonis Persicis proferam? Nam cum dormienti ei sol ad pedes visus esset, ter eum scribit frustra adpetivisse manibus, cum se convolvens sol elaberetur et abiret; ei magos dixisse, quod genus sapientium et doctorum habebatur in Persis, ex triplici adpetitione solis triginta annos Cyrum regnaturum esse portendi. Quod ita contigit; nam ad septuagesimum pervenit, cum quadraginta natus annos regnare coepisset. 1.47 Est profecto quiddam etiam in barbaris gentibus praesentiens atque divis, siquidem ad mortem proficiscens Callanus Indus, cum inscenderet in rogum ardentem, O praeclarum discessum, inquit, e vita, cum, ut Herculi contigit, mortali corpore cremato in lucem animus excesserit! Cumque Alexander eum rogaret, si quid vellet, ut diceret, Optime, inquit; propediem te videbo . Quod ita contigit; nam Babylone paucis post diebus Alexander est mortuus. Discedo parumper a somniis, ad quae mox revertar. Qua nocte templum Ephesiae Dianae deflagravit, eadem constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum, atque, ubi lucere coepisset, clamitasse magos pestem ac perniciem Asiae proxuma nocte natam. Haec de Indis et magis. 1.48 Redeamus ad somnia. Hannibalem Coelius scribit, cum columnam auream, quae esset in fano Iunonis Laciniae, auferre vellet dubitaretque, utrum ea solida esset an extrinsecus inaurata, perterebravisse, cumque solidam invenisset, statuisse tollere; ei secundum quietem visam esse Iunonem praedicere, ne id faceret, minarique, si fecisset, se curaturam, ut eum quoque oculum, quo bene videret, amitteret, idque ab homine acuto non esse neglectum; itaque ex eo auro, quod exterebratum esset, buculam curasse faciendam et eam in summa columna conlocavisse. 1.49 Hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est (is autem diligentissume res Hannibalis persecutus est): Hannibalem, cum cepisset Saguntum, visum esse in somnis a Iove in deorum concilium vocari; quo cum venisset, Iovem imperavisse, ut Italiae bellum inferret, ducemque ei unum e concilio datum, quo illum utentem cum exercitu progredi coepisse; tum ei ducem illum praecepisse, ne respiceret; illum autem id diutius facere non potuisse elatumque cupiditate respexisse; tum visam beluam vastam et immanem circumplicatam serpentibus, quacumque incederet, omnia arbusta, virgulta, tecta pervertere, et eum admiratum quaesisse de deo, quodnam illud esset tale monstrum; et deum respondisse vastitatem esse Italiae praecepisseque, ut pergeret protinus, quid retro atque a tergo fieret, ne laboraret.
1.51 At vero P. Decius ille Q. F., qui primus e Deciis consul fuit, cum esset tribunus militum M. Valerio A. Cornelio consulibus a Samnitibusque premeretur noster exercitus, cum pericula proeliorum iniret audacius monereturque, ut cautior esset, dixit, quod extat in annalibus, se sibi in somnis visum esse, cum in mediis hostibus versaretur, occidere cum maxuma gloria. Et tum quidem incolumis exercitum obsidione liberavit; post triennium autem, cum consul esset, devovit se et in aciem Latinorum inrupit armatus. Quo eius facto superati sunt et deleti Latini. Cuius mors ita gloriosa fuit, ut eandem concupisceret filius.
1.52 Sed veniamus nunc, si placet, ad somnia philosophorum. Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum; vidisse se in somnis pulchritudine eximia feminam, quae se nomine appellans diceret Homericum quendam eius modi versum: Tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit. Quod, ut est dictum, sic scribitur contigisse. Xenophon Socraticus (qui vir et quantus!) in ea militia, qua cum Cyro minore perfunctus est, sua scribit somnia, quorum eventus mirabiles exstiterunt.
1.53 Mentiri Xenophontem an delirare dicemus? Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium, familiarem suum, iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur; in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse, ut omnes medici diffiderent; ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. Atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta, et convaluisse Eudemum, et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum; quinto autem anno exeunte, cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse; ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum, ut, cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.
1.54 Adiungamus philosophis doctissimum hominem, poe+tam quidem divinum, Sophoclem; qui, cum ex aede Herculis patera aurea gravis subrepta esset, in somnis vidit ipsum deum dicentem, qui id fecisset. Quod semel ille iterumque neglexit. Ubi idem saepius, ascendit in Arium pagum, detulit rem; Areopagitae conprehendi iubent eum, qui a Sophocle erat nominatus; is quaestione adhibita confessus est pateramque rettulit. Quo facto fanum illud Indicis Herculis nominatum est.
1.55 Sed quid ego Graecorum? nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant. Omnes hoc historici, Fabii, Gellii, sed proxume Coelius: Cum bello Latino ludi votivi maxumi primum fierent, civitas ad arma repente est excitata, itaque ludis intermissis instaurativi constituti sunt. Qui ante quam fierent, cumque iam populus consedisset, servus per circum, cum virgis caederetur, furcam ferens ductus est. Exin cuidam rustico Romano dormienti visus est venire, qui diceret praesulem sibi non placuisse ludis, idque ab eodem iussum esse eum senatui nuntiare; illum non esse ausum. Iterum esse idem iussum et monitum, ne vim suam experiri vellet; ne tum quidem esse ausum. Exin filium eius esse mortuum, eandem in somnis admonitionem fuisse tertiam. Tum illum etiam debilem factum rem ad amicos detulisse, quorum de sententia lecticula in curiam esse delatum, cumque senatui somnium enarravisset, pedibus suis salvum domum revertisse. Itaque somnio comprobato a senatu ludos illos iterum instauratos memoriae proditum est.
1.56 C. vero Gracchus multis dixit, ut scriptum apud eundem Coelium est, sibi in somnis quaesturam pete re dubita nti Ti. fratrem visum esse dicere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tamen eodem sibi leto, quo ipse interisset, esse pereundum. Hoc, ante quam tribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse scribit Coelius et dixisse eum multis. Quo somnio quid inveniri potest certius? Quid? illa duo somnia, quae creberrume commemorantur a Stoicis, quis tandem potest contemnere? unum de Simonide: Qui cum ignotum quendam proiectum mortuum vidisset eumque humavisset haberetque in animo navem conscendere, moneri visus est, ne id faceret, ab eo, quem sepultura adfecerat; si navigavisset, eum naufragio esse periturum; itaque Simonidem redisse, perisse ceteros, qui tum navigassent. Alterum ita traditum clarum admodum somnium:
1.57 Cum duo quidam Arcades familiares iter una facerent et Megaram venissent, alterum ad cauponem devertisse, ad hospitem alterum. Qui ut cenati quiescerent, concubia nocte visum esse in somnis ei, qui erat in hospitio, illum alterum orare, ut subveniret, quod sibi a caupone interitus pararetur; eum primo perterritum somnio surrexisse; dein cum se conlegisset idque visum pro nihilo habendum esse duxisset, recubuisse; tum ei dormienti eundem illum visum esse rogare, ut, quoniam sibi vivo non subvenisset, mortem suam ne inultam esse pateretur; se interfectum in plaustrum a caupone esse coniectum et supra stercus iniectum; petere, ut mane ad portam adesset, prius quam plaustrum ex oppido exiret. Hoc vero eum somnio commotum mane bubulco praesto ad portam fuisse, quaesisse ex eo, quid esset in plaustro; illum perterritum fugisse, mortuum erutum esse, cauponem re patefacta poenas dedisse.
1.58 Quid hoc somnio dici potest divinius? Sed quid aut plura aut vetera quaerimus? Saepe tibi meum narravi, saepe ex te audivi tuum somnium: me, cum Asiae pro cos. praeessem, vidisse in quiete, cum tu equo advectus ad quandam magni fluminis ripam provectus subito atque delapsus in flumen nusquam apparuisses, me contremuisse timore perterritum; tum te repente laetum exstitisse eodemque equo adversam ascendisse ripam, nosque inter nos esse conplexos. Facilis coniectura huius somnii, mihique a peritis in Asia praedictum est fore eos eventus rerum, qui acciderunt. Venio nunc ad tuum.
1.59 Audivi equidem ex te ipso, sed mihi saepius noster Sallustius narravit, cum in illa fuga nobis gloriosa, patriae calamitosa in villa quadam campi Atinatis maneres magnamque partem noctis vigilasses, ad lucem denique arte et graviter dormire te coepisse; itaque, quamquam iter instaret, tamen silentium fieri iussisse se neque esse passum te excitari; cum autem experrectus esses hora secunda fere, te sibi somnium narravisse: visum tibi esse, cum in locis solis maestus errares, C. Marium cum fascibus laureatis quaerere ex te, quid tristis esses, cumque tu te patria vi pulsum esse dixisses, prehendisse eum dextram tuam et bono animo te iussisse esse lictorique proxumo tradidisse, ut te in monumentum suum deduceret, et dixisse in eo tibi salutem fore. Tum et se exclamasse Sallustius narrat reditum tibi celerem et gloriosum paratum, et te ipsum visum somnio delectari. Nam illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est, ut audivisses in monumento Marii de tuo reditu magnificentissumum illud senatus consultum esse factum referente optumo et clarissumo viro consule, idque frequentissimo theatro incredibili clamore et plausu comprobatum, dixisse te nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius. 1.61 At qui salubri et moderato cultu atque victu quieti se tradiderit ea parte animi, quae mentis et consilii est, agitata et erecta saturataque bonarum cogitationum epulis, eaque parte animi, quae voluptate alitur, nec inopia enecta nec satietate affluenti (quorum utrumque praestringere aciem mentis solet, sive deest naturae quippiam sive abundat atque affluit), illa etiam tertia parte animi, in qua irarum existit ardor, sedata atque restincta, tum eveniet duabus animi temerariis partibus compressis, ut illa tertia pars rationis et mentis eluceat et se vegetam ad somniandum acremque praebeat, tum ei visa quietis occurrent tranquilla atque veracia.” Haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi. 1.62 Epicurum igitur audiemus potius? Namque Carneades concertationis studio modo hoc, modo illud ait; ille, quod sentit; sentit autem nihil umquam elegans, nihil decorum. Hunc ergo antepones Platoni et Socrati? qui ut rationem non redderent, auctoritate tamen hos minutos philosophos vincerent. Iubet igitur Plato sic ad somnum proficisci corporibus adfectis, ut nihil sit, quod errorem animis perturbationemque adferat. Ex quo etiam Pythagoriis interdictum putatur, ne faba vescerentur, quod habet inflationem magnam is cibus tranquillitati mentis quaerenti vera contrariam. 1.63 Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. Itaque adpropinquante morte multo est divinior. Nam et id ipsum vident, qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero adfecti, instare mortem; itaque iis occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum, tumque vel maxume laudi student, eosque, qui secus, quam decuit, vixerunt, peccatorum suorum tum maxume paenitet. 1.64 Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somniare, uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus ae+r sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur. Idque, ut modo dixi, facilius evenit adpropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur. 1.65 Ex quo et illud est Callani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. Neque enim illud verbum temere consuetudo adprobavisset, si ea res nulla esset omnino: Praésagibat ánimus frustra me íre, cum exirém domo. Sagire enim sentire acute est; ex quo sagae anus, quia multa scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes. Is igitur, qui ante sagit, quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire.
1.72 in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. Haec inprobantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. Quorum alia sunt posita in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant et haruspicini et fulgurales et rituales libri, vestri etiam augurales, alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est, et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano inmolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret illum, ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret; id cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam florentissuma Samnitium castra cepit.
1.82 Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus, quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines aut, quid eventurum sit, ignorant aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire, quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus, quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt; at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea, quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt, (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus) neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscere; 1.83 non igitur sunt di nec significant futura; sunt autem di; significant ergo; et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent), nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio. 1.84 Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. Quid est igitur, cur dubitandum sit, quin sint ea, quae disputavi, verissima, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi philosophi, si poe+- tae, si sapientissimi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An, dum bestiae loquantur, exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus?
1.87 Dixi de Pythagora, de Democrito, de Socrate, excepi de antiquis praeter Xenophanem neminem, adiunxi veterem Academiam, Peripateticos, Stoicos; unus dissentit Epicurus. Quid vero hoc turpius, quam quod idem nullam censet gratuitam esse virtutem? Quis est autem, quem non moveat clarissumis monumentis testata consignataque antiquitas? Calchantem augurem scribit Homerus longe optumum, eumque ducem classium fuisse ad Ilium, auspiciorum credo scientia, non locorum.
1.109 Sed ut, unde huc digressa est, eodem redeat oratio: si nihil queam disputare, quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea, quae commemoravi, doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam? Quid, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? Quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. Adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque inpulsu deorum, cum, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, crebra animadversione perspectum est.
1.111 Rarum est quoddam genus eorum, qui se a corpore avocent et ad divinarum rerum cognitionem cura omni studioque rapiantur. Horum sunt auguria non divini impetus, sed rationis humanae; nam et natura futura praesentiunt, ut aquarum eluviones et deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum; alii autem in re publica exercitati, ut de Atheniensi Solone accepimus, orientem tyrannidem multo ante prospiciunt; quos prudentes possumus dicere, id est providentes, divinos nullo modo possumus, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui, ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, ante quam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio coe+misse dicitur.
1.117 Quo modo autem aut vates aut somniantes ea videant, quae nusquam etiam tunc sint, magna quaestio est. Sed explorata si sint ea, quae ante quaeri debeant, sint haec, quae quaerimus, faciliora. Continet enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum, quae a te secundo libro est explicata dilucide. Quam si obtinemus, stabit illud, quod hunc locum continet, de quo agimus, esse deos, et eorum providentia mundum administrari, eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec solum universis, verum etiam singulis. Haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non videntur posse convelli, profecto hominibus a dis futura significari necesse est.
1.118 Sed distinguendum videtur, quonam modo. Nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. Ea quibus bene percepta sunt, ii non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia. Hoc autem posito atque concesso, esse quandam vim divinam hominum vitam continentem, non difficile est, quae fieri certe videmus, ea qua ratione fiant, suspicari. Nam et ad hostiam deligendam potest dux esse vis quaedam sentiens, quae est toto confusa mundo, et tum ipsum, cum immolare velis, extorum fieri mutatio potest, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; parvis enim momentis multa natura aut adfingit aut mutat aut detrahit.
1.122 Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum saepe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod daimo/nion appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit numquam impellenti, saepe revocanti. Et Socrates quidem (quo quem auctorem meliorem quaerimus?) Xenophonti consulenti, sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quae ipsi videbantur: Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humanum est consilium; sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referundum, ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de maioribus rebus semper rettulerunt.
1.124 Illud tamen eius philosophi magnificum ac paene divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, aequissimo animo se dixit mori; neque enim domo egredienti neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, ascendenti signum sibi ullum, quod consuesset, a deo quasi mali alicuius inpendentis datum. Equidem sic arbitror, etiamsi multa fallant eos, qui aut arte aut coniectura divinare videantur, esse tamen divinationem; homines autem, ut in ceteris artibus, sic in hac posse falli. Potest accidere, ut aliquod signum dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum, potest aliquod latuisse aut ipsum, aut quod esset illi contrarium. Mihi autem ad hoc, de quo disputo, probandum satis est non modo plura, sed etiam pauciora divine praesensa et praedicta reperiri.
1.127 Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium. 1.128 Non est igitur, ut mirandum sit ea praesentiri a divitibus, quae nusquam sint; sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. Atque ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iis progignuntur, sic in causis conditae sunt res futurae, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit. Atque ut ii, qui solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus motusque cognorunt, quo quidque tempore eorum futurum sit, multo ante praedicunt, sic, qui cursum rerum eventorumque consequentiam diuturnitate pertractata notaverunt, aut semper aut, si id difficile est, plerumque, quodsi ne id quidem conceditur, non numquam certe, quid futurum sit, intellegunt. Atque haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio, ducuntur a fato.
2.13 Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis, quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus, quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris. Nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator?
2.26 Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae. Duo enim genera dividi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque, qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque, qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. 2.27 Illud autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. Duxisti autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. Sed tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: Hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror, testibus uti, qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis, iis praesertim, quibus mihi liceat non credere.
2.137 Quem enim tu Marium visum a me putas? Speciem, credo, eius et imaginem, ut Democrito videtur. Unde profectam imaginem? a corporibus enim solidis et a certis figuris vult fluere imagines; quod igitur Marii corpus erat? Ex eo, inquit, quod fuerat. Ista igitur me imago Marii in campum Atinatem persequebatur?—Plena sunt imaginum omnia; nulla enim species cogitari potest nisi pulsu imaginum.
2.146 At enim observatio diuturna (haec enim pars una restat) notandis rebus fecit artem. Ain tandem? somnia observari possunt? quonam modo? sunt enim innumerabiles varietates. Nihil tam praepostere, tam incondite, tam monstruose cogitari potest, quod non possimus somniare; quo modo igitur haec infinita et semper nova aut memoria conplecti aut observando notare possumus? Astrologi motus errantium stellarum notaverunt; inventus est enim ordo in iis stellis, qui non putabatur. Cedo tandem, qui sit ordo aut quae concursatio somniorum; quo modo autem distingui possunt vera somnia a falsis? cum eadem et aliis aliter evadant et isdem non semper eodem modo; ut mihi mirum videatur, cum mendaci homini ne verum quidem dicenti credere soleamus, quo modo isti, si somnium verum evasit aliquod, non ex multis potius uni fidem derogent quam ex uno innumerabilia confirment.' ' None | sup>
1.5 Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest.
1.5 We read in a history by Agathocles that Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, during his siege of Syracuse heard a voice in his sleep telling him that he would dine the next day in Syracuse. At daybreak the following day a serious conflict broke out in his camp between the troops of the Carthaginians and their allies, the Siculi. When the Syracusans saw this they made a sudden assault on the camp and carried Hamilcar off alive. Thus the event verified the dream.History is full of such instances, and so is everyday life. 1.6 Ah, it is objected, but many dreams are untrustworthy. Rather, perhaps, their meaning is hidden from us. But grant that some are untrustworthy, why do we declaim against those that trustworthy? The fact is the latter would be much more frequent if we went to our rest in proper condition. But when we are burdened with food and drink our dreams are troubled and confused. Observe what Socrates says in Platos Republic:When a man goes to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul languid and inert, but having that other portion, which has in it a certain brutishness and wild savagery, immoderately gorged with drink and food, then does that latter portion leap up and hurl itself about in sleep without check. In such a case every vision presented to the mind is so devoid of thought and reason that the sleeper dreams that he is committing incest with his mother, or that he is having unlawful commerce indiscriminately with gods and men, and frequently too, with beasts; or even that he is killing someone and staining his hands with impious bloodshed; and that he is doing many vile and hideous things recklessly and without shame. 1.6 The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics — much against their will I grant you — permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school?
1.11 Really, my dear Quintus, said I, I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.There is, I assure you, said he, nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature.
1.11 The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh. 1.12 Now — to mention those almost entirely dependent on art — what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or — to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination — the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? of these methods of divining it behoves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future. 7 Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve. 1.12 The Divine Will accomplishes like results in the case of birds, and causes those known as alites, which give omens by their flight, to fly hither and thither and disappear now here and now there, and causes those known as oscines, which give omens by their cries, to sing now on the left and now on the right. For if every animal moves its body forward, sideways, or backward at will, it bends, twists, extends, and contracts its members as it pleases, and performs these various motions almost mechanically; how much easier it is for such results to be accomplished by a god, whose divine will all things obey!
1.23 But what? You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you yourself see. Mere accidents, you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be an accident which bears upon itself every mark of truth? Four dice are cast and a Venus throw results — that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws? It is possible for paints flung at random on a canvasc to form the outlines of a face; but do you imagine that an accidental scattering of pigments could produce the beautiful portrait of Venus of Cos? Suppose that a hog should form the letter A on the ground with its snout; is that a reason for believing that it would write out Enniuss poem The Andromache?Carneades used to have a story that once in the Chian quarries when a stone was split open there appeared the head of the infant god Pan; I grant that the figure may have borne some resemblance to the god, but assuredly the resemblance was not such that you could ascribe the work to a Scopas. For it is undeniably true that no perfect imitation of a thing was ever made by chance. 14
1.25 It sometimes misleads perhaps, but none the less in most cases it guides us to the truth. For this same conjectural divination is the product of boundless eternity and within that period it has grown into an art through the repeated observation and record of almost countless instances in which the same results have been preceded by the same signs.15 Indeed how trustworthy were the auspices taken when you were augur! At the present time — pray pardon me for saying so — Roman augurs neglect auspices, although the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians hold them in high esteem.
1.29 For example, Publius Claudius, son of Appius Caecus, and his colleague Lucius Junius, lost very large fleets by going to sea when the auguries were adverse. The same fate befell Agamemnon; for, after the Greeks had begun toRaise aloft their frequent clamours, showing scorn of augurs art,Noise prevailed and not the omen: he then bade the ships depart.But why cite such ancient instances? We see what happened to Marcus Crassus when he ignored the announcement of unfavourable omens. It was on the charge of having on this occasion falsified the auspices that Gaius Ateius, an honourable man and a distinguished citizen, was, on insufficient evidence, stigmatized by the then censor Appius, who was your associate in the augural college, and an able one too, as I have often heard you say. I grant you that in pursuing the course he did Appius was within his rights as a censor, if, in his judgement, Ateius had announced a fraudulent augury. But he showed no capacity whatever as an augur in holding Ateius responsible for that awful disaster which befell the Roman people. Had this been the cause then the fault would not have been in Ateius, who made the announcement that the augury was unfavourable, but in Crassus, who disobeyed it; for the issue proved that the announcement was true, as this same augur and censor admits. But even if the augury had been false it could not have been the cause of the disaster; for unfavourable auguries — and the same may be said of auspices, omens, and all other signs — are not the causes of what follows: they merely foretell what will occur unless precautions are taken.
1.34 I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy — like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles — not oracles given by means of equalized lots — but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets.
1.39 But let us leave oracles and come to dreams. In his treatise on this subject Chrysippus, just as Antipater does, has assembled a mass of trivial dreams which he explains according to Antiphonsf rules of interpretation. The work, I admit, displays the acumen of its author, but it would have been better if he had cited illustrations of a more serious type. Now, Philistus, who was a learned and painstaking man and a contemporary of the times of which he writes, gives us the following story of the mother of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse: while she was with child and was carrying this same Dionysius in her womb, she dreamed that she had been delivered of an infant satyr. When she referred this dream to the interpreters of portents, who in Sicily were called Galeotae, they replied, so Philistus relates, that she should bring forth a son who would be very eminent in Greece and would enjoy a long and prosperous career. 1.41 And then I thought my father spoke these words:Great sorrows, daughter, thou must first endureUntil thy fortune from the Tiber rise.When this was said he suddenly withdrew;Nor did his cherished vision come again,Though oft I raised my hand to heavens domeAnd called aloud in tearful, pleading voice.Then sleep departing left me sick at heart. 21 1.42 This dream, I admit, is the fiction of a poets brain, yet it is not contrary to our experience with real dreams. It may well be that the following story of the dream which greatly disturbed Priams peace of mind is fiction too:When mother Hecuba was great with child,She dreamed that she brought forth a flaming torch.Alarmed at this, with sighing cares possessed,The king and father, Priam, to the godsDid make a sacrifice of bleating lambs.He, seeking peace and answer to the dream,Implored Apollos aid to understandWhat great events the vision did foretell,Apollos oracle, with voice divine,Then gave this explanation of the dream:Thy next-born son forbear to rear, for heWill be the death of Pergamos and Troy. 1.43 Grant, I repeat, that these dreams are myths and in the same category put Aeneass dream, related in the Greek annals of our countryman, Fabius Pictor. According to Pictor everything that Aeneas did or suffered turned out just as it had been predicted to him in a dream.22 But let us look at examples nearer our own times. Would you dare call that famous dream of Tarquin the Proud a myth? He describes it himself in the following lines from the Brutus of Accius: 1.44 At nights approach I sought my quiet couchTo soothe my weary limbs with restful sleep.Then in my dreams a shepherd near me droveA fleecy herd whose beauty was extreme.I chose two brother rams from out the flockAnd sacrificed the comelier of the twain.And then, with lowered horns, the other ramAttacked and bore me headlong to the ground.While there I lay outstretched and wounded sore,The sky a wondrous miracle disclosed:The blazing star of day reversed its courseAnd glided to the right by pathway new. 1.45 Now observe how the diviners interpreted this dream:It is not strange, O king, that dreams reflectThe days desires and thoughts, its sights and deeds,And everything we say or do awake.But in so grave a dream as yours we seeA message clearly sent, and thus it warns:Beware of him you deem bereft of witAnd rate no higher than a stupid ram,Lest he, with wisdom armed, should rise to fameAnd drive you from your throne. The suns changed courseUnto the state portends immediate change.And may that prove benigt to the state;For since the almighty orb from left to rightRevolved, it was the best of auguriesThat Rome would be supreme oer all the earth. 23 1.46 But come now and let us return to foreign instances. Heraclides Ponticus, a man of learning, and both a pupil and a disciple of Platos, relates a dream of the mother of Phalaris. She fell asleep and dreamed that, while looking at the consecrated images of the gods set up in her house, she saw the statue of Mercury pouring blood from a bowl which it held in its right hand and that the blood, as it touched the ground, welled up and completely filled the house. The truth of the dream was subsequently established by the inhuman cruelty of her son.Why need I bring forth from Dinons Persian annals the dreams of that famous prince, Cyrus, and their interpretations by the magi? But take this instance: Once upon a time Cyrus dreamed that the sun was at his feet. Three times, so Dinon writes, he vainly tried to grasp it and each time it turned away, escaped him, and finally disappeared. He was told by the magi, who are classed as wise and learned men among the Persians, that his grasping for the sun three times portended that he would reign for thirty years. And thus it happened; for he lived to his seventieth year, having begun to reign at forty. 1.47 It certainly must be true that even barbarians have some power of foreknowledge and of prophecy, if the following story of Callanus of India be true: As he was about to die and was ascending the funeral pyre, he said: What a glorious death! The fate of Hercules is mine. For when this mortal frame is burned the soul will find the light. When Alexander directed him to speak if he wished to say anything to him, he answered: Thank you, nothing, except that I shall see you very soon. So it turned out, for Alexander died in Babylon a few days later. I am getting slightly away from dreams, but I shall return to them in a moment. Everybody knows that on the same night in which Olympias was delivered of Alexander the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned, and that the magi began to cry out as day was breaking: Asias deadly curse was born last night. But enough of Indians and magi. 24 1.48 Let us go back to dreams. Coelius writes that Hannibal wished to carry off a golden column from Junos temple at Lacinium, but since he was in doubt whether it was solid or plated, he bored into it. Finding it solid he decided to take it away. But at night Juno came to him in a vision and warned him not to do so, threatening that if he did she would cause the loss of his good eye. That clever man did not neglect the warning. Moreover out of the gold filings he ordered an image of a calf to be made and placed on top of the column. 1.49 Another story of Hannibal is found in the history written in Greek by Silenus, whom Coelius follows, and who, by the way, was a very painstaking student of Hannibals career. After his capture of Saguntum Hannibal dreamed that Jupiter summoned him to a council of the gods. When he arrived Jupiter ordered him to carry the war into Italy, and gave him one of the divine council as a guide whom he employed when he being the march with his army. This guide cautioned Hannibal not to look back. But, carried away by curiosity, he could refrain no longer and looked back. Then he saw a horrible beast of enormous size, enveloped with snakes, and wherever it went it overthrew every tree and shrub and every house. In his amazement Hannibal asked what the monster was. The god replied that it was the desolation of Italy and ordered him to press right on and not to worry about what happened behind him and in the rear.
1.51 And yet let me cite another: the famous Publius Decius, son of Quintus, and the first of that family to become consul, was military tribune in the consulship of Marcus Valerius and Aulus Cornelius while our army was being hard pressed by the Samnites. When, because of his rushing too boldly into the dangers of battle, he was advised to be more cautious, he replied, according to the annals, I dreamed that by dying in the midst of the enemy I should win immortal fame. And though he was unharmed at that time and extricated the army from its difficulties, yet three years later, when consul, he devoted himself to death and rushed full-armed against the battle-line of the Latins. By this act of his the Latins were overcome and destroyed; and so glorious was his death that his son sought the same fate.
1.52 But let us come now, if you please, to the dreams of philosophers.25 We read in Plato that Socrates, while in prison, said in a conversation with his friend Crito: I am to die in three days; for in a dream I saw a woman of rare beauty, who called me by name and quoted this verse from Homer:Gladly on Phthias shore the third days dawn shall behold thee.And history informs us that his death occurred as he had foretold. That disciple of Socrates, Xenophon — and what a man he was! — records the dreams he had during his campaign with Cyrus the Younger, and their remarkable fulfilment. Shall we say that Xenophon is either a liar or a madman?
1.53 And Aristotle, who was endowed with a matchless and almost godlike intellect, — is he in error, or is he trying to lead others into error in the following account of his friend, Eudemus the Cyprian? Eudemus, while on his way to Macedonia, reached Pherae, then a very famous city of Thessaly, but groaning under the cruel sway of the tyrant, Alexander. There he became so violently ill that the physicians despaired of his recovery. While sick he had a dream in which a youth of striking beauty told him that he would speedily get well; that the despot Alexander would die in a few days, and that he himself would return home five years later. And so, indeed, the first two prophecies, as Aristotle writes, were immediately fulfilled by the recovery of Eudemus and by the death of the tyrant at the hands of his wifes brothers. But at the end of five years, when, in reliance upon the dream, he hoped to return to Cyprus from Sicily, he was killed in battle before Syracuse. Accordingly the dream was interpreted to mean that when his soul left the body it then had returned home.
1.54 To the testimony of philosophers let us add that of a most learned man and truly divine poet, Sophocles. A heavy gold dish having been stolen from the temple of Hercules, the god himself appeared to Sophocles in a dream and told who had committed the theft. But Sophocles ignored the dream a first and second time. When it came again and again, he went up to the Areopagus and laid the matter before the judges who ordered the man named by Sophocles to be arrested. The defendant after examination confessed his crime and brought back the dish. This is the reason why that temple is called the temple of Hercules the Informer. 26
1.55 But why am I dwelling on illustrations from Greek sources when — though I cant explain it — those from our own history please me more? Now here is a dream which is mentioned by all our historians, by the Fabii and the Gellii and, most recently, by Coelius: During the Latin War when the Great Votive Games were being celebrated for the first time the city was suddenly called to arms and the games were interrupted. Later it was determined to repeat them, but before they began, and while the people were taking their seats, a slave bearing a yoke was led about the circus and beaten with rods. After that a Roman rustic had a dream in which someone appeared to him and said that he disapproved of the leader of the games and ordered this statement to be reported to the Senate. But the rustic dared not do as he was bid. The order was repeated by the spectre with a warning not to put his power to the test. Not even then did the rustic dare obey. After that his son died and the same vision was repeated the third time. Thereupon he became ill and told his friends of his dream. On their advice he was carried to the Senate-house on a litter and, having related his dream to the Senate, his health was restored and he walked home unaided. And so, the tradition is, the Senate gave credence to the dream and had the games repeated.
1.56 According to this same Coelius, Gaius Gracchus told many persons that his brother Tiberius came to him in a dream when he was a candidate for the quaestorship and said: However much you may try to defer your fate, nevertheless you must die the same death that I did. This happened before Gaius was tribune of the people, and Coelius writes that he himself heard it from Gaius who had repeated it to many others. Can you find anything better authenticated than this dream?27 And who, pray, can make light of the two following dreams which are so often recounted by Stoic writers? The first one is about Simonides, who once saw the dead body of some unknown man lying exposed and buried it. Later, when he had it in mind to go on board a ship he was warned in a vision by the person to whom he had given burial not to do so and that if he did he would perish in a shipwreck. Therefore he turned back and all the others who sailed were lost.
1.57 The second dream is very well known and is to this effect: Two friends from Arcadia who were taking a journey together came to Megara, and one traveller put up at an inn and the second went to the home of a friend. After they had eaten supper and retired, the second traveller, in the dead of the night, dreamed that his companion was imploring him to come to his aid, as the innkeeper was planning to kill him. Greatly frightened at first by the dream he arose, and later, regaining his composure, decided that there was nothing to worry about and went back to bed. When he had gone to sleep the same person appeared to him and said: Since you would not help me when I was alive, I beg that you will not allow my dead body to remain unburied. I have been killed by the innkeeper, who has thrown my body into a cart and covered it with dung. I pray you to be at the city gate in the morning before the cart leaves the town, Thoroughly convinced by the second dream he met the cart-driver at the gate in the morning, and, when he asked what he had in the cart, the driver fled in terror. The Arcadian then removed his friends dead body from the cart, made complaint of the crime to the authorities, and the innkeeper was punished.28 What stronger proof of a divinely inspired dream than this can be given?
1.58 But why go on seeking illustrations from ancient history? I had a dream which I have often related to you, and you one which you have often told to me. When I was governor of Asia I dreamed that I saw you on horseback riding toward the bank of some large river, when you suddenly plunged forward, fell into the stream, and wholly disappeared from sight. I was greatly alarmed and trembled with fear. But in a moment you reappeared mounted on the same horse, and with a cheerful countece ascended the opposite bank where we met and embraced each other. The meaning of the dream was readily explained to me by experts in Asia who from it predicted those events which subsequent occurred.
1.59 I come now to your dream. I heard it, of course, from you, but more frequently from our Sallustius. In the course of your banishment, which was glorious for us but disastrous to the State, you stopped for the night at a certain country-house in the plain of Atina. After lying awake most of the night, finally, about daybreak, you fell into a very profound sleep. And though your journey was pressing, yet Sallustius gave instructions to maintain quiet and would not permit you to be disturbed. But you awoke about the second hour and related your dream to him. In it you seemed to be wandering sadly about in solitary places when Gaius Marius, with his fasces wreathed in laurel, asked you why you were sad, and you replied that you had been driven from your country by violence. He then bade you be of good cheer, took you by the right hand, and delivered you to the nearest lictor to be conducted to his memorial temple, saying that there you should find safety. Sallustius thereupon, as he relates, cried out, a speedy and a glorious return awaits you. He further states that you too seemed delighted at the dream. Immediately thereafter it was reported to me that as soon as you heard that it was in Marius temple that the glorious decree of the Senate for your recall had been enacted on motion of the consul, a most worthy and most eminent man, and that the decree had been greeted by unprecedented shouts of approval in a densely crowded theatre, you said that no stronger proof could be given of a divinely inspired dream than this. 29 1.61 But, on the other hand, when the man, whose habits of living and of eating are wholesome and temperate, surrenders himself to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul eager and erect, and satisfied by a feast of noble thoughts, and having that portion which feeds on carnal pleasures neither utterly exhausted by abstinence nor cloyed by over-indulgence — for, as a rule, the edge of thought is dulled whether nature is starved or overfed — and, when such a man, in addition, has that third portion of the soul, in which the fire of anger burns, quieted and subdued — thus having the two irrational portions under complete control — then will the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul shine forth and show itself keen and strong for dreaming and then will his dreams be peaceful and worthy of trust. I have reproduced Platos very words. 30 1.62 Then shall we listen to Epicurus rather than to Plato? As for Carneades, in his ardour for controversy he asserts this and now that. But, you retort, Epicurus says what he thinks. But he thinks nothing that is ever well reasoned, or worthy of a philosopher. Will you, then, put this man before Plato or Socrates, who though they gave no reason, would yet prevail over these petty philosophers by the mere weight of their name? Now Platos advice to us is to set out for the land of dreams with bodies so prepared that no error or confusion may assail the soul. For this reason, it is thought, the Pythagoreans were forbidden to indulge in beans; for that food produces great flatulence and induces a condition at war with a soul in search for truth. 1.63 When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins. 1.64 Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future. 1.65 This is illustrated by the story which I related about Callanus and by Homers account of Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the early death of Achilles.31 It is clear that, in our ordinary speech, we should not have made such frequent use of the word praesagire, meaning to sense in advance, or to presage, if the power of presaging had been wholly non-existent. An illustration of its use is seen in the following well-known line from Plautus:My soul presaged as I left home that my leaving was in vain.Now sagire means to have a keen perception. Accordingly certain old women are called sagae, because they are assumed to know a great deal, and dogs are said to be sagacious. And so one who has knowledge of a thing before it happens is said to presage, that is, to perceive the future in advance.
1.72 But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola.
1.82 The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; 1.83 therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs — otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination. 39 1.84 Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same reasoning. Then what ground is there to doubt the absolute truth of my position? For I have on my side reason, facts, peoples, and races, both Greek and barbarian, our own ancestors, the unvarying belief of all ages, the greatest philosophers, the poets, the wisest men, the builders of cities, and the founders of republics. Are we not satisfied with the uimous judgement of men, and do we wait for beasts to give their testimony too?
1.87 I have already cited Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates and, of the ancients, I have excluded no one except Xenophanes. To them I have added the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. The only dissenter is Epicurus. But why wonder at that? for is his opinion of divination any more discreditable than his view that there is no such thing as a disinterested virtue?40 But is there a man anywhere who is uninfluenced by clear and unimpeachable records signed and sealed by the hand of Time? For example, Homer writes that Calchas was by far the best augur among the Greeks and that he commanded the Greek fleet before Troy. His command of the fleet I suppose was due to his skill as an augur and not to his skill in seamanship.
1.109 But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event.
1.111 However, there is a certain class of men, though small in number, who withdraw themselves from carnal influences and are wholly possessed by an ardent concern for the contemplation of things divine. Some of these men make predictions, not as the result of direct heavenly inspiration, but by the use of their own reason. For example, by means of natural law, they foretell certain events, such as a flood, or the future destruction of heaven and earth by fire. Others, who are engaged in public life, like Solon of Athens, as history describes him, discover the rise of tyranny long in advance. Such men we may call foresighted — that is, able to foresee the future; but we can no more apply the term divine to them than we can apply it to Thales of Miletus, who, as the story goes, in order to confound his critics and thereby show that even a philosopher, if he sees fit, can make money, bought up the entire olive crop in the district of Miletus before it had begun to bloom.
1.117 Now there is a great problem as to how prophets and dreamers can see things, which, at the time, have no actual existence anywhere. But that question would be solved quite readily if we were to investigate certain other questions which demand consideration first. For the theory in regard to the nature of the gods, so clearly developed in the second book of your work on that subject, includes this whole question. If we maintain that theory we shall establish the very point which I am trying to make: namely, that there are gods; that they rule the universe by their foresight; and that they direct the affairs of men — not merely of men in the mass, but of each individual. If we succeed in holding that position — and for my part I think it impregnable — then surely it must follow that the gods give to men signs of coming events. 52
1.118 But it seems necessary to settle the principle on which these signs depend. For, according to the Stoic doctrine, the gods are not directly responsible for every fissure in the liver or for every song of a bird; since, manifestly, that would not be seemly or proper in a god and furthermore is impossible. But, in the beginning, the universe was so created that certain results would be preceded by certain signs, which are given sometimes by entrails and by birds, sometimes by lightnings, by portents, and by stars, sometimes by dreams, and sometimes by utterances of persons in a frenzy. And these signs do not often deceive the persons who observe them properly. If prophecies, based on erroneous deductions and interpretations, turn out to be false, the fault is not chargeable to the signs but to the lack of skill in the interpreters.Assuming the proposition to be conceded that there is a divine power which pervades the lives of men, it is not hard to understand the principle directing those premonitory signs which we see come to pass. For it may be that the choice of a sacrificial victim is guided by an intelligent force, which is diffused throughout the universe; or, it may be that at the moment when the sacrifice is offered, a change in the vitals occurs and something is added or taken away; for many things are added to, changed, or diminished in an instant of time.
1.122 It is the purity of soul, no doubt, that explains that famous utterance which history attributes to Socrates and which his disciples in their books often represent him as repeating: There is some divine influence — δαιμόνιον, he called it — which I always obey, though it never urges me on, but often holds me back. And it was the same Socrates — and what better authority can we quote? — who was consulted by Xenophon as to whether he should join Cyrus. Socrates, after stating what seemed to him the best thing to do, remarked: But my opinion is only that of a man. In matters of doubt and perplexity I advise that Apollos oracle be consulted. This oracle was always consulted by the Athenians in regard to the more serious public questions.
1.124 However, the following utterance of that philosopher, made after he had been wickedly condemned to death, is a noble one — I might almost call it divine: I am very content to die, he said; for neither when I left my home nor when I mounted the platform to plead my cause, did the god give any sign, and this he always does when some evil threatens me.55 And so my opinion is that the power of divination exists, notwithstanding the fact that those who prophesy by means of art and conjecture are oftentimes mistaken. I believe that, just as men may make mistakes in other callings, so they may in this. It may happen that a sign of doubtful meaning is assumed to be certain or, possibly, either a sign was itself unobserved or one that annulled an observed sign may have gone unnoticed. But, in order to establish the proposition for which I contend it is enough for me to find, not many, but even a few instances of divinely inspired prevision and prophecy.
1.127 Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena. 1.128 Therefore it is not strange that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all things are, though, from the standpoint of time, they are not present. As in seeds there inheres the germ of those things which the seeds produce, so in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture, or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy, or when it is set free by sleep. Persons familiar with the rising, setting, and revolutions of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies, can tell long in advance where any one of these bodies will be at a given time. And the same thing may be said of men who, for a long period of time, have studied and noted the course of facts and the connexion of events, for they always know what the future will be; or, if that is putting it too strongly, they know in a majority of cases; or, if that will not be conceded either, then, surely, they sometimes know what the future will be. These and a few other arguments of the same kind for the existence of divination are derived from Fate. 57
2.13 But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of things which happen by chance. Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade?
2.13 Chrysippus, indeed, defines divination in these words: The power to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods. Its duty, he goes on to say, is to know in advance the disposition of the gods towards men, the manner in which that disposition is shown and by what means the gods may be propitiated and their threatened ills averted. And this same philosopher defines the interpretation of dreams thus: It is the power to understand and explain the visions sent by the gods to men in sleep. Then, if that be true, will just ordinary shrewdness meet these requirements, or rather is there not need of surpassing intelligence and absolutely perfect learning? But I have never seen such a man. 64
2.26 But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument.11 You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. The artificial, you said, consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself — that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out. Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed. 2.27 Natural divination, on the other hand, according to your view, is the result — the effusion, as it were — of mental excitement, or it is the prophetic power which the soul has during sleep while free from bodily sensation and worldly cares. Moreover, you derived every form of divination from three sources — God, Fate, and Nature. And although you could not give a reason for any kind of divination, still you carried on the war by marshalling an astonishing array of examples from fiction. of such a course I wish to say emphatically that it is not becoming in a philosopher to introduce testimony which may be either true by accident, or false and fabricated through malice. You ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so‑called occurrences — certainly not to such occurrences as are unworthy of belief. 12
2.137 Now what Marius do you think it was I saw? His likeness or phantom, I suppose — at least that is what Democritus thinks. Whence did the phantom come? He would have it that phantoms emanate from material bodies and from actual forms. Then, it was the body of Marius from which my phantom came? No, says Democritus, but from his body that was. So that phantom of Marius was pursuing me to the plains of Atina? Oh, but the universe is full of phantoms; no picture of anything can be formed in the mind except as the result of the impact of phantoms.
2.146 In our consideration of dreams we come now to the remaining point left for discussion, which is your contention that by long-continued observation of dreams and by recording the results an art has been evolved. Really? Then, it is possible, I suppose, to observe dreams? If so, how? For they are of infinite variety and there is no imaginable thing too absurd, too involved, or too abnormal for us to dream about it. How, then, is it possible for us either to remember this countless and ever-changing mass of visions or to observe and record the subsequent results? Astronomers have recorded the movements of the planets and thereby have discovered an orderly course of the stars, not thought of before. But tell me, if you can, what is the orderly course of dreams and what is the harmonious relation between them and subsequent events? And by what means can the true be distinguished from the false, in view of the fact that the same dreams have certain consequences for one person and different consequences for another and seeing also that even for the same individual the same dream is not always followed by the same result? As a rule we do not believe a liar even when he tells the truth, but, to my surprise, if one dream turns out to be true, your Stoics do not withdraw their belief in the prophetic value of that one though it is only one out of many; rather, from the character of the one true dream, they establish the character of countless others that are false.' ' None |
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57. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.29, 1.37, 2.9, 2.75, 3.16-3.23, 3.50-3.51, 3.58, 3.62-3.64, 3.68, 3.71, 3.73-3.75, 4.14, 5.24-5.26, 5.34-5.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Natural and necessary emotions • Cicero, And law of nature • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Epicurus, on nature and the self • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Natural, necessary, Desire • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Nature/nature • Order (τάξις), natural (ordo rerum) • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Posidonius, Stoic, Different virtues and natures cultivated corresponding to different capacities • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • accordance with nature, • human nature, • ingenium = Gr. euphyia (a good natural endowment) • law of nature, and wise man • law of nature, transcended written law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • life (or living) according to nature (Lat. secundum naturam vivere = Gr. kata physin zēn) • nature • nature, • nature, and value • nature, cosmic • nature, first things according to (Lat. prima secundum naturam/prima naturae = Gr. prōta kata physin) • nature, human • nature, individual or peculiar • nature, life according to • nature, of human beings • nature, species-specific • virtue, natural • wise man, and law of nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 168, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 229; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 28, 187, 331, 348; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 24, 26; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 34, 95; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97, 201; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 50, 62, 78, 87, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 111, 121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 131, 136, 175, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 229; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 40, 42, 52, 53, 55, 63
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2.9 \xa0"He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I\xa0have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I\xa0said, "as for the formula \'freedom from pain,\' I\xa0will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that \'freedom from pain\' does not mean the same as \'pleasure.\'\xa0" "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said\xa0I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst is a \'static\' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a \'kinetic\' pleasure." "Why then," I\xa0asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" <
2.75 \xa0"But let us grant your position. The actual word \'pleasure\' has not a lofty sound; and perhaps we do not understand its significance: you are always repeating that we do not understand what you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult or recondite notion! If we understand you when you talk of \'indivisible atoms\' and \'cosmic interspaces,\' things that don\'t exist and never can exist, is our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow? What if I\xa0force you to admit that I\xa0do know not only what pleasure really is (it is an agreeable activity of the sense), but also what you mean by it? For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I\xa0have just defined, and this you entitle \'kinetic\' pleasure, as producing a definite change of feeling, but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, which is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists merely in the complete absence of pain; this you call \'static\' pleasure. <
3.16 \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17 \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.18 \xa0The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock\'s tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) < 3.19 \xa0All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am\xa0I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I\xa0rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A\xa0man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly." < 3.20 \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "3.21 \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" "3.22 \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" '3.23 \xa0"Again, as all \'appropriate acts\' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ\x93, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. <
3.50 \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <' "3.51 \xa0Again among things valuable â\x80\x94 e.g.\xa0health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â\x80\x94 they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄ\x93gmena and the opposite, apoproÄ\x93gmena â\x80\x94 for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. <" 3.58 \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. <
3.62 \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63 \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '3.64 \xa0"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâ\x80\x91abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. <
3.68 \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <' "
3.71 \xa0Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. <" 3.73 \xa0"The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to \'obey occasion,\' \'follow God,\' \'know thyself,\' and \'moderation in all things.\' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature\'s secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. < 3.74 \xa0"However I\xa0begin to perceive that I\xa0have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I\xa0set before me. The fact is that I\xa0have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. < 3.75 \xa0"Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a\xa0better right to the name of \'Master of the People\' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a\xa0better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man\'s authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. <
4.14 \xa0"But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics\' conception of this \'End of Goods,\' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I\xa0also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being \'to live in accordance with nature.\' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, \'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.\' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno\'s, being an explanation of your phrase \'to live in agreement with nature.\' <
5.24 \xa0"Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. < 5.25 \xa0At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. < 5.26 \xa0Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a\xa0number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. <
5.34 \xa0"Having made it sufficiently clear that self-love is an instinct of nature, we must next examine what is the nature of man; for it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the mind plays the more important part and the body the less. Next we further observe both that man\'s body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the domit factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man\'s nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. In fact the faculties of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind. Moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them. < 5.35 \xa0"It is manifest how well the parts of our body, and its entire shape, form and attitude are adapted to our nature; and that special conformation of the brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate to man can be recognized without hesitation by the understanding. But of course it is necessary that these organs should be healthy and vigorous and possessed of their natural motions and uses; no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled â\x80\x94 this is a requirement of nature. Again, there is also a certain form of bodily activity which keeps the motions and postures in harmony with nature; and any error in these, due to distortion or abnormality of movement or posture, â\x80\x94 for example, if a man were to walk on his hands, or backwards instead of forwards, â\x80\x94 would make a man appear alienated from himself, as if he had stripped off his proper humanity and hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are contrary to nature, and though really arising from a defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perversion of man\'s nature. < 5.36 \xa0And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body has the appearance of being in harmony with nature. "Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving sensible objects. \xa0The mind, on the other hand, and that domit part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called nonâ\x80\x91volitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled \'virtues\' in the more special sense; and the latter are the preâ\x80\x91eminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of \'talent,\' and their possessors are spoken of as \'talented.\' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind. < 5.37 \xa0"Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man\'s nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. <' "5.38 \xa0From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâ\x80\x91volitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I\xa0think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. <" ' None |
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58. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29, 1.37, 2.9-2.10, 2.75, 3.16-3.24, 3.50-3.51, 3.58-3.64, 3.66, 3.68, 3.71, 3.73-3.75, 4.14, 5.2, 5.24-5.26, 5.34-5.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Natural and necessary emotions • Cicero, And law of nature • Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Epicurus, on nature and the self • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Natural, necessary, Desire • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Nature/nature • Order (τάξις), natural (ordo rerum) • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Posidonius, Stoic, Different virtues and natures cultivated corresponding to different capacities • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • accordance with nature, • children, and natural law • congressus naturalis (natural sociability) • human nature, • human nature, innate orientations • human nature, intellectual and moral development • human nature, social instinct • ingenium = Gr. euphyia (a good natural endowment) • law of nature, and wise man • law of nature, transcended written law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • life (or living) according to nature (Lat. secundum naturam vivere = Gr. kata physin zēn) • marriage, and natural law • myth, nature of • nature • nature, • nature, according to • nature, and value • nature, cosmic • nature, first things according to (Lat. prima secundum naturam/prima naturae = Gr. prōta kata physin) • nature, human • nature, individual or peculiar • nature, life according to • nature, living in accordance with • nature, of human beings • nature, species-specific • rationality, and human nature • reproduction, and natural law • virtue, natural • wise man, and law of nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 168, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 229; Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 123; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 177; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 159, 175, 176, 248; Hawes (2021), Pausanias in the World of Greek Myth, 22; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 80; Hug (2023), Fertility, Ideology, and the Cultural Politics of Reproduction at Rome, 12; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 28, 187, 331, 348; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 283; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 24, 26; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 34, 95; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97, 201; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 48, 50, 62, 78, 87, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 111, 121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 131, 136, 175, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 229; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 40, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021), The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 103
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2.9 Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 ) difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem?" '2.10 Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere?' "
2.75 Verum esto: verbum ipsum voluptatis non habet dignitatem, nec nos fortasse intellegimus. hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos quam dicatis voluptatem. rem videlicet videlicet P. Man. vides difficilem et obscuram! individua cum dicitis et intermundia, quae nec sunt ulla nec possunt esse, intellegimus, voluptas, quae passeribus omnibus nota est, nota est omnibus A a nobis intellegi non potest? quid, si efficio ut fateare me non modo quid sit voluptas scire—est enim iucundus motus in sensu—, sed etiam quid eam tu velis velis tu eam BE esse? tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, dixi ego BE et nomen inponis, in motu ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem, tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, quo quo ARN qua BE cui V Mdv. ('quo et qua orta puto ex quoi') addi nihil possit; eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit; eam stabilem appellas." "
3.16 Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo." '3.17 in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.18 artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum cum ABE tum N (t corr. ut vid., ex c), RV quia sit in iis iis Mdv. his aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint sunt R contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, ut ea et ea BE quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam etiam a medicis R disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. 3.19 Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri.' "3.20 Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici." '3.21 prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.22 cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.23 Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.24 ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.
3.50 quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE' "3.51 quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere." 3.58 Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59 Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60 Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61 nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.62 Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63 ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64 mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum.
3.66 itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, ii edd. hi qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles viles NV cules A eules R civiles BE neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus.
3.68 Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.
3.71 Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, natura P. Man., Lamb. naturam alienumque alienumque V et ( corr. priore u ab alt. m. ) N alienamque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare sociare BE aut coniungere iniuriam, gravissimeque et gravissime et BE verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum vicissimque, quicquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore.
3.73 physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum' "3.74 Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me rerum me R me rerum BE rerum ANV traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum coagmentatum ed. princ. Colon. cocicmentatum A cociom tatū R coaugmentatum BEN coagumentatum V inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ut si ' aliquis apud Bentl. ' Mdv. ut non si ABERN aut non si V ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod quod BE quo moveri possit." '3.75 quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit;
4.14 Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere.
5.2 tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina.
5.24 Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime.
5.25 Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV' "
5.26 quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente." "
5.34 Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit hominis natura. id est enim, de quo quaerimus. atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque que om. B ita constitutum, aliis ... constitutum om. E ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. iam iam (' aptius scriberetur : iam quae cet. ') Mdv. nam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. itaque ab his ordiamur." '5.35 Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet, neque est dubium, quin frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint sint Lamb. ( in curis secundis ); sunt hominis intellegatur. sed certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit; id enim natura desiderat. est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis, quae motus et status naturae congruentis tenet; in quibus si peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam aut aut ac BE motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante, sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem ex homine exuens ex homine exuens RN 2 V exuens ( om. ex homine) N 1 exuens ex homine BE naturam odisse videatur. quam ob rem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut, etiamsi animi vitio id eveniat, tamen in corpore immutari mutari BE hominis natura videatur. 5.36 itaque e contrario moderati aequabilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti esse ad naturam videntur. Iam vero animus non esse solum, sed etiam cuiusdam modi cuiusdam modi cuiusmodi BE debet esse, ut et omnis partis suas habeat incolumis et de virtutibus nulla desit. atque atque BE atqui NV at qui R in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis, quae subiectae sunt sensibus. animi autem et eius animi partis, quae princeps est, quaeque mens nominatur, plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum earum, quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum autem earum, quae in voluntate positae magis proprio proprio proprie eo Dav. nomine appellari solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine, easque virtutes qui habent, ingeniosi vocantur. alterum autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum, quas appellamus voluntarias, ut ut N 2 et prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas eiusdem generis. generis eiusdem BE Et summatim quidem haec erant de corpore animoque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est quid quid NV quod hominis natura postulet. 5.37 ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.38 Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant.' " None | sup>
2.9 \xa0"He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I\xa0have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I\xa0said, "as for the formula \'freedom from pain,\' I\xa0will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that \'freedom from pain\' does not mean the same as \'pleasure.\'\xa0" "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said\xa0I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst is a \'static\' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a \'kinetic\' pleasure." "Why then," I\xa0asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" < 2.10 \xa0"Do you not remember," he replied, "what I\xa0said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I\xa0remember," said\xa0I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. \'Variation\' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a\xa0number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a\xa0number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I\xa0could understand the term, just as I\xa0understand it without your speaking of it. But I\xa0cannot quite grasp what you mean by \'variation\' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or \'kinetic\' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain â\x80\x94 although why you should call this \'pleasure\' I\xa0cannot\xa0make out." <
2.75 \xa0"But let us grant your position. The actual word \'pleasure\' has not a lofty sound; and perhaps we do not understand its significance: you are always repeating that we do not understand what you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult or recondite notion! If we understand you when you talk of \'indivisible atoms\' and \'cosmic interspaces,\' things that don\'t exist and never can exist, is our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow? What if I\xa0force you to admit that I\xa0do know not only what pleasure really is (it is an agreeable activity of the sense), but also what you mean by it? For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I\xa0have just defined, and this you entitle \'kinetic\' pleasure, as producing a definite change of feeling, but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, which is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists merely in the complete absence of pain; this you call \'static\' pleasure. <
3.16 \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17 \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.18 \xa0The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock\'s tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) < 3.19 \xa0All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am\xa0I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I\xa0rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A\xa0man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly." < 3.20 \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "3.21 \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" "3.22 \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" '3.23 \xa0"Again, as all \'appropriate acts\' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ\x93, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. <' "3.24 \xa0For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthÅ\x8dmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. <" 3.50 \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <' "3.51 \xa0Again among things valuable â\x80\x94 e.g.\xa0health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â\x80\x94 they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄ\x93gmena and the opposite, apoproÄ\x93gmena â\x80\x94 for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. <" 3.58 \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59 \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <' "3.60 \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" '3.61 \xa0For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. < 3.62 \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63 \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '3.64 \xa0"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâ\x80\x91abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. <
3.66 \xa0Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. <
3.68 \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <' "
3.71 \xa0Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. <" 3.73 \xa0"The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to \'obey occasion,\' \'follow God,\' \'know thyself,\' and \'moderation in all things.\' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature\'s secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. < 3.74 \xa0"However I\xa0begin to perceive that I\xa0have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I\xa0set before me. The fact is that I\xa0have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. < 3.75 \xa0"Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a\xa0better right to the name of \'Master of the People\' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a\xa0better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man\'s authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. <
4.14 \xa0"But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics\' conception of this \'End of Goods,\' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I\xa0also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being \'to live in accordance with nature.\' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, \'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.\' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno\'s, being an explanation of your phrase \'to live in agreement with nature.\' <
5.2 \xa0Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I\xa0can\'t say; but one\'s emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I\xa0am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates\' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I\xa0mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." <
5.24 \xa0"Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. <
5.25 \xa0At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. <
5.26 \xa0Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a\xa0number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. <
5.34 \xa0"Having made it sufficiently clear that self-love is an instinct of nature, we must next examine what is the nature of man; for it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the mind plays the more important part and the body the less. Next we further observe both that man\'s body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the domit factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man\'s nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. In fact the faculties of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind. Moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them. < 5.35 \xa0"It is manifest how well the parts of our body, and its entire shape, form and attitude are adapted to our nature; and that special conformation of the brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate to man can be recognized without hesitation by the understanding. But of course it is necessary that these organs should be healthy and vigorous and possessed of their natural motions and uses; no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled â\x80\x94 this is a requirement of nature. Again, there is also a certain form of bodily activity which keeps the motions and postures in harmony with nature; and any error in these, due to distortion or abnormality of movement or posture, â\x80\x94 for example, if a man were to walk on his hands, or backwards instead of forwards, â\x80\x94 would make a man appear alienated from himself, as if he had stripped off his proper humanity and hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are contrary to nature, and though really arising from a defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perversion of man\'s nature. < 5.36 \xa0And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body has the appearance of being in harmony with nature. "Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving sensible objects. \xa0The mind, on the other hand, and that domit part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called nonâ\x80\x91volitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled \'virtues\' in the more special sense; and the latter are the preâ\x80\x91eminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of \'talent,\' and their possessors are spoken of as \'talented.\' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind. < 5.37 \xa0"Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man\'s nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. <' "5.38 \xa0From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâ\x80\x91volitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I\xa0think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. <" ' None |
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59. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, On Nature • Cicero, And law of nature • Cicero, De natura deorum • Cicero, Marcus Tullius, De natura deorum • Cicero, Marcus Tullius, On the Nature of the Gods • Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods • Cicero, timelessness and the now, in On the Nature of the Gods • Cleanthes, level in the hierarchy of cosmic nature • Cotta (character in De natura deorum), • De natura deorum (Cicero) • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Epicurus, on nature and the self • Human nature • Lucretius, laws of nature in • Natural philosophy, natural philosophers • Nature • Nature, importance in Roman culture • Scala naturae • Socrates, and natural philosophical tradition • Stoicism/Stoics, attitudes to natural disaster • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • Superstition, supra-confessional nature • Xenophon, on Socrates and natural philosophy • craftsman, nature as • death, nature of • divisions on scala naturae • expertise (Lat. ars = Gr. technē), imitates nature • hierarchy, of being (scala naturae) • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and common law • law of nature, and wise man • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, transcended written law • law, as the force pervading cosmic nature • logical divisions on scala naturae • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natural philosophy, Socrates and prior tradition • nature • nature, and prodigies • nature, and virtue • nature, as craftsman • nature, as level in the hierarchy of cosmic nature • nature, laws of • nature, living in accordance with • nature, of things • numinousness, of nature • physis, as nature of things and persons • scala naturae, humans placed on • scala naturae, in Stoic cosmology • virtue, and nature • wise man, and law of nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 117, 126; Bickerman and Tropper (2007), Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 934; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 73, 174; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 225, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 240; Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 101, 102, 105, 121, 122, 128, 158; Davies (2004), Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on their Gods, 82; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 59; Engberg-Pedersen (2010), Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit, 19, 20; Ferrándiz (2022), Shipwrecks, Legal Landscapes and Mediterranean Paradigms: Gone Under Sea, 109, 118; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 86, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106; Gale (2000), Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition, 203; Gee (2013), Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition, 70, 71, 72, 73, 93, 94, 178; Goldhill (2022), The Christian Invention of Time: Temporality and the Literature of Late Antiquity, 169; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 27; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 57; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 88; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 228, 259; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 114, 116, 123, 133, 151; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 253, 254; Konig (2022), The Folds of Olympus: Mountains in Ancient Greek and Roman Culture, 104; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 117, 130, 157, 210, 240, 270; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 78; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 222; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 37; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 18, 23, 26, 71; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 168; Struck (2016), Divination and Human Nature: A Cognitive History of Intuition in Classical Antiquity, 194, 195; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 185, 195; Volk and Williams (2006), Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics, 190; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 225, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 240; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 56
| 1.18 Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato\'s Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render \'Providence\') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19 What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; ' "1.20 but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? " '1.21 Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? for though the world did not exist, it does not follow that ages did not exist — meaning by ages, not periods made up of a number of days and nights in annual courses, for ages in this sense I admit could not have been produced without the circular motion of the firmament; but from the infinite past there has existed an eternity not measured by limited divisions of time, but of a nature intelligible in terms of extension; since it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. 1.22 Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. ' "1.23 Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; " "1.24 for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. " '1.26 Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.30 The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31 Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32 Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.36 "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. ' "1.37 Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. " '1.38 Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39 Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.43 With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some \'preconception\' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus\'s Rule or Standard of Judgement. ' "1.44 You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) " '1.45 We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that \'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.\' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man\'s pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.46 "For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the same pronouncement. 1.47 For it seems appropriate that the being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on the beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. 1.48 But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. 1.49 Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood. "These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind\'s eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our minds with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal. ' "1.60 Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. " '1.61 But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? \'It is difficult to deny their existence.\' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 1.71 "He does the same as regards the nature of the gods. In his desire to avoid the assumption of a dense cluster of atoms, which would involve the possibility of destruction and dissipation, he says that the gods have not a body but a semblance of body, and not blood but a semblance of blood. It is thought surprising that an augur can see an augur without smiling; but it is more surprising that you Epicureans keep a grave face when by yourselves. \'It is not body but a semblance of body.\' I could understand what this supposition meant if it related to waxen images or figures of earthenware, but what \'a semblance of body\' or \'a semblance of blood\' may mean in the case of god, I cannot understand; nor can you either, Velleius, only you won\'t admit it. 1.74 "As to your formula \'a semblance of body\' and \'a semblance of blood,\' what meaning do you attach to it? That you have a better knowledge of the matter than I have I freely admit, and what is more, am quite content that this should be so; but once it is expressed in words, why should one of us be able to understand it and not the other? Well then, I do understand what body is and what blood is, but what \'a semblance of body\' and \'a semblance of blood\' are I don\'t understand in the very least. You are not trying to hide the truth from me, as Pythagoras used to hide it from strangers, nor yet are you speaking obscurely on purpose like Heraclitus, but (to speak candidly between ourselves) you don\'t understand it yourself any more than I do. ' "1.85 Well then, if the gods do not possess the appearance of men, as I have proved, nor some such form as that of the heavenly bodies, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny their existence? You do not dare to. Well, that is no doubt wise — although in this matter it is not the public that you fear, but the gods themselves: I personally am acquainted with Epicureans who worship every paltry image, albeit I am aware that according to some people's view Epicurus really abolished the gods, but nominally retained them in order not to offend the people of Athens. Thus the first of his selected aphorisms or maxims, which you call the Kyriai Doxai, runs, I believe, thus: That which is blessed and immortal neither experiences trouble nor causes it to anyone. Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional, though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly; their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind. " '1.100 "Then you censured those who argued from the splendour and the beauty of creation, and who, observing the world itself, and the parts of the world, the sky and earth and sea, and the sun, moon and stars that adorn them, and discovering the laws of the seasons and their periodic successions, conjectured that there must exist some supreme and transcendent being who had created these things, and who imparted motion to them and guided and governed them. Though this guess may be wide of the mark, I can see what they are after; but as for you, what mighty masterpiece pray do you adduce as apparently the creation of divine intelligence, leading you to conjecture that gods exist? \'We have an idea of god implanted in our minds,\' you say. Yes, and an idea of Jupiter with a beard, and Minerva in a helmet; but do you therefore believe that those deities are really like that? 1.105 Your assertion was that the form of god is perceived by thought and not by the senses, that it has no solidity nor numerical persistence, and that our perception of it is such that it is seen owing to similarity and succession, a never-ceasing stream of similar forms arriving continually from the infinite number of atoms, and that thus it results that our mind, when its attention is fixed on these forms, conceives the divine nature to be happy and eternal. Now in the name of the very gods about whom we are talking, what can possibly be the meaning of this? If the gods only appeal to the faculty of thought, and have no solidity or definite outline, what difference does it make whether we think of a god or of a hippocentaur? Such mental pictures are called by all other philosophers mere empty imaginations, but you say they are the arrival and entrance into our minds of certain images. ' "1.109 And how extravagantly! There is a constant passage or stream of visual presentations which collectively produce a single visual impression. I should be ashamed to say that I do not understand the doctrine, if you who maintain it understood it yourselves! How can you prove that the stream of images is continuous, or if it is, how are the images eternal? You say that there is an innumerable supply of atoms. Are you going to argue then that everything is eternal, for the same reason? You take refuge in the principle of 'equilibrium' (for so with your consent we will translate isonomia), and you say that because there is mortal substance there must also be immortal substance. On that showing, because there are mortal men, there are also some that are immortal, and because there are men born on land, there are men born in the water. 'And because there are forces of destruction, there are also forces of preservation.' Suppose there were, they would only preserve things that already exist; but I am not aware that your gods do exist. " "1.114 'But they are free from pain.' Does that satisfy the ideal of perfect bliss, overflowing with good things? 'God is engaged (they say) in ceaseless contemplation of his own happiness, for he has no other object for his thoughts.' I beg of you to realize in your imagination a vivid picture of a deity solely occupied for all eternity in reflecting 'What a good time I am having! How happy I am!' And yet I can't see how this happy god of yours is not to fear destruction, since he is subjected without a moment's respite to the buffeting and jostling of a horde of atoms that eternally assail him, while from his own person a ceaseless stream of images is given off. Your god is therefore neither happy nor eternal. " '1.117 On the other hand what reason is there for adoring the gods on the ground of our admiration for the divine nature, if we cannot see that that nature possesses any special excellence? "As for freedom from superstition, which is the favourite boast of your school, that is easy to attain when you have deprived the gods of all power; unless perchance you think that it was possible for Diagoras or Theodorus to be superstitious, who denied the existence of the gods altogether. For my part, I don\'t see how it was possible even for Protagoras, who was not certain either that the gods exist or that they do not. For the doctrines of all these thinkers abolish not only superstition, which implies a groundless fear of the gods, but also religion, which consists in piously worshipping them. 2.6 Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. ' "2.13 As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; " "2.14 third, the awe inspired by lightning, storms, rain, snow, hail, floods, pestilences, earthquakes and occasionally subterranean rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops the colour of blood, also landslips and chasms suddenly opening in the ground, also unnatural monstrosities human and animal, and also the appearance of meteoric lights and what are called by the Greeks 'comets,' and in our language 'long-haired stars,' such as recently during the Octavian War appeared as harbingers of dire disasters, and the doubling of the sun, which my father told me had happened in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, the year in which the light was quenched of Publius Africanus, that second sun of Rome: all of which alarming portents have suggested to mankind the idea of the existence of some celestial and divine power. " '2.15 And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind. 2.19 Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit. ' "2.21 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: " "2.22 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? " '2.23 "However, having begun to treat the subject in a different way from that which I proposed at the beginning (for I said that this part required no discussion, since the existence of god was manifest to everybody), in spite of this I should like to prove even this point by means of arguments drawn from Physics or Natural Philosophy. It is a law of Nature that all things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat, without which their nurture and growth would not be possible; for everything of a hot, fiery nature supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite and uniform motion; and as long as this motion remains within us, so long sensation and life remain, whereas so soon as our heat is cooled and quenched we ourselves perish and are extinguished. 2.24 This doctrine Cleanthes enforces by these further arguments, to show how great is the supply of heat in every living body: he states that there is no food so heavy that it is not digested in twenty-four hours; and even the residue of our food which nature rejects contains heat. Again, the veins and arteries never cease throbbing with a flame-like pulse, and frequent cases have been observed when the heart of an animal on being torn out of its body has continued to beat with a rapid motion resembling the flickering of fire. Every living thing therefore, whether animal or vegetable, owes its vitality to the heat contained within it. From this it must be inferred that this element of heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world. 2.25 "We shall discern the truth of this more readily from a more detailed account of this all‑permeating fiery element as a whole. All the parts of the world (I will however only specify the most important) are supported and sustained by heat. This can be perceived first of all in the element of earth. We see fire produced by striking or rubbing stones together; and when newly dug, \'the earth doth steam with warmth\'; and also warm water is drawn from running springs, and this occurs most of all in the winter-time, because a great store of heat is confined in the caverns of the earth, which in winter is denser and therefore confines more closely the heat stored in the soil. 2.26 It would require a long discourse and a great many arguments to enable me to show that all the seeds that earth receives in her womb, and all the plants which she spontaneously generates and holds fixed by their roots in the ground, owe both their origin and growth to this warm temperature of the soil. That water also contains an admixture of heat is shown first of all by its liquid nature; water would neither be frozen into ice by cold nor congealed into snow and hoar-frost unless it could also become fluid when liquefied and thawed by the admixture of heat; this is why moisture both hardens when exposed to a north wind or a frost from some other quarter, and also in turn softens when warmed, and evaporates with heat. Also the sea when violently stirred by the wind becomes warm, so that it can readily be realized that this great body of fluid contains heat; for we must not suppose the warmth in question to be derived from some external source, but stirred up from the lowest depths of the sea by violent motion, just as happens to our bodies when they are restored to warmth by movement and exercise. Indeed the air itself, though by nature the coldest of the elements, is by no means entirely devoid of heat; 2.27 indeed it contains even a considerable admixture of heat, for it is itself generated by exhalation from water, since air must be deemed to be a sort of vaporized water, and this vaporization is caused by the motion of the heat contained in the water. We may see an example of the same process when water is made to boil by placing fire beneath it. — There remains the fourth element: this is itself by nature glowing hot throughout and also imparts the warmth of health and life to all other substances. 2.28 Hence from the fact that all the parts of the world are sustained by heat the inference follows that the world itself also owes its continued preservation for so long a time to the same or a similar substance, and all the more so because it must be understood that this hot and fiery principle is interfused with the whole of nature in such a way as to constitute the male and female generative principles, and so to be the necessary cause of both the birth and the growth of all living creatures, whether animals or those whose roots are planted in the earth. 2.29 "There is therefore an element that holds the whole world together and preserves it, and this an element possessed of sensation and reason; since every natural object that is not a homogeneous and simple substance but a complex and composite one must contain within it some ruling principle, for example in man the intelligence, in the lower animals something resembling intelligence that is the source of appetition. With trees and plants the ruling principle is believed to be located in the roots. I use the term \'ruling principle\' as the equivalent of the Greek hēgemonikon, meaning that part of anything which must and ought to have supremacy in a thing of that sort. Thus it follows that the element which contains the ruling principle of the whole of nature must also be the most excellent of all things and the most deserving of authority and sovereignty over all things. 2.30 Now we observe that the parts of the world (and nothing exists in all the world which is not a part of the whole world) possess sensation and reason. Therefore it follows that that part which contains the ruling principle of the world must necessarily possess sensation and reason, and these in a more intense and higher form. Hence it follows that the world possesses wisdom, and that the element which holds all things in its embrace is pre‑eminently and perfectly rational, and therefore that the world is god, and all the forces of the world are held together by the divine nature. "Moreover that glowing heat of the world is far purer and more brilliant and far more mobile, and therefore more stimulating to the senses, than this warmth of ours by which the things that we know are preserved and vitalized. 2.34 Upon the animals she bestowed sensation and motion, and an appetite or impulse to approach things wholesome and retire from things harmful. For man she amplified her gift by the addition of reason, whereby the appetites might be controlled, and alternately indulged and held in check. But the fourth and highest grade is that of beings born by nature good and wise, and endowed from the outset with the innate attributes of right reason and consistency; this must be held to be above the level of man: it is the attribute of god, that is, of the world, which must needs possess that perfect and absolute reason of which I spoke. 2.35 Again, it is undeniable that every organic whole must have an ultimate ideal of perfection. As in vines or cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. Hence it follows that there must exist this fourth and highest grade, unassailable by any external force. 2.39 but no being is more perfect than the world, and nothing is better than virtue; therefore virtue is an essential attribute of the world. Again, man\'s nature is not perfect, yet virtue may be realized in man; how much more readily then in the world! therefore the world possesses virtue. Therefore it is wise, and consequently divine. "Having thus perceived the divinity of the world, we must also assign the same divinity to the stars, which are formed from the most mobile and the purest part of the aether, and are not compounded of any other element besides; they are of a fiery heat and translucent throughout. Hence they too have the fullest right to be pronounced to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence. 2.43 moreover the substance employed as food is also believed to have some influence on mental acuteness; it is therefore likely that the stars possess surpassing intelligence, since they inhabit the ethereal region of the world and also are nourished by the moist vapours of sea and earth, rarefied in their passage through the wide intervening space. Again, the consciousness and intelligence of the stars is most clearly evinced by their order and regularity; for regular and rhythmical motion is impossible without design, which contains no trace of casual or accidental variation; now the order and eternal regularity of the constellations indicates neither a process of nature, for it is highly rational, nor chance, for chance loves variation and abhors regularity; it follows therefore that the stars move of their own free-will and because of their intelligence and divinity. ' "2.58 the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. " '2.62 Those gods therefore who were the authors of various benefits owned their deification to the value of the benefits which they bestowed, and indeed the names that I just now enumerated express the various powers of the gods that bear them. "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon of distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber (I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated with Ceres and Libera, the import of which joint consecration may be gathered from the mysteries; but Liber and Libera were so named as Ceres\' offspring, that being the meaning of our Latin word liberi — a use which has survived in the case of Libera but not of Liber) — and this is also the origin of Romulus, who is believed to be the same as Quirinus. And these benefactors were duly deemed divine, as being both supremely good and immortal, because their souls survived and enjoyed eternal life. 2.75 I therefore declare that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and have been governed for all time by converse providence: a thesis which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we feel at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial. ' "2.82 Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence — for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void, and the attributes of these. When we on the other hand speak of nature as the sustaining and governing principle of the world, we do not mean that the world is like a clod of earth or lump of stone or something else of that sort, which possesses only the natural principle of cohesion, but like a tree or an animal, displaying no haphazard structure, to be order and a certain semblance of design. " '2.87 Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things. "But if the structure of the world in all its parts is such that it could not have been better whether in point of utility or beauty, let us consider js is the result of chance, or whether on the contrary the parts of the world are in such a condition that they could not possibly have cohered together if they were not controlled by intelligence and by divine providence. If then that produces of nature are better than those of art, and if art produces nothing without reason, nature too cannot be deemed to be without reason. When you see a statue or a painting, you recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun‑dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason? 2.88 Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit. 2.90 Well then, even as the shepherd at the first sight thinks he sees some lifeless and iimate object, but afterwards is led by clearer indications to begin to suspect the true nature of the thing about which he had previously been uncertain, so it would have been the proper course for the philosophers, if it so happened that the first sight of the world perplexed them, afterwards when they had seen its definite and regular motions, and all its phenomena controlled by fixed system and unchanging uniformity, to infer the presence not merely of an inhabitant of this celestial and divine abode, but also of a ruler and governor, the architect as it were of this mighty and monumental structure. "But as it is they appear to me to have no suspicion even of the marvels of the celestial and terrestrial creation. 2.93 "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! ' "2.94 Yet according to the assertion of your friends, that out of particles of matter not endowed with heat, nor with any 'quality' (the Greek term poiotes), nor with sense, but colliding together at haphazard and by chance, the world has emerged complete, or rather a countless number of worlds are some of them being born and some perishing at every moment of time — yet if the clash of atoms can create a world, why can it not produce a colonnade, a temple, a house, a city, which are less and indeed much less difficult things to make? The fact is, they indulge in such random babbling about the world that for my part I cannot think that they have ever looked up at this marvellously beautiful sky — which is my next topic. " "2.95 So Aristotle says brilliantly: 'If there were beings who had always lived beneath the earth, in comfortable, well‑lit dwellings, decorated with statues and pictures and furnished with all the luxuries enjoyed by persons thought to be supremely happy, and who though they had never come forth above the ground had learnt by report and by hearsay of the existence of certain deities or divine powers; and then if at some time the jaws of the earth were opened and they were able to escape from their hidden abode and to come forth into the regions which we inhabit; when they suddenly had sight of the earth and the seas and the sky, and came to know of the vast clouds and mighty winds, and beheld the sun, and realized not only its size and beauty but also its Ptolemaic in causing the day by shedding light over all the sky, and, after night had darkened the earth, they then saw the whole sky spangled and adorned with stars, and the changing phases of the moon's light, now waxing and now waning, and the risings and settings of all these heavenly bodies and their courses fixed and changeless throughout all eternity, — when they saw these things, surely they would think that the gods exist and that these mighty marvels are their handiwork.' " '2.96 Thus far Aristotle; let us for our part imagine a darkness as dense as that which is said to have once covered the neighbouring districts on the occasion of an eruption of the volcano Etna, so that for two days no man could recognize his fellow, and when on the third day the sun shone upon them, they felt as if they had come to life again: well, suppose that after darkness had prevailed from the beginning of time, it similarly happened to ourselves suddenly to behold the light of day, what should we think of the splendour of the heavens? But daily recurrence and habit familiarize our indicates with the sight, and we feel no surprise or curiosity as to the reasons for things that we see always; just as if it were the novelty and not rather the importance of phenomena that ought to arouse us to inquire into their causes. 2.97 Who would not deny the name of human being to a man who, on seeing the regular motions of the heaven and the fixed order of the stars and the accurate interconnexion and interrelation of all things, can deny that these things possess any rational design, and can maintain that phenomena, the wisdom of whose ordering transcends the capacity of our wisdom to understand it, take place by chance? When we see something moved by machinery, like an orrery or clock or many other such things, we do not doubt that these contrivances are the work of reason; when therefore we behold the whole compass of the heaven moving with revolutions of marvellous velocity and executing with perfect regularity the annual changes of the seasons with absolute safety and security for all things, how can we doubt that all this is effected not merely by reason, but by a reason that is transcendent and divine? 2.98 "For we may now put aside elaborate argument and gaze as it were with our eyes upon the beauty of the creations of divine providence, as we declare them to be. And first let us behold the whole earth, situated in the centre of the world, a solid spherical mass gathered into a globe by the natural gravitation of all its parts, clothed with flowers and grass and trees and corn,º forms of vegetation all of them incredibly numerous and inexhaustibly varied and diverse. Add to these cool fountains ever flowing, transparent streams and rivers, their banks clad in brightest verdure, deep vaulted caverns, craggy rocks, sheer mountain heights and plains of immeasurable extent; add also the hidden veins of gold and silver, and marble in unlimited quantity. 2.99 Think of all the various species of animals, both tame and wild! think of the flights and songs of birds! of the pastures filled with cattle, and the teeming life of the woodlands! Then why need I speak of the race of men? who are as it were the appointed tillers of the soil, and who suffer it not to become a savage haunt of monstrous beasts of prey nor a barren waste of thickets and brambles, and whose industry diversifies and adorns the lands and islands and coasts with houses and cities. Could we but behold these things with our eyes as we can picture them in our minds, no one taking in the whole earth at one view could doubt the divine reason. 2.100 Then how great is the beauty of the sea! how glorious the aspect of its vast expanse! him many and how diverse its islands! how lovely the scenery of its coasts and shores! how numerous and how different the species of marine animals, some dwelling in the depths, some floating and swimming on the surface, some clinging in their own shells to the rocks! And the sea itself, yearning for the earth, sports against her shores in such a fashion that the two elements appear to be fused into one. 2.101 Next the air bordering on the sea undergoes the alternates of day and night, and now rises upward melt down rarefied, now is condensed and compressed into clouds and gathering mixture enriches the earth with rain, now flows forth in currents thenceforth and produces winds. Likewise it causes the yearly variations of cold and heat, and it also both supports the flight of birds and inhaled by breathing nourishes and sustains the animal race. There remains the element that is most distant and highest removed from our abodes, the all‑engirdling, all‑confining circuit of the sky, also named the aether, the farthest coast and frontier of the world, wherein those fiery shapes most marvellously trace out their ordered courses. 2.102 of these the sun, which many times surpasses the earth in magnitude, revolves about her, and by his rising and setting causes day and night, and now approaching, then again retiring, twice each year makes returns in opposite directions from his farthest point, and in the period of those returns at one time causes the face of the earth as it were to contract with a gloomy frown, and at another restores her to gladness til she seems to smile in sympathy with the sky. 2.103 Again the moon, which is, as the mathematicians prove, more than half the size of the earth, roams in the same courses as the sun, but at one time converging with the sun and at another diverging from it, both bestows upon the light that it has borrowed from the sun and itself undergoes divers changes of its light, and also at one time is in conjunction and hides the sun, darken ut light of its rays, at another itself comes into the shadow of the earth, being opposite to the sun, and owing to the interpose and interference of the earth is suddenly extinguished. And the so‑called wandering stars (planets) travel in the same courses round the earth, and rise and set in the same way, with motions now accelerated, now retarded, and sometimes even ceasing altogether. 2.104 Nothing can be more marvellous or more beautiful than this spectacle. Next comes the vast multitude of the fixed stars, grouped in constellations so clearly defined that they have received names derived from their resemblance to familiar objects." Here he looked at me and said, "I will make use of the poems of Aratus, as translated by yourself when quite a young man, which because of their Latin dress give me such pleasure that I retain many of them in memory. Well then, as we continually see with our own eyes, without any change or variation Swiftly the other heavenly bodies glide, All day and night travelling with the sky, 2.115 Can any sane person believe that all this array of stars and this vast celestial adornment could have been created out of atoms rushing thenceforth fortuitously and at random? or could any other being devoid of intelligence and reason have created them? Not merely did their creation postulate intelligence, but it is impossible to understand their nature without intelligence of a high order. "but not only are these things marvellous, but nothing is more remarkable than the stability and coherence of the world, which is such that it is impossible even to imagine anything better adapted to endure. For all its parts in every direction gravitate with a uniform pressure towards the centre. Moreover busy conjoined maintain their union most permanently when they have some bond encompassing them to bind them together; and this function is fulfilled by that rational and intelligent substance which pervades the whole world as the efficient cause of all things and which draws and collects the outermost particles towards the centre. 2.118 But the stars are of a fiery substance, and for this reason they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters, which are raised up by the sun out of the fields which it warms and out of the waters; and when nourished and renewed by these vapours the stars and the whole aether shed them back again, and then once more draw them up from the same source, with the loss of none of their matter, or only of an extremely small part which is consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the aether. As a consequence of this, so our school believe, though it used to be said that Panaetius questioned the doctrine, there will ultimately occur a conflagration of the whole while, because when the moisture has been used up neither can the earth be nourished nor will the air continue to flow, being unable to rise upward after it has drunk up all the water; thus nothing will remain but fire, by which, as a living being and a god, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before. 2.133 "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature. 2.145 Similarly the nostrils, which to serve the purposes required of them have to be always open, have narrower apertures, to prevent the entrance of anything that may harm them; and they are always moist, which is useful to guard them against dust and many other things. The sense of taste is admirably shielded, being enclosed in the mouth in a manner well suited for the performance of its function and for its protection against harm. "And all the senses of man far excel those of the lower animals. In the first place our eyes have a finer perception of many things in the arts which appeal to the sense of sight, painting, modelling and sculpture, and also in bodily movements and gestures; since the eyes judge beauty and arrangement and so to speak propriety of colour and shape; and also other more important matters, for they also recognize virtues and vices, the angry and the friendly, the joyful and the sad, the brave man and the coward, the bold and the craven. 2.148 it is by collating and comparing our precepts that we also create the arts that serve either practical necessities or the purpose of amusement. Then take the gift of speech, the queen of arts as you are fond of calling it — what a glorious, what a divine faculty it is! In the first place it enables us both to learn things we do not know and to teach things we do know to others; secondly it is our instrument for exhortation and persuasion, for consoling the afflicted and assuaging the fears of the terrified, for curbing passion and quenching appetite and anger; it is this that has united us in the bonds of justice, law and civil order, this that has sped us from savagery and barbarism. ' "2.152 Timber moreover is of great value for constructing ships, whose voyages supply an abundance of sustece of all sorts from all parts of the earth; and we alone have the power of controlling the most violent of nature's offspring, the sea and the winds, thanks to the science of navigation, and we use and enjoy many products of the sea. Likewise the entire command of the commodities produced on land is vested in mankind. We enjoy the fruits of the plains and of the mountains, the rivers and the lakes are ours, we sow corn, we plant trees, we fertilize the soil by irrigation, we confine the rivers and straighten or divert their courses. In fine, by means of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world within the world of nature. " '2.154 "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. 2.156 Then the earth, teeming with grain and vegetables of various kinds, which she pours forth in lavish abundance — does she appear to give birth to this produce for the sake of the wild beasts or for the sake of men? What shall I say of the vines and olives, whose bounteous and delightful fruits do not concern the lower animals at all? In fact the beasts of the field are entirely ignorant of the arts of sowing and cultivating, and of reaping and gathering the fruits of the earth in due season and storing them in garners; all these products are both enjoyed and tended by men. 2.157 Just as therefore we are bound to say that lyres and flutes were made for the sake of those who can use them, so it must be agreed that the things of which I have spoken have been provided for those only who make use of them, and even if some portion of them is filched or plundered by some of the lower animals, we shall not admit that they were created for the sake of these animals also. Men do not store up corn for the sake of mice and ants but for their wives and children and households; so the animals share these fruits of the earth only by stealth as I have said, whereas the masters enjoy them openly and freely. ' "2.158 It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? " "2.160 As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. " ' None |
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60. Cicero, On Duties, 1.12, 1.15, 1.22, 1.34-1.35, 1.65, 1.107-1.113, 1.128, 1.153, 3.15, 3.20-3.22, 3.27, 3.29-3.30, 3.42, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, And law of nature • Human nature • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Natural law • Nature/nature • Roman law, and law of nature • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • accordance with nature, • dietary laws natural interpretation of • human nature, • human nature, innate orientations • human nature, intellectual and moral development • law (natural), • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and wise man • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, officia of • law of nature, transcended written law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • law, natural • natura • natural law • nature • nature, • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and impurity • nature, and value • nature, living in accordance with • nature, of human beings • physis, as nature of things and persons • rationality, and human nature • theology, natural • wise man, and law of nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 190, 193, 194, 228, 238, 280, 288, 289; Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 210; Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 430; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 182; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 247, 248; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 80; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 327, 330, 331, 336, 349; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 127; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 71, 73, 119, 153, 154, 157; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 91; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 163; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 125; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 27, 42, 56
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1.22 Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.
1.34 Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. 1.35 Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset optemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus. Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.
1.65 Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.
1.107 Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108 Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109 Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110 Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111 Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112 Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113 Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum.
1.128 Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui filerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque in ear sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum.
1.153 Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis quamvis omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofi/an Graeci vocant—prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fro/nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognition anteponenda est.
3.15 Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum; quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem, quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia.
3.20 Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21 Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.22 Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus.
3.27 Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum.
3.29 Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? Minime vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nonne faciat? 3.30 Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta.
3.42 Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est.
3.69 Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis.' ' None | sup>
1.22 \xa0But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. <" 1.34 \xa0Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. < 1.35 \xa0The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare. For instance, our forefathers actually admitted to full rights of citizenship the Tusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I\xa0wish they had not destroyed Corinth; but I\xa0believe they had some special reason for what they did â\x80\x94 its convenient situation, probably â\x80\x94 and feared that its very location might some day furnish a temptation to renew the war. In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we should still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all. Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though the battering-ram has hammered at their walls. And among our countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or nations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of those states. <' "
1.65 \xa0So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. <" 1.107 \xa0We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. <' "1.108 \xa0Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏ\x81Ï\x89ν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. <" '1.109 \xa0Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â\x80\x94 both father and son â\x80\x94 and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I\xa0have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â\x80\x94 the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â\x80\x94 had no such gracious manner in social intercourse .\xa0.\xa0., and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. < 1.110 \xa0Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one\'s nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â\x80\x94 that is, if it is in direct opposition to one\'s natural genius. <' "1.111 \xa0If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. <" '1.112 \xa0Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another under the same circumstances a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. <' "1.113 \xa0How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a\xa0thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. <"
1.128 \xa0But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have called "propriety." <
1.153 \xa0My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)\xa0suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom â\x80\x94 what the Greeks call Ï\x83οÏ\x86ία; for by prudence, which they call Ï\x86Ï\x81Ï\x8cνηÏ\x83ιÏ\x82, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2)\xa0Again, that wisdom which I\xa0have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty. And (3)\xa0service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. <
3.15 \xa0On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I\xa0suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion. The performance of the duties, then, which I\xa0am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness, not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind. <' "
3.20 \xa0That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I\xa0am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. <" "3.21 \xa0Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. <" "3.22 \xa0Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. <" "
3.27 \xa0And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of Nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. <" 3.29 \xa0But, perhaps, someone may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly useless member of society?" Not at all; for my life is not more precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing wrong to anybody for my own advantage. "Or again; supposing a righteous man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?" <' "3.30 \xa0These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society â\x80\x94 if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure. But, if such is not the case, each one must bear his own burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is more repugt to Nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests is repugt to Nature; for it is unjust. <" 3.42 \xa0And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour\'s. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour." <
3.69 \xa0Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I\xa0find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â\x80\x94 although I\xa0have often made this statement, I\xa0must still repeat it again and again â\x80\x94 which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a\xa0mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I\xa0only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. <' " None |
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61. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 15.1, 15.11-15.20, 17.1, 24.13-24.14, 24.25-24.27, 34.5, 39.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Church, Nature of • Fear, of Natural Forces • Hadassa Hospital Natural Medicine Research Center • Natural/Meterological Phenomena • Paradise, Nature of • determinism, determinists, necessity (of nature) • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • human, nature • natural • nature, human • terrestrial nature • wisdom, and/or correlation with Torah and natural order
Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 20, 65, 197; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 143; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 96, 97; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 121, 122; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 325; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 472; Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 314; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 22
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15.1 For a hymn of praise should be uttered in wisdom,and the Lord will prosper it.
15.1 The man who fears the Lord will do this,and he who holds to the law will obtain wisdom.
15.11 Do not say, "Because of the Lord I left the right way";for he will not do what he hates.
15.12 Do not say, "It was he who led me astray";for he had no need of a sinful man.
15.13 The Lord hates all abominations,and they are not loved by those who fear him.
15.14 It was he who created man in the beginning,and he left him in the power of his own inclination.
15.15 If you will, you can keep the commandments,and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice.
15.16 He has placed before you fire and water:stretch out your hand for whichever you wish.
15.17 Before a man are life and death,and whichever he chooses will be given to him.
15.18 For great is the wisdom of the Lord;he is mighty in power and sees everything;
15.19 his eyes are on those who fear him,and he knows every deed of man.
17.1 And they will praise his holy name,to proclaim the grandeur of his works.
17.1 The Lord created man out of earth,and turned him back to it again.
24.13 "I grew tall like a cedar in Lebanon,and like a cypress on the heights of Hermon. 24.14 I grew tall like a palm tree in En-gedi,and like rose plants in Jericho;like a beautiful olive tree in the field,and like a plane tree I grew tall.
24.25 It fills men with wisdom, like the Pishon,and like the Tigris at the time of the first fruits. 24.26 It makes them full of understanding, like the Euphrates,and like the Jordan at harvest time. 24.27 It makes instruction shine forth like light,like the Gihon at the time of vintage.
34.5 Divinations and omens and dreams are folly,and like a woman in travail the mind has fancies.
39.1 Nations will declare his wisdom,and the congregation will proclaim his praise;'
39.1 On the other hand he who devotes himself to the study of the law of the Most High will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients,and will be concerned with prophecies; ' None |
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62. Septuagint, Judith, 16.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 0th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Biblical Nature, see also Deuteronomy, Allusions • Natural/Meterological Phenomena
Found in books: Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 357; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 453
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16.17 Woe to the nations that rise up against my people! The Lord Almighty will take vengeance on them in the day of judgment; fire and worms he will give to their flesh; they shall weep in pain for ever. '' None |
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63. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 1.12, 3.1, 3.4, 7.1, 13.1, 15.18-15.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, in literary settings • death (natural, physical) • guilt, and reatus, sin nature/propensity/principle • human being, views of, dual nature of • human, nature • nature, human • resurrection, nature of (relationship to embodiment)
Found in books: Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 40; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 131, 153; Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 246; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 174; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 371; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 69, 70, 71, 104, 107; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 22
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1.12 Do not invite death by the error of your life,nor bring on destruction by the works of your hands;
3.1 But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,and no torment will ever touch them.
3.1 Why sleepest thou, O my soul, And blessest not the Lord?
3.4 For though in the sight of men they were punished,their hope is full of immortality.
3.4 The righteous despiseth not the chastening of the Lord; His will is always before the Lord.
7.1 I also am mortal, like all men,a descendant of the first-formed child of earth;and in the womb of a mother I was molded into flesh,
7.1 Make not Thy dwelling afar from us, O God; Lest they assail us that hate us without cause.
1
3.1 For all men who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature;and they were unable from the good things that are seen to know him who exists,nor did they recognize the craftsman while paying heed to his works;
1
3.1 The right hand of the Lord hath covered me; The right hand of the Lord hath spared us.
15.18 The enemies of thy people worship even the most hateful animals,which are worse than all others, when judged by their lack of intelligence; 15.19 and even as animals they are not so beautiful in appearance that one would desire them,but they have escaped both the praise of God and his blessing.' ' None |
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64. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, on nature and the self • nature • nature, laws of
Found in books: Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 196; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 210
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65. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on law and nature • Cicero, And law of nature • Cotta (character in De natura deorum), • De natura deorum (Cicero) • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Natural Law • Natural law • Nature • Nature, importance in Roman culture • On Law and Justice (attrib. Archytas), on compliance of law with nature and proportion • Roman law, and law of nature • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • human being, creation of, nature and condition • human nature, innate orientations • human nature, intellectual and moral development • human nature, social instinct • impietas against, sacred nature of • justice, natural origin • law (natural), • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and common law • law of nature, and wise man • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, officia of • law of nature, transcended written law • law, natural • law, natural law • natural law • natural law, and cosmopolitanism • natural law, in Cicero • nature, • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • nature, benevolence of • norms, natural • numinousness, of nature • pain, bodily, natural aversion to • rationality, and human nature • statuary, sacred nature of • virtue, and nature • wise man, and law of nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature • year, natural year
Found in books: Ando and Ruepke (2006), Religion and Law in Classical and Christian Rome, 32, 133, 137; Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 17, 40, 98, 99, 108, 193, 244; Ferrándiz (2022), Shipwrecks, Legal Landscapes and Mediterranean Paradigms: Gone Under Sea, 109; Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 429; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 146, 157, 182; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 159, 160, 161, 248; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 57, 58, 61; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 137; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 126, 127; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 251; Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 200; Liatsi (2021), Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond, 82; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 40, 122, 129; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 18, 21, 25, 28, 29, 105, 120, 125, 153, 154, 156, 157; Rosa and Santangelo (2020), Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies, 31, 32, 33, 89, 90; Rupke (2016), Religious Deviance in the Roman World Superstition or Individuality?, 103; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 110; Rüpke (2011), The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine Time, History and the Fasti 109; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 464, 465, 483
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66. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, And law of nature • De natura deorum (Cicero) • Human nature • Natural law • Stoics/Stoicism, and law of nature • human nature, • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and common law • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, transcended written law • natural law, in Cicero • nature, • nature, and value • nature, and virtue • nature, of human beings • physis, as nature of things and persons • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 194; Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 429; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 57; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 327, 330; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 40; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 18, 20, 71
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67. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • De rerum natura (Lucretius) • Lucretius, On the Nature of Things
Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 212; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 22
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68. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 232; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 232
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69. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Pythagoras, as spectator of nature • Socrates, and natural philosophical tradition • belief/s, nature of • distress, as natural capacity of humans • elevation, natural capacity for • emotions, nature of • excellence (aretē), related to cosmic nature • feelings, natural capacity for • human nature, and capacity for emotions • human nature, innate orientations • human nature, intellectual and moral development • justice, natural origin • law (natural), • law of nature, death as • natura • natural philosophy, Socrates and prior tradition • nature • nature, • nature, God as • nature, according to • nature, benevolence of • nature, central to Stoic thought • pain, bodily, natural aversion to • rationality, and human nature • reaching (orexis), natural capacity for
Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 15, 18, 45; Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 17, 198; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 389; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40; Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 10, 225; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 193; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 79; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 146, 157; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 36, 161, 203, 204, 248, 253; Trettel (2019), Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14, 15, 52; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 113, 144; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 10, 225; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 54
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70. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cosmos, cosmology, nature • Natural and Meteorological Phenomena, Cloud
Found in books: Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 85, 86; Lampe (2003), Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries: From Paul to Valentinus, 415
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71. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • law, natural/of nature • resurrection, nature of (relationship to embodiment)
Found in books: Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 142; Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 17
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72. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • human, nature • natural world, • nature, human
Found in books: Bay (2022), Biblical Heroes and Classical Culture in Christian Late Antiquity: The Historiography, Exemplarity, and Anti-Judaism of Pseudo-Hegesippus, 168; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 110
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73. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 1.103-1.106 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • culture and nature blended • nature • nature and culture, blended
Found in books: Clay and Vergados (2022), Teaching through Images: Imagery in Greco-Roman Didactic Poetry, 272; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 273
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1.103 Tunc neque marmoreo pendebant vela theatro, 1.104 rend= 1.105 Illic quas tulerant nemorosa Palatia, frondes 1.106 rend='' None | sup>
1.103 The Theatres are berries for the fair; 1.104 Like ants or mole-hills thither they repair; 1.105 Like bees to hives so numerously they throng, 1.106 It may be said they to that place belong:'' None |
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74. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1.262-1.312 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Ovid, natural philosophy in exilic corpus • Seneca, Natural questions, original order of books • Seneca, cataclysm in Natural questions • nature, living according to
Found in books: Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 64; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 161, 162, 256, 260, 263
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1.262 Protinus Aeoliis Aquilonem claudit in antris 1.263 et quaecumque fugant inductas flamina nubes 1.264 emittitque Notum. Madidis Notus evolat alis, 1.265 terribilem picea tectus caligine vultum: 1.266 barba gravis nimbis, canis fluit unda capillis; 1.267 fronte sedent nebulae, rorant pennaeque sinusque. 1.268 Utque manu late pendentia nubila pressit, 1.269 fit fragor: hinc densi funduntur ab aethere nimbi. 1.270 Nuntia Iunonis varios induta colores 1.271 concipit Iris aquas alimentaque nubibus adfert. 1.272 Sternuntur segetes et deplorata coloni 1.273 vota iacent, longique perit labor inritus anni. 1.274 Nec caelo contenta suo est Iovis ira, sed illum 1.275 caeruleus frater iuvat auxiliaribus undis. 1.276 Convocat hic amnes. Qui postquam tecta tyranni 1.277 intravere sui, “non est hortamine longo 1.278 nunc” ait “utendum. Vires effundite vestras: 1.279 sic opus est! aperite domos ac mole remota 1.280 fluminibus vestris totas inmittite habenas!” 1.281 Iusserat; hi redeunt ac fontibus ora relaxant 1.282 et defrenato volvuntur in aequora cursu. 1.283 Ipse tridente suo terram percussit: at illa 1.284 intremuit motuque vias patefecit aquarum. 1.285 Exspatiata ruunt per apertos flumina campos 1.286 cumque satis arbusta simul pecudesque virosque 1.287 tectaque cumque suis rapiunt penetralia sacris. 1.288 Siqua domus mansit potuitque resistere tanto 1.289 indeiecta malo, culmen tamen altior huius 1.290 unda tegit, pressaeque latent sub gurgite turres. 1.291 Iamque mare et tellus nullum discrimen habebant: 1.292 omnia pontus erant; deerant quoque litora ponto. 1.293 Occupat hic collem, cumba sedet alter adunca 1.294 et ducit remos illic, ubi nuper ararat, 1.295 ille supra segetes aut mersae culmina villae 1.296 navigat, hic summa piscem deprendit in ulmo. 1.297 Figitur in viridi, si fors tulit, ancora prato, 1.298 aut subiecta terunt curvae vineta carinae; 1.299 et, modo qua graciles gramen carpsere capellae, 1.300 nunc ibi deformes ponunt sua corpora phocae. 1.301 Mirantur sub aqua lucos urbesque domosque 1.302 Nereides, silvasque tenent delphines et altis 1.303 incursant ramis agitataque robora pulsant. 1.304 Nat lupus inter oves, fulvos vehit unda leones, 1.305 unda vehit tigres, nec vires fulminis apro, 1.306 crura nec ablato prosunt velocia cervo. 1.307 Quaesitisque diu terris, ubi sistere possit, 1.308 in mare lassatis volucris vaga decidit alis. 1.309 Obruerat tumulos inmensa licentia ponti, 1.310 pulsabantque novi montana cacumina fluctus. 1.311 Maxima pars unda rapitur; quibus unda pepercit, 1.312 illos longa domant inopi ieiunia victu.'' None | sup>
1.262 by fierce Lycaon?” Ardent in their wrath, 1.263 the astonished Gods demand revenge overtake 1.264 this miscreant; he who dared commit such crimes.' "1.265 'Twas even thus when raged that impious band" '1.266 to blot the Roman name in sacred blood 1.267 of Caesar, sudden apprehensive fear 1.268 of ruin absolute astonished man, 1.269 and all the world convulsed. Nor is the love 1.270 thy people bear to thee, Augustus, le 1.271 than these displayed to Jupiter whose voice 1.272 and gesture all the murmuring host restrained: 1.273 and as indigt clamour ceased, suppressed 1.274 by regt majesty, Jove once again 1.275 broke the deep silence with imperial words; 1.276 “Dismiss your cares; he paid the penalty 1.277 however all the crime and punishment 1.278 now learn from this:—An infamous report 1.279 of this unholy age had reached my ears, 1.280 and wishing it were false, I sloped my course 1.281 from high Olympus , and—although a God— 1.282 disguised in human form I viewed the world. 1.283 It would delay us to recount the crime 1.284 unnumbered, for reports were less than truth. 1.285 “I traversed Maenalus where fearful den 1.286 abound, over Lycaeus, wintry slope 1.287 of pine tree groves, across Cyllene steep;' "1.288 and as the twilight warned of night's approach," "1.289 I stopped in that Arcadian tyrant's realm" '1.290 and entered his inhospitable home:— 1.291 and when I showed his people that a God 1.292 had come, the lowly prayed and worshiped me, 1.293 but this Lycaon mocked their pious vow 1.294 and scoffing said; ‘A fair experiment 1.295 will prove the truth if this be god or man.’ 1.296 and he prepared to slay me in the night,— 1.297 to end my slumbers in the sleep of death. 1.298 So made he merry with his impious proof; 1.299 but not content with this he cut the throat 1.300 of a Molossian hostage sent to him, 1.301 and partly softened his still quivering limb 1.302 in boiling water, partly roasted them 1.303 on fires that burned beneath. And when this flesh 1.304 was served to me on tables, I destroyed 1.305 his dwelling and his worthless Household Gods, 1.306 with thunder bolts avenging. Terror struck 1.307 he took to flight, and on the silent plain 1.308 is howling in his vain attempts to speak; 1.309 he raves and rages and his greedy jaws, 1.310 desiring their accustomed slaughter, turn 1.311 against the sheep—still eager for their blood. 1.312 His vesture separates in shaggy hair,'' None |
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75. Philo of Alexandria, Plant., 132 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • law of nature, in Philo • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 162; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 103
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132 Since therefore all the fruit of the soul is consecrated in the fourth year and the fourth number; in the fifth year we ourselves shall be allowed the use and enjoyment of it for ourselves; for the scripture says, "In the fifth year ye shall eat the fruit thereof;" since it has been established by a perpetual law of nature, that account shall be taken of the creation after the Creator in every thing; so that even if we are thought worthy of the second place, it must be considered a marvellous thing; '' None |
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76. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 3-6, 16, 52-54, 275-276 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, its relation to human law • law of nature, transcended written law • law, natural/of nature • legal concepts, divine law and natural law • natural law and divine law • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature • unwritten law, unwritten nature • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 466; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 74, 75, 88, 89, 99, 107, 108, 119; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 95, 99, 100, 110, 111, 114, 115, 222, 223, 249, 252; Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 98
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3 but since it is necessary, to be consistent with the regular order in which the sacred history proceeds to go on, now to investigate the laws, we will for the present postpone the particular laws which are copies as it were; and first of all examine the more general laws which are, as it were, the models of the others. 4 Now these are those men who have lived irreproachably and admirably, whose virtues are durably and permanently recorded, as on pillars in the sacred scriptures, not merely with the object of praising the men themselves, but also for the sake of exhorting those who read their history, and of leading them on to emulate their conduct; 5 for these men have been living and rational laws; and the lawgiver has magnified them for two reasons; first, because he was desirous to show that the injunctions which are thus given are not inconsistent with nature; and, secondly, that he might prove that it is not very difficult or laborious for those who wish to live according to the laws established in these books, since the earliest men easily and spontaneously obeyed the unwritten principle of legislation before any one of the particular laws were written down at all. So that a man may very properly say, that the written laws are nothing more than a memorial of the life of the ancients, tracing back in an antiquarian spirit, the actions and reasonings which they adopted; 6 for these first men, without ever having been followers or pupils of any one, and without ever having been taught by preceptors what they ought to do or say, but having embraced a line of conduct consistent with nature from attending to their own natural impulses, and from being prompted by an innate virtue, and looking upon nature herself to be, what in fact she is, the most ancient and duly established of laws, did in reality spend their whole lives in making laws, never of deliberate purpose doing anything open to reproach, and for their accidental errors propitiating God, and appeasing him by prayers and supplications, so as to procure for themselves the enjoyment of an entire life of virtue and prosperity, both in respect of their deliberate actions, and those which proceeded from no voluntary purpose. II.
16 Therefore the lawgivers, and the laws in every state on earth, labour with great diligence to fill the souls of free men with good hopes; but he who, without any recommendation and without being enjoined to be so, is nevertheless hopeful, has acquired this virtue by an unwritten, self-taught law, which nature has implanted in him. 52 This then is what appears to be said of these holy men; and it is indicative of a nature more remote from our knowledge than, and much superior to, that which exists in the objects of outward sense; for the sacred word appears thoroughly to investigate and to describe the different dispositions of the soul, being all of them good, the one aiming at what is good by means of instruction, the second by nature, the last by practice; for the first, who is named Abraham, is a symbol of that virtue which is derived from instruction; the intermediate Isaac is an emblem of natural virtue; the third, Jacob, of that virtue which is devoted to and derived from practice. 5
3 But we must not be ignorant that each of these men was endowed with all these powers, but that each derived his name from that one which predominated in him and mastered the others; for neither is it possible for instruction to be made perfect without natural endowments and practice, nor is nature able to arrive at the goal without instruction and practice, nor is practice unless it be founded on natural gifts and sound instruction. 54 Very appropriately, therefore, he has represented, as united by relationship, these three, which in name indeed are men, but in reality, as I have said before, virtues, nature, instruction, and practice, which men also call by another name, and entitle them the three graces (charites), either from the fact of God having bestowed (kecharisthai) on our race those three powers, in order to produce the perfection of life, or because they themselves have bestowed themselves on the rational soul as the most glorious of gifts, so that the eternal name, as set forth in the scriptures, may not be used in conjunction with three men, but rather with the aforesaid powers;
275 Thus much is sufficient to say on this subject. But God, adding to the multitude and magnitude of the praises of the wise man one single thing as a crowning point, says that "this man fulfilled the divine law, and all the commandments of God," not having been taught to do so by written books, but in accordance with the unwritten law of his nature, being anxious to obey all healthful and salutary impulses. And what is the duty of man except most firmly to believe those things which God asserts? 276 Such is the life of the first author and founder of our nation; a man according to the law, as some persons think, but, as my argument has shown, one who is himself the unwritten law and justice of God. ' None |
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77. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 14-15, 27-29, 46 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, And law of nature • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, officia of • law of nature/natural law • law, natural/of nature • natural • nature, • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 144; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 192; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 121, 155, 156; Sly (1990), Philo's Perception of Women, 49; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 106; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 46
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14 Now of the kind of opposition of place which is connected with standing in front of a judge for judgment, we have an example in the case of the woman who has been suspected of having committed adultery. For, says Moses, "the priest shall cause the woman to stand in front of her lord, and she shall uncover her Head." Let us now examine what he intends to show by this direction. It often happens that what ought to be done is not done, in the manner in which it ought to be done, and sometimes too that which is not proper is nevertheless done in a proper manner. For instance, when the return of a deposit is not made in an honest spirit, but is intended either to work the injury of him who receives it back again, or by way of a snare to bear out a denial in the case of another deposit of greater value, in that case a proper action is done in an improper manner. '15 On the other hand, for a physician not to tell the exact truth to a sick patient, when he has decided on purging him, or performing some operation with the knife or with the cautery for the benefit of the patient, lest if the sick man were to be moved too strongly by the anticipation of the suffering, he might refuse to submit to the cure, or through weakness of mind might despair of its succeeding; or in the case of a wise man giving false information to the enemy to secure the safety of his country, fearing lest through his speaking the truth the affairs of the adversaries should succeed, in this case an action which is not intrinsically right is done in a proper manner. In reference to which distinction Moses says, "to pursue what is just Justly," as if it were possible also to pursue it unjustly, if at any time the judge who gives sentence does not decide in an honest spirit.
27 I have also, on one occasion, heard a more ingenious train of reasoning from my own soul, which was accustomed frequently to be seized with a certain divine inspiration, even concerning matters which it could not explain even to itself; which now, if I am able to remember it accurately, I will relate. It told me that in the one living and true God there were two supreme and primary powers--goodness and authority; and that by his goodness he had created every thing, and by his authority he governed all that he had created; 28 and that the third thing which was between the two, and had the effect of bringing them together was reason, for that it was owing to reason that God was both a ruler and good. Now, of this ruling authority and of this goodness, being two distinct powers, On the Cherubim were the symbols, but of reason the flaming sword was the symbol. For reason is a thing capable of rapid motion and impetuous, and especially the reason of the Creator of all things is so, inasmuch as it was before everything and passed by everything, and was conceived before everything, and appears in everything. 29 And do thou, O my mind, receive the impression of each of these cherubims unadulterated, that thus becoming thoroughly instructed about the ruling authority of the Creator of all things and about his goodness, thou mayest receive a happy inheritance; for immediately thou shalt understand the conjunction and combination of these imperishable powers, and learn in what respects God is good, his majesty arising from his sovereign power being all the time conspicuous; and in what he is powerful, his goodness, being equally the object of attention, that is this way thou mayest attain to the virtues which are engendered by these conceptions, namely, a love and a reverential awe of God, neither being uplifted to arrogance by any prosperity which may befall thee, having regard always to the greatness of the sovereignty of thy King; nor abjectly giving up hope of better things in the hour of unexpected misfortune, having regard, then, to the mercifulness of thy great and bounteous God.
46 And he teaches the same lesson more plainly in the case of Leah, where he says that "God opened her Womb." But to open the womb is the especial business of the husband. And she having conceived, brought forth, not to God, for he alone is sufficient and all-abundant for himself, but to him who underwent labour for the sake of that which is good, namely, for Jacob; so that in this instance virtue received the divine seed from the great Cause of all things, but brought forth her offspring to one of her lovers, who deserved to be preferred to all her other Suitors. ' None |
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78. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 71, 120 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, procreation as • law of nature, vs. irrational desire • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature • reproduction, as law of nature • unwritten law, unwritten nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 377; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 194; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 74, 89
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71 Therefore, continues the sacred historian, Sarah, the wife of Abraham, having taken Hagar, the Egyptian woman, her own handmaiden, ten years after Abraham had begun to dwell in the land of Canaan, gave her to Abraham her "husband, to be his Wife." Wickedness is by nature an envious, and bitter, and evil-disposed thing, but virtue is gentle, and inclined to communion, and friendly; wishing in every possible manner to benefit those who are well disposed, either by its own power or by the means of others.
120 For what is more important than this is the fact, that Moses gave laws to that sacred and divine assembly in a code of ten commandments in all. And these are the commandments which are the generic heads, and roots, and principles of the infinite multitude of particular laws; being the everlasting source of all commands, and containing every imaginable injunction and prohibition to the great advantage of those who use them. XXXII. '' None |
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79. Philo of Alexandria, On The Decalogue, 1, 20-23, 52, 64, 132 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • humanity, compound nature of • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, Stoic concept of • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, contents identified by Philo • law of nature, in Philo • law, natural/of nature • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • nature, laws not at variance with • physis, and nature of God • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature • unwritten law, unwritten nature • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 2, 8, 9, 141, 148, 153, 162, 189; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 173, 174; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 74, 77, 84, 89, 103, 108; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 97, 114; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 104, 105, 106, 107
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1 I have in my former treatises set forth the lives of Moses and the other wise men down to his time, whom the sacred scriptures point out as the founders and leaders of our nation, and as its unwritten laws; I will now, as seems pointed out by the natural order of my subject, proceed to describe accurately the character of those laws which are recorded in writing, not omitting any allegorical meaning which may perchance be concealed beneath the plain language, from that natural love of more recondite and laborious knowledge which is accustomed to seek for what is obscure before, and in preference to, what is evident. 20 and I will explain each kind as well as I can. VI. And first of all, I will speak of those which rather resemble heads of laws, of which in the first place one must at once admire the number, inasmuch as they are completed in the perfect number of the decade, which contains every variety of number, both those which are even, and those which are odd, and those which are even-odd; the even numbers being such as two, the odd numbers such as three, the even-odd such as five, it also comprehends all the varieties of the multiplication of numbers, and of those numbers which contain a whole number and a fraction, and of those which contain several fractional parts; 2
1 it comprehends likewise all the proportions; the arithmetical, which exceeds and it exceeded by an equal number: as in the case of the numbers one, and two, and three; and the geometrical, according to which, as the proportion of the first number is to the second, the same is the ratio of the second to the third, as is the case in the numbers one, two and four; and also in multiplication, which double, or treble, or in short multiply figures to any extent; also in those which are half as much again as the numbers first spoken of, or one third greater, and so on. It also contains the harmonic proportion, in accordance with which that number which is in the middle between two extremities, is exceeded by the one, and exceeds the other by an equal part; as is the case with the numbers three, four, and six. 22 The decade also contains the visible peculiar properties of the triangles, and squares, and other polygonal figures; also the peculiar properties of symphonic ratios, that of the diatessaron in proportion exceeding by one fourth, as is the ratio of four to three; that of fifths exceeding in the ratio of half as much again, as is the case with the proportion of three to two. Also, that of the diapason, where the proportion is precisely twofold, as is the ratio of two to one, or that of the double diapason, where the proportion is fourfold, as in the ratio of eight to two. 23 And it is in reference to this fact that the first philosophers appear to me to have affixed the names to things which they have given them. For they were wise men, and therefore they very speciously called the number ten the decade (teµn dekada), as being that which received every thing (hoµsanei dechada ousan), from receiving (tou dechesthai) and containing every kind of number, and ratio connected with number, and every proportion, and harmony, and symphony. VII.
52 But we must consider, with all the accuracy possible, each of these oracles separately, not looking upon any one of them as superfluous. Now the best beginning of all living beings is God, and of all virtues, piety. And we must, therefore, speak of these two principles in the first place. There is an error of no small importance which has taken possession of the greater portion of mankind concerning a subject which was likely by itself, or, at least, above all other subjects, to have been fixed with the greatest correctness and truth in the mind of every one;
64 Let us, therefore, reject all such impious dishonesty, and not worship those who are our brothers by nature, even though they may have received a purer and more immortal essence than ourselves (for all created things are brothers to one another, inasmuch as they are created; since the Father of them all is one, the Creator of the universe); but let us rather, with our mind and reason, and with all our strength, gird ourselves up vigorously and energetically to the service of that Being who is uncreated and everlasting, and the maker of the universe, never shrinking or turning aside from it, nor yielding to a desire of pleasing the multitude, by which even those who might be saved are often destroyed.
132 The second commandment of this second table is to do no murder. For nature, having produced man as a gregarious and sociable creature, and the most easily domesticated of all animals, has invited it to a fellowship of opinion and partnership, giving him reason, as a means to lead to a harmony and admixture of dispositions. And he who slays any man must not be ignorant that he is overturning the laws and ordices of nature, which have been beautifully established for the common advantage of all men. ' None |
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80. Philo of Alexandria, On Giants, 25 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Human nature • law of nature • law of nature, unwritten law and • physis, as nature of things and persons
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 152; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73
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25 But think not that thus this taking away, could be by means of cutting off or separation; but it is here, as is the case in an operation effected by fire, which can light ten thousand torches, without itself being diminished the least atom, or ceasing to remain as it was before. Something like this also is the nature of knowledge. For though it has made all its pupils, and all who have become acquainted with it, learned, still it is in no degree diminished itself, but very often it even becomes improved, just as, they say, that fountains sometimes are by being drained dry; for, it is said, that they sometimes become sweeter by such a process. '' None |
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81. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 29-31, 82 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anger, Anger natural or necessary among Christians • Appetite (epithumia), Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Gentiles, and law of nature • Gluttony, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Human nature • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Lust, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Natural, necessary, Thoughts • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • law of nature, and Gentiles • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, contents identified by Philo • law of nature, death as • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, its relation to human law • nature, God as • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • physis, and nature of God • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • ps.-Makarios (Makarios, desert Father, mentor of Evagrius) , Some thoughts natural rather than bad • reason, in Philos view of nature • unwritten law, unwritten nature • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 389; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 74, 75, 77, 84, 89, 99, 115; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 386
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29 for this world is a sort of large state, and has one constitution, and one law, and the word of nature enjoins what one ought to do, and forbids what one ought not to do: but the cities themselves in their several situations are unlimited in number, and enjoy different constitutions, and laws which are not all the same; for there are different customs and established regulations found out and established in different nations; ' 30 and the cause of this the want of union, and participation existing not merely between the Greeks and the barbarians, or between the barbarians and the Greeks, but also between the different tribes of each of these respective nations. Then they, as it would seem, blaming those things which do not deserve blame, such as unexpected occurrences or opportunities, deficiency of crops, badness of soil, their own situation either as being by the sea-side, or inland, or insular, or on the continent, or anything of that sort, are silent as to the real truth. The real truth is their covetousness, their want of good faith towards and confidence in one another, on which account they have not been satisfied with the laws of nature, but have called those regulations, which have appeared to be for the common advantage of the agreeing and uimous multitudes, laws, so that the individual constitutions do naturally appear rather in the light of additions to the one great general constitution of nature; 31 for the laws of individual cities are additions to the one right reason of nature; and so also the man who is occupied with political affairs is an addition to the man who lives in accordance with nature. VII. ' None |
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82. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 34-35, 89-90, 128 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Nature • following nature • law of nature • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law, natural/of nature • nature, God’s commands evident in
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 209; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 144; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 129; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 105; Sly (1990), Philo's Perception of Women, 49; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 269
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34 I am not ashamed to relate what has happened to me myself, which I know from having experienced it ten thousand times. Sometimes, when I have desired to come to my usual employment of writing on the doctrines of philosophy, though I have known accurately what it was proper to set down, I have found my mind barren and unproductive, and have been completely unsuccessful in my object, being indigt at my mind for the uncertainty and vanity of its then existent opinions, and filled with amazement at the power of the living God, by whom the womb of the soul is at times opened and at times closed up; 35 and sometimes when I have come to my work empty I have suddenly become full, ideas being, in an invisible manner, showered upon me, and implanted in me from on high; so that, through the influence of divine inspiration, I have become greatly excited, and have known neither the place in which I was nor those who were present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writing; for then I have been conscious of a richness of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most penetrating sight, a most manifest energy in all that was to be done, having such an effect on my mind as the clearest ocular demonstration would have on the eyes. VIII.
89 For there are some men, who, looking upon written laws as symbols of things appreciable by the intellect, have studied some things with superfluous accuracy, and have treated others with neglectful indifference; whom I should blame for their levity; for they ought to attend to both classes of things, applying themselves both to an accurate investigation of invisible things, and also to an irreproachable observance of those laws which are notorious. 90 But now men living solitarily by themselves as if they were in a desert, or else as if they were mere souls unconnected with the body, and as if they had no knowledge of any city, or village, or house, or in short of any company of men whatever, overlook what appears to the many to be true, and seek for plain naked truth by itself, whom the sacred scripture teaches not to neglect a good reputation, and not to break through any established customs which divine men of greater wisdom than any in our time have enacted or established.
128 And this is the end which is celebrated among those who study philosophy in the best manner, namely, to live in accordance with nature. And this takes place when the mind, entering into the path of virtue, treads in the steps of right reason, and follows God, remembering his commandments, and at all times and in all places confirming them both by word and deed;" '' None |
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83. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 14, 84-86 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, in Philo • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, living in accordance with • physis, and nature of God • physis, as nature of things and persons
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 201, 210; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70, 78
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14 And, indeed, the living God is so completely indescribable, that even those powers which minister unto him do not announce his proper name to us. At all events, after the wrestling match in which the practicer of virtue wrestled for the sake of the acquisition of virtue, he says to the invisible Master, "Tell me thy Name;" but he said, "Why askest thou me my name?" And he does not tell him his peculiar and proper name, for says he, it is sufficient for thee to be taught my ordinary explanations. But as for names which are the symbols of created things, do not seek to find them among immortal natures. III. 84 for the man who is improved by instruction, having received a happy and virtuous nature, uses that virtue alone which, by means of memory co-operating with it, implants in him an absence of forgetfulness, so that he comprehends and takes firm hold of all the things which he has once learnt; but he who practices virtue, since he is continually exercising himself, stops to take breath, and relaxes his efforts for a while, collecting himself and recovering the vigour which was a little impaired by his exertions, just as those men do who have oiled their bodies for the contests in the arena. For these men, also, labouring at their training exercises, in order to prevent their powers being utterly broken down, anoint themselves with oil on account of the violent and continued nature of their exercise. 85 Then the man who is improved by instruction, having an immortal monitor, receives from him a harmonious and imperishable advantage, without suffering any change; but the practiser of virtue is impelled to action by his own inclination alone, and he exercises himself in it, and labours at it in order to change that passion, which is akin to a created being; and even if he attains to perfection, he still, being fatigued, returns to his ancient kind of labour; 86 for he is more inclined to endure toil, but the other is more fortunate, for he has another person as a teacher. But this man, by his own unassisted efforts, investigates, and inquires, and pushes his examination, investigating the mysteries of nature with great earnestness, and exerting continual and incessant labour. ' None |
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84. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 1-3, 13, 16, 19-20, 22, 46, 69-70, 73, 88-128, 134-135 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Gentiles, and law of nature • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Law of nature • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • Will, Nature’s • angels, incorporeal nature of • heaven, as intelligible nature • human, nature • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, Stoic concept of • law of nature, and Gentiles • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, contents identified by Philo • law of nature, death as • law of nature, in Philo • law, natural/of nature • legal concepts, divine law and natural law • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natural law and divine law • natural world, • nature, • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • nature, hierarchy in • nature, human • nature, laws not at variance with • nature, “heaven” as intelligible • physis, and nature of God • physis, as nature of things and persons • tenor (hexis), level in the hierarchy of cosmic nature • the three visitors, incorporeal nature of • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Bay (2022), Biblical Heroes and Classical Culture in Christian Late Antiquity: The Historiography, Exemplarity, and Anti-Judaism of Pseudo-Hegesippus, 101; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 1, 2, 148, 151, 159, 161, 209, 258, 305, 389, 390; Bloch (2022), Ancient Jewish Diaspora: Essays on Hellenism, 73; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 72; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 173, 174, 179, 180, 187, 188, 189; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 69, 71; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 128; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 466; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 240; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 285; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 73, 79, 84, 116; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 113, 255; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 301
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1 of other lawgivers, some have set forth what they considered to be just and reasonable, in a naked and unadorned manner, while others, investing their ideas with an abundance of amplification, have sought to bewilder the people, by burying the truth under a heap of fabulous inventions. '2 But Moses, rejecting both of these methods, the one as inconsiderate, careless, and unphilosophical, and the other as mendacious and full of trickery, made the beginning of his laws entirely beautiful, and in all respects admirable, neither at once declaring what ought to be done or the contrary, nor (since it was necessary to mould beforehand the dispositions of those who were to use his laws) inventing fables himself or adopting those which had been invented by others. 3 And his exordium, as I have already said, is most admirable; embracing the creation of the world, under the idea that the law corresponds to the world and the world to the law, and that a man who is obedient to the law, being, by so doing, a citizen of the world, arranges his actions with reference to the intention of nature, in harmony with which the whole universal world is regulated.
13 And he says that the world was made in six days, not because the Creator stood in need of a length of time (for it is natural that God should do everything at once, not merely by uttering a command, but by even thinking of it); but because the things created required arrangement; and number is akin to arrangement; and, of all numbers, six is, by the laws of nature, the most productive: for of all the numbers, from the unit upwards, it is the first perfect one, being made equal to its parts, and being made complete by them; the number three being half of it, and the number two a third of it, and the unit a sixth of it, and, so to say, it is formed so as to be both male and female, and is made up of the power of both natures; for in existing things the odd number is the male, and the even number is the female; accordingly, of odd numbers the first is the number three, and of even numbers the first is two, and the two numbers multiplied together make six.
16 for God, as apprehending beforehand, as a God must do, that there could not exist a good imitation without a good model, and that of the things perceptible to the external senses nothing could be faultless which wax not fashioned with reference to some archetypal idea conceived by the intellect, when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect, in order that so using an incorporeal model formed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect.
19 Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who, having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model. V. 20 As therefore the city, when previously shadowed out in the mind of the man of architectural skill had no external place, but was stamped solely in the mind of the workman, so in the same manner neither can the world which existed in ideas have had any other local position except the divine reason which made them; for what other place could there be for his powers which should be able to receive and contain, I do not say all, but even any single one of them whatever, in its simple form?
22 For the substance was of itself destitute of arrangement, of quality, of animation, of distinctive character, and full of all disorder and confusion; and it received a change and transformation to what is opposite to this condition, and most excellent, being invested with order, quality, animation, resemblance, identity, arrangement, harmony, and everything which belongs to the more excellent idea. VI.
46 "Let them run over in their minds the first creation of the universe, when, before the sun or the moon existed, the earth brought forth all kinds of plants and all kinds of fruits: and seeing this in their minds let them hope that it will again also bring forth such, according to the appointment of the Father, when it shall seem good to him, without his having need of the aid of any of the sons of men beneath the heavens, to whom he has given powers, though not absolute ones." For as a charioteer holding the reigns or a helmsman with his hand upon the rudder, he guides everything as he pleases, in accordance with law and justice, needing no one else as his assistant; for all things are possible to God. XV.
69 So then after all the other things, as has been said before, Moses says that man was made in the image and likeness of God. And he says well; for nothing that is born on the earth is more resembling God than man. And let no one think that he is able to judge of this likeness from the characters of the body: for neither is God a being with the form of a man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind: for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which carries it about and bears its image within it. In the same rank that the great Governor occupies in the universal world, that same as it seems does the mind of man occupy in man; for it is invisible, though it sees everything itself; and it has an essence which is undiscernible, though it can discern the essences of all other things, and making for itself by art and science all sorts of roads leading in divers directions, and all plain; it traverses land and sea, investigating everything which is contained in either element. 70 And again, being raised up on wings, and so surveying and contemplating the air, and all the commotions to which it is subject, it is borne upwards to the higher firmament, and to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. And also being itself involved in the revolutions of the planets and fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music, and being led on by love, which is the guide of wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible by the external senses, it comes to aspire to such as is perceptible only by the intellect:
73 of existing things, there are some which partake neither of virtue nor of vice; as for instance, plants and irrational animals; the one, because they are destitute of soul, and are regulated by a nature void of sense; and the other, because they are not endowed with mind of reason. But mind and reason may be looked upon as the abode of virtue and vice; as it is in them that they seem to dwell. Some things again partake of virtue alone, being without any participation in any kind of vice; as for instance, the stars, for they are said to be animals, and animals endowed with intelligence; or I might rather say, the mind of each of them is wholly and entirely virtuous, and unsusceptible of every kind of evil. Some things again are of a mixed nature, like man, who is capable of opposite qualities, of wisdom and folly, of temperance and dissoluteness, of courage and cowardice, of justice and injustice, in short of good and evil, of what is honourable and what is disgraceful, of virtue and vice.
88 for the charioteers sit behind their beasts of burden, and are placed at, their backs, and yet when they have the reins in their hands, they guide them wherever they choose, and at one time they urge them on to a swift pace, and at another time they hold them back, if they are going on at a speed greater than is desirable. And pilots again, sitting in the hindmost part of the ship, that is the stern are, as one may say, the most important of all the people in the ship, inasmuch as they have the safety of the ship and of all those who are in it, in their hands. And so the Creator has made man to be as it were a charioteer and pilot over all other animals, in order that he may hold the reins and direct the course of every thing upon earth, having the superintendence of all animals and plants, as a sort of viceroy of the principal and mighty King. XXX. 89 But after the whole world had been completed according to the perfect nature of the number six, the Father hallowed the day following, the seventh, praising it, and calling it holy. For that day is the festival, not of one city or one country, but of all the earth; a day which alone it is right to call the day of festival for all people, and the birthday of the world. 90 And I know not if any one would be able to celebrate the nature of the number seven in adequate terms, since it is superior to every form of expression. But it does not follow that because it is more admirable than anything that can be said of it, that on that account one ought to keep silence; but rather we ought to try, even if one cannot say everything which is proper, or even that which is most proper, at all events to utter such things as may be attainable by our capacities. 9
1 The number seven is spoken of in two ways; the one within the number ten which is measured by repeating the unit alone seven times, and which consists of seven units; the other is the number outside ten, the beginning of which is altogether the unit increasing according to a twofold or threefold, or any other proportion whatever; as are the numbers sixty-four, and seven hundred and twenty-nine; the one number of which is increased by doubling on from the unit, and the other by trebling. And it is not well to examine either species superficially, but the second has a most manifest pre-eminence. 92 For in every case the number which is combined from the unit in double or treble ratio, or any other ratio, whatsoever, is the seventh number, a cube and a square, embracing both species, both that of the incorporeal and that of the corporeal essence. That of the incorporeal essence according to the superficies which quadrangular figures present, and that of the corporeal essence according to the other figure which cubes make; 93 and the clearest proof of this is afforded by the numbers already spoken of. In the seventh number increasing immediately from the unit in a twofold ratio, namely, the number sixty-four, is a square formed by the multiplication of eight by eight, and it is also a cube by the multiplication of four and four, four times. And again, the seventh number from the unit being increased in a threefold ratio, that is to say, the number seven hundred and twenty-nine, is a square, the number seven and twenty being multiplied by itself; and it is also a cube, by nine being multiplied by itself nine times. 94 And in every case a man making his beginning from the unit, and proceeding on to the seventh number, and increasing in the same ratio till he comes to the number seven, will at all times find the number, when increased, both a cube and a square. At all events, he who begins with the number sixty-four, and combines them in a doubling ratio, will make the seventh number four thousand and ninety-six, which is both a square and a cube, having sixty-four as its square root, and sixteen as its cube root. XXXI. 95 And we must also pass on to the other species of the number seven, which is contained in the number ten, and which displays an admirable nature, and one not inferior to the previously mentioned species. The number seven consists of one, and two and four, numbers which have two most harmonious ratios, the twofold and the fourfold ratio; the former of which affects the diapason harmony, while the fourfold ratio causes that of the double diapason. It also comprehends other divisions, existing in some kind of yoke-like combination. For it is divided first of all into the number one, and the number six; then into the two and the five; and last of all, into the three and the four. 96 And the proportion of these numbers is a most musical one; for the number six bears to the number one a six-fold ratio, and the six-fold ratio causes the greatest possible difference between existing tones; the distance namely, by which the sharpest tone is separated from the flattest, as we shall show when we pass on from numbers to the discussion of harmony. Again, the ratio of four to two displays the greatest power in harmony, almost equal to that of the diapason, as is most evidently shown in the rules of that art. And the ratio of four to three effects the first harmony, that in the thirds, which is the diatessaron. XXXII. 97 The number seven displays also another beauty which it possesses, and one which is most sacred to think of. For as it consists of three and four, it displays in existing things a line which is free from all deviation and upright by nature. And in what way it does so I must show. The rectangular triangle, which is the beginning of all qualities, consists of the Numbers and four, and five; and the three and the four, which are the essence of the seven, contain the right angle; for the obtuse angle and the acute angle show irregularity, and disorder, and inequality; for one may be more acute or more obtuse than another. But a right angle does not admit of comparison, nor is one right angle more a right angle than another: but one remains similar to another, never changing its peculiar nature. But if the right-angled triangle is the beginning of all figures and of all qualities, and if the essence of the number seven, that is to say, the numbers three and four together, supply the most necessary part of this, namely, the right angle, then seven may be rightly thought to be the fountain of every figure and of every quality. 98 And besides what has been already advanced, this also may be asserted that three is the number of a plane figure, since a point has been laid down to be, according to a unit, and a line according to the number two, and a plane superficies according to the number three. Also, four is the number of a cube, by the addition of one to the number of a plane superficies, depth being added to the superficies. From which it is plain that the essence of the number seven is the foundation of geometry and trigonometry; and in a word, of all incorporeal and corporeal substances. XXXIII. 99 And such great sanctity is there in the number seven, that it has a pre-eminent rank beyond all the other numbers in the first decade. For of the other numbers, some produce without being produced, others are produced but have no productive power themselves; others again both produce and are produced. But the number seven alone is contemplated in no part. And this proposition we must confirm by demonstration. Now the number one produces all the other numbers in order, being itself produced absolutely by no other; and the number eight is produced by twice four, but itself produces no other number in the decade. Again, four has the rank of both, that is, of parents and of offspring; for it produces eight when doubled, and it is produced by twice two.
100 But seven alone, as I said before, neither produces nor is produced, on which account other philosophers liken this number to Victory, who had no mother, and to the virgin goddess, whom the fable asserts to have sprung from the head of Jupiter: and the Pythagoreans compare it to the Ruler of all things. For that which neither produces, nor is produced, remains immovable. For generation consists in motion, since that which is generated, cannot be so without motion, both to cause production, and to be produced. And the only thing which neither moves nor is moved, is the Elder, Ruler, and Lord of the universe, of whom the number seven may reasonably be called a likeness. And Philolaus gives his testimony to this doctrine of mine in the following Words:ù"for God," says he "is the ruler and Lord of all things, being one, eternal, lasting, immovable, himself like to himself, and different from all other beings." XXXIV.
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1 Among the things then which are perceptible only by intellect, the number seven is proved to be the only thing free from motion and accident; but among things perceptible by the external senses, it displays a great and comprehensive power, contributing to the improvement of all terrestrial things, and affecting even the periodical changes of the moon. And in what manner it does this, we must consider. The number seven when compounded of numbers beginning with the unit, makes eight-and-twenty, a perfect number, and one equalised in its parts. And the number so produced, is calculated to reproduce the revolutions of the moon, bringing her back to the point from which she first began to increase in a manner perceptible by the external senses, and to which she returns by waning. For she increases from her first crescent-shaped figure, to that of a half circle in seven days; and in seven more, she becomes a full orb; and then again she turns back, retracing the same path, like a runner of the diaulos, receding from an orb full of light, to a half circle again in seven days, and lastly, in an equal number she diminishes from a half circle to the form of a crescent; and thus the number before mentioned is completed.
102 And the number seven by those persons who are in the habit of employing names with strict propriety is called the perfecting number; because by it, everything is perfected. And any one may receive a confirmation of this from the fact, that every organic body has three dimensions, length, depth, and breadth; and four boundaries, the point, the line, the superficies, and the solid; and by theses, when combined, the number seven is made up. But it would be impossible for bodies to be measured by the number seven, according to the combination of the three dimensions, and the four boundaries, if it did not happen that the ideas of the first numbers, one, two, three and four, in which the number ten is founded, comprised the nature of the number seven. For the aforesaid numbers have four boundaries, the first, the second, the third, the fourth, and three intervals. The first interval being that between one and two; the second, that between two and three; the third, that between three and four. XXXV.
103 And besides what has been already said, the growth of men from infancy to old age, when measured by the number seven, displays in a most evident manner its perfecting power; for in the first period of seven years, the putting forth of the teeth takes place. And at the end of the second period of the same length, he arrives at the age of puberty: at the end of the third period, the growth of the beard takes place. The fourth period sees him arrive at the fullness of his manly strength. The fifth seven years is the season for marriage. In the sixth period he arrives at the maturity of his understanding. The seventh period is that of the most rapid improvement and growth of both his intellectual and reasoning powers. The eighth is the sum of the perfection of both. In the ninth, his passions assume a mildness and gentleness, from being to a great degree tamed. In the tenth, the desirable end of life comes upon him, while his limbs and organic senses are still unimpaired: for excessive old age is apt to weaken and enfeeble them all. ' "
104 And Solon, the Athenian lawgiver, described these different ages in the following elegiac verses:ù In seven years from th' earliest breath, The child puts forth his hedge of teeth; When strengthened by a similar span, He first displays some signs of man. As in a third, his limbs increase, A beard buds o'er his changing face. When he has passed a fourth such time, His strength and vigour's in its prime. When five times seven years o'er his head Have passed, the man should think to wed; At forty two, the wisdom's clear To shun vile deed of folly or fear: While seven times seven years to sense Add ready wit and eloquence. And seven years further skill admit To raise them to their perfect height. When nine such periods have passed, His powers, though milder grown, still last; When God has granted ten times seven, The aged man prepares for heaven. XXXVI. " 105 Solon therefore thus computes the life of man by the aforesaid ten periods of seven years. But Hippocrates the physician says that there are Seven ages of man, infancy, childhood, boyhood, youth, manhood, middle age, old age; and that these too, are measured by periods of seven, though not in the same order. And he speaks thus; ``In the nature of man there are seven seasons, which men call ages; infancy, childhood, boyhood, and the rest. He is an infant till he reaches his seventh year, the age of the shedding of his teeth. He is a child till he arrives at the age of puberty, which takes place in fourteen years. He is a boy till his beard begins to grow, and that time is the end of a third period of seven years. He is a youth till the completion of the growth of his whole body, which coincides with the fourth seven years. Then he is a man till he reaches his forty-ninth year, or seven times seven periods. He is a middle aged man till he is fifty-six, or eight times seven years old; and after that he is an old man.
106 And it is also affirmed for the particular praise of the number seven, that it has a very admirable rank in nature, because it is composed of three and four. And if any one doubles the third number after the unit, he will find a square; and if he doubles the fourth number, he will find a cube. And if he doubles the seventh from both, he will both a cube and a square; therefore, the third number from the unit is a square in a double ratio. And the fourth number, eight, is a cube. And the seventh number, being sixty-four, is both a cube and a square at the same time; so that the seventh number is really a perfecting one, signifying both equalities, ùthe plane superficies by the square, according to the connection with the number three, and the solid by the cube according to its relationship to the number four; and of the numbers three and four, are composed the number seven. XXXVII.
107 But this number is not only a perfecter of things, but it is also, so to say, the most harmonious of numbers; and in a manner the source of that most beautiful diagram which describes all the harmonies, that of fourths, and that of fifths, and the diapason. It also comprises all the proportions, the arithmetical, the geometrical, and moreover the harmonic proportion. And the square consists of these numbers, six, eight, nine, and twelve; and eight bears to six the ratio of being one third greater, which is the diatessaron of harmony. And nine bears to six the ratio of being half as great again, which is the ratio of fifths. And twelve is to six, in a twofold proportion; and this is the same as the diapason.
108 The number seven comprises also, as I have said, all the proportions of arithmetrical proportion, from the numbers six, and nine, and twelve; for as the number in the middle exceeds the first number by three, it is also exceeded by three by the last number. And geometrical proportion is according to these four numbers. For the same ratio that eight bears to six, that also does twelve bear to nine. And this is the ratio of thirds. Harmonic ratio consists of three numbers, six, and eight, and twelve.
109 But there are two ways of judging of harmonic proportion. One when, whatever ratio the last number bears to the first, the excess by which the last number exceeds the middle one is the same as the excess by which the middle number exceeds the first. And any one may derive a most evident proof of this from the numbers before mentioned, six, and eight, and twelve: for the last number is double the first. And again, the excess of twelve over eight is double the excess of eight over six. For the number twelve exceeds eight by four, and eight exceeds six by two; and four is the double of two.
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10 And another test of harmonic proportion is, when the middle term exceeds and is exceeded by those on each side of it, by an equal portion; for eight being the middle term, exceeds the first term by a third part; for if six be subtracted from it, the remainder two is one third of the original number six: and it is exceeded by the last term in an equal proportion; for if eight be taken from twelve, the remainder four is one third of the whole number twelve. XXXVIII.
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1 Let this then be premised, as of necessity it must, respecting the honourable qualities which this diagram or square has, and the name to which it is entitled, and the number seven unfolds an equal number of ideas, and even more in the case of incorporeal things, which are perceptible only by the intellect; and its nature extends also over every visible essence, reaching to both heaven and earth, which are the boundaries of every thing. For what portion of all the things on earth is there which is not fond of seven; being subdued by an affection and longing for the seventh.
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12 Accordingly men say, that the heaven is girdled with seven circles, the names of which are as follows; the arctic, the antarctic, the summer tropic, the winter tropic, the equinoctial, the zodiac, and last of all the galaxy. For the horizon is something which affects ourselves, in proportion as any one has acute vision, or the contrary; our sensation cutting off at one time a lesser, and at another time a greater circumference.
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13 The planets too, and the corresponding host of fixed stars, are arrayed in seven divisions, displaying a very great sympathy with the air and the earth. For they turn the air towards the times, that are called the seasons of the year, causing in each of them innumerable changes by calm weather, and pleasant breezes, and clouds, and irresistible blasts of wind. And again, they make rivers to overflow and to subside, and turn plains into lakes; and again, on the contrary, they dry up the waters: they also cause the alterations of the seas, when they receded, and return with a reflux. For at times, when the tide recedes on a sudden, an extensive line of shore occupies what is usually a wide gulf of sea; and in a short time afterwards, the waters are brought back, and there appears a sea, sailed over, not by shallow boats, but by ships of exceeding great burden. And they also give increase and perfection to all the terrestrial animals and plants which produce fruit, endowing each with a nature to last a long time, so that new plants may flourish and come to maturity; ùthe old ones having passed away, in order to provide an abundant supply of necessary things. XXXIX.
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14 Moreover, the constellation Ursa Major, which men call the guide of mariners, consists of seven stars, which the pilots keeping in view, steer in innumerable paths across the sea, directing their endeavours towards an incredible task, beyond the capacity of human intellect. For it is through conjectures, directed by the aforementioned stars, that they have discovered countries which were previously unknown; those who dwell on the continent having discovered islands, and islanders having found out continents. For it was fitting that the recesses both of earth and sea should be revealed to that God-loving animal, the race of mankind, by the purest of essences, namely heaven.
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15 And besides the stars above mentioned the band of the Pleiades is also made up of seven stars, the rising and occultation of which are the causes of great benefits to all men. For when they set, the furrows are ploughed up for the purpose of sowing; and when they are about to rise, they bring glad tidings of harvest; and after they have arisen, they awaken the rejoicing husbandman to the collection of their necessary food. And they with joy store up their food for their daily use.
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16 And the sun, the ruler of the day, making two equinoxes every year, both in spring and autumn. The spring equinox in the constellation of Aries, and the autumnal one in Libra, gives the most evident demonstration possible of the divine dignity of the number seven. For each of the equinoxes takes place in the seventh month, at which time men are expressly commanded by law to celebrate the greatest and most popular and comprehensive festivals; since it is owing to both these seasons, that all the fruits of the earth are engendered and brought to perfection; the fruit of corn, and all other things which are sown, being owing to the vernal equinox; and that of the vine, and of all the other plants which bear hard berries, of which there are great numbers, to the autumnal one. XL.
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17 And since all the things on the earth depend upon the heavenly bodies according to a certain natural sympathy, it is in heaven too that the ratio of the number seven began, and from thence it descended to us also, coming down to visit the race of mortal men. And so again, besides the domit part of our mind, our soul is divided into seven divisions; there being five senses, and besides them the vocal organ, and after that the generative power. All which things, like the puppets in a raree show, which are moved by strings by the manager, are at one time quiet, and at another time in motion, each according to its suitable habits and capacities of motion.
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18 And in the same way, if any one were to set about investigating the different parts of the body, in both their interior and the exterior arrangement, he will in each case find seven divisions. Those which are visible are as follow; ùthe head, the chest, the belly, two arms, and two legs; the internal parts, or the entrails, as they are called, are the stomach, the heart, the lungs, the spleen, the liver, and the two kidneys.
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19 Again, the principal and domit part in an animal is the head, and that has seven most necessary divisions: two eyes, an equal number of ears, two channels for the nostrils, and the mouth to make up seven, through which as Plato says, mortal things find their entrance, and immortal things their exit. For into the mouth do enter meat and drink, perishable food of a perishable body; but from out of it proceed wordsùthe immortal laws of an immortal soul, by means of which rational life is regulated. XLI.
120 Again, the things which are judged of by the best of the senses, sight, partake of number according to their kind. For the things which are seen are seven; body, distance, shape, magnitude, colour, motion, tranquillity, and besides these there is nothing.
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1 It also happens that all the changes of the voice amount to seven; the acute, the grave, the contracted, in the fourth place the aspirated sound, the fifth is the tone, the sixth the long, the seventh the short sound.
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22 There are also seven motions; the motion upwards, the motion downwards, that to the right, that to the left, the forward motion, the backward motion, and the rotatory motion, as is most especially shown by those who exhibit dances.
123 It is affirmed also that the secretions of the body are performed in the aforesaid number of seven. For tears are poured out through the eyes, and the purifications of the head through the nostrils, and through the mouth the saliva which is spit out; there are, besides two other channels for the evacuation of the superfluities of the body, the one being placed in front and the other behind; the sixth mode of evacuation is the effusion of perspiration over the whole body, and the seventh that most natural exercise of the generative powers.
124 Again, in the case of women, the flux called the catamenia, is usually carried on for seven days. Also, children in the womb receive life at the end of seven months, so that a very extraordinary thing happens: for children who are born at the end of the seventh month live, while those who are born at the expiration of the eighth month are altogether incapable of surviving.
125 Again, the dangerous diseases of the body, especially when lasting fevers, arising from the distemperature of the powers within us, attack us, are usually decided about the seventh day. For that day determines the contest for life, allotting safety to some men, and death to others. XLII.
126 And the power of this number does not exist only in the instances already mentioned, but it also pervades the most excellent of the sciences, the knowledge of grammar and music. For the lyre with seven strings, bearing a proportion to the assemblage of the seven planets, perfects its admirable harmonies, being almost the chief of all instruments which are conversant about music. And of the elements of grammar, those which are properly called vowels are, correctly speaking, seven in number, since they can be sounded by themselves, and when they are combined with other letters, they make complete sounds; for they fill up the deficiency existing in semi-vowels, making the sounds whole; and they change and alter the natures of the mutes inspiring them with their own power, in order that what has no sound may become endowed with sound.
127 On which account it appears to me that they also originally gave letters their names, and acting as became wise men, did give the name to the number seven from the Respect they had for it, and from regard to the dignity inherent in it. But the Romans, adding the letter S, which had been omitted by the Greeks, show still more conspicuously the correct etymological meaning of the word, calling it septem, as derived from semnos, venerable, as has been said before, and from sebasmos, veneration. XLIII.
128 These things, and more still are said in a philosophical spirit about the number seven, on account of which it has received the highest honours, in the highest nature. And it is honoured by those of the highest reputation among both Greeks and barbarians, who devote themselves to mathematical sciences. It was also greatly honoured by Moses, a man much attached to excellence of all sorts, who described its beauty on the most holy pillars of the law, and wrote it in the hearts of all those who were subject to him, commanding them at the end of each period of six days to keep the seventh holy; abstaining from all other works which are done in the seeking after and providing the means of life, devoting that day to the single object of philosophizing with a view to the improvement of their morals, and the examination of their consciences: for conscience being seated in the soul as a judge, is not afraid to reprove men, sometimes employing pretty vehement threats; at other times by milder admonitions, using threats in regard to matters where men appear to be disobedient, of deliberate purpose, and admonitions when their offences seem involuntary, through want of foresight, in order to prevent their hereafter offending in a similar manner. XLIV.
134 After this, Moses says that "God made man, having taken clay from the earth, and he breathed into his face the breath of life." And by this expression he shows most clearly that there is a vast difference between man as generated now, and the first man who was made according to the image of God. For man as formed now is perceptible to the external senses, partaking of qualities, consisting of body and soul, man or woman, by nature mortal. But man, made according to the image of God, was an idea, or a genus, or a seal, perceptible only by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, imperishable by nature.
135 But he asserts that the formation of the individual man, perceptible by the external senses is a composition of earthy substance, and divine spirit. For that the body was created by the Creator taking a lump of clay, and fashioning the human form out of it; but that the soul proceeds from no created thing at all, but from the Father and Ruler of all things. For when he uses the expression, "he breathed into," etc., he means nothing else than the divine spirit proceeding form that happy and blessed nature, sent to take up its habitation here on earth, for the advantage of our race, in order that, even if man is mortal according to that portion of him which is visible, he may at all events be immortal according to that portion which is invisible; and for this reason, one may properly say that man is on the boundaries of a better and an immortal nature, partaking of each as far as it is necessary for him; and that he was born at the same time, both mortal and the immortal. Mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his intellect. XLVII. ' None |
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85. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 32 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • law of nature, in Philo • nature, Isaac and • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 195; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 74
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32 Having, therefore, now pointed out each variety, the tranquillity of the good man, and the state of agitation in which the bad man lives, let us now consider what follows the statement which we have hitherto been examining. For Moses says that Nod, which name, being interpreted, means the tumult into which the soul has migrated, is opposite to Eden. Now Eden is a symbolical expression for correct and divine reason, on which account its interpretation is luxury; because divine reason is, above all other things, delighted with and exults among unmingled and pure, and also well filled up and complete pleasure, God, the giver of all good things, raising his virgin and undying graces upon it. But by its own intrinsic nature, the bad is always striving with the good, the unjust with the just, the wise with the foolish, and all the different species of virtue with all the different species of vice. Something like this is the meaning of the statement that Nod is opposite to Eden. XI. '' None |
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86. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 20, 69 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, And law of nature • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, transcended written law • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • physis, as nature of things and persons • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 199; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70, 120, 156; Sly (1990), Philo's Perception of Women, 49
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20 Consider, O my soul, and know who it is who is hated, and who is the son of her who is hated, and immediately you shall perceive that the chief rights and chief honours belong to no one else but to him alone; for there are two wives cohabiting with each individual of us, hostile and inimical to one another, filling the abode of the soul with the contentions which arise from jealousy. of these we love one, which is gentle and tractable, and which we think very affectionate and akin to ourselves, and its name is pleasure; but the other we hate, looking upon it as untameable, ungentle, fierce, and very hostile to us, and the name of this one is virtue. Now what mortal is ignorant of the great mysteries of that exceedingly beautiful and greatly contended for pleasure? And who could worthily describe the multitude or the greatness of the good things which are treasured up by Virtue? 69 But Pharaoh, the squanderer of all things, not being able himself to receive the conception of virtues unconnected with time, inasmuch as he was mutilated as to the eyes of his soul, by which alone incorporeal natures are comprehended, would not endure to be benefited by virtues unconnected with time; but being weighed down by soulless opinions, I mean here by the frogs, animals which utter a sound and noise wholly void and destitute of reality, when Moses says, "appoint a time to me when I may pray for you and for your servants that God will make the frogs to Disappear," though he ought, as he was in very imminent necessity, to have said, Pray this moment, nevertheless postponed it, saying, "Pray to-morrow," in order that he might in every case preserve the folly of his impiety. ' None |
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87. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.6, 1.15, 1.33, 1.164-1.165, 1.167-1.169, 1.171-1.172 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Mosaic law, law of nature and • hierarchy, of being (scala naturae) • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, unwritten law and • law, of Nature • natural • nature • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, living in accordance with • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 1, 152, 161, 162, 194, 210; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 27; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 20; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 192; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70, 73, 74; Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 96; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 106
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1.6 Let us then at once begin and consider the first of these points. To me, then, the well appears to be an emblem of knowledge; for its nature is not superficial, but very deep. Nor does it lie in an open place, but a well is fond of being hidden somewhere in secret. Nor is it found with ease, but only after great labour and with difficulty; and this too is seen to be the case with sciences, not only with such as have great and indescribable subjects of speculation, but even with respect to such as are the most insignificant.
1.15 May it not be that sacred historian here desires to represent, in a figurative manner, that as in the universe there are four elements of which this world is composed, and as there are an equal number in ourselves, of which we have been fashioned before we were moulded into our human shape, three of them are capable of being comprehended somehow or other, but the fourth is unintelligible to all who come forward as judges of it.
1.33 Therefore now the fourth element is incomprehensible, in the world of heaven, in comparison of the nature of the earth, of the water, and of the air; and the mind in man, in comparison of the body and the outward sense, and the speech, which is the interpreter of the mind; may it not be the case also, that for this reason the fourth year is described as holy and praiseworthy in the sacred scriptures?
1.164 Now is it not fitting that even blind men should become sharpsighted in their minds to these and similar things, being endowed with the power of sight by the most sacred oracles, so as to be able to contemplate the glories of nature, and not to be limited to the mere understanding of the words? But even if we voluntarily close the eye of our soul and take no care to understand such mysteries, or if we are unable to look up to them, the hierophant himself stands by and prompts us. And do not thou ever cease through weariness to anoint thy eyes until you have introduced those who are duly initiated to the secret light of the sacred scriptures, and have displayed to them the hidden things therein contained, and their reality, which is invisible to those who are uninitiated. 1.165 It is becoming then for you to act thus; but as for ye, O souls, who have once tasted of divine love, as if you had even awakened from deep sleep, dissipate the mist that is before you; and hasten forward to that beautiful spectacle, putting aside slow and hesitating fear, in order to comprehend all the beautiful sounds and sights which the president of the games has prepared for your advantage. XXVII.
1.167 is it not then worth while to examine into the cause of this difference? Undoubtedly it is; let us then in a careful manner apply ourselves to the consideration of the cause. Philosophers say that virtue exists among men, either by nature, or by practice, or by learning. On which account the sacred scriptures represent the three founders of the nation of the Israelites as wise men; not indeed originally endowed with the same kind of wisdom, but arriving rapidly at the same end. 1.168 For the eldest of them, Abraham, had instruction for his guide in the road which conducted him to virtue; as we shall show in another treatise to the best of our power. And Isaac, who is the middle one of the three, had a self-taught and self-instructed nature. And Jacob, the third, arrived at this point by industry and practice, in accordance with which were his labours of wrestling and contention. 1.169 Since then there are thus three different manners by which wisdom exists among men, it happens that the two extremes are the most nearly and frequently united. For the virtue which is acquired by practice, is the offspring of that which is derived from learning. But that which is implanted by nature is indeed akin to the others, for it is set below them, as the root for them all. But it has obtained its prize without any rivalry or difficulty.
1.171 If, however, this practiser of virtue runs on vigorously towards the end and learns to see clearly what he previously only dreamed of in an indistinct way, being altered and re-stamped with a better character, and being called Israel, that is, "the man who sees God," instead of Jacob, that is, "the supplanter," he then is no longer set down as the son of Abraham, as his father, of him who derived wisdom from instruction, but as the son of Israel, who was born excellent by nature. 1.172 These statements are not fables of my own invention, but are the oracle written on the sacred pillars. For, says the scripture: "Israel having departed, he and all that he had came to the well of the oath, and there he sacrificed a sacrifice to the God of his father Isaac." Do you not now perceive that this present assertion has reference not to the relationship between mortal men, but, as was said before, to the nature of things? For look at what is before us. At one time, Jacob is spoken of as the son of his father Abraham, and at another time he is called Israel, the son of Isaac, on account of the reason which we have thus accurately investigated. XVIII. '' None |
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88. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.13, 1.17, 1.38, 1.52, 1.317, 2.1, 2.13, 2.45, 2.73, 2.162-2.163, 3.1-3.6, 3.45-3.46, 3.48, 4.101-4.102, 4.150 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • Gentiles, and law of nature • Human nature • Isaac, nature and • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Natural dreaming • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • Natural dreaming, hunger • Natural dreaming, morality and character • Natural dreaming, problem solving in • Nature/nature • Philo, on the Torah as the natural law • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • Torah, vs. natural law • hierarchy, of being (scala naturae) • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, and Gentiles • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and Stoicism • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, contents identified by Philo • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • law, natural/of nature • natural history • natural law • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • nature, living in accordance with • physis, and nature of God • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 2, 162, 182, 199, 210, 307; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143, 144; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 27; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 113; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 75, 77, 84, 103, 115, 116, 128; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 165, 169, 184; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 100, 105; Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 100, 134; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 106, 107; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 61
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1.13 Some persons have conceived that the sun, and the moon, and the other stars are independent gods, to whom they have attributed the causes of all things that exist. But Moses was well aware that the world was created, and was like a very large city, having rulers and subjects in it; the rulers being all the bodies which are in heaven, such as planets and fixed stars;
1.17 But if they had taken pains to travel along the straight and true road, they would soon have known that just as the outward sense is the subordinate minister of the mind, so in the same manner all the objects of the outward senses are servants of that which is appreciable only by intellect, being well contented if they can attain to the second place in honour.
1.38 But he does not on that account faint and renounce the task which he has undertaken, but goes on with invincible determination towards the sight which he considers attainable, as if he were a competitor at the games, and were striving for the second prize, though he has missed the first. And guess and conjecture are inferior to true perception, as are all those notions which are classed under the description of reasonable and plausible opinions.
1.52 Accordingly, having given equal rank and honour to all those who come over, and having granted to them the same favours that were bestowed on the native Jews, he recommends those who are ennobled by truth not only to treat them with respect, but even with especial friendship and excessive benevolence. And is not this a reasonable recommendation? What he says is this. "Those men, who have left their country, and their friends, and their relations for the sake of virtue and holiness, ought not to be left destitute of some other cities, and houses, and friends, but there ought to be places of refuge always ready for those who come over to religion; for the most effectual allurement and the most indissoluble bond of affectionate good will is the mutual honouring of the one God." ' "
1.317 For we should acknowledge only one relationship, and one bond of friendship, namely, a mutual zeal for the service of God, and a desire to say and do everything that is consistent with piety. And these bonds which are called relationships of blood, being derived from one's ancestors, and those connections which are derived from intermarriages and from other similar causes, must all be renounced, if they do not all hasten to the same end, namely, the honour of God which is the one indissoluble bond of all united good will. For such men will lay claim to a more venerable and sacred kind of relationship; " 2.1 In the treatise preceding this one we have discussed with accuracy two articles of the ten commandments, that which relates to not thinking that any other beings are absolute gods, except God himself; and the other which enjoins us not to worship as God any object made with hands. And we also spoke of the laws which relate specially to each of these points. But we will now proceed to discuss the three which come next in the regular order, again adapting suitable special laws to each.
2.13 for there are some men who swear, if chance so prompts them, to commit theft, or sacrilege, or adultery, or rape, or to inflict wounds or slaughter, or any similar acts of wickedness, and who perform them without any delay, making an excuse that they must keep their oaths, as if it were not better and more acceptable to God to do no iniquity, than to perform such a vow and oath as that. The national laws and ancient ordices of every people are established for the sake of justice and of every virtue, and what else are laws and ordices but the sacred words of nature having an authority and power in themselves, so that they differ in no respect from oaths?
2.45 admiring, as it were, a life of peace and tranquillity, being the most devoted contemplators of nature and of all the things in it. Investigating earth and sea, and the air, and the heaven, and all the different natures in each of them; dwelling, if one may so say, in their minds, at least, with the moon, and the sun, and the whole company of the rest of the stars, both planets and fixed stars. Having their bodies, indeed, firmly planted on the earth, but having their souls furnished with wings, in order that thus hovering in the air they may closely survey all the powers above, looking upon them as in reality the most excellent of cosmopolites, who consider the whole world as their native city, and all the devotees of wisdom as their fellow citizens, virtue herself having enrolled them as such, to whom it has been entrusted to frame a constitution for their common city.XIII. ' "
2.73 For while it does not permit them to lend on usury to their fellow countrymen, it has allowed them to receive interest from foreigners; calling the former, with great felicity of expression, their brothers, in order to prevent any one's grudging to give of his possessions to those who are as if by nature joint inheritors with themselves; but those who are not their fellow countrymen are called strangers, as is very natural. For the being a stranger shows that a person has no right to a participation in any thing, unless, indeed, any one out of an excess of virtue should treat even those in the conditions of strangers as kindred and related, from having been bred up under a virtuous state of things, and under virtuous laws which look upon what is virtuous alone as good. " "
2.162 There is also a festival on the day of the paschal feast, which succeeds the first day, and this is named the sheaf, from what takes place on it; for the sheaf is brought to the altar as a first fruit both of the country which the nation has received for its own, and also of the whole land; so as to be an offering both for the nation separately, and also a common one for the whole race of mankind; and so that the people by it worship the living God, both for themselves and for all the rest of mankind, because they have received the fertile earth for their inheritance; for in the country there is no barren soil but even all those parts which appear to be stony and rugged are surrounded with soft veins of great depth, which, by reason of their richness, are very well suited for the production of living Things.{20}{sections 163û174 were omitted in Yonge's translation because the edition on which Yonge based his translation, Mangey, lacked this material. These lines have been newly translated for this volume.} " 2.163 The reason is that a priest has the same relation to a city that the nation of the Jews has to the entire inhabited world. For it serves as a priest--to state the truth--through the use of all purificatory offerings and the guidance both for body and soul of divine laws which have checked the pleasures of the stomach and those under the stomach and tamed the mob of the Senses{21}{there is a clear problem with the text here, i.e., the noun ochlon lacks a verb.} by having appointed reason as charioteer over the irrational senses; they also have driven back and overturned the undiscriminating and excessive urges of the soul, some by rather gentle instructions and philosophical exhortations, others by rather weighty and forcible rebukes and by fear of punishment, the fear which they brandish threateningly.
3.1 There was once a time when, devoting my leisure to philosophy and to the contemplation of the world and the things in it, I reaped the fruit of excellent, and desirable, and blessed intellectual feelings, being always living among the divine oracles and doctrines, on which I fed incessantly and insatiably, to my great delight, never entertaining any low or grovelling thoughts, nor ever wallowing in the pursuit of glory or wealth, or the delights of the body, but I appeared to be raised on high and borne aloft by a certain inspiration of the soul, and to dwell in the regions of the sun and moon, and to associate with the whole heaven, and the whole universal world. 3.2 At that time, therefore, looking down from above, from the air, and straining the eye of my mind as from a watch-tower, I surveyed the unspeakable contemplation of all the things on the earth, and looked upon myself as happy as having forcibly escaped from all the evil fates that can attack human life. 3.3 Nevertheless, the most grievous of all evils was lying in wait for me, namely, envy, that hates every thing that is good, and which, suddenly attacking me, did not cease from dragging me after it by force till it had taken me and thrown me into the vast sea of the cares of public politics, in which I was and still am tossed about without being able to keep myself swimming at the top. 3.4 But though I groan at my fate, I still hold out and resist, retaining in my soul that desire of instruction which has been implanted in it from my earliest youth, and this desire taking pity and compassion on me continually raises me up and alleviates my sorrow. And it is through this fondness for learning that I at times lift up my head, and with the eyes of my soul, which are indeed dim (for the mist of affairs, wholly inconsistent with their proper objects, has overshadowed their acute clear-sightedne 3.5 And if at any time unexpectedly there shall arise a brief period of tranquillity, and a short calm and respite from the troubles which arise from state affairs, I then rise aloft and float above the troubled waves, soaring as it were in the air, and being, I may almost say, blown forward by the breezes of knowledge, which often persuades me to flee away, and to pass all my days with her, escaping as it were from my pitiless masters, not men only, but also affairs which pour upon me from all quarters and at all times like a torrent. 3.6 But even in these circumstances I ought to give thanks to God, that though I am so overwhelmed by this flood, I am not wholly sunk and swallowed up in the depths. But I open the eyes of my soul, which from an utter despair of any good hope had been believed to have been before now wholly darkened, and I am irradiated with the light of wisdom, since I am not given up for the whole of my life to darkness. Behold, therefore, I venture not only to study the sacred commands of Moses, but also with an ardent love of knowledge to investigate each separate one of them, and to endeavour to reveal and to explain to those who wish to understand them, things concerning them which are not known to the multitude.II. ' "
3.45 And it is very likely that there may be other Pasipha's also, with passions equally unbridled, and that not women only, but men likewise may fall madly in love with animals, from whom, perhaps, indescribable monsters may be born, being memorials of the excessive pollution of men; owing to which, perhaps, those unnatural creations of unprecedented and fabulous monsters will exist, such as hippocentaurs and chimaeras, and other similar animals. " 3.48 Therefore he provided thus against those evils in a manner suited to and consistent with nature; and from a long distance off, as from a watchtower, he admonished men and kept them in the straight path, in order that both men and women, learning from these percepts of his, might abstain from unlawful connections.
4.101 Now of land animals, the swine is confessed to be the nicest of all meats by those who eat it, and of all aquatic animals the most delicate are the fish which have no scales; and Moses is above all other men skilful in training and inuring persons of a good natural disposition to the practice of virtue by frugality and abstinence, endeavouring to remove costly luxury from their characters, 4.102 at the same time not approving of unnecessary rigour, like the lawgiver of Lacedaemon, nor undue effeminacy, like the man who taught the Ionians and the Sybarites lessons of luxury and license, but keeping a middle path between the two courses, so that he has relaxed what was over strict, and tightened what was too loose, mingling the excesses which are found at each extremity with moderation, which lies between the two, so as to produce an irreproachable harmony and consistency of life, on which account he has laid down not carelessly, but with minute particularity, what we are to use and what to avoid. ' "
4.150 For the children ought to inherit from the father of their being the national customs in which they have been brought up, and in which they have lived from their cradle, and not to despise them merely because they are handed down without being written. For the man who obeys the written laws is not justly entitled to any praise, inasmuch as he is influenced by compulsion and the fear of punishment. But he who abides by the unwritten laws is worthy of praise, as exhibiting a spontaneous and unconstrained Virtue.{36}{yonge's translation includes a separate treatise title at this point: On the Creation of Magistrates. Accordingly, his next paragraph begins with roman numeral I (= XXIX in the Loeb" ' None |
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89. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 70, 94, 144, 194, 212-213, 218-219 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anger, Anger natural or necessary among Christians • Appetite (epithumia), Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Gluttony, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Lust, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Natural, necessary, Thoughts • Nature/nature • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • angels, incorporeal nature of • hierarchy, of being (scala naturae) • law of nature • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • ps.-Makarios (Makarios, desert Father, mentor of Evagrius) , Some thoughts natural rather than bad • the three visitors, incorporeal nature of • unwritten law, unwritten nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 1, 2, 162, 252; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 27; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 89, 103, 111, 112; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 386; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 61
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70 He had also received an oracular command to call his successor and to render him full of confidence and good courage to undertake the care of the nation, without being apprehensive of the great burden of the authority committed to him, in order that he might be a standard and rule for all governors who should come hereafter, and who should look upon Moses as their model; so that none of them should ever grudge good advice to their successors, but should train, and exercise, and instruct their souls with their suggestions and counsels.
94 And though these men know and actually see that nature is continually perfecting her work by these means, and is enriching them with her abundant bounties, nevertheless they endeavour to appropriate the whole of her liberality to themselves, and, as if they themselves were the causes of everything, they give no share of any of their wealth to any one, showing at one and the same time their inhumanity and their impiety. These men accordingly, since they have not laboured in the cause of virtue of their own free will, he reproves and chastises against their will by his sacred laws, which the virtuous man obeys voluntarily, and the wicked man unwillingly. XVIII.
144 And if any one should desire to dress flesh with milk, let him do so without incurring the double reproach of inhumanity and impiety. There are innumerable herds of cattle in every direction, and some are every day milked by the cowherds, or goatherds, or shepherds, since, indeed, the milk is the greatest source of profit to all breeders of stock, being partly used in a liquid state and partly allowed to coagulate and solidify, so as to make cheese. So that, as there is the greatest abundance of lambs, and kids, and all other kinds of animals, the man who seethes the flesh of any one of them in the milk of its own mother is exhibiting a terrible perversity of disposition, and exhibits himself as wholly destitute of that feeling which, of all others, is the most indispensable to, and most nearly akin to, a rational soul, namely, compassion. XXVII. '1
94 In the same manner, just parents are of no advantage to unjust men, nor temperate parents to intemperate children, nor, in short, are ancestors of any kind of excellence of any advantage to wicked descendants; for even the laws themselves are of no advantage to those who transgress them, as they are meant to punish them, and what is it that we ought to look upon as unwritten laws, except the lives of those persons who have imitated virtue?
212 The most ancient person of the Jewish nation was a Chaldaean by birth, born of a father who was very skilful in astronomy, and famous among those men who pass their lives in the study of mathematics, who look upon the stars as gods, and worship the whole heaven and the whole world; thinking, that from them do all good and all evil proceed, to every individual among men; as they do not conceive that there is any cause whatever, except such as are included among the objects of the outward senses. 213 Now what can be more horrible than this? What can more clearly show the innate ignobleness of the soul, which, by consequence of its knowledge of the generality of things, of secondary causes, and of things created, proceeds onwards to ignorance of the one most ancient uncreated Being, the Creator of the universe, and who is most excellent on this account, and for many other reasons also, which the human reason is unable to comprehend by reason of their magnitude?
218 Would not any one, then, be quite correct to say that this man who thus left his native land, who thus forsook all his relations and all his friends, was the most nobly related of all men, as aiming at making himself a kinsman of God, and labouring by every means in his power to become his disciple and friend? And that he was deservedly ranked in the very highest class among the prophets, because he trusted in no created being in preference to the uncreated God, the Father of all? And being honoured as king, as I have said before, by those who received him among them, not as having obtained his authority by warlike arms, or by armed hosts, as some persons have done, but having received his appointment from the all-righteous God, who honours the lovers of piety with independent authority, to the great advantage of all who are associated with them. 219 This man is the standard of nobleness to all who come to settle in a foreign land, leaving that ignobleness which attaches to them from foreign laws and unbecoming customs, which give honours, such as are due only to God, to stocks, and to stones, and, in short, to all kinds of iimate things; and who have thus come over to a constitution really full of vitality and life, the president and governor of which is truth. XL. ' None |
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90. Philo of Alexandria, On The Contemplative Life, 28, 78 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Human nature • Law, Natural • physis, as nature of things and persons • soul, tripartite nature of
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 362; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 103, 104
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28 And the interval between morning and evening is by them devoted wholly to meditation on and to practice of virtue, for they take up the sacred scriptures and philosophise concerning them, investigating the allegories of their national philosophy, since they look upon their literal expressions as symbols of some secret meaning of nature, intended to be conveyed in those figurative expressions. 78 And these explanations of the sacred scriptures are delivered by mystic expressions in allegories, for the whole of the law appears to these men to resemble a living animal, and its express commandments seem to be the body, and the invisible meaning concealed under and lying beneath the plain words resembles the soul, in which the rational soul begins most excellently to contemplate what belongs to itself, as in a mirror, beholding in these very words the exceeding beauty of the sentiments, and unfolding and explaining the symbols, and bringing the secret meaning naked to the light to all who are able by the light of a slight intimation to perceive what is unseen by what is visible. ' None |
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91. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.4, 1.7, 1.162, 2.1-2.2, 2.4, 2.6-2.7, 2.9-2.14, 2.26-2.27, 2.31-2.40, 2.44-2.53, 2.58, 2.65, 2.288 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • Gentiles, and law of nature • Human nature • Law of nature • Law, Natural • Mosaic law, and law of nature • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Nature • Philo, on the Torah as the natural law • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • homosexual behavior, as contrary to nature • human, nature • humanity, compound nature of • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, Sodomites abandoning • law of nature, Stoic concept of • law of nature, and Gentiles • law of nature, and Mosaic law • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • law of nature, death as • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature, procreation as • law of nature, transcended written law • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • law, natural/of nature • legal concepts, divine law and natural law • natural law and divine law • nature, • nature, God as • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, Isaac and • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, human • nature, laws not at variance with • nature, unwritten • physis, and nature of God • physis, as nature of things and persons • physis, as ordering nature • reason, in Philos view of nature • reproduction, as law of nature • unwritten law, unwritten nature • virtue, peaceable nature of • written law, vis a vis law of nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 148, 151, 153, 159, 161, 195, 240, 282, 389, 398, 407; Bloch (2022), Ancient Jewish Diaspora: Essays on Hellenism, 73; Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143, 144; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 71; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 113, 114, 115; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 466; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70, 74, 76, 79, 88, 89, 103, 105, 115, 119; Najman (2010), The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, 90, 93, 94, 97, 101, 102, 104, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 183, 224, 246, 252, 253, 255; Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 172; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 106; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 4; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 163
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1.4 But I disregard the envious disposition of these men, and shall proceed to narrate the events which befell him, having learnt them both from those sacred scriptures which he has left as marvellous memorials of his wisdom, and having also heard many things from the elders of my nation, for I have continually connected together what I have heard with what I have read, and in this way I look upon it that I am acquainted with the history of his life more accurately than other people.
1.7 And his father and mother were among the most excellent persons of their time, and though they were of the same time, still they were induced to unite themselves together more from an uimity of feeling than because they were related in blood; and Moses is the seventh generation in succession from the original settler in the country who was the founder of the whole race of the Jews.
1.162 but, perhaps, since Moses was also destined to be the lawgiver of his nation, he was himself long previously, through the providence of God, a living and reasonable law, since that providence appointed him to the lawgiver, when as yet he knew nothing of his appointment.
2.1 The first volume of this treatise relates to the subject of the birth and bringing up of Moses, and also of his education and of his government of his people, which he governed not merely irreproachably, but in so exceedingly praiseworthy a manner; and also of all the affairs, which took place in Egypt, and in the travels and journeyings of the nation, and of the events which happened with respect to their crossing the Red Sea and in the desert, which surpass all power of description; and, moreover, of all the labours which he conducted to a successful issue, and of the inheritances which he distributed in portions to his soldiers. But the book which we are now about to compose relates to the affairs which follow those others in due order, and bear a certain correspondence and connection with them. 2.2 For some persons say, and not without some reason and propriety, that this is the only way by which cities can be expected to advance in improvement, if either the kings cultivate philosophy, or if philosophers exercise the kingly power. But Moses will be seen not only to have displayed all these powers--I mean the genius of the philosopher and of the king--in an extraordinary degree at the same time, but three other powers likewise, one of which is conversant about legislation, the second about the way of discharging the duties of high priest, and the last about the prophetic office;
2.4 It becomes a king to command what ought to be done, and to forbid what ought not to be done; but the commanding what ought to be done, and the prohibition of what ought not to be done, belongs especially to the law, so that the king is at once a living law, and the law is a just king.
2.6 But since there is an infinite variety of both human and divine circumstances which are unknown both to king, and lawgiver, and chief priest, for a man is no less a created and mortal being from having all these offices, or because he is clothed with such a vast and boundless inheritance of honour and happiness, he was also of necessity invested with the gift of prophecy, in order that he might through the providence of God learn all those things which he was unable to comprehend by his own reason; for what the mind is unable to attain to, that prophecy masters. 2.7 Therefore the connection of these four powers is beautiful and harmonious, for being all connected together and united one to another, they unite in concert, receiving and imparting a reciprocity of benefits from and to one another, imitating the virgin graces with whom it is an immutable law of their nature that they cannot be disunited, with respect to whom one might fairly say, what is habitually said of the virtues, that he who has one has them all.
2.9 Now these four qualities are closely connected with and related to the legislative power, namely, humility, the love of justice, the love of virtue, and the hatred of iniquity; for every individual who has any desire for exercising his talents as a lawgiver is under the influence of each of these feelings. It is the province of humanity to prepare for adoption such opinions as will benefit the common weal, and to teach the advantages which will proceed from them. It is the part of justice to point out how we ought to honour equality, and to assign to every man his due according to his deserts. It is the part of the love of virtue to embrace those things which are by nature good, and to give to every one who deserves them facilities without limit for the most unrestrained enjoyment of happiness. It is also the province of the hatred of iniquity to reject all those who dishonour virtue, and to look upon them as common enemies of the human race.
2.10 Therefore it is a very great thing if it has fallen to the lot of any one to arrive at any one of the qualities before mentioned, and it is a marvellous thing, as it should seem, for any one man to have been able to grasp them all, which in fact Moses appears to have been the only person who has ever done, having given a very clear description of the aforesaid virtues in the commandments which he established.
2.11 And those who are well versed in the sacred scriptures know this, for if he had not had these principles innate within him he would never have compiled those scriptures at the promptings of God. And he gave to those who were worthy to use them the most admirable of all possessions, namely, faithful copies and imitations of the original examples which were consecrated and enshrined in the soul, which became the laws which he revealed and established, displaying in the clearest manner the virtues which I have enumerated and described above.
2.12 But that he himself is the most admirable of all the lawgivers who have ever lived in any country either among the Greeks or among the barbarians, and that his are the most admirable of all laws, and truly divine, omitting no one particular which they ought to comprehend, there is the clearest proof possible in this fact, the laws of other lawgivers,
2.13 if any one examines them by his reason, he will find to be put in motion in an innumerable multitude of pretexts, either because of wars, or of tyrannies, or of some other unexpected events which come upon nations through the various alterations and innovations of fortune; and very often luxury, abounding in all kind of superfluity and unbounded extravagance, has overturned laws, from the multitude not being able to bear unlimited prosperity, but having a tendency to become insolent through satiety, and insolence is in opposition to law.
2.14 But the enactments of this lawgiver are firm, not shaken by commotions, not liable to alteration, but stamped as it were with the seal of nature herself, and they remain firm and lasting from the day on which they were first promulgated to the present one, and there may well be a hope that they will remain to all future time, as being immortal, as long as the sun and the moon, and the whole heaven and the whole world shall endure.
2.26 In olden time the laws were written in the Chaldaean language, and for a long time they remained in the same condition as at first, not changing their language as long as their beauty had not made them known to other nations; 2.27 but when, from the daily and uninterrupted respect shown to them by those to whom they had been given, and from their ceaseless observance of their ordices, other nations also obtained an understanding of them, their reputation spread over all lands; for what was really good, even though it may through envy be overshadowed for a short time, still in time shines again through the intrinsic excellence of its nature. Some persons, thinking it a scandalous thing that these laws should only be known among one half portion of the human race, namely, among the barbarians, and that the Greek nation should be wholly and entirely ignorant of them, turned their attention to their translation.
2.31 He, then, being a sovereign of this character, and having conceived a great admiration for and love of the legislation of Moses, conceived the idea of having our laws translated into the Greek language; and immediately he sent out ambassadors to the high-priest and king of Judea, for they were the same person. 2.32 And having explained his wishes, and having requested him to pick him out a number of men, of perfect fitness for the task, who should translate the law, the high-priest, as was natural, being greatly pleased, and thinking that the king had only felt the inclination to undertake a work of such a character from having been influenced by the providence of God, considered, and with great care selected the most respectable of the Hebrews whom he had about him, who in addition to their knowledge of their national scriptures, had also been well instructed in Grecian literature, and cheerfully sent them. ' "2.33 And when they arrived at the king's court they were hospitably received by the king; and while they feasted, they in return feasted their entertainer with witty and virtuous conversation; for he made experiment of the wisdom of each individual among them, putting to them a succession of new and extraordinary questions; and they, since the time did not allow of their being prolix in their answers, replied with great propriety and fidelity as if they were delivering apophthegms which they had already prepared. " '2.34 So when they had won his approval, they immediately began to fulfil the objects for which that honourable embassy had been sent; and considering among themselves how important the affair was, to translate laws which had been divinely given by direct inspiration, since they were not able either to take away anything, or to add anything, or to alter anything, but were bound to preserve the original form and character of the whole composition, they looked out for the most completely purified place of all the spots on the outside of the city. For the places within the walls, as being filled with all kinds of animals, were held in suspicion by them by reason of the diseases and deaths of some, and the accursed actions of those who were in health. 2.35 The island of Pharos lies in front of Alexandria, the neck of which runs out like a sort of tongue towards the city, being surrounded with water of no great depth, but chiefly with shoals and shallow water, so that the great noise and roaring from the beating of the waves is kept at a considerable distance, and so mitigated. 2.36 They judged this place to be the most suitable of all the spots in the neighbourhood for them to enjoy quiet and tranquillity in, so that they might associate with the laws alone in their minds; and there they remained, and having taken the sacred scriptures, they lifted up them and their hands also to heaven, entreating of God that they might not fail in their object. And he assented to their prayers, that the greater part, or indeed the universal race of mankind might be benefited, by using these philosophical and entirely beautiful commandments for the correction of their lives. 2.37 Therefore, being settled in a secret place, and nothing even being present with them except the elements of nature, the earth, the water, the air, and the heaven, concerning the creation of which they were going in the first place to explain the sacred account; for the account of the creation of the world is the beginning of the law; they, like men inspired, prophesied, not one saying one thing and another another, but every one of them employed the self-same nouns and verbs, as if some unseen prompter had suggested all their language to them. 2.38 And yet who is there who does not know that every language, and the Greek language above all others, is rich in a variety of words, and that it is possible to vary a sentence and to paraphrase the same idea, so as to set it forth in a great variety of manners, adapting many different forms of expression to it at different times. But this, they say, did not happen at all in the case of this translation of the law, but that, in every case, exactly corresponding Greek words were employed to translate literally the appropriate Chaldaic words, being adapted with exceeding propriety to the matters which were to be explained; 2.39 for just as I suppose the things which are proved in geometry and logic do not admit any variety of explanation, but the proposition which was set forth from the beginning remains unaltered, in like manner I conceive did these men find words precisely and literally corresponding to the things, which words were alone, or in the greatest possible degree, destined to explain with clearness and force the matters which it was desired to reveal.
2.40 And there is a very evident proof of this; for if Chaldaeans were to learn the Greek language, and if Greeks were to learn Chaldaean, and if each were to meet with those scriptures in both languages, namely, the Chaldaic and the translated version, they would admire and reverence them both as sisters, or rather as one and the same both in their facts and in their language; considering these translators not mere interpreters but hierophants and prophets to whom it had been granted it their honest and guileless minds to go along with the most pure spirit of Moses.
2.44 and then, if they make any fresh start and begin to improve, how great is the increase of their renown and glory? I think that in that case every nation, abandoning all their own individual customs, and utterly disregarding their national laws, would change and come over to the honour of such a people only; for their laws shining in connection with, and simultaneously with, the prosperity of the nation, will obscure all others, just as the rising sun obscures the stars.
2.45 Now what has been here said is quite sufficient for the abundant praise of Moses as a lawgiver. But there is another more extensive praise which his own holy writings themselves contain, and it is to them that we must now turn for the purpose of exhibiting the virtue of him who compiled them.
2.46 Now these writings of Moses may be divided into several parts; one of which is the historical part, another is occupied with commands and prohibitions, respecting which part we will speak at some other time when we have first of all accurately examined that part which comes first in the order of our division.
2.47 Again, the historical part may be subdivided into the account of the creation of the world, and the genealogical part. And the genealogical part, or the history of the different families, may be divided into the accounts of the punishment of the wicked, and of the honours bestowed on the just; we must also explain on what account it was that he began his history of the giving of the law with these particulars, and placed the commandments and prohibitions in the second order;
2.48 for he was not like any ordinary compiler of history, studying to leave behind him records of ancient transactions as memorials to future ages for the mere sake of affording pleasure without any advantage; but he traced back the most ancient events from the beginning of the world, commencing with the creation of the universe, in order to make known two most necessary principles. First, that the same being was the father and creator of the world, and likewise the lawgiver of truth; secondly, that the man who adhered to these laws, and clung closely to a connection with and obedience to nature, would live in a manner corresponding to the arrangement of the universe with a perfect harmony and union, between his words and his actions and between his actions and his words.
2.49 Now of all other lawgivers, some the moment that they have promulgated positive commands as to what it is right to do and what it is right not to do, proceed to appoint punishments for those who transgress those laws; but others, who appear to have proceeded on a better plan, have not begun in this manner, but, having first of all built and established their city in accordance with reason, have then adapted to this city which they have built, that constitution which they have considered the best adapted and most akin to it, and have confirmed this constitution by the giving of laws. 2.50 But he, thinking the first of the two courses above mentioned to be tyrannical and despotic, as indeed it is, namely, that of laying positive commands on persons as if they were not free men but slaves, without offering them any alleviation; and that the second course was better indeed, but was not entirely to be commended, must appear to all judges to be superior in each of the above considerations. 2.51 For both in his commandments and also in his prohibitions he suggests and recommends rather than commands, endeavouring with many prefaces and perorations to suggest the greater part of the precepts that he desires to enforce, desiring rather to allure men to virtue than to drive them to it, and looking upon the foundation and beginning of a city made with hands, which he has made the commencement of his work a commencement beneath the dignity of his laws, looking rather with the most accurate eye of his mind at the importance and beauty of his whole legislative system, and thinking it too excellent and too divine to be limited as it were by any circle of things on earth; and therefore he has related the creation of that great metropolis, the world, thinking his laws the most fruitful image and likeness of the constitution of the whole world. 2.52 At all events if any one were inclined to examine with accuracy the powers of each individual and particular law, he will find them all aiming at the harmony of the universe, and corresponding to the law of eternal nature: 2.53 on which account those men who have had unbounded prosperity bestowed upon them, and all things tending to the production of health of body, and riches, and glory, and all other external parts of good fortune, but who have rejected virtue, and have chosen crafty wickedness, and all others kinds of vice, not through compulsion, but of their own spontaneous free will, looking upon that which is the greatest of all evils as the greatest possible advantage, he looks upon as enemies not of mankind only, but of the entire heaven and world, and says that they are awaiting, not any ordinary punishments, but new and extraordinary ones, which that constant assessor of God, justice, who detests wickedness, invents and inflicts terribly upon them, turning against them the most powerful elements of the universe, water and fire, so that at appointed times some are destroyed by deluges, others are burnt with fire, and perish in that manner.
2.58 But when the whole of that district was thus burnt, inhabitants and all, by the impetuous rush of the heavenly fire, one single man in the country, a sojourner, was preserved by the providence of God because he had never shared in the transgressions of the natives, though sojourners in general were in the habit of adopting the customs of the foreign nations, among which they might be settled, for the sake of their own safety, since, if they despised them, they might be in danger from the inhabitants of the land. And yet this man had not attained to any perfection of wisdom, so as to be thought worthy of such an honour by reason of the perfect excellence of his nature; but he was spared only because he did not join the multitude who were inclined to luxury and effeminacy, and who pursued every kind of pleasure and indulged every kind of appetite, gratifying them abundantly, and inflaming them as one might inflame fire by heaping upon it plenty of rough fuel.' "
2.65 These are the rewards and honours for pre-eminent excellence given to good men, by means of which, not only did they themselves and their families obtain safety, having escaped from the greatest dangers which were thus aimed against all men all over the earth, by the change in the character of the elements; but they became also the founders of a new generation, and the chiefs of a second period of the world, being left behind as sparks of the most excellent kind of creatures, namely, of men, man having received the supremacy over all earthly creatures whatsoever, being a kind of copy of the powers of God, a visible image of his invisible nature, a created image of an uncreated and immortal Original.{1}{yonge's translation includes a separate treatise title at this point: On the Life of Moses, That Is to Say, On the Theology and Prophetic office of Moses, Book III. Accordingly, his next paragraph begins with roman numeral I (= XIII in the Loeb" 2.288 And some time afterwards, when he was about to depart from hence to heaven, to take up his abode there, and leaving this mortal life to become immortal, having been summoned by the Father, who now changed him, having previously been a double being, composed of soul and body, into the nature of a single body, transforming him wholly and entirely into a most sun-like mind; he then, being wholly possessed by inspiration, does not seem any longer to have prophesied comprehensively to the whole nation altogether, but to have predicted to each tribe separately what would happen to each of them, and to their future generations, some of which things have already come to pass, and some are still expected, because the accomplishment of those predictions which have been fulfilled is the clearest testimony to the future. '' None |
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92. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 168 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Mosaic law, law of nature and • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, and the Patriarchs • nature, Isaac and • unwritten law, unwritten nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 2, 398; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 89
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168 And, indeed, of the ten commandments engraved on these tables which are properly and especially laws, there is an equal division into two numbers of five; the first of which contains the principle of justice relating to God, and the second those relating to man. '' None |
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93. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 68 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • law of nature, in Philo • law, natural/of nature
Found in books: Brooke et al. (2008), Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation, and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity, 143; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 103
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68 Therefore, he here clearly asserts that the good man is the guardian of the words and of the covet of God. And, indeed, in another place he has shown that he is the best interpreter and declarer of his justifications and laws; the faculty of interpretation being displayed through its kindred organ--the voice, and guardianship being exerted through the mind, which having been made by nature as a great storehouse, easily contains the conceptions of all things, whether bodies or things. It would therefore have been worth the while of this self-loving Cain to have been the keeper of Abel; for if he had kept him he would have attained to a compounded and moderate kind of life, and would not have been filled with unmodified and absolute wickedness. XX. '' None |
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94. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 35-36 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature • Scala naturae • myth of Er, nature (physis) • psychic, vital, natural
Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 117, 147
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35 for some bodies he has endowed with habit, others with nature, others with soul, and some with rational soul; for instance, he has bound stones and beams, which are torn from their kindred materials, with the most powerful bond of habit; and this habit is the inclination of the spirit to return to itself; for it begins at the middle and proceeds onwards towards the extremities, and then when it has touched the extreme boundary, it turns back again, until it has again arrived at the same place from which it originally started. '36 This is the continued unalterable course, up and down, of habit, which runners, imitating in their triennial festivals, in those great common spectacles of all men, display as a brilliant achievement, and a worthy subject of rivalry and contention. VIII. ' None |
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95. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, 7.5, 7.5.3-7.5.4 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • authentic versus copy, sacred nature of • deception, and naturalism • natura • natura, and truth • naturalism, and deception • nature
Found in books: Elsner (2007), Roman Eyes: Visuality and Subjectivity in Art and Text, 192; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 86, 87, 91, 92; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 102
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7.5.3 3.\xa0But those which were used by the ancients are now tastelessly laid aside: inasmuch as monsters are painted in the present day rather than objects whose prototype are to be observed in nature. For columns reeds are substituted; for pediments the stalks, leaves, and tendrils of plants; candelabra are made to support the representations of small buildings, from whose summits many stalks appear to spring with absurd figures thereon. Not less so are those stalks with figures rising from them, some with human heads, and others with the heads of beasts;
7.5.4 4.\xa0because similar forms never did, do, nor can exist in nature. These new fashions have so much prevailed, that for want of competent judges, true art is little esteemed. How is it possible for a reed to support a roof, or a candelabrum to bear a house with the ornaments on its roof, or a small and pliant stalk to carry a sitting figure; or, that half figures and flowers at the same time should spring out of roots and stalks? And yet the public, so far from discouraging these falsehoods, are delighted with them, not for a moment considering whether such things could exist. Hence the minds of the multitude, misled by improper judges, do not discern that which is founded on reason and the rules of propriety. No pictures should be tolerated but those established on the basis of truth; and although admirably painted, they should be immediately discarded, if they transgress the rules of propriety and perspicuity as respects the subject.' ' None |
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96. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • belief/s, nature of • nature, central to Stoic thought
Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 18; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253
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97. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Homer, and transience of nature • Natural law • lyric, and transience of nature • nature (transience of), and Homer • nature (transience of), and Simonides • nature (transience of), and choice of words • nature (transience of), and cyclical time • nature (transience of), and flower of youth • nature (transience of), and leaves • nature (transience of), and lyric • nature (transience of), and wine • word choice, and transience of nature
Found in books: Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 428; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117
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98. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • False Worship, Nature Worship • external appearance, and internal nature • statues, dichotomy of external appearance and internal nature
Found in books: Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 72; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 127
| 1.8 However, they acknowledge themselves so far, that they were the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Phoenicians (for I will not now reckon ourselves among them) that have preserved the memorials of the most ancient and most lasting traditions of mankind; 1.8 When this man had reigned thirteen years, after him reigned another, whose name was Beon, for forty-four years; after him reigned another, called Apachnas, thirty-six years and seven months; after him Apophis reigned sixty-one years, and then Jonias fifty years and one month; '' None |
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99. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pliny the Elder, the Natural History • festivals,, averting natural catastrophes • house, public versus private nature • nature • nature, and prodigies
Found in books: Davies (2004), Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on their Gods, 77; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 185; Mueller (2002), Roman Religion in Valerius Maximus, 41; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 11, 60
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100. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, De natura deorum • De rerum natura (Lucretius) • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Sex natural but necessary and tends to harm • Epicurus, authority in the De Rerum Natura • Epicurus, on nature and the self • Lucretius, De rerum natura (DNR) • Lucretius, On the Nature of Things • Lucretius, cosmogony in De rerum natura • Lucretius, laws of nature in • Lucretius, natura in • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural Law • Natural law • Natural laws • Natural phenomena • Natural philosophy, natural philosophers • Natural, necessary, Desire • Nature • Nature, • Ovid, natural philosophy in exilic corpus • Plato, on positive law as rescue from the state of nature • Plutarch, on divine nature of statuary • Seneca, cataclysm in Natural questions • Tomis, nature’s laws subverted in • Tullius Cicero, M., on sacred nature of statuary • culture and nature blended • fastidium, and natural appetite • foedera naturae • human law, as opposed to nature • myth of Er, nature (physis) • natura • natural appetite, deviation from • nature • nature and culture, blended • nature, human • nature, laws of • nature, of human beings • nature, of things • nature, personification of • numinousness, of nature • personification, –of disease, feminine personification of Nature • statuary, sacred nature of
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241; Clay and Vergados (2022), Teaching through Images: Imagery in Greco-Roman Didactic Poetry, 112, 122, 123, 131, 174, 211, 214, 218, 245, 323, 324; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 138; Faure (2022), Conceptions of Time in Greek and Roman Antiquity, 80, 81, 82, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96; Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 169, 173; Gagarin and Cohen (2005), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 428; Gale (2000), Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition, 29, 37, 66, 69, 84, 86, 88, 96, 115, 177, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 218, 220, 224, 236, 237, 257; Gee (2013), Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition, 71, 72, 93, 94, 108, 178; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 73; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 248, 251, 257; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 223, 251; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 200; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 29, 59; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 158, 159, 160, 163, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179, 185, 194, 196, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 216; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 214, 237; Nuno et al. (2021), SENSORIVM: The Senses in Roman Polytheism, 36, 37, 41, 58, 62, 63, 66, 67; Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 155, 180, 182, 270, 271; Romana Berno (2023), Roman Luxuria: A Literary and Cultural History, 231; Rosa and Santangelo (2020), Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies, 95; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 108; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 283; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 148, 228, 254, 304, 305; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 22, 76, 77, 80, 81, 143
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101. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • law of nature • law of nature, unwritten law and • nature, according to
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 152; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 177
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102. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anger, Anger natural or necessary among Christians • Appetite (epithumia), Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Gluttony, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Human nature • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Lust, Natural or necessary among certain Christians • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Mosaic law, law of nature and • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Natural, necessary, Pleasure • Natural, necessary, Thoughts • Nature • Nature/nature • Pleasure, Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Scala naturae • dietary laws natural interpretation of • human, nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, in Philo • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • myth of Er, nature (physis) • nature • nature, • nature, God as • nature, and impurity • nature, hierarchy in • nature, human • physis, as nature of things and persons • ps.-Makarios (Makarios, desert Father, mentor of Evagrius) , Some thoughts natural rather than bad • psychic, vital, natural • tenor (hexis), level in the hierarchy of cosmic nature • weakness, of human nature
Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 157; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 161; Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 210; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 72; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 109; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 228, 231; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 117; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 177; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 213; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 70, 72, 103; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 386; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 313; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 61
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103. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Mosaic law, law of nature and • law of nature • law of nature, Mosaic laws consonant with • law of nature, in Philo • nature, God’s commands evident in • nature, living in accordance with
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 210; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 103
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104. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Human nature • Nature • Stoics/Stoicism, natural law • Will, Nature’s • angels, incorporeal nature of • law of nature, connection to reason and God • law of nature, contents identified by Philo • law of nature, in Philo • myth of Er, nature (physis) • nature, Philos and Stoics views of • nature, and virtue • physis, and nature of God • physis, as ordering nature • psychic, vital, natural • reason, in Philos view of nature • the three visitors, incorporeal nature of • virtue, and nature
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 254, 259; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 187; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 148; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 77, 84, 104
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105. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 36.29-36.32 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Nature/nature • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • law, natural
Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 301; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 61
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36.29 \xa0Yet, despite my brave words to Hieroson, I\xa0was moved and heaved a sigh, as it were, when I\xa0bethought me of Homer and Plato."Well then," said\xa0I, "the term \'city\' must be taken on the understanding that our sect is not literally defining the universe as a city; for that would be in direct conflict with our doctrine of the city, which, as I\xa0have said, the Stoics define as an organization of human beings; and at the same time it would possibly not be suitable or convincing, if, after stating in the strict sense of the term that the universe is a living creature, they should then call it a city, < 36.30 \xa0for that the same thing is both a city and a living being is a proposition that, I\xa0imagine, no one would readily consent to entertain. Yet the present orderly constitution of the universe ever since the whole has been separated and divided into a considerable number of forms of plants and animals, mortal and immortal, yes, and into air and earth and water and fire, being nevertheless by nature in all these forms one thing and governed by one spirit and force â\x80\x94 this orderly constitution, I\xa0say, the Stoics do in one way or another liken to a city because of the multitude of the creatures that are constantly either being born or else ending their existence in it, and, furthermore, because of the arrangement and orderliness of its administration. < 36.31 \xa0"This doctrine, in brief, aims to harmonize the human race with the divine, and to embrace in a single term everything endowed with reason, finding in reason the only sure and indissoluble foundation for fellowship and justice. For in keeping with that concept the term \'city\' would be applied, not, of course, to an organization that has chanced to get mean or petty leaders nor to one which through tyranny or democracy or, in fact, through decarchy or oligarchy or any other similar product of imperfection, is being torn to pieces and made the victim of constant party faction. Nay, term would be applied rather to an organization that is governed by the sanest and noblest form of kingship, to one that is actually under royal goverce in accordance with law, in complete friendship and concord. <' "36.32 \xa0And this, indeed, is precisely what the wisest and eldest ruler and law-giver ordains for all, both mortals and immortals, he who is the leader of all the heaven and lord of all being, himself thus expounding the term and offering his own administration as a pattern of the happy and blessed condition, he whom the divine bards, instructed by the Muses, praise in song and call the 'father of gods and men.' <"' None |
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106. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 1.1.23, 1.4.28-1.4.29, 1.6.15, 1.7.1-1.7.4, 1.9, 1.9.5, 1.9.7-1.9.8, 1.11.39-1.11.40, 1.17.23, 1.18.1-1.18.2, 1.20.11, 1.22.9-1.22.11, 2.2.21, 2.2.25-2.2.26, 2.5.8, 2.17.33, 3.1.25, 3.3.2, 3.3.10, 3.22.42, 3.24.18, 3.24.24, 3.24.67-3.24.70, 4.1.83, 4.1.86-4.1.87, 4.1.146, 4.4.1-4.4.2, 4.7.8-4.7.11, 4.13.24 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Harmony with nature • Nature/nature • Stoicism, harmony with nature • divisions on scala naturae • freedom, by nature • law of nature/natural law • law of nature/natural law, Stoic politics • law, as the force pervading cosmic nature • law, natural • logical divisions on scala naturae • nature, according to • nature, and value • nature, by nature (phusei) • nature, central to Stoic thought • nature, of human beings • nature, pervaded by law • scala naturae, and in Epictetus • scala naturae, humans placed on
Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 90; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 174, 191; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 72; Engberg-Pedersen (2010), Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit, 111; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 253; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 250, 251; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 31; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 345, 382, 385; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 293; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 50; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 147, 148, 149; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 32, 48, 55, 56, 60, 64, 65, 66, 97, 143
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1.1 of the things which are in our power, and not in our power. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please. Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero’s freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master. What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you? What then did Agrippinus say? He said, I am not a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day —this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath— let us go and take our exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.
1.4.28 HE who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take the treatise on the active powers ( ὁρμή ), and see how I have studied it. I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making progress: but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will ( προαίρεσις ) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed abort with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles τὰ προηγούμενα ) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus say this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the perturbations ( πάθη ) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish. What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! 0 the great benefactor who points out the way! To Triptolemus all men have erectedtemples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?
1.6.15 FROM everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion? What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiarly need; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another: God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things. But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens? Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave, have you hands? Is it not that you may wipe your nose?— Is it then consistent with reason that there should be running of noses in the world?—Nay, how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been one, what would have been the use of him? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of exercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? This would be folly and madness: but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and powers for honouring myself through the things which happen. You do not so: but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us these faculties; by which we shall be able to bear everything thing happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as your own, use them not: you do not even see what you have received, and from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations, do you show me.
1.7.1 THE handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing with the matter. Let then people either say that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry ought to be made into those topics ( τόπων ) on which particularly questioning and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not enough; but it is necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should accept what follows from that which you have properly granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by him, who purposes to conduct himself skilfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and the power of understanding the demonstrations of others, and of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise of conclusive arguments and figures, and it has been shown to be necessary. But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premises or assumptions, and there results from them something; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the falsehood? And how is that possible? Well, should I say that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon? But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say that the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded? But neither is this allowed. What then must be done in this case? Consider if it is not this: as to have borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to compel you to admit the inferencethat you have granted the premises ( τὰ λήμματα ), but you must abide by what you have granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences: but if the premises do not remain This, then, is a case of μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι (chap. vii. 1), where there has been a sophistical or dishonest change in the premises or in some term, by virtue of which change there appears to be a just conclusion, which, however, is false; and it is not a conclusion derived from the premises to which we assented. A ridiculous example is given by Seneca, Ep. 48: Mus syllaba est: mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit. Seneca laughs at this absurdity, and says perhaps the following syllogism ( collectio ) may be a better example of acuteness: Mus syllaba est: syllaba autem caseum non rodit: mus ergo caseum non rodit. One is as good as the other. We know that neither conclusion is true, and we see where the error is. Ménage says that though the Stoics particularly cultivated logic, some of them despised it, and he mentions Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus. Upton, however, observes that Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus did not despise logic (he says nothing about Seneca), but employed it for their own purposes. It has been observed that if a man is asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: Every goose is an animal, he immediately perceives that he cannot say, Every animal is a goose. What does this show? It shows that the man’s comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not true, and that he took it to mean Something different from what the person intended who put the question. He understood that A and B were coextensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet it is not true. such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and such change and variation of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premises undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what conclusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper manner nor in a confused way. And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument? Let them show this; and all these speculations ( θεωρήματα ) become superfluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man. Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What then have you done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus when he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism: I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father? But for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent; is there no error in this?
1.9 IF the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man, what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world ( κόσμιος ). For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings—for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with him—why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men? Is kinship with Caesar (the emperor) or with any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us to live in safety, and above ( contempt and without any fear at all? and to have God for your maker ( ποιητήν ), and father and guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears? But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat when I have nothing? And how do slaves, and runaways, on what do they rely when they leave their masters? Do they rely on their lands or slaves, or their vessels of silver? They rely on nothing but themselves; and food does not fail them. In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by honest labour. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labour, live an heroic life, which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian. Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. Millions die annually for want of sufficient food; and many human beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did not know these facts. Compare the passage in Matthew (vi. 25–34). It is said, v. 26: Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? The expositors of this passage may be consulted. And shall it be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not to take care of himself, and shall he be inferior to irrational animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-sufficient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suitable way of living, and one conformable to nature? I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here, not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any young men of such a mind, that when they have recognised their kinship to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw off these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labour that your teacher and instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You should come to him and say, Epictetus, we can no longer endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it and giving it drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the wishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner kinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the place from which we came; allow us to be released at last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any man. And I on my part would say, Friends, wait for God: when He shall give the signal and release you from this service, then go to Him; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you: short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed: for what tyrant or what thief, or what courts of justice, are formidable to those who have thus considered as things of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then, do not depart without a reason. Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, if you have it, you will have it; if you have it not, you will depart from life. The door is open. Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this expression is used, i. 24, 20; i. 25, 18; ii. 1, 19, and others; to Seneca, De Provid. c. 6, Ep. 91; to Cicero, De Fin. iii. 18, where there is this conclusion: e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser. Compare Matthew vi. 31: Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things, etc. Why do you grieve? where does there remain any room for tears? and where is there occasion for flattery? why shall one man envy another? why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if they be both very strong and of violent temper? for what will they do to us? We shall not care for that which they can do; and what we do care for, that they cannot do. How did Socrates behave with respect to these matters? Why, in what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced that he was a kinsman of the gods? If you say to me now, said Socrates to his judges, we will acquit you on the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves ridiculous by thinking that, if one of our commanders has appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and maintain it, and to resolve to die a thousand times rather than desert it; but if God has put us in any place and way of life, we ought to desert it. Socrates speaks like a mar who is really a kinsman of the gods. But we think about ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and shameful parts; we fear, we desire; we flatter those who are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also. A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back to me and said, I wished for your help, not your pity: no evil has happened to me. Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to say: This and this will befall you from your master; and when I replied that these were things which happen in the ordinary course of human affairs. Why then, said he, should I ask him for anything when I can obtain it from you? For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and foolish to receive from another?s Shall I then, who am able to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial office? I hope not: I will not be so ignorant about my own possessions. But when a man is cowardly and mean, what else must be done for him than to write letters as you would about a corpse. Please to grant us the body of a certain person and a sextarius of poor blood. For such a person is, in fact, a carcase and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood, and nothing more. But if he were anything more, lie would know that one man is not miserable through the means of another.
1.11.39 WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? I acted naturally, the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. This is the case, said the man, with all or at least most fathers. I do not deny that: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behaviour is natural. I cannot, he said; but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and is not rightly done. Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them? The sight, he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion? The touch. Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ? I do not know, he said. And yet not to know the criterion of colours and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? The greatest harm (I think). Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming, rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? How is it possible? he said. Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong: if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right. Certainly. But where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary. He assented to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so muck as this to aid you towards what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? Certainly. Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good? By no means. Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection? I think not. You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? It is, he said. Whatever then we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. Agreed. Well then to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. Yes, let us consider. Did you then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her; and has the mother no affection for the child? Certainly, she has. Ought then the mother also to have left her, or ought she not? She ought not. And the nurse, does she love her? She does. Ought then she also to have left her? By no means. And the paedagogue, does he not love her? He does love her. Ought then he also to have deserted her? and so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her? Certainly not. Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. It is absurd. Come then, if you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you alone and deserted? By no means. And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act. Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child? and how is that possible? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favoured; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding any thing or pursuing: the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do sc? No other. But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do? This then was the cause of Achilles’ lamentation, not the death of Patroclus; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so; and on the other side, if you should (hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And now you are going to Rome because you choose; and if you should change your mind, you will not go thither. And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing; but our own opinions and our wills ( δόγματα ). Do I convince you of this or not? You do convince me. Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are the effects. When then we are doing anything not rightly, from this day we shall impute it to nothing else than to the will ( δόγμα or opinion) from which we have done it: and it is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extirpate more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body. And in like manner we shall give the same account of the cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we do not the acts which follow from such opinions; and as to thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. It is so, he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. I hope so. You see then that you must become a Scholasticus, an animal whom all ridicule, if you really intend to make an examination of your own opinions: and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know yourself.
1.17.23 SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
1.18.1 IF what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement towards any thing the persuasion that a thing is for a man’s advantage, and it is impossible to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards another, why then are we angry with the many? Mrs. Carter says: The most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it. (Perhaps she means them, their inclinations. ) The doctrine of Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience: nor is it less pernicious than ill-grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God. Mrs. Carter has not understood Epictetus; and her censure is misplaced. It is true that the most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil, as she truly says. But she might have said more. It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with others who are as bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Mrs. Carter seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justified by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if the interests of society require the guilty to be punished: but he will not punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others: the matter of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have towards those who do wrong, because they are mistaken about good and evil. He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men’s mistake further than this: men think that a thing or act is advantageous; and it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not here examining the way of showing them their error; by which I suppose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors; for he says, if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion. This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Mrs. Carter in her zeal has not seen. They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion. Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him rather: drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: these accursed and odious fellows. How have you been made so wise at once? and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbour has not: you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man’s good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them: do not have a window: do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods: hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp: for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that you had a garment. I have pain in my head. Have you any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for we only lose those things, we have only pains about those things which we possess. But the tyrant will chain—what? the leg. He will take away—what? the neck. What then will he n |
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