Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

validated results only / all results

and or

Filtering options: (leave empty for all results)
By author:     
By work:        
By subject:
By additional keyword:       

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

649 results for "julius"
1. Septuagint, Tobit, 1.5-1.8, 5.15 (th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, and jews, reorganization of jewish state by c. •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 89, 90
1.5. All the tribes that joined in apostasy used to sacrifice to the calf Baal, and so did the house of Naphtali my forefather. 1.6. But I alone went often to Jerusalem for the feasts, as it is ordained for all Israel by an everlasting decree. Taking the first fruits and the tithes of my produce and the first shearings, I would give these to the priests, the sons of Aaron, at the altar. 1.7. of all my produce I would give a tenth to the sons of Levi who ministered at Jerusalem; a second tenth I would sell, and I would go and spend the proceeds each year at Jerusalem; 1.8. the third tenth I would give to those to whom it was my duty, as Deborah my fathers mother had commanded me, for I was left an orphan by my father. 5.15. And besides, I will add to your wages if you both return safe and sound." So they agreed to these terms.
2. Septuagint, 1 Esdras, 1.27 (th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 65
1.27. I was not sent against you by the Lord God, for my war is at the Euphrates. And now the Lord is with me! The Lord is with me, urging me on! Stand aside, and do not oppose the Lord."
3. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 25.8 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •antony, mark, and julius caesar •julius caesar, honours to Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 22
25.8. "אַל־תֵּצֵא לָרִב מַהֵר פֶּן מַה־תַּעֲשֶׂה בְּאַחֲרִיתָהּ בְּהַכְלִים אֹתְךָ רֵעֶךָ׃", 25.8. "Go not forth hastily to strive, lest thou know not what to do in the end thereof, when thy neighbour hath put thee to shame.",
4. Hebrew Bible, Micah, 5.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Keddie (2019), Class and Power in Roman Palestine: The Socioeconomic Setting of Judaism and Christian Origins, 122
5.2. "לָכֵן יִתְּנֵם עַד־עֵת יוֹלֵדָה יָלָדָה וְיֶתֶר אֶחָיו יְשׁוּבוּן עַל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃", 5.2. "Therefore will He give them up, Until the time that she who travaileth hath brought forth; Then the residue of his brethren shall return with the children of Israel.",
5. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 18.9, 20.10-20.21, 21.17, 27.27 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Levine Allison and Crossan (2006), The Historical Jesus in Context, 18; Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 235; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 90
18.9. "עֶרְוַת אֲחוֹתְךָ בַת־אָבִיךָ אוֹ בַת־אִמֶּךָ מוֹלֶדֶת בַּיִת אוֹ מוֹלֶדֶת חוּץ לֹא תְגַלֶּה עֶרְוָתָן׃", 20.11. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אָבִיו עֶרְוַת אָבִיו גִּלָּה מוֹת־יוּמְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם׃", 20.12. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־כַּלָּתוֹ מוֹת יוּמְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם תֶּבֶל עָשׂוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם׃", 20.13. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־זָכָר מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה תּוֹעֵבָה עָשׂוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹת יוּמָתוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם׃", 20.14. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת־אִשָּׁה וְאֶת־אִמָּהּ זִמָּה הִוא בָּאֵשׁ יִשְׂרְפוּ אֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן וְלֹא־תִהְיֶה זִמָּה בְּתוֹכְכֶם׃", 20.15. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן שְׁכָבְתּוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָת וְאֶת־הַבְּהֵמָה תַּהֲרֹגוּ׃", 20.16. "וְאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר תִּקְרַב אֶל־כָּל־בְּהֵמָה לְרִבְעָה אֹתָהּ וְהָרַגְתָּ אֶת־הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת־הַבְּהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָתוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם׃", 20.17. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִקַּח אֶת־אֲחֹתוֹ בַּת־אָבִיו אוֹ בַת־אִמּוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת־עֶרְוָתָהּ וְהִיא־תִרְאֶה אֶת־עֶרְוָתוֹ חֶסֶד הוּא וְנִכְרְתוּ לְעֵינֵי בְּנֵי עַמָּם עֶרְוַת אֲחֹתוֹ גִּלָּה עֲוֺנוֹ יִשָּׂא׃", 20.18. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־אִשָּׁה דָּוָה וְגִלָּה אֶת־עֶרְוָתָהּ אֶת־מְקֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה וְהִיא גִּלְּתָה אֶת־מְקוֹר דָּמֶיהָ וְנִכְרְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מִקֶּרֶב עַמָּם׃", 20.19. "וְעֶרְוַת אֲחוֹת אִמְּךָ וַאֲחוֹת אָבִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה כִּי אֶת־שְׁאֵרוֹ הֶעֱרָה עֲוֺנָם יִשָּׂאוּ׃", 20.21. "וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו נִדָּה הִוא עֶרְוַת אָחִיו גִּלָּה עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ׃", 21.17. "דַּבֵּר אֶל־אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אִישׁ מִזַּרְעֲךָ לְדֹרֹתָם אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בוֹ מוּם לֹא יִקְרַב לְהַקְרִיב לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו׃", 27.27. "וְאִם בַּבְּהֵמָה הַטְּמֵאָה וּפָדָה בְעֶרְכֶּךָ וְיָסַף חֲמִשִׁתוֹ עָלָיו וְאִם־לֹא יִגָּאֵל וְנִמְכַּר בְּעֶרְכֶּךָ׃", 18.9. "The nakedness of thy sister, the daughter of thy father, or the daughter of thy mother, whether born at home, or born abroad, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover. .", 20.10. "And the man that committeth adultery with another man’s wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbour’s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.", 20.11. "And the man that lieth with his father’s wife—he hath uncovered his father’s nakedness—both of them shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.", 20.12. "And if a man lie with his daughter-in-law, both of them shall surely be put to death; they have wrought corruption; their blood shall be upon them.", 20.13. "And if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, both of them have committed abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.", 20.14. "And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is wickedness: they shall be burnt with fire, both he and they; that there be no wickedness among you.", 20.15. "And if a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death; and ye shall slay the beast.", 20.16. "And if a woman approach unto any beast, and lie down thereto, thou shalt kill the woman, and the beast: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.", 20.17. "And if a man shall take his sister, his father’s daughter, or his mother’s daughter, and see her nakedness, and she see his nakedness: it is a shameful thing; and they shall be cut off in the sight of the children of their people: he hath uncovered his sister’s nakedness; he shall bear his iniquity.", 20.18. "And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness, and shall uncover her nakedness—he hath made naked her fountain, and she hath uncovered the fountain of her blood—both of them shall be cut off from among their people.", 20.19. "And thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother’s sister, nor of thy father’s sister; for he hath made naked his near kin; they shall bear their iniquity.", 20.20. "And if a man shall lie with his uncle’s wife—he hath uncovered his uncle’s nakedness—they shall bear their sin; they shall die childless.", 20.21. "And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity: he hath uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless.", 21.17. "Speak unto Aaron, saying: Whosoever he be of thy seed throughout their generations that hath a blemish, let him not approach to offer the bread of his God.", 27.27. "And if it be of an unclean beast, then he shall ransom it according to thy valuation, and shall add unto it the fifth part thereof; or if it be not redeemed, then it shall be sold according to thy valuation.",
6. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •(great) library of alexandria, destruction by julius caesar Found in books: Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 16
7. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 13.13, 22.29, 30.11-30.16, 34.19-34.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of •julius caesar, and jews, reorganization of jewish state by c. Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 89, 90
13.13. "וְכָל־פֶּטֶר חֲמֹר תִּפְדֶּה בְשֶׂה וְאִם־לֹא תִפְדֶּה וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ וְכֹל בְּכוֹר אָדָם בְּבָנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה׃", 22.29. "כֵּן־תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשֹׁרְךָ לְצֹאנֶךָ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים יִהְיֶה עִם־אִמּוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי תִּתְּנוֹ־לִי׃", 30.11. "וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר׃", 30.12. "כִּי תִשָּׂא אֶת־רֹאשׁ בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לִפְקֻדֵיהֶם וְנָתְנוּ אִישׁ כֹּפֶר נַפְשׁוֹ לַיהוָה בִּפְקֹד אֹתָם וְלֹא־יִהְיֶה בָהֶם נֶגֶף בִּפְקֹד אֹתָם׃", 30.13. "זֶה יִתְּנוּ כָּל־הָעֹבֵר עַל־הַפְּקֻדִים מַחֲצִית הַשֶּׁקֶל בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ עֶשְׂרִים גֵּרָה הַשֶּׁקֶל מַחֲצִית הַשֶּׁקֶל תְּרוּמָה לַיהוָה׃", 30.14. "כֹּל הָעֹבֵר עַל־הַפְּקֻדִים מִבֶּן עֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה וָמָעְלָה יִתֵּן תְּרוּמַת יְהוָה׃", 30.15. "הֶעָשִׁיר לֹא־יַרְבֶּה וְהַדַּל לֹא יַמְעִיט מִמַּחֲצִית הַשָּׁקֶל לָתֵת אֶת־תְּרוּמַת יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם׃", 30.16. "וְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת־כֶּסֶף הַכִּפֻּרִים מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנָתַתָּ אֹתוֹ עַל־עֲבֹדַת אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְהָיָה לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְזִכָּרוֹן לִפְנֵי יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם׃", 34.19. "כָּל־פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם לִי וְכָל־מִקְנְךָ תִּזָּכָר פֶּטֶר שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה׃", 13.13. "And every firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break its neck; and all the first-born of man among thy sons shalt thou redeem.", 22.29. "Likewise shalt thou do with thine oxen, and with thy sheep; seven days it shall be with its dam; on the eighth day thou shalt give it Me.", 30.11. "And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying:", 30.12. "’When thou takest the sum of the children of Israel, according to their number, then shall they give every man a ransom for his soul unto the LORD, when thou numberest them; that there be no plague among them, when thou numberest them.", 30.13. "This they shall give, every one that passeth among them that are numbered, half a shekel after the shekel of the sanctuary—the shekel is twenty gerahs—half a shekel for an offering to the LORD.", 30.14. "Every one that passeth among them that are numbered, from twenty years old and upward, shall give the offering of the LORD.", 30.15. "The rich shall not give more, and the poor shall not give less, than the half shekel, when they give the offering of the LORD, to make atonement for your souls.", 30.16. "And thou shalt take the atonement money from the children of Israel, and shalt appoint it for the service of the tent of meeting, that it may be a memorial for the children of Israel before the LORD, to make atonement for your souls.’", 34.19. "All that openeth the womb is Mine; and of all thy cattle thou shalt sanctify the males, the firstlings of ox and sheep.", 34.20. "And the firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break its neck. All the first-born of thy sons thou shalt redeem. And none shall appear before Me empty.",
8. Hebrew Bible, Esther, 2.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 82, 83
2.16. "וַתִּלָּקַח אֶסְתֵּר אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ אֶל־בֵּית מַלְכוּתוֹ בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָעֲשִׂירִי הוּא־חֹדֶשׁ טֵבֵת בִּשְׁנַת־שֶׁבַע לְמַלְכוּתוֹ׃", 2.16. "So Esther was taken unto king Ahasuerus into his house royal in the tenth month, which is the month Tebeth, in the seventh year of his reign.",
9. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 3.44-3.51, 18.15-18.16, 22.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 66, 90
3.44. "וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר׃", 3.45. "קַח אֶת־הַלְוִיִּם תַּחַת כָּל־בְּכוֹר בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת־בֶּהֱמַת הַלְוִיִּם תַּחַת בְּהֶמְתָּם וְהָיוּ־לִי הַלְוִיִּם אֲנִי יְהוָה׃", 3.46. "וְאֵת פְּדוּיֵי הַשְּׁלֹשָׁה וְהַשִּׁבְעִים וְהַמָּאתָיִם הָעֹדְפִים עַל־הַלְוִיִּם מִבְּכוֹר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃", 3.47. "וְלָקַחְתָּ חֲמֵשֶׁת חֲמֵשֶׁת שְׁקָלִים לַגֻּלְגֹּלֶת בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ תִּקָּח עֶשְׂרִים גֵּרָה הַשָּׁקֶל׃", 3.48. "וְנָתַתָּה הַכֶּסֶף לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו פְּדוּיֵי הָעֹדְפִים בָּהֶם׃", 3.49. "וַיִּקַּח מֹשֶׁה אֵת כֶּסֶף הַפִּדְיוֹם מֵאֵת הָעֹדְפִים עַל פְּדוּיֵי הַלְוִיִּם׃", 3.51. "וַיִּתֵּן מֹשֶׁה אֶת־כֶּסֶף הַפְּדֻיִם לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו עַל־פִּי יְהוָה כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת־מֹשֶׁה׃", 18.15. "כָּל־פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם לְכָל־בָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר־יַקְרִיבוּ לַיהוָה בָּאָדָם וּבַבְּהֵמָה יִהְיֶה־לָּךְ אַךְ פָּדֹה תִפְדֶּה אֵת בְּכוֹר הָאָדָם וְאֵת בְּכוֹר־הַבְּהֵמָה הַטְּמֵאָה תִּפְדֶּה׃", 18.16. "וּפְדוּיָו מִבֶּן־חֹדֶשׁ תִּפְדֶּה בְּעֶרְכְּךָ כֶּסֶף חֲמֵשֶׁת שְׁקָלִים בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ עֶשְׂרִים גֵּרָה הוּא׃", 22.1. "וַיִּסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיַּחֲנוּ בְּעַרְבוֹת מוֹאָב מֵעֵבֶר לְיַרְדֵּן יְרֵחוֹ׃", 22.1. "וַיֹּאמֶר בִּלְעָם אֶל־הָאֱלֹהִים בָּלָק בֶּן־צִפֹּר מֶלֶךְ מוֹאָב שָׁלַח אֵלָי׃", 3.44. "And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying:", 3.45. "’Take the Levites instead of all the first-born among the children of Israel, and the cattle of the Levites instead of their cattle; and the Levites shall be Mine, even the LORD’S.", 3.46. "And as for the redemption of the two hundred and three score and thirteen of the first-born of the children of Israel, that are over and above the number of the Levites,", 3.47. "thou shalt take five shekels apiece by the poll; after the shekel of the sanctuary shalt thou take them—the shekel is twenty gerahs.", 3.48. "And thou shalt give the money wherewith they that remain over of them are redeemed unto Aaron and to his sons.’", 3.49. "And Moses took the redemption-money from them that were over and above them that were redeemed by the Levites;", 3.50. "from the first-born of the children of Israel took he the money: a thousand three hundred and threescore and five shekels, after the shekel of the sanctuary.", 3.51. "And Moses gave the redemption-money unto Aaron and to his sons, according to the word of the LORD, as the LORD commanded Moses.", 18.15. "Every thing that openeth the womb, of all flesh which they offer unto the LORD, both of man and beast, shall be thine; howbeit the first-born of man shalt thou surely redeem, and the firstling of unclean beasts shalt thou redeem.", 18.16. "And their redemption-money—from a month old shalt thou redeem them—shall be, according to thy valuation, five shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary—the same is twenty gerahs.", 22.1. "And the children of Israel journeyed, and pitched in the plains of Moab beyond the Jordan at Jericho.",
10. Hebrew Bible, 1 Kings, 18.45-18.46, 21.1 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 62
18.45. "וַיְהִי עַד־כֹּה וְעַד־כֹּה וְהַשָּׁמַיִם הִתְקַדְּרוּ עָבִים וְרוּחַ וַיְהִי גֶּשֶׁם גָּדוֹל וַיִּרְכַּב אַחְאָב וַיֵּלֶךְ יִזְרְעֶאלָה׃", 18.46. "וְיַד־יְהוָה הָיְתָה אֶל־אֵלִיָּהוּ וַיְשַׁנֵּס מָתְנָיו וַיָּרָץ לִפְנֵי אַחְאָב עַד־בֹּאֲכָה יִזְרְעֶאלָה׃", 21.1. "וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה כֶּרֶם הָיָה לְנָבוֹת הַיִּזְרְעֵאלִי אֲשֶׁר בְּיִזְרְעֶאל אֵצֶל הֵיכַל אַחְאָב מֶלֶךְ שֹׁמְרוֹן׃", 21.1. "וְהוֹשִׁיבוּ שְׁנַיִם אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל נֶגְדּוֹ וִיעִדֻהוּ לֵאמֹר בֵּרַכְתָּ אֱלֹהִים וָמֶלֶךְ וְהוֹצִיאֻהוּ וְסִקְלֻהוּ וְיָמֹת׃", 18.45. "And it came to pass in a little while, that the heaven grew black with clouds and wind, and there was a great rain. And Ahab rode, and went to Jezreel.", 18.46. "And the hand of the LORD was on Elijah; and he girded up his loins, and ran before Ahab to the entrance of Jezreel.", 21.1. "And it came to pass after these things, that Naboth the Jezreelite had a vineyard, which was in Jezreel, hard by the palace of Ahab, king of Samaria.",
11. Homer, Iliad, 1.1, 1.8, 1.348-1.427, 3.146-3.155, 3.173, 7.230, 9.228-9.230, 18.96, 19.302, 21.248-21.271, 22.262-22.266, 23.114-23.122, 24.719-24.722, 24.804 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 30; Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 58, 65; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 6; Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 41, 50, 51, 52, 53, 74, 75, 79, 81, 139, 243, 255; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 153
1.1. / The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus' son, Achilles, that destructive wrath which brought countless woes upon the Achaeans, and sent forth to Hades many valiant souls of heroes, and made them themselves spoil for dogs and every bird; thus the plan of Zeus came to fulfillment, 1.8. / from the time when first they parted in strife Atreus' son, king of men, and brilliant Achilles.Who then of the gods was it that brought these two together to contend? The son of Leto and Zeus; for he in anger against the king roused throughout the host an evil pestilence, and the people began to perish, 1.348. / and led forth from the hut the fair-cheeked Briseis, and gave her to them to lead away. So the two went back beside the ships of the Achaeans, and with them, all unwilling, went the woman. But Achilles burst into tears, and withdrew apart from his comrades, and sat down on the shore of the grey sea, looking forth over the wine-dark deep. 1.349. / and led forth from the hut the fair-cheeked Briseis, and gave her to them to lead away. So the two went back beside the ships of the Achaeans, and with them, all unwilling, went the woman. But Achilles burst into tears, and withdrew apart from his comrades, and sat down on the shore of the grey sea, looking forth over the wine-dark deep. 1.350. / Earnestly he prayed to his dear mother with hands outstretched:Mother, since you bore me, though to so brief a span of life, honour surely ought the Olympian to have given into my hands, Zeus who thunders on high; but now he has honoured me not a bit. Truly the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon 1.351. / Earnestly he prayed to his dear mother with hands outstretched:Mother, since you bore me, though to so brief a span of life, honour surely ought the Olympian to have given into my hands, Zeus who thunders on high; but now he has honoured me not a bit. Truly the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon 1.352. / Earnestly he prayed to his dear mother with hands outstretched:Mother, since you bore me, though to so brief a span of life, honour surely ought the Olympian to have given into my hands, Zeus who thunders on high; but now he has honoured me not a bit. Truly the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon 1.353. / Earnestly he prayed to his dear mother with hands outstretched:Mother, since you bore me, though to so brief a span of life, honour surely ought the Olympian to have given into my hands, Zeus who thunders on high; but now he has honoured me not a bit. Truly the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon 1.354. / Earnestly he prayed to his dear mother with hands outstretched:Mother, since you bore me, though to so brief a span of life, honour surely ought the Olympian to have given into my hands, Zeus who thunders on high; but now he has honoured me not a bit. Truly the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon 1.355. / has dishonoured me: for he has taken and keeps my prize through his own arrogant act. So he spoke, weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside the old man, her father. And speedily she came forth from the grey sea like a mist, and sat down before him, as he wept, 1.356. / has dishonoured me: for he has taken and keeps my prize through his own arrogant act. So he spoke, weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside the old man, her father. And speedily she came forth from the grey sea like a mist, and sat down before him, as he wept, 1.357. / has dishonoured me: for he has taken and keeps my prize through his own arrogant act. So he spoke, weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside the old man, her father. And speedily she came forth from the grey sea like a mist, and sat down before him, as he wept, 1.358. / has dishonoured me: for he has taken and keeps my prize through his own arrogant act. So he spoke, weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside the old man, her father. And speedily she came forth from the grey sea like a mist, and sat down before him, as he wept, 1.359. / has dishonoured me: for he has taken and keeps my prize through his own arrogant act. So he spoke, weeping, and his lady mother heard him, as she sat in the depths of the sea beside the old man, her father. And speedily she came forth from the grey sea like a mist, and sat down before him, as he wept, 1.360. / and she stroked him with her hand, and spoke to him, and called him by name:My child, why do you weep? What sorrow has come upon your heart? Speak out; hide it not in your mind, that we both may know. Then with heavy moaning spoke swift-footed Achilles to her:You know. Why then should I tell the tale to you who knows all? 1.361. / and she stroked him with her hand, and spoke to him, and called him by name:My child, why do you weep? What sorrow has come upon your heart? Speak out; hide it not in your mind, that we both may know. Then with heavy moaning spoke swift-footed Achilles to her:You know. Why then should I tell the tale to you who knows all? 1.362. / and she stroked him with her hand, and spoke to him, and called him by name:My child, why do you weep? What sorrow has come upon your heart? Speak out; hide it not in your mind, that we both may know. Then with heavy moaning spoke swift-footed Achilles to her:You know. Why then should I tell the tale to you who knows all? 1.363. / and she stroked him with her hand, and spoke to him, and called him by name:My child, why do you weep? What sorrow has come upon your heart? Speak out; hide it not in your mind, that we both may know. Then with heavy moaning spoke swift-footed Achilles to her:You know. Why then should I tell the tale to you who knows all? 1.364. / and she stroked him with her hand, and spoke to him, and called him by name:My child, why do you weep? What sorrow has come upon your heart? Speak out; hide it not in your mind, that we both may know. Then with heavy moaning spoke swift-footed Achilles to her:You know. Why then should I tell the tale to you who knows all? 1.365. / We went forth to Thebe, the sacred city of Eetion, and laid it waste, and brought here all the spoil. This the sons of the Achaeans divided properly among themselves, but for the son of Atreus they chose out the fair-cheeked daughter of Chryses. However, Chryses, priest of Apollo, who strikes from afar, 1.366. / We went forth to Thebe, the sacred city of Eetion, and laid it waste, and brought here all the spoil. This the sons of the Achaeans divided properly among themselves, but for the son of Atreus they chose out the fair-cheeked daughter of Chryses. However, Chryses, priest of Apollo, who strikes from afar, 1.367. / We went forth to Thebe, the sacred city of Eetion, and laid it waste, and brought here all the spoil. This the sons of the Achaeans divided properly among themselves, but for the son of Atreus they chose out the fair-cheeked daughter of Chryses. However, Chryses, priest of Apollo, who strikes from afar, 1.368. / We went forth to Thebe, the sacred city of Eetion, and laid it waste, and brought here all the spoil. This the sons of the Achaeans divided properly among themselves, but for the son of Atreus they chose out the fair-cheeked daughter of Chryses. However, Chryses, priest of Apollo, who strikes from afar, 1.369. / We went forth to Thebe, the sacred city of Eetion, and laid it waste, and brought here all the spoil. This the sons of the Achaeans divided properly among themselves, but for the son of Atreus they chose out the fair-cheeked daughter of Chryses. However, Chryses, priest of Apollo, who strikes from afar, 1.370. / came to the swift ships of the bronze-clad Achaeans, to free his daughter, bearing ransom past counting, and in his hands he held the wreaths of Apollo who strikes from afar, on a staff of gold, and he implored all the Achaeans, but most of all the two sons of Atreus, marshallers of the people. 1.371. / came to the swift ships of the bronze-clad Achaeans, to free his daughter, bearing ransom past counting, and in his hands he held the wreaths of Apollo who strikes from afar, on a staff of gold, and he implored all the Achaeans, but most of all the two sons of Atreus, marshallers of the people. 1.372. / came to the swift ships of the bronze-clad Achaeans, to free his daughter, bearing ransom past counting, and in his hands he held the wreaths of Apollo who strikes from afar, on a staff of gold, and he implored all the Achaeans, but most of all the two sons of Atreus, marshallers of the people. 1.373. / came to the swift ships of the bronze-clad Achaeans, to free his daughter, bearing ransom past counting, and in his hands he held the wreaths of Apollo who strikes from afar, on a staff of gold, and he implored all the Achaeans, but most of all the two sons of Atreus, marshallers of the people. 1.374. / came to the swift ships of the bronze-clad Achaeans, to free his daughter, bearing ransom past counting, and in his hands he held the wreaths of Apollo who strikes from afar, on a staff of gold, and he implored all the Achaeans, but most of all the two sons of Atreus, marshallers of the people. 1.375. / Then all the rest of the Achaeans shouted assent, to reverence the priest and accept the glorious ransom; yet the thing did not please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, but he sent him away harshly, and laid upon him a stern command. So the old man went back again in anger; and Apollo 1.376. / Then all the rest of the Achaeans shouted assent, to reverence the priest and accept the glorious ransom; yet the thing did not please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, but he sent him away harshly, and laid upon him a stern command. So the old man went back again in anger; and Apollo 1.377. / Then all the rest of the Achaeans shouted assent, to reverence the priest and accept the glorious ransom; yet the thing did not please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, but he sent him away harshly, and laid upon him a stern command. So the old man went back again in anger; and Apollo 1.378. / Then all the rest of the Achaeans shouted assent, to reverence the priest and accept the glorious ransom; yet the thing did not please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, but he sent him away harshly, and laid upon him a stern command. So the old man went back again in anger; and Apollo 1.379. / Then all the rest of the Achaeans shouted assent, to reverence the priest and accept the glorious ransom; yet the thing did not please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, but he sent him away harshly, and laid upon him a stern command. So the old man went back again in anger; and Apollo 1.380. / heard his prayer, for he was very dear to him, and sent against the Argives an evil shaft. Then the people began to die thick and fast, and the shafts of the god ranged everywhere throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans. But to us the prophet with sure knowledge declared the oracles of the god who strikes from afar. 1.381. / heard his prayer, for he was very dear to him, and sent against the Argives an evil shaft. Then the people began to die thick and fast, and the shafts of the god ranged everywhere throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans. But to us the prophet with sure knowledge declared the oracles of the god who strikes from afar. 1.382. / heard his prayer, for he was very dear to him, and sent against the Argives an evil shaft. Then the people began to die thick and fast, and the shafts of the god ranged everywhere throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans. But to us the prophet with sure knowledge declared the oracles of the god who strikes from afar. 1.383. / heard his prayer, for he was very dear to him, and sent against the Argives an evil shaft. Then the people began to die thick and fast, and the shafts of the god ranged everywhere throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans. But to us the prophet with sure knowledge declared the oracles of the god who strikes from afar. 1.384. / heard his prayer, for he was very dear to him, and sent against the Argives an evil shaft. Then the people began to die thick and fast, and the shafts of the god ranged everywhere throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans. But to us the prophet with sure knowledge declared the oracles of the god who strikes from afar. 1.385. / 1.386. / 1.387. / 1.388. / 1.389. / Forthwith, then, I first bade propitiate the god, but thereafter anger seized the son of Atreus, and straightway he arose and spoke a threatening word, which now has come to pass. For the quick-glancing Achaeans are taking the maiden in a swift ship to Chryse, and are bearing gifts to the god; 1.390. / while the other woman the heralds have just now taken from my tent and led away, the daughter of Briseus, whom the sons of the Achaeans gave me. But, you, if you are able, guard your own son; go to Olympus and make prayer to Zeus, if ever you have gladdened his heart by word or deed. 1.391. / while the other woman the heralds have just now taken from my tent and led away, the daughter of Briseus, whom the sons of the Achaeans gave me. But, you, if you are able, guard your own son; go to Olympus and make prayer to Zeus, if ever you have gladdened his heart by word or deed. 1.392. / while the other woman the heralds have just now taken from my tent and led away, the daughter of Briseus, whom the sons of the Achaeans gave me. But, you, if you are able, guard your own son; go to Olympus and make prayer to Zeus, if ever you have gladdened his heart by word or deed. 1.393. / while the other woman the heralds have just now taken from my tent and led away, the daughter of Briseus, whom the sons of the Achaeans gave me. But, you, if you are able, guard your own son; go to Olympus and make prayer to Zeus, if ever you have gladdened his heart by word or deed. 1.394. / while the other woman the heralds have just now taken from my tent and led away, the daughter of Briseus, whom the sons of the Achaeans gave me. But, you, if you are able, guard your own son; go to Olympus and make prayer to Zeus, if ever you have gladdened his heart by word or deed. 1.395. / For often I have heard you glorying in the halls of my father, and declaring that you alone among the immortals warded off shameful ruin from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the other Olympians wished to put him in bonds, even Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athene. 1.396. / For often I have heard you glorying in the halls of my father, and declaring that you alone among the immortals warded off shameful ruin from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the other Olympians wished to put him in bonds, even Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athene. 1.397. / For often I have heard you glorying in the halls of my father, and declaring that you alone among the immortals warded off shameful ruin from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the other Olympians wished to put him in bonds, even Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athene. 1.398. / For often I have heard you glorying in the halls of my father, and declaring that you alone among the immortals warded off shameful ruin from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the other Olympians wished to put him in bonds, even Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athene. 1.399. / For often I have heard you glorying in the halls of my father, and declaring that you alone among the immortals warded off shameful ruin from the son of Cronos, lord of the dark clouds, on the day when the other Olympians wished to put him in bonds, even Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athene. 1.400. / But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than his father. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, exulting in his glory, 1.401. / But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than his father. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, exulting in his glory, 1.402. / But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than his father. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, exulting in his glory, 1.403. / But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than his father. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, exulting in his glory, 1.404. / But you came, goddess, and freed him from his bonds, when you had quickly called to high Olympus him of the hundred hands, whom the gods call Briareus, but all men Aegaeon; for he is mightier than his father. He sat down by the side of the son of Cronos, exulting in his glory, 1.405. / and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, and did not bind Zeus. Bring this now to his remembrance, and sit by his side, and clasp his knees, in hope that he might perhaps wish to succour the Trojans, and for those others, the Achaeans, to pen them in among the sterns of their ships and around the sea as they are slain, so that they may all have profit of their king, 1.406. / and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, and did not bind Zeus. Bring this now to his remembrance, and sit by his side, and clasp his knees, in hope that he might perhaps wish to succour the Trojans, and for those others, the Achaeans, to pen them in among the sterns of their ships and around the sea as they are slain, so that they may all have profit of their king, 1.407. / and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, and did not bind Zeus. Bring this now to his remembrance, and sit by his side, and clasp his knees, in hope that he might perhaps wish to succour the Trojans, and for those others, the Achaeans, to pen them in among the sterns of their ships and around the sea as they are slain, so that they may all have profit of their king, 1.408. / and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, and did not bind Zeus. Bring this now to his remembrance, and sit by his side, and clasp his knees, in hope that he might perhaps wish to succour the Trojans, and for those others, the Achaeans, to pen them in among the sterns of their ships and around the sea as they are slain, so that they may all have profit of their king, 1.409. / and the blessed gods were seized with fear of him, and did not bind Zeus. Bring this now to his remembrance, and sit by his side, and clasp his knees, in hope that he might perhaps wish to succour the Trojans, and for those others, the Achaeans, to pen them in among the sterns of their ships and around the sea as they are slain, so that they may all have profit of their king, 1.410. / and that the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon may know his blindness in that he did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. Then Thetis answered him as she wept:Ah me, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? Would that it had been your lot to remain by your ships without tears and without grief, 1.411. / and that the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon may know his blindness in that he did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. Then Thetis answered him as she wept:Ah me, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? Would that it had been your lot to remain by your ships without tears and without grief, 1.412. / and that the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon may know his blindness in that he did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. Then Thetis answered him as she wept:Ah me, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? Would that it had been your lot to remain by your ships without tears and without grief, 1.413. / and that the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon may know his blindness in that he did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. Then Thetis answered him as she wept:Ah me, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? Would that it had been your lot to remain by your ships without tears and without grief, 1.414. / and that the son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon may know his blindness in that he did no honour to the best of the Achaeans. Then Thetis answered him as she wept:Ah me, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? Would that it had been your lot to remain by your ships without tears and without grief, 1.415. / since your span of life is brief and endures no long time; but now you are doomed to a speedy death and are laden with sorrow above all men; therefore to an evil fate I bore you in our halls. Yet in order to tell this your word to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt I will myself go to snowy Olympus, in hope that he may be persuaded. 1.416. / since your span of life is brief and endures no long time; but now you are doomed to a speedy death and are laden with sorrow above all men; therefore to an evil fate I bore you in our halls. Yet in order to tell this your word to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt I will myself go to snowy Olympus, in hope that he may be persuaded. 1.417. / since your span of life is brief and endures no long time; but now you are doomed to a speedy death and are laden with sorrow above all men; therefore to an evil fate I bore you in our halls. Yet in order to tell this your word to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt I will myself go to snowy Olympus, in hope that he may be persuaded. 1.418. / since your span of life is brief and endures no long time; but now you are doomed to a speedy death and are laden with sorrow above all men; therefore to an evil fate I bore you in our halls. Yet in order to tell this your word to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt I will myself go to snowy Olympus, in hope that he may be persuaded. 1.419. / since your span of life is brief and endures no long time; but now you are doomed to a speedy death and are laden with sorrow above all men; therefore to an evil fate I bore you in our halls. Yet in order to tell this your word to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt I will myself go to snowy Olympus, in hope that he may be persuaded. 1.420. / But remain by your swift, sea-faring ships, and continue your wrath against the Achaeans, and refrain utterly from battle; for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus, 1.421. / But remain by your swift, sea-faring ships, and continue your wrath against the Achaeans, and refrain utterly from battle; for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus, 1.422. / But remain by your swift, sea-faring ships, and continue your wrath against the Achaeans, and refrain utterly from battle; for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus, 1.423. / But remain by your swift, sea-faring ships, and continue your wrath against the Achaeans, and refrain utterly from battle; for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus, 1.424. / But remain by your swift, sea-faring ships, and continue your wrath against the Achaeans, and refrain utterly from battle; for Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus, 1.425. / and then will I go to the house of Zeus with threshold of bronze, and will clasp his knees in prayer, and I think I shall win him. 1.426. / and then will I go to the house of Zeus with threshold of bronze, and will clasp his knees in prayer, and I think I shall win him. 1.427. / and then will I go to the house of Zeus with threshold of bronze, and will clasp his knees in prayer, and I think I shall win him. 3.146. / and with speed they came to the place where were the Scaean gates. 3.147. / and with speed they came to the place where were the Scaean gates. 3.148. / and with speed they came to the place where were the Scaean gates. 3.149. / and with speed they came to the place where were the Scaean gates. And they that were about Priam and Panthous and Thymoetes and Lampus and Clytius and Hicetaon, scion of Ares, and Ucalegon and Antenor, men of prudence both, sat as elders of the people at the Scaean gates. 3.150. / Because of old age had they now ceased from battle, but speakers they were full good, like unto cicalas that in a forest sit upon a tree and pour forth their lily-like voice; even in such wise sat the leaders of the Trojans upon the wall. Now when they saw Helen coming upon the wall, 3.151. / Because of old age had they now ceased from battle, but speakers they were full good, like unto cicalas that in a forest sit upon a tree and pour forth their lily-like voice; even in such wise sat the leaders of the Trojans upon the wall. Now when they saw Helen coming upon the wall, 3.152. / Because of old age had they now ceased from battle, but speakers they were full good, like unto cicalas that in a forest sit upon a tree and pour forth their lily-like voice; even in such wise sat the leaders of the Trojans upon the wall. Now when they saw Helen coming upon the wall, 3.153. / Because of old age had they now ceased from battle, but speakers they were full good, like unto cicalas that in a forest sit upon a tree and pour forth their lily-like voice; even in such wise sat the leaders of the Trojans upon the wall. Now when they saw Helen coming upon the wall, 3.154. / Because of old age had they now ceased from battle, but speakers they were full good, like unto cicalas that in a forest sit upon a tree and pour forth their lily-like voice; even in such wise sat the leaders of the Trojans upon the wall. Now when they saw Helen coming upon the wall, 3.155. / softly they spake winged words one to another:Small blame that Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans should for such a woman long time suffer woes; wondrously like is she to the immortal goddesses to look upon. But even so, for all that she is such an one, let her depart upon the ships, 3.173. / neither one so royal: he is like unto one that is a king. And Helen, fair among women, answered him, saying:Revered art thou in mine eyes, dear father of my husband, and dread. Would that evil death had been my pleasure when I followed thy son hither, and left my bridal chamber and my kinfolk 7.230. / in utter wrath against Agamemnon, Atreus' son, shepherd of the host; yet are we such as to face thee, yea, full many of us. But begin thou war and battle. To him then made answer great Hector of the flashing helm:Aias, sprung from Zeus, thou son of Telamon, captain of the host, 9.228. / Hail, O Achilles, of the equal feast have we no stinting, either in the hut of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, or now in thine; for here is abundance that satisfies the heart to feast withal. Yet matters of the delicious feast are not in our thoughts, nay, Zeus-nurtured one, it is utter ruin that we behold, and are afraid; 9.229. / Hail, O Achilles, of the equal feast have we no stinting, either in the hut of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, or now in thine; for here is abundance that satisfies the heart to feast withal. Yet matters of the delicious feast are not in our thoughts, nay, Zeus-nurtured one, it is utter ruin that we behold, and are afraid; 9.230. / for it is in doubt whether we save the benched ships or they perish, except thou clothe thee in thy might. Hard by the ships and the wall have the Trojans, high of heart, and their far-famed allies set their bivouac, and kindled many fires throughout the host, and they deem that they shall no more be stayed, 18.96. / Doomed then to a speedy death, my child, shalt thou be, that thou spakest thus; for straightway after Hector is thine own death ready at hand. 19.302. / Wherefore I wail for thee in thy death and know no ceasing, for thou wast ever kind. So spake she wailing, and thereto the women added their laments; Patroclus indeed they mourned, but therewithal each one her own sorrows. But around Achilles gathered the elders of the Achaeans, beseeching him that he would eat; but he refused them, moaning the while: 21.248. / with its thick branches, and dammed the River himself, falling all within him; but Achilles, springing forth from the eddy hasted to fly with swift feet over the plain, for he was seized with fear. Howbeit the great god ceased not, but rushed upon him with dark-crested wave, that he might stay 21.249. / with its thick branches, and dammed the River himself, falling all within him; but Achilles, springing forth from the eddy hasted to fly with swift feet over the plain, for he was seized with fear. Howbeit the great god ceased not, but rushed upon him with dark-crested wave, that he might stay 21.250. / goodly Achilles from his labour, and ward off ruin from the Trojans. But the son of Peleus rushed back as far as a spear-cast with the swoop of a black eagle, the mighty hunter, that is alike the strongest and swiftest of winged things; like him he darted, and upon his breast 21.251. / goodly Achilles from his labour, and ward off ruin from the Trojans. But the son of Peleus rushed back as far as a spear-cast with the swoop of a black eagle, the mighty hunter, that is alike the strongest and swiftest of winged things; like him he darted, and upon his breast 21.252. / goodly Achilles from his labour, and ward off ruin from the Trojans. But the son of Peleus rushed back as far as a spear-cast with the swoop of a black eagle, the mighty hunter, that is alike the strongest and swiftest of winged things; like him he darted, and upon his breast 21.253. / goodly Achilles from his labour, and ward off ruin from the Trojans. But the son of Peleus rushed back as far as a spear-cast with the swoop of a black eagle, the mighty hunter, that is alike the strongest and swiftest of winged things; like him he darted, and upon his breast 21.254. / goodly Achilles from his labour, and ward off ruin from the Trojans. But the son of Peleus rushed back as far as a spear-cast with the swoop of a black eagle, the mighty hunter, that is alike the strongest and swiftest of winged things; like him he darted, and upon his breast 21.255. / the bronze rang terribly, while he swerved from beneath the flood and fled ever onward, and the River followed after, flowing with a mighty roar. As when a man that guideth its flow leadeth from a dusky spring a stream of water amid his plants and garden-lots a mattock in his hands and cleareth away the dams from the channel— 21.256. / the bronze rang terribly, while he swerved from beneath the flood and fled ever onward, and the River followed after, flowing with a mighty roar. As when a man that guideth its flow leadeth from a dusky spring a stream of water amid his plants and garden-lots a mattock in his hands and cleareth away the dams from the channel— 21.257. / the bronze rang terribly, while he swerved from beneath the flood and fled ever onward, and the River followed after, flowing with a mighty roar. As when a man that guideth its flow leadeth from a dusky spring a stream of water amid his plants and garden-lots a mattock in his hands and cleareth away the dams from the channel— 21.258. / the bronze rang terribly, while he swerved from beneath the flood and fled ever onward, and the River followed after, flowing with a mighty roar. As when a man that guideth its flow leadeth from a dusky spring a stream of water amid his plants and garden-lots a mattock in his hands and cleareth away the dams from the channel— 21.259. / the bronze rang terribly, while he swerved from beneath the flood and fled ever onward, and the River followed after, flowing with a mighty roar. As when a man that guideth its flow leadeth from a dusky spring a stream of water amid his plants and garden-lots a mattock in his hands and cleareth away the dams from the channel— 21.260. / and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River 21.261. / and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River 21.262. / and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River 21.263. / and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River 21.264. / and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River 21.265. / ever overtake Achilles for all he was fleet of foot; for the gods are mightier than men. And oft as swift-footed, goodly Achilles strove to make stand against him and to learn if all the immortals that hold broad heaven were driving him in rout, so often would the great flood of the heaven-fed River beat upon his shoulders from above; and he would spring on high with his feet 21.266. / ever overtake Achilles for all he was fleet of foot; for the gods are mightier than men. And oft as swift-footed, goodly Achilles strove to make stand against him and to learn if all the immortals that hold broad heaven were driving him in rout, so often would the great flood of the heaven-fed River beat upon his shoulders from above; and he would spring on high with his feet 21.267. / ever overtake Achilles for all he was fleet of foot; for the gods are mightier than men. And oft as swift-footed, goodly Achilles strove to make stand against him and to learn if all the immortals that hold broad heaven were driving him in rout, so often would the great flood of the heaven-fed River beat upon his shoulders from above; and he would spring on high with his feet 21.268. / ever overtake Achilles for all he was fleet of foot; for the gods are mightier than men. And oft as swift-footed, goodly Achilles strove to make stand against him and to learn if all the immortals that hold broad heaven were driving him in rout, so often would the great flood of the heaven-fed River beat upon his shoulders from above; and he would spring on high with his feet 21.269. / ever overtake Achilles for all he was fleet of foot; for the gods are mightier than men. And oft as swift-footed, goodly Achilles strove to make stand against him and to learn if all the immortals that hold broad heaven were driving him in rout, so often would the great flood of the heaven-fed River beat upon his shoulders from above; and he would spring on high with his feet 21.270. / in vexation of spirit, and the River was ever tiring his knees with its violent flow beneath, and was snatching away the ground from under his feet. 21.271. / in vexation of spirit, and the River was ever tiring his knees with its violent flow beneath, and was snatching away the ground from under his feet. 22.262. / Then with an angry glance from beneath his brows spake unto him Achilles, swift of foot:Hector, talk not to me, thou madman, of covets. As between lions and men there are no oaths of faith, nor do wolves and lambs have hearts of concord but are evil-minded continually one against the other, 22.263. / Then with an angry glance from beneath his brows spake unto him Achilles, swift of foot:Hector, talk not to me, thou madman, of covets. As between lions and men there are no oaths of faith, nor do wolves and lambs have hearts of concord but are evil-minded continually one against the other, 22.264. / Then with an angry glance from beneath his brows spake unto him Achilles, swift of foot:Hector, talk not to me, thou madman, of covets. As between lions and men there are no oaths of faith, nor do wolves and lambs have hearts of concord but are evil-minded continually one against the other, 22.265. / even so is it not possible for thee and me to be friends, neither shall there be oaths between us till one or the other shall have fallen, and glutted with his blood Ares, the warrior with tough shield of hide. Bethink thee of all manner of valour: now in good sooth it behoveth thee to quit thee as a spearman and a dauntless warrior. No more is there any escape for thee, but forthwith shall Pallas Athene 22.266. / even so is it not possible for thee and me to be friends, neither shall there be oaths between us till one or the other shall have fallen, and glutted with his blood Ares, the warrior with tough shield of hide. Bethink thee of all manner of valour: now in good sooth it behoveth thee to quit thee as a spearman and a dauntless warrior. No more is there any escape for thee, but forthwith shall Pallas Athene 23.114. / while yet they wailed around the piteous corpse. But the lord Agamemnon sent forth mules an men from all sides from out the huts to fetch wood and a man of valour watched thereover, even Meriones, squire of kindly Idomeneus. And they went forth bearing in their hands axes for the cutting of wood 23.115. / and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules: and ever upward, downward, sideward, and aslant they fared. But when they were come to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, forthwith they set them to fill high-crested oaks with the long-edged bronze in busy haste and with a mighty crash the trees kept falling. 23.116. / and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules: and ever upward, downward, sideward, and aslant they fared. But when they were come to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, forthwith they set them to fill high-crested oaks with the long-edged bronze in busy haste and with a mighty crash the trees kept falling. 23.117. / and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules: and ever upward, downward, sideward, and aslant they fared. But when they were come to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, forthwith they set them to fill high-crested oaks with the long-edged bronze in busy haste and with a mighty crash the trees kept falling. 23.118. / and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules: and ever upward, downward, sideward, and aslant they fared. But when they were come to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, forthwith they set them to fill high-crested oaks with the long-edged bronze in busy haste and with a mighty crash the trees kept falling. 23.119. / and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules: and ever upward, downward, sideward, and aslant they fared. But when they were come to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, forthwith they set them to fill high-crested oaks with the long-edged bronze in busy haste and with a mighty crash the trees kept falling. 23.120. / Then the Achaeans split the trunks asunder and bound them behind the mules, and these tore up the earth with their feet as they hasted toward the plain through the thick underbrush. And all the woodcutters bare logs; for so were they bidden of Meriones, squire of kindly Idomeneus. 23.121. / Then the Achaeans split the trunks asunder and bound them behind the mules, and these tore up the earth with their feet as they hasted toward the plain through the thick underbrush. And all the woodcutters bare logs; for so were they bidden of Meriones, squire of kindly Idomeneus. 23.122. / Then the Achaeans split the trunks asunder and bound them behind the mules, and these tore up the earth with their feet as they hasted toward the plain through the thick underbrush. And all the woodcutters bare logs; for so were they bidden of Meriones, squire of kindly Idomeneus. 24.719. / had not the old man spoken amid the folk from out the car:Make me way for the mules to pass through; thereafter shall ye take your fill of wailing, when I have brought him to the house. So spake he, and they stood apart and made way for the waggon. But the others, when they had brought him to the glorious house, 24.720. / laid him on a corded bedstead, and by his side set singers, leaders of the dirge, who led the song of lamentation—they chanted the dirge, and thereat the women made lament. And amid these white-armed Andromache led the wailing, holding in her arms the while the head of man-slaying Hector: 24.721. / laid him on a corded bedstead, and by his side set singers, leaders of the dirge, who led the song of lamentation—they chanted the dirge, and thereat the women made lament. And amid these white-armed Andromache led the wailing, holding in her arms the while the head of man-slaying Hector: 24.722. / laid him on a corded bedstead, and by his side set singers, leaders of the dirge, who led the song of lamentation—they chanted the dirge, and thereat the women made lament. And amid these white-armed Andromache led the wailing, holding in her arms the while the head of man-slaying Hector: 24.804. / lest the well-greaved Achaeans should set upon them before the time. And when they had piled the barrow they went back, and gathering together duly feasted a glorious feast in the palace of Priam, the king fostered of Zeus.On this wise held they funeral for horse-taming Hector.
12. Hesiod, Theogony, 24-26, 79-80, 338 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Williams (2012), The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca's 'Natural Questions', 119
338. Beneath the holy earth this dreadful thing
13. Hesiod, Works And Days, 103-104, 350 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 59
350. And paying dearly for his sins. But you
14. Homer, Odyssey, 1.1-1.4, 4.24, 4.333-4.592, 5.34-5.35, 5.295-5.296, 5.299-5.318, 5.392-5.463, 8.83-8.88, 10.49-10.52, 12.212, 13.73-13.125, 14.48-14.52 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius, commentarii de bello civili •caesar, julius, as anti-odyssean •caesar, c. julius, role in civil wars •julius caesar, c., his funeral •caesar, c. julius •julius caesar, c., image in jupiter capitolinus’ temple •caesar, gaius julius, as aeneas Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 30; Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 208; Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 153; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 106, 108
15. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 47.13 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, Found in books: Luck (2006), Arcana mundi: magic and the occult in the Greek and Roman worlds: a collection of ancient texts, 373
47.13. "נִלְאֵית בְּרֹב עֲצָתָיִךְ יַעַמְדוּ־נָא וְיוֹשִׁיעֻךְ הברו [הֹבְרֵי] שָׁמַיִם הַחֹזִים בַּכּוֹכָבִים מוֹדִיעִם לֶחֳדָשִׁים מֵאֲשֶׁר יָבֹאוּ עָלָיִךְ׃", 47.13. "Thou art wearied in the multitude of thy counsels; Let now the astrologers, the stargazers, The monthly prognosticators, Stand up, and save thee From the things that shall come upon thee.",
16. Hebrew Bible, Joshua, None (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 67
17. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 862-864, 861 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 30
861. τὸ μὲν γυναῖκα πρῶτον ἄρσενος δίχα 861. First: for a woman, from the male divided,
18. Theognis, Elegies, 33 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, gaius julius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 98
19. Sophocles, Antigone, 1176-1177, 1175 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 30
20. Aristophanes, Acharnians, 530 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, references alexander the great Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 71
530. ἐντεῦθεν ὀργῇ Περικλέης οὑλύμπιος
21. Euripides, Electra, 584, 1292 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 151
1292. ὦ παῖδε Διός, θέμις ἐς φθογγὰς
22. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, 8.1.22, 8.6.17-8.6.18 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •julius caesar, and jews, caesar granting judea immunity from military service, billeting, and requisitioned transport •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 58; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 82
8.1.22. αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους βελτίους γιγνομένους ἀνθρώπους· τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανός ἐστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν. 8.6.17. κατεμάθομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλο μηχάνημα πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐξ οὗ ταχέως ᾐσθάνετο καὶ τὰ πάμπολυ ἀπέχοντα ὅπως ἔχοι. σκεψάμενος γὰρ πόσην ἂν ὁδὸν ἵππος καθανύτοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐλαυνόμενος ὥστε διαρκεῖν, ἐποιήσατο ἱππῶνας τοσοῦτον διαλείποντας καὶ ἵππους ἐν αὐτοῖς κατέστησε καὶ τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους τούτων, καὶ ἄνδρα ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ τῶν τόπων ἔταξε τὸν ἐπιτήδειον παραδέχεσθαι τὰ φερόμενα γράμματα καὶ παραδιδόναι καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς ἀπειρηκότας ἵππους καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἄλλους πέμπειν νεαλεῖς· 8.6.18. ἔστι δʼ ὅτε οὐδὲ τὰς νύκτας φασὶν ἵστασθαι ταύτην τὴν πορείαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡμερινῷ ἀγγέλῳ τὸν νυκτερινὸν διαδέχεσθαι. τούτων δὲ οὕτω γιγνομένων φασί τινες θᾶττον τῶν γεράνων ταύτην τὴν πορείαν ἁνύτειν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ψεύδονται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι γε τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πεζῇ πορειῶν αὕτη ταχίστη, τοῦτο εὔδηλον. ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα ἕκαστον αἰσθανόμενον ὡς τάχιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. 8.1.22. 8.6.17. We have observed still another device of Cyrus inaugurates a postal system Cyrus to cope with the magnitude of his empire; by means of this institution he would speedily discover the condition of affairs, no matter how far distant they might be from him: he experimented to find out how great a distance a horse could cover in a day when ridden hard but so as not to break down, and then he erected post-stations at just such distances and equipped them with horses and men to take care of them; at each one of the stations he had the proper official appointed to receive the letters that were delivered and to forward them on, to take in the exhausted horses and riders and send on fresh ones. 8.6.18.
23. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
184c. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ διʼ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνῃ, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ διʼ οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ διʼ οὗ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. διʼ ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς. 184c. SOC. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear? THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.
24. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
246e. ἀσκῆτε, ἀσκεῖν μετʼ ἀρετῆς, εἰδότας ὅτι τούτου λειπόμενα πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακά. οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος κάλλος φέρει τῷ κεκτημένῳ μετʼ ἀνανδρίας— ἄλλῳ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλουτεῖ καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ—οὔτε σώματος κάλλος καὶ ἰσχὺς δειλῷ καὶ κακῷ συνοικοῦντα πρέποντα φαίνεται ἀλλʼ ἀπρεπῆ, καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκφαίνει τὴν δειλίαν· ΣΩ. πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη 246e. and whatsoever else ye practice ye must practice it in union with valor, being well assured that when divorced from this all possessions and pursuits are base and ignoble. For neither does wealth bring honor to its possessor if combined with cowardice—for such an one is rich for another rather than for himself,—nor do beauty and strength appear comely, but rather uncomely, when they are attached to one that is cowardly and base, since they make their possessor more conspicuous and show up his cowardice; Soc. and every form of knowledge
25. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan
26. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ruiz and Puertas (2021), Emperors and Emperorship in Late Antiquity: Images and Narratives, 101
344a. what you say is not true, for it is not being but becoming good, indeed—in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach—that is truly hard. In this way we see a purpose in the insertion of indeed, and that the truly is correctly placed at the end; and all that comes after corroborates this view of his meaning. There are many points in the various expressions of the poem
27. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Ruiz and Puertas (2021), Emperors and Emperorship in Late Antiquity: Images and Narratives, 95
215a. ψεύσομαι. ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάσῃς· οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾴδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδʼ ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι. 215a. have the goodness to take me up short and say that there I am lying; for I will not lie if I can help it. Still, you are not to be surprised if I tell my reminiscences at haphazard; it is anything but easy for a man in my condition to give a fluent and regular enumeration of your oddities. Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates The way I shall take, gentlemen, in my praise of Socrates, is by similitudes. Probably he will think I do this for derision; but I choose my similitude for the sake of truth, not of ridicule. For I say
28. Plato, Epinomis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
992a. γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἷς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις —εἰ δʼ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα μεταχειριεῖταί τις, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ γε τούτων μήποτέ τις ἐν πόλεσιν εὐδαίμων γένηται φύσις, ἀλλʼ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, αὕτη ἡ τροφή, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα· εἴτε χαλεπὰ εἴτε ῥᾴδια, ταύτῃ πορευτέον. ἀμελῆσαι δὲ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστιν θεῶν, καταφανοῦς γενομένης τῆς πάντων αὐτῶν κατὰ τρόπον λεγομένης φήμης 992a. Ath. for it will be manifest to us, as we reflect, that there is one bond naturally uniting all these things: but if one goes about it in some other way, one must call it Fortune, as we also put it. For never, without these lessons, will any nature be happy in our cities: no, this is the way, this the nurture, these the studies, whether difficult or easy, this the path to pursue: to neglect the gods is not permissible, when it has been made manifest that the fame of them, stated in proper terms, hits the mark.
29. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 283
30. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
31. Sophocles, Ajax, 474, 473 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 30
32. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 319
197b. ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ διʼ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; ἀλλʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ 197b. as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent act
33. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
34. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.11.1, 1.21.2, 1.23.6, 4.11-5.11, 6.6.1, 8.10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Nuno et al. (2021), SENSORIVM: The Senses in Roman Polytheism, 162
35. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291
21a. ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφʼ ὅτι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν. 21a. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don’t make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.
36. Euripides, Bacchae, 221 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, religiosity of Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 248
221. πλήρεις δὲ θιάσοις ἐν μέσοισιν ἑστάναι
37. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan
38. Euripides, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 62
39. Euripides, Hecuba, 584, 1292 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 151
1292. ἔχοντ' ἴδοιμεν τῶνδ' ἀφειμένοι πόνων.
40. Plato, Letters, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan
41. Herodotus, Histories, 1.5.3, 1.29.1, 1.60.10-1.60.15, 3.80, 3.126, 4.94, 7.152.3, 8.98 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 82
8.98. While Xerxes did thus, he sent a messenger to Persia with news of his present misfortune. Now there is nothing mortal that accomplishes a course more swiftly than do these messengers, by the Persians' skillful contrivance. It is said that as many days as there are in the whole journey, so many are the men and horses that stand along the road, each horse and man at the interval of a day's journey. These are stopped neither by snow nor rain nor heat nor darkness from accomplishing their appointed course with all speed. ,The first rider delivers his charge to the second, the second to the third, and thence it passes on from hand to hand, even as in the Greek torch-bearers' race in honor of Hephaestus. This riding-post is called in Persia, angareion.
42. Euripides, Phoenician Women, 393, 524-525, 531-532, 534-540, 533 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 171
43. Hebrew Bible, 2 Chronicles, 35.22 (5th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 65
35.22. "וְלֹא־הֵסֵב יֹאשִׁיָּהוּ פָנָיו מִמֶּנּוּ כִּי לְהִלָּחֵם־בּוֹ הִתְחַפֵּשׂ וְלֹא שָׁמַע אֶל־דִּבְרֵי נְכוֹ מִפִּי אֱלֹהִים וַיָּבֹא לְהִלָּחֵם בְּבִקְעַת מְגִדּוֹ׃", 35.22. "Nevertheless Josiah would not turn his face from him, but disguised himself, that he might fight with him, and hearkened not unto the words of Neco, from the mouth of God, and came to fight in the valley of Megiddo.",
44. Hebrew Bible, Ezra, 4.6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, caesar granting judea immunity from military service, billeting, and requisitioned transport •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 82
4.6. "וּבְמַלְכוּת אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ בִּתְחִלַּת מַלְכוּתוֹ כָּתְבוּ שִׂטְנָה עַל־יֹשְׁבֵי יְהוּדָה וִירוּשָׁלִָם׃", 4.6. "And in the reign of Ahasuerus, in the beginning of his reign, wrote they an accusation against the inhabitants of Judah and Jerusalem.",
45. Isocrates, Busiris, 22 (225) (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •greek doctors, and julius caesar Found in books: Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 228
46. Hebrew Bible, Nehemiah, 10.32-10.33 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 89
10.32. "וְעַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ הַמְבִיאִים אֶת־הַמַּקָּחוֹת וְכָל־שֶׁבֶר בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת לִמְכּוֹר לֹא־נִקַּח מֵהֶם בַּשַּׁבָּת וּבְיוֹם קֹדֶשׁ וְנִטֹּשׁ אֶת־הַשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִית וּמַשָּׁא כָל־יָד׃", 10.33. "וְהֶעֱמַדְנוּ עָלֵינוּ מִצְוֺת לָתֵת עָלֵינוּ שְׁלִשִׁית הַשֶּׁקֶל בַּשָּׁנָה לַעֲבֹדַת בֵּית אֱלֹהֵינוּ׃", 10.32. "and if the peoples of the land bring ware or any victuals on the sabbath day to sell, that we would not buy of them on the sabbath, or on a holy day; and that we would forego the seventh year, and the exaction of every debt.", 10.33. "Also we made ordices for us, to charge ourselves yearly with the third part of a shekel for the service of the house of our God;",
47. Duris of Samos, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 212
48. Demosthenes, Philip, 1.24, 5.11-5.13, 8.27, 10.26 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 210, 259
49. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 168
50. Callimachus, Epigrams, 51 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 90
51. Philochorus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 249
52. Theocritus, Idylls, 17.124-17.130 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Xinyue (2022), Politics and Divinization in Augustan Poetry, 46
53. Callimachus, Aetia, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Xinyue (2022), Politics and Divinization in Augustan Poetry, 46
54. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 40; Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 448
55. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 26
56. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 171
57. Callimachus, Iambi, 1.9-1.11 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, deification, divinity Found in books: Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 88
58. Callimachus, Epigrams, 51 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 90
59. Septuagint, Tobit, 1.5-1.8, 5.15, 6.1 (4th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, and jews, reorganization of jewish state by c. •julius caesar, favors of •caesar, julius Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 89, 90; Van Nuffelen (2012), Orosius and the Rhetoric of History, 43
1.5. All the tribes that joined in apostasy used to sacrifice to the calf Baal, and so did the house of Naphtali my forefather. 1.6. But I alone went often to Jerusalem for the feasts, as it is ordained for all Israel by an everlasting decree. Taking the first fruits and the tithes of my produce and the first shearings, I would give these to the priests, the sons of Aaron, at the altar. 1.7. of all my produce I would give a tenth to the sons of Levi who ministered at Jerusalem; a second tenth I would sell, and I would go and spend the proceeds each year at Jerusalem; 1.8. the third tenth I would give to those to whom it was my duty, as Deborah my fathers mother had commanded me, for I was left an orphan by my father. 5.15. And besides, I will add to your wages if you both return safe and sound." So they agreed to these terms. 6.1. Now as they proceeded on their way they came at evening to the Tigris river and camped there.
60. Plautus, Aulularia, 250, 189 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 70
61. Cato, Marcus Porcius, On Agriculture, 141.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c. •julius caesar, c., and haruspicy Found in books: Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 109
62. Ennius, Annales, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Price, Finkelberg and Shahar (2021), Rome: An Empire of Many Nations: New Perspectives on Ethnic Diversity and Cultural Identity, 54
63. Ennius, Incerta, 18 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius Found in books: Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 65
64. Plautus, Amphitruo, 475.841.962 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 36
65. Plautus, Rudens, 214 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, c. julius, as author Found in books: Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 67
66. Plautus, Epidicus, 223, 703-705 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 102
67. Cicero, Philippicae, 1.1.1, 1.2.4, 1.3, 1.5, 1.13, 1.30-1.31, 2.2, 2.12, 2.18.44, 2.20, 2.25-2.33, 2.34.85, 2.35-2.36, 2.40-2.41, 2.43.110, 2.62-2.64, 2.67-2.69, 2.75, 2.79-2.87, 2.89-2.91, 2.99, 2.107-2.111, 2.113-2.114, 2.116-2.117, 3.9, 3.30, 5.20, 5.42-5.43, 5.46, 8.9, 9.7, 9.10, 9.13-9.14, 11.12, 11.24, 13.8-13.9, 13.11-13.12, 13.13.28, 13.22, 13.24, 13.29-13.30, 13.35, 13.37-13.38, 13.41, 13.46, 14.10, 14.31, 14.33, 14.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 141, 142, 143; Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 27, 45, 91; Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 138, 183; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23, 46, 50, 124, 184; Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 230; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 313; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 347, 354, 369; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 58, 113; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 168; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 58, 70, 80, 153, 163; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 2, 53, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 43, 55, 65; Xinyue (2022), Politics and Divinization in Augustan Poetry, 37, 46
68. Septuagint, Judith, 1.8, 3.9-3.10, 4.6, 6.11, 7.3, 7.18, 14.2, 15.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 0th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 65
1.8. and those among the nations of Carmel and Gilead, and Upper Galilee and the great Plain of Esdraelon, 3.9. Then he came to the edge of Esdraelon, near Dothan, fronting the great ridge of Judea; 3.10. here he camped between Geba and Scythopolis, and remained for a whole month in order to assemble all the supplies for his army. 4.6. And Joakim, the high priest, who was in Jerusalem at the time, wrote to the people of Bethulia and Betomesthaim, which faces Esdraelon opposite the plain near Dothan, 6.11. So the slaves took him and led him out of the camp into the plain, and from the plain they went up into the hill country and came to the springs below Bethulia. 7.3. They encamped in the valley near Bethulia, beside the spring, and they spread out in breadth over Dothan as far as Balbaim and in length from Bethulia to Cyamon, which faces Esdraelon. 7.18. And the sons of Esau and the sons of Ammon went up and encamped in the hill country opposite Dothan; and they sent some of their men toward the south and the east, toward Acraba, which is near Chusi beside the brook Mochmur. The rest of the Assyrian army encamped in the plain, and covered the whole face of the land, and their tents and supply trains spread out in great number, and they formed a vast multitude. 14.2. And as soon as morning comes and the sun rises, let every valiant man take his weapons and go out of the city, and set a captain over them, as if you were going down to the plain against the Assyrian outpost; only do not go down. 15.2. Fear and trembling came over them, so that they did not wait for one another, but with one impulse all rushed out and fled by every path across the plain and through the hill country.
69. Cicero, On Old Age, 23.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 14, 115
70. Cicero, Letters, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 80
71. Cicero, Letters, 1.10.1, 1.15.7, 1.15.9, 1.16.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c., dictatorship of •julius caesar •julius caesar, assassination •julius caesar, monumental architecture •julius caesar, c., as diseased limb •julius caesar, c., as parens patriae •julius caesar, c., as parricide and tyrant Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 47; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 91, 114; Xinyue (2022), Politics and Divinization in Augustan Poetry, 37
72. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 14.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Janowitz (2002), Magic in the Roman World: Pagans, Jews and Christians, 75
14.15. For a father, consumed with grief at an untimely bereavement,made an image of his child, who had been suddenly taken from him;and he now honored as a god what was once a dead human being,and handed on to his dependents secret rites and initiations.
73. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 50
74. Cicero, Letters, 1.1.6, 1.1.13, 1.1.27, 1.1.32-1.1.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •julius caesar, and jews, caesar asking for percentage of annual produce from judea •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, and jews, publicani removed from judea by •julius caesar, favors of •publicani (tax companies), abolished from judea by julius caesar Found in books: Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 210; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 54, 55
75. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, 1.1.21, 1.2.15, 2.15.2, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.1, 3.5.1, 3.5.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •julius caesar, c., imagined as saving the res publica •julius caesar, c. •julius caesar, and cato •julius caesar, assassination •julius caesar, c., dictatorship of •julius caesar, and cicero Found in books: Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 47; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 37, 151; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 43, 64; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 81, 89, 91, 94
76. Cicero, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 96
77. Cicero, In Catilinam, 1.31, 2.25, 3.5-3.6, 3.14-3.15, 3.18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius •caesar, c. julius, as author •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 142, 143; Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 223, 224; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 222; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 26, 60
78. Cicero, In Pisonem, 21.5, 38.92-38.93 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 35, 45; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 52; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 55
79. Cicero, In Vatinium, 12.30, 13.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 253; Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 91; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 108
80. Cicero, In Verrem, 1.15.45, 2.1.32, 2.1.44, 2.1.59-2.1.60, 2.1.154, 2.2.7, 2.2.35-2.2.37, 2.2.46, 2.2.50, 2.2.84-2.2.85, 2.2.154, 2.2.158-2.2.160, 2.2.167, 2.3.32, 2.4.3-2.4.7, 2.4.73, 2.4.79-2.4.80, 2.4.82, 2.4.113, 2.4.122, 2.4.126, 2.5.3, 2.5.31, 2.5.41, 2.5.106, 5.86 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, and cato •julius caesar, assassination •caesar, julius •julius caesar •julius caesar, c., his triumph •julius caesar, house of •julius caesar, c., his aedileship •julius caesar, c. •rome, forum of julius caesar •julius caesar, monumental architecture •julius caesar, c., image in jupiter capitolinus’ temple •julius caesar, and brutus •julius caesar, c., display of bloody robes of •julius caesar, c., and the gallic war •julius caesar, c., and the civil war •julius caesar, honours to •julius caesar, c., image on the capitoline •caesar, julius (see julius caesar) Found in books: Bexley (2022), Seneca's Characters: Fictional Identities and Implied Human Selves, 105; Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 217; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 36, 37, 45, 47, 49, 50, 124; Radicke (2022), Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development, 256; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 58, 65, 67, 80, 108, 153, 155, 156; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 40; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 66
81. Cicero, Oratio Post Reditum Ad Populum, 5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c., imagined as saving the res publica Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 81
5. haec disputo? quorsum? ut intellegere possitis neminem umquam tanta eloquentia fuisse, neque tam divino atque incredibili genere dicendi, qui vestram magnitudinem multitudinemque beneficiorum quae quae c all. et add. s. l. H : qua P1 : quã B S b rell. in me fratremque meum et liberos nostros contulistis non modo augere aut ornare oratione, sed enumerare aut consequi possit. A parentibus, id quod necesse erat, parvus sum procreatus, a vobis natus sum consularis. illi mihi fratrem incognitum qualis futurus esset dederunt, vos spectatum et incredibili pietate cognitum reddidistis. rem publicam illis accepi temporibus eam quae paene amissa est, a vobis eam vobis eam ks all. : vob. iam codd. pler. reciperavi quam aliquando omnes unius opera servatam iudicaverunt. di immortales mihi liberos dederunt, vos reddidistis. multa praeterea a dis immortalibus optata consecuti sumus: nisi vestra voluntas fuisset, omnibus divinis muneribus careremus careremus b2s all. : caruerimus codd. pler. ( cf. valeret § 10): caruissemus bkg . vestros denique honores, quos eramus gradatim singulos adsecuti, nunc a vobis universos habemus, ut quantum antea parentibus, quantum dis immortalibus, quantum vobismet ipsis, tantum hoc tempore universum cuncto populo Romano debeamus.
82. Cicero, Oratio Pro Rege Deiotaro, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 49; Viglietti and Gildenhard (2020), Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic, 288, 290, 314
83. Cicero, Orator, 98, 66 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 15
84. Cicero, Republic, 1.2, 1.15-1.17, 1.16.25, 1.19, 1.25, 1.31, 1.39, 1.64, 1.66, 2.3.5, 2.4, 2.20, 2.26.47-2.26.48, 2.41, 2.43, 4.5, 4.10.11, 5.2, 5.4, 5.7, 6.8, 6.25-6.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius (iulius caesar, c.) •caesar, julius •caesar, c. julius, activities as dictator •caesar, c. julius, planned renovation of the saepta •julius caesar •julius caesar, deification, divinity •caesar c. julius •caesar, c. julius, as author •closeness to the gods, of julius caesar and romulus •caesar, c. julius •julius caesar, c., imagined as saving the res publica •julius caesar, c., and trojan ancestry •julius caesar, honours to Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 29; Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 40; Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 129, 135, 139, 140; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 44; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 112; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 66, 67, 178; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 161; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 32, 42; Viglietti and Gildenhard (2020), Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic, 287; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 81
1.2. Nec vero habere virtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam, nisi utare; etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, virtus in usu sui tota posita est; usus autem eius est maximus civitatis gubernatio et earum ipsarum rerum, quas isti in angulis persot, reapse, non oratione perfectio. Nihil enim dicitur a philosophis, quod quidem recte honesteque dicatur, quod non ab iis partum confirmatumque sit, a quibus civitatibus iura discripta sunt. Unde enim pietas aut a quibus religio? unde ius aut gentium aut hoc ipsum civile quod dicitur? unde iustitia, fides, aequitas? unde pudor, continentia, fuga turpitudinis, adpetentia laudis et honestatis? unde in laboribus et periculis fortitudo? Nempe ab iis, qui haec disciplinis informata alia moribus confirmarunt, sanxerunt autem alia legibus. 1.2. Non. p. 426M Sic, quoniam plura beneficia continet patria et est antiquior parens quam is, qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti debetur gratia. 1.15. Tum ille: Visne igitur, quoniam et me quodam modo invitas et tui spem das, hoc primum, Africane, videamus, ante quam veniunt alii, quidnam sit, de isto altero sole quod nuntiatum est in senatu? neque enim pauci neque leves sunt, qui se duo soles vidisse dicant, ut non tam fides non habenda quam ratio quaerenda sit. Hic Scipio: Quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera, tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere. Sed ego, Tubero, (nam tecum aperte, quod sentio, loquar) non nimis adsentior in omni isto genere nostro illi familiari, qui, quae vix coniectura qualia sint possumus suspicari, sic adfirmat, ut oculis ea cernere videatur aut tractare plane manu. Quo etiam sapientiorem Socratem soleo iudicare, qui omnem eius modi curam deposuerit eaque, quae de natura quaererentur, aut maiora, quam hominum ratio consequi posset, aut nihil omnino ad vitam hominum adtinere dixerit. 1.16. Dein Tubero: Nescio, Africane, cur ita memoriae proditum sit, Socratem omnem istam disputationem reiecisse et tantum de vita et de moribus solitum esse quaerere. Quem enim auctorem de illo locupletiorem Platone laudare possumus? cuius in libris multis locis ita loquitur Socrates, ut etiam, cum de moribus, de virtutibus, denique de re publica disputet, numeros tamen et geometriam et harmoniam studeat Pythagorae more coniungere. Tum Scipio: Sunt ista, ut dicis; sed audisse te credo, Tubero, Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse, ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret, eumque et cum Archyta Tarentino et cum Timaeo Locro multum fuisse et Philoleo commentarios esse ctum, cumque eo tempore in iis locis Pythagorae nomen vigeret, illum se et hominibus Pythagoreis et studiis illis dedisse. Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset, leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa plurimarum artium gravitate contexuit. 1.17. Haec Scipio cum dixisset, L. Furium repente venientem aspexit, eumque ut salutavit, amicissime adprehendit et in lecto suo conlocavit. Et cum simul P. Rutilius venisset, qui est nobis huius sermonis auctor, eum quoque ut salutavit, propter Tuberonem iussit adsidere. Tum Furius: Quid vos agitis? num sermonem vestrum aliquem diremit noster interventus? Minime vero, Africanus; soles enim tu haec studiose investigare, quae sunt in hoc genere, de quo instituerat paulo ante Tubero quaerere; Rutilius quidem noster etiam sub ipsis Numantiae moenibus solebat mecum interdum eius modi aliquid conquirere. Quae res tandem inciderat? inquit Philus. Tum ille: De solibus istis duobus; de quo studeo, Phile, ex te audire quid sentias. 1.19. Tum Philus: Non mihi videtur, inquit, quod hi venerunt, alius nobis sermo esse quaerendus, sed agendum accuratius et dicendum dignum aliquid horum auribus. Hic Laelius: Quid tandem agebatis, aut cui sermoni nos intervenimus? PH. Quaesierat ex me Scipio, quidnam sentirem de hoc, quod duo soles visos esse constaret. L. Ain vero? Phile, iam explorata nobis sunt ea, quae ad domos nostras quaeque ad rem publicam pertineant? siquidem, quid agatur in caelo, quaerimus. Et ille: An tu ad domos nostras non censes pertinere scire, quid agatur et quid fiat domi? quae non ea est, quam parietes nostri cingunt, sed mundus hic totus, quod domicilium quamque patriam di nobis communem secum dederunt, cum praesertim, si haec ignoremus, multa nobis et magna ignoranda sint. Ac me quidem, ut hercule etiam te ipsum, Laeli, omnisque avidos sapientiae cognitio ipsa rerum consideratioque delectat. 1.25. Atque eius modi quiddam etiam bello illo maximo, quod Athenienses et Lacedaemonii summa inter se contentione gesserunt, Pericles ille, et auctoritate et eloquentia et consilio princeps civitatis suae, cum obscurato sole tenebrae factae essent repente Atheniensiumque animos summus timor occupavisset, docuisse civis suos dicitur, id quod ipse ab Anaxagora, cuius auditor fuerat, acceperat, certo illud tempore fieri et necessario, cum tota se luna sub orbem solis subiecisset; itaque, etsi non omni intermenstruo, tamen id fieri non posse nisi certo intermenstruo tempore. Quod cum disputando rationibusque docuisset, populum liberavit metu; erat enim tum haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositu solere deficere, quod Thaletem Milesium primum vidisse dicunt. Id autem postea ne nostrum quidem Ennium fugit; qui ut scribit, anno trecentesimo quinquagesimo fere post Romam conditam Nonis Iunis soli luna obstitit et nox. Atque hac in re tanta inest ratio atque sollertia, ut ex hoc die, quem apud Ennium et in maximis annalibus consignatum videmus, superiores solis defectiones reputatae sint usque ad illam, quae Nonis Quinctilibus fuit regte Romulo; quibus quidem Romulum tenebris etiamsi natura ad humanum exitum abripuit, virtus tamen in caelum dicitur sustulisse. 1.31. Tum Tubero: Non dissentio a te, Laeli, sed quaero, quae tu esse maiora intellegas. L. Dicam mehercule et contemnar a te fortasse, cum tu ista caelestia de Scipione quaesieris, ego autem haec, quae videntur ante oculos esse, magis putem quaerenda. Quid enim mihi L. Pauli nepos, hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in hac tam clara re publica natus, quaerit, quo modo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit, cur in una re publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint? Nam, ut videtis, mors Tiberii Gracchi et iam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partis; obtrectatores autem et invidi Scipionis initiis factis a P. Crasso et Appio Claudio tenent nihilo minus illis mortuis senatus alteram partem dissidentem a vobis auctore Metello et P. Mucio neque hunc, qui unus potest, concitatis sociis et nomine Latino, foederibus violatis, triumviris seditiosissimis aliquid cotidie novi molientibus, bonis viris locupletibus perturbatis his tam periculosis rebus subvenire patiuntur. 1.39. Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tia 1.64. iusto quidem rege cum est populus orbatus, 'pectora diu tenet desiderium', sicut ait Ennius, 'post optimi regis obitum'; simul inter Sese sic memorant: 'o Romule, Romule die, Qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum!' Non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa; quid enim adiungunt? Tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras. Vitam, honorem, decus sibi datum esse iustitia regis existimabant. Mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris, si regum similitudo permansisset, sed vides unius iniustitia concidisse genus illud totum rei publicae. L. Video vero, inquit, et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni re publica noscere. 1.66. 'Cum' enim inquit 'inexplebiles populi fauces exaruerunt libertatis siti malisque usus ille ministris non modice temperatam, sed nimis meracam libertatem sitiens hausit, tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint et large sibi libertatem ministrent, insequitur, insimulat, arguit, praepotentes, reges, tyrannos vocat.' Puto enim tibi haec esse nota. L. Vero mihi, inquit ille, notissima. 2.4. Hoc cum omnes adprobavissent, Quod habemus, inquit, institutae rei publicae tam clarum ac tam omnibus notum exordium quam huius urbis condendae principium profectum a Romulo? qui patre Marte natus (concedamus enim famae hominum, praesertim non inveteratae solum, sed etiam sapienter a maioribus proditae, bene meriti de rebus communibus ut genere etiam putarentur, non solum ingenio esse divino)—is igitur, ut natus sit, cum Remo fratre dicitur ab Amulio, rege Albano, ob labefactandi regni timorem ad Tiberim exponi iussus esse; quo in loco cum esset silvestris beluae sustentatus uberibus pastoresque eum sustulissent et in agresti cultu laboreque aluissent, perhibetur, ut adoleverit, et corporis viribus et animi ferocitate tantum ceteris praestitisse, ut omnes, qui tum eos agros, ubi hodie est haec urbs, incolebant, aequo animo illi libenterque parerent. Quorum copiis cum se ducem praebuisset, ut iam a fabulis ad facta veniamus, oppressisse Longam Albam, validam urbem et potentem temporibus illis, Amuliumque regem interemisse fertur. 2.20. us ne pos ei us, ut di xeru nt quidam, e x filia. Quo autem ille mor tuus, e odem est an no na tus Si moni des Ol ympia de se xta et quin qua gesima, ut f acilius intel legi pos sit tu m de Ro mu li inmortalitate creditum, cum iam inveterata vita hominum ac tractata esset et cognita. Sed profecto tanta fuit in eo vis ingenii atque virtutis, ut id de Romulo Proculo Iulio, homini agresti, crederetur, quod multis iam ante saeculis nullo alio de mortali homines credidissent; qui inpulsu patrum, quo illi a se invidiam interitus Romuli pellerent, in contione dixisse fertur a se visum esse in eo colle Romulum, qui nunc Quirinalis vocatur; eum sibi mandasse, ut populum rogaret, ut sibi eo in colle delubrum fieret; se deum esse et Quirinum vocari. 2.41. Non. p. 342M Statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali et optumati et populari, confusa modice nec puniendo inritet animum inmanem ac ferum. 2.43. Nam in qua re publica est unus aliquis perpetua potestate, praesertim regia, quamvis in ea sit et senatus, ut tum fuit Romae, cum erant reges, ut Spartae Lycurgi legibus, et ut sit aliquod etiam populi ius, ut fuit apud nostros reges, tamen illud excellit regium nomen, neque potest eius modi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari. Ea autem forma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob causam, quod unius vitio praecipitata in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit. Nam ipsum regale genus civitatis non modo non est reprehendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum, si ullum probarem simplex rei publicae genus, sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet. Is est autem status, ut unius perpetua potestate et iustitia omnique sapientia regatur salus et aequabilitas et otium civium. Desunt omnino ei populo multa, qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas, quae non in eo est, ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nul lo 4.5. Non. 362M et noster Plato magis etiam quam Lycurgus, omnia qui prorsus iubet esse communia, ne quis civis propriam aut suam rem ullam queat dicere. Non. 308M Ego vero eodem, quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe, quam sibi ipse fingit. 5.4. Non. 497M sed tamen ut bono patri familias colendi, aedificandi, ratiocidi quidam usus opus est. 5.7. Ad vitam autem usumque vivendi ea discripta ratio est iustis nuptiis, legitimis liberis, sanctis penatium deorum Larumque familiarium sedibus, ut omnes et communibus commodis et suis uterentur, nec bene vivi sine bona re publica posset nec esse quicquam civitate bene constituta beatius. Quocirca permirum mihi videri solet, quae sit tanta doc 6.8. Macr. Sat. 1.4.2sq. Sed quamquam sapientibus conscientia ipsa factorum egregiorum amplissimum virtutis est praemium, tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat. Quae tandem ista sunt, inquit Laelius? Tum Scipio: Patimini me, quoniam tertium diem iam feriati sumus 6.25. Quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris, quanti tandem est ista hominum gloria, quae pertinere vix ad unius anni partem exiguam potest? Igitur alte spectare si voles atque hanc sedem et aeternam domum contueri, neque te sermonibus vulgi dedideris nec in praemiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum; suis te oportet inlecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus, quid de te alii loquantur, ipsi videant, sed loquentur tamen. Sermo autem omnis ille et angustiis cingitur iis regionum, quas vides, nec umquam de ullo perennis fuit et obruitur hominum interitu et oblivione posteritatis extinguitur. 6.26. Quae cum dixisset, Ego vero, inquam, Africane, siquidem bene meritis de patria quasi limes ad caeli aditum patet, quamquam a pueritia vestigiis ingressus patris et tuis decori vestro non defui, nunc tamen tanto praemio exposito enitar multo vigilantius. Et ille: Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. Deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet.
85. Hortensius Hortalus, Orations, 92.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c., display of bloody robes of Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 66
86. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.28, 1.199-1.200, 1.227, 1.249, 2.2, 2.36, 2.51-2.64, 2.194-2.196, 2.257, 2.266, 2.335, 2.341, 3.4, 3.9-3.10, 3.21, 3.138, 3.149-3.158, 3.217 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 15, 53; Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 101, 102, 194, 205; Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 141; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291, 312; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 66, 212; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 18, 153; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 55; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 42; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 66, 70, 95
1.28. postero autem die, cum illi maiores natu satis quiessent et in ambulationem ventum esset, dicebat tum Scaevolam duobus spatiis tribusve factis dixisse 'cur non imitamur, Crasse, Socratem illum, qui est in Phaedro Platonis? Nam me haec tua platanus admonuit, quae non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est diffusa ramis, quam illa, cuius umbram secutus est Socrates, quae mihi videtur non tam ipsa acula, quae describitur, quam Platonis oratione crevisse, et quod ille durissimis pedibus fecit, ut se abiceret in herba atque ita illa, quae philosophi divinitus ferunt esse dicta, loqueretur, id meis pedibus certe concedi est aequius.' 1.199. Senectuti vero celebrandae et ordae quod honestius potest esse perfugium quam iuris interpretatio? Equidem mihi hoc subsidium iam inde ab adulescentia comparavi, non solum ad causarum usum forensem, sed etiam ad decus atque ornamentum senectutis, ut, cum me vires, quod fere iam tempus adventat, deficere coepissent, ista ab solitudine domum meam vindicarem. Quid est enim praeclarius quam honoribus et rei publicae muneribus perfunctum senem posse suo iure dicere idem, quod apud Ennium dicat ille Pythius Apollo, se esse eum, unde sibi, si non populi et reges, at omnes sui cives consilium expetant, summarum rerum incerti: quos ego ope mea †ex incertis certos compotesque consili dimitto, ut ne res temere tractent turbidas: 1.200. est enim sine dubio domus iuris consulti totius oraculum civitatis; testis est huiusce Q. Muci ianua et vestibulum, quod in eius infirmissima valetudine adfectaque iam aetate maxima cotidie frequentia civium ac summorum hominum splendore celebratur. 1.227. Itaque haec cum a te divinitus ego dicta arbitrarer, P. Rutilius Rufus, homo doctus et philosophiae deditus, non modo parum commode, sed etiam turpiter et flagitiose dicta esse dicebat; idemque Servium Galbam, quem hominem probe commeminisse se aiebat, pergraviter reprehendere solebat, quod is, L. Scribonio quaestionem in eum ferente, populi misericordiam concitasset, cum M. Cato, Galbae gravis atque acer inimicus, aspere apud populum Romanum et vehementer esset locutus, quam orationem in Originibus suis exposuit ipse. 1.249. Cui nostrum licet fundos nostros obire aut res rusticas vel fructus causa vel delectationis invisere? Tamen nemo tam sine oculis, tam sine mente vivit, ut quid sit sementis ac messis, quid arborum putatio ac vitium, quo tempore anni aut quo modo ea fiant omnino nesciat. Num igitur si qui fundus inspiciendus aut si mandandum aliquid procuratori de agri cultura aut imperandum vilico est, Magonis Karthaginiensis sunt libri perdiscendi? an hac communi intellegentia contenti esse possumus? Cur ergo non eidem in iure civili, praesertim cum in causis et in negotiis et in foro conteramur, satis instructi esse possumus ad hoc dumtaxat, ne in nostra patria peregrini atque advenae esse videamur? 2.2. Quos tum, ut pueri, refutare domesticis testibus patre et C. Aculeone propinquo nostro et L. Cicerone patruo solebamus, quod de Crasso pater et Aculeo, quocum erat nostra matertera, quem Crassus dilexit ex omnibus plurimum, et patruus, qui cum Antonio in Ciliciam profectus una decesserat, multa nobis de eius studio et doctrina saepe narravit; cumque nos cum consobrinis nostris, Aculeonis filiis, et ea disceremus, quae Crasso placerent, et ab eis doctoribus, quibus ille uteretur, erudiremur, etiam illud saepe intelleximus, cum essemus eius domi, quod vel pueri sentire poteramus, illum et Graece sic loqui, nullam ut nosse aliam linguam videretur, et doctoribus nostris ea ponere in percontando eaque ipsum omni in sermone tractare, ut nihil esse ei novum, nihil inauditum videretur. 2.36. Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur? Nam si qua est ars alia, quae verborum aut faciendorum aut legendorum scientiam profiteatur; aut si quisquam dicitur nisi orator formare orationem eamque variare et distinguere quasi quibusdam verborum sententiarumque insignibus; aut si via ulla nisi ab hac una arte traditur aut argumentorum aut sententiarum aut denique discriptionis atque ordinis, fateamur aut hoc, quod haec ars profiteatur, alienum esse aut cum alia aliqua arte esse commune: sed si in hac una est ea ratio atque doctrina, non, si qui aliarum artium bene locuti sunt, eo minus id est huius unius proprium; 2.51. 'Plane' inquit Catulus 'adsentior.' 'Age vero,' inquit Antonius 'qualis oratoris et quanti hominis in dicendo putas esse historiam scribere?' 'Si, ut Graeci scripserunt, summi,' inquit Catulus; 'si, ut nostri, nihil opus est oratore; satis est non esse mendacem.' 'Atqui, ne nostros contemnas,' inquit Antonius, 'Graeci quoque ipsi sic initio scriptitarunt, ut noster Cato, ut Pictor, ut Piso; 2.52. erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio, cuius rei memoriaeque publicae retinendae causa ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. Mucium pontificem maximum res omnis singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus referebatque in album et proponebat tabulam domi, potestas ut esset populo cognoscendi, eique etiam nunc annales maximi nomitur. 2.53. Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi secuti sunt, qui sine ullis ornamentis monumenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum reliquerunt; itaque qualis apud Graecos Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas fuit aliique permulti, talis noster Cato et Pictor et Piso, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornetur oratio—modo enim huc ista sunt importata—et, dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem. 2.54. Paulum se erexit et addidit maiorem historiae sonum vocis vir optimus, Crassi familiaris, Antipater; ceteri non exornatores rerum, sed tantum modo narratores fuerunt.' 'Est,' inquit Catulus 'ut dicis; sed iste ipse Caelius neque distinxit historiam varietate colorum neque verborum conlocatione et tractu orationis leni et aequabili perpolivit illud opus; sed ut homo neque doctus neque maxime aptus ad dicendum, sicut potuit, dolavit; vicit tamen, ut dicis, superiores.' 2.55. 'Minime mirum,' inquit Antonius 'si ista res adhuc nostra lingua inlustrata non est; nemo enim studet eloquentiae nostrorum hominum, nisi ut in causis atque in foro eluceat; apud Graecos autem eloquentissimi homines remoti a causis forensibus cum ad ceteras res inlustris tum ad historiam scribendam maxime se applicaverunt: namque et Herodotum illum, qui princeps genus hoc ornavit, in causis nihil omnino versatum esse accepimus; atqui tanta est eloquentia, ut me quidem, quantum ego Graece scripta intellegere possum, magno opere delectet; et post illum Thucydides omnis dicendi artificio mea sententia facile vicit; 2.56. qui ita creber est rerum frequentia, ut verborum prope numerum sententiarum numero consequatur, ita porro verbis est aptus et pressus, ut nescias, utrum res oratione an verba sententiis inlustrentur: atqui ne hunc quidem, quamquam est in re publica versatus, ex numero accepimus eorum, qui causas dictitarunt; et hos ipsos libros tum scripsisse dicitur, cum a re publica remotus atque, id quod optimo cuique Athenis accidere solitum est, in exsilium pulsus esset; 2.57. hunc consecutus est Syracosius Philistus, qui, cum Dionysi tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda maximeque Thucydidem est, ut mihi videtur, imitatus. Postea vero ex clarissima quasi rhetoris officina duo praestantes ingenio, Theopompus et Ephorus ab Isocrate magistro impulsi se ad historiam contulerunt; causas omnino numquam attigerunt. 2.58. Denique etiam a philosophia profectus princeps Xenophon, Socraticus ille, post ab Aristotele Callisthenes, comes Alexandri, scripsit historiam, et is quidem rhetorico paene more; ille autem superior leniore quodam sono est usus, et qui illum impetum oratoris non habeat, vehemens fortasse minus, sed aliquanto tamen est, ut mihi quidem videtur, dulcior. Minimus natu horum omnium Timaeus, quantum autem iudicare possum, longe eruditissimus et rerum copia et sententiarum varietate abundantissimus et ipsa compositione verborum non impolitus magnam eloquentiam ad scribendum attulit, sed nullum usum forensem.' 2.59. Haec cum ille dixisset, 'quid est,' inquit 'Catule?' Caesar; 'ubi sunt, qui Antonium Graece negant scire? Quot historicos nominavit! Quam scienter, quam proprie de uno quoque dixit!' 'Id me hercule' inquit Catulus 'admirans illud iam mirari desino, quod multo magis ante mirabar, hunc, cum haec nesciret, in dicendo posse tantum.' 'Atqui, Catule,' inquit Antonius 'non ego utilitatem aliquam ad dicendum aucupans horum libros et non nullos alios, sed delectationis causa, cum est otium, legere soleo. 2.60. Quid ergo est ? Est, fatebor, aliquid tamen; ut, cum in sole ambulem, etiam si ego aliam ob causam ambulem, fieri natura tamen, ut colorer, sic, cum istos libros ad Misenum—nam Romae vix licet—studiosius legerim, sentio illorum tactu orationem meam quasi colorari. Sed ne latius hoc vobis patere videatur, haec dumtaxat in Graecis intellego, quae ipsi, qui scripserunt, voluerunt vulgo intellegi: 2.61. in philosophos vestros si quando incidi, deceptus indicibus librorum, qui sunt fere inscripti de rebus notis et inlustribus, de virtute, de iustitia, de honestate, de voluptate, verbum prorsus nullum intellego; ita sunt angustis et concisis disputationibus inligati; poetas omnino quasi alia quadam lingua locutos non conor attingere. Cum eis me, ut dixi, oblecto, qui res gestas aut orationes scripserunt suas aut qui ita loquuntur, ut videantur voluisse esse nobis, qui non sumus eruditissimi, familiares. 2.62. Sed illuc redeo: videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum; neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam rhetorum praeceptis; sita sunt enim ante oculos. Nam quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid veri non audeat? Ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? Ne quae simultatis? 2.63. Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, ipsa autem exaedificatio posita est in rebus et verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem; vult etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probet et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicentur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae, sed etiam, qui fama ac nomine excellant, de cuiusque vita atque natura; 2.64. verborum autem ratio et genus orationis fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudiciali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensibus aculeis persequendum est. Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne nulla esse praecepta, quae in artibus rhetorum reperiantur? In eodem silentio multa alia oratorum officia iacuerunt, cohortationes, praecepta, consolationes, admonita, quae tractanda sunt omnia disertissime, sed locum suum in his artibus, quae traditae sunt, habent nullum. 2.194. Fieri nullo modo potuit. Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse et sine quodam adflatu quasi furoris. Qua re nolite existimare me ipsum, qui non heroum veteres casus fictosque luctus velim imitari atque adumbrare dicendo neque actor sim alienae personae, sed auctor meae, cum mihi M'. Aquilius in civitate retinendus esset, quae in illa causa peroranda fecerim, sine magno dolore fecisse: 2.195. quem enim ego consulem fuisse, imperatorem ornatum a senatu, ovantem in Capitolium ascendisse meminissem, hunc cum adflictum, debilitatum, maerentem, in summum discrimen adductum viderem, non prius sum conatus misericordiam aliis commovere quam misericordia sum ipse captus. Sensi equidem tum magno opere moveri iudices, cum excitavi maestum ac sordidatum senem et cum ista feci, quae tu, Crasse, laudas, non arte, de qua quid loquar nescio, sed motu magno animi ac dolore, ut discinderem tunicam, ut cicatrices ostenderem. 2.196. Cum C. Marius maerorem orationis meae praesens ac sedens multum lacrimis suis adiuvaret cumque ego illum crebro appellans conlegam ei suum commendarem atque ipsum advocatum ad communem imperatorum fortunam defendendam invocarem, non fuit haec sine meis lacrimis, non sine dolore magno miseratio omniumque deorum et hominum et civium et sociorum imploratio; quibus omnibus verbis, quae a me tum sunt habita, si dolor afuisset meus, non modo non miserabilis, sed etiam inridenda fuisset oratio mea. Quam ob rem hoc vos doceo, Sulpici, bonus ego videlicet atque eruditus magister, ut in dicendo irasci, ut dolere, ut flere possitis. 2.257. illa "si tu et adversus et aversus impudicus es." Etiam interpretatio nominis habet acumen, cum ad ridiculum convertas, quam ob rem ita quis vocetur; ut ego nuper Nummium divisorem, ut Neoptolemum ad Troiam, sic illum in campo Martio nomen invenisse; atque haec omnia verbo continentur. Saepe etiam versus facete interponitur, vel ut est vel paululum immutatus, aut aliqua pars versus, ut Stati a Scauro stomachante; ex quo sunt non nulli, qui tuam legem de civitate natam, Crasse, dicant: st, tacete, quid hoc clamoris? Quibus nec mater nec pater, tanta confidentia? Auferte istam enim superbiam. Nam in Caelio sane etiam ad causam utile fuit tuum illud, Antoni, cum ille a se pecuniam profectam diceret testis et haberet filium delicatiorem, abeunte iam illo, sentin senem esse tactum triginta minis? 2.266. quisque optime Graece sciret, ita esse nequissimum." Valde autem ridentur etiam imagines, quae fere in deformitatem aut in aliquod vitium corporis ducuntur cum similitudine turpioris: ut meum illud in Helvium Manciam "iam ostendam cuius modi sis," cum ille "ostende, quaeso"; demonstravi digito pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico sub Novis distortum, eiecta lingua, buccis fluentibus; risus est commotus; nihil tam Manciae simile visum est; ut cum Tito Pinario mentum in dicendo intorquenti: "tum ut 2.335. Controversia autem est inter hominum sententias aut in illo, utrum sit utilius; aut etiam, cum id convenit, certatur, utrum honestati potius an utilitati consulendum sit; quae quia pugnare inter se saepe videntur, qui utilitatem defendet, enumerabit commoda pacis, opum, potentiae, vectigalium, praesidi militum, ceterarum rerum, quarum fructum utilitate metimur, itemque incommoda contrariorum; qui ad dignitatem impellit, maiorum exempla, quae erant vel cum periculo gloriosa, conliget, posteritatis immortalem memoriam augebit, utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet semperque eam cum dignitate esse coniunctam. 2.341. Nec illud tertium laudationum genus est difficile, quod ego initio quasi a praeceptis nostris secreveram; sed et quia multa sunt orationum genera et graviora et maioris copiae, de quibus nemo fere praeciperet, et quod nos laudationibus non ita multum uti soleremus, totum hunc segregabam locum; ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis alicuius ordi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander aliique laudantur; nostrae laudationes, quibus in foro utimur, aut testimoni brevitatem habent nudam atque inornatam aut scribuntur ad funebrem contionem, quae ad orationis laudem minime accommodata est. Sed tamen, quoniam est utendum aliquando, non numquam etiam scribendum, vel ut Q. Tuberoni Africanum avunculum laudanti scripsit C. Laelius, vel ut nosmet ipsi ordi causa Graecorum more, si quos velimus, laudare possimus, sit a nobis quoque tractatus hic locus. 3.4. Hic cum homini et vehementi et diserto et in primis forti ad resistendum Philippo quasi quasdam verborum faces admovisset, non tulit ille et graviter exarsit pigneribusque ablatis Crassum instituit coercere. Quo quidem ipso in loco multa a Crasso divinitus dicta esse ferebantur, cum sibi illum consulem esse negaret, cui senator ipse non esset. 'An tu, cum omnem auctoritatem universi ordinis pro pignere putaris eamque in conspectu populi Romani concideris, me his existimas pigneribus terreri? Non tibi illa sunt caedenda, si L. Crassum vis coercere: haec tibi est incidenda lingua, qua vel evulsa spiritu ipso libidinem tuam libertas mea refutabit.' 3.9. Et quoniam attigi cogitatione vim varietatemque fortunae, non vagabitur oratio mea longius atque eis fere ipsis definietur viris, qui hoc sermone, quem referre suscepimus, continentur. Quis enim non iure beatam L. Crassi mortem illam, quae est a multis saepe defleta, dixerit, cum horum ipsorum sit, qui tum cum illo postremum fere conlocuti sunt, eventum recordatus? Tenemus enim memoria Q. Catulum, virum omni laude praestantem, cum sibi non incolumem fortunam, sed exsilium et fugam deprecaretur, esse coactum, ut vita se ipse privaret. 3.10. Iam M. Antoni in eis ipsis rostris, in quibus ille rem publicam constantissime consul defenderat quaeque censor imperatoriis manubiis ornarat, positum caput illud fuit, a quo erant multorum civium capita servata; neque vero longe ab eo C. Iuli caput hospitis Etrusci scelere proditum cum L. Iuli fratris capite iacuit, ut ille, qui haec non vidit, et vixisse cum re publica pariter et cum illa simul exstinctus esse videatur. Neque enim propinquum suum, maximi animi virum, P. Crassum, suapte interfectum manu neque conlegae sui, pontificis maximi, sanguine simulacrum Vestae respersum esse vidit; cui maerori, qua mente ille in patriam fuit, etiam C. Carbonis, inimicissimi hominis, eodem illo die mors fuisset nefaria; 3.21. Sed si haec maior esse ratio videtur, quam ut hominum possit sensu aut cogitatione comprehendi, est etiam illa Platonis vera et tibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri; ubi enim perspecta vis est rationis eius, qua causae rerum atque exitus cognoscuntur, mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque reperitur. 3.138. Quid Pericles? de cuius vi dicendi sic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriae severius, tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra popularis homines diceret, populare omnibus et iucundum videretur; cuius in labris veteres comici, etiam cum illi male dicerent (quod tum Athenis fieri licebat), leporem habitasse dixerunt tantamque in eodem vim fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret. At hunc non declamator aliqui ad clepsydram latrare docuerat, sed, ut accepimus, Clazomenius ille Anaxagoras vir summus in maximarum rerum scientia: itaque hic doctrina, consilio, eloquentia excellens quadraginta annis praefuit Athenis et urbanis eodem tempore et bellicis rebus. 3.149. Omnis igitur oratio conficitur ex verbis; quorum primum nobis ratio simpliciter videnda est, deinde coniuncte. Nam est quidam ornatus orationis, qui ex singulis verbis est; alius, qui ex continuatis coniunctis constat. Ergo utimur verbis aut eis, quae propria sunt et certa quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis; aut eis, quae transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco conlocantur; aut eis, quae novamus et facimus ipsi. 3.150. In propriis igitur est verbis illa laus oratoris, ut abiecta atque obsoleta fugiat, lectis atque inlustribus utatur, in quibus plenum quiddam et sos inesse videatur. Sed in hoc verborum genere propriorum dilectus est habendus quidam atque is aurium quodam iudicio ponderandus est; in quo consuetudo etiam bene loquendi valet plurimum. 3.151. Itaque hoc, quod vulgo de oratoribus ab imperitis dici solet "bonis hic verbis," aut "aliquis non bonis utitur," non arte aliqua perpenditur, sed quodam quasi naturali sensu iudicatur: in quo non magna laus est vitare vitium, quamquam est magnum, verum tamen hoc quasi solum quoddam atque fundamentum est, verborum usus et copia bonorum. 3.152. Sed quid ipse aedificet orator et in quo adiungat artem, id esse nobis quaerendum atque explicandum videtur. Tria sunt igitur in verbo simplici, quae orator adferat ad inlustrandam atque exordam orationem: aut inusitatum verbum aut novatum aut translatum. 3.153. Inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetustate ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt poetarum licentiae liberiora quam nostrae; sed tamen raro habet etiam in oratione poeticum aliquod verbum dignitatem. Neque enim illud fugerim dicere, ut Caelius "qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam venit," nec "prolem" aut "subolem" aut "effari" aut "nuncupare" aut, ut tu soles, Catule, "non rebar" aut "opinabar"; aut alia multa, quibus loco positis grandior atque antiquior oratio saepe videri solet. 3.154. Novantur autem verba, quae ab eo, qui dicit, ipso gignuntur ac fiunt, vel coniungendis verbis, ut haec: tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat. num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias videtis enim et "versutiloquas" et "expectorat" ex coniunctione facta esse verba, non nata; sed saepe vel sine coniunctione verba novantur ut "ille senius desertus," ut "di genitales," ut "bacarum ubertate incurvescere." 3.155. Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit. Nam ut vestis frigoris depellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, sic verbi translatio instituta est inopiae causa, frequentata delectationis. Nam gemmare vitis, luxuriem esse in herbis, laetas segetes etiam rustici dicunt. Quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio potest, id translato cum est dictum, inlustrat id, quod intellegi volumus, eius rei, quam alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo. 3.156. Ergo haec translationes quasi mutuationes sunt, cum quod non habeas aliunde sumas, illae paulo audaciores, quae non inopiam indicant, sed orationi splendoris aliquid arcessunt; quarum ego quid vobis aut inveniendi rationem aut genera ponam? 3.157. Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tamquam in suo positum si agnoscitur, delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur ; sed ea transferri oportet, quae aut clariorem faciunt rem, ut illa omnia: inhorrescit mare, tenebrae conduplicantur, noctisque et nimbum occaecat nigror, flamma inter nubis coruscat, caelum tonitru contremit, grando mixta imbri largifico subita praecipitans cadit, undique omnes venti erumpunt, saevi exsistunt turbines, fervit aestu pelagus: omnia fere, quo essent clariora, translatis per similitudinem verbis dicta sunt; 3.158. aut quo significatur magis res tota sive facti alicuius sive consili, ut ille, qui occultantem consulto, ne id, quod ageretur, intellegi posset, duobus translatis verbis similitudine ipsa indicat: quandoquidem is se circum vestit dictis, saepit se dolo. Non numquam etiam brevitas translatione conficitur, ut illud "si telum manu fugit": imprudentia teli missi brevius propriis verbis exponi non potuit, quam est uno significata translato. 3.217. nullum est enim horum generum, quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur. Hi sunt actori, ut pictori, expositi ad variandum colores. Aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro incidens: ipsus hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser mandarem natos et ea, quae tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti segregare abs te ausu's ausus es et ecquis hoc animadvortet? vincite et Atreus fere totus. Aliud miseratio ac maeror, flexibile, plenum, interruptum, flebili voce: quo nunc me vortam? quod iter incipiam ingredi? domum paternamne? anne ad Peliae filias? et illa o pater, o patria, o Priami domus! et quae sequuntur haec omnia videi inflammarei, Priamo vi vitam evitarei.
87. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 27-28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 88
88. Septuagint, 1 Maccabees, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.38, 2.39, 2.40, 2.41, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 3.20, 3.21, 3.22, 3.23, 3.24, 5.22, 5.52, 9.50, 9.51, 9.52, 10.26, 10.27, 10.28, 10.29, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 10.34, 10.35, 10.36, 10.37, 10.38, 10.39, 10.40, 10.41, 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 11.28, 11.34, 11.57, 12.49, 13.15, 14.27, 14.28, 14.29, 14.30, 14.31, 14.32, 14.33, 14.34, 14.35, 14.36, 14.37, 14.38, 14.39, 14.40, 14.41, 14.42, 14.43, 14.44, 14.45, 14.46, 14.47, 14.48, 14.49, 15.9, 15.28-16.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 49, 73, 83, 84
10.30. and instead of collecting the third of the grain and the half of the fruit of the trees that I should receive, I release them from this day and henceforth. I will not collect them from the land of Judah or from the three districts added to it from Samaria and Galilee, from this day and for all time.
89. Cicero, Academica, 1.1, 1.9, 1.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, c. julius, role in civil wars •caesar, c. julius, assassination of •caesar, julius Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 212, 213
1.1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis eisdem et vetustate amicitiae coniunctum; itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus. paulumque cum ab ab om. *d eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus; atque illum complexi, ut mos amicorum est (satis enim satis enim *g longo intervallo * * * ), ad suam -eum *d se visentium Dav. villam reduximus. non videramus inter nos Reitz. advenerat pl. 1.9. Tum ego Sunt sunt uera *g . an s. vero? inquam “ista Varro. nam nos in nostra urbe peregritis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, reduxerunt s Aug. ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. tu aetatem patriae tu descriptiones discr. cod. Aug. l Mue. temporum, tu sacrorum iura tu sacerdotum, sacerdotem pm 1 nr tu domesticam tu bellicam bellicam] publicam Aug. disciplinam, tu sedum sedum vel -ium codd. Aug. plerique sedem *g*d regionum locorum tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera officia causas aperuisti; nos ... aperuisti Aug. civ. 6, 2 plurimum plurimumque s Ald. -que idem p. Gr. quidem poetis a petis *d nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis inchoasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. 1.16. hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque que om. px sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, pr. se m ; praestarem p 1 (ceteris in ras. ) quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, putent *dn -ant *g ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se se rem *g arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis omnis *d . cf. Plato apol. 23 A Lact. ira 1, 6 s. epit. 35, 5 sapientia, non arbitrari sese se gf scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum tantum Dav. ad Lact. epit. 37 tam *g*d tamen vel tum s in virtute laudanda et in hominibus hom. omnibus *d o. h. s ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest.
90. Cicero, Brutus, 16.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 313
91. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 4.7-4.15, 14.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •julius caesar, and jews, caesar granting judea immunity from military service, billeting, and requisitioned transport •julius caesar, and jews, decrees of c. concerning jewish state •julius caesar, favors of Found in books: Keddie (2019), Class and Power in Roman Palestine: The Socioeconomic Setting of Judaism and Christian Origins, 116; Schliesser et al. (2021), Alexandria: Hub of the Hellenistic World. 40; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 84
4.7. When Seleucus died and Antiochus who was called Epiphanes succeeded to the kingdom, Jason the brother of Onias obtained the high priesthood by corruption,' 4.8. promising the king at an interview three hundred and sixty talents of silver and, from another source of revenue, eighty talents.' 4.9. In addition to this he promised to pay one hundred and fifty more if permission were given to establish by his authority a gymnasium and a body of youth for it, and to enrol the men of Jerusalem as citizens of Antioch.' 4.10. When the king assented and Jason came to office, he at once shifted his countrymen over to the Greek way of life.' 4.11. He set aside the existing royal concessions to the Jews, secured through John the father of Eupolemus, who went on the mission to establish friendship and alliance with the Romans; and he destroyed the lawful ways of living and introduced new customs contrary to the law.' 4.12. For with alacrity he founded a gymnasium right under the citadel, and he induced the noblest of the young men to wear the Greek hat.' 4.13. There was such an extreme of Hellenization and increase in the adoption of foreign ways because of the surpassing wickedness of Jason, who was ungodly and no high priest,' 4.14. that the priests were no longer intent upon their service at the altar. Despising the sanctuary and neglecting the sacrifices, they hastened to take part in the unlawful proceedings in the wrestling arena after the call to the discus,' 4.15. disdaining the honors prized by their fathers and putting the highest value upon Greek forms of prestige." 14.5. But he found an opportunity that furthered his mad purpose when he was invited by Demetrius to a meeting of the council and was asked about the disposition and intentions of the Jews. He answered:"
92. Cicero, Brutus, 16.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 313; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 44, 52
79. erat isdem temporibus Ti. Gracchus P. F., qui bis consul et censor fuit, cuius est oratio Graeca apud Rhodios; quem civem cum gravem tum etiam eloquentem constat fuisse. P. etiam Scipionem Nasicam, qui est Corculum appellatus, qui item bis consul et censor fuit, habitum eloquentem aiunt, illius qui sacra acceperit accepit maluit Schütz, qui et Idaeae matris sacra habet filium; dicunt etiam L. Lentulum, qui cum C. Figulo consul fuit. Q. Nobiliorem M. F. iam patrio patrio vulg. : patre L institute deditum studio litterarum—qui etiam Q. Ennium, qui cum patre eius in Aetolia militaverat, civitate donavit, cum triumvir triumvir vulg. : tresvir Eberhard : triumvirum L coloniam deduxisset— et T. Annium Luscum huius Q. Fulvi conlegam non indisertum dicunt fuisse;
93. Cicero, On Friendship, 100, 102-104, 22, 27, 36, 97, 41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 315
94. Cicero, De Consulatu Suo, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 26, 221
95. Cicero, On Divination, 1.1, 1.3, 1.6-1.9, 1.11-1.12, 1.15, 1.17-1.23, 1.27, 1.29-1.30, 1.39-1.61, 1.63, 1.68, 1.105, 1.115, 1.119, 1.125, 1.132, 2.1, 2.3, 2.12-2.20, 2.26, 2.28, 2.33.71, 2.46, 2.48, 2.52-2.53, 2.70, 2.78-2.79, 2.100, 2.110, 2.114, 2.148-2.150 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius •julius caesar, c. •julius caesar, c., and cicero •julius caesar •caesar c. julius •julius caesar, •caesar, c. julius, role in civil wars •julius caesar, c., and haruspicy Found in books: Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 93; Erker (2023), Ambiguity and Religion in Ovid’s Fasti: Religious Innovation and the Imperial Family, 91, 184; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Luck (2006), Arcana mundi: magic and the occult in the Greek and Roman worlds: a collection of ancient texts, 310; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 38, 40, 83; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 6, 212; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 11, 12, 19, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 53, 55, 62, 108, 111, 147, 237, 275, 277; Williams (2012), The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca's 'Natural Questions', 315, 316
1.1. Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci mantikh/n appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt. 1.3. Quam vero Graecia coloniam misit in Aeoliam, Ioniam, Asiam, Siciliam, Italiam sine Pythio aut Dodonaeo aut Hammonis oraculo? aut quod bellum susceptum ab ea sine consilio deorum est? Nec unum genus est divinationis publice privatimque celebratum. Nam, ut omittam ceteros populos, noster quam multa genera conplexus est! Principio huius urbis parens Romulus non solum auspicato urbem condidisse, sed ipse etiam optumus augur fuisse traditur. Deinde auguribus et reliqui reges usi, et exactis regibus nihil publice sine auspiciis nec domi nec militiae gerebatur. Cumque magna vis videretur esse et inpetriendis consulendisque rebus et monstris interpretandis ac procurandis in haruspicum disciplina, omnem hanc ex Etruria scientiam adhibebant, ne genus esset ullum divinationis, quod neglectum ab iis videretur. 1.6. Sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse dividi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur? praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius. 1.7. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata est. Etenim nobismet ipsis quaerentibus, quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque, ne temere vel falsae rei vel non satis cognitae adsentiamur, faciendum videtur, ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in iis tribus libris, quos de natura deorum scripsimus. Nam cum omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo errorque turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime, in quo iudicandum est, quantum auspiciis rebusque divinis religionique tribuamus; est enim periculum, ne aut neglectis iis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur. 1.8. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe et paulo accuratius nuper, cum essem cum Q. fratre in Tusculano, disputatum est. Nam cum ambulandi causa in Lyceum venissemus (id enim superiori gymnasio nomen est), Perlegi, ille inquit, tuum paulo ante tertium de natura deorum, in quo disputatio Cottae quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit. Optime vero, inquam; etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat, ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem. Tum Quintus: Dicitur quidem istuc, inquit, a Cotta, et vero saepius, credo, ne communia iura migrare videatur; sed studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere. 1.9. Eius rationi non sane desidero quid respondeam; satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cuius disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior. Sed, quod praetermissum est in illis libris (credo, quia commodius arbitratus es separatim id quaeri deque eo disseri), id est de divinatione, quae est earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio, id, si placet, videamus quam habeat vim et quale sit. Ego enim sic existimo, si sint ea genera dividi vera, de quibus accepimus quaeque colimus, esse deos, vicissimque, si di sint, esse qui divinent. 1.11. Ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud, quod lubenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire, de divinatione quid sentias. Nihil, inquit, equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu conprobatam sequor. Duo sunt enim dividi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. 1.12. Quae est autem gens aut quae civitas, quae non aut extispicum aut monstra aut fulgora interpretantium aut augurum aut astrologorum aut sortium (ea enim fere artis sunt) aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur) praedictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quam causas quaeri oportere. Est enim vis et natura quaedam, quae tum observatis longo tempore significationibus, tum aliquo instinctu inflatuque divino futura praenuntiat. Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius requirens, Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera canere iussisset. Observata sunt haec tempore inmenso et in significatione eventis animadversa et notata. Nihil est autem, quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque adsequi possit. 1.15. Videmus haec signa numquam fere mentientia nec tamen, cur ita fiat, videmus. Vos quoque signa videtis, aquai dulcis alumnae, Cum clamore paratis iis fundere voces Absurdoque sono fontis et stagna cietis. Quis est, qui ranunculos hoc videre suspicari possit? sed inest in ranunculis vis et natura quaedam significans aliquid per se ipsa satis certa, cognitioni autem hominum obscurior. Mollipedesque boves spectantes lumina caeli Naribus umiferum duxere ex ae+re sucum. Non quaero, cur, quoniam, quid eveniat, intellego. Iam vero semper viridis semperque gravata Lentiscus triplici solita grandescere fetu Ter fruges fundens tria tempora monstrat arandi. Ne hoc quidem quaero, cur haec arbor una ter floreat aut cur arandi maturitatem ad signum floris accommodet; 1.17. Sed quo potius utar aut auctore aut teste quam te? cuius edidici etiam versus, et lubenter quidem, quos in secundo de consulatu Urania Musa pronuntiat: Principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni Vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum Menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit, Quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat Aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis. Et, si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis Nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae, Quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus erant, Re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur, Omnia iam cernes divina mente notata. 1.18. Nam primum astrorum volucris te consule motus Concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis Tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis Lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas, Vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas, Multaque misceri nocturna strage putasti, Quod ferme dirum in tempus cecidere Latinae, Cum claram speciem concreto lumine luna Abdidit et subito stellanti nocte perempta est. Quid vero Phoebi fax, tristis nuntia belli, Quae magnum ad columen flammato ardore volabat, Praecipitis caeli partis obitusque petessens? Aut cum terribili perculsus fulmine civis Luce sereti vitalia lumina liquit? Aut cum se gravido tremefecit corpore tellus? Iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae Terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant, Multaque per terras vates oracla furenti Pectore fundebant tristis minitantia casus, 1.19. Atque ea, quae lapsu tandem cecidere vetusto, Haec fore perpetuis signis clarisque frequentans Ipse deum genitor caelo terrisque canebat. Nunc ea, Torquato quae quondam et consule Cotta Lydius ediderat Tyrrhenae gentis haruspex, Omnia fixa tuus glomerans determinat annus. Nam pater altitos stellanti nixus Olympo Ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit Et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis. Tum species ex aere vetus venerataque Nattae Concidit, elapsaeque vetusto numine leges, Et divom simulacra peremit fulminis ardor. 1.20. Hic silvestris erat Romani nominis altrix, Martia, quae parvos Mavortis semine natos Uberibus gravidis vitali rore rigabat; Quae tum cum pueris flammato fulminis ictu Concidit atque avolsa pedum vestigia liquit. Tum quis non artis scripta ac monumenta volutans Voces tristificas chartis promebat Etruscis? Omnes civilem generosa a stirpe profectam Vitare ingentem cladem pestemque monebant Vel legum exitium constanti voce ferebant Templa deumque adeo flammis urbemque iubebant Eripere et stragem horribilem caedemque vereri; Atque haec fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri, Ni prius excelsum ad columen formata decore Sancta Iovis species claros spectaret in ortus. Tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus Cernere conatus posset, si solis ad ortum Conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret. 1.21. Haec tardata diu species multumque morata Consule te tandem celsa est in sede locata, Atque una fixi ac signati temporis hora Iuppiter excelsa clarabat sceptra columna, Et clades patriae flamma ferroque parata Vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat. Rite igitur veteres, quorum monumenta tenetis, Qui populos urbisque modo ac virtute regebant, Rite etiam vestri, quorum pietasque fidesque Praestitit et longe vicit sapientia cunctos, Praecipue coluere vigenti numine divos. Haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci, Otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris, 1.22. Inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo Fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis. E quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae Te patria in media virtutum mole locavit. Tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxans, Quod patriae vacat, id studiis nobisque sacrasti. Tu igitur animum poteris inducere contra ea, quae a me disputantur de divinatione, dicere, qui et gesseris ea, quae gessisti, et ea, quae pronuntiavi, accuratissume scripseris? 1.23. Quid? quaeris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint? Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. Casu, inquis. Itane vero? quicquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? Quattuor tali iacti casu Venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum Venerios, si quadringentos talos ieceris, casu futuros putas? Aspersa temere pigmenta in tabula oris liniamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuita putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram inpresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi? Fingebat Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput extitisse Panisci; credo, aliquam non dissimilem figuram, sed certe non talem, ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim se profecto res habet, ut numquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur. 1.27. Itaque, ut ex ipso audiebam, persaepe revertit ex itinere, cum iam progressus esset multorum dierum viam. Cuius quidem hoc praeclarissimum est, quod, posteaquam a Caesare tetrarchia et regno pecuniaque multatus est, negat se tamen eorum auspiciorum, quae sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti secunda evenerint, paenitere; senatus enim auctoritatem et populi Romani libertatem atque imperii dignitatem suis armis esse defensam, sibique eas aves, quibus auctoribus officium et fidem secutus esset, bene consuluisse; antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse possessionibus suis gloriam. Ille mihi videtur igitur vere augurari. Nam nostri quidem magistratus auspiciis utuntur coactis; necesse est enim offa obiecta cadere frustum ex pulli ore, cum pascitur; 1.29. Ut P. Claudius, Appii Caeci filius, eiusque collega L. Iunius classis maxumas perdiderunt, cum vitio navigassent. Quod eodem modo evenit Agamemnoni; qui, cum Achivi coepissent . inter se strépere aperteque ártem obterere extíspicum, Sólvere imperát secundo rúmore adversáque avi. Sed quid vetera? M. Crasso quid acciderit, videmus, dirarum obnuntiatione neglecta. In quo Appius, collega tuus, bonus augur, ut ex te audire soleo, non satis scienter virum bonum et civem egregium censor C. Ateium notavit, quod ementitum auspicia subscriberet. Esto; fuerit hoc censoris, si iudicabat ementitum; at illud minime auguris, quod adscripsit ob eam causam populum Romanum calamitatem maximam cepisse. Si enim ea causa calamitatis fuit, non in eo est culpa, qui obnuntiavit, sed in eo, qui non paruit. Veram enim fuisse obnuntiationem, ut ait idem augur et censor, exitus adprobavit; quae si falsa fuisset, nullam adferre potuisset causam calamitatis. Etenim dirae, sicut cetera auspicia, ut omina, ut signa, non causas adferunt, cur quid eveniat, sed nuntiant eventura, nisi provideris. 1.30. Non igitur obnuntiatio Ateii causam finxit calamitatis, sed signo obiecto monuit Crassum, quid eventurum esset, nisi cavisset. Ita aut illa obnuntiatio nihil valuit aut, si, ut Appius iudicat, valuit, id valuit, ut peccatum haereat non in eo, qui monuerit, sed in eo, qui non obtemperarit. Quid? lituus iste vester, quod clarissumum est insigne auguratus, unde vobis est traditus? Nempe eo Romulus regiones direxit tum, cum urbem condidit. Qui quidem Romuli lituus, id est incurvum et leviter a summo inflexum bacillum, quod ab eius litui, quo canitur, similitudine nomen invenit, cum situs esset in curia Saliorum, quae est in Palatio, eaque deflagravisset, inventus est integer. 1.39. Sed omittamus oracula; veniamus ad somnia. De quibus disputans Chrysippus multis et minutis somniis colligendis facit idem, quod Antipater ea conquirens, quae Antiphontis interpretatione explicata declarant illa quidem acumen interpretis, sed exemplis grandioribus decuit uti. Dionysii mater, eius qui Syracosiorum tyrannus fuit, ut scriptum apud Philistum est, et doctum hominem et diligentem et aequalem temporum illorum, cum praegs hunc ipsum Dionysium alvo contineret, somniavit se peperisse Satyriscum. Huic interpretes portentorum, qui Galeotae tum in Sicilia nominabantur, responderunt, ut ait Philistus, eum, quem illa peperisset, clarissimum Graeciae diuturna cum fortuna fore. 1.40. Num te ad fabulas revoco vel nostrorum vel Graecorum poe+tarum? Narrat enim et apud Ennium Vestalis illa: Eccita cum tremulis anus attulit artubus lumen, Talia tum memorat lacrimans exterrita somno: “Eurydica prognata, pater quam noster amavit, Vires vitaque corpus meum nunc deserit omne. Nam me visus homo pulcher per amoena salicta Et ripas raptare locosque novos; ita sola Postilla, germana soror, errare videbar Tardaque vestigare et quaerere te neque posse Corde capessere; semita nulla pedem stabilibat. 1.41. Exin compellare pater me voce videtur His verbis: "O gnata, tibi sunt ante gerendae Aerumnae, post ex fluvio fortuna resistet." Haec ecfatus pater, germana, repente recessit Nec sese dedit in conspectum corde cupitus, Quamquam multa manus ad caeli caerula templa Tendebam lacrumans et blanda voce vocabam. Vix aegro tum corde meo me somnus reliquit.” 1.42. Haec, etiamsi ficta sunt a poe+ta, non absunt tamen a consuetudine somniorum. Sit sane etiam illud commenticium, quo Priamus est conturbatus, quia . máter gravida párere ex se ardentém facem Visást in somnis Hécuba; quo factó pater Rex ípse Priamus sómnio mentís metu Percúlsus curis súmptus suspirántibus Exsácrificabat hóstiis balántibus. Tum cóniecturam póstulat pacém petens, Ut se édoceret, óbsecrans Apóllinem, Quo sése vertant tántae sortes sómnium. Ibi éx oraclo vóce divina édidit Apóllo, puerum, prímus Priamo quí foret Postílla natus, témperaret tóllere; Eum ésse exitium Tróiae, pestem Pérgamo. 1.43. Sint haec, ut dixi, somnia fabularum, hisque adiungatur etiam Aeneae somnium, quod in nostri Fabii Pictoris Graecis annalibus eius modi est, ut omnia, quae ab Aenea gesta sunt quaeque illi acciderunt, ea fuerint, quae ei secundum quietem visa sunt. Sed propiora videamus. Cuiusnam modi est Superbi Tarquinii somnium, de quo in Bruto Accii loquitur ipse? 1.44. Quoniám quieti córpus nocturno ínpetu Dedí sopore plácans artus lánguidos, Visúst in somnis pástor ad me appéllere Pecús lanigerum exímia puchritúdine; Duós consanguineos árietes inde éligi Praeclárioremque álterum immoláre me; Deinde eíus germanum córnibus conítier, In me árietare, eoque íctu me ad casúm dari; Exín prostratum térra, graviter saúcium, Resupínum in caelo cóntueri máximum ac Mirifícum facinus: déxtrorsum orbem flámmeum Radiátum solis líquier cursú novo. Eius igitur somnii a coniectoribus quae sit interpretatio facta, videamus: 1.45. Réx, quae in vita usúrpant homines, cógitant, curánt, vident, Quaéque agunt vigilántes agitantque, éa, cui in somno áccidunt, Mínus mirandum est; dí rem tantam haud témere inproviso ófferunt. Próin vide ne, quém tu esse hebetem députes aeque ác pecus, Ís sapientiá munitum péctus egregié gerat Téque regno expéllat; nam id, quod dé sole ostentúmst tibi, Pópulo commutátionem rérum portendít fore Pérpropinquam. Haec béne verruncent pópulo. Nam quod ad déxteram Cépit cursum ab laéva signum praépotens, pulchérrume Aúguratum est rém Romanam públicam summám fore. Age nunc ad externa redeamus. 1.46. Matrem Phalaridis scribit Ponticus Heraclides, doctus vir, auditor et discipulus Platonis, visam esse videre in somnis simulacra deorum, quae ipsa domi consecravisset; ex iis Mercurium e patera, quam dextera manu teneret, sanguinem visum esse fundere; qui cum terram attigisset, refervescere videretur sic, ut tota domus sanguine redundaret. Quod matris somnium inmanis filii crudelitas conprobavit. Quid ego, quae magi Cyro illi principi interpretati sint, ex Dinonis Persicis proferam? Nam cum dormienti ei sol ad pedes visus esset, ter eum scribit frustra adpetivisse manibus, cum se convolvens sol elaberetur et abiret; ei magos dixisse, quod genus sapientium et doctorum habebatur in Persis, ex triplici adpetitione solis triginta annos Cyrum regnaturum esse portendi. Quod ita contigit; nam ad septuagesimum pervenit, cum quadraginta natus annos regnare coepisset. 1.47. Est profecto quiddam etiam in barbaris gentibus praesentiens atque divis, siquidem ad mortem proficiscens Callanus Indus, cum inscenderet in rogum ardentem, O praeclarum discessum, inquit, e vita, cum, ut Herculi contigit, mortali corpore cremato in lucem animus excesserit! Cumque Alexander eum rogaret, si quid vellet, ut diceret, Optime, inquit; propediem te videbo . Quod ita contigit; nam Babylone paucis post diebus Alexander est mortuus. Discedo parumper a somniis, ad quae mox revertar. Qua nocte templum Ephesiae Dianae deflagravit, eadem constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum, atque, ubi lucere coepisset, clamitasse magos pestem ac perniciem Asiae proxuma nocte natam. Haec de Indis et magis. 1.48. Redeamus ad somnia. Hannibalem Coelius scribit, cum columnam auream, quae esset in fano Iunonis Laciniae, auferre vellet dubitaretque, utrum ea solida esset an extrinsecus inaurata, perterebravisse, cumque solidam invenisset, statuisse tollere; ei secundum quietem visam esse Iunonem praedicere, ne id faceret, minarique, si fecisset, se curaturam, ut eum quoque oculum, quo bene videret, amitteret, idque ab homine acuto non esse neglectum; itaque ex eo auro, quod exterebratum esset, buculam curasse faciendam et eam in summa columna conlocavisse. 1.49. Hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est (is autem diligentissume res Hannibalis persecutus est): Hannibalem, cum cepisset Saguntum, visum esse in somnis a Iove in deorum concilium vocari; quo cum venisset, Iovem imperavisse, ut Italiae bellum inferret, ducemque ei unum e concilio datum, quo illum utentem cum exercitu progredi coepisse; tum ei ducem illum praecepisse, ne respiceret; illum autem id diutius facere non potuisse elatumque cupiditate respexisse; tum visam beluam vastam et immanem circumplicatam serpentibus, quacumque incederet, omnia arbusta, virgulta, tecta pervertere, et eum admiratum quaesisse de deo, quodnam illud esset tale monstrum; et deum respondisse vastitatem esse Italiae praecepisseque, ut pergeret protinus, quid retro atque a tergo fieret, ne laboraret. 1.50. Apud Agathoclem scriptum in historia est Hamilcarem Karthaginiensem, cum oppugnaret Syracusas, visum esse audire vocem, se postridie cenaturum Syracusis; cum autem is dies inluxisset, magnam seditionem in castris eius inter Poenos et Siculos milites esse factam; quod cum sensissent Syracusani, inproviso eos in castra inrupisse, Hamilcaremque ab iis vivum esse sublatum. Ita res somnium conprobavit. Plena exemplorum est historia, tum referta vita communis. 1.51. At vero P. Decius ille Q. F., qui primus e Deciis consul fuit, cum esset tribunus militum M. Valerio A. Cornelio consulibus a Samnitibusque premeretur noster exercitus, cum pericula proeliorum iniret audacius monereturque, ut cautior esset, dixit, quod extat in annalibus, se sibi in somnis visum esse, cum in mediis hostibus versaretur, occidere cum maxuma gloria. Et tum quidem incolumis exercitum obsidione liberavit; post triennium autem, cum consul esset, devovit se et in aciem Latinorum inrupit armatus. Quo eius facto superati sunt et deleti Latini. Cuius mors ita gloriosa fuit, ut eandem concupisceret filius. 1.52. Sed veniamus nunc, si placet, ad somnia philosophorum. Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum; vidisse se in somnis pulchritudine eximia feminam, quae se nomine appellans diceret Homericum quendam eius modi versum: Tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit. Quod, ut est dictum, sic scribitur contigisse. Xenophon Socraticus (qui vir et quantus!) in ea militia, qua cum Cyro minore perfunctus est, sua scribit somnia, quorum eventus mirabiles exstiterunt. 1.53. Mentiri Xenophontem an delirare dicemus? Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium, familiarem suum, iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur; in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse, ut omnes medici diffiderent; ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. Atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta, et convaluisse Eudemum, et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum; quinto autem anno exeunte, cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse; ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum, ut, cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur. 1.54. Adiungamus philosophis doctissimum hominem, poe+tam quidem divinum, Sophoclem; qui, cum ex aede Herculis patera aurea gravis subrepta esset, in somnis vidit ipsum deum dicentem, qui id fecisset. Quod semel ille iterumque neglexit. Ubi idem saepius, ascendit in Arium pagum, detulit rem; Areopagitae conprehendi iubent eum, qui a Sophocle erat nominatus; is quaestione adhibita confessus est pateramque rettulit. Quo facto fanum illud Indicis Herculis nominatum est. 1.55. Sed quid ego Graecorum? nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant. Omnes hoc historici, Fabii, Gellii, sed proxume Coelius: Cum bello Latino ludi votivi maxumi primum fierent, civitas ad arma repente est excitata, itaque ludis intermissis instaurativi constituti sunt. Qui ante quam fierent, cumque iam populus consedisset, servus per circum, cum virgis caederetur, furcam ferens ductus est. Exin cuidam rustico Romano dormienti visus est venire, qui diceret praesulem sibi non placuisse ludis, idque ab eodem iussum esse eum senatui nuntiare; illum non esse ausum. Iterum esse idem iussum et monitum, ne vim suam experiri vellet; ne tum quidem esse ausum. Exin filium eius esse mortuum, eandem in somnis admonitionem fuisse tertiam. Tum illum etiam debilem factum rem ad amicos detulisse, quorum de sententia lecticula in curiam esse delatum, cumque senatui somnium enarravisset, pedibus suis salvum domum revertisse. Itaque somnio comprobato a senatu ludos illos iterum instauratos memoriae proditum est. 1.56. C. vero Gracchus multis dixit, ut scriptum apud eundem Coelium est, sibi in somnis quaesturam pete re dubita nti Ti. fratrem visum esse dicere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tamen eodem sibi leto, quo ipse interisset, esse pereundum. Hoc, ante quam tribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse scribit Coelius et dixisse eum multis. Quo somnio quid inveniri potest certius? Quid? illa duo somnia, quae creberrume commemorantur a Stoicis, quis tandem potest contemnere? unum de Simonide: Qui cum ignotum quendam proiectum mortuum vidisset eumque humavisset haberetque in animo navem conscendere, moneri visus est, ne id faceret, ab eo, quem sepultura adfecerat; si navigavisset, eum naufragio esse periturum; itaque Simonidem redisse, perisse ceteros, qui tum navigassent. Alterum ita traditum clarum admodum somnium: 1.57. Cum duo quidam Arcades familiares iter una facerent et Megaram venissent, alterum ad cauponem devertisse, ad hospitem alterum. Qui ut cenati quiescerent, concubia nocte visum esse in somnis ei, qui erat in hospitio, illum alterum orare, ut subveniret, quod sibi a caupone interitus pararetur; eum primo perterritum somnio surrexisse; dein cum se conlegisset idque visum pro nihilo habendum esse duxisset, recubuisse; tum ei dormienti eundem illum visum esse rogare, ut, quoniam sibi vivo non subvenisset, mortem suam ne inultam esse pateretur; se interfectum in plaustrum a caupone esse coniectum et supra stercus iniectum; petere, ut mane ad portam adesset, prius quam plaustrum ex oppido exiret. Hoc vero eum somnio commotum mane bubulco praesto ad portam fuisse, quaesisse ex eo, quid esset in plaustro; illum perterritum fugisse, mortuum erutum esse, cauponem re patefacta poenas dedisse. 1.58. Quid hoc somnio dici potest divinius? Sed quid aut plura aut vetera quaerimus? Saepe tibi meum narravi, saepe ex te audivi tuum somnium: me, cum Asiae pro cos. praeessem, vidisse in quiete, cum tu equo advectus ad quandam magni fluminis ripam provectus subito atque delapsus in flumen nusquam apparuisses, me contremuisse timore perterritum; tum te repente laetum exstitisse eodemque equo adversam ascendisse ripam, nosque inter nos esse conplexos. Facilis coniectura huius somnii, mihique a peritis in Asia praedictum est fore eos eventus rerum, qui acciderunt. Venio nunc ad tuum. 1.59. Audivi equidem ex te ipso, sed mihi saepius noster Sallustius narravit, cum in illa fuga nobis gloriosa, patriae calamitosa in villa quadam campi Atinatis maneres magnamque partem noctis vigilasses, ad lucem denique arte et graviter dormire te coepisse; itaque, quamquam iter instaret, tamen silentium fieri iussisse se neque esse passum te excitari; cum autem experrectus esses hora secunda fere, te sibi somnium narravisse: visum tibi esse, cum in locis solis maestus errares, C. Marium cum fascibus laureatis quaerere ex te, quid tristis esses, cumque tu te patria vi pulsum esse dixisses, prehendisse eum dextram tuam et bono animo te iussisse esse lictorique proxumo tradidisse, ut te in monumentum suum deduceret, et dixisse in eo tibi salutem fore. Tum et se exclamasse Sallustius narrat reditum tibi celerem et gloriosum paratum, et te ipsum visum somnio delectari. Nam illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est, ut audivisses in monumento Marii de tuo reditu magnificentissumum illud senatus consultum esse factum referente optumo et clarissumo viro consule, idque frequentissimo theatro incredibili clamore et plausu comprobatum, dixisse te nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius. 1.60. At multa falsa. Immo obscura fortasse nobis. Sed sint falsa quaedam; contra vera quid dicimus? Quae quidem multo plura evenirent, si ad quietem integri iremus. Nunc onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus. Vide, quid Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur. Dicit enim: “Cum dormientibus ea pars animi, quae mentis et rationis sit particeps, sopita langueat, illa autem, in qua feritas quaedam sit atque agrestis inmanitas, cum sit inmoderato obstupefacta potu atque pastu, exsultare eam in somno inmoderateque iactari. Itaque huic omnia visa obiciuntur a mente ac ratione vacua, ut aut cum matre corpus miscere videatur aut cum quovis alio vel homine vel deo, saepe belua, atque etiam trucidare aliquem et impie cruentari multaque facere inpure atque taetre cum temeritate et inpudentia. 1.61. At qui salubri et moderato cultu atque victu quieti se tradiderit ea parte animi, quae mentis et consilii est, agitata et erecta saturataque bonarum cogitationum epulis, eaque parte animi, quae voluptate alitur, nec inopia enecta nec satietate affluenti (quorum utrumque praestringere aciem mentis solet, sive deest naturae quippiam sive abundat atque affluit), illa etiam tertia parte animi, in qua irarum existit ardor, sedata atque restincta, tum eveniet duabus animi temerariis partibus compressis, ut illa tertia pars rationis et mentis eluceat et se vegetam ad somniandum acremque praebeat, tum ei visa quietis occurrent tranquilla atque veracia.” Haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi. 1.63. Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. Itaque adpropinquante morte multo est divinior. Nam et id ipsum vident, qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero adfecti, instare mortem; itaque iis occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum, tumque vel maxume laudi student, eosque, qui secus, quam decuit, vixerunt, peccatorum suorum tum maxume paenitet. 1.68. At ex te ipso non commenticiam rem, sed factam eiusdem generis audivi: C. Coponium ad te venisse Dyrrhachium, cum praetorio imperio classi Rhodiae praeesset, cumprime hominem prudentem atque doctum, eumque dixisse remigem quendam e quinqueremi Rhodiorum vaticinatum madefactum iri minus xxx diebus Graeciam sanguine, rapinas Dyrrhachii et conscensionem in naves cum fuga fugientibusque miserabilem respectum incendiorum fore, sed Rhodiorum classi propinquum reditum ac domum itionem dari; tum neque te ipsum non esse commotum Marcumque Varronem et M. Catonem, qui tum ibi erant, doctos homines, vehementer esse perterritos; paucis sane post diebus ex Pharsalia fuga venisse Labienum; qui cum interitum exercitus nuntiavisset, reliqua vaticinationis brevi esse confecta. 1.105. Quid de auguribus loquar? Tuae partes sunt, tuum inquam, auspiciorum patrocinium debet esse. Tibi App. Claudius augur consuli nuntiavit addubitato Salutis augurio bellum domesticum triste ac turbulentum fore; quod paucis post mensibus exortum paucioribus a te est diebus oppressum. Cui quidem auguri vehementer adsentior; solus enim multorum annorum memoria non decantandi augurii, sed dividi tenuit disciplinam. Quem inridebant collegae tui eumque tum Pisidam, tum Soranum augurem esse dicebant; quibus nulla videbatur in auguriis aut praesensio aut scientia veritatis futurae; sapienter aiebant ad opinionem imperitorum esse fictas religiones. Quod longe secus est; neque enim in pastoribus illis, quibus Romulus praefuit, nec in ipso Romulo haec calliditas esse potuit, ut ad errorem multitudinis religionis simulacra fingerent. Sed difficultas laborque discendi disertam neglegentiam reddidit; malunt enim disserere nihil esse in auspiciis quam, quid sit, ediscere. 1.115. quo de genere Apollinis operta prolata sunt. Credo etiam anhelitus quosdam fuisse terrarum, quibus inflatae mentes oracla funderent. Atque haec quidem vatium ratio est, nec dissimilis sane somniorum. Nam quae vigilantibus accidunt vatibus, eadem nobis dormientibus. Viget enim animus in somnis liber ab sensibus omnique inpeditione curarum iacente et mortuo paene corpore. Qui quia vixit ab omni aeternitate versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quae in natura rerum sunt, videt, si modo temperatis escis modicisque potionibus ita est adfectus, ut sopito corpore ipse vigilet. Haec somniantis est divinatio. 1.119. Quod ne dubitare possimus, maximo est argumento, quod paulo ante interitum Caesaris contigit. Qui cum immolaret illo die, quo primum in sella aurea sedit et cum purpurea veste processit, in extis bovis opimi cor non fuit. Num igitur censes ullum animal, quod sanguinem habeat, sine corde esse posse? †Qua ille rei novitate perculsus, cum Spurinna diceret timendum esse, ne et consilium et vita deficeret; earum enim rerum utramque a corde proficisci. Postero die caput in iecore non fuit. Quae quidem illi portendebantur a dis immortalibus, ut videret interitum, non ut caveret. Cum igitur eae partes in extis non reperiuntur, sine quibus victuma illa vivere nequisset, intellegendum est in ipso immolationis tempore eas partes, quae absint, interisse. 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 1.132. Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos, qui quaestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem, quibus Appius, amicus tuus, uti solebat, agnoscere; non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem, non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos, non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes somniorum; non enim sunt ii aut scientia aut arte divini, Séd superstitiósi vates ínpudentesque hárioli Aút inertes aút insani aut quíbus egestas ímperat, Quí sibi semitám non sapiunt, álteri monstránt viam; Quíbus divitias póllicentur, áb iis drachumam ipsí petunt. De hís divitiis síbi deducant dráchumam, reddant cétera. Atque haec quidem Ennius, qui paucis ante versibus esse deos censet, sed eos non curare opinatur, quid agat humanum genus. Ego autem, qui et curare arbitror et monere etiam ac multa praedicere, levitate, vanitate, malitia exclusa divinationem probo. Quae cum dixisset Quintus, Praeclare tu quidem, inquam, paratus 2.1. Quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti, quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla maior occurrebat, quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus; quod conpluribus iam libris me arbitror consecutum. Nam et cohortati sumus, ut maxime potuimus, ad philosophiae studium eo libro, qui est inscriptus Hortensius, et, quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus. 2.3. Quibus rebus editis tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum, in quibus omnis eius loci quaestio continetur. Quae ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; quibus, ut est in animo, de fato si adiunxerimus, erit abunde satis factum toti huic quaestioni. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus. Magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime. Nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? quae mihi quidem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam profuturam puto. Interiectus est etiam nuper liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus; in primisque, quoniam philosophia vir bonus efficitur et fortis, Cato noster in horum librorum numero ponendus est. 2.12. Quodsi nec earum rerum, quae subiectae sensibus sunt, ulla divinatio est nec earum, quae artibus continentur, nec earum, quae in philosophia disseruntur, nec earum, quae in re publica versantur, quarum rerum sit, nihil prorsus intellego; nam aut omnium debet esse, aut aliqua ei materia danda est, in qua versari possit. Sed nec omnium divinatio est, ut ratio docuit, nec locus nec materia invenitur, cui divinationem praeficere possimus. Vide igitur, ne nulla sit divinatio. Est quidam Graecus vulgaris in hanc sententiam versus: Bene quí coniciet, vátem hunc perhibebo óptumum. Num igitur aut, quae tempestas inpendeat, vates melius coniciet quam gubernator aut morbi naturam acutius quam medicus aut belli administrationem prudentius quam inperator coniectura adsequetur? 2.13. Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis, quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus, quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris. Nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator? 2.14. Atqui ne illa quidem divitis esse dicebas, ventos aut imbres inpendentes quibusdam praesentire signis (in quo nostra quaedam Aratea memoriter a te pronuntiata sunt), etsi haec ipsa fortuita sunt; plerumque enim, non semper eveniunt. Quae est igitur aut ubi versatur fortuitarum rerum praesensio, quam divinationem vocas? Quae enim praesentiri aut arte aut ratione aut usu aut coniectura possunt, ea non divinis tribuenda putas, sed peritis. Ita relinquitur, ut ea fortuita divinari possint, quae nulla nec arte nec sapientia provideri possunt; ut, si quis M. Marcellum illum, qui ter consul fuit, multis annis ante dixisset naufragio esse periturum, divinasset profecto; nulla enim arte alia id nec sapientia scire potuisset. Talium ergo rerum, quae in fortuna positae sunt, praesensio divinatio est. 2.15. Potestne igitur earum rerum, quae nihil habent rationis, quare futurae sint, esse ulla praesensio? Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit? Quo modo ergo id, quod temere fit caeco casu et volubilitate fortunae, praesentiri et praedici potest? 2.16. Medicus morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperator, tempestates gubernator; et tamen ii ipsi saepe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opitur; ut agricola, cum florem oleae videt, bacam quoque se visurum putat, non sine ratione ille quidem; sed non numquam tamen fallitur. Quodsi falluntur ii, qui nihil sine aliqua probabili coniectura ac ratione dicunt, quid existimandum est de coniectura eorum, qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraclis aut somniis futura praesentiunt? Nondum dico, quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio, voces furentium, sortes, somnia; de quibus singulis dicam suo loco; nunc de universis. 2.17. Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam neque notam, cur futurum sit? Solis defectiones itemque lunae praedicuntur in multos annos ab iis, qui siderum motus numeris persequuntur; ea praedicunt enim, quae naturae necessitas perfectura est. Vident ex constantissimo motu lunae, quando illa e regione solis facta incurrat in umbram terrae, quae est meta noctis, ut eam obscurari necesse sit, quandoque eadem luna subiecta atque opposita soli nostris oculis eius lumen obscuret, quo in signo quaeque errantium stellarum quoque tempore futura sit, qui exortus quoque die signi alicuius aut qui occasus futurus sit. Haec qui ante dicunt, quam rationem sequantur, vides. 2.18. Qui thesaurum inventum iri aut hereditatem venturam dicunt, quid sequuntur? aut in qua rerum natura inest id futurum? Quodsi haec eaque, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent aliquam talem necessitatem, quid est tandem, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna putemus? Nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est; est autem fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est. 2.19. Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est. 2.20. Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? Quod enim is, qui divinat, praedicit, id vero futurum est, ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, necessarium nostrum, ex itinere aquila revocavit; qui nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxuma nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset. At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset. Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio? aut quid est, quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? Si enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo, alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam, interire, etiamsi tripudium solistumum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent. Sin, cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; 2.26. Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae. Duo enim genera dividi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque, qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque, qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. 2.28. Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo. Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti. Inspiciamus, si placet, exta primum. Persuaderi igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse ab haruspicibus observatione diuturna? Quam diuturna ista fuit? aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? aut quo modo est conlatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam. 2.46. Mirabile autem illud, quod eo ipso tempore, quo fieret indicium coniurationis in senatu, signum Iovis biennio post, quam erat locatum, in Capitolio conlocabatur.—Tu igitur animum induces (sic enim mecum agebas) causam istam et contra facta tua et contra scripta defendere?—Frater es; eo vereor. Verum quid tibi hic tandem nocet? resne, quae talis est, an ego, qui verum explicari volo? Itaque nihil contra dico, a te rationem totius haruspicinae peto. Sed te mirificam in latebram coniecisti; quod enim intellegeres fore ut premerere, cum ex te causas unius cuiusque divinationis exquirerem, multa verba fecisti te, cum res videres, rationem causamque non quaerere; quid fieret, non cur fieret, ad rem pertinere. Quasi ego aut fieri concederem aut esset philosophi causam, 2.48. Non equidem plane despero ista esse vera, sed nescio et discere a te volo. Nam cum mihi quaedam casu viderentur sic evenire, ut praedicta essent a divitibus, dixisti multa de casu, ut Venerium iaci posse casu quattuor talis iactis, sed quadringentis centum Venerios non posse casu consistere. Primum nescio, cur non possint, sed non pugno; abundas enim similibus. Habes et respersionem pigmentorum et rostrum suis et alia permulta. Idem Carneadem fingere dicis de capite Panisci; quasi non potuerit id evenire casu et non in omni marmore necesse sit inesse vel Praxitelia capita! Illa enim ipsa efficiuntur detractione, neque quicquam illuc adfertur a Praxitele; sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad liniamenta oris perventum est, tum intellegas illud, quod iam expolitum sit, intus fuisse. 2.52. Quota enim quaeque res evenit praedicta ab istis? aut, si evenit quippiam, quid adferri potest, cur non casu id evenerit? Rex Prusias, cum Hannibali apud eum exsulanti depugnari placeret, negabat se audere, quod exta prohiberent. Ain tu? inquit, carunculae vitulinae mavis quam imperatori veteri credere? Quid? ipse Caesar cum a summo haruspice moneretur, ne in Africam ante brumam transmitteret, nonne transmisit? quod ni fecisset, uno in loco omnes adversariorum copiae convenissent. Quid ego haruspicum responsa commemorem (possum equidem innumerabilia), quae aut nullos habuerint exitus aut contrarios? 2.53. Hoc civili bello, di inmortales! quam multa luserunt! quae nobis in Graeciam Roma responsa haruspicum missa sunt! quae dicta Pompeio! etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur. Non lubet commemorare, nec vero necesse est, tibi praesertim, qui interfuisti; vides tamen omnia fere contra, ac dicta sint, evenisse. Sed haec hactenus; nunc ad ostenta veniamus. 2.70. Satis multa de ostentis; auspicia restant et sortes eae, quae ducuntur, non illae, quae vaticinatione funduntur, quae oracla verius dicimus; de quibus tum dicemus, cum ad naturalem divinationem venerimus. Restat etiam de Chaldaeis; sed primum auspicia videamus. Difficilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum. Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillumus. Non enim sumus ii nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus. Et tamen credo Romulum, qui urbem auspicato condidit, habuisse opinionem esse in providendis rebus augurandi scientiam (errabat enim multis in rebus antiquitas), quam vel usu iam vel doctrina vel vetustate immutatam videmus; retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei publicae mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurium, collegii auctoritas. 2.78. Quid est aliud nolle moneri a Iove nisi efficere, ut aut ne fieri possit auspicium aut, si fiat, videri? Nam illud admodum ridiculum, quod negas Deiotarum auspiciorum, quae sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti facta sint, paenitere, quod fidem secutus amicitiamque populi Romani functus sit officio; antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse laudem et gloriam quam regnum et possessiones suas. Credo equidem, sed hoc nihil ad auspicia; nec enim ei cornix canere potuit recte eum facere, quod populi Romani libertatem defendere pararet; ipse hoc sentiebat, sicuti sensit. 2.79. Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos; virtutis auspiciis video esse usum Deiotarum, quae vetat spectare fortunam, dum praestetur fides. Aves vero si prosperos eventus ostenderunt, certe fefellerunt. Fugit e proelio cum Pompeio; grave tempus! Discessit ab eo; luctuosa res! Caesarem eodem tempore hostem et hospitem vidit; quid hoc tristius? Is cum ei Trocmorum tetrarchian eripuisset et adseculae suo Pergameno nescio cui dedisset eidemque detraxisset Armeniam a senatu datam, cumque ab eo magnificentissumo hospitio acceptus esset, spoliatum reliquit et hospitem et regem. Sed labor longius; ad propositum revertar. Si eventa quaerimus, quae exquiruntur avibus, nullo modo prospera Deiotaro; sin officia, a virtute ipsius, non ab auspiciis petita sunt. 2.100. Restant duo dividi genera, quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticidi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte, inquam, si placet, disseramus. Mihi vero, inquit, placet; his enim, quae adhuc disputasti, prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar, quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim. 2.110. Quid vero habet auctoritatis furor iste, quem divinum vocatis, ut, quae sapiens non videat, ea videat insanus, et is, qui humanos sensus amiserit, divinos adsecutus sit? Sibyllae versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. Hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur hominum et temporum definitione sublata. 2.114. Quid? inquies, remex ille de classe Coponii nonne ea praedixit, quae facta sunt? Ille vero, et ea quidem, quae omnes eo tempore ne acciderent timebamus. Castra enim in Thessalia castris conlata audiebamus, videbaturque nobis exercitus Caesaris et audaciae plus habere, quippe qui patriae bellum intulisset, et roboris propter vetustatem; casum autem proelii nemo nostrum erat quin timeret, sed, ita ut constantibus hominibus par erat, non aperte. Ille autem Graecus, quid mirum, si magnitudine timoris, ut plerumque fit, a constantia atque a mente atque a se ipse discessit? qua perturbatione animi, quae, sanus cum esset, timebat ne evenirent, ea demens eventura esse dicebat. Utrum tandem, per deos atque homines! magis veri simile est vesanum remigem an aliquem nostrum, qui ibi tum eramus, me, Catonem, Varronem, Coponium ipsum, consilia deorum inmortalium perspicere potuisse? 2.148. Explodatur igitur haec quoque somniorum divinatio pariter cum ceteris. Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio fusa per gentis oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum inbecillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hac disputatione id maxume egimus. Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri. 2.149. Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes eligendae. Instat enim et urget et, quo te cumque verteris, persequitur, sive tu vatem sive tu omen audieris, sive immolaris sive avem aspexeris, si Chaldaeum, si haruspicem videris, si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de caelo, si ostenti simile natum factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat, ut numquam liceat quieta mente consistere. 2.150. Perfugium videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurumae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugtia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. Cum quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxume contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare, quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et, quid in quamque sententiam dici possit, expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. Mihi vero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius. Quae cum essent dicta, surreximus. 1.1. Book I[1] There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική — that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is — if only such a faculty exists — since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning gods, whereas, according to Platos interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning frenzy. 1.3. And, indeed, what colony did Greece ever send into Aeolia, Ionia, Asia, Sicily, or Italy without consulting the Pythian or Dodonian oracle, or that of Jupiter Hammon? Or what war did she ever undertake without first seeking the counsel of the gods? [2] Nor is it only one single mode of divination that has been employed in public and in private. For, to say nothing of other nations, how many our own people have embraced! In the first place, according to tradition, Romulus, the father of this City, not only founded it in obedience to the auspices, but was himself a most skilful augur. Next, the other Roman kings employed augurs; and, again, after the expulsion of the kings, no public business was ever transacted at home or abroad without first taking the auspices. Furthermore, since our forefathers believed that the soothsayers art had great efficacy in seeking for omens and advice, as well as in cases where prodigies were to be interpreted and their effects averted, they gradually introduced that art in its entirety from Etruria, lest it should appear that any kind of divination had been disregarded by them. 1.6. The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics — much against their will I grant you — permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school? 1.7. At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher. [4] Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old womens superstition if we approve them. [5] 1.8. This subject has been discussed by me frequently on other occasions, but with somewhat more than ordinary care when my brother Quintus and I were together recently at my Tusculan villa. For the sake of a stroll we had gone to the Lyceum which is the name of my upper gymnasium, when Quintus remarked:I have just finished a careful reading of the third book of your treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, containing Cottas discussion, which, though it has shaken my views of religion, has not overthrown them entirely.Very good, said I; for Cottas argument is intended rather to refute the arguments of the Stoics than to destroy mans faith in religion.Quintus then replied: Cotta says the very same thing, and says it repeatedly, in order, as I think, not to appear to violate the commonly accepted canons of belief; yet it seems to me that, in his zeal to confute the Stoics, he utterly demolishes the gods. 1.9. However, I am really at no loss for a reply to his reasoning; for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer to the truth than Cottas. But there is a question which you passed over in those books because, no doubt, you thought it more expedient to inquire into it in a separate discussion: I refer to divination, which is the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance. Now let us see, if you will, what efficacy it has and what its nature is. My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practise are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination. [6] 1.11. Really, my dear Quintus, said I, I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.There is, I assure you, said he, nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature. 1.12. Now — to mention those almost entirely dependent on art — what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or — to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination — the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? of these methods of divining it behoves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future. [7] Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve. 1.15. Hardly ever do we see such signs deceive us and yet we do not see why it is so.Ye, too, distinguish the signs, ye dwellers in waters delightful,When, with a clamour, you utter your cries that are empty of meaning,Stirring the fountains and ponds with absurd and ridiculous croaking.Who could suppose that frogs had this foresight? And yet they do have by nature some faculty of premonition, clear enough of itself, but too dark for human comprehension.Slow, clumsy oxen, their glances upturned to the light of the heavens,Sniff at the air with their nostrils and know it is freighted with moisture.I do not ask why, since I know what happens.Now tis a fact that the evergreen mastic, eer burdened with leafage,Thrice is expanding and budding and thrice producing its berries;Triple its signs for the purpose of showing three seasons for ploughing. 1.17. But what authority or what witness can I better employ than yourself? I have even learned by heart and with great pleasure the following lines uttered by the Muse, Urania, in the second book of your poem entitled, My Consulship:First of all, Jupiter, glowing with fire from regions celestial,Turns, and the whole of creation is filled with the light of his glory;And, though the vaults of aether eternal begird and confine him,Yet he, with spirit divine, ever searching the earth and the heavens,Sounds to their innermost depths the thoughts and the actions of mortals.When one has learned the motions and variant paths of the planets,Stars that abide in the seat of the signs, in the Zodiacs girdle,(Spoken of falsely as vagrants or rovers in Greek nomenclature,Whereas in truth their distance is fixed and their speed is determined,)Then will he know that all are controlled by an Infinite Wisdom. 1.18. You, being consul, at once did observe the swift constellations,Noting the glare of luminous stars in direful conjunction:Then you beheld the tremulous sheen of the Northern aurora,When, on ascending the mountainous heights of snowy Albanus,You offered joyful libations of milk at the Feast of the Latins;Ominous surely the time wherein fell that Feast of the Latins;Many a warning was given, it seemed, of slaughter nocturnal;Then, of a sudden, the moon at her full was blotted from heaven —Hidden her features resplendent, though night was bejewelled with planets;Then did that dolorous herald of War, the torch of Apollo,Mount all aflame to the dome of the sky, where the sun has its setting;Then did a Roman depart from these radiant abodes of the living,Stricken by terrible lightning from heavens serene and unclouded.Then through the fruit-laden body of earth ran the shock of an earthquake;Spectres at night were observed, appalling and changeful of figure,Giving their warning that war was at hand, and internal commotion;Over all lands there outpoured, from the frenzied bosoms of prophets,Dreadful predictions, gloomy forecasts of impending disaster. 1.19. And the misfortunes which happened at last and were long in their passing —These were foretold by the Father of Gods, in earth and in heaven,Through unmistakable signs that he gave and often repeated.[12] Now, of those prophecies made when Torquatus and Cotta were consuls, —Made by a Lydian diviner, by one of Etruscan extraction —All, in the round of your crowded twelve months, were brought to fulfilment.For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,Hurled forth his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,And on the Capitols site he unloosed the bolts of his lightning.Then fell the brazen image of Natta, ancient and honoured:Vanished the tablets of laws long ago divinely enacted;Wholly destroyed were the statues of gods by the heat of the lightning. 1.20. Here was the Martian beast, the nurse of Roman dominion,Suckling with life-giving dew, that issued from udders distended,Children divinely begotten, who sprang from the loins of the War God;Stricken by lightning she toppled to earth, bearing with her the children;Torn from her station, she left the prints of her feet in descending.Then what diviner, in turning the records and tomes of the augurs,Failed to relate the mournful forecasts the Etruscans had written?Seers all advised to beware the monstrous destruction and slaughter,Plotted by Romans who traced their descent from a noble ancestry;Or they proclaimed the laws overthrow with voices insistent,Bidding rescue the city from flames, and the deities temples;Fearful they bade us become of horrible chaos and carnage;These, by a rigorous Fate, would be certainly fixed and determined,Were not a sacred statue of Jove, one comely of figure,High on a column erected beforehand, with eyes to the eastward;Then would the people and venerable senate be able to fathomHidden designs, when that statue — its face to the sun at its rising —Should behold from its station the seats of the people and Senate. 1.21. Long was the statue delayed and much was it hindered in making.Finally, you being consul, it stood in its lofty position.Just at the moment of time, which the gods had set and predicted,When on column exalted the sceptre of Jove was illumined,Did Allobrogian voices proclaim to Senate and peopleWhat destruction by dagger and torch was prepared for our country.[13] Rightly, therefore, the ancients whose monuments you have in keeping,Romans whose rule over peoples and cities was just and courageous,Rightly your kindred, foremost in honour and pious devotion,Far surpassing the rest of their fellows in shrewdness and wisdom,Held it a duty supreme to honour the Infinite Godhead.Such were the truths they beheld who painfully searching for wisdomGladly devoted their leisure to study of all that was noble, 1.22. Who, in Academys shade and Lyceums dazzling effulgence,Uttered the brilliant reflections of minds abounding in culture.Torn from these studies, in youths early dawn, your country recalled you,Giving you place in the thick of the struggle for public preferment;Yet, in seeking surcease from the worries and cares that oppress you,Time, that the State leaves free, you devote to us and to learning.In view, therefore, of your acts, and in view too of your own verses which I have quoted and which were composed with the utmost care, could you be persuaded to controvert the position which I maintain in regard to divination? 1.23. But what? You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you yourself see. Mere accidents, you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be an accident which bears upon itself every mark of truth? Four dice are cast and a Venus throw results — that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws? It is possible for paints flung at random on a canvasc to form the outlines of a face; but do you imagine that an accidental scattering of pigments could produce the beautiful portrait of Venus of Cos? Suppose that a hog should form the letter A on the ground with its snout; is that a reason for believing that it would write out Enniuss poem The Andromache?Carneades used to have a story that once in the Chian quarries when a stone was split open there appeared the head of the infant god Pan; I grant that the figure may have borne some resemblance to the god, but assuredly the resemblance was not such that you could ascribe the work to a Scopas. For it is undeniably true that no perfect imitation of a thing was ever made by chance. [14] 1.27. This is why, as he told me himself, he had time and again abandoned a journey even though he might have been travelling for many days. By the way, that was a very noble utterance of his which he made after Caesar had deprived him of his tetrarchy and kingdom, and had forced him to pay an indemnity too. Notwithstanding what has happened, said he, I do not regret that the auspices favoured my joining Pompey. By so doing I enlisted my military power in defence of senatorial authority, Roman liberty, and the supremacy of the empire. The birds, at whose instance I followed the course of duty and of honour, counselled well, for I value my good name more than riches. His conception of augury, it seems to me, is the correct one.For with us magistrates make use of auspices, but they are forced auspices, since the sacred chickens in eating the dough pellets thrown must let some fall from their beaks. 1.29. For example, Publius Claudius, son of Appius Caecus, and his colleague Lucius Junius, lost very large fleets by going to sea when the auguries were adverse. The same fate befell Agamemnon; for, after the Greeks had begun toRaise aloft their frequent clamours, showing scorn of augurs art,Noise prevailed and not the omen: he then bade the ships depart.But why cite such ancient instances? We see what happened to Marcus Crassus when he ignored the announcement of unfavourable omens. It was on the charge of having on this occasion falsified the auspices that Gaius Ateius, an honourable man and a distinguished citizen, was, on insufficient evidence, stigmatized by the then censor Appius, who was your associate in the augural college, and an able one too, as I have often heard you say. I grant you that in pursuing the course he did Appius was within his rights as a censor, if, in his judgement, Ateius had announced a fraudulent augury. But he showed no capacity whatever as an augur in holding Ateius responsible for that awful disaster which befell the Roman people. Had this been the cause then the fault would not have been in Ateius, who made the announcement that the augury was unfavourable, but in Crassus, who disobeyed it; for the issue proved that the announcement was true, as this same augur and censor admits. But even if the augury had been false it could not have been the cause of the disaster; for unfavourable auguries — and the same may be said of auspices, omens, and all other signs — are not the causes of what follows: they merely foretell what will occur unless precautions are taken. 1.30. Therefore Ateius, by his announcement, did not create the cause of the disaster; but having observed the sign he simply advised Crassus what the result would be if the warning was ignored. It follows, then, that the announcement by Ateius of the unfavourable augury had no effect; or if it did, as Appius thinks, then the sin is not in him who gave the warning, but in him who disregarded it.[17] And whence, pray, did you augurs derive that staff, which is the most conspicuous mark of your priestly office? It is the very one, indeed with which Romulus marked out the quarter for taking observations when he founded the city. Now this staffe is a crooked wand, slightly curved at the top, and, because of its resemblance to a trumpet, derives its name from the Latin word meaning the trumpet with which the battle-charge is sounded. It was placed in the temple of the Salii on the Palatine hill and, though the temple was burned, the staff was found uninjured. 1.39. But let us leave oracles and come to dreams. In his treatise on this subject Chrysippus, just as Antipater does, has assembled a mass of trivial dreams which he explains according to Antiphonsf rules of interpretation. The work, I admit, displays the acumen of its author, but it would have been better if he had cited illustrations of a more serious type. Now, Philistus, who was a learned and painstaking man and a contemporary of the times of which he writes, gives us the following story of the mother of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse: while she was with child and was carrying this same Dionysius in her womb, she dreamed that she had been delivered of an infant satyr. When she referred this dream to the interpreters of portents, who in Sicily were called Galeotae, they replied, so Philistus relates, that she should bring forth a son who would be very eminent in Greece and would enjoy a long and prosperous career. 1.40. May I not recall to your memory some stories to be found in the works of Roman and of Greek poets? For example, the following dream of the Vestal Virgin is from Ennius:The vestal from her sleep in fright awokeAnd to the startled maid, whose trembling handsA lamp did bear, thus spoke in tearful tones:O daughter of Eurydice, though whomOur father loved, from my whole frame departsThe vital force. For in my dreams I sawA man of beauteous form, who bore me offThrough willows sweet, along the fountains brink,To places strange. And then, my sister dear,Alone, with halting step and longing heart,I seemed to wander, seeking thee in vain;There was no path to make my footing sure. 1.41. And then I thought my father spoke these words:Great sorrows, daughter, thou must first endureUntil thy fortune from the Tiber rise.When this was said he suddenly withdrew;Nor did his cherished vision come again,Though oft I raised my hand to heavens domeAnd called aloud in tearful, pleading voice.Then sleep departing left me sick at heart. [21] 1.42. This dream, I admit, is the fiction of a poets brain, yet it is not contrary to our experience with real dreams. It may well be that the following story of the dream which greatly disturbed Priams peace of mind is fiction too:When mother Hecuba was great with child,She dreamed that she brought forth a flaming torch.Alarmed at this, with sighing cares possessed,The king and father, Priam, to the godsDid make a sacrifice of bleating lambs.He, seeking peace and answer to the dream,Implored Apollos aid to understandWhat great events the vision did foretell,Apollos oracle, with voice divine,Then gave this explanation of the dream:Thy next-born son forbear to rear, for heWill be the death of Pergamos and Troy. 1.43. Grant, I repeat, that these dreams are myths and in the same category put Aeneass dream, related in the Greek annals of our countryman, Fabius Pictor. According to Pictor everything that Aeneas did or suffered turned out just as it had been predicted to him in a dream.[22] But let us look at examples nearer our own times. Would you dare call that famous dream of Tarquin the Proud a myth? He describes it himself in the following lines from the Brutus of Accius: 1.44. At nights approach I sought my quiet couchTo soothe my weary limbs with restful sleep.Then in my dreams a shepherd near me droveA fleecy herd whose beauty was extreme.I chose two brother rams from out the flockAnd sacrificed the comelier of the twain.And then, with lowered horns, the other ramAttacked and bore me headlong to the ground.While there I lay outstretched and wounded sore,The sky a wondrous miracle disclosed:The blazing star of day reversed its courseAnd glided to the right by pathway new. 1.45. Now observe how the diviners interpreted this dream:It is not strange, O king, that dreams reflectThe days desires and thoughts, its sights and deeds,And everything we say or do awake.But in so grave a dream as yours we seeA message clearly sent, and thus it warns:Beware of him you deem bereft of witAnd rate no higher than a stupid ram,Lest he, with wisdom armed, should rise to fameAnd drive you from your throne. The suns changed courseUnto the state portends immediate change.And may that prove benigt to the state;For since the almighty orb from left to rightRevolved, it was the best of auguriesThat Rome would be supreme oer all the earth. [23] 1.46. But come now and let us return to foreign instances. Heraclides Ponticus, a man of learning, and both a pupil and a disciple of Platos, relates a dream of the mother of Phalaris. She fell asleep and dreamed that, while looking at the consecrated images of the gods set up in her house, she saw the statue of Mercury pouring blood from a bowl which it held in its right hand and that the blood, as it touched the ground, welled up and completely filled the house. The truth of the dream was subsequently established by the inhuman cruelty of her son.Why need I bring forth from Dinons Persian annals the dreams of that famous prince, Cyrus, and their interpretations by the magi? But take this instance: Once upon a time Cyrus dreamed that the sun was at his feet. Three times, so Dinon writes, he vainly tried to grasp it and each time it turned away, escaped him, and finally disappeared. He was told by the magi, who are classed as wise and learned men among the Persians, that his grasping for the sun three times portended that he would reign for thirty years. And thus it happened; for he lived to his seventieth year, having begun to reign at forty. 1.47. It certainly must be true that even barbarians have some power of foreknowledge and of prophecy, if the following story of Callanus of India be true: As he was about to die and was ascending the funeral pyre, he said: What a glorious death! The fate of Hercules is mine. For when this mortal frame is burned the soul will find the light. When Alexander directed him to speak if he wished to say anything to him, he answered: Thank you, nothing, except that I shall see you very soon. So it turned out, for Alexander died in Babylon a few days later. I am getting slightly away from dreams, but I shall return to them in a moment. Everybody knows that on the same night in which Olympias was delivered of Alexander the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned, and that the magi began to cry out as day was breaking: Asias deadly curse was born last night. But enough of Indians and magi. [24] 1.48. Let us go back to dreams. Coelius writes that Hannibal wished to carry off a golden column from Junos temple at Lacinium, but since he was in doubt whether it was solid or plated, he bored into it. Finding it solid he decided to take it away. But at night Juno came to him in a vision and warned him not to do so, threatening that if he did she would cause the loss of his good eye. That clever man did not neglect the warning. Moreover out of the gold filings he ordered an image of a calf to be made and placed on top of the column. 1.49. Another story of Hannibal is found in the history written in Greek by Silenus, whom Coelius follows, and who, by the way, was a very painstaking student of Hannibals career. After his capture of Saguntum Hannibal dreamed that Jupiter summoned him to a council of the gods. When he arrived Jupiter ordered him to carry the war into Italy, and gave him one of the divine council as a guide whom he employed when he being the march with his army. This guide cautioned Hannibal not to look back. But, carried away by curiosity, he could refrain no longer and looked back. Then he saw a horrible beast of enormous size, enveloped with snakes, and wherever it went it overthrew every tree and shrub and every house. In his amazement Hannibal asked what the monster was. The god replied that it was the desolation of Italy and ordered him to press right on and not to worry about what happened behind him and in the rear. 1.50. We read in a history by Agathocles that Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, during his siege of Syracuse heard a voice in his sleep telling him that he would dine the next day in Syracuse. At daybreak the following day a serious conflict broke out in his camp between the troops of the Carthaginians and their allies, the Siculi. When the Syracusans saw this they made a sudden assault on the camp and carried Hamilcar off alive. Thus the event verified the dream.History is full of such instances, and so is everyday life. 1.51. And yet let me cite another: the famous Publius Decius, son of Quintus, and the first of that family to become consul, was military tribune in the consulship of Marcus Valerius and Aulus Cornelius while our army was being hard pressed by the Samnites. When, because of his rushing too boldly into the dangers of battle, he was advised to be more cautious, he replied, according to the annals, I dreamed that by dying in the midst of the enemy I should win immortal fame. And though he was unharmed at that time and extricated the army from its difficulties, yet three years later, when consul, he devoted himself to death and rushed full-armed against the battle-line of the Latins. By this act of his the Latins were overcome and destroyed; and so glorious was his death that his son sought the same fate. 1.52. But let us come now, if you please, to the dreams of philosophers.[25] We read in Plato that Socrates, while in prison, said in a conversation with his friend Crito: I am to die in three days; for in a dream I saw a woman of rare beauty, who called me by name and quoted this verse from Homer:Gladly on Phthias shore the third days dawn shall behold thee.And history informs us that his death occurred as he had foretold. That disciple of Socrates, Xenophon — and what a man he was! — records the dreams he had during his campaign with Cyrus the Younger, and their remarkable fulfilment. Shall we say that Xenophon is either a liar or a madman? 1.53. And Aristotle, who was endowed with a matchless and almost godlike intellect, — is he in error, or is he trying to lead others into error in the following account of his friend, Eudemus the Cyprian? Eudemus, while on his way to Macedonia, reached Pherae, then a very famous city of Thessaly, but groaning under the cruel sway of the tyrant, Alexander. There he became so violently ill that the physicians despaired of his recovery. While sick he had a dream in which a youth of striking beauty told him that he would speedily get well; that the despot Alexander would die in a few days, and that he himself would return home five years later. And so, indeed, the first two prophecies, as Aristotle writes, were immediately fulfilled by the recovery of Eudemus and by the death of the tyrant at the hands of his wifes brothers. But at the end of five years, when, in reliance upon the dream, he hoped to return to Cyprus from Sicily, he was killed in battle before Syracuse. Accordingly the dream was interpreted to mean that when his soul left the body it then had returned home. 1.54. To the testimony of philosophers let us add that of a most learned man and truly divine poet, Sophocles. A heavy gold dish having been stolen from the temple of Hercules, the god himself appeared to Sophocles in a dream and told who had committed the theft. But Sophocles ignored the dream a first and second time. When it came again and again, he went up to the Areopagus and laid the matter before the judges who ordered the man named by Sophocles to be arrested. The defendant after examination confessed his crime and brought back the dish. This is the reason why that temple is called the temple of Hercules the Informer. [26] 1.55. But why am I dwelling on illustrations from Greek sources when — though I cant explain it — those from our own history please me more? Now here is a dream which is mentioned by all our historians, by the Fabii and the Gellii and, most recently, by Coelius: During the Latin War when the Great Votive Games were being celebrated for the first time the city was suddenly called to arms and the games were interrupted. Later it was determined to repeat them, but before they began, and while the people were taking their seats, a slave bearing a yoke was led about the circus and beaten with rods. After that a Roman rustic had a dream in which someone appeared to him and said that he disapproved of the leader of the games and ordered this statement to be reported to the Senate. But the rustic dared not do as he was bid. The order was repeated by the spectre with a warning not to put his power to the test. Not even then did the rustic dare obey. After that his son died and the same vision was repeated the third time. Thereupon he became ill and told his friends of his dream. On their advice he was carried to the Senate-house on a litter and, having related his dream to the Senate, his health was restored and he walked home unaided. And so, the tradition is, the Senate gave credence to the dream and had the games repeated. 1.56. According to this same Coelius, Gaius Gracchus told many persons that his brother Tiberius came to him in a dream when he was a candidate for the quaestorship and said: However much you may try to defer your fate, nevertheless you must die the same death that I did. This happened before Gaius was tribune of the people, and Coelius writes that he himself heard it from Gaius who had repeated it to many others. Can you find anything better authenticated than this dream?[27] And who, pray, can make light of the two following dreams which are so often recounted by Stoic writers? The first one is about Simonides, who once saw the dead body of some unknown man lying exposed and buried it. Later, when he had it in mind to go on board a ship he was warned in a vision by the person to whom he had given burial not to do so and that if he did he would perish in a shipwreck. Therefore he turned back and all the others who sailed were lost. 1.57. The second dream is very well known and is to this effect: Two friends from Arcadia who were taking a journey together came to Megara, and one traveller put up at an inn and the second went to the home of a friend. After they had eaten supper and retired, the second traveller, in the dead of the night, dreamed that his companion was imploring him to come to his aid, as the innkeeper was planning to kill him. Greatly frightened at first by the dream he arose, and later, regaining his composure, decided that there was nothing to worry about and went back to bed. When he had gone to sleep the same person appeared to him and said: Since you would not help me when I was alive, I beg that you will not allow my dead body to remain unburied. I have been killed by the innkeeper, who has thrown my body into a cart and covered it with dung. I pray you to be at the city gate in the morning before the cart leaves the town, Thoroughly convinced by the second dream he met the cart-driver at the gate in the morning, and, when he asked what he had in the cart, the driver fled in terror. The Arcadian then removed his friends dead body from the cart, made complaint of the crime to the authorities, and the innkeeper was punished.[28] What stronger proof of a divinely inspired dream than this can be given? 1.58. But why go on seeking illustrations from ancient history? I had a dream which I have often related to you, and you one which you have often told to me. When I was governor of Asia I dreamed that I saw you on horseback riding toward the bank of some large river, when you suddenly plunged forward, fell into the stream, and wholly disappeared from sight. I was greatly alarmed and trembled with fear. But in a moment you reappeared mounted on the same horse, and with a cheerful countece ascended the opposite bank where we met and embraced each other. The meaning of the dream was readily explained to me by experts in Asia who from it predicted those events which subsequent occurred. 1.59. I come now to your dream. I heard it, of course, from you, but more frequently from our Sallustius. In the course of your banishment, which was glorious for us but disastrous to the State, you stopped for the night at a certain country-house in the plain of Atina. After lying awake most of the night, finally, about daybreak, you fell into a very profound sleep. And though your journey was pressing, yet Sallustius gave instructions to maintain quiet and would not permit you to be disturbed. But you awoke about the second hour and related your dream to him. In it you seemed to be wandering sadly about in solitary places when Gaius Marius, with his fasces wreathed in laurel, asked you why you were sad, and you replied that you had been driven from your country by violence. He then bade you be of good cheer, took you by the right hand, and delivered you to the nearest lictor to be conducted to his memorial temple, saying that there you should find safety. Sallustius thereupon, as he relates, cried out, a speedy and a glorious return awaits you. He further states that you too seemed delighted at the dream. Immediately thereafter it was reported to me that as soon as you heard that it was in Marius temple that the glorious decree of the Senate for your recall had been enacted on motion of the consul, a most worthy and most eminent man, and that the decree had been greeted by unprecedented shouts of approval in a densely crowded theatre, you said that no stronger proof could be given of a divinely inspired dream than this. [29] 1.60. Ah, it is objected, but many dreams are untrustworthy. Rather, perhaps, their meaning is hidden from us. But grant that some are untrustworthy, why do we declaim against those that trustworthy? The fact is the latter would be much more frequent if we went to our rest in proper condition. But when we are burdened with food and drink our dreams are troubled and confused. Observe what Socrates says in Platos Republic:When a man goes to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul languid and inert, but having that other portion, which has in it a certain brutishness and wild savagery, immoderately gorged with drink and food, then does that latter portion leap up and hurl itself about in sleep without check. In such a case every vision presented to the mind is so devoid of thought and reason that the sleeper dreams that he is committing incest with his mother, or that he is having unlawful commerce indiscriminately with gods and men, and frequently too, with beasts; or even that he is killing someone and staining his hands with impious bloodshed; and that he is doing many vile and hideous things recklessly and without shame. 1.61. But, on the other hand, when the man, whose habits of living and of eating are wholesome and temperate, surrenders himself to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul eager and erect, and satisfied by a feast of noble thoughts, and having that portion which feeds on carnal pleasures neither utterly exhausted by abstinence nor cloyed by over-indulgence — for, as a rule, the edge of thought is dulled whether nature is starved or overfed — and, when such a man, in addition, has that third portion of the soul, in which the fire of anger burns, quieted and subdued — thus having the two irrational portions under complete control — then will the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul shine forth and show itself keen and strong for dreaming and then will his dreams be peaceful and worthy of trust. I have reproduced Platos very words. [30] 1.63. When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins. 1.68. I seem to be relying for illustrations on myths drawn from tragic poets. But you yourself are my authority for an instance of the same nature, and yet it is not fiction but a real occurrence. Gaius Coponius, a man of unusual capacity and learning, came to you at Dyrrachium while he, as praetor, was in command of the Rhodian fleet, and told you of a prediction made by a certain oarsman from one of the Rhodian quinqueremes. The prediction was that in less than thirty days Greece would be bathed in blood; Dyrrachium would be pillaged; its defenders would flee to their ships and, as they fled, would see behind them the unhappy spectacle of a great conflagration; but the Rhodian fleet would have a quick passage home. This story gave you some concern, and it caused very great alarm to those cultured men, Marcus Varro and Marcus Cato, who were at Dyrrachium at the time. In fact, a few days later Labienus reached Dyrrachium in flight from Pharsalus, with the news of the loss of the army. The rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled. 1.105. Why need I speak of augurs? That is your rôle; the duty to defend auspices, I maintain, is yours. For it was to you, while you were consul, that the augur Appius Claudius declared that because the augury of safety was unpropitious a grievous and violent civil war was at hand. That war began few months later, but you brought it to an end in still fewer days. Appius is one augur of whom I heartily approve, for not content merely with the sing-song ritual of augury, he, alone, according to the record of many years, has maintained a real system of divination. I know that your colleagues used to laugh at him and call him the one time a Pisidian and at another a Soran. They did not concede to augury any power of prevision or real knowledge of the future, and used to say that it was a superstitious practice shrewdly invented to gull the ignorant. But the truth is far otherwise, for neither those herdsmen whom Romulus governed, nor Romulus himself, could have had cunning enough to invent miracles with which to mislead the people. It is the trouble and hard work involved in mastering the art that has induced this eloquent contempt; for men prefer to say glibly that there is nothing in auspices rather than to learn what auspices are. 1.115. Likewise Marcius and Publicius, according to tradition, made their prophecies in verse, and the cryptic utterances of Apollo were expressed in the same form.[51] Such is the rationale of prophecy by means of frenzy, and that of dreams is not much unlike it. For the revelations made to seers when awake are made to us in sleep. While we sleep and the body lies as if dead, the soul is at its best, because it is then freed from the influence of the physical senses and from the worldly cares that weigh it down. And since the soul has lived from all eternity and has had converse with numberless other souls, it sees everything that exists in nature, provided that moderation and restraint have been used in eating and in drinking, so that the soul is in a condition to watch while the body sleeps. Such is the explanation of divination by dreams. 1.119. Conclusive proof of this fact, sufficient to put it beyond the possibility of doubt, is afforded by incidents which happened just before Caesars death. While he was offering sacrifices on the day when he sat for the first time on a golden throne and first appeared in public in a purple robe, no heart was found in the vitals of the votive ox. Now do you think it possible for any animal that has blood to exist without a heart? Caesar was unmoved by this occurrence, even though Spurinna warned him to beware lest thought and life should fail him — both of which, he said, proceeded from the heart. On the following day there was no head to the liver of the sacrifice. These portents were sent by the immortal gods to Caesar that he might foresee his death, not that he might prevent it. Therefore, when those organs, without which the victim could not have lived, are found wanting in the vitals, we should understand that the absent organs disappeared at the very moment of immolation. [53] 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. 1.132. I will assert, however, in conclusion, that I do not recognize fortune-tellers, or those who prophesy for money, or necromancers, or mediums, whom your friend Appius makes it a practice to consult.In fine, I say, I do not care a figFor Marsian augurs, village mountebanks,Astrologers who haunt the circus grounds,Or Isis-seers, or dream interpreters:— for they are not diviners either by knowledge or skill, —But superstitious bards, soothsaying quacks,Averse to work, or mad, or ruled by want,Directing others how to go, and yetWhat road to take they do not know themselves;From those to whom they promise wealth they begA coin. From what they promised let them takeTheir coin as toll and pass the balance on.Such are the words of Ennius who only a few lines further back expresses the view that there are gods and yet says that the gods do not care what human beings do. But for my part, believing as I do that the gods do care for man, and that they advise and often forewarn him, I approve of divination which is not trivial and is free from falsehood and trickery.When Quintus had finished I remarked, My dear Quintus, you have come admirably well prepared. 2.1. Book IIAfter serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens in the ways of the noblest learning — and this, I believe, I have already accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy. And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined. 2.3. After publishing the works mentioned I finished three volumes On the Nature of the Gods, which contain a discussion of every question under that head. With a view of simplifying and extending the latter treatise I started to write the present volume On Divination, to which I plan to add a work on Fate; when that is done every phase of this particular branch of philosophy will be sufficiently discussed. To this list of works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while holding the helm of state, entitled On the Republic — a weighty subject, appropriate for philosophic discussion, and one which has been most elaborately treated by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire peripatetic school. What need is there to say anything of my treatise On Consolation? For it is the source of very great comfort to me and will, I think, be of much help to others. I have also recently thrown in that book On Old Age, which I sent my friend Atticus; and, since it is by philosophy that a man is made virtuous and strong, my Cato is especially worthy of a place among the foregoing books. 2.12. But if there is no place for divination in things perceived by the senses, or in those included among the arts, or in those discussed by philosophers, or in those which have to do with government, I see absolutely no need for it anywhere. For either it ought to be of use in every case, or, at least, some department in which it may be employed should be found. But divination is not of use in every case, as my reasoning has shown; nor can any field or subject matter be found over which it may exercise control.[5] Therefore I am inclined to think that there is no such thing as divination. There is a much-quoted Greek verse to this effect:The best diviner I maintain to beThe man who guesses or conjectures best.Now do you think that a prophet will conjecture better whether a storm is at hand than a pilot? or that he will by conjecture make a more accurate diagnosis than a physician, or conduct a war with more skill than a general? 2.13. But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of things which happen by chance. Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade? 2.14. And you went on to say that even the foreknowledge of impending storms and rains by means of certain signs was not divination, and, in that connexion, you quoted a number of verses from my translation of Aratus. Yet such coincidences happen by chance, for though they happen frequently they do not happen always. What, then, is this thing you call divination — this foreknowledge of things that happen by chance — and where is it employed? You think that whatever can be foreknown by means of science, reason, experience, or conjecture is to be referred, not to diviners, but to experts. It follows, therefore, that divination of things that happen by chance is possible only of things which cannot be foreseen by means of skill or wisdom. Hence, if someone had declared many years in advance that the famous Marcus Marcellus, who was consul three times, would perish in a shipwreck, this, by your definition, undoubtedly would have been a case of divination, since that calamity could not have been foreseen by means of any other skill or by wisdom. That is why you say that divination is the foreknowledge of such things as depend upon chance. [6] 2.15. Can there, then, be any foreknowledge of things for whose happening no reason exists? For we do not apply the words chance, luck, accident, or casualty except to an event which has so occurred or happened that it either might not have occurred at all, or might have occurred in any other way. How, then, is it possible to foresee and to predict an event that happens at random, as the result of blind accident, or of unstable chance? 2.16. By the use of reason the physician foresees the progress of a disease, the general anticipates the enemys plans and the pilot forecasts the approach of bad weather. And yet even those who base their conclusions on accurate reasoning are often mistaken: for example, when the farmer sees his olive-tree in bloom he expects also, and not unreasonably, to see it bear fruit, but occasionally he is disappointed. If then mistakes are made by those who make no forecasts not based upon some reasonable and probable conjecture, what must we think of the conjectures of men who foretell the future by means of entrails, birds, portents, oracles, or dreams? I am not ready yet to take up one by one the various kinds of divination and show that the cleft in the liver, the croak of a raven, the flight of an eagle, the fall of a star, the utterances of persons in a frenzy, lots, and dreams have no prophetic value whatever; I shall discuss each of them in its turn — now I am discussing the subject as a whole. 2.17. How can anything be foreseen that has no cause and no distinguishing mark of its coming? Eclipses of the sun and also of the moon are predicted for many years in advance by men who employ mathematics in studying the courses and movements of the heavenly bodies; and the unvarying laws of nature will bring their predictions to pass. Because of the perfectly regular movements of the moon the astronomers calculate when it will be opposite the sun and in the earths shadow — which is the cone of night — and when, necessarily, it will become invisible. For the same reason they know when the moon will be directly between the earth and the sun and thus will hide the light of the sun from our eyes. They know in what sign each planet will be at any given time and at what time each day any constellation will rise and set. You see the course of reasoning followed in arriving at these predictions. [7] 2.18. But what course of reasoning is followed by men who predict the finding of a treasure or the inheritance of an estate? On what law of nature do such prophecies depend? But, on the other hand, if the prophecies just mentioned and others of the same class are controlled by some natural and immutable law such as regulates the movements of the stars, pray, can we conceive of anything happening by accident, or chance? Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance? Hence it seems to me that it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen accidentally and by chance. For if He knows, then the event is certain to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance does not exist. And yet chance does exist, therefore there is no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. 2.19. But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old womens credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary. [8] 2.20. of what advantage to me is divination if everything is ruled by Fate? On that hypothesis what the diviner predicts is bound to happen. Hence I do not know what to make of the fact that an eagle recalled our intimate friend Deiotarus from his journey; for if he had not turned back he must have been sleeping in the room when it was destroyed the following night, and, therefore, have been crushed in the ruins. And yet, if Fate had willed it, he would not have escaped that calamity; and vice versa. Hence, I repeat, what is the good of divination? Or what is it that lots, entrails, or any other means of prophecy warn me to avoid? For, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman fleets in the First Punic War should perish — the one by shipwreck and the other at the hands of the Carthaginians — they would have perished just the same even if the sacred chickens had made a tripudium solistimum in the consulship of Lucius Junius and Publius Claudius! On the other hand, if obedience to the auspices would have prevented the destruction of the fleets, then they did not perish in accordance with Fate. But you insist that all things happen by Fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination. 2.26. But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument.[11] You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. The artificial, you said, consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself — that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out. Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed. 2.28. In discussing separately the various methods of divination, I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state religion. But we are alone and for that reason we may, without causing ill-will, make an earnest inquiry into the truth of soothsaying — certainly I can do so, since in most things my philosophy is that of doubt. In the first place, then, if you please, let us make an inspection of entrails! Now can anybody be induced to believe that the things said to be predicted by means of entrails were learned by the soothsayers through long-continued observation? How long, pray, did the observations last? How could the observations have continued for a long time? How did the soothsayers manage to agree among themselves what part of the entrails was unfavourable, and what part favourable; or what cleft in the liver indicated danger and what promised some advantage? Are the soothsayers of Etruria, Elis, Egypt, and of Carthage in accord on these matters? Apart from such an agreement being impossible in fact, it is impossible even to imagine; and, moreover, we see some nations interpreting entrails in one way and some in another; hence there is no uniformity of practice. 2.46. Besides, you quote me as authority for the remarkable fact that, at the very time when proof of the conspiracy was being presented to the Senate, the statue of Jupiter, which had been contracted for two years before, was being erected on the Capitol.Will you then — for thus you pleaded with me — will you then persuade yourself to take sides against me in this discussion, in the face of your own writings and of your own practice? You are my brother and on that account I shrink from recrimination. But what, pray, is causing you distress in this matter? Is it the nature of the subject? Or is it my insistence on finding out the truth? And so I waive your charge of my inconsistency — I am asking you for an explanation of the entire subject of soothsaying. But you betook yourself to a strange place of refuge. You knew that you would be in straits when I asked your reason for each kind of divination, and, hence, you had much to say to this effect: Since I see what divination does I do not ask the reason or the cause why it does it. The question is, what does it do? not, why does it do it? As if I would grant either that divination accomplished anything, or that it was permissible for a philosopher not to ask why anything happened! 2.48. I am not a hopeless sceptic on the subject of such warnings really being sent by the gods; however, I do not know that they are and I want to learn the actual facts from you. Again, when certain other events occurred as they had been foretold by diviners and I attributed the coincidence to chance, you talked a long time about chance. You said, for example, For the Venus-throw to result from one cast of the four dice might be due to chance; but if a hundred Venus-throws resulted from one hundred casts this could not be due to chance. In the first place I do not know why it could not; but I do not contest the point, for you are full of the same sort of examples — like that about the scattering of the paints and that one about the hogs snout, and you had very many other examples besides. You also mentioned that myth from Carneades about the head of Pan — as if the likeness could not have been the result of chance! and as if every block of marble did not necessarily have within it heads worthy of Praxiteles! For his masterpieces were made by chipping away the marble, not by adding anything to it; and when, after much chipping, the lineaments of a face were reached, one then realized that the work now polished and complete had always been inside the block. 2.52. For how many things predicted by them really come true? If any do come true, then what reason can be advanced why the agreement of the event with the prophecy was not due to chance? While Hannibal was in exile at the court of King Prusias he advised the king to go to war, but the king replied, I do not dare, because the entrails forbid. And do you, said Hannibal, put more reliance in piece of ox‑meat than you do in a veteran commander? Again, when Caesar himself was warned by a most eminent soothsayer not to cross over to Africa before the winter solstice, did he not cross? If he had not done so all the forces opposed to him would have effected a junction. Why need I give instances — and, in fact, I could give countless ones — where the prophecies of soothsayers either were without result or the issue was directly the reverse of the prophecy? 2.53. Ye gods, how many times were they mistaken in the late civil war! What oracular messages the soothsayers sent from Rome to our Pompeian party then in Greece! What assurances they gave to Pompey! For he placed great reliance in divination by means of entrails and portents. I have no wish to call these instances to mind, and indeed it is unnecessary — especially to you, since you had personal knowledge of them. Still, you are aware that the result was nearly always contrary to the prophecy. But enough on this point: let us now come to portents. [25] 2.70. Enough has been said of portents; auspices remain and so do lots — I mean lots that are drawn, and not those uttered by prophets, and more correctly styled oracles. I shall speak of oracles when I get to natural divination. In addition I must discuss the Chaldeans. But first let us consider auspices. To argue against auspices is a hard thing, you say, for an augur to do. Yes, for a Marsian, perhaps; but very easy for a Roman. For we Roman augurs are not the sort who foretell the future by observing the flights of birds and other signs. And yet, I admit that Romulus, who founded the city by the direction of auspices, believed that augury was an art useful in seeing things to come — for the ancients had erroneous views on many subjects. But we see that the art has undergone a change, due to experience, education, or the long lapse of time. However, out of respect for the opinion of the masses and because of the great service to the State we maintain the augural practices, discipline, religious rites and laws, as well as the authority of the augural college. 2.78. What else does a refusal to be warned by Jove accomplish except either to prevent an auspice from occurring, or, if it occurs, to prevent it from being seen?[37] Your story about Deiotarus is utterly absurd: He did not regret the auspices given him as he was setting out to join Pompey. They caused him to continue in the path of loyalty and friendship to the Roman people and to perform his duty; for he valued his reputation and glory more than kingdom and riches. I dare say; but that has nothing to do with auspices. For the crow would not tell Deiotarus that he was doing right in preparing to defend the liberty of the Roman people. He ought to have realized that of himself, and in fact he did. 2.79. Birds indicate that results will be unfavourable or favourable. In my view of the case Deiotarus employed the auspices of virtue, and virtue bids us not to look to fortune until the claims of honour are discharged. However, if the birds indicated that the issue would be favourable to Deiotarus they certainly deceived him. He fled from the battle with Pompey — a serious situation! He separated from Pompey — an occasion of sorrow! He beheld Caesar at once his enemy and his guest — what could have been more distressing than that? Caesar wrested from him the tetrarchy over the Trocmi and conferred it upon some obscure sycophant of his own from Pergamus; deprived him of Armenia, a gift from the Senate; accepted a most lavish hospitality at the hands of his royal host and left him utterly despoiled. But I wander too far: I must return to the point at issue. If we examine this matter from the standpoint of the results — and that was the question submitted to the determination of the birds — the issue was in no sense favourable to Deiotarus; but if we examine it from the standpoint of duty, he sought information on that score not from the auspices, but from his own conscience. [38] 2.100. There remain the two kinds of divination which we are said to derive from nature and not from art — vaticination and dreams, — these, my dear Quintus, if agreeable to you, let us now discuss.Delighted, I assure you, said he, for I am in entire accord with the views which you have so far expressed. To be quite frank, your argument has merely strengthened the opinion which I already had, for my own reasoning had convinced me that the Stoic view of divination smacked too much of superstition. I was more impressed by the reasoning of the Peripatetics, of Dicaearchus, of ancient times, and of Cratippus, who still flourishes. According to their opinion there is within the human soul some sort of power — oracular, I might call it — by which the future is foreseen when the soul is inspired by a divine frenzy, or when it is released by sleep and is free to move at will. I should like very much to learn your views of these two classes of divination and by what arguments you disprove them. [49] 2.110. But what weight is to be given to that frenzy of yours, which you term divine and which enables the crazy man to see what the wise man does not see, and invests the man who has lost human intelligence with the intelligence of the gods? We Romans venerate the verses of the Sibyl who is said to have uttered them while in a frenzy. Recently there was a rumour, which was believed at the time, but turned out to be false, that one of the interpreters of those verses was going to declare in the Senate that, for our safety, the man whom we had as king in fact should be made king also in name. If this is in the books, to what man and to what time does it refer? For it was clever in the author to take care that whatever happened should appear foretold because all reference to persons or time had been omitted. 2.114. Oh! but what about that oarsman in Coponiuss fleet, you say, didnt he truly foretell what afterwards came to pass? He did indeed, and the very things that all of us at the time feared would happen. For news was coming to us that the armies of Caesar and Pompey were facing each other in Thessaly. We thought that Caesars troops had more reckless courage because they were fighting against their country and greater strength because of their long military training. Besides there was not one of us who did not dread the outcome of the battle, but our apprehension was not openly shown and was such as not to be discreditable to men of strong character. As for that Greek sailor, is it strange if, in the extremity of his fear, he, as most people do in such cases, lost his courage, reason, and self-control? In his mental excitement and aberration, he merely stated that things would occur, which, when he was himself, he feared would come to pass. In heavens name, pray tell me, then, which you think was more likely to have had the power to interpret the decrees of the immortal gods — that crazy sailor, or someone of our party then on the ground — Cato, Varro, Coponius or I? [56] 2.148. Then let dreams, as a means of divination, be rejected along with the rest. Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, has taken advantage of human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man. This same view was stated in my treatise On the Nature of the Gods; and to prove the correctness of that view has been the chief aim of the present discussion. For I thought that I should be rendering a great service both to myself and to my countrymen if I could tear this superstition up by the roots. But I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition does not mean the destruction of religion. For I consider it the part of wisdom to preserve the institutions of our forefathers by retaining their sacred rites and ceremonies. Furthermore, the celestial order and the beauty of the universe compel me to confess that there is some excellent and eternal Being, who deserves the respect and homage of men. 2.149. Wherefore, just as it is a duty to extend the influence of true religion, which is closely associated with the knowledge of nature, so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition. For superstition is ever at your heels to urge you on; it follows you at every turn. It is with you when you listen to a prophet, or an omen; when you offer sacrifices or watch the flight of birds; when you consult an astrologer or a soothsayer; when it thunders or lightens or there is a bolt from on high; or when some so‑called prodigy is born or is made. And since necessarily some of these signs are nearly always being given, no one who believes in them can ever remain in a tranquil state of mind. 2.150. Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers — not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not — men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.Nothing could please me better, Quintus replied.When this was said, we arose.
96. Cicero, De Domo Sua, 37.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 36; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 51; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 108
146. facis iniuriam, Chrysogone, si maiorem spem emptionis tuae in huius exitio ponis quam in eis iis π : his cett. rebus quas L. L ucius Sulla gessit. quod si tibi causa nulla est cur hunc miserum tanta calamitate adfici velis, si tibi omnia sua praeter praeter σχψ : propter cett. animam tradidit nec sibi quicquam paternum ne monumenti quidem causa reservavit causa reservavit ψ2 : causa clare servavit cett. : causa clam reservavit pauci dett. , per deos immortalis! quae ista tanta crudelitas est, quae tam fera immanisque natura? quis umquam praedo fuit tam nefarius, quis pirata tam barbarus ut, cum integram praedam sine sanguine habere posset, cruenta spolia detrahere mallet?
97. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.1-2.2, 2.23, 2.52, 2.92, 2.102, 5.7, 5.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 65
2.1.  Upon this they both looked at me, and signified their readiness to hear me. So I began: "First of all, I beg of you not to imagine that I am going to deliver you a formal lecture, like a professional philosopher. That is a procedure which even in the case of philosophers I have never very much approved. Socrates, who is entitled to be styled the father of philosophy, never did anything of the sort. It was the method of his contemporaries the Sophists, as they were called. It was one of the Sophists, Gorgias of Leontini, who first ventured in an assembly to 'invite a question,' that is, to ask anyone to state what subject he desired to hear discussed. A bold undertaking, indeed, I should call it a piece of effrontery, had not this custom later on passed over into our own school. 2.2.  But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The would‑be learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. 2.23.  "What then is the point of saying 'I should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds'? That is tantamount to saying 'I should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a new‑broach'd cask, . . . as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I will never allow. 2.52.  The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom; could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken! And why is this so? Is it because of her supreme ability and cunning in the art of contriving pleasures? Why is Justice commended? What gave rise to the old familiar saying, 'A man with whom you might play odd and even in the dark'? This proverb strictly applies to the particular case of honesty, but it has this general application, that in all our conduct we should be influenced by the character of the action, not by the presence or absence of a witness. 2.92.  However, let us grant his point: let him get the highest pleasures cheap, or for all I care for nothing, if he can; allow that there is as much pleasure to be found in the cress salad which according to Xenophon formed the staple diet of the Persians, as in the Syracusan banquets which Plato takes to task so severely; grant, I say, that pleasure is as easy to get as your school makes out; — but what are we to say of pain? Pain can inflict such tortures as to render happiness absolutely impossible, that is, if it be true that pain is the Chief Evil. Metrodorus himself, who was almost a second Epicurus, describes happiness (I give almost his actual words) as 'sound health, and an assurance of its continuance.' Can anyone have an assurance of what his health will be, I don't say a year hence, but this evening? It follows that we can never be free from the apprehension of pain, which is the chief Evil, even when it is absent, for at any moment it may be upon us. How then can life be happy when haunted by fear of the greatest Evil? 2.102.  That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a man as you like, I cannot deny; but what business has a philosopher, and especially a natural philosopher, which Epicurus claims to be, to think that any day can be anybody's birthday? Why, can the identical day that has once occurred recur again and again? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar day recur? This too is impossible, except after an interval of many thousands of years, when all the heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return to the point from which they started. It follows that there is no such thing as anybody's birthday. 'But a certain day is so regarded.' Much obliged, I am sure, for the information! But even granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be observed when he is dead? And to provide for this by will — is this appropriate for a man who told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us after death? Such a provision ill became one whose 'intellect had roamed' over unnumbered worlds and realms of infinite space, without shores or circumference. Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To omit others, I cite the case of the philosopher who was Epicurus's only master.) 5.7.  "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.58.  "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later.
98. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.1-2.2, 2.4-2.118, 3.16-3.76, 5.7, 5.51-5.52, 5.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius •caesar c. julius •julius caesar, c. •cicero, assessment of julius caesar •julius caesar Found in books: Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 62; Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 141; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 29; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 65
2.1. Hic cum uterque me intueretur seseque ad audiendum significarent paratos, Primum, inquam, deprecor, ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere umquam probavi. quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure dici potest, quicquam tale fecit? eorum erat iste mos qui tum sophistae nominabantur, quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. audax negotium, dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros nostros philosophos BE esset. 2.2. sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando percontando A 2 percun- tando NV percunctando A 1 BE per cunctando R atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, ea haec R quae ii ii hi BER hii A hij NV respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas archesilas A acesilaos N achesilas V eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum eum om. RNV qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam etiam om. BER in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum', perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri sibi aliquid (aliquit E) videri BE aliquid videri sibi V dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus. 2.4. hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone probavit Epicurus sensitque in omni disputatione id fieri oportere. sed quod proximum fuit non vidit. negat enim definiri rem placere, sine quo fieri interdum non potest, ut inter eos, qui ambigunt, conveniat quid sit id, de quo agatur, velut in hoc ipso, de quo nunc disputamus. quaerimus enim finem bonorum. possumusne hic hic Se. hoc ARNV (h vel h = hoc, h N p. 1, 7 vel h N 37, 30 = hic); hac BE scire qualis sit, qualis sit BERNV quali sunt A 1 quales A 2 nisi contulerimus inter nos, cum finem bonorum dixerimus, quid finis, quid etiam sit ipsum bonum? 2.5. atqui haec patefactio quasi rerum opertarum, cum quid quidque sit aperitur, definitio est. qua tu etiam inprudens utebare non numquam. nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas definiebas p. 13, 14 sqq. (cf. p. 5, 25 sqq.); 19, 3 sqq. id esse, quo omnia, quae recte fierent, referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur. praeclare hoc quidem. bonum ipsum etiam quid esset, fortasse, si opus fuisset, definisses aut quod esset natura adpetendum adp. AR app aut quod prodesset aut quod iuvaret aut quod liberet modo. nunc idem, nunc om. R (Modo aū = autem idem), N (Modo idem), V nisi molestum est, quoniam quoniam quō A q uo BE tibi non omnino displicet definire definire diffinire N 2 V finire et id facis, cum vis, velim definias definias definiri R quid sit voluptas, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. Quis, quaeso, inquit, est, qui quid sit voluptas quaeso Gz. quasi A 1 BE quam A 2 qua fit R; om. N (ubi de quo ... voluptas excid. et in mg. add.), V nesciat, aut qui, quo magis id intellegat, definitionem aliquam desideret? 2.6. Me ipsum esse dicerem, inquam, nisi mihi viderer habere bene cognitam cognitam bene BE voluptatem et satis firme conceptam animo atque comprehensam. Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire et in eo nutare eumque, qui crebro dicat diligenter oportere exprimi quae vis subiecta sit vocibus, non intellegere interdum, quid sonet haec vox voluptatis, id est quae res huic voci subiciatur. Tum ille ridens: Hoc vero, inquit, optimum, ut is, qui finem rerum expetendarum voluptatem esse dicat, id extremum, id ultimum bonorum, id ipsum quid et quid et Brem. quidē ABENV quid sit R quale sit, nesciat! Atqui, inquam, aut Epicurus quid sit voluptas aut omnes mortales, qui ubique sunt, nesciunt. Quonam, quo nam N quoniam inquit, modo? Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes, quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucunditate quadam perfunditur. Quid ergo? 2.7. istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam; nam interdum nimis nimis minus R etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum, aut non possim quem ad modum ea dicantur ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti adsentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt. 2.8. Verum hoc loco sumo verbis de verbis Non. p. 396 his eandem certe certe om. Non. p. 396 vim voluptatis Verum ... voluptatis Non. p. 396 Epicurum nosse non esse vel non nosse Non. quam ceteros. omnes enim iucundum motum, quo sensus hilaretur. hilaretur N 2 Non. hiaretur ABERN 1 yarēt sequente spatio 4 fere litt. V Graece h(donh/n, hedoneum Non. Latine voluptatem vocant. verum ... vocant Non. p. 121 Quid est igitur, inquit, quod requiras? Dicam, inquam, et quidem discendi causa magis, quam quo te aut Epicurum reprehensum velim. Ego quoque, inquit, didicerim libentius si quid attuleris, quam te reprehenderim. Tenesne igitur, inquam, Hieronymus Rhodius quid quid quod ANV dicat esse summum bonum, bonum summum BE quo putet omnia referri oportere? Teneo, inquit, finem illi videri nihil dolere. Quid? idem iste, inquam, inquam om. R de voluptate quid sentit? 2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 )] difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? 2.10. Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere? 2.11. Immo sit sane nihil melius, inquam—nondum enim id quaero—, num propterea idem voluptas est, quod, ut ita dicam, indolentia? Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Quid dubitas igitur, inquam, summo bono a te ita constituto, ut id totum in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id defendere? 2.12. quid enim necesse est, tamquam meretricem in matronarum coetum, sic voluptatem in virtutum concilium adducere? invidiosum nomen est, infame, suspectum. suspectum subiectum R itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a vobis, non intellegere nos, quam dicat Epicurus voluptatem. quod quidem mihi si quando dictum est—est autem dictum non parum saepe—, etsi satis clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci. egone non intellego, quid sit h(donh/ Graece, Latine voluptas? utram tandem linguam nescio? deinde qui fit, ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes, quicumque Epicurei esse voluerunt? voluerint BE quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, qui philosophus futurus sit, philosophus qui futurus sit A (cf. Iw. Mue. II p. 10 sq.); qui futurus sit philosophus BE scire litteras. itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt Cincinnatum illum, ut dictator esset, sic vos de pagis pagis cod. 1 Eliens. Davisii, Turneb. adversar. IV8; plagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros, sed certe non pereruditos. 2.13. ergo illi intellegunt quid Epicurus dicat, ego non intellego? ut scias me intellegere, primum idem esse dico voluptatem, quod ille h(donh/n . et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit, quod quaereremus. nullum inveniri verbum potest quod magis idem declaret Latine, quod Graece, quam declarat voluptas. huic verbo omnes, qui ubique sunt, qui Latine sciunt, qui latine sciunt qui ubique sunt BE duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, commotionem suavem iucunditatis iocunditatis suavem BE in corpore. nam et ille apud Trabeam voluptatem animi nimiam laetitiam dicit eandem, quam ille Caecilianus, qui omnibus laetitiis laetum esse se narrat. sed hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo—vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt: sublationem animi sine ratione opitis se magno bono frui—, non dicitur laetitia nec gaudium in corpore. 2.14. in eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea, quae sensum aliquem moveat, iucunditas. hanc quoque iucunditatem, si vis, transfer in animum; iuvare enim in utroque dicitur, ex eoque iucundum, modo intellegas inter illum, qui dicat: 'Ta/nta laetitia au/ctus sum, ut nihil co/nstet', et eum, qui: 'Nunc demum mihi animus ardet', quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse illum medium: 'Quamquam hae/c inter nos nu/per notitia a/dmodum est', qui nec laetetur nec angatur, itemque inter eum, qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus, et eum, qui crucietur excrucietur BE summis doloribus, esse eum, qui utroque careat. 2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 2.16. si enim idem dicit, dicat RNV quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat putat BE putat dicat ARN dicat V adiungendam eam, quae sit in motu—sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: 'in motu', illam nihil dolentis 'in stabilitate'—, quid tendit? cum efficere non possit ut cuiquam, qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus inbuti sumus. quis enim est, est enim BEN qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum, cum in voluptate sumus, alterum, cum in dolore, tertium hoc, in quo nunc equidem sum, equidem sum Mdv. quidem sumus ARNV sumus BE credo item item Ernest. idem ABER 2 N 1 V quidem N 2 et fort. R 1, ubi littera i scripta est super ras. (////dē), cuius in loco fuisse potest q vos, nec vos AN 1 V nos BERN 2 in dolore nec in voluptate; ut in voluptate sit, qui epuletur, in dolore, qui torqueatur. tu autem inter haec tantam multitudinem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium nec dolentium? 2.17. Non prorsus, inquit, omnisque, qui sine dolore sint, in voluptate, et ea quidem summa, esse dico. Ergo in eadem voluptate eum, qui alteri misceat mulsum ipse non sitiens, et eum, qui illud sitiens bibat? Tum ille: Finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur, quod quidem ego a principio ita me malle dixeram dixeram p. 13, 7 sq. hoc ipsum providens, dialecticas captiones. Rhetorice igitur, inquam, nos mavis quam dialectice disputare? Quasi vero, inquit, perpetua oratio rhetorum solum, non etiam philosophorum sit. Zenonis est, inquam, hoc Stoici. omnem vim loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni pugni edd. pugnis similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. obsequar igitur voluntati tuae dicamque, si potero, rhetorice, sed hac rhetorica philosophorum, non nostra illa forensi, quam necesse est, cum populariter loquatur, esse interdum paulo hebetiorem. 2.18. sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et iudicandi quale quidque sit quidque sit sit quidque A et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea, quae docere doceri R dicere V vult, ulla arte distinguit, ut haec ipsa, quae modo loquebamur. summum a vobis bonum voluptas dicitur. aperiendum est igitur, quid sit voluptas; aliter enim explicari, quod quaeritur, non potest. quam si explicavisset, non tam haesitaret. aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur, quam Aristippus, id est, qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur, quam etiam pecudes, si loqui possent, appellarent voluptatem, aut, si magis placeret suo more loqui, quam ut Omnés Danai atque Mycénenses. atque Lamb. aut (a E) Attica pubes reliquique Graeci, qui hoc anapaesto citantur, hoc non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud Aristippeum contemneret, aut, si utrumque probaret, ut ut edd. aut (in V ut probat excid.) probat, coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum voluptate et duobus ultimis uteretur. 2.19. multi enim et magni philosophi haec ultima bonorum iuncta fecerunt, ut Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit, Callipho adiunxit ad honestatem voluptatem, Diodorus ad eandem honestatem addidit vacuitatem doloris. idem fecisset Epicurus, si sententiam hanc, quae nunc Hieronymi est, coniunxisset cum Aristippi vetere sententia. illi enim inter se dissentiunt. propterea singulis finibus utuntur et, cum uterque Graece egregie loquatur, nec Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in voluptate ponit non dolere, neque Hieronymus, qui summum bonum statuit non dolere, voluptatis nomine umquam utitur pro illa indolentia, quippe qui ne in expetendis quidem rebus quidem rebus rebus quidem BE quidem tibi V numeret voluptatem. 2.20. duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum —nam id facilius paterer—, sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo nullo modo fieri BE potest. hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re, neque re neque neque ( om. re) BE remque R tamen dividit verbis. cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, appellant A 1 laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis, atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio oratio eius est BE de summo bono. in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt—quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kuri/as do/cas, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?—animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter: 2.21. 'Si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, voluptatem A 2 BENV liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque qui essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus quod reprehenderemus, add. Dav. cum undique complerentur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.' Hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus? quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquatum. At ille non pertimuit saneque fidenter: Istis quidem ipsis verbis, inquit; sed quid sentiat, non videtis. Si alia sentit, inquam, alia loquitur, numquam intellegam quid sentiat; sed plane dicit quod intellegit. idque si ita dicit, non esse reprehendendos luxuriosos, si sapientes sint, dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat non reprehendendos parricidas, si nec cupidi sint nec deos metuant nec mortem nec dolorem. et tamen quid attinet luxuriosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos, qui, cum luxuriose viverent, a summo philosopho non reprehenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent? 2.22. sed tamen nonne reprehenderes, Epicure, luxuriosos ob eam ipsam causam, quod ita viverent, ut persequerentur cuiusque modi voluptates, cum esset praesertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere? atqui reperiemus asotos primum ita non religiosos, ut edint edint Mdv. edient A 1 RN edent A 2 edant V om. BE de patella, deinde ita mortem mortem ita BE non timentes, ut illud in ore habeant ex Hymnide: 'Mihi sex menses sa/tis sunt vitae, se/ptimum Orco spo/ndeo'. iam doloris medicamenta illa Epicurea tamquam de narthecio proment: Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis. Unum nescio, quo modo possit, si luxuriosus sit, finitas cupiditates habere. 2.23. quid ergo attinet dicere: 'Nihil haberem, quod reprehenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent'? hoc est dicere: Non reprehenderem asotos, si non essent asoti. isto modo ne improbos quidem, si essent boni viri. hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprehendendam non putat, et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Noli noli Se. nolui N nolim rell. codd. enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant, et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniis egeant. nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus vinum quibus vinum et q. s. cf. Lucilii carm. rell. rec. Marx. I p. 78, II p. 366 sq. defusum e pleno sit chrysizon, chrysizon Marx.; hirsizon A hrysizon vel heysizon B hrysizon E hyrsi|hon R hyrsizon N hrysiron V ut ait Lucilius, cui nihildum situlus et nihildum situlus et (situlus = situla, sitella) Se. nihil (nichil BE) dum sit vis et ABE nichil dum sit viset R nichil dempsit (e vid. corr. ex u, psit in ras. ) vis (post s ras.) et (in ras.) N nichil dempsit vis et V sacculus sacculus ABE saculos V sarculos R, N (a ex corr. m. alt., r superscr. ab alt. m. ) abstulerit, adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri, qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium—hos ergo ergo BER ego ANV asotos bene quidem vivere aut aut at BE beate numquam dixerim. 2.24. ex quo efficitur, non ut voluptas ne sit voluptas, sed ut voluptas non sit summum bonum. Nec ille, qui Diogenem Stoicum adolescens, post autem Panaetium audierat, Laelius, eo dictus est sapiens, quod non intellegeret quid suavissimum esset—nec enim sequitur, ut, cui cor sapiat, ei non sapiat palatus—, sed quia parvi id duceret. O lapathe, ut iactare, nec es satis nec es satis Lachmann. ad Lucret. p. 29 ; ne cessatis ABEN necessarii R 1 necessatis R 2 necessitatis V cognitu' qui sis! In quo cognitu del. edd. Laelius clamores sofo\s ille solebat Edere compellans gumias guimas BE ginnas R ex ordine nostros. praeclare Laelius, et recte sofo/s, illudque vere: O Publi, o gurges, Galloni! es homo miser, inquit. Cenasti in vita numquam bene, cum omnia in ista isto ARNV Consumis cū sumis A 1 squilla squulla AN 1 . atque acupensere acupensere RKl. acip. edd. vett. accubans aere ABRV accubant aere E accubas aere cum ras. super as N cum decimano. is haec loquitur, qui in voluptate nihil ponens negat eum bene cenare, qui omnia ponat in voluptate, et tamen non non om. ABER negat libenter cenasse umquam Gallonium— mentiretur enim—, sed bene. ita graviter et severe voluptatem secrevit secernit dett. a bono. ex quo illud efficitur, qui bene cenent omnis libenter cenare, qui libenter, non continuo bene. semper Laelius bene. 2.25. quid bene? dicet diceret A dicit BE Lucilius: 'cocto, cocto porto R 1 porco R 2 condito', sed cedo caput cenae: 'sermone bono', quid ex eo? 'si quaeris, libenter'; veniebat enim ad cenam, ut animo ut in animo BE quieto satiaret desideria naturae. recte ergo is negat umquam bene cenasse Gallonium, recte miserum, cum praesertim in eo omne studium consumeret. quem libenter cenasse nemo negat. cur igitur non bene? quia, quod bene, id recte, frugaliter, honeste; ille porro male del. Wes. sec. Mdv. prave, nequiter, turpiter cenabat; non igitur bene. add. Mdv. nec lapathi suavitatem acupenseri acupenseri RKl. acip. edd. vett. accubens ere V accubans aere AR accumbans ere BE accubanti aere N (banti a m. alt. in ras. ) Galloni Laelius anteponebat, sed suavitatem ipsam neglegebat; quod non faceret, si in voluptate summum bonum poneret. 2.26. Semovenda est igitur voluptas, non solum ut recta sequamini, sed etiam ut loqui deceat frugaliter. possumusne ergo in vita summum bonum dicere, cum id cum id cum igitur V quod Bentl. ne in cena quidem posse videamur? Quo modo autem philosophus loquitur? loquitur p.20, 12 sqq. Tria genera cupiditatum, frange re Qui R; frangere Qui (fr. ex corr. m. alt.; quid primitus fuerit, cognosci nequit; ad Qui, quo vocab. novae paginae initium fit, in marg. superiore adscript. est: al' Qui si diceret cupiditatum esse duo genera, naturales et ies, Naturalium quoque item duo necessarias et non necessarias confecta res esset) N; tangere Qui V naturales et necessariae, naturales et necessariae om. R et non necessarie A 2 R et necessariae A 1 et non necessarias V, (as ab alt. m. in ras. ) N; et in necessarias BE naturales et et necessariae A 2 et necessarias A 1 BENV non necessariae, nec naturales nec necessariae. nec naturales nec necessariae om. BE n ec naturales R nec necessariae A, nec necessarias N (as ex corr. m. alt. ), V; et necessarias ( superscr. nec super et, e super as) R primum divisit ineleganter; ineleganter ineliganter A negliganter R duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. hoc est non dividere, sed frangere. qui haec didicerunt, quae ille contemnit, sic solent: Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales didicerunt ... naturales (u. 10) om. R et ies, naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae. confecta res esset. esset ARN essent BE est V vitiosum est enim in dividendo partem in genere numerare. 2.27. sed hoc sane concedamus. contemnit enim enim om. BE disserendi elegantiam, confuse loquitur. gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. et quidem et quidem ARN equidem BEV illud ipsum non nimium probo et tantum tantum A tamen (tn = tamen, pro tm = tantum) patior, philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. an potest cupiditas finiri? tollenda est atque extrahenda radicitus. quis est enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin quin qui N 1 V qui non BE recte cupidus dici possit? ergo et avarus erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et luxuriosus eodem modo. qualis ista philosophia est, quae non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum? quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam rem ipsam (ips in ras. ) N remissam BERV remissionem A prorsus probo, probam A 1 reprobo A 2 elegantiam desidero. appellet haec desideria naturae, cupiditatis nomen servet alio, ut eam, cum de avaritia, cum de intemperantia, cum de maximis vitiis loquetur, tamquam capitis accuset. 2.28. Sed haec quidem quidem VN 2 quae (que) liberius ab eo dicuntur et saepius. quod equidem non reprehendo; est enim tanti philosophi tamque nobilis audacter sua decreta defendere. sed tamen ex eo, quod eam voluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, videtur amplexari saepe vehementius sepe BE vehementius, in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. deinde, ubi erubuit—vis enim est deinde enim ubi erubuit vis est BE permagna naturae—, confugit confugit cum fugit NV illuc, ut neget accedere quicquam posse ad voluptatem nihil dolentis. at iste non dolendi status non vocatur voluptas. 'Non laboro', inquit, 'de nomine'. Quid, quod res alia tota est? Reperiam repperiam A multos, vel innumerabilis potius, non tam curiosos nec tam molestos, quam vos estis, quibus, quid quid Se. quiquid B quicquid AERN quitquid V velim, facile persuadeam. quid ergo dubitamus, quin, si non dolere voluptas sit summa, non esse in voluptate dolor sit maximus? cur id non non id A ita fit? Quia dolori non voluptas contraria est, sed doloris privatio. 2.29. Hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse voluptatem illam, illam ullam RN 2 qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum—eam autem ita persequitur: persequer BE persequar R quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus; cetera addit, neget, 29 addit cf. p. 34, 30 sqq quae si appelles, honos praefandus praestandus NV prefraudus E perfraudus B sit—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt vidit BE ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus. 2.30. quam haec sunt contraria! hic si definire, si dividere si dividere BE Non. in dividere R; individere A 1, N 1 (in-|d.), V ( uel ni d.); vel dividere A 2 N 2 didicisset, hic si definire ... incidisset Non. p. 177 didicisset potuisset Non. si loquendi vim, si denique consuetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. nunc vides, quid faciat. quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. hanc in motu voluptatem —sic enim has suaves suaves has BE et quasi dulces voluptates appellat—interdum ita extenuat, ut M'. M'. edd. marcum Curium putes putes potes A 1 po t R loqui, interdum ita laudat, ut quid praeterea praeter eam NV sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem. quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo, sed a censore opprimenda est. non est enim vitium in oratione solum, solum in oratione R sed etiam in moribus. luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut, qui asoti esse velint, philosophi ante fiant. 2.31. A primo, ut opinor, animantium ortu petitur origo summi boni. Simul atque natum animal animal N 2 V animale est, gaudet voluptate et eam appetit ut bonum, aspernatur dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab iis animalibus, quae nondum depravata sint, sint BE sunt ait optime iudicari. haec et tu ita posuisti, posuisti p. 13, 19—24 et verba vestra sunt. quam multa vitiosa! summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate diiudicabit, stante an an edd. ante BERN 1 ; an te A (in medio versu, ab alt. m.), an te V, autem N 2 ( mutato an in au) movente? quoniam, quoniam Q uo ARN Quomō (= quomodo) V si dis placet, dis placet AN 2 displicet ab Epicuro loqui discimus. discimus loqui BE si stante, hoc natura videlicet vult, salvam esse se, quod concedimus; si movente, quod tamen dicitis, nulla turpis voluptas erit, quae praetermittenda sit, et simul non proficiscitur animal illud modo natum a summa voluptate, quae est a te posita in non dolendo. 2.32. Nec tamen argumentum hoc Epicurus a parvis petivit aut etiam a bestiis, quae putat esse specula naturae, ut diceret ab iis iis Vict. his (hijs, hys) duce natura hanc voluptatem expeti nihil dolendi. nec Nec ( ante enim) etiam A, in R a man. recentiore, ut vid., corr. in neque enim haec movere potest appetitum animi, nec ullum habet ictum, quo pellat animum, status animum, status Vict., P. Man. animi statum hic non dolendi, itaque in hoc eodem peccat Hieronymus. at ille pellit, qui permulcet sensum voluptate. itaque Epicurus semper hoc utitur, utitur nititur A 2 N utatur BE ut probet voluptatem natura expeti, quod ea voluptas, quae in motu sit, et parvos ad se alliciat et bestias, non illa stabilis, in qua tantum inest nihil dolere. qui Qui Lamb. quid igitur convenit ab alia voluptate dicere naturam proficisci, in alia summum bonum ponere? 2.33. Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto. quamvis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse possunt. sunt AR 1 ut bacillum baccillum A 1 ERV baculum N aliud est inflexum et incurvatum de industria, de industria om. Non. aliud ita natum, ut bacillum ... natum Non. p. 78 sic ferarum natura non est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua. nec vero ut voluptatem expetat, natura movet infantem, sed tantum ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit. omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, se simul et ortum est, se Se. simul et ( etiam N 1, ut vid. ; simulet R, simul est N 2 ) ortum et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum tum BE tunc discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sunt sunt RN sint natura, appetat asperneturque aspernaturque A 1 R contraria. 2.34. in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, non valitudinem corporis om. E non valetudinem ( om. cor- poris) edd. summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam et iam NV etiam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante paulo ante § 33 omne enim animal ... asperneturque contraria dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * Mdv. : ' nonnulla exciderunt, quibus Cicero simili forma atque supra (Polemoni et Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt cet. ) dixerit, quae alii prima posuissent; tum rectissime (quemadmodum ante: ergo nata est cet.) subiciebatur de finibus : his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes (consentanei iis, quae posita sunt prima) sunt fines bonorum. Et fortasse etiam Carneadem et Hieronymum no- minarat, sed hic exempli causa solos Aristippum et Stoicos ponit. ' his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt fines sunt etiam A bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis Stoicis N 2 stoici consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque reficientemque A 1 BERN contraria. 2.35. ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi carneadis A 2 V tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; id est in honestate dett. id est honestate BERNV idē honestate A nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam, quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum, quod ille; sin eam, quam Hieronymus, ne add. Se. cf. § 32: Epicurus semper hoc utitur... inest nihil dolere) fecisset idem, ut voluptatem illam Aristippi Aristippi secl. cum allis Mdv. aristippo BE in prima commendatione poneret. 2.36. Nam quod ait ait p. 13, 24—14, 4 sensibus ipsis iudicari voluptatem bonum esse, dolorem malum, plus tribuit sensibus, quam nobis leges permittunt, cum add. Lamb. privatarum litium iudices sumus. nihil enim possumus iudicare, nisi quod est nostri iudicii—in quo frustra iudices solent, solent iudices BE cum sententiam pronuntiant, addere: 'si quid mei iudicii est'; si enim non fuit eorum iudicii, nihilo magis hoc non addito nihilo magis hoc non addito = nihilo magis hoc omisso vel hoc tamen addito illud est iudicatum—. quid Quid N ( corr., ut vid., ab alt. man. ex quod); quod (etiam A eodem compendio quo p. 51, 10 et 53, 25) iudicant iudicant Ern. iudicat ( etiam B) sensus? dulce amarum, leve leve etiam BE asperum, prope longe, stare movere, quadratum rotundum. 2.37. aequam aequam ed. Ascens. quam igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia, quae potest appellari rite rite potest appellari BE sapientia, deinde adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium dominas, tu voluptatum satellites et ministras esse voluisti. quarum adeo omnium sententia pronuntiabit primum de voluptate nihil esse ei loci, loci ei B non modo ut sola ponatur in summi boni sede, quam quaerimus, sed ne illo quidem modo, ut ad honestatem applicetur. 2.38. de vacuitate doloris eadem sententia erit. erit Bentl. est reicietur etiam Carneades, nec ulla de summo bono ratio aut voluptatis non dolendive particeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. ita relinquet duas, de quibus etiam atque etiam consideret. aut enim statuet nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, nihil malum nisi turpe, cetera aut omnino nihil habere momenti aut tantum, ut nec expetenda nec fugienda, sed eligenda modo aut reicienda sint, aut anteponet eam, quam cum honestate ornatissimam, tum etiam ipsis initiis naturae et totius perfectione vitae locupletatam videbit. quod eo liquidius faciet, si perspexerit rerum inter eas verborumne sit controversia. 2.39. Huius ego nunc auctoritatem sequens idem faciam. quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque simplices sententias sententias simplices A eorum, in quibus nulla inest inest est BE virtutis adiunctio, omnino adiunctio omnino omnino adiunctio E omnis adiunctio B a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere primum ... bonum ponere Macrob. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil V 648) contemnentis istam vacuitatem doloris. 2.40. hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum intellegendum, om. ad, AN et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. 2.41. Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui eam voluptatem non modo summam, sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes unam appellamus voluptatem. aliter autem vobis placet. sed ille, ut dixi, vitiose. nec enim figura corporis nec ratio excellens ingenii humani significat ad unam hanc hanc unam RV rem natum hominem, ut frueretur voluptatibus. Nec vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem, quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe minimum sepe V sepe minimum BE dicitis, nihil dolere. non enim, si malum est dolor, carere eo malo satis est ad bene vivendum. hoc dixerit potius Ennius: 'Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali'. nos beatam vitam non depulsione mali, sed adeptione boni iudicemus, nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem, gaudendo NV ut Aristippus, sive non dolentem, dolendo V ut hic, sed agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus. 2.42. quae possunt eadem contra Carneadeum illud summum bonum dici, quod is non tam, ut probaret, protulit, quam ut Stoicis, quibuscum bellum gerebat, opponeret. id autem eius modi est, ut additum ad virtutem auctoritatem videatur habiturum et expleturum cumulate vitam beatam, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. nam qui ad virtutem adiungunt vel voluptatem, quam unam virtus minimi facit, vel vacuitatem doloris, quae etiamsi malo caret, tamen non est summum bonum, accessione utuntur non ita probabili, nec tamen, cur id tam parce tamque restricte faciant, intellego. quasi enim emendum eis sit, quod addant ad virtutem, primum vilissimas res addunt, dein deinde BENV singulas potius, quam omnia, quae prima natura approbavisset, ea cum honestate coniungerent. 2.43. Quae quod quod Mdv. cum Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt sunt visa BE pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est desitum est contra eos BE disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione se lectione R electione BE delectione V expoliarent expoliarent N ( sed hamulus ad litt. r pertinens et ent in ras. ), V; expoliaverunt AR spoliaverunt BE nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, oriretur darent ARN 2 ore retunderet BE orientur darent N 1 orirentur darent V aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum contra eum add. Se. (est contra eum disp. H. A. Koch p. 37 ) non sane est disputatum. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta incerta V ĩcerta (˜ et cer ab alt. man., cer in ras. ) N uncta AR iuncta BE luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur. 2.44. cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, quodque et ipse et amici eius et multi postea defensores eius sententiae fuerunt, et nescio quo modo, is qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam vim, populus cum illis cum illis populus BE facit. quos nisi redarguimus, omnis virtus, omne decus, omnis vera laus deserenda est. ita ceterorum sententiis semotis relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato, sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio. quam quidem certationem homo et acutus et diligens, Chrysippus, non contemnit totumque discrimen summi boni in earum earum eadem R ea rerum aut eā rem rerum Nonius comparatione positum putat. homo ... positum putat Non. p. 282 ego autem existimo, si honestum esse aliquid aliquid esse BE ostendero, quod sit ipsum vi sua vi sua NV in sua BER sua vi A propter seque expetendum, iacere vestra omnia. itaque eo, quale sit, breviter, ut tempus postulat, constituto accedam ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi nisi n u (n = nisi, u = ubi) R memoria forte defecerit. 2.45. Honestum igitur id intellegimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se fructibusve per se A 2 fructibus vespere A 1 BER fructibus ve ( om. per se) NV ipsum possit iure laudari. quod quale sit, non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest, quamquam aliquantum potest, quam communi omnium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis, qui permulta ob eam unam causam unam causam causam unam BE causam una R faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem habent habent dett. habeant a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul simul multa BE agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. eademque ratio fecit hominem hominem fecit BE appet. BENV hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium mortalium omnium BE societate atque, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur. 2.46. et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi, quod facillime apparet, cum vacui curis etiam quid etiam quid et quid iam BE in caelo fiat scire avemus, avemus dett. habemus his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia, simplicia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, periurium, malitiam, iniuriam. eadem ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum accommodatum, omnia humana non tolerabilia solum, sed etiam levia ducens, altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cedens, semper invictum. 2.47. atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis quartum sequitur et in eadem pulchritudine et aptum ex illis tribus, in quo inest ordo et moderatio. cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie specie s pe BER ac ac cod. Eliens. 2 Davisii, ed. Veneta a. 1480; a dignitate transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum. nam ex his tribus laudibus, quas ante dixi, et temeritatem reformidat et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut facto nocere vereturque quicquam aut facere aut eloqui, quod parum virile videatur. 2.48. Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor hys quattuor BE his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint qui hy qui BE ii qui Mdv. honestate honestate edd. honestatem summum bonum metiantur. Si Si Sic BE enim ad honestatem honestatem enim (om. ad) A 1 ad honestatem enim A 2 omnia referant referant Bentl. referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce ii ii voce R sonare— his enim ipsis verbis utitur—neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem hanc vocem Wes. apud Mdv. hac voce honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. 'Quod', inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissensio? 2.49. philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit non sit Mdv. non est in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore rumore mi|nore R timore NV laudetur. ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile, non ob eam causam tamen tamen non ob eam causam BE illud dici esse honestum, honestum esse BE quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines, vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante paulo ante ante paulo E ante populo B dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste. 2.50. quid nunc honeste dicit? idemne, quod iucunde? ergo ita: non posse honeste vivi, nisi honeste vivatur? an nisi populari fama? sine ea igitur iucunde negat posse se add. Bai. vivere? quid turpius quam sapientis vitam ex ex et ABR insipientium sermone pendere? pendere sermone BE quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum? certe nihil nisi quod possit ipsum propter se iure laudari. nam si propter voluptatem, quae est ista laus, quae possit e macello peti? non is vir est, ut, cum honestatem eo loco habeat, ut sine ea iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum, quod populare sit, sentiat et sine eo neget iucunde vivi posse, aut quicquam aliud honestum intellegat, nisi quod sit rectum ipsumque per se sua vi, sua natura, sua sponte sua sponte sua natura A laudabile. 2.51. Itaque, Torquate, cum diceres diceres p. 25, 21—23 clamare Epicurum non posse iucunde vivi, nisi honeste et sapienter et iuste viveretur, tu ipse mihi gloriari videbare. tanta vis inerat in verbis propter earum rerum, quae significabantur his verbis, dignitatem, ut altior fieres, ut interdum insisteres, ut nos intuens quasi testificarere testificarere A 2 testificare A 1 RN 1 testificareris V testificari BE testificares N 2 laudari honestatem et iustitiam aliquando ab Epicuro. quam te decebat decebat NA 2 dicebat A 1 BER declat (= declarat?) V iis iis edd. his verbis uti, quibus si philosophi non uterentur, philosophia omnino non egeremus! istorum enim verborum amore, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro, sapientiae, fortitudinis, iustitiae, temperantiae, praestantissimis ingeniis homines se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt. 2.52. 'Oculorum', inquit Plato, Plato in Phaedro p. 250 D est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam illa ardentis amores excitaret sui! sui si videretur Cur V, (si videretur a man. poster. in marg. add. ) N Cur tandem? an quod ita callida est, ut optime possit architectari voluptates? an quod classidas ut... voluptates Non. p. 70 Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: 'quicum in tenebris'? hoc dictum in una re latissime patet, ut in omnibus factis re, non teste moveamur. 2.53. sunt enim levia et perinfirma, quae dicebantur a te, animi conscientia improbos excruciari, tum etiam poenae timore, qua aut aut A 2 RV,N 2 (in ras); ut A 1 BE afficiantur aut semper sint in metu ne afficiantur aliquando. non oportet timidum aut inbecillo animo fingi non bonum illum virum, qui, quicquid fecerit, ipse se cruciet omniaque formidet, sed omnia callide referentem ad utilitatem, acutum, versutum, veteratorem, facile ut excogitet quo modo occulte, sine teste, sine ullo conscio fallat. 2.54. an tu me de L. Tubulo putas dicere? qui cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam, ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tribunus plebis ferret ad plebem vellentne de ea re quaeri. quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni. caepioni A cepioni R çepioni V cypioni N scipioni BE profectus in exilium Tubulus statim nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta. Non igitur de improbo, sed de add. dett. callido improbo quaerimus, qualis Q. Pompeius in foedere Numantino infitiando fuit, nec vero omnia timente, timente Lamb. timentem sed primum qui animi conscientiam non curet, quam scilicet comprimere nihil est negotii. is enim, qui occultus et tectus dicitur, tantum abest ut se indicet, perficiet etiam ut dolere alterius improbe improbo A facto videatur. quid est enim aliud esse versutum? 2.55. memini me adesse P. Sextilio Rufo, Rufo fuso ARNV cum is rem ad amicos ita deferret, se esse heredem Q. Fadio Fadio edd. fabio Gallo, cuius in testamento scriptum esset se ab eo rogatum ut omnis hereditas ad filiam perveniret. id Sextilius factum factum Sextilius BE negabat. poterat autem inpune; quis enim redargueret? nemo nostrum credebat, eratque veri similius hunc mentiri, cuius interesset, quam illum, qui id se rogasse scripsisset, quod debuisset rogare. addebat etiam se in legem Voconiam iuratum contra eam facere non audere, nisi aliter amicis videretur. aderamus nos quidem adolescentes, sed multi amplissimi viri, quorum nemo censuit plus Fadiae dandum, quam posset ad eam lege Voconia pervenire. tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem, unde, si secutus esset eorum sententiam, qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent, nummum nullum attigisset. num igitur eum postea censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? nihil minus, contraque illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus. magni enim aestimabat pecuniam non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam. quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis; est enim effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum. 2.56. ut igitur illis, qui, recta et honesta quae sunt, ea statuunt per se expetenda, adeunda sunt saepe sepe BE, ceu ( corr., ut videtur, ex seu) A sue R queuis (in ras. angustioris spatii) N que vis V pericula decoris honestatisque causa, sic vestris, qui omnia voluptate metiuntur, pericula adeunda sunt, ut adipiscantur magnas voluptates. si magna res, magna hereditas agetur, cum pecunia voluptates pariantur plurimae, idem idem cod. Bas. Goerenzii; idemque erit Epicuro vestro faciendum, si suum finem bonorum sequi volet, quod Scipioni magna gloria proposita, si Hannibalem in Africam retraxisset. itaque quantum adiit periculum! ad honestatem enim illum omnem conatum suum referebat, non ad voluptatem. sic vester sapiens magno aliquo emolumento commotus cicuta, cicuta Se. cum causa ABEN c ca R cu ca V si opus erit, erit fuerit R dimicabit. 2.57. occultum facinus esse fort. legendum: facinus si esse potuerit, gaudebit; deprehensus omnem poenam contemnet. erit enim instructus ad mortem contemnendam, ad exilium, ad ipsum etiam dolorem. quem quidem vos, cum improbis poenam proponitis, inpetibilem facitis, cum sapientem semper boni plus habere vultis, tolerabilem. Sed finge non solum callidum eum, qui aliquid improbe faciat, verum etiam praepotentem, ut M. Crassus fuit, qui tamen solebat uti suo bono, ut hodie est noster Pompeius, cui recte facienti gratia est habenda; esse enim quam vellet iniquus iustus iustus om. BE cf. serius ocius, velit nolit, scias nescias, ioca seria (p. 71, 6), urbani rustici (p. 67, 11) poterat inpune. quam multa vero iniuste fieri possunt, quae nemo possit reprehendere! si te amicus tuus moriens rogaverit, ut hereditatem reddas suae filiae, filie sue BE nec usquam id scripserit, ut scripsit Fadius, nec cuiquam dixerit, quid facies? 2.58. tu quidem reddes; ipse Epicurus fortasse redderet, ut Sextus Peducaeus, Sex. F., is qui hunc nostrum reliquit effigiem et humanitatis et probitatis suae filium, cum doctus, tum omnium vir optimus et iustissimus, cum sciret nemo eum rogatum a Caio Plotio, equite Romano splendido, Nursino, ultro ad mulierem venit eique nihil opiti viri mandatum exposuit hereditatemque reddidit. sed ego ex te quaero, quoniam idem tu certe fecisses, nonne intellegas eo maiorem vim esse naturae, quod ipsi vos, qui omnia ad vestrum commodum et, ut ipsi et ipsi ut BE dicitis, ad voluptatem referatis, tamen ea faciatis, e quibus appareat non voluptatem vos, sed officium sequi, plusque rectam naturam quam rationem pravam valere. 2.59. si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte latere uspiam, et velle aliquem inprudentem super eam assidere, cuius mors tibi emolumentum futura sit, improbe feceris, nisi monueris monueris eum ne BE ne assidat, sed inpunite tamen; scisse enim te quis coarguere possit? Sed nimis multa. perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri; deque his rebus satis multa in nostris de re publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio. 2.60. Transfer idem ad modestiam vel temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi vel cupiditatum temperantiam quae est moderatio rationi BE oboediens. satisne ergo pudori consulat, si quis sine teste libidini pareat? an est aliquid per se ipsum flagitiosum, etiamsi nulla comitetur infamia? Quid? fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt, sanguinem pro patria profundunt, an quodam animi ardore atque impetu concitati? utrum tandem censes, Torquate, Imperiosum illum, si nostra verba audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum fuisse an meam, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse sua causa omniaque rei publicae, tu contra nihil nisi sua? si vero id etiam explanare velles apertiusque diceres nihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quo modo eum tandem laturum fuisse existimas? 2.61. esto, fecerit, si ita vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates— malo enim dicere quam voluptates, in tanto praesertim viro—, num etiam eius collega collega eius BE P. Decius, princeps in ea familia consulatus, cum se devoverat devoverat Mdv. devoveret et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat? ubi ut eam caperet aut quando? cum sciret confestim esse moriendum eamque mortem ardentiore studio peteret, quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat. quod quidem eius factum nisi esset iure esset iure iure esset BE esset in re V laudatum, non esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus cum Pyrrho pirro ARNV pyrro BE bellum gerens consul cecidisset in proelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publicae praebuisset. 2.62. Contineo me ab exemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est: Leonidas, Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor; ego si nostros colligere coepero, perficiam illud quidem, ut se virtuti tradat constringendam voluptas, sed dies me deficiet, et, ut Aulus Varius, qui est habitus habitus est BE iudex durior, dicere consessori confessori BERV censori N solebat, cum datis testibus alii tamen citarentur: Aut hoc testium satis est, aut nescio, quid satis sit, sic a me satis datum est testium. Quid enim? te ipsum, dignissimum maioribus tuis, voluptasne induxit, ut adolescentulus eriperes P. Sullae consulatum? quem cum ad patrem tuum rettulisses, retulisses fortissimum virum, qualis ille vel consul vel civis cum semper, tum post consulatum fuit! quo quidem auctore nos ipsi ea gessimus, ut omnibus potius quam ipsis nobis consuluerimus. 2.63. At quam pulchre dicere videbare, cum ex altera parte ponebas cumulatum aliquem aliquem cumulatum BE plurimis et maximis voluptatibus nullo nec praesenti nec futuro dolore, ex altera autem cruciatibus maximis toto corpore nulla nec adiuncta nec sperata voluptate, et quaerebas, quis aut hoc miserior aut miseriorum aut BE superiore illo beatior; beatiorum BE beatiore R deinde concludebas summum malum esse dolorem, summum bonum voluptatem! Lucius Thorius Balbus fuit, Lanuvinus, quem meminisse tu non potes. is ita vivebat, ut nulla tam exquisita posset inveniri voluptas, voluptas posset inveniri BE qua non abundaret. erat et cupidus voluptatum et eius generis intellegens et copiosus, ita non superstitiosus, ut illa plurima in sua patria sacrificia et fana contemneret, ita non timidus ad mortem, ut in acie sit ob rem publicam interfectus. 2.64. cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat, sed sua satietate. habebat tamen rationem rationem edd. ratione valitudinis: utebatur iis iis edd. his AR hys BE hijs NV exercitationibus, ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo, qui et suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquendum, conoqquendum N coquendum BEV vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intellegere quid sit bonum. aberat omnis dolor, qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. color egregius, integra valitudo, summa gratia, vita denique conferta voluptatum confecta voluptatum V voluptatum conferta BE omnium varietate. 2.65. hunc vos vos ABE u R vero V uo (= vero) N sed ab alt. man. et post o ras. I litt. beatum; ratio quidem vestra sic cogit. at ego cogit. At ego Bentl. cogitat ego (cogitat. ego) quem huic anteponam non audeo dicere; dicet pro me ipsa virtus nec dubitabit isti vestro beato M. Regulum anteponere, quem quidem, cum sua voluntate, nulla vi coactus praeter fidem, quam dederat hosti, ex patria Karthaginem revertisset, tum ipsum, tum ipsum dett. eum ipsum cum vigiliis et fame cruciaretur, clamat virtus beatiorem fuisse quam potantem in rosa Thorium. bella rosa Thorium. bella VN 2 rosa. torius (Thorius E) bella ABER et fort. N 1 magna gesserat, bis consul fuerat, triumpharat nec tamen sua illa superiora sua illa superiora illa sua superiora BE illa superiora R tam magna neque tam praeclara ducebat quam illum ultimum casum, quem propter fidem constantiamque susceperat, qui nobis miserabilis videtur audientibus, illi perpetienti erat voluptarius. voluptarius (p ex corr. man. alt. ) N voluntarius non enim hilaritate nec lascivia nec risu aut ioco, comite levitatis, saepe etiam tristes firmitate et constantia sunt beati. 2.66. stuprata per vim Lucretia a regis filio testata civis se ipsa interemit. hic dolor populi Romani duce et auctore Bruto causa civitati libertatis fuit, ob eiusque mulieris memoriam primo anno et vir et pater eius consul est factus. factus est BEV tenuis Lucius Verginius unusque de multis sexagesimo anno post libertatem receptam virginem filiam sua manu suam ABER occidit potius, quam ea Ap. Ap. edd. P Claudii libidini, qui tum erat summo cum add. Iw. Mue. II p. 14 sqq. imperio, dederetur. 2.67. Aut haec tibi, Torquate, sunt vituperanda aut patrocinium voluptatis repudiandum. quod autem patrocinium aut quae ista causa est voluptatis, quae nec testes ullos e claris viris nec laudatores poterit adhibere? ut enim nos ex annalium monimentis testes excitamus eos, quorum omnis vita consumpta est in laboribus gloriosis, qui voluptatis nomen audire non possent, sic in vestris disputationibus historia muta est. numquam audivi in Epicuri schola Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum omnium philosophorum. philosophorum ceterorum omnium B ceterorum philoso- phorum omnium E nunc vero, quoniam haec nos etiam tractare coepimus, suppeditabit nobis Atticus noster e e AB et E ex R om. NV thesauris suis quos et quantos viros! nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis voluminibus de Themista loqui? 2.68. sint ista Graecorum; quamquam ab iis iis edd. his (hijs, hys) philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus; sed tamen est aliquid, quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis. Pugt Stoici cum Peripateticis. alteri negant quicquam esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit, alteri plurimum se et longe longeque plurimum tribuere honestati, sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quaedam bona. et certamen honestum et disputatio splendida! omnis est enim de virtutis dignitate contentio. at cum tuis cum disseras, multa sunt audienda etiam de obscenis voluptatibus, de de ( post voluptatibus) N 2 om. rell. quibus ab Epicuro saepissime dicitur. 2.69. non potes potest RN ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris; pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret inprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. Nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus, aliud negotii aliud negotii nihil dett. aliud negotium nihil ARNV aliud negocium non BE nihil habemus. 2.70. At negat Epicurus Epicurus negat BE —hoc enim vestrum lumen est— quemquam, qui honeste non vivat, iucunde posse vivere. quasi ego id curem, quid quid quod Non. ille aiat aiat NV Non. alat aut neget. quasi ... neget Non. p. 70 illud quaero, quid ei, qui in voluptate summum bonum ponat, consentaneum sit dicere. quid affers, cur Thorius, cur Caius cur Caius Se. cur chius (curehius B) Postumius, cur Postumius cur postumus cur BE cur postumus V omnium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime vixerit? ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam reprehendendam, nisi plane fatui sint, id est nisi aut cupiant aut metuant. quarum ambarum rerum cum medicinam cum medicina V medicinam cum BE pollicetur, luxuriae licentiam pollicetur. his enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asotorum vita quod reprehendat. 2.71. Non igitur potestis voluptate omnia dirigentes aut tueri aut retinere virtutem. nam nec vir bonus ac iustus haberi debet qui, ne malum habeat, abstinet se ab iniuria. nosti, credo, illud: 'Ne/mo pius est, qui/ pietatem—'; cave putes quicquam esse verius. nec enim, dum metuit, iustus est, et certe, si metuere destiterit, non erit; non metuet autem, sive celare poterit, potuerit BE sive opibus magnis quicquid fecerit optinere, certeque malet malet edd. mallet existimari bonus vir, vir bonus BE ut non sit, quam esse, ut non putetur. ita, quod certissimum est, pro vera certaque iustitia simulationem nobis iustitiae traditis praecipitisque quodam modo ut nostram stabilem conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opinionem aucupemur. 2.72. Quae dici eadem de ceteris virtutibus possunt, quarum omnium fundamenta vos in voluptate tamquam in aqua ponitis. quid enim? fortemne possumus dicere eundem illum Torquatum?—delector enim, quamquam te non possum, ut ais, corrumpere, delector, inquam, et familia vestra et nomine. et hercule mihi vir optimus nostrique amantissimus, Aulus Torquatus, versatur ante oculos, cuius quantum studium et quam insigne fuerit erga me temporibus illis, quae nota sunt omnibus, scire necesse est utrumque vestrum. quae mihi ipsi, qui volo et esse et haberi gratus, grata non essent, nisi eum perspicerem mea causa mihi amicum fuisse, non sua, nisi hoc dicis sua, quod interest omnium recte facere. si id dicis, vicimus. id enim volumus, id contendimus, ut officii fructus sit ipsum officium. 2.73. hoc ille tuus non vult omnibusque ex rebus voluptatem quasi mercedem exigit. sed ad illum redeo. si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam ullam ed. Veneta a. 1480 nullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. iam si pudor, si modestia, si pudicitia, si uno verbo temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coe+rcebuntur, non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet aut occultatione proposita aut inpunitate aut licentia? 2.74. Quid? illud, Torquate, quale tandem videtur, te isto nomine, ingenio, gloria, quae facis, quae cogitas, quae contendis quo referas, cuius rei causa perficere quae conaris velis, quid quid P. Man. quod Cic. 43 optimum denique in vita iudices non audere in conventu dicere? quid enim mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in contionem ascenderis—est enim tibi edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum—, quid merearis igitur, ut dicas te in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse, teque nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa? 'An me', inquis, tam amentem putas, ut apud imperitos isto modo loquar? At tu eadem ista dic in iudicio aut, si coronam times, dic in senatu. numquam facies. cur, nisi quod quod om. BE turpis oratio est? est oratio RV mene ergo et Triarium dignos existimas, existimes ARNV apud quos turpiter loquare? 2.75. Verum esto: verbum ipsum voluptatis non habet dignitatem, nec nos fortasse intellegimus. hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos quam dicatis voluptatem. rem videlicet videlicet P. Man. vides difficilem et obscuram! individua cum dicitis et intermundia, quae nec sunt ulla nec possunt esse, intellegimus, voluptas, quae passeribus omnibus nota est, nota est omnibus A a nobis intellegi non potest? quid, si efficio ut fateare me non modo quid sit voluptas scire—est enim iucundus motus in sensu—, sed etiam quid eam tu velis velis tu eam BE esse? tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, dixi ego BE et nomen inponis, in motu ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem, tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, quo quo ARN qua BE cui V Mdv. ('quo et qua orta puto ex quoi') addi nihil possit; eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit; eam stabilem appellas. 2.76. sit sane ista voluptas. dic in quovis conventu in quo conventu vis BE te omnia te omnia etiam A facere, ne doleas. si ne hoc quidem satis ample, satis honeste dici putas, dic te omnia omnia te A et in isto magistratu et in omni vita utilitatis tuae causa facturum, nihil nisi quod expediat, nihil denique nisi tua tui BE causa: quem clamorem contionis aut quam spem consulatus eius, qui tibi paratissimus est, futuram putas? putas N 1 V putes eamne rationem igitur sequere, sequere AV sequare B seq re E seq re (= sequere) R seqa re (a in ras. ) N qua tecum ipse et cum tuis utare, profiteri et in medium proferre non audeas? at vero illa, quae Peripatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt in iudiciis, in senatu. officium, aequitatem, dignitatem, fidem, recta, honesta, digna imperio, digna populo Romano, omnia pericula pro re publica, mori pro patria, haec cum loqueris, nos barones stupemus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides. 2.77. nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa, quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem. Vide igitur ne non debeas debeas dubeca s R verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. quodsi vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres, fingeres BEN 2 fringeres AN 1 V fringens R quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas et ea dicas, quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. mihi quidem eae eae edd. hae A he R ee (= esse) NV et BE verae videntur opiniones, quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, quae in omni coetu concilioque profitendae sint, sunt R ne id non pudeat non pudeat pudeat non (ne E) BE sentire, quod pudeat dicere. Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam, quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum? 2.78. quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis, etiamsi ad se ex iis nihil ex iis nihil edd. ex his (hijs) nihil (nichil) ARNV nichil ex hys BE redundet? redundet Mdv. red- eunt et ABER reddeat Quid N 1 redeat Quid N 2 V 'Prodest', inquit, mihi eo esse animo. Immo videri fortasse. esse enim, nisi eris, non potes. qui autem esse poteris, poteris pot- est Non. nisi te amor ipse ceperit? quod non subducta subducta Non. subdubia utilitatis ratione effici solet, qui autem ... effici solet Non. p. 399 sed ipsum a se oritur et sua sponte nascitur. At enim sequor utilitatem. Manebit ergo amicitia tam diu, tam diu om. NV quam diu quam diu om. A 1 BE sequetur utilitas, et, si utilitas amicitiam constituet, constituet amicitiam A tollet eadem. 2.79. sed quid ages tandem, si utilitas ab amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? relinquesne? quae relinquesne? quae relinquens neque A 1 relinquens ne que E relinquens ne q ; R relinquens nequaquam N 1 relinques? nequaquam N 2 V ista amicitia est? retinebis? qui convenit? quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expetenda vides. Ne in odium veniam, si amicum destitero tueri. Primum cur ista res digna odio est, nisi quod est turpis? odio est non quod est turpis n (= nisi, puncto, ut videtur, sub n posito: n) quod est|sine quo R quodsi, ne quo incommodo afficiare, non relinques amicum, tamen, ne sine fructu alligatus sis, ut moriatur optabis. Quid, si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed iacturae rei familiaris erunt faciendae, labores suscipiendi, suscipiendi labores NV adeundum vitae periculum? ne tum quidem te respicies et cogitabis sibi quemque natum esse et suis voluptatibus? vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit fecit siculo tirāno R tyranno? aut, Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Orestem, Oresten A horestē R honestem V ut moriare pro amico? aut, si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares et, si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremini non precarere? non deprecarere edit. Venet. 1480 2.80. Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; nihil enim arbitror esse magna laude dignum, esse om. R magna laude dignum esse BE quod te praetermissurum credam aut mortis aut doloris metu. non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid sed quid N 2 V sed quod ABERN 1 disciplinae. ratio ista, quam defendis, praecepta, quae didicisti, quae probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus. At coluit ipse amicitias. Quis, quaeso, Quis quaeso Dav. quis quasi ABE quas quasi R quis nā (nā in ras., in qua hasta infer. litt. q cognoscitur ) N quasi quis V illum negat et bonum virum et comem et humanum fuisse? de ingenio eius in his disputationibus, non de moribus quaeritur. sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt. sed quamvis comis in amicis tuendis fuerit, fuerit in amicis tuendis BE tamen, si haec vera sunt—nihil enim affirmo—, non satis acutus fuit. At multis se probavit. 2.81. Et quidem iure fortasse, sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. in omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis scientia vel in ipsa virtute optimum quidque rarissimum est. ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et Epicurei et Lamb. et epicurei A et epicurij N 1 epicurei (epicuri E) sunt BE epicurei RV epicurij N 2 fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed sed se A 1 BER officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere. 2.82. Sed haec nihil sane ad rem; illa videamus, quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. dicta sunt p. 28, 17—30, 26 e quibus Ex quibus NV unum unum p. 29, 4 sqq. mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli posse diuelli posset. Satis (rell. om., cf. p. 70, 1) R ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod, quoniam add. Se. (cf. ad p. 31, 25); si sine P. Man. cum sine Mdv. sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset, ne ne Mdv. nec iucunde quidem posset. ne iucunde quidem posset om. B satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud aliud p. 30, 5 sqq. humanius horum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, illo ipso BE illo ( om. ipso) Non. quod sciam, horum ... sciam Non. p. 167 primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari per se etiam omissa spe voluptatis. voluptatis utilitatis V; in marg. vel utilitatis add. A 2 hoc etsi multimodis multis modis NV reprehendi potest, tamen accipio, quod dant. dat R mihi enim satis est, ipsis non satis. nam aliquando posse recte fieri dicunt nulla expectata nec quaesita quaesita exquisita BE voluptate. 2.83. Posuisti etiam posuisti etiam p. 30, 18 sqq. dicere alios foedus quoddam inter se facere sapientis, ut, quem ad modum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates percipiendas perspiciendas ABER maxime pertinere. hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. an an BE at vero, si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit, quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et insulas amicis anteponamus? 2.84. Licet hic rursus ea commemores, ea commemores p. 28,19 sqq. quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. non quaero, quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi rationi possit R et sententiae suae dicere. Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita. est quaesita (quesita) ARN 2 V est quaesita est N 1 quesita est BE Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse, quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? gramana ABERN 1 gramina V, N 2 ( ubi a man. poster. adscr. est grana- ria puto) collige omnia, quae soletis: Praesidium praesidium p. 30, 3 amicorum. Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis praesidii. praesidii marg. ed. Cratandr.; praesidium iam contemni non poteris. odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis. ad eas enim res res enim BE ab Epicuro praecepta dantur. et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem liberalitatem ed. Colon. 1467 libertatem utens etiam etiam P. Man. eam (eam N 2 ) sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benivolentia praeclare tuebere et munies. tuebere et munies Mdv. tuebare munies BE et tuebere et munies ARNV At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia? 2.85. Tecum optime, deinde etiam cum mediocri amico. sed fac ista esse non inportuna; inportuna A 1 BE, V (imp.); inoportuna (superscr. priore o ab alt. ut videtur man.) A 2 in oportuna N oportuna R quid ad utilitatem tantae pecuniae? vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate metiare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede superari. me igitur ipsum ames oportet, non mea, si veri amici futuri sumus. Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longi sumus. perfecto enim et concluso neque virtutibus neque amicitiis usquam locum esse, si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magnopere dicendum. ac tamen, attamen V ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam. 2.86. quoniam quoniam q uo A igitur omnis summa summa omnis BE philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt, beate autem vivere alii in alio, vos in voluptate ponitis, item contra miseriam miseriam om. R. omnem in dolore, id primum videamus, beate vivere vestrum quale sit. atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis. nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. quis enim confidit semper sibi sibi semper BE illud stabile et firmum permansurum, quod fragile et caducum sit? qui autem diffidet diffidit BE perpetuitati bonorum suorum, timeat necesse est, ne aliquando amissis illis sit miser. beatus autem esse beatus esse ENV in maximarum rerum timore nemo potest. nemo igitur esse beatus potest. 2.87. neque enim in aliqua parte, sed in perpetuitate temporis vita beata dici dici ed. Veneta 1494 duci solet, nec appellatur omnino vita, nisi confecta atque absoluta, nec potest quisquam alias beatus esse, alias miser; qui enim existimabit posse se miserum esse beatus non erit. nam cum suscepta semel est beata vita, tam permanet quam ipsa illa effectrix beatae vitae sapientia neque expectat ultimum tempus aetatis, quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praeceptum a Solone. At enim, At enim P. Man. etenim quem ad modum tute dicebas, dicebas p. 27,19—21 negat Epicurus diuturnitatem nec diuturn. BEV nec diuturn. N quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis, quam si illa sit sempiterna. 2.88. haec dicuntur inconstantissime. cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem. qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam effici voluptate beatam vitam A putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? igitur ne dolorem quidem. an dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beatum epicurus appellet beatum B Epicurus beatum appellet E et aeternum? dempta enim aeternitate nihilo beatior Iuppiter iupiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. At enim hic etiam dolore. At eum nihili nihili edd. nihil (nichil) facit; ait enim se, se RNV, superscr. A, om. BE si uratur, si uratur A 2 BE si iuratur A 1 si uratum R se iura- turum NV Quam hoc suave! dicturum. 2.89. qua igitur re ab ab a BE deo vincitur, si aeternitate non vincitur? in qua quid est boni praeter summam voluptatem, et eam sempiternam? quid ergo attinet gloriose loqui, nisi constanter loquare? In voluptate corporis—addam, si vis, 'animi', dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e e BE et corpore—situm est vivere beate. Quid? istam voluptatem perpetuam quis potest praestare sapienti? nam quibus rebus efficiuntur voluptates, eae eae Mdv. hae A hee BEV he R, N (ab alt. m. in ras.) non sunt in potestate in potestate sunt BE (in om. A 1 ) sapientis. non enim in ipsa sapientia positum est beatum esse, sed in iis rebus, quas sapientia comparat ad voluptatem. totum autem id externum est, et quod externum, id in casu est. ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam Epicurus ait ait p. 27, 17 sq. exiguam intervenire sapienti. 2.90. Age, inquies, ista parva sunt. Sapientem locupletat ipsa natura, cuius divitias Epicurus parabiles esse docuit. docuit p. 20, 20 sq. Haec bene dicuntur, nec ego repugno, sed inter sese ipsa pugt. negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus, minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum. huic ego, si negaret quicquam interesse ad beate vivendum quali uteretur victu, concederem, laudarem etiam; verum enim diceret, idque Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat, audio dicentem, cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim. sed qui ad voluptatem omnia referens vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi ille Piso, non audio nec eum, quod sentiat, dicere existimo. 2.91. naturales divitias dixit parabiles esse, quod parvo esset natura contenta. Certe, nisi voluptatem tanti aestimaretis. Non minor, inquit, voluptas percipitur ex vilissimis rebus quam ex pretiosissimis. Hoc est non modo cor non habere, sed ne palatum quidem. qui enim voluptatem ipsam voluptates ipsas Non. contemnunt, iis iis V eis Non. is A 1 his A 2 BER illis N licet dicere se acupenserem maenae non anteponere. qui enim ... anteponere Non. p. 550 cui vero in voluptate summum bonum est, huic omnia sensu, non ratione sunt iudicanda, eaque dicenda optima, quae sint sunt BE suavissima. 2.92. Verum esto; consequatur summas voluptates non modo parvo, sed per me nihilo, si potest; sit voluptas non minor in nasturcio illo, quo vesci Persas esse solitos scribit Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis, quae a Platone graviter vituperantur; sit, inquam, tam facilis, quam vultis, comparatio voluptatis, quid de dolore dicemus? cuius tanta tormenta sunt, ut in iis iis Mdu. his AER hys B hijs NV beata vita, si modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit. ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter alter A 2 BEN aliter A 1 R alr (= aliter) quam V Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis: cum corpus bene constitutum sit et sit exploratum ita futurum. an id exploratum cuiquam potest esse, quo modo se hoc se hoc A 2 E (h'), se haec A 1 se hic B se hee R se se hec N sese V habiturum sit corpus, non dico ad annum, sed ad vesperum? vesperam R vespm V dolor ergo, go (= ergo) ARNV igitur BE id est summum malum, metuetur semper, etiamsi non aderit; iam enim adesse poterit. qui potest igitur habitare in beata vita summi mali metus? 2.93. Traditur, inquit, ab Epicuro ratio neglegendi doloris. Iam id id Bentl. ad BE om. ARNV ipsum absurdum, maximum malum neglegi. sed quae tandem ista ratio est? Maximus dolor, inquit, brevis est. Primum quid tu dicis breve? deinde dolorem quem maximum? quid enim? summus dolor plures dies manere non potest? vide, ne etiam menses! nisi forte eum dicis, qui, simul atque arripuit, interficit. quis istum dolorem timet? illum mallem levares, quo optimum atque humanissimum virum, Cn. Octavium, Marci filium, familiarem meum, confici vidi, nec vero semel nec ad breve tempus, sed et saepe et plane diu. quos et plane diu quos Halm. plane et diu quos dett.; plane quos, post plane superscr. (= vel) duos, R; plane diu quos ABENV ille, di di R dii A dy BE dij NV inmortales, cum omnes artus ardere viderentur, cruciatus perferebat! nec tamen miser esse, quia summum id malum non erat, tantum modo laboriosus videbatur; at miser, si in flagitiosa et et ( etiam A)] atque BE vitiosa vita afflueret voluptatibus. 2.94. Quod autem magnum dolorem brevem, longinquum levem esse dicitis, id non intellego quale sit. video enim et magnos et eosdem bene longinquos dolores, quorum quorum que non R alia toleratio est verior, qua uti vos non potestis, qui honestatem ipsam per se non amatis. fortitudinis quaedam praecepta sunt ac paene leges, quae effeminari virum vetant in dolore. quam ob rem turpe putandum est, non dico dolere—nam id quidem est interdum interdum est A necesse—, sed saxum illud Lemnium clamore Philocteteo philocteteo A 2 philocteto A 1 R philoctere BE phyloctete N phylotete V funestare, Quod éiulatu, heiulatu ARN quéstu, gemitu, frémitibus Resonándo mutum flébiles vocés refert. Huic Epicurus praecentet, praecentet BE p t irent et R et AN 1 V, et (competenter ita in marg. add., ut legatur ante et) N 2 si potest, cui E add. Bai. víperino mórsu venae víscerum Venéno inbutae taétros cruciatús cient! Sic Epicurus: Philocteta, st! brevis dolor. st! brevis dolor Mdv. si brevis dolor levis ABERN 1 si brevis dolor lenis V si gravis dolor brevis N 2 in marg. At iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. Si longus, levis; lenis AR dat enim intervalla et relaxat. 2.95. Primum non saepe, deinde quae est ista relaxatio, cum cum que BE; fortasse legen- dam quoniam, cf. ad p. 31, 25 et praeteriti doloris memoria recens est et futuri atque inpendentis impendentis RN impedientis V torquet timor? 'Moriatur', inquit. Fortasse id optimum, sed ubi illud: 'Plus semper voluptatis'? si enim ita est, vide ne facinus facias, facias facinus BE cum mori suadeas. potius ergo illa dicantur: turpe esse, viri non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. nam ista vestra: Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis dictata sunt. virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, fortitudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet. 2.96. Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas intellegas (intellig.) BEA 2 intellegat A 1 intelligat R intelligantur N intelligatur V facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem autem om. A aderant aderant om. BE vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam me et philosophiam Bai. me (ne R) et philosophia A 1 RN me philosophia BE me et philosophia et A 2 V voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos. 2.97. non ego iam Epaminondae, non Leonidae mortem huius morti antepono, quorum alter cum vicisset Lacedaemonios apud Mantineam atque ipse gravi vulnere exanimari se videret, ut primum dispexit, despexit BEN quaesivit salvusne esset clipeus. cum salvum esse flentes sui respondissent, rogavit essentne fusi hostes. cum id quoque, ut cupiebat, audivisset, evelli iussit eam, qua erat transfixus, hastam. ita multo sanguine profuso in laetitia et in et in ARNV et BE victoria est mortuus. Leonidas autem, rex Lacedaemoniorum, se in Thermopylis trecentosque eos, quos eduxerat Sparta, cum esset proposita aut fuga turpis aut gloriosa mors, opposuit hostibus. praeclarae mortes sunt imperatoriae; philosophi autem in suis lectulis plerumque moriuntur. refert tamen, quo modo. beatus add. Mdv. sibi videtur videbatur BE esse moriens. magna laus. 'Compensabatur', inquit, cum summis doloribus laetitia. 2.98. Audio equidem philosophi vocem, Epicure, sed quid tibi dicendum sit oblitus es. primum enim, si vera sunt ea, quorum recordatione te gaudere dicis, hoc est, si vera sunt tua scripta et inventa, gaudere non potes. nihil enim iam habes, quod ad corpus referas; est autem a te semper dictum nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere. 'Praeteritis', inquit, gaudeo. Quibusnam praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, non memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum; sin autem ad animum, falsum est, quod negas animi ullum esse gaudium, quod non referatur ad corpus. cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas? quid in add. Mdv. ('ex addidit, opinor, A. Man. Ex (de?) an in (cum tam officiose agis) adden- dum fuerit dubitari potest' Mdv. sed ī ante isto facilius excidit quam ex) isto egregio tuo officio et tanta fide—sic enim existimo—ad corpus refers? 2.99. Huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet, nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum scriptum epistula (e pl a B) BE ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. ita redarguitur redarguitur edd. redarguetur ipse a sese, sese se A convincunturque convincunturque Dav. vincunturque ABEN vincuntur V veneantur que R scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam. quod enim testimonium maius quaerimus, quae honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, cum videamus tanta officia morientis? 2.100. Sed ut epistulam laudandam arbitror eam, quam modo totidem fere verbis interpretatus sum, quamquam ea cum summa eius philosophia philosophia BE philosophi nullo modo congruebat, sic eiusdem testamentum non solum a add. P. Man. philosophi gravitate, sed etiam ab ipsius sententia iudico discrepare. scripsit enim et multis saepe verbis et breviter arteque arteque Se. apteque ARNV aperteque BE in eo libro, quem modo nominavi, mortem nihil ad nos pertinere. quod enim dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu, quod autem sine sensu sit, id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino. hoc ipsum elegantius poni meliusque potuit. nam quod ita positum est, quod dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu, id eius modi est, ut non satis plane dicat quid sit dissolutum. sed tamen intellego quid velit. qui velit A 1 R 2.101. quaero autem quid sit, quod, cum dissolutione, id est morte, sensus omnis extinguatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino, quod pertineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligenter caveat et sanciat ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad diem agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Gamelione itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae dent ad eorum epulas, qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et ut et et ut A sui et Metrodori memoria colatur. 2.102. haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare putare edd. putari ullum esse cuiusquam diem natalem. quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius, qui semel fuit? certe non potest. an eiusdem modi? ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem, unde profecta sint, sunt R fiat ad unum tempus reversio. nullus est igitur cuiusquam dies natalis. At habetur! Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? ad nos pertinere post mortem A haec non erant eius, qui innumerabilis mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset. num quid tale Democritus? ut alios omittam, hunc appello, quem ille unum secutus est. 2.103. quodsi dies notandus fuit, eumne potius, quo natus, an eum, quo sapiens factus est? Non potuit, inquies, fieri sapiens, nisi natus esset. et sustul. P. Man. et Lamb. Isto modo, ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. quos quidem dies quem ad modum agatis et in quantam hominum facetorum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico— nihil opus est litibus—; tantum dico, magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem, quam illius testamento cavere ut ageretur. 2.104. Sed ut ad propositum propositum propositum revertamur N 2 (rev. in marg. add. ), V —de dolore enim cum diceremus, ad istam epistulam delati sumus—, nunc totum illud concludi sic licet: qui in summo malo est, is tum, is tum Lamb. istum A 1 RN iste A 2 BEV cum in eo est, non est beatus; sapiens autem semper beatus est et est aliquando in dolore; non est igitur summum malum dolor. Iam illud illud p. 18, 19 sq. quale tandem est, bona praeterita non effluere sapienti, mala meminisse non oportere? primum in nostrane potestate est, est potestate A quid meminerimus? Themistocles quidem, cum ei Simonides an quis alius artem memoriae polliceretur, 'Oblivionis', inquit, mallem. Nam memini etiam quae nolo, oblivisci non possum quae volo. 2.105. Magno hic ingenio, sed res se tamen sic habet, ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare meminisse. vide ne ista sint Manliana vestra aut maiora etiam, si imperes quod facere non possim. possum BE quid, si etiam iucunda memoria est praeteritorum malorum? ut proverbia non nulla veriora sint quam vestra dogmata. vulgo enim dicitur: 'Iucundi iocundi V iucunde A iocunde BERN acti labores', nec male Euripides— concludam, si potero, Latine; Graecum enim hunc versum nostis omnes—: Suavi/s laborum est praeteritorum me/moria. memoria est praeteritorum BE Sed ad bona praeterita redeamus. quae si a vobis talia dicerentur, qualibus Caius Caius graius B gravis E Marius uti poterat, ut expulsus, egens, in palude demersus tropaeorum recordatione levaret dolorem suum, audirem et plane probarem. nec enim absolvi beata vita sapientis neque ad exitum perduci poterit, si prima quaeque bene ab eo consulta atque facta ipsius oblivione obruentur. obruentur dett. obruerentur 2.106. sed vobis voluptatum perceptarum recordatio vitam beatam facit, et quidem corpore perceptarum. nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est omnis animi voluptates animi voluptates voluptas animi BE e om. A 1 BEN esse e corporis societate. corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tantopere tanto opere B tanta opere R derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur se omnis se omnis N se omnes BEV omnis A se causas R secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse. abstulisse libidinum voluptates BE Quod enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quo modo id potuit mortuo mortuo potuit BE permanere? effluit effluit Se. (cf. p. 18, 19; 79, 23; inter e et f excidit ef); fluit ARNV; in B et E pro hac voce compendium est, quod in E apud Mdv. sumitur pro etc., deinde in utroque cod. littera prima in igitur solito maior et rubro colore exarata; in E praeterea spatio relicto novus versus incipit igitur voluptas corporis et prima quaeque avolat saepiusque relinquit causam paenitendi penitendi quam recordandi. itaque beatior Africanus cum patria illo modo loquens: Desine, Roma, tuos hostes reliquaque praeclare: Nam tibi moenimenta moenimenta RKl. monimenta AERN monumenta BV mu- nimenta Mur. (Var. lect. XI 1) mei peperere peperere BE repperere A reperere NV reperire R labores. Nam E namque ( fuitne praeclare, nam Quae tibi ... labores!? in quo dubitari possit, utrum Ciceroni an Ennio tribuendum sit illud nam) Laboribus hic praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes voluptatibus, et hic se ad ea revocat, e quibus nihil umquam rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore. Illud autem ipsum qui optineri potest, quod dicitis, dicitis p. 24, 15—22 (—referri) omnis animi et voluptates et dolores ad corporis voluptates ac dolores ad corporis voluptates ac ac et R nihilne te] nichil tene BE dolores om. BE pertinere? 2.107. nihilne te delectat umquam —video, quicum loquar—, te igitur, Torquate, ipsum per se nihil delectat? omitto dignitatem, honestatem, speciem ipsam virtutum, de quibus ante dictum est, haec leviora ponam: poe+ma, ponam poëma dett. poema ponam ABEN postea ponam V ponam ( om. poëma) R orationem cum aut cum aut aut cum BE scribis aut legis, cum omnium factorum, cum regionum conquiris historiam, signum, tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, venatio, villa Luculli Luculli dett. lucilli —nam si tuam dicerem, latebram haberes; ad corpus diceres pertinere—, sed ea, quae dixi, ad corpusne refers? an est aliquid, quod te sua sponte delectet? aut pertinacissimus fueris, si in eo in eo ARNV om. BE perstiteris ad corpus ea, quae dixi, referri, referri Lamb. referre aut deserueris totam Epicuri voluptatem, si negaveris. Quod vero a te disputatum est disputatum est p. 24, 22 (nec ob eam) —30 maiores esse voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis, quia trium temporum particeps animus sit, corpore autem praesentia solum sentiantur, qui id qui id B quid id E quid ARNV probari potest, ut is, qui propter me aliquid gaudeat, plus quam ego ipse gaudeat? plus quam ego ipse gaudeat E om. ABRNV 2.108. animo voluptas oritur propter voluptatem corporis, et maior est animi voluptas quam corporis. ita fit, ut gratulator animo voluptas ... gratulatur (v. 27) del. Brem. laetior sit quam is, cui gratulatur. Sed dum efficere vultis beatum sapientem, cum maximas animo voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus maiores maioris ABEN 1 quam corpore, quid occurrat non videtis. animi enim quoque dolores animi enim dolores quoque Mdv. percipiet omnibus partibus maiores quam corporis. ita miser sit aliquando necesse est is, quem vos beatum semper vultis esse, nec vero id, dum omnia ad voluptatem doloremque referetis, efficietis umquam. 2.109. Quare aliud aliquod, aliquod Lamb. aliquid Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est, voluptatem bestiis concedamus, quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis. quid, si etiam bestiae multa faciunt duce sua quaeque quaeque N 2 V quaque ABER quamque N 1 natura partim indulgenter vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in educando, perfacile ut add. C. F. W. Mue. appareat aliud quiddam iis propositum, non voluptatem? partim cursu et peragratione laetantur, congregatione aliae coetum quodam modo civitatis imitantur; 2.110. videmus in quodam volucrium volucrium Charis. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil I p. 146); volucrum ARNV voluerunt BE genere non nulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, in multis etiam desideria videmus. ergo in bestiis erunt secreta e voluptate humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat, praecipue praecipui P. Man. sec. Mdv. a natura nihil datum esse dicemus? esse dicemus datum BE 2.111. Nos vero, siquidem in voluptate sunt omnia, longe multumque superamur a bestiis, quibus ipsa terra fundit ex sese ex sese fundit BEV pastus varios atque abundantes nihil laborantibus, nobis autem aut vix aut ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore multo labore labores multo B labore multo E quaerentibus. nec tamen ullo modo summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest. quid enim tanto opus est instrumento in optimis artibus comparandis? quid tanto concursu honestissimorum studiorum, tanto virtutum comitatu, si ea nullam ad aliam rem nisi ad voluptatem conquiruntur? 2.112. ut, si Xerxes, cum tantis classibus tantisque equestribus et pedestribus copiis Hellesponto iuncto Athone perfosso mari ambulavisset terra mari ... terra Bai. in ed. min.; maria ... terram navigavisset, navigasset NV si, cum tanto impetu in Graeciam venisset, causam quis ex eo quaereret tantarum copiarum tantique belli, mel se auferre ex Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa videretur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem plurimis et gravissimis artibus atque virtutibus instructum et ornatum non, ut illum, maria pedibus peragrantem, classibus montes, sed omne caelum totamque cum universo mari terram mente complexum voluptatem petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta molitum. 2.113. ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora, mihi crede, Torquate, nati sumus, nec id ex animi solum partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium, in te in te AN inte R vite V inde BE quidem infinita, inest coniectura consequentium non multum a divinatione differens, inest moderator cupiditatis pudor, inest ad humanam societatem iustitiae fida custodia, inest in perpetiendis laboribus adeundisque periculis firma et stabilis doloris mortisque contemptio—ergo haec in animis, tu autem etiam membra ipsa sensusque considera, qui tibi, que tibi B ut reliquae corporis corporis om. BE partes, non comites solum virtutum, sed ministri etiam videbuntur. videbantur R 2.114. Quid? quod BE cf. p. 3, 6 sqq. si in ipso corpore multa voluptati praeponenda sunt, ut vires, valitudo, velocitas, pulchritudo, quid tandem in animis censes? in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam caeleste et divinum putaverunt. Quodsi esset in voluptate summum bonum, ut dicitis, optabile esset maxima in voluptate in maxima voluptate BE in voluptate maxima R nullo intervallo interiecto dies noctesque versari, cum omnes sensus dulcedine omni quasi perfusi moverentur. quis est autem dignus nomine hominis, qui unum diem totum velit esse in genere isto voluptatis? Cyrenaici quidem non recusant; vestri haec verecundius, illi fortasse constantius. 2.115. sed lustremus animo non has maximas artis, quibus qui qui om. AN 1 carebant inertes a maioribus a maioribus EVN 2 maioribus N 1 amori- bus ABR nominabantur, sed quaero num existimes, non dico Homerum, Archilochum, Pindarum, sed Phidian, Polyclitum, Zeuxim ad voluptatem artes suas direxisse. ergo opifex plus sibi proponet ad formarum quam civis excellens ad factorum pulchritudinem? quae autem est alia causa erroris tanti tam longe lateque diffusi, nisi quod is, qui voluptatem summum bonum esse decernit, esse decernit esse om. BE decerit B dicerint E decreverit esse R non cum ea parte animi, in add. edd. qua inest ratio atque consilium, sed cum cupiditate, id est cum animi levissima parte, deliberat? Quaero enim de te, si sunt di, dii AR dy BE dij NV ut vos etiam putatis, qui possint possint Lamb. possunt esse beati, cum voluptates corpore percipere percipere V p cip e N percipe AR percipi BE non possint, aut, si sine eo genere voluptatis beati sint, cur similem animi usum in sapiente in sapienti B insapienti E esse nolitis. 2.116. Lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum, qui sunt ab Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Agesilai, non Aristidi aut Themistocli, non Philippi aut aut ( post Philippi) om. R Alexandri, lege nostrorum hominum, lege vestrae familiae; neminem videbis ita laudatum, ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum voluptatum dett. utilitatum diceretur. non elogia elogia edd. eulogia monimentorum id significant, velut hoc ad portam: Hunc unum Hunc unum Ern. uno cum ABER uno cu j (j ex corr. m. alt.; voluisse videtur scriba uno cui) N ymo cum V plurimae consentiunt gentes populi primarium fuisse virum. 2.117. Idne consensisse de Calatino plurimas gentis arbitramur, primarium populi fuisse, fuisse populi A quod praestantissimus fuisset in conficiendis voluptatibus? ergo in iis adolescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus et magnam indolem, quos suis commodis inservituros et quicquid ipsis expediat facturos arbitrabimur? nonne videmus quanta perturbatio rerum omnium consequatur, quanta confusio? tollitur beneficium, tollitur gratia, quae sunt vincla vincula BEV concordiae. nec enim, cum tua causa tua causa NV tuā causā AR tuam causam BE cui commodes, beneficium illud habendum est, sed faeneratio, nec gratia deberi videtur ei, qui sua causa commodaverit. sua causa commodaverit (comod. N) NV suā causā co. AR suam commodaverit causam BE maximas vero virtutes iacere omnis necesse est voluptate domite. sunt etiam turpitudines plurimae, quae, nisi honestas honestas marg. ed. Cratandr. honesta ( in N ab alt. m. in marg. add. = vel honestatis) natura plurimum valeat, cur non cadant in sapientem non est facile defendere. 2.118. Ac ne plura complectar—sunt enim innumerabilia—, bene laudata virtus voluptatis aditus intercludat necesse est. quod iam a me expectare noli. tute introspice in mentem tuam ipse eamque omni cogitatione pertractans percontare ipse te perpetuisne malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea, quam saepe usurpabas, tranquillitate degere omnem aetatem sine dolore, adsumpto etiam illo, quod vos quidem adiungere soletis, sed fieri non potest, sine doloris metu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mererere, mererere cod. Paris. Madvigii merere cum opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel Herculis perpeti aerumnas. sic enim maiores nostri labores non fugiendos fugiendos RNV figiendos A fingendo BE tristissimo tamen verbo aerumnas etiam in deo nominaverunt. 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.18. artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum cum ABE tum N (t corr. ut vid., ex c), RV quia sit in iis iis Mdv. his aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint sunt R contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, ut ea et ea BE quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam etiam a medicis R disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. 3.19. Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. 3.25. Inscite autem medicinae et gubernationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae comparatur. sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam, et ut omnia, quae homini accidant, accidunt BE infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit. contigit A tenere autem virtutes eas ipsas, quarum modo feci mentionem, nemo poterit, nisi statuerit nihil esse, quod intersit aut differat aliud ab alio, praeter praeter nisi BE honesta et turpia. 3.26. Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illa his, quae iam posui, consequentia. cum enim hoc sit extremum —sentis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod te/los te/los Graeci] greci celos BE Graeci dicant, dicant ARV dicunt BEN id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere—, cum igitur hoc sit extremum, extremum hoc sit BE congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam, de qua loquor, quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est ut, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari, sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic: 3.27. Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est. satisne hoc conclusum videtur? certe; quod enim efficiebatur ex iis iis Bai. his (hijs) duobus, quae erant sumpta, in eo vides vides ed. princ. Colon. 1467 (ex sil. Mdv.) vide esse conclusum. duorum autem, e quibus effecta conclusio est, contra superius dici solet non omne bonum esse laudabile. nam quod laudabile sit honestum esse conceditur. illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid, quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum, quod non placens, aut, si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem honestum. ita fit, ut, quod bonum sit, id etiam honestum sit. 3.28. Deinde quaero, quis aut de misera vita possit gloriari aut de non de non Mdv. non de beata. de sola igitur beata. ex quo ex quo edd. (Ascens. 1511), ex qua ABERN de qua V efficitur gloriatione, ut ita dicam, dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae iure contingere. ita fit, ut honesta vita beata vita sit. Et quoniam is, cui contingit ut iure laudetur, habet insigne quiddam ad decus et ad gloriam, ut ob ea, ut ob ea edd., P. Man. ut ad ea AERN et ad ea BV quae tanta sint, beatus dici iure possit, idem de vita talis viri rectissime dicetur. ita, si beata vita honestate honestate honeste AB cernitur, quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est. Quid vero? Quid vero? negarine ullo Dav. quod vero negari nullo ARNV qui vero negari nullo BE 3.29. negarine ullo modo possit numquam add. Mdv. quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quem fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem? ut enim qui mortem in malis ponit non potest eam non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse decreverit, non curare idque contemnere. quo posito et omnium adsensu adprobato illud adsumitur, eum, qui magno sit animo atque forti, omnia, quae cadere in hominem possint, despicere ac pro nihilo putare. quae cum ita sint, effectum est nihil esse malum, quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae et actae et consequenti et bene de sese iudicare statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. ex quo intellegitur idem illud, solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere: honeste, id est cum virtute, vivere. 3.30. Nec vero ignoro varias philosophorum fuisse sententias, eorum dico, qui summum bonum, quod ultimum appello, appellant Non. in animo ponerent. eorum ... ponerent Non. p. 417 quae quae quas V quamquam vitiose quidam secuti sunt, tamen non modo iis iis Mdv. his (hijs) tribus, qui virtutem a summo bono segregaverunt, cum aut voluptatem aut vacuitatem doloris aut prima naturae in summis bonis ponerent, sed etiam alteris tribus, qui mancam fore putaverunt sine aliqua accessione virtutem ob eamque rem trium earum rerum, quas supra dixi, singuli singulas singuli singulas P. Faber apud Lamb. singulis singulas ABENV singulas singulis R addiderunt,—his tamen omnibus eos antepono, cuicuimodi antepono cuicuimodi Lamb. in curis secundis, ante potui modo A antepono cuimodi (cui modi R) BER antepono cuiusmodi N antepono cuius modici V sunt, qui summum bonum in animo atque in virtute posuerunt. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 3.32. Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi e)pigennhmatiko/n appellant; cum cum Ern. Dav. quod autem in quo sapienter dicimus, dicimus etiam A ( cf. ad. v. 5 ) id a primo a primo BE ad primo AR ad primum N apprime V rectissime dicitur. quicquid enim a sapientia asapiencia E as apia (= asapientia) B a sapienti ARV a sapiente N proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, enim positum est id positum est enim id BE enim positum ad est ( om. id) V quod dicimus dicimus om. A esse expetendum. nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, violari ABER fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, effecto ABERN 1 oppido V opido sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. verum ut haec non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea, quae proficiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione recta sunt iudicanda. 3.33. Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.34. hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. nam cum aestimatio, quae a)ci/a dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus rursus N 2 risus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit. alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet. 3.35. Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci pa/- qh appellant—poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret conveniret A. Man. conveniet ABERN conveniat V ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt pa/qos . sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur . secl. Mdv. omnesque eae eae ee RV he (h in ras. ) N hec BE; om. ( spatio parvo relicto ) A sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi h(donh/n appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam. perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. itaque his sapiens semper vacabit. 3.36. Omne autem, quod honestum sit, id esse propter se expetendum commune nobis est cum multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. praeter enim tres disciplinas, quae virtutem a summo bono excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis haec est tuenda sententia, maxime tamen his Stoicis, qui nihil aliud in bonorum numero del. Lamb. nisi honestum esse voluerunt. sed haec quidem est perfacilis et perexpedita et expedita BEN defensio. quis est enim, aut quis umquam fuit aut avaritia tam ardenti aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam quam cod. Monac. sec. Mdv. ; quamquam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese etiam omni inpunitate proposita sine facinore quam illo modo pervenire? 3.37. quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus illa, quae occulta nobis sunt, quo modo moveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur versentur BE in caelo? add. (' videtur Cicero scripsisse ea quae versantur in caelo id esi corpora caelestia ') Mdv. quis autem tam agrestibus institutis vivit, aut quis se contra studia naturae tam add. Se. vehementer obduravit, ut a rebus cognitione dignis abhorreat easque sine voluptate aut utilitate aliqua non requirat et et aut BE pro nihilo putet? aut quis est, qui maiorum, aut Africanorum pro aut Africanorum ' scribendum videtur ut Africanorum, quod iam Goerenzio in mentem venit' Mdv. aut eius, quem tu in ore semper habes, proavi mei, ceterorumque virorum fortium atque omni que om. A virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consilia cognoscens nulla animo afficiatur voluptate? 3.38. quis autem honesta in familia institutus et educatus ingenue non ipsa turpitudine, etiamsi eum laesura non sit, offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum, quem inpure ac flagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordidos, vanos, leves, futtiles? quid autem dici poterit, si turpitudinem non ipsam ipsam non BE per se fugiendam esse statuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem nacti nullo dedecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterreat? Innumerabilia dici possunt in hanc sententiam, sed non necesse est. Nihil est enim, de quo minus dubitari possit, quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda. 3.39. Constituto autem illo, de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, intellegi necesse est pluris id, quod honestum sit, aestimandum esse quam illa media, quae ex eo comparentur. stultitiam autem et timiditatem timiditatem Guyet. temeritatem et iniustitiam et intemperantiam cum dicimus esse fugiendas fugiendas ( sequitur ipsis) Se. fugiendā AN fugienda ( super a lineola videtur erasa ) R fugiendam BV fugiendū E cf. I 50 copulatas et turbulentae propter eas res, quae ex ipsis eveniant, non ita dicimus, ut cum illo, quod positum est, solum id esse malum, quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommodum referuntur, sed ad turpes actiones, quae oriuntur e vitiis. quas enim kaki/as Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare. 3.40. Ne tu, inquam, Cato, verbis ante aut post verbis excidisse videtur uteris illustribus inlustr. A et id, quod vis, declarantibus! itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare. quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. scio enim esse quosdam, qui quavis quavis dett. quāvis ABE quamvis RNV lingua philosophari possint; nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur ipsique dicunt ea se modo probare, quibus natura tacita adsentiatur. itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor. quare attendo te studiose et, quaecumque rebus iis, de quibus hic sermo est, nomina inponis, memoriae mando; mihi enim erit isdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime rectissime igitur BE mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. quod enim vituperabile est per se ipsum, id eo id eo ideo E io R ipso vitium vitium dett, vitio nominatum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. sin kaki/an malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum vitium consuetudo Latina traduceret. nunc omni virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur. 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 3.42. An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 3.43. Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut, si, cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem adprobandum sit nobis, ut, qui plura habeat ea, quae in corpore magni aestimantur, sit beatior. illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum, quae nos bona vere appellemus, frequentia beatiorem vitam fieri aut magis expetendam aut pluris aestimandam, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum. 3.44. etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. nam qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea virtuti anteponatur. quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. nobis aliter videtur, recte secusne, postea; sed potestne sed potest ne V sed postne AB sed post ne E sed ne ( inter sed et ne ras. duarum fere litt. ) R sed p o t ne (p o t ex corr. alt. m., t in ras. ) N rerum maior esse dissensio? 3.45. Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit in magnitudine maris Aegaei add. Halm. stilla mellis, et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum corporearum dett. incorporearum RN in corpore (incorp. E) harum ABE in corpore sitarum V aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est. et quem ad modum oportunitas—sic enim appellemus eu)kairi/an —non fit maior productione temporis—habent enim suum modum, quae oportuna dicuntur—, sic recta effectio— kato/rqwsin enim ita appello, quoniam quoniam A qnĩa (o et in ras. nĩa ab alt. m. ) N quod BE quomodo V rectum factum kato/rqwma —, recta igitur effectio, kato/rqwsin ... effectio ( v. 29 ) om. R item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est, ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. 3.46. ut enim oportunitas illa, sic haec, de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora, ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa, quam si brevis, utunturque simili: ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque oportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponent. anteponent Bentl. Mdv. ; anteponentur A RN V anteponerentur BE Nec vero satis acute dicunt: 3.47. si bona valitudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi. non intellegunt valitudinis aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis oportunitate, ut videantur qui illud dicant idem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse esse longum BE quam brevem. non vident alia brevitate pluris aestimari, alia diuturnitate. 3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam; 3.49. sed, etiam uti ea uti ea Bai. ut in ea ABRN ut inea E ut ea V (etiam uti ea contineant = etiam si concedatur ea divitiis contineri) contineant, non idem facere eas in virtute neque in ceteris artibus, ad quas esse dux pecunia potest, continere autem non potest, itaque, itaque = et ita (ita i. e. si concedatur divitias voluptatem et valitudinem continere) si voluptas aut si bona valitudo sit in bonis, divitias quoque in bonis esse ponendas, at, at edd. aut si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi ut etiam divitias bonum esse dicamus. neque ab ulla re, quae non sit in bonis, id, id quod sit in bonis RN id qua sit in bonis BE nulla ars divitiis ( cf. v. 17 ) A om. V quod sit in bonis, contineri potest, ob eamque causam, quia cognitiones comprehensionesque rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes, adpetitionem movent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis contineri potest. 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 3.51. quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere. 3.52. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. 3.53. quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum praepositum edd. propositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis satis om. A aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse esse P. Man. esset praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur: 3.54. Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus adsistat, qui ita talus erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter, contra, qui aliter contra edd. qualiter qui contra AR qui aliter qui contra BENV neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem pertinebit, sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent. 3.55. Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv. 3.56. Haec, quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque, per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut ut et BE aut NV motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda sunt et praeponenda RNV sunt et ponenda A et praeponenda sunt BE quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicentur, quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valitudo. 3.57. De bona autem fama—quam enim appellant eu)doci/an, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam—Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta detracta detractate quidem BE utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque esseque BENV esse A om. R hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum, dicuntque, ut ipsam non dicuntque propter usumque ut BE liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum. 3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 3.65. ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. 3.66. itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, ii edd. hi qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles viles NV cules A eules R civiles BE neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus. 3.67. Et Et Sed Mdv. quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint possint suam BE sine iniuria. Quoniamque quoniamque quēque R ea natura esset hominis, ut ei ei Lamb. et ABEN om. RV cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum iustum, qui migraret, migraret negaret A iniustum fore. sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum cum ut E commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque quodque BE cuiusque sit. 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.69. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta, quae w)felh/mata et bla/mmata appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera. neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. incommoda autem et commoda—ita enim eu)xrhsth/mata et dusxrhsth/mata appello—communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est. commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta diximus; dicimus BE ea possunt paria non esse. sed emolumenta communia emolumenta et detrimenta communia Lamb. esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia. 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V 3.71. Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, natura P. Man., Lamb. naturam alienumque alienumque V et ( corr. priore u ab alt. m. ) N alienamque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare sociare BE aut coniungere iniuriam, gravissimeque et gravissime et BE verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum vicissimque, quicquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore. 3.72. Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, didicerimus BE didiceremus A diceremus RNV ut tenere teneri AR ne BE tuerique possimus. nam sine hac arte quemvis quamvis RBE arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 3.74. Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me rerum me R me rerum BE rerum ANV traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum coagmentatum ed. princ. Colon. cocicmentatum A cociom tatū R coaugmentatum BEN coagumentatum V inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ut si ' aliquis apud Bentl. ' Mdv. ut non si ABERN aut non si V ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod quod BE quo moveri possit. 3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 3.76. nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam usque ad illum a Cyro extructum rogum pertulisset. quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes omnis ABER boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut quid est virtute divinius? 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.51. Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a a e RNV nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum cognitiones quem ad modum N 2 cogni- tionesque admodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, add. Se. inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. 5.52. quid, cum fictas fabulas, e quibus utilitas nulla elici elici dett. dici BERN duci V potest, cum voluptate legimus? quid, cum volumus nomina eorum, qui quid gesserint, gesserunt R nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? quid, quod homines infima infirma BE fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur delectentur RNV historia? maximeque que om. R eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle, qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. quocirca intellegi necesse est in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta invita—menta ( lineola et ta poste- rius ab alt. m. scr., ta in ras. ) N invita mente BE invita|et mente R in vita mentem V inesse, quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur. 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 2.1.  Upon this they both looked at me, and signified their readiness to hear me. So I began: "First of all, I beg of you not to imagine that I am going to deliver you a formal lecture, like a professional philosopher. That is a procedure which even in the case of philosophers I have never very much approved. Socrates, who is entitled to be styled the father of philosophy, never did anything of the sort. It was the method of his contemporaries the Sophists, as they were called. It was one of the Sophists, Gorgias of Leontini, who first ventured in an assembly to 'invite a question,' that is, to ask anyone to state what subject he desired to hear discussed. A bold undertaking, indeed, I should call it a piece of effrontery, had not this custom later on passed over into our own school. 2.2.  But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The would‑be learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. 2.4.  This rule is laid down by Plato in the Phaedrus, and it was approved by Epicurus, who realized that it ought to be followed in every discussion. But he failed to see what this involved. For he says that he does not hold with giving a definition of the thing in question; yet without this it is sometimes impossible for the disputants to agree what the subject under discussion is; as, for example, in the case of the very question we are now debating. We are trying to discover the End of Goods; but how can we possibly know what the nature of this is, without comparing notes as to what we mean, in the phrase 'End of Goods,' by the term 'End' and also by the term 'Good' itself? 2.5.  Now this process of disclosing latent meanings, of revealing what a particular thing is, is the process of definition; and you yourself now and then unconsciously employed it. For you repeatedly defined this very notion of End or final or ultimate aim as 'that to which all right actions are a means while it is not itself a means to anything else.' Excellent so far. Very likely had occasion arisen you would have defined the Good itself, either as 'the naturally desirable,' or 'the beneficial,' or 'the delightful,' or just 'that which we like.' Well then, if you don't mind, as you do not entirely disapprove of definition, and indeed practise it when it suits your purpose, I should be glad if you would now define pleasure, the thing which is the subject of the whole of our present inquiry." 2.6.  "Dear me," cried Torquatus, "who is there who does not know what pleasure is?" Who needs a definition to assist him to understand it?" "I should say that I myself was such a person," I replied, "did I not believe that as a matter of fact I do fully understand the nature of pleasure, and possess a well-founded conception and comprehension of it. As it is, I venture to assert that Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is, but is uncertain about it. He is always harping on the necessity of carefully sifting out the meaning underlying the terms we employ, and yet he occasionally fails to understand what is the import of the term 'pleasure,' I mean, what is the notion that corresponds to the term." Torquatus laughed. "Come, that is a good joke," he said, "that the author of the doctrine that pleasure is the End of things desirable, the final and ultimate Good, should actually not know what manner of thing pleasure itself is!' "Well," I replied, "either Epicurus does not know what pleasure is, or the rest of mankind all the world over do not." "How so?" he asked. "Because the universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffusing over it a certain agreeable feeling." 2.7.  "What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said I; "now and then, I admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said I, "I haven't the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man — who stands alone, so far as I am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. 2.8.  Still, for the present I take it for granted that in the utterance in question Epicurus undoubtedly recognizes the same meaning of 'pleasure' as everyone else. Every one uses the Greek word hēdonē and the Latin voluptas to mean an agreeable and exhilarating stimulation of the sense." "Well then," he asked, "what more do you want?" "I will tell you," I said, "though more for the sake of ascertaining the truth than from any desire to criticize yourself or Epicurus." "I also," he replied, "would much rather learn anything you may have to contribute, than criticize your views." "Do you remember, then," I said, "what Hieronymus of Rhodes pronounces to be the Chief Good, the standard as he conceives it to which all other things should be referred?" "I remember," said he, "that he considers the End to be freedom from pain." "Well," said I, "what is the same philosopher's view about pleasure?" 2.9.  "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" 2.10.  "Do you not remember," he replied, "what I said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I remember," said I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. 'Variation' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I could understand the term, just as I understand it without your speaking of it. But I cannot quite grasp what you mean by 'variation' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or 'kinetic' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain — although why you should call this 'pleasure' I cannot make out." 2.11.  "Well," he asked, "can anything be more pleasant than freedom from pain?" "Still," I replied, "granting there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" "Absolutely the same," said he, "indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible." "If then," said I, "according to your account the Chief Good consists entirely in feeling no pain, why do you not keep to this without wavering? Why do you not firmly maintain this conception of the Good and no other? 2.12.  What need is there to introduce so abandoned a character as Mistress Pleasure into the company of those honourable ladies the Virtues? Her very name is suspect, and lies under a cloud of disrepute — so much so that you Epicureans are fond of telling us that we do not understand what Epicurus means by pleasure. I am a reasonably good-tempered disputant, but for my own part when I hear this assertion (and I have encountered it fairly often), I am sometimes inclined to be a little irritated. Do I not understand the meaning of the Greek word hēdonē, the Latin voluptas? Pray which of these two languages is it that I am not acquainted with? Moreover how comes it that I do not know what the word means, while all and sundry who have elected to be Epicureans do? As for that, your sect argues very plausibly that there is no need for the aspirant to philosophy to be a scholar at all. And you are as good as your word. Our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from the plough to be dictator. You ransack the country villages for your assemblage of doubtless respectable but certainly not very learned adherents. 2.13.  Well, if these gentlemen can understand what Epicurus means, cannot I? I will prove to you that I do. In the first place, I mean the same by 'pleasure' as he does by hēdonē. One often has some trouble to discover a Latin word that shall be the precise equivalent of a Greek one; but in this case no search was necessary. No instance can be found of a Latin word that more exactly conveys the same meaning as the corresponding Greek word than does the word voluptas. Every person in the world who knows Latin attaches to this word two ideas — that of gladness of mind, and that of a delightful excitation of agreeable feeling in the body. On the one hand there is the character in Trabea who speaks of 'excessive pleasure of the mind,' meaning gladness, the same feeling as is intended by the person in Caecilius who describes himself as being 'glad with every sort of gladness.' But there is this difference, that the word 'pleasure' can denote a mental as well as a bodily feeling (the former a vicious emotion, in the opinion of the Stoics, who define it as 'elation of the mind under an irrational conviction that it is enjoying some great good'), whereas 'joy' and 'gladness' are not used of bodily sensation. 2.14.  However pleasure according to the usage of all who speak good Latin consists in the enjoyment of a delightful stimulation of one of the senses. The term 'delight' also you may apply if you like to the mind ('to delight' is said of both mind and body, and from it the adjective 'delightful' is derived), so long as you understand that between the man who says So full am I of gladness That I am all confusion, and him who says Now, now my soul with anger burns, one of whom is transported with gladness and the other tormented with painful emotion, there is the intermediate state: Though our acquaintanceship is but quite recent, where the speaker feels neither gladness nor sorrow; and that similarly between the enjoyment of the most desirable bodily pleasures and the endurance of the most excruciating pains there is the neutral state devoid of either. 2.15.  "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style — an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 2.16.  For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself — anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations — that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses — this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 2.17.  "I certainly do not," said he; "I maintain that all who are without pain are enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest form of pleasure." "Then you think that a man who, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for another, feels the same pleasure as the thirsty man who drinks it?" At this Torquatus exclaimed: "A truce to question and answer, if you do not mind. I told you from the beginning that I preferred continuous speeches. I foresaw this kind of thing exactly; I knew we should come to logic-chopping and quibbling." "Then," said I, "would you sooner we adopted the rhetorical and not the dialectical mode of debate?" "Why," he cried, "just as if continuous discourse were proper for orators only, and not for philosophers as well!" "That is the view of Zeno the Stoic," I rejoined; "he used to say that the faculty of speech in general falls into two departments, as Aristotle had already laid down; and that Rhetoric was like the palm of the hand, Dialectic like the closed fist; because rhetoricians employ an expansive style, and dialecticians one that is more compressed. So I will defer to your wish, and will speak if I can in the rhetorical manner, but with the rhetoric of the philosophers, not with the sort which we use in the law‑courts. The latter, as it employed a popular style, must necessarily sometimes be a little lacking in subtlety. 2.18.  Epicurus however, Torquatus, in his contempt for dialectic, which comprises at once the entire science of discerning the essence of things, of judging their qualities, and of conducting a systematic and logical argument, — Epicurus, I say, makes havoc of his exposition. He entirely fails, in my opinion at all events, to impart scientific precision to the doctrines he desires to convey. Take for example the particular tenet that we have just been discussing. The Chief Good is pleasure, say you Epicureans. Well then, you must explain what pleasure is; otherwise it is impossible to make clear the subject under discussion. Had Epicurus cleared up the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen into such confusion. Either he would have upheld pleasure in the same sense as Aristippus, that is, an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure; or, if he preferred to use an idiom of his own, instead of speaking the language of the Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, Scions of Athens, and the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, he might have confined the name of pleasure to this state of freedom from pain, and despised pleasure as Aristippus understands it; or else, if he approved of both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, then he ought to combine together pleasure and absence of pain, and profess two ultimate Goods. 2.19.  Many distinguished philosophers have as a matter of fact thus interpreted the ultimate good as composite. For instance, Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime; Callipho united pleasure with moral worth; Diodorus to moral worth added freedom from pain. Epicurus would have followed their example, had he coupled the view we are now discussing, which as it is belongs to Hieronymus, with the old doctrine of Aristippus. For there is a real difference of opinion between them, and accordingly each sets up his own separate End; and as both speak unimpeachable Greek, Aristippus, who calls pleasure the Chief Good, does not count absence of pain as pleasure, while Hieronymus, who makes the Chief Good absence of pain, never employs the name pleasure to denote this negation of pain, and in fact does not reckon pleasure among things desirable at all. 2.20.  "For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings — not merely under a single name (for that I could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master's Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I will ask you kindly to notice whether I translate this maxim correctly: 2.21.  'If the things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver them from the fear of the gods and of death and pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their desires, we should have no reason to blame them, since on every hand they would be abundantly supplied with pleasures, and on no side would be exposed to any pain or grief, which are the sole evil.' " At this point Triarius could contain himself no longer. "Seriously now, Torquatus," he broke out, "does Epicurus really say that?" (For my own part, I believe that he knew it to be true, but wanted to hear Torquatus admit it.) Torquatus, nothing daunted, answered with complete assurance: "Certainly, those are his very words. But you don't perceive his meaning." "Oh," I retorted, "if he means one thing and says another, I never shall understand his meaning. But what he understands he expresses clearly enough. If what he here says is that sensualists are not to be blamed provided they are wise men, he is talking nonsense. He might as well say that parricides are not to be blamed provided they are free from avarice and from fear of the gods, of death and pain. Even so, what is the point of granting the sensual any saving clause? Why imagine certain fictitious persons who, though living sensually, would not be blamed by the wisest of philosophers for their sensuality, provided they avoided other faults? 2.22.  All the same, Epicurus, would not you blame sensualists for the very reason that their one object in life is the pursuit of pleasure of any and every sort, especially as according to you the highest pleasure is to feel no pain? Yet we shall find profligates in the first place so devoid of religious scruples that they will 'eat the food on the paten,' and secondly so fearless of death as to be always quoting the lines from the Hymnis: Enough for me six months of life, the seventh to Hell I pledge! Or if they want an antidote to pain, out comes from their phial the great Epicurean panacea, 'Short if it's strong, light if it's long.' Only one point I can't make out: how can a man at once be a sensualist and keep his desires within bounds? 2.23.  "What then is the point of saying 'I should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds'? That is tantamount to saying 'I should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a new‑broach'd cask, . . . as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I will never allow. 2.24.  The conclusion is, not that pleasure is not pleasure but that pleasure is not the Chief Good. The famous Laelius, who had been a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic in his youth and later of Panaetius, was not called 'the Wise' because he was no judge of good eating (for a wise mind is not necessarily incompatible with a nice palate), but because he set little store by it. Dinner of herbs, how all the earth Derides thee and ignores thy worth! Tho' Laelius, our old Roman sage, Shouted thy praises to the age, Our gourmands one by one arraigning. Bravo, Laelius, 'sage' indeed. How true the lines: 'O bottomless gulf of gluttony, Publius Gallonius,' cried he, 'You're a poor devil, truth to tell, Who never in your life dined well, No, never once, although you pay A fortune for a fish away, Lobster or sturgeon Brobdingnagian.' The speaker is a man who, setting no value on pleasure, declares that he who makes pleasure his all in all cannot dine well. Observe, he does not say Gallonius never dined pleasantly (which would be untrue), but never well. So strict and severe is the distinction he draws between pleasure and good. The conclusion is that though all who dine well dine pleasantly, yet he who dines pleasantly does not necessarily dine well. Laelius always dined well. 2.25.  What does 'well' mean? Lucilius shall say, Well-cook'd, well-season'd, ah, but now the principal dish: with a deal of honest talk, and the result: a pleasant meal; for he came to dinner that with mind at ease he might satisfy the wants of Nature. Laelius is right therefore in denying that Gallonius ever dined well, right in calling him unhappy, and that too although all his thoughts were centred on the pleasures of the table. No one will deny that he dined pleasantly. Then why not 'well'? Because 'well' implies rightly, respectably, worthily; whereas Gallonius dined wrongly, disreputably, basely; therefore he did not dine well. It was not that Laelius thought his 'dinner of herbs' more palatable than Gallonius's sturgeon, but that he disregarded the pleasures of the palate altogether; and this he could not have done, had he made the Chief Good consist in pleasure. 2.26.  "Consequently you are bound to discard pleasure, not merely if you are to guide your conduct aright, but even if you are to be able consistently to use the language of respectable people. Can we possibly therefore call a thing the Chief Good with regard to living, when we feel we cannot call it so even in regard to dining? But how says our philosopher? 'The desires are of three kinds, natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, neither natural nor necessary.' To begin with, this is a clumsy division; it makes three classes when there are really only two. This is not dividing but hacking in pieces. Thinkers trained in the science which Epicurus despised usually put it thus: 'The desires are of two kinds, natural and imaginary; natural desires again fall into two subdivisions, necessary and not necessary.' That would have rounded it off properly. It is a fault in division to reckon a species as a genus. 2.27.  Still, do not let us stickle about form. Epicurus despises the niceties of dialectic; his style neglects distinctions; we must humour him in this, provided that his meaning is correct. But for my own part I cannot cordially approve, I merely tolerate, a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept within bounds? It ought to be destroyed, uprooted altogether. On your principle there is no form of desire whose possessor could not be morally approved. He will be a miser — within limits; an adulterer — in moderation; and a sensualist to correspond. What sort of a philosophy is this, that instead of dealing wickedness its death-blow, is satisfied with moderating our vices? Albeit I quite approve the substance of this classification; it is the form of it to which I take exception. Let him speak of the first class as 'the needs of nature,' and keep the term 'desire' for another occasion, to be put on trial for its life when he comes to deal with Avarice, Intemperance, and all the major vices. 2.28.  "This classification of the desires is then a subject on which Epicurus is fond of enlarging. Not that I find fault with him for that; we expect so great and famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly. But he often seems unduly eager to approve of pleasure in the common acceptation of the term, for this occasionally lands him in a very awkward position. It conveys the impression that there is no action so base but that he would be ready to commit it for the sake of pleasure, provided he were guaranteed against detection. Afterwards, put to the blush by this conclusion (for the force of natural instinct after all is overwhelming), he turns for refuge to the assertion that nothing can enhance the pleasure of freedom from pain. 'Oh but,' we urge, 'your static condition of feeling no pain is not what is termed pleasure at all.' — 'I don't trouble about the name,' he replies. — 'Well, but the thing itself is absolutely different.' — 'Oh, I can find hundreds and thousands of people less precise and troublesome than yourselves, who will be glad to accept as true anything I like to teach them.' — 'Then why do we not go a step further and argue that, if not to feel pain is the highest pleasure, therefore not to feel pleasure is the greatest pain? Why does not this hold good?' — 'Because the opposite of pain is not pleasure but absence of pain.' 2.29.  "But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology), — he fails, I say, to see that this, the sole Good which our strict and serious philosopher recognizes, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! 2.30.  If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary use of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it, — it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for converts: the would‑be roué need only turn philosopher. 2.31.  "For the origin of the Chief Good he goes back, I understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as an animal is born, it delights in pleasure and seeks it as a good, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet uncorrupted are according to him the best judges of Good and Evil. That is the position both as you expounded it and as it is expressed in the phraseology of your school. What a mass of fallacies! Which kind of pleasure will it be that guides a mewling infant to distinguish between the Chief Good and Evil, 'static' pleasure or 'kinetic'? — since we learn our language, heaven help us! from Epicurus. If the 'static' kind, the natural instinct is clearly towards self-preservation, as we agree; but if the 'kinetic,' and this is after all what you maintain, then no pleasure will be too base to be accepted; and also our new‑born animal in this case does not find its earliest motive in the highest form of pleasure, since this on your showing consists in absence of pain. 2.32.  For proof of this, however, Epicurus cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him hold a mirror up to nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite appetition; the 'static' condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is wrong here); it is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epicurus's standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants and animals are attracted by the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure, not the 'static' kind which consists merely in freedom from pain. Surely then it is inconsistent to say that natural instinct starts from one sort of pleasure, but that the Chief Good is found in another. 2.33.  "As for the lower animals, I set no value on their verdict. Their instincts may be wrong, although we cannot say they are perverted. One stick has been bent and twisted on purpose, another has grown crooked; similarly the nature of wild animals, though not indeed corrupted by bad education, is corrupt of its own nature. Again in the infant the natural instinct is not to seek pleasure; its instinct is merely towards self-regard, self-preservation and protection from injury. Every living creature, from the moment of birth, loves itself and all its members; primarily this self-regard embraces the two main divisions of mind and body, and subsequently the parts of each of these. Both mind and body have certain excellences; of these the young animal grows vaguely conscious, and later begins to discriminate, and to seek for the primary endowments of Nature and shun their opposites. 2.34.  Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 2.35.  Thus there are three Ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades; three that comprise moral goodness together with some additional element, those of Polemo, Callipho and Diodorus; and one theory that is simple, of which Zeno was the author, and which is based entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus were consistent, and made their final ends agree with their first principles, — Aristippus holding the End to be Pleasure, Hieronymus freedom from pain, Carneades the enjoyment of the primary natural objects.  Whereas Epicurus, if in saying that pleasure was the primary object of attraction, he meant pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus; or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of Aristippus, the primary attraction? 2.36.  "The fact is that when he says that the verdict of the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and pain evil, he assigns more authority to the senses than the law allows to us when we sit as judges in private suits. We cannot decide any issue not within our jurisdiction; and there is not really any point in the proviso which judges are fond of adding to their verdicts: 'if it be a matter within my jurisdiction,' for if it was not within their jurisdiction, the verdict is equally invalid with the proviso omitted. What does come under the verdict of the senses? Sweetness, sourness, smoothness, roughness, proximity, distance; whether an object is stationary or moving, square or round. 2.37.  A just decision can therefore only be delivered by Reason, with the aid in the first place of that knowledge of things human and divine, which may rightly claim the title of Wisdom; and secondly with the assistance of the Virtues, which Reason would have to be the mistresses of all things, but you considered as the handmaids and subordinates of the pleasures. After calling all of these into council, she will pronounce first as to Pleasure, that she has no claim, not merely to be enthroned alone in the seat of our ideal Chief Good, but even to be admitted as the associate of Moral Worth. As regards freedom from pain her decision will be the same. 2.38.  For Carneades will be put out of court, and no theory of the Chief Good will be approved that either includes pleasure or absence of pain, or does not include moral worth. Two views will thus be left. After prolonged consideration of these, either her final verdict will be that there is no Good but moral worth and no Evil but moral baseness, all other things being either entirely unimportant or of so little importance that they are not desirable or to be avoided, but only to be selected or rejected; or else she will prefer the theory which she will recognize as including the full beauty of moral worth, enriched by the addition of the primary natural objects and of a life completed to its perfect span. And her judgment will be all the clearer, if she can first of all settle whether the dispute between these rival theories is one of fact, or turns on verbal differences only. 2.39.  "Guided by the authority of Reason I will now adopt a similar procedure myself. As far as possible I will narrow the issue, and will assume that all the simple theories, of those who include no admixture of virtue, are to be eliminated from philosophy altogether. First among these comes the system of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school in general, who did not shrink from finding their Chief Good in pleasure of the sort that excites the highest amount of actively agreeable sensation, and who despised your freedom from pain. 2.40.  They failed to see that just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God. The Cyrenaics held on the contrary that this godlike animal came into being, like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjoy the pleasure of procreation, — a view that seems to me the climax of absurdity. 2.41.  So much in answer to Aristippus, who considers pleasure in the only sense in which we all of us employ the term to be not merely the highest but the sole pleasure that exists. Your school holds a different view. However, as I said, Aristippus is wrong. Neither man's bodily conformation nor his surpassing mental faculty of reason indicates that he was born for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasure. Nor yet can we listen to Hieronymus, whose Chief Good is the same as is occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves, freedom from pain. If pain is an evil, to be without this evil is not enough to constitute the Good Life. Let Ennius say if he likes that Enough, and more, of good Is his who hath no ill; but let us reckon happiness not by the avoidance of evil but by the attainment of good. Let us seek it not in the idle acceptance whether of positive delights, like Aristippus, or of freedom from pain, like Hieronymus, but in a life of action or of contemplation. 2.42.  "The same arguments can be urged against the Chief Good of Carneades, which he advanced less from a desire to adopt it himself than to use it as a weapon in his battle with the Stoics; though it is such that if added to Virtue it may be thought to be of importance and to be likely to augment the sum total of Happiness, which is the one subject of our inquiry. Whereas those who join with Virtue either pleasure, the one thing she values least, or freedom from pain, which even though it is devoid of evil yet is not the Chief Good, make a not very acceptable combination; nor yet can I understand why they go to work in so cautious and niggardly a fashion. You would think they had to purchase the commodity which is to be added to virtue. To begin with they choose the cheapest things they can find to add, and then they each dole out one only, instead of coupling with moral worth all the things initially approved by Nature. 2.43.  Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him."Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. 2.44.  Epicurus however is a more troublesome opponent, because he is a combination of two different sorts of pleasure, and because besides himself and his friends there have been so many later champions of his theory, which somehow or other enlists the support of that least competent but most powerful adherent, the general public. Unless we refute these adversaries, all virtue, all honour, all true merit must be abandoned. Thus, when all the other systems have been discarded, there remains a duel in which the combatants are, not myself and Torquatus, but Virtue and Pleasure. This contest is by no means scouted by so penetrating and so industrious a writer as Chrysippus, who considers that the rivalry between pleasure and virtue is the cardinal issue in the whole question of the Chief Good. My own view is that, if I can succeed in proving the existence of Moral Worth as a thing essentially and for itself desirable, your entire system at once collapses. Accordingly I will begin by defining, with such brevity as the occasion demands, the Nature of Moral Worth; and then, Torquatus, I will proceed to deal with each of your points, unless my memory should happen to fail me. 2.45.  "By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to carry on several operations at the same time with extreme speed, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the causes and effects of things, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. 2.46.  Nature has also engendered in mankind the desire of contemplating truth. This is most clearly manifested in our hours of leisure; when our minds are at ease we are eager to acquire knowledge even of the movements of the heavenly bodies. This primary instinct leads us on to love all truth as such, that is, all that is trustworthy, simple and consistent, and to hate things insincere, false and deceptive, such as cheating, perjury, malice and injustice. Further, Reason possesses an intrinsic element of dignity and grandeur, suited rather to require obedience than to render it, esteeming all the accidents of human fortunes not merely as endurable but also as unimportant; a quality of loftiness and elevation, fearing nothing, submitting to no one, ever unsubdued. 2.47.  These three kinds of moral goodness being noted, there follows a fourth kind, possessed of equal beauty, and indeed arising out of the other three. This is the principle of order and restraint. From recognizing something analogous to this principle in the beauty and dignity of outward forms, we pass to beauty in the moral sphere of speech and conduct. Each of the three excellences mentioned before contributes something to this fourth one: it dreads rashness; it shrinks from injuring anyone by wanton word or deed; and it fears to do or say anything that may appear unmanly. 2.48.  "There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance 'moral' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. 2.49.  Do you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is? Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure; unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude. For my part I hold that what is popular is often positively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only when the multitude happens to applaud something that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which even so is not called 'moral' (honourable) because it is widely applauded, but because it is of such a nature that even if men were unaware of its existence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of instinct to say in another passage what you also said just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly without also living morally (honourably). 2.50.  What does he mean by 'morally' now? The same as 'pleasantly'? If so, does it amount to saying that it is impossible to live morally unless you — live morally? Or, unless you make public opinion your standard? He means then that he cannot live pleasantly without the approval of public opinion? But what can be baser than to make the conduct of the Wise Man depend upon the gossip of the foolish? What therefore does he understand by 'moral' in this passage? Clearly, nothing but that which can be rightly praised for its own sake. For if it be praised as being a means to pleasure, what is there creditable about this? You can get pleasure at the provision-dealer's. No, — Epicurus, who esteems Moral Worth so highly as to say that it is impossible to live pleasantly without it, is not the man to identify 'moral' (honourable) with 'popular' and maintain that it is impossible to live pleasantly without popular esteem; he cannot understand 'moral" to mean anything else than that which is right, — that which is in and for itself, independently, intrinsically, and of its own nature praiseworthy. 2.51.  "This, Torquatus, accounts for the glow of pride with which, as I noticed, you informed us how loudly Epicurus proclaims the impossibility of living pleasantly without living morally, wisely and justly. Your words derived potency from the grandeur of the things that they denoted; you drew yourself up to your full height, and kept stopping and fixing us with your gaze, as if solemnly asseverating that Epicurus does occasionally commend morality and justice. Were those names never mentioned by philosophers we should have no use for philosophy; how well they sounded on your lips! Too seldom does Epicurus speak to us of Wisdom, Courage, Justice, Temperance. Yet it is the love that those great names inspire which has lured the ablest of mankind to devote themselves to philosophical studies. 2.52.  The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom; could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken! And why is this so? Is it because of her supreme ability and cunning in the art of contriving pleasures? Why is Justice commended? What gave rise to the old familiar saying, 'A man with whom you might play odd and even in the dark'? This proverb strictly applies to the particular case of honesty, but it has this general application, that in all our conduct we should be influenced by the character of the action, not by the presence or absence of a witness. 2.53.  How weak and ineffectual are the deterrents you put forward, — the torture of a guilty conscience, and the fear of the punishment that offenders incur, or at all events stand in continual dread of incurring in the end! We must not picture our unprincipled man as a poor-spirited coward, tormenting himself about his past misdeeds, and afraid of everything; but as shrewdly calculating profit in all he does, sharp, dexterous, a practised hand, fertile in devices for cheating in secret, without witness or accomplice. 2.54.  Don't suppose I am speaking of a Lucius Tubulus, who when he sat as praetor to try charges of murder made so little concealment of taking bribes for his verdict that next year the tribune of the plebs, Publius Scaevola, moved in the plebeian assembly for a special inquiry. The bill passed the plebs, and the senate commissioned the consul Gnaeus Caepio to hold the investigation; but Tubulus promptly left the country, and did not venture to stand his trial, so open was his guilt."It is not therefore a question of a rascal merely, but of a crafty rascal, like Quintus Pompeius when he disowned the treaty he had made with the Numantines; nor yet of a timid, cowardly knave, but of one who to begin with is deaf to the voice of conscience, which it is assuredly no difficult matter to stifle. The man we call stealthy and secret, so far from betraying his own guilt, will actually make believe to be indigt at the knavery of another; that is what we mean by a cunning old hand. 2.55.  "I remember assisting at a consultation which Publius Sextilius Rufus held with his friends on the following matter. He had been left heir to Quintus Fadius Gallus. Fadius's will contained a statement that he had requested Sextilius to allow the whole of his estate to pass to his daughter. Sextilius now denied the arrangement, as he could do with impunity, for there was no one to rebut him. Not one of us believed his denial; it was more probable that he should be lying, as his pocket was concerned, than the testator, who had left it in writing that he had made a request which it had been his duty to make. Sextilius actually went on to say that, having sworn to maintain the Voconian law, he would not venture to break it, unless his friends thought he ought to do so. I was only a young man, but many of the company were persons of high consideration; and every one of these advised him not to give Fadia more than she was entitled to get under the Voconian law. Sextilius kept a handsome property, not a penny of which he would have touched had he followed the advice of those who placed honour and right above all considerations of profit and advantage. Do you therefore suppose that he was afterwards troubled by remorse? Not a bit of it. On the contrary, the inheritance made him a rich man, and he was thoroughly pleased with himself in consequence. He thought he had scored heavily: he had won a fortune, not only by no illegal means, but actually by the aid of the law. And according to your school it is right to try to get money even at some risk; for money procures many very delightful pleasures. 2.56.  "Therefore just as those who hold that things right and honourable are desirable for their own sake must often take risks in the cause of honour and morality, so Epicureans, who measure all things by pleasure, may properly take risks in order to obtain considerable pleasures. If a large sum of money or a great inheritance is at stake, inasmuch as money procures a great many pleasures, your Epicurus, if he wishes to attain his own end of Goods, will have to act as Scipio did, when he had the chance of winning great renown by enticing Hannibal back to Africa. To do so, he risked enormous dangers. For honour and pleasure was the aim of that great enterprise. Similarly, your Epicurean Wise Man, when stirred by the prospect of some considerable gain, will fight to the death, if need be, and with good reason. 2.57.  Do circumstances allow his crime to go undetected, so much the better; but if found out, he will make light of every penalty. For he will have been schooled to make light of death, of exile, even of pain itself. The latter indeed you make out to be unendurable when you are enacting penalties for the wicked, but easy to bear when you are maintaining that the Wise Man will always command a preponderance of Good."But suppose that our evil-doer is not only clever but also supremely powerful, as was Marcus Crassus, — who however used actually to be guided by his natural goodness; or like our friend Pompeius at the present time, who deserves our gratitude for his upright conduct, since he might be as unjust as he liked with impunity. But how many unrighteous acts are possible which no one would be in a position to censure! 2.58.  If a friend of yours requests you on his death‑bed to hand over his estate to his daughter, without leaving his intention anywhere in writing, as Fadius did, or speaking of it to anybody, what will you do? You no doubt will hand over the money; perhaps Epicurus himself would have done the same; as did Sextus Peducaeus, son of Sextus, a scholar and a gentleman of scrupulous honour, who left behind him a son, our friend of to‑day, to recall his father's culture and integrity. No one knew that such a request had been made to Sextus by a distinguished Roman knight named Gaius Plotius, of Nursia; but Sextus of his own accord went to Plotius's widow, informed her, much to her surprise, of her husband's commission, and handed over the property to her. But the question I want to put to you is this: since you yourself would undoubtedly have done the same, do you not see that the force of natural instinct is all the more firmly established by the fact that even you Epicureans, who profess to make your own interest and pleasure your sole standard, nevertheless perform actions that prove you to be really aiming not at pleasure but at duty; prove, I say, that the natural impulse towards right is more powerful than corrupt reason? 2.59.  Suppose, says Carneades, you should know that there is a viper lurking somewhere, and that some one, by whose death you stand to profit, is about to sit down on it unawares; then you will do a wicked deed if you do not warn him not to sit down. But still your wickedness would go unpunished, for who could possibly prove that you knew? However, I labour the point unnecessarily. It is obvious that, if fair-dealing, honesty and justice have not their source in nature, and if all these things are only valuable for their utility, no good man can anywhere be found. The subject is fully discussed by Laelius in my volumes On the State. 2.60.  "Apply the same test to Temperance or Moderation, which means the control of the appetites in obedience to the reason. Suppose a man yields to vicious impulses in secret, — is it no offence against purity? Or is it not true that an act can be sinful in itself, even though no disgrace attends it? And again, does a brave soldier go into battle and shed his blood for his country upon a nice calculation of the balance of pleasures, or in hot blood and under the stimulus of impulse? Come, Torquatus, if the great Imperiosus were listening to our debate, which of our two speeches about himself would he have heard with greater satisfaction, yours or mine? Me declaring that no deed of his was done for selfish ends, but all from motives of patriotism, or you maintaining that he acted solely for self? And suppose you had wanted to make your meaning clearer, and had said more explicitly that all his actions were prompted by desire for pleasure, pray how do you imagine he would have taken it? 2.61.  But grant your view; assume if you like that Torquatus acted for his own advantage (I would sooner put it in that way than say 'for his own pleasure,' especially in the case of so great a man). Yet what about his colleague Publius Decius, the first of his family to be consul? When Decius vowed himself to death, and setting spurs to his horse was charging into the thickest of the Latin ranks, surely he had no thought of personal pleasure? Pleasure where to be enjoyed or when? For he knew he must die in a moment, aye and he courted death with more passionate ardour than Epicurus would have us seek pleasure. Had not his exploit won praise on its merits, it would not have been copied by his son in his fourth consulship; nor would the latter's son again, commanding as consul in the war with Pyrrhus, have also fallen in battle, third in succession of his line to give himself a victim for the state. 2.62.  I refrain from further instances. The Greeks have but a modest list, — Leonidas, Epaminondas, some three or four; but were I to begin to cite the heroes of our race, I should doubtless succeed in making Pleasure yield herself prisoner to Virtue, but — daylight would fall before I had done. Aulus Varius, noted for his severity as a judge, used to say to his colleague on the bench, when after witnesses had been produced still further witnesses were called: 'Either we have evidence enough already, or I do not know what evidence can be enough.' Well, I have cited witnesses enough. Why, you yourself, in every way a worthy scion of your stock, — was pleasure the inducement that led you, a mere youth, to wrest the consulship from Publius Sulla? You won that office for your gallant father; and what a consul he was! What a patriot, all his life long and more especially after his consulship! It was with his support that I carried through an affair, which was for all men's interest rather than my own. 2.63.  "But how well you thought you put your case when you pictured on the one hand a person loaded with an abundance of the most delightful pleasures and free from all pain whether present or in prospect, and on the other one racked throughout his frame by the most excruciating pains, unqualified by any pleasure or hope of pleasure; then proceeded to ask who could be more wretched than the latter or more happy than the former; and finally drew the conclusion that pain was the Chief Evil and pleasure the Chief Good!"Well, there was a certain Lucius Thorius of Lanuvium, whom you cannot remember; he lived on the principle of enjoying in the fullest measure all the most exquisite pleasures that could possibly be found. His appetite for pleasures was only equalled by his taste and ingenuity in devising them. He was so devoid of superstition as to scoff at all the sacrifices and shrines for which his native place is famous; and so free from fear of death that he died in battle for his country. 2.64.  Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every variety. 2.65.  Your school pronounces him a happy man, at least your theory requires you to do so. But I place above him — I do not venture to say whom: Virtue herself shall speak for me, and she will not hesitate to rank Marcus Regulus higher than this typically happy man, as you would call him. Regulus, of his own free will and under no compulsion except that of a promise given to an enemy, returned from his native land to Carthage; yet Virtue proclaims that when he had done so he was happier while tormented with sleeplessness and hunger than Thorius carousing on his couch of roses. Regulus had fought great wars, had twice been consul, had celebrated a triumph; yet all his earlier exploits he counted less great and glorious than that final disaster, which he chose to undergo for the sake of honour and of self-respect; a pitiable end, as it seems to us who hear of it, but full of pleasure for him who endured it. It is not merriment and wantonness, nor laughter or jesting, the comrade of frivolity, that make men happy; those are happy, often in sadness, whose wills are strong and true. 2.66.  Lucretia outraged by the royal prince called on her fellow-citizens to witness her wrong and died by her own hand. The indignation that this aroused in the Roman people, under the leadership and guidance of Brutus, won freedom for the state; and in gratitude to Lucretia's memory both her husband and her father were made consuls for the first year of the republic. Sixty years after our liberties had been won, Lucius Verginius, a poor man of humble station, killed his maiden daughter with his own hand rather than surrender her to the lust of Appius Claudius, who then held the highest power in the state. 2.67.  "Either, Torquatus, you must reprobate such actions, or you must give up your championship of Pleasure. But what defence can Pleasure offer, what case can you make out for her, when she will be able to produce no famous men as her witnesses or supporters? On our side we cite in evidence from our records and our annals men who spent their whole lives in glorious toils, men who would not have borne to hear pleasure so much as named; but in your discourses history is dumb. In the school of Epicurus I never heard one mention of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, who are always on the lips of the other philosophers. And now that we Romans too have begun to treat of these themes, what a marvellous roll of great men will our friend Atticus supply to us from his store-houses of learning! 2.68.  Would it not be better to talk of these than to devote those bulky volumes to Themista? Let us leave that sort of thing to the Greeks. True we owe to them philosophy and all the liberal sciences; yet there are topics not permitted to us, that are allowable for them. Battle rages between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. One school declares that nothing is good but Moral Worth, the other that, while it assigns the greatest, and by far the greatest, value to Morality, yet still some bodily and external things are good. Here is an honourable quarrel, fought out in high debate! For the whole dispute turns on the true worth of virtue. But when one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epicurus is always harping upon them! 2.69.  Believe me then, Torquatus, if you will but look within, and study your own thoughts and inclinations, you cannot continue to defend the doctrines you profess. You will be put to the blush, I say, by the picture that Cleanthes used to draw so cleverly in his lectures. He would tell his audience to imagine a painting representing Pleasure, decked as a queen, and gorgeously apparelled, seated on a throne; at her side should stand the Virtues as her handmaids, who should make it their sole object and duty to minister to Pleasure, merely whispering in her ear the warning (provided this could be conveyed by the painter's art) to beware of unwittingly doing aught to offend public opinion, or anything from which pain might result. 'As for us Virtues, we were born to be your slaves; that is our one and only business.' 2.70.  "But Epicurus, you will tell me (for this is your strong point), denies that anyone who does not live morally can live pleasantly. As if I cared what Epicurus says or denies! What I ask is, what is it consistent for a man to say who places the Chief Good in pleasure? What reason can you give for thinking that Thorius, or Postumius of Chios, or the master of them all, Orata, did not live extremely pleasant lives? Epicurus himself says that the life of sensualists is blameless, if they are not utter fools — for that is what his proviso, 'if they are free from fear and from desire,' amounts to. And, as he offers an antidote for both desire and fear, he virtually offers free indulgence for sensuality. Eliminate those passions, he says, and he cannot find anything to blame in a life of profligacy. 2.71.  Consequently you Epicureans, by taking pleasure as the sole guide, make it impossible for yourselves either to uphold or to retain virtue. For a man is not to be thought good and just who refrains from doing wrong to avoid incurring harm; no doubt you know the line: None is good, whose love of goodness â€”; believe me, nothing can be truer. As long as his motive is fear, he is not just, and assuredly as soon as he ceases to fear, he will not be just; and he will not feel fear, if he can conceal his wrong-doing, or is sufficiently powerful to brazen it out; and he will assuredly prefer the reputation without the reality of goodness to the reality without the reputation. So your school undoubtedly preaches the pretence of justice instead of the real and genuine thing. Its lesson amounts to this — we are to despise the trustworthy voice of our own conscience, and to run after the fallible imaginations of other men. 2.72.  The same applies in the case of the other virtues. Basing them entirely on pleasure you are laying the foundations in water. Why, take the great Torquatus again: can he really be called brave? — for I delight, albeit my flattery, as you put it, is powerless to bribe you, I delight, I say, in your name and lineage; and indeed I have personal recollections of that distinguished man, Aulus Torquatus, who was an affectionate friend of my own, and whose signal loyalty and devotion to me in circumstances that are within universal knowledge must be familiar to you both; yet for my part, anxious as I am to feel and show a proper gratitude, I would not have thanked him for his friendship had I not known that it was disinterested; unless you choose to say that it was for his own interest in this sense, that it is to every man's interest to act rightly. If you do say so, we have won our case; for our one principle, our one contention is, that duty is its own reward. 2.73.  This your great master does not allow; he expects everything to pay — to yield its quota of pleasure. But I return to old Torquatus. If it was to win pleasure that he accepted the Gallic warrior's challenge to single combat on the banks of the Anio, and if he despoiled him and assumed his necklet and the corresponding surname for any other reason than that he thought such deeds became a man, I do not consider him brave. Again, if modesty, self-control, chastity, if in a word Temperance is to depend for its sanction on the fear of punishment or of disgrace, and not to maintain itself by its own intrinsic sacredness, what form of adultery, vice or lust will not break loose and run riot when it is assured of concealment, impunity or indulgence. 2.74.  "Or what, pray, are we to think of the situation if you, Torquatus, bearing the name you do, and gifted and distinguished as you are, dare not profess before a public audience the real object of all your actions, aims and endeavours, what it is in short that you consider the greatest good in life? In return for what payment or consideration, when not long hence you have attained to public office and come forward to address a meeting (for you will have to announce the rules that you propose to observe in administering justice, and very likely also, if you think good, you will follow the time-honoured custom of making some reference to your ancestors and to yourself), — for what consideration then would you consent to declare that you intend in office to guide your conduct solely by pleasure, and that pleasure has been your aim in every action of your life? — 'Do you take me for such an imbecile,' you exclaim, 'as to talk in that fashion before ignorant people?' — Well, make the same profession in a law‑court, or if you are afraid of the public there, say it in the senate. You will never do it. Why, if not because such language is disgraceful? Then what a compliment to Torquatus and myself, to use it in our presence! 2.75.  "But let us grant your position. The actual word 'pleasure' has not a lofty sound; and perhaps we do not understand its significance: you are always repeating that we do not understand what you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult or recondite notion! If we understand you when you talk of 'indivisible atoms' and 'cosmic interspaces,' things that don't exist and never can exist, is our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow? What if I force you to admit that I do know not only what pleasure really is (it is an agreeable activity of the sense), but also what you mean by it? For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle 'kinetic' pleasure, as producing a definite change of feeling, but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, which is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists merely in the complete absence of pain; this you call 'static' pleasure. 2.76.  Well, grant that pleasure is the latter sort of feeling. Profess in any public assembly that the motive of all your actions is the desire to avoid pain. If you feel that this too does not sound sufficiently dignified and respectable, say that you intend both in your present office and all your life long to act solely for the sake of your own advantage, — to do nothing but what will pay, nothing in short that is not for your own interest; imagine the uproar among the audience! What would become of your chances of the consulship, which as it is seems to be a certainty for you in the near future? Will you then adopt a rule of life which you can appeal to in private and among friends but which you dare not openly profess or parade in public? Ah, but it is the vocabulary of the Peripatetics and the Stoics that is always on your lips, in the law‑courts and the senate. Duty, Fair-dealing, Moral Worth, Fidelity, Uprightness, Honour, the Dignity of office, the Dignity of the Roman People, Risk all for the state, Die for your Country, — when you talk in this style, we simpletons stand gaping in admiration, — and you no doubt laugh in your sleeve. 2.77.  For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls 'kinetic' pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this 'static' pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all.  Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble — which can be openly avowed in the senate and the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think. 2.78.  "Again, how will friendship be possible? How can one man be another man's friend, if he does not love him in and for himself? What is the meaning of 'to love' — from which our word for friendship is derived — except to wish some one to receive the greatest possible benefits even though one gleans no advantage therefrom oneself? 'It pays me,' says he, 'to be a disinterested friend.' No, perhaps it pays you to seem so. Be so you cannot, unless you really are; but how can you be a disinterested friend unless you feel genuine affection? Yet affection does not commonly result from any calculation of expediency. It is a spontaneous growth; it springs up of itself. 'But,' you will say, 'I am guided by expediency.' Then your friendship will last just so long as it is attended by expediency. If expediency creates the feeling it will also destroy it. 2.79.  But what, pray, will you do, if, as often happens, expediency parts company with friendship? Will you throw your friend over? What sort of friendship is that? Will you keep him? How does that square with your principles? You remember your pronouncement that friendship is desirable for the sake of expediency. 'I might become unpopular if I left a friend in the lurch." Well, in the first place, why is such conduct unpopular, unless because it is base? And if you refrain from deserting a friend because to do so will have inconvenient consequences, still you will long for his death to release you from an unprofitable tie. What if he not only brings you no advantage, but causes you to suffer loss of property, to undergo toil and trouble, to risk your life? Will you not even then take interest into account, and reflect that each man is born for himself and for his own pleasure? Will you go bail with your life to a tyrant on behalf of a friend, as the famous Pythagorean did to the Sicilian despot? or being Pylades will you say you are Orestes, so as to die in your friend's stead? or supposing you were Orestes, would you say Pylades was lying and reveal your identity, and if they would not believe you, would you make no appeal against your both dying together? 2.80.  "Yes, Torquatus, you personally would do all these things; for I do not believe there is any high or noble action which fear of pain or death could induce you to forgo. But the question is not what conduct is consistent with your character, but what is consistent with your tenets. The system you uphold, the principles you have studied and accept, undermine the very foundations of friendship, however much Epicurus may, as he does, praise friendship to the skies. 'But,' you tell me, 'Epicurus himself had many friends." Who pray denies that Epicurus was a good man, and a kind and humane man? In these discussions it is his intellect and not his character that is in question. Let us leave to the frivolous Greeks the wrong-headed habit of attacking and abusing the persons whose views of truth they do not share. Epicurus may have been a kind and faithful friend; but if my opinion is right (for I do not dogmatize), he was not a very acute thinker. 2.81.  'But he won many disciples.' Yes, and perhaps he deserved to do so; but still the witness of the crowd does not carry much weight; for as in every art or study, or science of any kind, so in right conduct itself, supreme excellence is extremely rare. And to my mind the fact that Epicurus himself was a good man and that many Epicureans both have been and to‑day are loyal to their friends, consistent and high-principled throughout their lives, ruling their conduct by duty and not by pleasure, — all this does but enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons' lives and behaviour refute the principles they profess. Most men's words are thought to be better than their deeds; these people's deeds on the contrary seem to me better than their words. 2.82.  "But this I admit is a digression. Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epicurus himself, — that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live agreeably. Enough has been said in answer to this already. You quoted another and a more humane dictum of the more modern Epicureans, which so far as I know was never uttered by the master himself. This was to the effect that, although at the outset we desire a man's friendship for utilitarian reasons, yet when intimacy has grown up we love our friend for his own sake, even if all prospect of pleasure be left out of sight. It is possible to take exception to this on several grounds; still I won't refuse what they give, as it is sufficient for my case and not sufficient for theirs. For it amounts to saying that moral action is occasionally possible, — action prompted by no anticipation or desire of pleasure. 2.83.  You further alleged that other thinkers speak of wise men as making a sort of mutual compact to entertain the same sentiments towards their friends as they feel towards themselves; this (you said) was possible, and in fact had often occurred; and it was highly conducive to the attainment of pleasure. If men have succeeded in making this compact, let them make a further compact to love fair-dealing, self-control, and all the virtues, for their own sakes and without reward. If on the other hand we are to cultivate friendships for their results, for profit and utility, if there is to be no affection to render friendship, in and for itself, intrinsically and spontaneously desirable, can we doubt that we shall value land and house-property more than friends? 2.84.  It is no good your once again repeating Epicurus's admirable remarks in praise of friendship. I am not asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes. 'Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility.' Well, but surely you don't reckon Triarius here a more valuable asset than the granaries at Puteoli would be if they belonged to you? Cite all the stock Epicurean maxims. 'Friends are a protection.' You can protect yourself; the laws will protect you; ordinary friendships offer protection enough; you will be too powerful to despise as it is, while hatred and envy it will be easy to avoid, — Epicurus gives rules for doing so! And in any case, with so large an income to give away, you can dispense with the romantic sort of friendship that we have in mind; you will have plenty of well-wishers to defend you quite effectively. 2.85.  But a confidant, to share your 'grave thoughts or gay' as the saying is, all your secrets and private affairs? Your best confidant is yourself; also you may confide in a friend of the average type. But granting that friendship has the conveniences you mention, what are they compared with the advantages of vast wealth? You see then that although if you measure friendship by the test of its own charm it is unsurpassed in value, by the standard of profit the most affectionate intimacy is outweighed by the rents of a valuable estate. So you must love me yourself, not my possessions, if we are to be genuine friends."But we dwell too long upon the obvious. For when it has been conclusively proved that if pleasure is the sole standard there is no room left either for virtue or for friendship, there is no great need to say anything further. Still I do not want you to think I have failed to answer any of your points, so I will now say a few words in reply to the remainder of your discourse. 2.86.  The entire end and aim of philosophy is the attainment of happiness; and desire for happiness is the sole motive that has led men to engage in this study. But different thinkers make happiness consist in different things. According to your school it consists in pleasure, and conversely misery consists solely in pain. Let us then begin by examining what sort of thing happiness as you conceive it is. You will grant, I suppose, that if there is such a thing as happiness, it is bound to be attainable in its entirety by the Wise Man. For if happiness once won can be lost, a happy life is impossible. Since who can feel confident of permanently and securely retaining a possession that is perishable and precarious? yet one who is not sure of the permanence of his goods must inevitably fear lest at some time he may lose them and be miserable. 2.87.  But no one can be happy who is uneasy about matters of the highest moment. Therefore no one can be happy at all. For we usually speak of a life as a happy one not in reference to a part of it, but to the whole of a lifetime; indeed 'a life' means a finished and complete life; nor is it possible to be at one time happy and at another miserable, since he who thinks that he may be miserable will not be happy. For when happiness has once been achieved, it is as permanent as Wisdom itself, which is the efficient cause of happiness; it does not wait for the end of our mortal term, as Croesus in Herodotus's history was warned by Solon to do. "It may be rejoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting. 2.88.  In this he is grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good in pleasure, and yet he says that no greater pleasure would result from a lifetime of endless duration than from a limited and moderate period. If a person finds the sole Good in Virtue, it is open to him to say that the happy life is consummated by the consummation of virtue; for his position is that the Chief Good is not increased by lapse of time. But if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? If it is not, pain is not either. Or if pain is worse the longer it lasts, is not pleasure rendered more desirable by continuance? On what ground then does Epicurus speak of the Deity (for so he always does) as happy and everlasting? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. 'Ah but,' you say, 'Epicurus is liable to pain as well.' Yes, but he thinks nothing of pain; for he tells us that if he were being burnt to death he would exclaim, 'How delightful this is!' 2.89.  Wherein then is he inferior to God, except that God lives for ever? But what good has everlasting life to offer beside supreme and never-ending pleasure? What then is the use of your high-flown language, if it be not consistent? Bodily pleasure (and I will add if you like mental pleasure, so long as this, as you hold, is understood to have its source in the body) constitutes happiness. Well, who can guarantee this pleasure for the Wise Man in perpetuity? For the things that produce pleasure are not in the Wise Man's control; since happiness does not consist in wisdom itself, but in the means to pleasure which wisdom can procure. But all the apparatus of pleasure is external, and what is external must depend on chance. Consequently happiness becomes the slave of fortune; yet Epicurus says that fortune interferes with the Wise Man but little! 2.90.  " 'Come,' you will say, 'these are trivial objections. The Wise Man is endowed with Nature's own riches, and these, as Epicurus has shown, are easy of attainment.' This is excellently said, and I do not combat it; but Epicurus's own statements are at war with each other. He tells us that the simplest fare, that is, the meanest sorts of food and drink, afford no less pleasure than a banquet of the rarest delicacies. For my part, if he said that it made no difference to happiness what sort of food he ate, I should agree, and what is more I should applaud; for he would be telling the truth. I  will listen to Socrates, who holds pleasure of no account, when he says that the best sauce for food is hunger and the best flavouring for drink thirst. But I will not listen to one who makes pleasure the sole standard, when while living like Gallonius he talks like Piso the Thrifty; I refuse to believe in his sincerity. 2.91.  He said that natural wealth is easily won, because nature is satisfied with little. Undoubtedly, — if only you Epicureans did not value pleasure so highly. As much pleasure, he says, is derived from the cheapest things as from the most costly. Dear me, his palate must be as dull as his wits. Persons who despise pleasure in itself are at liberty to say that they value a sturgeon no higher than a sprat; but a man whose chief good consists in pleasure is bound to judge everything by sensation, not by reason, and to call those things the best which are the pleasantest. 2.92.  However, let us grant his point: let him get the highest pleasures cheap, or for all I care for nothing, if he can; allow that there is as much pleasure to be found in the cress salad which according to Xenophon formed the staple diet of the Persians, as in the Syracusan banquets which Plato takes to task so severely; grant, I say, that pleasure is as easy to get as your school makes out; — but what are we to say of pain? Pain can inflict such tortures as to render happiness absolutely impossible, that is, if it be true that pain is the Chief Evil. Metrodorus himself, who was almost a second Epicurus, describes happiness (I give almost his actual words) as 'sound health, and an assurance of its continuance.' Can anyone have an assurance of what his health will be, I don't say a year hence, but this evening? It follows that we can never be free from the apprehension of pain, which is the chief Evil, even when it is absent, for at any moment it may be upon us. How then can life be happy when haunted by fear of the greatest Evil? 2.93.  'Ah but,' he rejoins, 'Epicurus teaches a method for disregarding pain.' To begin with, the mere idea of disregarding that which is the greatest of evils is absurd. But what is this method, pray? 'The severest pain,' says he, 'is brief.' First of all, who do you mean by brief? and secondly, what do you mean by the severest pain? Why, cannot the most intense pain last for several days? You may find it last for months! Unless indeed you mean a seizure that instantaneously kills you. But no one is afraid of such a pain as that. I want you rather to alleviate such agony as I have seen afflicting my excellent and amiable friend, Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus; and that not once only or for a short time, but repeatedly and for very long periods. Great heavens, what torments he used to suffer! All his joints felt as if on fire. And yet one did not think of him as miserable, because such pain was not the greatest evil, — only as afflicted. Miserable he would have been if he had lived a life of profligacy and vice surrounded by every pleasure. 2.94.  "As for your maxim that severe pain is short and prolonged pain light, I cannot make out what it may mean. For I see pains that are at once severe and considerably prolonged; and the truer way to endure them is the other method, which you who do not love moral worth for its own sake are not able to employ. Courage has its precepts and its rules, rules of constraining force, that forbid a man to show womanish weakness in pain. Hence it must be considered a disgrace, I do not say to feel pain (that is sometimes inevitable), but that 'rock of Lemnos to outrage' with the cries of a Philoctetes, Till the dumb stones utter a voice of weeping, Echoing his wails and plaints, his sighs and groanings. Let Epicurus soothe with his spells, if he can, the man whose Veins and vitals, from the viper's fang Envenom'd, throb with pangs of anguish dire in this way: 'Philoctetes! If pain is severe, it is short.' Oh, but he has been languishing in his cave for these ten years past. "If it is long, it is light: for it grants intervals of respite.' 2.95.  In the first place, this is not often the case; and secondly, what is the good of a respite embittered by recent pain still fresh in memory, and tormented by fear of pain impending in the future? Let him die, says Epicurus. Perhaps that were the best course, but what becomes of the maxim about 'a constant preponderance of pleasure'? If that be true, are you not guilty of a crime in advising him to end his life? Well, then, let us rather tell him that it is base and unmanly to let pain demoralize, crush and conquer one. As for the formula of your sect, 'Short if it's strong, light if it's long,' it is a tag for copybooks. Virtue, magimity, endurance, courage — it is these that have balm to assuage pain. 2.96.  "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.' 2.97.  When I read this I rank the death-scene of Epicurus on a level with those of Epaminondas and of Leonidas. Epaminondas had defeated the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea, and perceived himself to be mortally wounded. As soon as he opened his eyes he inquired if his shield were safe. His weeping followers told him that it was. He asked, were the enemy routed? Satisfied on this point, he bade them pluck out the spear that pierced his side. A rush of blood followed, and so in the hour of joy and victory he died. Leonidas, king of the Lacedaemonians, had to choose between dishonourable flight and a glorious death; with the three hundred warriors that he had brought from Sparta he confronted the foe at Thermopylae. A great commander's death is famous; but philosophers mostly die in their beds. Still it makes a difference how they die. Epicurus counts himself happy in his last moments. All honour to him. 'My joy,' he writes, 'counterbalances the severest pain.' 2.98.  The words of a philosopher, Epicurus, command my attention; but you forget what you logically ought to say. In the first place, if the things in the recollection of which you profess to find pleasure, I mean your writings and discoveries, are true, you cannot really be feeling pleasure. All feelings referable to the body are over for you; yet you have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. He says 'I take pleasure in my past feelings.' What past feelings? If you mean bodily feelings, I notice that it is not the memory of bodily delights, but your philosophical theories, that counterbalance for you your present pains; if mental feelings, your doctrine that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body is an error. And secondly, why do you provide for the children of Metrodorus? What standard of bodily pleasure are you following in this signal act (for so I esteem it) of loyalty and duty? 2.99.  "Yes, Torquatus, you people may turn and twist as you like, but you will not find a line in this famous letter of Epicurus that is not inconsistent and incompatible with his teachings. Hence he is his own refutation; his writings are disproved by the uprightness of his character. That provision for the care of the children, that loyalty to friendship and affection, that observance of these solemn duties with his latest breath, prove that there was innate in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by pleasure nor elicited by prizes and rewards. Seeing so strong a sense of duty in a dying man, what clearer evidence do we want that morality and rectitude are desirable for their own sakes? 2.100.  But while I think that the letter I have just translated almost word for word is most admirable, although entirely inconsistent with the chief tenets of his philosophy, yet I consider his will to be quite out of harmony not only with the dignity of a philosopher but also with his own pronouncement. For he repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the book I have just mentioned, that 'death does not affect us at all; for a thing that has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation; and that which is devoid of sensation cannot affect us in any degree whatsoever.' The maxim such as it is might have been better and more neatly put. For the phrase, 'what has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation,' does not make clear what it is that has experienced dissolution. 2.101.  However in spite of this I understand the meaning intended. What I want to know is this: if all sensation is annihilated by dissolution, that is, by death, and if nothing whatever that can affect us remains, why is it that he makes such precise and careful provision and stipulation 'that his heirs, ')" onMouseOut="nd();" Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall after consultation with Hermarchus assign a sufficient sum to celebrate his birthday every year in the month of Gamelion, and also on the twentieth day of every month shall assign a sum for a banquet to his fellow-students in philosophy, in order to keep alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus'? 2.102.  That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a man as you like, I cannot deny; but what business has a philosopher, and especially a natural philosopher, which Epicurus claims to be, to think that any day can be anybody's birthday? Why, can the identical day that has once occurred recur again and again? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar day recur? This too is impossible, except after an interval of many thousands of years, when all the heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return to the point from which they started. It follows that there is no such thing as anybody's birthday. 'But a certain day is so regarded.' Much obliged, I am sure, for the information! But even granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be observed when he is dead? And to provide for this by will — is this appropriate for a man who told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us after death? Such a provision ill became one whose 'intellect had roamed' over unnumbered worlds and realms of infinite space, without shores or circumference. Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To omit others, I cite the case of the philosopher who was Epicurus's only master.) 2.103.  And if a special day was to be kept, did he do well to take the day on which he was born, and not rather that on which he became a Wise Man? You will object that he could not have become a Wise Man if he had not first of all been born. You might equally well say, if his grandmother had not been born either. The entire notion of wishing one's name and memory to be celebrated by a banquet after one's death is alien to a man of learning. I won't refer to your mode of keeping these anniversaries, or the shafts of wit you bring upon you from persons with a sense of humour. We do not want to quarrel. I only remark that it was more your business to keep Epicurus's birthday than his business to provide by will for its celebration. 2.104.  "But to return to our subject (for we were discussing the question of pain, when we digressed to the letter of Epicurus). The whole matter may now be put in the following syllogism: A man undergoing the supreme Evil is not for the time being happy; but the Wise Man is always happy, and sometimes undergoes pain; therefore pain is not the supreme Evil. And again, what is the sense of the maxim that the Wise Man will not let past blessings fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget past misfortunes? To begin with, have we the power to choose what we shall remember? Themistocles at all events, when Simonides or some one offered to teach him the art of memory, replied that he would prefer the art of forgetting; 'for I remember,' said he, 'even things I don't wish to remember, but I cannot forget things I wish to forget.' 2.105.  Epicurus was a very able man; but still the fact of the matter is that a philosopher who forbids us to remember lays too heavy a charge upon us. Why, you are as great a martinet as your ancestor Manlius, or greater, if you order me to do what is beyond my power. What if the memory of past evils be actually pleasant? proving certain proverbs truer than the tenets of your school. There is a popular saying to the effect that 'Toil is pleasant when 'tis over'; and Euripides well writes (I will attempt a verse translation; the Greek line is known to you all): Sweet is the memory of sorrows past. But let us return to the question of past blessings. If your school meant by these the sort of successes that Gaius Marius could fall back on, enabling him when a penniless exile up to his chin in a swamp to lighten his sufferings by recollecting his former victories, I would listen to you, and would unreservedly assent. Indeed it would be impossible for the happiness of the wise Man to attain its final and ultimate perfection, if all his wise designs and good deeds were to be successively erased from his memory. 2.106.  But with you it is the recollection of pleasures enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be bodily pleasures, — for if it be any others, it ceases to be true that mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body. Yet if bodily pleasure even when past can give delight, I do not see why Aristotle should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus. The famous Syrian monarch boasts that he has taken with him all the sensual pleasures that he has enjoyed. How, asks Aristotle, could a dead man continue to experience a feeling which even while alive he could only be conscious of so long as he was actually enjoying it? So that bodily pleasures are transient; each in turn evaporates, leaving cause for regrets more often than for recollection. Accordingly Africanus must be counted happier than Sardanapalus, when he addresses his country with the words: Cease, Rome, thy foes â€” and the glorious conclusion: My toils have won thee battlements secure. His past toils are what he delights in, whereas you bid us dwell upon our past pleasures; he recalls experiences that never had any connection with bodily enjoyment, but you never rise above the body. 2.107.  "Again how can you possibly defend the dictum of your school, that all mental pleasures and pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the body? Do you, Torquatus (for I bethink me who it is I am addressing) — do you personally never experience in something for its own sake? I pass over moral worth and goodness, and the intrinsic beauty of the virtues, of which we spoke before. I will suggest less serious matters, reading or writing a poem or a speech, the study of history or geography, statues, pictures, scenery, the games and wild beast shows, Lucullus's country house (I won't mention your own, for that would give you a loophole of escape; you would say it is a source of bodily enjoyment); but take the things I have mentioned, — do you connect them with bodily sense? Is there nothing which of itself affords you delight? Persist in tracing back the pleasures I have instanced to the body — and you show yourself impervious to argument; recant — and you abandon Epicurus's conception of pleasure altogether. 2.108.  "As for your contention that mental pleasures and pains are greater than bodily, because the mind apprehends all three periods of time, whereas the body perceives only present sensations, surely it is absurd to say that a man who rejoices in sympathy with my pleasure feels more joy than I feel myself. [Pleasure of the mind arises out of sympathy with that of the body, and pleasure of the mind is greater than that of the body; thus it comes about that one who offers congratulations feels more delight than the person congratulated.] But when you try to prove the Wise Man happy on the ground that he enjoys the greatest mental pleasures, and that these are infinitely greater than bodily pleasures, you do not see the difficulty that meets you. For it follows that the mental pains which he experiences will also be infinitely greater than the bodily ones. Hence he whom you maintain to be always happy would inevitably be sometimes miserable; nor in fact will you ever prove him to be invariably happy, as long as you make pleasure and pain the sole standard. 2.109.  Therefore we are bound, Torquatus, to find some other Chief Good for man. Let us leave pleasure to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this question of the Chief Good your school is fond of appealing. But what if even animals are prompted by their several natures to do many actions conclusively proving that they have some other than pleasure? Some of them show kindness even at the cost of trouble, as for instance in giving birth to and rearing their offspring; some delight in running and roaming about; others are gregarious, and create something resembling a social polity; 2.110.  in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 2.111.  "As a matter of fact if pleasure be all in all, the lower animals are far and away superior to ourselves. The Earth of herself without labour of theirs lavishes on them food from her stores in great variety and abundance; whereas we with the most laborious efforts can scarcely if at all supply our needs. Yet I cannot think that the Chief Good can possibly be the same for a brute beast and for a man. What is the use of all our vast machinery of culture, of the great company of liberal studies, of the goodly fellowship of the virtues, if all these things are sought after solely for the sake of pleasure? 2.112.  Suppose when Xerxes led forth his huge fleets and armies of horse and foot, bridged the Hellespont, cut through Athos, marched over sea and sailed over land — suppose on his reaching Greece with his great armada some one asked him the reason for all this enormous apparatus of warfare, and he were to reply that he had wanted to procure some honey from Hymettus! surely he would be thought to have had no adequate motive for so vast an undertaking. So with our Wise Man, equipped and adorned with all the noblest accomplishments and virtues, not like Xerxes traversing the seas on foot and the mountains on shipboard, but mentally embracing sky and earth and sea in their entirety — to say that this man's aim is pleasure is to say that all his high endeavour is for the sake of a little honey. 2.113.  "No, Torquatus, believe me, we are born for loftier and more splendid purposes. Nor is this evidenced by the mental faculties alone, including as they do a memory for countless facts, in your case indeed a memory of unlimited range; a power of forecasting the future little short of divination; the sense of modesty to curb the appetites; love of justice, the faithful guardian of human society; contempt of pain and death, remaining firm and steadfast when toil is to be endured and danger undergone. These are our mental endowments. But I would also have you consider our actual members, and our organs of sensation, which like the other parts of the body you for your part will esteem not as the comrades merely but actually as the servants of the virtues. 2.114.  But if even the body has many attributes of higher value than pleasure, such as strength, health, beauty, speed of foot, what pray think you of the mind? The wisest philosophers of old believed that the mind contains an element of the celestial and divine. Whereas if the Chief Good consisted in pleasure as your school avers, the ideal of happiness would be to pass days and nights in the enjoyment of the keenest pleasure, without a moment's intermission, every sense drenched and stimulated with every sort of delight. But who that is worthy to be called a human being would choose to pass a single entire day in pleasure of that description? The Cyrenaics, it is true, do not repudiate it; on this point your friends are more decent, but the Cyrenaics perhaps more consistent. 2.115.  But let us pass in review not these 'arts' of first importance, a lack of which with our ancestors gave a man the name of 'inert' or good-for‑nothing, but I ask you whether you believe that, I do not say Homer, Archilochus or Pindar, but Phidias, Polyclitus and Zeuxis regarded the purpose of their art as pleasure. Then shall a craftsman have a higher ideal of external than a distinguished citizen of moral beauty? But what else is the cause of an error so profound and so very widely diffused, than the fact that he who decides that pleasure is the Chief Good judges the question not with the rational and deliberative part of his mind, but with its lowest part, the faculty of desire? For I ask you, if gods exist, as your school too believes, how can they be happy, seeing that they cannot enjoy bodily pleasures? or, if they happy without that kind of pleasure, why do you deny that the Wise Man is capable of a like purely mental activity? 2.116.  "Read the panegyrics, Torquatus, not of the heroes praised by Homer, not of Cyrus or Agesilaus, Aristides or Themistocles, Philip or Alexander; but read those delivered upon our own great men, read those of your own family. You will not find anyone extolled for his skill and cunning in procuring pleasures. This is not what is conveyed by epitaphs, like that one near the city gate: Here lyeth one whom many lands agree Rome's first and greatest citizen to be. 2.117.  Do we suppose that many lands agreed that Calatinus was Rome's greatest citizen because of his surpassing eminence in the acquisition of pleasures? Then are we to say that a youth is a young man of great promise and high character, when we judge him likely to study his own interests and to do whatever will be for his personal advantage? Do we not see what a universal upheaval and confusion would result from such a principle? It does away with generosity and with gratitude, the bonds of mutual harmony. If you lend a man money for your own advantage, this cannot be considered an act of generosity — it is usury; no gratitude is owing to a man who lends money for gain. In fact if pleasure usurps the sovereignty, all the cardinal virtues must inevitably be dethroned; and also there are a number of base qualities which can with difficulty be proved inconsistent with the character of the Wise Man, unless it be a law of nature that moral goodness should be supreme. 2.118.  Not to bring forward further arguments (for they are countless in number), any sound commendation of Virtue must needs keep Pleasure at arm's length. Do not expect me further to argue the point; look within, study your own consciousness. Then after full and careful introspection, ask yourself the question, would you prefer to pass your whole life in that state of calm which you spoke of so often, amidst the enjoyment of unceasing pleasures, free from all pain, and even (an addition which your school is fond of postulating but which is really impossible) free from all fear of pain, or to be a benefactor of the entire human race, and to bring succour and safety to the distressed, even at the cost of enduring the dolours of a Hercules? Dolours — that was indeed the sad and gloomy name which our ancestors bestowed, even in the case of a god, upon labours which were not to be evaded. 3.16.  "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17.  Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalēpseis), — these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.18.  The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock's tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) 3.19.  All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly." 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21.  Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' — in Stoic phraseology ennoia — and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' — inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.22.  But since those actions which I have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' 3.23.  "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormē, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.24.  For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthōmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. 3.25.  It is erroneous, however, to place the End of medicine or of navigation exactly on a par with the End of Wisdom. For Wisdom includes also magimity and justice and a sense of superiority to all the accidents of man's estate, but this is not the case with the other arts. Again, even the very virtues I have just mentioned cannot be attained by anyone unless he has realized that all things are indifferent and indistinguishable except moral worth and baseness. 3.26.  "We may now observe how strikingly the principles I have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim — (and you have observed, no doubt, that I have all along been translating the Greek term telos either by 'final' or 'ultimate aim,' or 'chief Good,' and for 'final or ultimate aim' we may also substitute 'End') — inasmuch then as the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and destinies is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical manner, with great length and fullness and with all the resources of choice diction and impressive argument; but for my own part I like the concise and pointed 'consequences' of the Stoics. 3.27.  "They put their arguments in the following syllogistic form: Whatever is good is praiseworthy; but whatever is praiseworthy is morally honourable: therefore that which is good is morally honourable. Does this seem to you a valid deduction? Surely it must: you can see that the conclusion consists in what necessarily resulted from the two premises. The usual line of reply is to deny the major premise, and say that not everything good is praiseworthy; for there is no denying that what is praiseworthy is morally honourable. But it would be paradoxical to maintain that there is something good which is not desirable; or desirable that is not pleasing; or if pleasing, not also esteemed; and therefore approved as well; and so also praiseworthy. But the praiseworthy is the morally honourable. Hence it follows that what is good is also morally honourable. 3.28.  "Next I ask, who can be proud of a life that is miserable or not happy? It follows that one can only be proud of one's lot when it is a happy one. This proves that the happy life is a thing that deserves (so to put it) that one should be proud of it; and this cannot rightly be said of any life but one morally honourable. Therefore the moral life is the happy life. And the man who deserves and wins praise has exceptional cause for pride and self-satisfaction; but these things count for so much that he can justly be pronounced happy; therefore the life of such a man can with full correctness be described as happy also. Thus if Moral Worth is the criterion of happiness, Moral Worth must be deemed the only Good. 3.29.  "Once more; could it be denied that it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm and lofty mind, such a one as we call a brave man, unless it be established that pain is not an evil? For just as it is impossible for one who counts death as an evil not to fear death, so in no case can a man disregard and despise a thing that he decides to be evil. This being laid down as generally admitted, we take as our minor premise that the brave and high-minded man despises and holds of no account all the accidents to which mankind is liable. The conclusion follows that nothing is evil that is not base. Also, your lofty, distinguished, magimous and truly brave man, who thinks all human vicissitudes beneath him, I mean, the character we desire to produce, our ideal man, must unquestionably have faith in himself and in his own character both past and future, and think well of himself, holding that no ill can befall the wise man. Here then is another proof of the same position, that Moral Worth alone is good, and that to live honourably, that is virtuously, is to live happily. 3.30.  "I am well aware, it is true, that varieties of opinion have existed among philosophers, I mean among those of them who have placed the Chief Good, the ultimate aim as I call it, in the mind. Some of those who adopted this view fell into error; but nevertheless I rank all those, of whatever type, who have placed the Chief Good in the mind and in virtue, not merely above the three philosophers who dissociate the Chief Good from virtue altogether and identified it either with pleasure or freedom from pain or the primary impulses of nature, but also above the other three, who held that virtue would be incomplete without some enhancement, and therefore added to it one or other respectively of the three things I have just enumerated. 3.31.  But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.32.  "But in the other arts when we speak of an 'artistic' performance, this quality must be considered as in a sense subsequent to and a result of the action; it is what the Stoics term epigennēmatikon (in the nature of an after-growth). Whereas in conduct, when we speak of an act as 'wise,' the term is applied with full correctness from the first inception of the act. For every action that the Wise Man initiates must necessarily be complete forthwith in all its parts; since the thing desirable, as we term it, consists in his activity. As it is a sin to betray one's country, to use violence to one's parents, to rob a temple, where the offence lies in the result of the act, so the passions of fear, grief and lust are sins, even when no extraneous result ensues. The latter are sins not in their subsequent effects, but immediately upon their inception; similarly, actions springing from virtue are to be judged right from their first inception, and not in their successful completion. 3.33.  "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ōphelēma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.34.  At the same time Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree; the Good is recognized and pronounced to be good from its own inherent properties and not by comparison with other things. Just as honey, though extremely sweet, is yet perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind of flavour and not by being compared with something else, so this Good which we are discussing is indeed superlatively valuable, yet its value depends on kind and not on quantity. Value, in Greek axiā, is not counted as a Good nor yet as an Evil; so that however much you increase it in amount, it will still remain the same in kind. The value of Virtue is therefore peculiar and distinct; it depends on kind and not on degree. 3.35.  "Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I might have rendered this literally and styled them 'diseases,' but the word 'disease' would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then accept the term 'emotion,' the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hēdonē 'pleasure,' but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exaltation), these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them. 3.36.  "The view that all Moral Worth is intrinsically desirable is one that we hold in common with many other systems of philosophy. Excepting three schools that shut out Virtue from the Chief Good altogether, all the remaining philosophers are committed to this opinion, and most of all the Stoics, with whom we are now concerned, and who hold that nothing else but Moral Worth is to be counted as a good at all. But this position is one that is extremely simple and easy to defend. For who is there, or who ever was there, of avarice so consuming and appetites so unbridled, that, even though willing to commit any crime to achieve his end, and even though absolutely secure of impunity, yet would not a hundred times rather attain the same object by innocent than by guilty means? 3.37.  "Again, what desire for profit or advantage underlies our curiosity to learn the secrets of nature, the mode and the causes of the movements of the heavenly bodies? Who lives in such a boorish state, or who has become so rigidly insensible to natural impulses, as to feel a repugce for these lofty studies and eschew them as valueless apart from any pleasure or profit they may bring? Or who is there who feels no sense of pleasure when he hears of the wise words and brave deeds of our forefathers, — of the Africani, or my great-grandfather whose name is always on your lips, and the other heroes of valour and of virtue? 3.38.  On the other hand, what man of honourable family and good breeding and education is not shocked by moral baseness as such, even when it is not calculated to do him personally any harm? who can view without disgust a person whom he believes to be dissolute and an evil liver? who does not hate the mean, the empty, the frivolous, the worthless? Moreover, if we decide that baseness is not a thing to be avoided for its own sake, what arguments can be urged against men's indulging in every sort of unseemliness in privacy and under cover of darkness, unless they are deterred by the essential and intrinsic ugliness of what is base? Endless reasons could be given in support of this view, but they are not necessary. For nothing is less open to doubt than that what is morally good is to be desired for its own sake, and similarly what is morally bad is to be avoided for its own sake. 3.39.  Again, the principle already discussed, that Moral Worth is the sole Good, involves the corollary that it is of more value than those neutral things which it procures. On the other hand when we say that folly, cowardice, injustice and intemperance are to be avoided because of the consequences they entail, this dictum must not be so construed as to appear inconsistent with the principle already laid down, that moral baseness alone is evil; for the reason that the consequences referred to are not a matter of bodily harm but of the base conduct to which vices give rise (the term 'vice' I prefer to 'badness' as a translation of the Greek kakiā)." 3.40.  "Indeed, Cato," said I, "your language is lucidity itself; it conveys your meaning exactly. In fact I feel you are teaching philosophy to speak Latin, and naturalizing her as a Roman citizen. Hitherto she has seemed a foreigner at Rome, and shy of conversing in our language; and this is especially so with your Stoic system because of its precision and subtlety alike of thought and language. (There are some philosophers, I know, who could express their ideas in any language; for they ignore Division and Definition altogether, and themselves profess that they only seek to commend doctrines to which nature assents without argument. Hence, their ideas being so far from recondite, they spend small pains on logical exposition.) So I am following you attentively, and am committing to memory all the terms you use to denote the conceptions we are discussing; for very likely I shall soon have to employ the same terms myself. Well, I think you are quite correct in calling the opposite of the virtues 'vices.' This is in conformity with the usage of our language. The word 'vice' denotes, I believe, that which is in its own nature 'vituperable'; or else 'vituperable' is derived from 'vice.' Whereas if you had rendered kakiā by 'badness' ('malice'), Latin usage would point us to another meaning, that of a single particular vice. As it is, we make 'vice' the opposite term to 'virtue' in general." 3.41.  "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole so‑called 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 3.42.  "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.43.  Further, on the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether. We hold that the multiplication even of those goods that in our view are truly so called does not render life happier or more desirable or of higher value; even less therefore is happiness affected by the accumulation of bodily advantages. 3.44.  Clearly if wisdom and health be both desirable, a combination of the two would be more desirable than wisdom alone; but it is not the case that if both be deserving of value, wisdom plus ')" onMouseOut="nd();" health is worth more than wisdom by itself separately. We deem health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon it a good; at the same time we rate no value so highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action which is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We think otherwise — whether rightly or wrongly, I will consider later; but how could there be a wider or more real difference of opinion? 3.45.  "The light of a lamp is eclipsed and overpowered by the rays of the sun; a drop of honey is lost in the vastness of the Aegean sea; an additional sixpence is nothing amid the wealth of Croesus, or a single step in the journey from here to India. Similarly if the Stoic definition of the End of Goods be accepted, it follows that all the value you set on bodily advantages must be absolutely eclipsed and annihilated by the brilliance and the majesty of virtue. And just as opportuneness (for so let us translate eukairia) is not increased by prolongation in time (since things we call opportune have attained their proper measure), so right conduct (for thus I translate katorthōsis, since katorthōma is a single right action), right conduct, I say, and also propriety, and lastly Good itself, which consists in harmony with nature, are not capable of increase or addition. 3.46.  For these things that I speak of, like opportuneness before mentioned, are not made greater by prolongation. And on this ground the Stoics do not deem happiness to be any more attractive or desirable if it be lasting than if it be brief; and they use this illustration: Just as, supposing the merit of a shoe were to fit the foot, many shoes would not be superior to few shoes nor bigger shoes to smaller ones, so, in the case of things the good of which consists solely and entirely in propriety and opportuneness, a larger number of these things will not be rated higher than a smaller number nor those lasting longer to those of shorter duration. 3.47.  No is there much point in the argument that, if good health is more valuable when lasting than when brief, therefore the exercise of wisdom also is worth most when it continues longest. This ignores the fact that, whereas the value of health is estimated by duration, that of virtue is measured by opportuneness; so that those who use the argument in question might equally be expected to say that an easy death or an easy child-birth would be better if protracted than if speedy. They fail to see that some things are rendered more valuable by brevity as others by prolongation. 3.48.  So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. 3.49.  Wealth again, in the opinion of Diogenes, though so important for pleasure and health as to be not merely conducive but actually essential to them, yet has not the same effect in relation to virtue, nor yet in the case of the other arts; for money may be a guide to these, but cannot form an essential factor in them; therefore although if pleasure or if good health be a good, wealth also must be counted a good, yet if wisdom is a good, it does not follow that we must also pronounce wealth to be a good. Nor can anything which is not a good be essential to a thing that is a good; and hence, because acts of cognition and of comprehension, which form the raw material of the arts, excite desire, since wealth is not a good, wealth cannot be essential to any art. 3.50.  But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.51.  Again among things valuable — e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like — they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proēgmena and the opposite, apoproēgmena — for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. 3.52.  "In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honour (for that is the meaning of proēgmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal pre‑eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proēgmenon, that is, 'promoted,' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or 'advanced' and 'degraded,' or the term we have been using all along, 'preferred' or 'superior,' and for the opposite 'rejected.' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. 3.53.  But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value — since it has occurred to me that I may use the word 'indifferent' to represent their term adiaphoron. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be 'preferred.' 3.54.  There were good grounds therefore for making this distinction; and furthermore, to elucidate the matter still more clearly they put forward the following illustration: Just as, supposing we were to assume that our end and aim is to throw a knuckle-bone in such a way that it may stand upright, a bone that is thrown so as to fall upright will be in some measure 'preferred' or advanced' in relation to the proposed end, and one that falls otherwise the reverse, and yet that 'advance' on the part of the knuckle-bone will not be a constituent part of the end indicated, so those things which are 'preferred' are it is true means to the End but are in no sense constituents of its essential nature. 3.55.  "Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are 'constituents' of the final end (for so I represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are 'productive' of the End, the Greek poiētika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the 'constituent' class are moral action; the only instance of a 'productive' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. 3.56.  "These things which we call 'preferred' are in some cases preferred for their own sake, in others because they produce a certain result, and in others for both reasons; for their own sake, as a certain cast of features and of countece, or a certain pose or movement, things which may be in themselves either preferable or to be rejected; others will be called preferred because they produce a certain result, for example, money; others again for both reasons, like sound senses and good health. 3.57.  About good fame (that term being a better translation in this context than 'glory' of the Stoic expression eudoxiā) Chrysippus and Diogenes used to aver that, apart from any practical value it may possess, it is not worth stretching out a finger for; and I strongly agree with them. On the other hand their successors, finding themselves unable to resist the attacks of Carneades, declared that good fame, as I have called it, was preferred and desirable for its own sake, and that a man of good breeding and liberal education would desire to have the good opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good men in general, and that for its own sake and not for any practical advantage; and they argue that just as we desire the welfare of our children, even of such as may be born after we are dead, for their own sake, so a man ought to study his reputation even after death, for itself, even apart from any advantage. 3.58.  "But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. 3.59.  "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.60.  But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61.  For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. 3.62.  "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63.  From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the sea‑pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the sea‑pen, which swims out of the sea‑pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard — these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64.  "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law‑abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.65.  "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 3.66.  Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. 3.67.  "But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such, that as it were a code of law subsists between the individual and the human race, so that he who upholds this code will be just and he who departs from it, unjust. But just as, though the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of justice militates against the possession of private property. 3.68.  Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. 3.69.  "To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between man and man, the Stoics held that both 'benefits' and 'injuries' (in their terminology, ōphelēmata and blammata) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounce them to be not only 'common' but also 'equal.' 'Disadvantages' and 'advantages' (for so I render euchrēstēmata and duschrēstēmata) they held to be 'common' but not 'equal.' For things 'beneficial' and 'injurious' are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but 'advantages' and 'disadvantages' belong to the class we speak of as 'preferred' and 'rejected,' and these may differ in degree. But whereas 'benefits' and 'injuries' are pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and sinful acts are not considered 'common.' 3.70.  "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. 3.71.  Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. 3.72.  "To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us for giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue. 3.73.  "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 3.74.  "However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 3.76.  Nor need he wait for any period of time, that the decision whether he has been happy or not may be finally pronounced only when he has rounded off his life's last day in death, — the famous warning so unwisely given to Croesus by old Solon, one of the seven Wise Men; for had Croesus ever been happy, he would have carried his happiness uninterrupted to the pyre raised for him by Cyrus. If then it be true that all the good and none but the good are happy, what possession is more precious than philosophy, what more divine than virtue?" 5.7.  "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.51.  But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.52.  What of our eagerness to learn the names of people who have done something notable, their parentage, birthplace, and many quite unimportant details beside? What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans? Also we may notice that the persons most eager to hear and read of public affairs are those who are debarred by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking part in them. Hence we are forced to infer that the objects of study and knowledge contain in themselves the allurements that entice us to study and to learning. 5.58.  "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later.
99. Cicero, On The Haruspices, 62.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 107
100. Cicero, On Invention, 1.33, 2.153, 2.160 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •scaliger, julius caesar •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 55, 60
1.33. ritia. hoc igitur vitandum est, ne, cuius genus po- sueris, eius * sicuti aliquam diversam ac dissimilem partem ponas in eadem partitione. quodsi quod in genus plures incident partes, id cum in prima causae partitione erit simpliciter expositum, distribuetur tem- pore eo commodissime, cum ad ipsum ventum erit explicandum in causae dictione post partitionem. atque illud quoque pertinet ad paucitatem, ne aut plura, quam satis est, demonstraturos nos dicamus, hoc modo: ostendam adversarios, quod arguamus, et potuisse facere et voluisse et fecisse; nam fecisse satis est ostendere: aut, cum in causa partitio nulla sit, et cum simplex quiddam agatur, tamen utamur distributione, id quod perraro potest accidere. Ac sunt alia quoque praecepta partitionum, quae ad hunc usum oratorium non tanto opere pertineant, quae versantur in philosophia, ex quibus haec ipsa trans- tulimus, quae convenire viderentur, quorum nihil in ceteris artibus inveniebamus. Atque his de partitione praeceptis in omni dictione meminisse oportebit, ut et prima quaeque pars, ut expo- sita est in partitione, sic ordine transigatur et omnibus explicatis peroratum sit hoc modo, ut ne quid po- sterius praeter conclusionem inferatur. partitur apud Terentium breviter et commode senex in Andria, quae cognoscere libertum velit: Eo pacto et gnati vitam et consilium meum Cognosces et quid facere in hac re te velim. itaque quemadmodum in partitione proposuit, ita narrat, primum nati vitam: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis ; deinde suum consilium: Et nunc id operam do deinde quid Sosiam velit facere, id quod postremum posuit in partitione, postremum di- cit: Nunc tuum est officium quemadmodum igitur hic et ad primam quamque partem primum accessit et omnibus absolutis finem dicendi fecit, sic nobis pla- cet et ad singulas partes accedere et omnibus abso- lutis perorare. Nunc de confirmatione deinceps, ita ut ordo ipse postulat, praecipiendum videtur. 2.153. contra ratiocinationem huiusmodi: coniecturam divinationem esse et stulti scriptoris esse non posse om- nibus de rebus cavere, quibus velit. Definitio est, cum in scripto verbum aliquod est positum, cuius de vi quaeritur, hoc modo: lex: qui in adversa tempestate navem reliquerint, omnia amittunto; eorum navis et onera sunto, qui in nave remanserint . Duo quidam, cum iam in alto navigarent, et cum eorum alterius navis, alterius onus esset, naufragum quendam natantem et manus ad se tendentem animum adverterunt; misericordia commoti navem ad eum adplicarunt, hominem ad se sustulerunt. 2.160. Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutra- rumque scientia. partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa, quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit, quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est. Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate con- servata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in con- suetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.
101. Cicero, De Lege Agraria, 2.16.40, 2.35, 2.70, 2.88, 2.91 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •caesar, c. julius, as author •julius caesar, monumental architecture Found in books: Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 268; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 95; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 67; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 38
102. Cicero, On Laws, 1.5-1.7, 2.5-2.6, 2.15, 2.20-2.23, 2.25, 2.31, 2.38-2.39, 2.45, 2.59, 2.62, 2.64, 3.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •caesar, c. julius, extension of citizenship to transpadane gaul •caesar, julius •julius caesar, religiosity of •julius caesar, and cato •julius caesar, assassination •caesar (julius) Found in books: Augoustakis (2014), Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past, 269; Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 15, 20; Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 211; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 28, 37; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 354, 369; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 74; Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 269
103. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.3.6, 1.6, 1.10-1.11, 1.79, 1.93, 2.32, 2.151, 3.49 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •caesar c. julius •caesar, julius •caesar strabo vopiscus, c. julius •caesar, c. julius, as author •julius caesar, gaius Found in books: Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 55; Dignas (2002), Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, 119; Edelmann-Singer et al. (2020), Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions, 75; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 19, 112, 114; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 67
1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools. 1.79. Yes, and every ant like an ant! Still, the question is, like what man? How small a percentage of handsome people there are! When I was at Athens, there was scarcely one to be found in each platoon of the training-corps — I see why you smile, but the fact is all the same. Another point: we, who with the sanction of the philosophers of old are fond of the society of young men, often find even their defects agreeable. Alcaeus 'admires a mole upon his favourite's wrist'; of course a mole is a blemish, but Alcaeus thought it a beauty. Quintus Catulus, the father of our colleague and friend to‑day, was warmly attached to your fellow-townsman Roscius, and actually wrote the following verses in his honour: By chance abroad at dawn, I stood to pray To the uprising deity of day; When lo! upon my left — propitious sight — Suddenly Roscius dawned in radiance bright. Forgive me, heavenly pow'rs, if I declare, Meseem'd the mortal than the god more fair. To Catulus, Roscius was fairer than a god. As a matter of fact he had, as he has to‑day, a pronounced squint; but no matter — in the eyes of Catulus this in itself gave him piquancy and charm. 1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. 2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole. 2.151. Moreover men's industry, that is to say the work of their hands, porticus us also our food in variety and abundance. It is the hand that gathers the divers products of the fields, whether to be consumed immediately or to be stored in repositories for the days to come; and our diet also includes flesh, fish and fowl, obtained partly by the chase and partly by breeding. We also tame the four-footed animals to carry us on their backs, their swiftness and strength bestowing strength and swiftness upon ourselves. We cause certain beasts to bear our burdens or to carry a yoke, we divert to our service the marvellously acute senses of elephants and the keen scent of hounds; we collect from the caves of the earth the iron which we need for tilling the land, we discover the deeply hidden veins of copper, silver and gold which serve us both for use and for adornment; we cut up a multitude of trees both wild and cultivated for timber which we employ partly by setting fire to it to warm our busy and cook our food, partly for building so as to shelter ourselves with houses and banish heat and cold. 3.49. Or if we allow Ino, are we going to make Amphiaraus and Trophonius divine? The Roman tax‑farmers, finding that lands in Boeotia belonging to the immortal gods were exempted by the censor's regulations, used to maintain that nobody was immortal who had once upon a time been a human being. But if these are divine, so undoubtedly is Erechtheus, whose shrine and whose priest also we saw when at Athens. And if we make him out to be divine, what doubts can we feel about Codrus or any other persons who fell fighting for their country's freedom? if we stick at this, we must reject the earlier cases too, from which these follow.
104. Cicero, On Duties, 1.1-1.2, 1.9, 1.15, 1.25-1.26, 1.28, 1.43-1.44, 1.54, 1.57-1.58, 1.61-1.92, 1.138-1.140, 1.151, 2.4-2.118, 2.7.23, 2.12.41-2.12.43, 3.7, 3.16-3.76, 3.82-3.83, 3.90, 5.51-5.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar •caesar, julius •caesar, julius, and pompey •julius caesar (c. iulius caesar) •julius caesar, c., as diseased limb •julius caesar, c., as parens patriae •julius caesar, c., as parricide and tyrant •julius caesar, c., assassination of •julius caesar, c., dictatorship of •julius caesar, c., victory in civil war as salus •caesar, julius (iulius caesar, c.) •julius caesar, house of •julius caesar, honours to •caesar, c. julius, as author •caesar c. julius •caesar, c. julius •julius caesar, assassination •cicero, assessment of julius caesar •julius caesar, c. Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 24, 26, 27; Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 25, 62; Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 171; Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 141; Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Hug (2023), Fertility, Ideology, and the Cultural Politics of Reproduction at Rome, 144; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23, 45, 183, 184; Keddie (2019), Class and Power in Roman Palestine: The Socioeconomic Setting of Judaism and Christian Origins, 87; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 291, 312, 318, 319, 320, 328; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 29; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 66, 222, 223; Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 42; Viglietti and Gildenhard (2020), Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic, 292; Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 101, 114, 115
1.1. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum et ad iudicandum. 1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.9. Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contraries sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt aut consultant, ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi. 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 1.25. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis pecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum elegantia et copia; quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est. 1.26. Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt. Quod enim est apud Ennium: Núlla sancta sócietas Néc fides regni ést. id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare sanctam societatem. Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat, principatum. Est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis cavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur. 1.28. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehementer expetant, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemt et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur, ut inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; namhoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. 1.43. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 1.44. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos. Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem sinulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati. 1.54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate; 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit. 1.61. Intelligendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor, e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri, quod animo magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in probris maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: Vós enim, iuvenes, ánimum geritis múliebrem, ílla virgo viri et si quid eius modi: Salmácida, spolia sÍne sudore et sánguine. Contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, hine noster Cocles, hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari. 1.62. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugtem pro aequitate. Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat. 1.63. Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: Non, inquit, solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam fortitudinis. Itaque viros fortes et magimnos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae. 1.64. Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellet, ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse. Difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. Ex quo fit, ut neque disceptatione vinci se nec ullo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur, exsistuntque in re publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam maximas consequantur et sint vi potius superiores quam iustitia pares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius; nullum enim est tempus, quod iustitia vacare debeat. 1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 1.66. Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur, quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum est nihil hominem, nisi quod honestum decorumque sit, aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere nullique neque homini neque perturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut, cum ita sis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas quidem et maxime utiles, sed ut vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent. 1.67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea. quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae. 1.68. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate nec, qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda et pecuniae figienda cupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare divitias, nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre. Cavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra dixi; eripit enim libertatem, pro qua magimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nee vero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda non numquam. 1.69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari. 1.70. His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis, alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant, alteri, si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilior et tutior et minus aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum generi et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt. 1.71. Quapropter et iis forsitan concedendum sit rem publicam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et iis, qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a re publica recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis laudemque concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere se dicant ea, quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto; quorum iudicium in eo, quod gloriam contemt et pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non probare; sed videntur labores et molestias, tum offensionum et repulsarum quasi quandam ignominiam timere et infamiam. Sunt enim, qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime contemt, in dolore sint molliores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur infamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter. 1.72. Sed iis, qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum gerendarum, abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus et gerenda res publica est; nec enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest. Capessentibus autem rem publicam nihilo minus quam philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est rerum humanarum, quam saepe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque securitas, siquidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque victuri. 1.73. Quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in eorum vita, quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus egent, et quia, si quid adversi eveniat, tam graviter cadere non possunt. Quocirca non sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur maioraque studia efficiendi rem publicam gerentibus quam quietis, quo magis iis et magnitudo est animi adhibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus. Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat, ne id modo consideret, quam illa res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; in quo ipso considerandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatem. In omnibus autem negotiis, prius quam aggrediare, adhibenda est praeparatio diligens. 1.74. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et cupidi bellorum gerendorum; vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae res exstiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae. 1.75. Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit eius nomen quam Solonis illustrius citcturque Salamis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas, non minus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum est; illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc maiorum instituta servantur; et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at ille vere a se adiutum Themistoclem; est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus. 1.76. Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis partum putatur, tamen ne minima quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae confercndi sunt; quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habuerunt exercitus et fortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum versaremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur; parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi; nec plus Africanus, singularis et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia rei publicae profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. Gracchum interemit; quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione (attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est), sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu. 1.77. Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio: Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi. Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubertibus nonne togae arma cesserunt? neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. 1.78. Quae res igitur gesta umquam in bello tanta? qui triumphus conferendus? licet enim mihi, M. fill, apud te gloriari, ad quem et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet. Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus hoc tribuit, ut diceret frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in rem publicam beneficio, ubi triumpharet, esset habiturus. Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est. 1.79. Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo excelso magnificoque quaerimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen corpus et ita afficiendum est, ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. Honestum autem id, quod exquirimus, totum est positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non minorem utilitatem afferunt, qui togati rei publicae praesunt, quam qui bellum gerunt. Itaque eorum consilio saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta bella sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas. 1.80. Quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere. 1.81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: Non putaram. Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 1.82. De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. Idque est magni viri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere. Ut enim sunt, quem ad modum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas antepot, sic reperias multos, quibus periculosa et calida consilia quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur. 1.83. Numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles timidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quare in tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipiscare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali. Periculosae autem rerum actiones partim iis sunt, qui eas suscipiunt, partim rei publicae. Itemque alii de vita, alii de gloria et benivolentia civium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore et gloria quam de ceteris commodis. 1.84. Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam profundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant; quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque haec quidem Lacedaemoniis plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt. Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim, qui, quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant dicere. 1.85. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis praecepta teneant, unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum. 1.86. Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et fortis civis et in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit tradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur totamque eam sic tuebitur, ut omnibus consulat; nec vero criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque ita iustitiae honestatique adhaerescet, ut, dum ea conservet, quamvis graviter offendat mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat illa, quae dixi. 1.87. Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare apud eundem est Platonem, similiter facere eos, qui inter se contenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret. Idemque praecipit, ut eos adversaries existimemus, qui arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint, qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio. 1.88. Nec vero audiendi, qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et altitudo animi, quae dicitur, ne, si irascamur aut intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque dementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest. Omnis autem et animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, qui punitur aliquem aut verbis castigat, sed ad rei publicae utilitatem referri. 1.89. Cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. Prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo; numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent utiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est optandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur. 1.90. Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est, praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque de C. Laelio accepimus. Philippum quidem, Macedonum regem, rebus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse; itaque alter semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus; ut recte praecipere videantur, qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius. Panaetius quidem Africanum, auditorem et familiarem suum, solitum ait dicere, ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate exsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos sibique praefidentes tamquam in gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque fortunae. 1.91. Atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio amicorum iisque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas. Isdemque temporibus cavendum est, ne assentatoribus patefaciamus auris neve adulari nos sinamus, in quo falli facile est; tales enim nos esse putamus, ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur et in maximis versantur erroribus. Sed haec quidem hactenus. 1.92. Illud autem sic est iudicandum, maximas geri res et maximi animi ab iis, qui res publicas regant, quod earum administratio latissime pateat ad plurimosque pertineat; esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam seseque suarum rerum finibus continerent aut interiecti inter philosophos et eos, qui rem publicam administrarent, delectarentur re sua familiari non eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes ab eius usu suos potiusque et amicis impertientes et rei publicae, si quando usus esset. Quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso, deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia, parsimonia, tum quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat nec libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat. Haec praescripta servantem licet magnifice, graviter animoseque vivere atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter, ° vere hominum amice. 1.138. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volumus quidem certe, dicendum est etiam, qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat esse, cuius finis est usus, ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi descriptio et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia. Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse accepimus, quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis domum; quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad consulatum putabatur; hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit aedibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, summi et clarissimi viri filius, in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum rettulit, sed ignominiam etiam et calamitatem. 1.139. Orda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est, et, ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sua solum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo, adhibenda cura est laxitatis; aliter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino fit, si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando alio domino solita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur: O domus ántiqua, heu quam dispari domináre domino! quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere. 1.140. Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum sumptu et magnificentia prodeas; quo in genere multum mali etiam in exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hane partem facta principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, virtutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificentiam imitati! quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque revocandus. Eademque mediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae transferenda est. Sed haec hactenus. 1.151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt. 2.4. Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae temporibus; id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium non erat. 2.5. Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nomitur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae. Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia; cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet. 2.6. Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina virtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris? Sed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accuratius disputari solent, quod alio quodam libro fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis declarandum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad hoc nos studium potissimum contulissemus. 2.7. Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus, satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 2.8. Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota esse nolui. Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 2.9. Quinque igitur rationibus propositis officii persequendi, quarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae, copias, opes, facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, si quando ea, quae dixi, pugnare inter se viderentur, honestatis pars confecta est, quam quidem tibi cupio esse notissimam. Hoc autem, de quo nune agimus, id ipsum est, quod utile appellatur. In quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est, ut honestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid, quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum, qua nulla pernicies maior hominum vitae potuit afferri. 2.10. Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec tria genera confusa cogitatione distinguunt. Quicquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum; ex quo efficitur, ut, quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile. Quod qui parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantes malitiam sapientiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinioque omnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis, non fraude et malitia se intellegant ea, quae velint, consequi posse. 2.11. Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt iima, ut aurum, argentum, ut ea, quae gignuntur e terra, ut alia generis eiusdem, partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus. Eorum autem alia rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione utentia; expertes rationis equi, boves, reliquae pecudes, apes, quarum opere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam; ratione autem utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum hominum. Deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas, proxime autem et secundum deos homines hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt. 2.12. Earumque item rerum, quae noceant et obsint, eadem divisio est. Sed quia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse plurimum arbitrantur. Ea enim ipsa, quae iima diximus, pleraque sunt hominum operis effecta; quae nec haberemus, nisi manus et ars accessisset, nec iis sine hominum administratione uteremur. Neque enim valetudinis curatio neque navigatio neque agri cultura neque frugum fructuumque reliquorum perceptio et conservatio sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset. 2.13. Iam vero et earum rerum, quibus abundaremus, exportatio et earum, quibus egeremus, invectio certe nulla esset, nisi his muneribus homines fungerentur. Eademque ratione nec lapides ex terra exciderentur ad usum nostrum necessarii, nec ferrum, aes, aurum, argentum effoderetur penitus abditum sine hominum labore et manu. Tecta vero, quibus et frigorum vis pelleretur et calorum molestiae sedarentur, unde aut initio generi humano dari potuissent aut postea subveniri, si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae motu aut vetustate cecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset? 2.14. Adde ductus aquarum, derivationes fluminum, agrorum irrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde sine hominum opere habere possemus? Ex quibus multisque aliis perspicuum est, qui fructus quaeque utilitates ex rebus iis,quae sint iimae,percipiantur,eas nosnullo modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere potuisse. Qui denique ex bestiis fructus aut quae commoditas, nisi homines adiuvarent, percipi posset? Nam et qui principes inveniendi fuerunt, quem ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nec hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare aut tueri aut tempestivos fructus ex iis capere possemus; ab eisdemque et, quae nocent, interficiuntur et, quae usui possunt esse, capiuntur. 2.15. Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset? Qui enim aegris subveniretur, quae esset oblectatio valentium, qui victus aut cultus, nisi tam multae nobis artes ministrarent? quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum distat a victu et cultu bestiarum. Urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent nec aedificari nec frequentari; ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum iuris aequa discriptio certaque vivendi disciplina; quas res et mansuetudo animorum consecuta et verecundia est effectumque, ut esset vita munitior, atque ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus et commodandis nulla re egeremus. 2.16. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur, neminem neque ducem bello nec principem domi magnas res et salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia testibus non necessariis. Atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab homine nascatur. Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam omni reliqua calamitate. 2.17. Cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque, quae in rebus iimis quaeque in usu et tractatione beluarum fiunt utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem studia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur. 2.18. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gigtur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit, alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci pa/qh nomit, appetitionesque, quas illi o(rma/s, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur. 2.19. Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatem assequi possimus, ut hominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus, dicemus, neque ita multo post, sed pauca ante dicenda sunt. Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel adversas, quis ignorat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad exitus pervehimur optatos et, cum reflavit, affligimur. Haec igitur ipsa fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab iimis procellas, tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia, deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus, impetus; haec ergo, ut dixi, rariora. 2.20. At vero interitus exercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, clades imperatorum, ut nuper summi et singularis viri, invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugae, rursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, victoriae, quamquam fortuita sunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici possunt. Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus. Quae si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse etiam brevior videbitur. 2.21. Quaecumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum, aut benivolentiae gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa quempiam diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, quemque dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant, aut cui fidem habent et bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur, aut cuius opes metuunt, aut contra, a quibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones aliquas proponunt, aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae sordidissima, est illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima et iis, qui ea tenentur, et illis, qui ad eam confugere cotur; 2.22. male enim se res habet, cum, quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. Sed quoniam non numquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quem ad modum sit utendum eo, dicemus, si prius iis de rebus, quae virtuti propiores sunt, dixerimus. Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati de causis pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine aut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu ne vi parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis promissisque capti aut postremo, ut saepe in nostra re publica videmus, mercede conducti. 2.23. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nec alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius: Quém metuunt, odérunt; quem quisque ódit, periisse éxpetit. Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa pertulit civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo, interitus declarat, quantum odium hominum valeat ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit; malus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis vel ad perpetuitatem. 2.24. Sed iis, qui vi oppresses imperio coercent, sit sane adhibenda saevitia, ut eris in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis nihil potest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latissime patet neque ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum, id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime, quae volemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur. Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. 2.25. Quid enim censemus superiorem ilium Dionysium quo cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente carbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum Pheraeum quo animo vixisse arbitramur? qui, ut scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum diligeret, tamen ad ear ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum, et eum quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio iubebat anteire praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur arculas muliebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum occultaretur, exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret quam coniugem! Nec eum fefellit; ab ea est enim ipsa propter pelicatus suspicionem interfectus. Nec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse diuturna. 2.26. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi, Alexander, non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit. Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid? Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes fere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae calamitatis? Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, 2.27. nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari. Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria; est enim ausus dicere, hasta posita cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium et certe civium, praedam se suam vendere. Secutus est, qui in causa impia, victoria etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publicaret, sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure comprehenderet. 2.28. Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi imperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari, sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt. Multa praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol vidisset indignius, lure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multorum impunita scelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset licentia; a quo quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit hereditas. 2.29. Nec vero umquam bellorum civilium semen et causa deerit, dum homines perditi hastam illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt; quam P. Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto tricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta non recessit; alter autem, qui in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo debet intellegi talibus praemiis propositis numquam defutura bella civilia. Itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus. Atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui quam carl esse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt, quid debent putare singuli? Quod cum perspicuum sit, benivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam, sequitur, ut disseramus, quibus rebus facillime possimus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore et fide caritatem. 2.30. Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam accommodandum est, a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi. Certum igitur hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium, familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum et nostra mirantium; haec enim una res prorsus, ut non multum differat inter summos et mediocris viros, aeque utrisque est propemodum comparanda. 2.31. Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum. Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere possimus. 2.32. Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta videamus; quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco voluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit; vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum, quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem. Etenim illud ipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet animosque omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque quasi perlucet ex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, idcirco illos, in quibus eas virtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem causae diligendi gravissimae; possunt enim praetcrea non nullae esse leviores. 2.33. Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis fidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem homines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in iis fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his fortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur. 2.34. Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia nihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior, hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam fidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. 2.35. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos constet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere virtutes, nune ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur, ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus; popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur de opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum revertamur. 2.36. Erat igitur ex iis tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem, sed de iis male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii, qui nec sibi nec alteri, ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. 2.37. Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae. maioris partis animos a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors, divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis? 2.38. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum, qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur. Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriarm omnia iustitia conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur. 2.39. Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat, quibuscum possit familiares conferre sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te boni viri feras. Ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti opinio iustitiae necessaria est, eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non habebunt, iniusti habebuntur, nullis praesidiis saepti multis afficientur iniuriis. 2.40. Atque iis etiam, qui vendunt emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocitur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum, ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt; quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta re publica fore putamus? 2.41. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops multitudo ab iis, qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae regum. 2.42. Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile; neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem etiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non esset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae. Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae, quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessaries, sed etiam liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. 2.43. Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et ii ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nee simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam volet, iustitiae fungatur officiis. Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore. 2.44. Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum. 2.45. Quorum autem prima aetas propter humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii, simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere; quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur. Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae alteri praefecisset, magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publica cecidit. Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam ob rein pergarnus ad ea, quae restant. 2.46. Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores sunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia cum pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes, quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. 2.47. P. Rutili adulescentiam ad opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus. Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde mutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione nobili et gloriosa, et, qua aetate qui exercentur, laude affici solent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se in foro optime iam facere, quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude meditari. 2.48. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam eloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam alliciant militesque blande appellando sermone deliniant. Quae autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam excitat gloriam ; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam ceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas, nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente. 2.49. Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent, multique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud populum et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est admiratio in iudiciis. Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat; quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M. Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. 2.50. Sed hoc quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi aut rei publicae causa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut patrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio Iulius. In accusando etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. Semel igitur aut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est reprehendendum; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis vel potius vix hominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis. Id cum periculosum ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator nominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere nato, illius filio, qui iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit. 2.51. Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri nullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem perniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. Iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae domitis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus, quae, ut scis, exstat oratio. 2.52. Sed expositis adulescentium officiis, quae valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam, deinceps de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicendum est; cuius est ratio duplex; nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti praesertim, sed illa lautior ac splendidior et viro forti claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in utroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex area, altera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque, quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur; qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. 2.53. At qui opera, id est virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, primum, quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adiutores habebunt, dein consuetudine beneficentiae paratiores erunt et tamquam exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum. Praeclare in epistula quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: Quae te, malum! inquit, ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem sperent fore? Bene ministrum et praebitorem, quia sordidum regi, melius etiam, quod largitionem corruptelam dixit esse; fit enim deterior, qui accipit, atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior. 2.54. Hoc ille filio, sed praeceptum putemus omnibus. Quam ob rem id quidem non dubium est, quin illa benignitas, quae constet ex opera et industria, et honestior sit et latius pateat et possit prodesse pluribus; non numquam tamen est largiendum, nec hoc benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum est et saepe idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari impertiendum, sed diligenter atque moderate; multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid autem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare, ut id diutius facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae; cum enim dando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita, cum benivolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse velint, non tanta studia assequuntur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt. 2.55. Quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut eam benignitas aperire non possit, nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus; modus adhibeatur, isque referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse debemus, id quod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum iam in proverbii consuetudinem venit, largitionem fundum non habere ; etenim quis potest modus esse, cum et idem, qui consuerunt, et idem illud alii desiderent? Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi, alteri liberales: prodigi, qui epulis et viscerationibus et gladiatorum muneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas res, quarum memoriam aut brevem aut nullam omnino sint relicturi, 2.56. liberales autem, qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt aut aes alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum collocatione adiuvant aut opitulantur in re vel quaerenda vel augenda. Itaque miror, quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quem de divitiis scripsit; in quo multa praeclare, illud absurde: est enim multus in laudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium munerum taliumque sumptuum facultatem fructum divitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus liberalitatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior videtur et certior. Quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit! qui has pecuniarum effusiones non admiremur, quae fiunt ad multitudinem deliniendam. Ait enim, qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium cogerentur mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri, omnesque mirari, sed cum attenderint, veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus iacturis infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari, cum praesertim neque necessitati subveniatur nec dignitas augeatur ipsaque illa delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus capiatur, eaque a levissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria quoque moriatur voluptatis. 2.57. Bene etiam colligit, haec pueris et mulierculis et servis et servorum simillimis liberis esse grata, gravi vero homini et ea, quae fiunt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse nullo modo. Quamquam intellego in nostra civitate inveterasse iam bonis temporibus, ut splendor aedilitatum ab optimis viris postuletur. Itaque et P. Crassus cum cognomine dives, tum copiis functus est aedilicio maximo munere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo Q. Mucio magnificentissima aedilitate functus est, deinde C. Claudius App. f., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; omnes autem P. Lentulus me consule vicit superiores; hunc est Scaurus imitatus; magnificentissima vero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu; in quibus omnibus quid mihi placeat, vides. 2.58. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, homini divitissimo, praetermissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit. Quare et, si postulatur a populo, bonis viris si non desiderantibus, at tamen approbantibus faciundum est, modo pro facultatibus, nos ipsi ut fecimus, et, si quando aliqua res maior atque utilior populari largitione acquiritur, ut Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decumae nomine magno honori fuerunt. Ne M. quidem Seio vitio datum est, quod in caritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia nec turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nec maxima liberavit. Sed honori summo nuper nostro Miloni fuit, qui gladiatoribus emptis rei publicae causa, quae salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus furoresque compressit. Causa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut utile. 2.59. In his autem ipsis mediocritatis regula optima est. L. quidem Philippus Q. f., magno vir ingenio in primisque clarus, gloriari solebat se sine ullo munere adeptum esse omnia, quae haberentur amplissima. Dicebat idem Cotta, Curio. Nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo gloriari; nam pro amplitudine honorum, quos cunctis suffragiis adepti sumus nostro quidem anno, quod contigit eorum nemini, quos modo nominavi, sane exiguus sumptus aedilitatis fuit. 2.60. Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et hic ipse Panaetius, quem nultum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re publica scripsi, diligenter est disputatum. Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate moderanda est. 2.61. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod a liberalitate proficiscitur, non uno modo in disparibus causis affecti esse debemus. Alia causa est eius, qui calamitate premitur, et eius, qui res meliores quaerit nullis suis rebus adversis. 2.62. Propensior benignitas esse debebit in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In iis tamen, qui se adiuvari volent, non ne affligantur, sed ut altiorem gradum ascendant, restricti omnino esse nullo modo debemus, sed in deligendis idoneis iudicium et diligentiam adhibere. Nam praeclare Ennius: Bene fácta male locáta male facta árbitror. 2.63. Quod autem tributum est bono viro et grato, in eo cum ex ipso fructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Temeritate enim remota gratissima est liberalitas, eoque eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuiusque bonitas commune perfugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, ut iis beneficiis quam plurimos afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis posterisque prodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam fieri eumque, qui faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant. Atque haec benignitas etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e servitute captos, locupletari tenuiores; quod quidem volgo solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe antepono; haec est gravium hominum atque magnorum, illa quasi assentatorum populi multitudinis levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium. 2.64. Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum in omnique re contrahenda, vendundo emendo, conducendo locando, vicinitatibus et confiniis, aequum, facilem, multa multis de suo iure cedentem, a litibus vero, quantum liceat et nescio an paulo plus etiam, quam liceat, abhorrentem. Est enim non modo liberale paulum non numquam de suo iure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem ratio est rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi sinere flagitiosum est, sed ita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiaeque absit suspicio; posse enim liberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio nimirum est pecuniae fructus maximus. Recte etiam a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas; est enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, valde decorum patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus illustribus, idque etiam rei publicae est ornamento, homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere. Est autem etiam vehementer utile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per hospites apud externos populos valere opibus et gratia. Theophrastus quidem scribit Cimonem Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem fuisse; ita enim instituisse et vilicis imperavisse, ut omnia praeberentur, quicumque Laciades in villam suam devertisset. 2.65. Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia dantur, haec tum in universam rem publicam, tum in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure cavere, consilio iuvare, atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam plurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas pertinet et ad gratiam. Itaque cum multa praeclara maiorum, tum quod optime constituti iuris civilis summo semper in honore fuit cognitio atque interpretatio; quam quidem ante hanc confusionem temporum in possessione sua principes retinuerunt, nunc, ut honores, ut omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius scientiae splendor deletus est, idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc contigit, cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par esset, scientia facile vicisset. Haec igitur opera grata multis et ad beneficiis obstringendos homines accommodata. 2.66. Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi gravior facultas et gratior et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia praestabilius vel admiratione audientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? Huic quoque ergo a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis principatus datus. Diserti igitur hominis et facile laborantis, quodque in patriis est moribus, multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito defendentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent. 2.67. Admonebat me res, ut hoc quoque loco intermissionem eloquentiae, ne dicam interitum, deplorarem, ni vererer, ne de me ipso aliquid viderer queri. Sed tamen videmus, quibus exstinctis oratoribus quam in paucis spes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quam in multis sit audacia. Cum autem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut diserti, licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem, commendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem pro re alterius, eos ipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt, plurimum gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat industria. 2.68. Iam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu), ut animadvertant, cum iuvare alios velint, ne quos offendant. Saepe enim aut eos laedunt, quos non debent, aut eos, quos non expedit; si imprudentes, neglegentiae est, si scientes, temeritatis. Utendum etiam est excusatione adversus eos, quos invitus offendas, quacumque possis, quare id, quod feceris, necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris, ceterisque aperis et officiis erit id, quod violatum videbitur, compensandum. 2.69. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio est; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit. Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem et, qui rettulerit, habere et, qui habeat, rettulisse. At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se usos aut clientes appellari mortis instar putant. 2.70. At vero ille tenuis, cum, quicquid factum sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet, non modo illi, qui est meritus, sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat (eget enim multis), gratum se videri studet neque vero verbis auget suum munus, si quo forte fungitur, sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, si opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo aut, si forte, in liberis eius manet gratia; sin autem inopem, probum tamen et modestum, omnes non improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo est, praesidium sibi paratum vident. 2.71. Quam ob rem melius apud bonos quam apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Danda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis facere possimus; sed si res in contentionem veniet, nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui cum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam collocaret: Ego vero, inquit, malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam, quae viro. Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione divitiarum; quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet? Illum fortasse adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper; sed fac iuvare; utentior sane sit, honestior vero quo modo? Quodsi etiam bonus erit vir, ne impediant divitiae, quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque omne iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit! Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra aequitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile. 2.72. Sed, quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, quae ad singulos spectant, deinceps de iis, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem publicam pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim eius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim, singulos ut attingant; quae sunt etiam gratiora. Danda opera est omnino, si possit, utrisque, nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed ita, ut ea res aut prosit aut certe ne obsit rei publicae. C. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio; exhauriebat igitur aerarium; modica M. Octavi et rei publicae tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae salutaris. 2.73. In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit—sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, non esse in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem baberent. Capitalis oratio est, ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur hominess, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. 2.74. Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe fiebat propter aerarii tenuitatem assiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit conferendum, idque ne eveniat, multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae necessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit (malo enim quam nostrae ominari; neque tamen de nostra, sed de omni re publica disputo), danda erit opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint, necessitati esse parendum. Atque etiam omnes, qui rem publicam gubernabunt, consulere debebunt, ut earum rerum copia sit, quae sunt necessariae. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat et debeat, non est necesse disputare; est enim in promptu; tantum locus attingendus fuit. 2.75. Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et muneris publici, ut avaritiae pellatur etiam minima suspicio. Utinam, inquit C. Pontius Samnis, ad illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem natus, quando Romani dona accipere coepissent! non essem passus diutius eos imperare. Ne illi multa saecula exspectanda fuerunt; modo enim hoc malum in hanc rem publicam invasit. Itaque facile patior tum potius Pontium fuisse, siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum et decem anni sunt, cum de pecuniis repetundis a L. Pisone lata lex est, nulla antea cum fuisset. At vero postea tot leges et proximae quaeque duriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantum Italicum bellum propter iudiciorum metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudiciis expilatio direptioque sociorum, ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute valeamus. 2.76. Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit abstinens. Quidni laudet? Sed in illo alia maiora; laus abstinentiae non hominis est solum, sed etiam temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit maxima, potitus est Paulus tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil domum suam intulit praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam. Imitatus patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa. Quid? qui eius collega fuit in censura. L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum copiosissimam urbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare quam domum suam maluit; quamquam Italia ornata domus ipsa mihi videtur ornatior. 2.77. Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo, unde egressa est, referat se oratio, quam avaritia, praesertim in principibus et rem publicam gubertibus. Habere enim quaestui rem publicam non modo turpe est, sed sceleratum etiam et nefarium. Itaque, quod Apollo Pythius oraclum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis, sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis praedixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius benivolentiam multitudinis possunt ii, qui rei publicae praesunt, quam abstinentia et continentia. 2.78. Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem temptant, ut possessores pellantur suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas debitoribus condodas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei publicae, concordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum aliis adimuntur, aliis condotur pecuniae, deinde aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere suum cuique non licet. Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque custodia. 2.79. Atque in hac pernicie rei publicae ne illam quidem consequuntur, quam putant, gratiam; nam cui res erepta est, est inimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse et maxime in pecuniis creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse solvendo; at vero ille, qui accepit iniuriam, et meminit et prae se fert dolorem suum, nec, si plures sunt ii, quibus inprobe datum est, quam illi, quibus iniuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent; non enim numero haec iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet aequitatem, ut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis ante possessum, qui nullum habuit, habeat, qui autem habuit, amittat? 2.80. Ac propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum ephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat, necaverunt, exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt, ut et tyranni exsisterent et optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime constituta res publica dilaberetur; nec vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed etiam reliquam Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum, quae a Lacedaemoniis profectae manarunt latius. Quid? nostros Gracchos, Ti. Gracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariae contentiones perdiderunt? 2.81. At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum eius civitas quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem clandestine introitu urbe est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem improviso oppressisset, sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi fuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam adventu suo liberavit. Sed cum magnam animadverteret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem, quod et eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possederant, egere iniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quinquaginta annorum possessiones moveri non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur sine iniuria, iudicavit neque illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum illa fuerant, oportere. 2.82. Cum igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem constituendam pecunia, Alexandream se proficisci velle dixit remque integram ad reditum suum iussit esse, isque celeriter ad Ptolomaeum, suum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandream conditam. Cui cum exposuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque docuisset, a rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit, ut grandi pecunia adiuvaretur. Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes, cum quibus causas cognovit et eorum, qui aliena tenebant, et eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecitque aestimandis possessionibus, ut persuaderet aliis, ut pecuniam accipere mallent, possessionibus cederent, aliis, ut commodius putarent numerari sibi, quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare. Ita perfectum est, ut omnes concordia constituta sine querella discederent. 2.83. O virum magnum dignumque, qui in re publica nostra natus esset! Sic par est agere cum civibus, non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro ponere et bona civium voci subicere praeconis. At ille Graecus, id quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit, eaque est summa ratio et sapientia boni civis, commoda civium non divellere atque omnis aequitate eadem continere. Habitent gratis in alieno. Quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim, aedificarim, tuear, impendam, tu me invito fruare meo? Quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aliis dare aliena? 2.84. Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam? Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat, providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti, ut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes alienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe sublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea perfecit, cum eius iam nihil interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset. 2.85. Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur, aberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur, in primisque operam dabunt, ut iuris et iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores propter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel tenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel belli vel domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris, vectigalibus. Haec magnorum hominum sunt, haec apud maiores nostros factitata, haec genera officiorum qui persequentur, cum summa utilitate rei publicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam. 2.86. In his autem utilitatum praeceptis Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, duo praeterita censet esse a Panaetio, valetudinis curationem et pecuniae; quas res a summo philosopho praeteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles; sunt certe utiles. Sed valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis tuendi causa praetermittendis voluptatibus, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent. 2.87. Res autem famniliaris quaeri debet iis rebus, a quibus abest turpitude, conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia, eisdem etiam rebus augeri. Has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo libro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quem nos, ista fere aetate cum essemus, qua es tu nunc, e Graeco in Latinum convertimus. Sed toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia (vellem etiam de utenda), commodius a quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum medium sedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur. Sunt tamen ea cognoscenda; pertinent enim ad utilitatem, de qua hoc libro disputatum est. 2.88. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a Panaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda cum externis et externa cum corporis et ipsa inter se corporis et externa cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo comparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, cum corporis externa hoc modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus, ipsa inter se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana rusticis. 2.89. Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis: a quo cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret, respondit: Bene pascere ; quid secundum: Satis bene pascere ; quid tertium: Male pascere ; quid quartum: Arare ; et cum ille, qui quaesierat, dixisset: Quid faenerari?, tum Cato: Quid hominem, inquit, occidere? Ex quo et multis aliis intellegi debet utilitatum comparationes fieri solere, recteque hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorum officiorum genus. Reliqua deinceps persequemur. 3.7. Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile, tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. 3.16. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 3.17. Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis repugtia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio. Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni. 3.18. Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, solere modo, non etiam oportere. Etenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum sit, sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare turpissimum est. Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat considerandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit id, de quo consideretur. 3.19. Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse scelus quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero honestas utilitatem secuta est. Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile, formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. 3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.22. Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. 3.23. Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem; quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent. Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi adsumat. 3.24. Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi est. Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem. 3.25. Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse. 3.26. Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius existimat. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. 3.27. Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum. 3.28. Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam rationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia omnem societatem distrahit civitatis. Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem; qua sublata beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt, etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel externa vel corporis vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent iustitia; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum. 3.29. Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? Minime vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nonne faciat? 3.30. Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. 3.31. Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit, modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati. 3.32. Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate extermidum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore segreganda est. Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium exquiritur. 3.33. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex quibus perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinen fugiendum, quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit. Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id, quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile. 3.34. Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum, nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis, sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent, induxit earn, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugtiam. Hanc igitur partem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte nostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt. 3.35. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitude sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem re utilitas et turpitudo esse non potest. Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid honestum, id utile. 3.36. Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum est, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena, hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes dir-ptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non ferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regdi exsistunt cupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest. Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum, quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est, non vident. 3.37. Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur, quod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea deliberanda omnlino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio. Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque removenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. 3.38. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine invisitata anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit. Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae. Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam si non haberet; honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur. 3.39. Atque hoc loco philosoplis quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone; quasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Ilaec est vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidemn sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotuml, sisne facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam potest id quidem; sed quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent rustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam adhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant. Sed iam ad propositum revertamur. 3.40. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud, possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste; fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor. Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile, patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas quidem esse potuisset. At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; species enim utilitatis animum pepulit eius; 3.41. cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit hic et pietatem et humanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et tamen muri causamopposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim. 3.42. Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est. 3.43. Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet. 3.44. Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit, meminerit deum se adhibere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, quae salva fide facere possit. Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice posse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non amicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. 3.45. Loquor autem de communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest esse tale. Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut, cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa postulavisset, vas factus sit alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset, admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium ascriberent. 3.46. Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas; cum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et fides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus officii. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt, ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo. Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. 3.47. Male etiam, qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque extermit, ut Pennus apud patres nostros, Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola; usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est. Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum maxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio, nulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis obscuret. 3.48. Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere statuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis naves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum quendam suadentem ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea nulla erat repugte honestate. 3.49. Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit in contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non opus ese; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret; datus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna exspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles afferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque ear rem, quam ne audierant quidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tur quidem, cum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare, quod turpe sit, calamitosum est. 3.50. Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti nurerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.53. Immo vero, inquiet ille, necesse est, siquidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille; sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ila est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed dodum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam, sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. 3.54. Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se venditurun putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit. 3.55. Ille vero, inquit Antipater; quid est enim aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere. Diogenes contra: Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quodsi, qui proscribunt villain bonam beneque aedificatam, non existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo'? 3.56. Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae diiudicanda sunt; non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut explicaremus. 3.57. Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina? 3.58. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur. 3.59. Tum Canius: Quaeso, inquit, quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne piscium? tantumne cumbarum? Et ille: Quid mirum? inquit, hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille primo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti Pythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum nullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum essent, quod eos nullos videret. Nullae, quod sciam, inquit; sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri mirabar, quid accidisset. 3.60. Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius, collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur, quid esset dolus malus, respondebat: cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab homine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud simulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum. 3.61. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat, quicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque iste dolus malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela duodecim tabulis, circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in quibus additur EX FIDE BONA . Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba maxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS, potest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE AGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem venditor, non, qui contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit, non plus quam semel eloquetur. 3.62. Q. quidem Scaevola P. f., cum postulasset, ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur idque venditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare; addidit centum milia. Nemo est, qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant, ut si minoris, quam potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pernicies, quod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. Ex quo Ennius nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non quiret. Vere id quidem, si, quid esset prodesse, mihi cum Ennio conveniret. 3.63. Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis. Huic Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec gratia est. 3.64. Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae res sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est is, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe istum virum bonum non facile reperimus. Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile. 3.65. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili, ut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam, cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim esset in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. 3.66. Ut, cum in arce augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque Ti. Claudium Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum altitudo officeret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam vendidit, emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus illud idem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum demolitus esset cognossetque Claudium aedes postea proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri iussus, arbitrum ilium adegit, QUICQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX FIDE BONA. M. Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim ceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit, ex filio est nomidus)—is igitur iudex ita pronuntiavit: cum in vendendo rem eam scisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere. 3.67. Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium, quod nosset venditor. Quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius ille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi reticentiae iure civili conlprehendi non possunt; quae autem possunt, diligenter tenentur. M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster, C. Sergio Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante annis emerat. Eae serviebant, sed hoc in mancipio Marius non dixerat. Adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urguebat, quod vitii venditor non dixisset sciens, id oportere praestari, aequitatem Antonius, quoniam id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendidisset, nihil fuisse necesse dici, nec eum esse deceptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret. 3.68. Quorsus haec? Ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos. Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias, leges, quatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et intellegentia. Ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid simulate, ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas, etiarnsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo insequente saepe incidunt. Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam plagam ponas, domum propter vitia vendas, in ear aliquis incurrat imprudens? 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. 3.70. Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint boni, et quid sit bene agi, magna quaestio est. Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus iis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus, fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus vitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere, praesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque cuique praestare oporteret. 3.71. Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, quae volt illa quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum. Prudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si omnia, quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante. Nec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione venditoris fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de furtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum alia causa est. 3.72. Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec ulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio intellegentiae; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisque reperietur, qui impunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria? 3.73. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de sicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco disserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed vinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec consideremus, quae faciunt ii, qui habentur boni. L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e Graecia Romamn attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt heredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis potentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem nullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non repudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur? Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi mortuum; 3.74. sed, cum Basilus M. Satrium, sororis filium, nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni et Sabini; o turpem notam temporum nomen illorum !), non erat aequum principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen pervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque propulsat, cum potest, iniuste facit, ut in primo libro disserui, qualis habendus est is, qui non modo non repellit, set etiam adiuvat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae videntur, si sunt malitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate, sed simulatione quaesitae. Atqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri solet. 3.75. Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula. Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus. Sic enim cogitans: Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc expedit, res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus, nescire fateatur. 3.76. At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam notionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat cum virum bonum esse, qui prosit, quibus possit, noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in eorum locum ipse succedat? Non igitur faciat, dixerit quis, quod utile sit, quod expediat? Immo intellegat nihil nec expedire nec utile esse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non poterit. 3.82. Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri boni et splendorem et nomen amittas? Quid est, quod afferre tantum utilitas ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit? Quid enim interest, utrum ex homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat beluae? Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dum modo potentiam consequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset? Utile ei videbatur plurimum posse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset, non videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res possit intellegi: Nam sí violandum est Iús, regdi grátia Violándum est; aliis rébus pietatém colas. Capitalis Eteocles vel potius Euripides, qui id unum, quod omnum sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit! 3.83. Quid igitur minuta colligimus, hereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque perfecerit! Hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est; probat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in ea civitate, quae libera fuerit quaeque esse debeat, regnare, sed ei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo potius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere? Potest enim, di immortales! cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium patriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civibus parens nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda utilitas est, et quidem sic, ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur. 3.90. Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique sapientes, sibine uter que rapiat, an alter cedat alteri? Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa vivere. Quid, si haec paria in utroque? Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut micando victus alteri cedet alter. Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id magistratibus filius? Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat patrem, si arguatur. Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis? Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere cives in parentes. Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater, silebitne filius? Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet, accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res spectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris. 1.25.  Again, men seek riches partly to supply the needs of life, partly to secure the enjoyment of pleasure. With those who cherish higher ambitions, the desire for wealth is entertained with a view to power and influence and the means of bestowing favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since declared that no amount of wealth was enough for the man who aspired to be the foremost citizen of the state, unless with the income from it he could maintain an army. Fine establishments and the comforts of life in elegance and abundance also afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it gives rise to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not mean to find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided. 1.26.  The great majority of people, however, when they fall a prey to ambition for either military or civil authority, are carried away by it so completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. For Ennius says: "There is no fellowship inviolate, No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;" and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide application. For whenever a situation is of such a nature that not more than one can hold pre-eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes so keen that it is an extremely difficult matter to maintain a "fellowship inviolate." We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar, who, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had conceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest souls and in the most brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and military authority, for power, and for glory, springing; and therefore we must be the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction. 1.28.  The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or expense; or through indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion. But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that it is voluntary. 1.43.  Now, there are many — and especially those who are ambitious for eminence and glory — who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous if it is not at the same time just. 1.44.  The second point for the exercise of caution was that our beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults: first they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or moral goodness. 1.54.  For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; 1.57.  But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. 1.58.  Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. 1.61.  We must realize, however, that while we have set down four cardinal virtues from which as sources moral rectitude and moral duty emanate, that achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the world which is won with a spirit great, exalted, and superior to the vicissitudes of earthly life. And so, when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to rise to our lips is, if possible, something like this: "For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden a man's;" and this: "Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood." When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or other praise in more eloquent strain the brave and noble work of some great soul. Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and countless others, and, above all, the Roman People as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory, moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in soldier's garb. 1.62.  But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The Stoics, therefore, correctly define courage as "that virtue which champions the cause of right." Accordingly, no one has attained to true glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right. 1.63.  This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice. 1.64.  But the mischief is that from this exaltation and greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power. For just as Plato tells us that the whole national character of the Spartans was on fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the more ambitious he is to be the foremost citizen, or, I should say rather, to be sole ruler. But when one begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential to justice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be constrained either by argument or by any public and lawful authority; but they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public life, seeking to obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force rather than equals through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for being guilty of injustice. 1.65.  So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. 1.66.  The soul that is altogether courageous and great is marked above all by two characteristics: one of these is indifference to outward circumstances; for such a person cherishes the conviction that nothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to be either admired or wished for or striven after, and that he ought not to be subject to any man or any passion or any accident of fortune. The second characteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in the way above mentioned, one should do deeds not only great and in the highest degree useful, but extremely arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both to life and to many things that make life worth living. 1.67.  All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. 1.68.  Moreover, it would be inconsistent for the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for the man who has shown himself invincible to toil to be conquered by pleasure. We must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also beware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic of narrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches; and there is nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if one does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality, if one does possess it. As I said before, we must also beware of ambition for glory; for it robs us of liberty, and in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake everything. And one ought not to seek military authority; nay, rather it ought sometimes to be declined, sometimes to be resigned. 1.69.  Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers and certain other earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates. 1.70.  Such men have had the same aims as kings — to suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty, that is, in its essence, to live just as they please. So, while this desire is common to men of political ambitions and men of retirement, of whom I have just spoken, the one class think they can attain their end if they secure large means; the other, if they are content with the little they have. And, in this matter, neither way of thinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to others, while the career of those who apply themselves to statecraft and to conducting great enterprises is more profitable to mankind and contributes more to their own greatness and renown. 1.71.  So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius who have devoted themselves to learning must be excused for not taking part in public affairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some still more valid reason have retired from the service of the state and left to others the opportunity and the glory of its administration. But if those who have no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and military offices, which most people admire, I think that this should be set down not to their credit but to their discredit; for in so far as they care little, as they say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult not to sympathize with their attitude; in reality however, they seem to dread the toil and trouble and also, perhaps, the discredit and humiliation of political failure and defeat. For there are people who in opposite circumstances do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for pleasure but in pain they are too sensitive; they are indifferent to glory, but they are crushed by disgrace and even in their inconsistency they show no great consistency. 1.72.  But those whom Nature has endowed with the capacity for administering public affairs should put aside all hesitation, enter the race for public office and take a hand in directing the government; for in no other way can a government be administered or greatness of spirit be made manifest. Statesmen too, no less than philosophers — perhaps even more so — should carry with them that greatness of spirit and indifference to outward circumstances to which I so often refer, together with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free from worries and lead a dignified and self-consistent life. 1.73.  This is easier for the philosophers; as their life is less exposed to the assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer; and, if any misfortune overtakes them, their fall is not so disastrous. Not without reason, therefore, are stronger emotions aroused in those who engage in public life than in those who live in retirement, and greater is their ambition for success; the more, therefore, do they need to enjoy greatness of spirit and freedom from annoying cares. If anyone is entering public life, let him beware of thinking only of the honour that it brings; but let him be sure also that he has the ability to succeed. At the same time, let him take care not to lose heart too readily through discouragement nor yet to be over-confident through ambition. In a word, before undertaking any enterprise, careful preparation must be made. 1.74.  Most people think that the achievements of war are more important than those of peace; but this opinion needs to be corrected. For many men have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for fame. This is notably the case with men of great spirit and natural ability, and it is the more likely to happen, if they are adapted to a soldier's life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the facts, we shall find that there have been many instances of achievement in peace more important and no less renowned than in war. 1.75.  However highly Themistocles, for example, may be extolled — and deservedly — and however much more illustrious his name may be than Solon's, and however much Salamis may be cited as witness of his most glorious victory — a victory glorified above Solon's statesmanship in instituting the Areopagus — yet Solon's achievement is not to be accounted less illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served the state once and only once; while Solon's work will be of service for ever. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the institutions of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles could not readily point to any instance in which he himself had rendered assistance to the Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert that Themistocles had received assistance from it; for the war was directed by the counsels of that senate which Solon had created. 1.76.  The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Although it is thought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her supremacy, yet these are not even remotely to be compared with the legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, it was due to these that Pausanias and Lysander had armies so brave and so well disciplined. For my own part, I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to Gaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey, when I was engaged in public life. For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater service to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same time by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official authority, by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that, executed as a political measure without the help of an army. 1.77.  The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I am told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail: "Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises, ye laurels." Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I was at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the most desperate traitors — dropped to the ground of their own accord! What achievement in war, then, was ever so great? 1.78.  What triumph can be compared with that? For I may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds. And it was to me, too, that Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with the honour of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, when he said that his third triumph would have been gained in vain, if he were not to have through my services to the state a place in which to celebrate it. There are, therefore, instances of civic courage that are not inferior to the courage of the soldier. Nay, the former calls for even greater energy and greater devotion than the latter. 1.79.  That moral goodness which we look for in a lofty, high-minded spirit is secured, of course, by moral, not by physical, strength. And yet the body must be trained and so disciplined that it can obey the dictates of judgment and reason in attending to business and in enduring toil. But that moral goodness which is our theme depends wholly upon the thought and attention given to it by the mind. And, in this way, the men who in a civil capacity direct the affairs of the nation render no less important service than they who conduct its wars: by their statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or terminated; sometimes also they are declared. Upon Marcus Cato's counsel, for example, the Third Punic War was undertaken, and in its conduct his influence was domit, even after he was dead. 1.80.  And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace. But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not to swerve from the path of reason. 1.81.  Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say, "I had not thought of that." These are the activities that mark a spirit strong, high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace. 1.82.  As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness. And it is great man's duty in troublous times to single out the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honourable course. For whereas there are many, as I have said before, who place the achievements of war above those of peace, so one may find many to whom adventurous, hot-headed counsels seem more brilliant and more impressive than calm and well-considered measures. 1.83.  We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming cowardly and craven in our avoidance of danger; but we must also beware of exposing ourselves to danger needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than that. Accordingly, in encountering danger we should do as doctors do in their practice: in light cases of illness they give mild treatment; in cases of dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply hazardous and even desperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm, would pray for a storm; a wise man's way is, when the storm does come, to withstand it with all the means at his command, and especially, when the advantages to be expected in case of a successful issue are greater than the hazards of the struggle. The dangers attending great affairs of state fall sometimes upon those who undertake them, sometimes upon the state. In carrying out such enterprises, some run the risk of losing their lives, others their reputation and the good-will of their fellow-citizens. It is our duty, then, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and to hazard honour and glory more readily than other advantages. 1.84.  Many, on the other hand, have been found who were ready to pour out not only their money but their lives for their country and yet would not consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory — even though the interests of their country demanded it. For example, when Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen to the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement with the Athenians. His answer to them was that "the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself." And yet what he did dealt only a slight blow to Sparta; there was another which proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism recklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that, the Spartan power fell. How much better was the conduct of Quintus Maximus! of him Ennius says: "One man — and he alone — restored our state by delaying. Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety; Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever brighter." This sort of offence must be avoided no less in political life. For there are men who for fear of giving offence do not dare to express their honest opinion, no matter how excellent. 1.85.  Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element — dissension and party strife. The result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole. 1.86.  As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose at Athens, and in our own country not only dissensions but also disastrous civil wars broke out. All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and worthy of a leading place in the state will shun with abhorrence; he will dedicate himself unreservedly to his country, without aiming at influence or power for himself; and he will devote himself to the state in its entirety in such a way as to further the interests of all. Besides, he will not expose anyone to hatred or disrepute by groundless charges, but he will surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that he will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than be untrue to them, and will face death itself rather than renounce them. 1.87.  A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering and scrambling for office. Concerning this also we find a fine thought in Plato: "Those who compete against one another," he says, "to see which of two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors quarrelling as to which one of them shall do the steering." And he likewise lays down the rule that we should regard only those as adversaries who take up arms against the state, not those who strive to have the government administered according to their convictions. This was the spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus: there was in it no trace of rancour. 1.88.  Neither must we listen to those who think that one should indulge in violent anger against one's political enemies and imagine that such is the attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For nothing is more commendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than courtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy equal rights before the law, we must school ourselves to affability and what is called "mental poise"; for if we are irritated when people intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make unreasonable requests, we shall develop a sour, churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and offensive to others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbearance are to be commended only with the understanding that strictness may be exercised for the good of the state; for without that, the government cannot be well administered. On the other hand, if punishment or correction must be administered, it need not be insulting; it ought to have regard to the welfare of the state, not to the personal satisfaction of the man who administers the punishment or reproof. 1.89.  We should take care also that the punishment shall not be out of proportion to the offence, and that some shall not be chastised for the same fault for which others are not even called to account. In administering punishment it is above all necessary to allow no trace of anger. For if any one proceeds in a passion to inflict punishment, he will never observe that happy mean which lies between excess and defect. This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics and wisely approved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But, in reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated; and it is to be desired that they who administer the government should be like the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice. 1.90.  Again, when fortune smiles and the stream of life flows according to our wishes, let us diligently avoid all arrogance, haughtiness, and pride. For it is as much a sign of weakness to give way to one's feelings in success as it is in adversity. But it is a fine thing to keep an unruffled temper, an unchanging mien, and the same cast of countece in every condition of life; this, history tells us, was characteristic of Socrates and no less of Gaius Laelius. Philip, king of Macedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and fame, was superior to him in affability and refinement. Philip, accordingly, was always great; Alexander, often infamously bad. There seems to be sound advice, therefore, in this word of warning: "The higher we are placed, the more humbly should we walk." Panaetius tells us that Africanus, his pupil and friend, used to say: "As, when horses have become mettlesome and unmanageable on account of their frequent participation in battles, their owners put them in the hands of trainers to make them more tractable; so men, who through prosperity have become restive and over self-confident, ought to be put into the training-ring, so to speak, of reason and learning, that they may be brought to comprehend the frailty of human affairs and the fickleness of fortune." 1.91.  The greater our prosperity, moreover, the more should we seek the counsel of friends, and the greater the heed that should be given to their advice. Under such circumstances also we must beware of lending an ear to sycophants or allowing them to impose upon us with their flattery. For it is easy in this way to deceive ourselves, since we thus come to think ourselves duly entitled to praise; and to this frame of mind a thousand delusions may be traced, when men are puffed up with conceit and expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule by committing the most egregious blunders. So much for this subject. 1.92.  To revert to the original question — we must decide that the most important activities, those most indicative of a great spirit, are performed by the men who direct the affairs of nations; for such public activities have the widest scope and touch the lives of the most people. But even in the life of retirement there are and there have been many high-souled men who have been engaged in important inquiries or embarked on most important enterprises and yet kept themselves within the limits of their own affairs; or, taking a middle course between philosophers on the one hand and statesmen on the other, they were content with managing their own property — not increasing it by any and every means nor debarring their kindred from the enjoyment of it, but rather, if ever there were need, sharing it with their friends and with the state. Only let it, in the first place, be honestly acquired, by the use of no dishonest or fraudulent means; let it, in the second place, increase by wisdom, industry, and thrift; and, finally, let it be made available for the use of as many as possible (if only they are worthy) and be at the service of generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality and excess. By observing these rules, one may live in magnificence, dignity, and independence, and yet in honour, truth and charity toward all. 1.138.  But since I am investigating this subject in all its phases (at least, that is my purpose), I must discuss also what sort of house a man of rank and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime object is serviceableness. To this the plan of the building should be adapted; and yet careful attention should be paid to its convenience and distinction. We have heard that Gnaeus Octavius — the first of that family to be elected consul — distinguished himself by building upon the Palatine an attractive and imposing house. Everybody went to see it, and it was thought to have gained votes for the owner, a new man, in his canvass for the consulship. That house Scaurus demolished, and on its site he built an addition to his own house. Octavius, then, was the first of his family to bring the honour of a consulship to his house; Scaurus, thought the son of a very great and illustrious man, brought to the same house, when enlarged, not only defeat, but disgrace and ruin. 1.139.  The truth is, a man's dignity may be enhanced by the house he lives in, but not wholly secured by it; the owner should bring honour to his house, not the house to its owner. And, as in everything else a man must have regard not for himself alone but for others also, so in the home of a distinguished man, in which numerous guests must be entertained and crowds of every sort of people received, care must be taken to have it spacious. But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an air of lonesomeness, a spacious palace often becomes a discredit to its owner. This is sure to be the case if at some other time, when it had a different owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant, when passers-by remark: "O good old house, alas! how different The owner who now owneth thee!" And in these times that may be said of many a house! 1.140.  One must be careful, too, not to go beyond proper bounds in expense and display, especially if one is building for oneself. For much mischief is done in their way, if only in the example set. For many people imitate zealously the foibles of the great, particularly in this direction: for example, who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus, excellent man that he was? But how many there are who have copied the magnificence of his villas! Some limit should surely be set to this tendency and it should be reduced at least to a standard of moderation; and by that same standard of moderation the comforts and wants of life generally should be regulated. But enough on this part of my theme. 1.151.  But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived — medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching — these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point. 2.4.  And since my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I had been well-read along these lines of thought from my early youth, that the most honourable way for me to forget my sorrows would be by turning to philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great deal of time to philosophy as a discipline; but after I began to fill the high offices of state and devoted myself heart and soul to the public service, there was only so much time for philosophical studies as was left over from the claims of my friends and of the state; all of this was spent in reading; I had no leisure for writing. 2.5.  Therefore, amid all the present most awful calamities I yet flatter myself that I have won this good out of evil — that I may commit to written form matters not at all familiar to our countrymen but still very much worth their knowing. For what, in the name of heaven, is more to be desired than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better for a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will translate the word into our idiom, than "the love of wisdom." Wisdom, moreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is "the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which those things are controlled." And if the man lives who would belittle the study of philosophy, I quite fail to see what in the world he would see fit to praise. 2.6.  For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively promote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of character and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no "method" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least important concerns is without its method, is the language of people who talk without due reflection and blunder in matters of the utmost importance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where shall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of learning? Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books. For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit. 2.7.  But people raise other objections against me â€” and that, too, philosophers and scholars — asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct — for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable. 2.8.  What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides. But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my "Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your master — and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that illustrious sect — still I wish our school, which is closely related to yours, not to be unknown to you. Let us now proceed to the task in hand. 2.9.  Five principles, accordingly, have been laid down for the pursuance of duty: two of them have to do with propriety and moral rectitude; two, with the external conveniences of life — means, wealth, influence; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the four first mentioned seem to be in conflict. The division treating of moral rectitude, then, has been completed, and this is the part with which I desire you to be most familiar. The principle with which we are now dealing is that one which is called Expediency. The usage of this word has been corrupted and perverted and has gradually come to the point where, separating moral rectitude from expediency, it is accepted that a thing may be morally right without being expedient, and expedient without being morally right. No more pernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life. 2.10.  There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very highest reputation who distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions, although they are indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For whatever is just, they hold, is also expedient; and, in like manner, whatever is morally right is also just. It follows, then, that whatever is morally right is also expedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that theory do often, in their admiration for shrewd and clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But they must be disabused of this error and their way of thinking must be wholly converted to the hope and conviction that it is only by moral character and righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that they may attain to the objects of their desires. 2.11.  of the things, then, that are essential to the sustece of human life, some are iimate (gold and silver, for example, the fruits of the earth, and so forth), and some are animate and have their own peculiar instincts and appetites. of these again some are rational, others irrational. Horses, oxen, and the other cattle, [bees,] whose labour contributes more or less to the service and subsistence of man, are not endowed with reason; of rational beings two divisions are made — gods and men. Worship and purity of character will win the favour of the gods; and next to the gods, and a close second to them, men can be most helpful to men. 2.12.  The same classification may likewise be made of the things that are injurious and hurtful. But, as people think that the gods bring us no harm, they decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that men are most hurtful to men. As for mutual helpfulness, those very things which we have called iimate are for the most part themselves produced by man's labours; we should not have them without the application of manual labour and skill nor could we enjoy them without the intervention of man. And so with many other things: for without man's industry there could have been no provisions for health, no navigation, no agriculture, no ingathering or storing of the fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. 2.13.  Then, too, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities or importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By the same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the stone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor would "iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for the human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the discomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or of earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not the bonds of social life taught men in such events to look to their fellow-men for help? 2.14.  Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these without the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is obvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands, have received the profits and the benefits accruing from iimate things. Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the cooperation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering what use could be made of each beast; and to‑day, if it were not for man's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care of them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too, noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured. 2.15.  Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would not be worth living at all? For how would the sick be healed? What pleasure would the hale enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there were not so many arts to master to our wants? In all these respects the civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the comforts and wants of the lower animals. And, without the association of men, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city life, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable distribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these institutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others, with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and by giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and conveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants. 2.16.  I have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are not self-evident — namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as a statesman at home, could have accomplished great things for the benefit of the state, without the hearty co‑operation of other men? He cites the deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he says, could not have achieved so great success without the support of other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact that no one questions. And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the sympathetic cooperation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a book by Dicaearchus on "The Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous and eloquent Peripatetic, and he gathered together all the other causes of destruction — floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of men — that is, by wars or revolutions — than by any and all other sorts of calamity. 2.17.  Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human life derives from iimate objects and from the employment and use of animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the cooperation of men, on the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests, is secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior ability]. 2.18.  And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties; the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses (ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their cooperation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward of any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit. 2.19.  I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say a few words by way of preface. Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to the wished‑for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual calamities, arising, first, from iimate Nature — hurricanes, storms, shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild beasts — kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are comparatively rare. 2.20.  But think, on the one side, of the destruction of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and military honours, and the victories, — though all these contain an element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good or for ill, without the influence and the cooperation of our fellow-men. With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to explain how we can win the affectionate cooperation of our fellows and enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short. 2.21.  Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise his estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives: (1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of him; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think him deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may have confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own interests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the contrary, hope for some favour — as, for example, when princes or demagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by the promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and most sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for those who venture to resort to it. 2.22.  For things are in a bad way, when that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But since recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I shall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those qualities which are more closely allied to merit. Now, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's authority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by gratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence of that other's social position or by the hope that their submission will turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled perforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of money and by liberal promises; or, finally, (6) they may be bribed with money, as we have frequently seen in our own country. 2.23.  But, of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence and hold it fast than love; nothing is more foreign to that end than fear. For Ennius says admirably: "Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him dead." And we recently discovered, if it was not known before, that no amount of power can withstand the hatred of the many. The death of this tyrant, whose yoke the state endured under the constraint of armed force and whom it still obeys more humbly than ever, though he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and the same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of whom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a poor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may be trusted to keep it safe for ever. 2.24.  But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have to employ severity — masters, for example, toward their servants, when these cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a free state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are the maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by some one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so intimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through unvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some high office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with keener fangs than freedom never endangered. Let us, then, embrace this policy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not only of security but also of influence and power — namely, to banish fear and cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in private and in public life. Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of those whom they intimidate. 2.25.  What, for instance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting fears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he used to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he dearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet-hall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian — one, too, tattooed like a Thracian, as the records state — to go before him with a drawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into the lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not concealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded slave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was murdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity. 2.26.  And indeed no power is strong enough to be lasting if it labours under the weight of fear. Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious beyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that tyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him with one accord. Again, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius and march over as one man to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy tyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view their disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators? I prefer in this connection to draw my illustrations from foreign history rather than from our own. Let me add, however, that as long as the empire of the Roman People maintained itself by acts of service, not of oppression, wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to safeguard our supremacy; the end of our wars was marked by acts of clemency or by only a necessary degree of severity; the senate was a haven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; 2.27.  and the highest ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and allies with justice and honour. 2.28.  And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed and ruined, we have seen a model of Marseilles carried in a triumphal procession, to serve as proof to the world that the supremacy of the people had been forfeited; and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city without whose help our generals have never gained a triumph for their wars beyond the Alps. I might mention many other outrages against our allies, if the sun had ever beheld anything more infamous than this particular one. Justly, therefore, are we being punished. For if we had not allowed the crimes of many to go unpunished, so great licence would never have centred in one individual. His estate descended by inheritance to but a few individuals, his ambitions to many scoundrels. 2.29.  And never will the seed and occasion of civil war be wanting, so long as villains remember that bloodstained spear and hope to see another. As Publius Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman was dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not shrink from a still more criminal spear. And still another Sulla, who was a mere clerk under the former dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor. From this, one would realize that, if such rewards are offered, civil wars will never cease to be. And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing — and even they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes — but our republic we have lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is while we have preferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection, that all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution could overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what ought private individuals to expect? And since it is manifest that the power of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains for us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection, linked with honour and confidence, which we desire. 2.30.  But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be determined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether it is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the love of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and absolute essential — that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate and loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both. 2.31.  All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled "Laelius." Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I have published two books on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business. The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once. 2.32.  But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at good-will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally through kind services; next to that, it is elicited by the will to do a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too, the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere name and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all those virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability of manner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and propriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts both by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with most lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore, compelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those virtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to love — not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides. 2.33.  Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we think have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in men who are just and true — that is, good men — on the definite assumption that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care. 2.34.  of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all. 2.35.  But I am afraid someone may wonder why I am now separating the virtues — as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject. 2.36.  The third, then, of the three conditions I name as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy, and indifferent. 2.37.  On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue? 2.38.  As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous virtue — and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him tried as by fire. Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried away. 2.39.  Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls for human co‑operation — first and above all, in order that one may have friends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy, unless he is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns society and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for justice is essential — even more so than to others; for they who do not have it [but are considered unjust] will have no defence to protect them and so will be the victims of many kinds of wrong. 2.40.  So also to buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct of business. Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius — the one surnamed "the Wise" — in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms, and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an easy conquest. Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts? 2.41.  Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy justice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was conspicuous for his virtue; and, as he shielded the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. 2.42.  For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice. This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honour and glory. But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring expenses — both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of life — so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to account. And yet, as Socrates used to express it so admirably, 2.43.  "the nearest way to glory — a short cut, as it were — is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but, for brevity's sake: I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus, Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose murder was justifiable. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book. 2.44.  But, although the very essence of the problem is that we actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being what we are. For, if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be kept a secret. 2.45.  Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition. Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare was almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has coincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime, the other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit accorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic. The subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history, but the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel. 2.46.  As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation, then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. Next to that, young men win recognition most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they have themselves selected them for imitation. 2.47.  His frequent visits to the home of Publius Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to gain a reputation for integrity of character and for ability as a jurisconsult. Not so, however, Lucius Crassus; for, though he was a mere boy, he looked to no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided ability he won for himself in that brilliant and famous prosecution a splendid reputation as an orator. And at an age when young men are accustomed with their school exercises to win applause as students of oratory, this Roman Demosthenes, Lucius Crassus, was already proving himself in the law-courts a master of the art which he might even then have been studying at home with credit to himself. 2.48.  But as the classification of discourse is a twofold one — conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other — there can be no doubt that of the two this debating power (for that is what we mean by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet, it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers think him understanding and wise beyond all others. And, if his speech have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man. 2.49.  But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for eloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained distinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies, and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite the highest admiration. The classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are divided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the defence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still that of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation. I spoke of Crassus a moment ago; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the same success. A prosecution brought the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius into favourable notice, when he brought an action against Gaius Norbanus, a seditious and dangerous citizen. 2.50.  But this should not be done often — never, in fact, except in the interest of the state (as in the cases of those above mentioned) or to avenge wrongs (as the two Luculli, for example, did) or for the protection of our provincials (as I did in the defence of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prosecution of Albucius in behalf of the Sardinians). The activity of Lucius Fufius in the impeachment of Manius Aquilius is likewise famous. This sort of work, then, may be done once in a lifetime, or at all events not often. But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent prosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no disgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of her enemies. And yet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires a heartless man, it seems, or rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one person after another on capital charges. It is not only fraught with danger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to allow himself to be called a prosecutor. Such was the effect of this epithet upon Marcus Brutus, the scion of a very noble family and the son of that Brutus who was an eminent authority in the civil law. 2.51.  Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed: never prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent. For that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men the eloquence bestowed by Nature for the safety and protection of our fellowmen? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a guilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible, even if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for the defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of someone in power. This I have done on many other occasions; and once in particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus Roscius of Ameria against the power of Lucius Sulla when he was acting the tyrant. The speech is published, as you know. 2.52.  Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in so far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory, I must next in order discuss kindness and generosity. The manner of showing it is twofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or by gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich man; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a strong and eminent man. For, although both ways alike betray a generous wish to oblige, still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon one's bank account, in the other upon one's personal energy; and the bounty which is drawn from one's material substance tends to exhaust the very fountain of liberality. Liberality is thus forestalled by liberality: for the more people one has helped with gifts of money, the fewer one can help. 2.53.  But if people are generous and kind in the way of personal service — that is, with their ability and personal effort — various advantages arise: first, the more people they assist, the more helpers they will have in works of kindness; and second, by acquiring the habit of kindness they are better prepared and in better training, as it were, for bestowing favours upon many. In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for trying by gifts of money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians: "What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope," he says, "as that those men would be loyal subjects to you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward and purveyor?" "Steward and purveyor" was well said, because it was degrading for a prince; better still, when he called the gift of money "corruption." For the recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to be constantly looking for one bribe after another. 2.54.  It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take it diligently to heart. That liberality, therefore, which consists in personal service and effort is more honourable, has wider application, and can benefit more people. There can be no doubt about that. Nevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of liberality is not to be discouraged altogether. We must often distribute from our purse to the worthy poor, but we must do so with discretion and moderation. For many have squandered their patrimony by indiscriminate giving. But what is worse folly than to do the thing you like in such a way that you can no longer do it at all? Then, too, lavish giving leads to robbery; for when through over-giving men begin to be impoverished, they are constrained to lay their hands on the property of others. And so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of winning good-will, the affection they gain from the object of their gifts is not so great as the hatred they incur from those whom they despoil. 2.55.  One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous impulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to everybody. A limit should be observed and that limit should be determined by our means. We ought, in a word, to remember the phrase, which, through being repeated so very often by our countrymen, has come to be a common proverb: "Bounty has no bottom." For indeed what limit can there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive gifts claim what they have been in the habit of getting, and those who have not wish for the same bounty? There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the one class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those who squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast fights — vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none at all. 2.56.  The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends' debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them in acquiring property or increasing what they have. 2.57.  His conclusion, too, is excellent: "This sort of amusement pleases children, silly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who weighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of them." And yet I realize that in our country, even in the good old times, it had become a settled custom to expect magnificent entertainments from the very best men in their year of aedileship. So both Publius Crassus, who was not merely surnamed "The Rich" but was rich in fact, gave splendid games in his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus (with Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the world, as his colleague) gave most magnificent entertainments in his aedileship. Then came Gaius Claudius, the son of Appius, and, after him, many others — the Luculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius Lentulus, however, in the year of my consulship, eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus emulated him. And my friend Pompey's exhibitions in his second consulship were the most magnificent of all. And so you see what I think about all this sort of thing. 2.58.  Still we should avoid any suspicion of penuriousness. Mamercus was a very wealthy man, and his refusal of the aedileship was the cause of his defeat for the consulship. If, therefore, such entertainment is demanded by the people, men of right judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even if they do not like the idea. But in so doing they should keep within their means, as I myself did. They should likewise afford such entertainment, if gifts of money to the people are to be the means of securing on some occasion some more important or more useful object. Thus Orestes recently won great honour by his public dinners given in the streets, on the pretext of their being a tithe-offering. Neither did anybody find fault with Marcus Seius for supplying grain to the people at an as the peck at a time when the market-price was prohibitive; for he thus succeeded in disarming the bitter and deep-seated prejudice of the people against him at an outlay neither very great nor discreditable to him in view of the fact that he was aedile at the time. But the highest honour recently fell to my friend Milo, who bought a band of gladiators for the sake of the country, whose preservation then depended upon my recall from exile, and with them put down the desperate schemes, the reign of terror, of Publius Clodius. The justification for gifts of money, therefore, is either necessity or expediency. 2.59.  And, in making them even in such cases, the rule of the golden mean is best. To be sure, Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus, a man of great ability and unusual renown, used to make it his boast that without giving any entertainments he had risen to all the positions looked upon as the highest within the gift of the state. Cotta could say the same, and Curio. I, too, may make this boast my own — to a certain extent; for in comparison with the eminence of the offices to which I was uimously elected at the earliest legal age — and this was not the good fortune of any one of those just mentioned — the outlay in my aedileship was very inconsiderable. 2.60.  Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers do not approve of them — our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am following, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius of Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The Republic." To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our ability and regulated by the golden mean. 2.61.  Now, as touching that second division of gifts of money, those which are prompted by a spirit of generosity, we ought to look at different cases differently. The case of the man who is overwhelmed by misfortune is different from that of the one who is seeking to better his condition, though he suffers from no actual distress. 2.62.  It will be the duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, unless, perchance, they deserve their misfortune. But of course we ought by no means to withhold our assistance altogether from those who wish for aid, not to save them from utter ruin but to enable them to reach a higher degree of fortune. But, in selecting worthy cases, we ought to use judgment and discretion. For, as Ennius says so admirably, "Good deeds misplaced, methinks, are evil deeds." 2.63.  Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man who is good and grateful finds its reward, in such a case, not only in his own good-will but in that of others. For, when generosity is not indiscriminate giving, it wins most gratitude and people praise it with more enthusiasm, because goodness of heart in a man of high station becomes the common refuge of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to benefit as many as possible with such kindnesses that the memory of them shall be handed down to children and to children's children, so that they too may not be ungrateful. For all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it as a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages generosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the poor. Ransoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of charity that is a service to the state as well as to the individual. And we find in one of Crassus's orations the full proof given that such beneficence used to be the common practice of our order. This form of charity, then, I much prefer to the lavish expenditure of money for public exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth and dignity, the latter to those shallow flatterers, if I may call them so, who tickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble. 2.64.  It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the same time liberal in giving and not inconsiderate in exacting his dues, but in every business relation — in buying or selling, in hiring or letting, in relations arising out of adjoining houses and lands — to be fair, reasonable, often freely yielding much of his own right, and keeping out of litigation as far as his interests will permit and perhaps even a little farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to abate a little of one's rightful claims, but it is sometimes even advantageous. We should, however, have a care for our personal property, for it is discreditable to let it run through our fingers; but we must guard it in such a way that there shall be no suspicion of meanness or avarice. For the greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one's fortune. Hospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, and rightly so. For, as it seems to me at least, it is most proper that the homes of distinguished men should be open to distinguished guests. And it is to the credit of our country also that men from abroad do not fail to find hospitable entertainment of this kind in our city. It is, moreover, a very great advantage, too, for those who wish to obtain a powerful political influence by honourable means to be able through their social relations with their guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence abroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospitality, Theophrastus writes that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the Laciads, the people of his own deme; for he instructed his bailiffs to that end and gave them orders that every attention should be shown to any Laciad who should ever call at his country home. 2.65.  Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts of money but by personal service are bestowed sometimes upon the community at large, sometimes upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his legal rights [, to assist him with counsel,] and to serve as many as possible with that sort of knowledge tends greatly to increase one's influence and popularity. Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our ancestors was the high respect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the excellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times the foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in their own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed along with offices of honour and positions of dignity; and this is the more deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a man who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his predecessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service such as this, then, finds many to appreciate it and is calculated to bind people closely to us by our good services. 2.66.  Closely connected with this profession, furthermore, is the gift of eloquence; it is at once more popular and more distinguished. For what is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has protected? It was to eloquence, therefore, that our fathers assigned the foremost rank among the civil professions. The door of opportunity for generous patronage to others, then, is wide open to the orator whose heart is in his work and who follows the custom of our forefathers in undertaking the defence of many clients without reluctance and without compensation. 2.67.  My subject suggests that at this point I express once more my regret at the decadence, not to say the utter extinction, of eloquence; and I should do so, did I not fear that people would think that I were complaining on my own account. We see, nevertheless, what orators have lost their lives and how few of any promise are left, how far fewer there are who have ability, and how many there are who have nothing but presumption. But though not all — no, not even many — can be learned in the law or, eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service to many by canvassing in their support for appointments, by witnessing to their character before juries and magistrates, by looking out for the interests of one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid of jurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform such services win the most gratitude and find a most extensive sphere for their activities. 2.68.  of course, those who pursue such a course do not need to be warned (for the point is self-evident) to be careful when they seek to oblige some, not to offend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom they ought not or those whom it is inexpedient to offend. If they do it inadvertently, it is carelessness; if designedly, inconsiderateness. A man must apologize also, to the best of his ability, if he has involuntarily hurt anyone's feelings, and explain why what he has done was unavoidable and why he could not have done otherwise; and he must by future services and kind offices atone for the apparent offence. 2.69.  Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return. But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As someone has happily said, "A man has not repaid money, if he still has it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the sense of the favour, he has repaid it." On the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a favour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a patron or to be called clients. 2.70.  Your man of slender means, on the other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard for himself and not for his outward circumstances. Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he expects similar favours in the future — and he needs the help of many; and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore, should not be overlooked — that, if one defends a wealthy favourite of fortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or, possibly, to his children. But, if one defends a man who is poor but honest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest — and there is a large proportion of that sort among the people — look upon such an advocate as a tower of defence raised up for them. 2.71.  I think, therefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than kindness to the favourites of fortune. We must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and conditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on this point, we must, I should say, follow the advice of Themistocles: when someone asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in marriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but less esteemed, he said: "For my part, I prefer a man without money to money without a man." But the moral sense of to‑day is demoralized and depraved by our worship of wealth. of what concern to any one of us is the size of another man's fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor; but not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have more money to spend; but how is he any the better man for that? Still, if he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a hindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but in conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man's character, not on his wealth. The supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by personal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right nor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of praise. 2.72.  Now, since we have finished the discussion of that kind of helpful services which concern individuals, we must next take up those which touch the whole body politic and the state. of these public services, some are of such a nature that they concern the whole body of citizens; others, that they affect individuals only. And these latter are the more productive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all means attend to both kinds of service; but we must take care in protecting the interests of individuals that what we do for them shall be beneficial, or at least not prejudicial, to the state. Gaius Gracchus inaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale; this had a tendency to exhaust the exchequer. Marcus Octavius inaugurated a moderate dole; this was both practicable for the state and necessary for the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to the state. 2.73.  The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities. 2.74.  The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent the levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be taken long in advance. Such a tax was often levied in the times of our forefathers on account of the depleted state of their treasury and their incessant wars. But, if any state (I say "any," for I would rather speak in general terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I am not discussing our own state but states in general) — if any state ever has to face a crisis requiring the imposition of such a burden, every effort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. And it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to take measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of life. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the duty is self-evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter. 2.75.  But the chief thing in all public administration and public service is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking. "I would," says Gaius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had withheld my appearance until a time when the Romans began to accept bribes, and that I had been born in those days! I should then have suffered them to hold their supremacy no longer." Aye, but he would have had many generations to wait; for this plague has only recently infected our nation. And so I rejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing that he was so mighty a man! It is not yet a hundred and ten years since the enactment of Lucius Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no such law before. But afterward came so many laws, each more stringent than the other, so many men were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a war was stirred up on account of the fear of what our courts would do to still others, so frightful was the pillaging and plundering of the allies when the laws and courts were suppressed, that now we find ourselves strong not in our own strength but in the weakness of others. 2.76.  Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life. Why should he not? But Africanus had other and greater virtues. The boast of official integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to his times. When Paulus got possession of all the wealth of Macedon — and it was enormous — he brought into our treasury so much money that the spoils of a single general did away with the need for a tax on property in Rome for all time to come. But to his own house he brought nothing save the glory of an immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's example and was none the richer for his overthrow of Carthage. And what shall we say of Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship? Was he one penny the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations the richest of cities? He preferred to adorn Italy rather than his own house. And yet by the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it seems to me, still more splendidly adorned. 2.77.  There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the point from which it digressed, no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous. And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They who direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the masses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and self-denial. 2.78.  But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money loaned should be remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the commonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another; and second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the rights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property. 2.79.  And yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to public welfare, they do not gain even that popularity which they anticipate. For he who has been robbed of his property is their enemy; he to whom it has been turned over actually pretends that he had no wish to take it; and most of all, when his debts are cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that he may be thought to have been insolvent; whereas the victim of the wrong both remembers it and shows his resentment openly. Thus even though they to whom property has been wrongfully awarded be more in number than they from whom it has been unjustly taken, they do not for that reason have more influence; for in such matters influence is measured not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair that a man who never had any property should take possession of lands that had been occupied for many years or even generations, and that he who had them before should lose possession of them? 2.80.  Now, it was on account of just this sort of wrong-doing that the Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to death — an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time on — and for the same reason — dissensions so serious ensued that tyrants arose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most admirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but by the contagion of the ills that starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely and more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. What shall we say of our own Gracchi, the sons of that famous Tiberius Gracchus and grandsons of Africanus? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue that caused their downfall and death? 2.81.  Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his city had been kept for fifty years in the power of its tyrants, he came over from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by surprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from banishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the city, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great difficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he considered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be left in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken possession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that tenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course of that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands by right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore decided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the present incumbents or to let them keep it without compensation to its former possessors. 2.82.  So, when he had come to the conclusion that he must have money to meet the situation, he announced that he meant to make a trip to Alexandria and gave orders that matters should remain as they were until his return. And so he went in haste to his friend Ptolemy, then upon the throne, the second king after the founding of Alexandria. To him he explained that he wished to restore constitutional liberty to his country and presented his case to him. And, being a man of the highest standing, he easily secured from that wealthy king assistance in the form of a large sum of money. And, when he had returned with this to Sicyon, he called into counsel with him fifteen of the foremost men of the city. With them he investigated the cases both of those who were holding possession of other people's property and of those who had lost theirs. And he managed by a valuation of the properties to persuade some that it was more desirable to accept money and surrender their present holdings; others he convinced that it was more to their interest to take a fair price in cash for their lost estates than to try to recover possession of what had been their own. As a result, harmony was preserved, and all parties went their way without a word of complaint. 2.83.  A great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our commonwealth! That is the right way to deal with one's fellow-citizens, and not, as we have already witnessed on two occasions, to plant the spear in the forum and knock down the property of citizens under the auctioneer's hammer. But yon Greek, like a wise and excellent man, thought that he must look out for the welfare of all. And this is the highest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom on the part of a good citizen, not to divide the interests of the citizens but to unite all on the basis of impartial justice. "Let them live in their neighbour's house rent-free." Why so? In order that, when I have bought, built, kept up, and spent my money upon a place, you may without my consent enjoy what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob one man of what belongs to him and to give to another what does not belong to him? 2.84.  And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money? We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred, we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for the repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my consulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to force the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this plague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was never greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully; for the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was enforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still carried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal advantage to him. So great was his passion for wrongdoing that the very doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake even when there was no motive for it. 2.85.  Those, then, whose office it is to look after the interests of the state will refrain from that form of liberality which robs one man to enrich another. Above all, they will use their best endeavours that everyone shall be protected in the possession of his own property by the fair administration of the law and the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be oppressed because of their helplessness, and that envy shall not stand in the way of the rich, to prevent them from keeping or recovering possession of what justly belongs to them; they must strive, too, by whatever means they can, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory, and in revenues. Such service calls for great men; it was commonly rendered in the days of our ancestors; if men will perform duties such as these, they will win popularity and glory for themselves and at the same time render eminent service to the state. 2.86.  Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic philosopher who recently died at Athens, claims that two points were overlooked by Panaetius — the care of health and of property. I presume that the eminent philosopher overlooked these two items because they present no difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Although they are a matter of course, I will still say a few words on the subject. Individual health is preserved by studying one's own constitution, by observing what is good or bad for one, by constant self-control in supplying physical wants and comforts (but only to the extent necessary to self-preservation), by forgoing sensual pleasures, and finally, by the professional skill of those to whose science these matters belong. 2.87.  As for property, it is a duty to make money, but only by honourable means; it is a duty also to save it and increase it by care and thrift. These principles Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, has set forth most happily in his book entitled "Oeconomicus." When I was about your present age, I translated it from the Greek into Latin. But this whole subject of acquiring money, investing money (I wish I could include also spending money), is more profitably discussed by certain worthy gentlemen on "Change" than could be done by any philosophers of any school. For all that, we must take cognizance of them for they come fitly under the head of expediency, and that is the subject of the present book. 2.88.  But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against another; — for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with outward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages are compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical advantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as this: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than wealth; [external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better to have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while the physical advantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is preferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages also may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be preferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived from the farm. 2.89.  To this class of comparisons belongs that famous saying of old Cato's: when he was asked what was the most profitable feature of an estate, he replied: "Raising cattle successfully." What next to that? "Raising cattle with fair success." And next? "Raising cattle with but slight success." And fourth? "Raising crops." And when his questioner said, "How about money-lending?" Cato replied: "How about murder?" From this as well as from many other incidents we ought to realize that expediencies have often to be weighed against one another and that it is proper for us to add this fourth division in the discussion of moral duty. Let us now pass on to the remaining problem. 3.7.  Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most thorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed him in the main — but with slight modifications. He classifies under three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which seems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in three books; but, while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third head in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. 3.16.  Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men. 3.17.  For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue. So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty. 3.18.  Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant precisely what he said — merely that "such was their custom," not that such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally right, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to choose between them. What, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to call for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to the character of an action under consideration. 3.19.  For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some particular case that admits of wider application — what more atrocious crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant — be he never so intimate a friend — he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People, at all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand with expediency. Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide without error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with what we feel to be morally right; and, if we follow that rule in comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of duty. 3.20.  That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. 3.21.  Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. 3.22.  Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. 3.23.  But this principle is established not by Nature's laws alone (that is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard; this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine. Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live in accord with Nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he has taken from his neighbour. 3.24.  Then, too, loftiness and greatness of spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony with Nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal. [But for anyone to rob his neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to Nature than death, pain, and the like.] 3.25.  In like manner it is more in accord with Nature to emulate the great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given him a place in the council of the gods. The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to Nature, cannot do harm to his fellow-man. 3.26.  Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for himself he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of Nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of Nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he believes that, while such a course should be avoided, the other alternatives are much worse — namely, death, poverty, pain — he is mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his property are more serious than those affecting his soul. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed. 3.27.  And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of Nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. 3.28.  For that is an absurd position which is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations, social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole structure of civil society. Others again who say that regard should be had for the rights of fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal brotherhood of mankind; and, when this is annihilated, kindness, generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugt to Nature for man to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss, whether to his property or to his person . . . or even to his very soul — so far as these losses are not concerned with justice; for this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues. 3.29.  But, perhaps, someone may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?" 3.30.  These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society — if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure. But, if such is not the case, each one must bear his own burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is more repugt to Nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests is repugt to Nature; for it is unjust. 3.31.  And therefore Nature's law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing. But, thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so fond of dwelling. 3.32.  As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill; — nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity. of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances. 3.33.  It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not immoral at all. We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which is unfinished, to be sure, but still almost completed; and, as mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition, but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if Cratippus does not permit this assumption, you will still grant this at least — that what is morally right is the object most worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more probable, and, besides these, there is no other alternative that seems probable at all. 3.34.  In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on this point; for he has said, not that the truly expedient could under certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not have said that conscientiously), but only that what seemed expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right, and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the saying is. For, of all that has been worked out on this line since the time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all satisfactory to me. 3.35.  Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugt to Nature as immorality (for Nature demands right and harmony and consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly in accord with Nature as expediency, then surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object. Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient; consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient. 3.36.  Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate that from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives rise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive wealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in the midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive than such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective they see the material rewards but not the punishment — I do not mean the penalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of all, their own demoralization. 3.37.  Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere consideration of which is itself morally wrong. Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice, of lust or of intemperance. 3.38.  By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes, a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his hand, he became invisible to everyone, while he himself saw everything; but as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia. Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that he was free to do wrongly any more than if he did not have it; for good men aim to secure not secrecy but the right. 3.39.  And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was actually true or even possible! But the force of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or sovereignty or sensual gratification — if your act should be hidden for ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. of course it is. But my question is, if that were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy, they assert that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided. But let us now return to our theme. 3.40.  Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious appearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not whether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent advantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him might have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate, and had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family. But when the leading men of the state had determined that all the kindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder of the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was expedient — namely, to serve the country's interests — was so pre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce in its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral rightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible expediency. Not so in the case of the king who founded the city: 3.41.  it was the specious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided that it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the throne with another, he slew his brother. He threw to the winds his brotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to him — but was not — expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered the excuse about his wall — a specious show of moral rectitude, neither reasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with due respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus. 3.42.  And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour." 3.43.  It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is short and easy to master: apparent advantages — political preferment, riches, sensual pleasures, and the like — should never be preferred to the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit his friend's convenience. 3.44.  But when he comes to pronounce the verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his witness — that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of view it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if we were only true to it now), to appeal to the juror with this formula — "to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour." This form of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be morally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we were bound to everything that our friends desired, such relations would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. 3.45.  But I am speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally wise and perfect such situations cannot arise. They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed such ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had appointed a day for the executing of one of them, and the one who had been condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of putting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety for his appearance, with the understanding that his friend did not return, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned on the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness begged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship. 3.46.  Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in friendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be disregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous regard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship. In this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting duties — the subject of this part of our investigation. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country in the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient; for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human nature, whose lead we ought to follow. 3.47.  They, too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the laws of humanity. There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our own country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and especially in the Second Punic War, when news came of the disaster at Cannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success; never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The influence of moral right is so potent, at it eclipses the specious appearance of expediency. 3.48.  When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian invasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and children in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the sea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they should stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They stoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought was expediency; but it was not — not at all, for it clashed with moral rectitude. 3.49.  After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles announced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the state, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He requested the people to appoint someone with whom he might discuss it. They appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan fleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly set on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed. When Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager expectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles was in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The result was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right was likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they rejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their attitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we make our allies pay tribute. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally wrong can never be expedient — not even when one secures by means of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a course expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. 3.50.  But, as I said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral. 3.51.  In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" 3.52.  "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." 3.53.  "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man." "I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away." In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. 3.54.  Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable. 3.55.  "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious loss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray." "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards For Sale: A Fine Villa, Well Built, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale'?" 3.56.  In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I must give my decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise the questions, but to offer a solution. 3.57.  I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides? 3.58.  If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. 3.59.  "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean? — all these fish? — all these boats?" "No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get along without this estate." Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early himself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door neighbour whether it was a fishermen's holiday, for not a sign of them did he see. "Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday." 3.60.  Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established form to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal fraud," as specified in these forms, he could reply: "Pretending one thing and practising another" — a very felicitous definition, as one might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices. 3.61.  But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of minors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective, without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that the decision shall be "as good faith requires." In all other cases in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is "the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing between honest parties" is stipulated? But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take. 3.62.  Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea — the world accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives Ennius occasion to say: "In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself." And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning of "benefit." 3.63.  Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor gratitude. 3.64.  Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute "criminal fraud," there are very few transactions into which "criminal fraud" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to find the good man as thus defined. To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral. 3.65.  In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is stipulated in our civil code that when a transfer of any real estate is made, all its defects shall be declared as far as they are known to the vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be sufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be made good and that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when questioned, he should be assessed double damages. A like penalty for failure to make such declaration also has now been secured by our jurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of real estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made good by him. 3.66.  For example, the augurs were proposing to take observations from the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, to pull down such parts of the building as obstructed the augurs' view by reason of their height. Claudius at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius Calpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice was served also upon him. And so, when Calpurnius had pulled down those parts of the building and discovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale only after the augurs had ordered them to be pulled down, he summoned the former owner before a court of equity to decide "what indemnity the owner was under obligation 'in good faith' to pay and deliver to him." The verdict was pronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato (for as other men receive a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who bestowed upon the world so bright a luminary must have his distinguishing name from his son); he, as I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced the verdict that "since the augurs' mandate was known to the vendor at the time of making the transfer and since he had not made it known, he was bound to make good the purchaser's loss." 3.67.  With this verdict he established the principle that it was essential to good faith that any defect known to the vendor must be made known to the purchaser. If his decision was right, our grain-dealer and the vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to suppress the facts in those cases. But the civil code cannot be made to include all cases where facts are thus suppressed; but those cases which it does include are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a kinsman of ours, sold back to Gaius Sergius Orata the house which he himself had bought a few years before from that same Orata. It was subject to an encumbrance, but Marius had said nothing about this fact in stating the terms of sale. The case was carried to the courts. Crassus was counsel for Orata; Antonius was retained by Gratidianus. Crassus pleaded the letter of the law that "the vendor was bound to make good the defect, for he had not declared it, although he was aware of it "; Antonius laid stress upon the equity of the case, leading that, "inasmuch as the defect in question had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the same house that he had sold to Marius), no declaration of it was needed, and in purchasing it back he had not been imposed upon, for he knew to what legal liability his purchase was subject. 3.68.  What is the purpose of these illustrations? To let you see that our forefathers did not countece sharp practice. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers in another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm upon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and conscience. Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness, with false pretence, or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception, then, to set snares, even if one does not mean to start the game or to drive it into them? Why, wild creatures often fall into snares undriven and unpursued. Could one in the same way advertise a house for sale, post up a notice "To be sold," like a snare, and have somebody run into it unsuspecting? 3.69.  Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship — although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again — which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. 3.70.  For how weighty are the words: "That I be not deceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you"! How precious are these "As between honest people there ought to be honest dealing, and no deception"! But who are "honest people," and what is "honest dealing" — these are serious questions. It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula was appended "as good faith requires"; and he held that the expression "good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and selling, in hiring and letting — in a word, in all the transactions on which the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it required a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each individual's obligation to the other, especially when the counter-claims were admissible in most cases. 3.71.  Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, which desires, of course, to pass for wisdom, but is far from it and totally unlike it. For the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil; whereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery prefers the evil to the good. It is not only in the case of real estate transfers that the civil law, based upon a natural feeling for the right, punishes trickery and deception, but also in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the vendor's part is disallowed. For by the aediles' ruling the vendor is answerable for any deficiency in the slave he sells, for he is supposed to know if his slave is sound, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The case of those who have just come into the possession of slaves by inheritance is different. 3.72.  From this we come to realize that since Nature is the source of right, it is not in accord with Nature that anyone should take advantage of his neighbour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found than knavery that wears the mask of wisdom. Thence come those countless cases in which the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For how few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment! 3.73.  Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see if it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in general finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of public moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions of philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here the conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men. Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will, purporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more easily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves two of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery, still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they did not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others. What shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and do not hate the other now that he is dead. 3.74.  Be that as it may, Basilus had in fact desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear his name and inherit his property, (I refer to the Satrius who is the present patron of Picenum and the Sabine country — and oh, what a shameful stigma it is upon the times!) And therefore it was not right that two of the leading citizens of Rome should take the estate and Satrius succeed to nothing except his uncle's name. For if he does wrong who does not ward off and repel injury when he can — as I explained in the course of the First Book — what is to be thought of the man who not only does not try to prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it? For my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if they are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions hypocritical rather than sincere. And yet in such cases there are times when one course is likely to appear expedient and another morally right. 3.75.  The appearance is deceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral rectitude. And the man who does not accept the truth of this will be capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he reasons, "That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings advantage," he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two conceptions that Nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail himself of that power — no, not even though he could be perfectly sure that no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one were to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping, of his fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir, he would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to enrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him confess that he does not know what a good man is. 3.76.  If, on the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the idea of a good man which lies wrapped up in his own mind, he would then at once make it clear to himself that a good man is one who helps all whom he can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong. What shall we say, then? Would he not be doing harm who by a kind of magic spell should succeed in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing himself into their place? "Well," someone may say, "is he not to do what is expedient, what is advantageous to himself?" Nay, verily; he should rather be brought to realize that nothing that is unjust is either advantageous or expedient; if he does not learn this lesson, it will never be possible for him to be a "good man." 3.82.  Is there, then, any object of such value or any advantage so worth the winning that, to gain it, one should sacrifice the name of a "good man" and the lustre of his reputation? What is there that your so‑called expediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take away, if it steals from you the name of a "good man" and causes you to lose your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make whether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping the outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast within? Again, when people disregard everything that is morally right and true, if only they may secure power thereby, are they not pursuing the same course as he who wished to have as a father-in‑law the man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? He thought it advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon another; and he failed to see how unjust to his country this was, and how wrong morally. But the father-in‑law himself used to have continually upon his lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae, which I will reproduce as well as I can — awkwardly, it may be, but still so that the meaning can be understood: "If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake Were wrong most right:— be God in all else feared!" Our tyrant deserved his death for having made an exception of the one thing that was the blackest crime of all. 3.83.  Why do we gather instances of petty crime — legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent buying and selling? Behold, here you have a man who was ambitious to be king of the Roman People and master of the whole world; and he achieved it! The man who maintains that such an ambition is morally right is a madman; for he justifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous and detestable suppression glorious. But if anyone agrees that it is not morally right to be kind in a state that once was free and that ought to be free now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for him who can reach that position, with what remonstrance or rather with what appeal should I try to tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh ye immortal gods! can the most horrible and hideous of all murders — that of fatherland — bring advantage to anybody, even though he who has committed such a crime receives from his enslaved fellow-citizens the title of "Father of his Country"? Expediency, therefore, must be measured by the standard of moral rectitude, and in such a way, too, that these two words shall seem in sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the same. 3.90.  "Again; suppose there were two to be saved from the sinking ship — both of them wise men — and only one small plank, should both seize it to save themselves? Or should one give place to the other?""Why, of course, one should give place to the other, but that other must be the one whose life is more valuable either for his own sake or for that of his country.""But what if these considerations are of equal weight in both?""Then there will be no contest, but one will give place to the other, as if the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even.""Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or making underground passages to the treasury, should a son inform the officers of it?""Nay; that were a crime; rather should he defend his father, in case he were indicted.""Well, then, are not the claims of country paramount to all other duties""Aye, verily; but it is to our country's interest to have citizens who are loyal to their parents.""But once more — if the father attempts to make himself king, or to betray his country, shall the son hold his peace?""Nay, verily; he will plead with his father not to do so. If that accomplishes nothing, he will take him to task; he will even threaten; and in the end, if things point to the destruction of the state, he will sacrifice his father to the safety of his country."
105. Cicero, On His Consulship, 3.6.12-3.6.15, 3.13.34, 3.14.35-3.14.36, 3.30.72, 3.39.90, 4.7, 5.9-5.10, 7.18-7.19, 32.75-32.76, 33.77, 36.83, 40.90-40.91, 47.113 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 52, 53
106. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, 37.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •julius caesar Found in books: Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 38
107. Cicero, Pro Balbo, 51, 53, 43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tuori (2016), The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication<, 52
108. Cicero, Pro Scauro, 47-48, 50, 46 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 34
109. Terence, Phormio, 364-365 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 67
365. Colendum habebat. Saepe interea mihi senex
110. Hebrew Bible, Daniel, 2.48, 3.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Luck (2006), Arcana mundi: magic and the occult in the Greek and Roman worlds: a collection of ancient texts, 373; Udoh (2006), To Caesar What Is Caesar's: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 63 B.C.E to 70 B.C.E, 64
2.48. "אֱדַיִן מַלְכָּא לְדָנִיֵּאל רַבִּי וּמַתְּנָן רַבְרְבָן שַׂגִּיאָן יְהַב־לֵהּ וְהַשְׁלְטֵהּ עַל כָּל־מְדִינַת בָּבֶל וְרַב־סִגְנִין עַל כָּל־חַכִּימֵי בָבֶל׃", 3.1. "אנתה [אַנְתְּ] מַלְכָּא שָׂמְתָּ טְּעֵם דִּי כָל־אֱנָשׁ דִּי־יִשְׁמַע קָל קַרְנָא מַשְׁרֹקִיתָא קיתרס [קַתְרוֹס] שַׂבְּכָא פְסַנְתֵּרִין וסיפניה [וְסוּפֹּנְיָה] וְכֹל זְנֵי זְמָרָא יִפֵּל וְיִסְגֻּד לְצֶלֶם דַּהֲבָא׃", 3.1. "נְבוּכַדְנֶצַּר מַלְכָּא עֲבַד צְלֵם דִּי־דְהַב רוּמֵהּ אַמִּין שִׁתִּין פְּתָיֵהּ אַמִּין שִׁת אֲקִימֵהּ בְּבִקְעַת דּוּרָא בִּמְדִינַת בָּבֶל׃", 2.48. "Then the king made Daniel great, and gave him many great gifts, and made him to rule over the whole province of Babylon, and to be chief prefect over all the wise men of Babylon.", 3.1. "Nebuchadnezzar the king made an image of gold, whose height was threescore cubits, and the breadth thereof six cubits; he set it up in the plain of Dura, in the province of Babylon.",
111. Polybius, Histories, 1.20, 2.7.5, 2.17.9-2.17.12, 2.19.4, 2.32.8, 3.26.1, 4.73.9-4.73.10, 5.85.11-5.85.12, 6.53, 6.53.1-6.53.3, 9.17.9, 15.36.3, 16.34.6, 18.28.4-18.28.5, 18.46, 30.18.3, 30.22.1-30.22.12, 31.2.7, 31.13.8, 32.5.7-32.5.8, 33.13.8, 36.17, 38.9.6-38.9.8, 38.10.4-38.10.5, 38.12.2-38.12.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius, character in lucan •julius caesar, c. •caesar, gaius julius •julius caesar •caesar (julius) •julius caesar, honours to •julius caesar, monumental architecture •julius caesar, c., his funeral •julius caesar, funeral of •julius caesar, sex. Found in books: Baumann and Liotsakis (2022), Reading History in the Roman Empire, 52; Black, Thomas, and Thompson (2022), Ephesos as a Religious Center under the Principate. 196; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 32; Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 114; Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 268; Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 63; Edmondson (2008), Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture, 27; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 49, 157; Joseph (2022), Thunder and Lament: Lucan on the Beginnings and Ends of Epic, 14; Miltsios (2023), Leadership and Leaders in Polybius. 66; Nuno et al. (2021), SENSORIVM: The Senses in Roman Polytheism, 162; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 52; Price, Finkelberg and Shahar (2021), Rome: An Empire of Many Nations: New Perspectives on Ethnic Diversity and Cultural Identity, 49; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 106, 148; Santangelo (2013), Roman Frugality: Modes of Moderation from the Archaic Age to the Early Empire and Beyond, 210; Woolf (2011). Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West. 22
2.7.5. πρῶτον γὰρ τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν κοινὴν περὶ Γαλατῶν φήμην ὑπιδόμενος εὐλαβηθείη τούτοις ἐγχειρίσαι πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς ἔχουσαν εἰς παρασπόνδησιν; 2.17.9. ᾤκουν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, τῆς λοιπῆς κατασκευῆς ἄμοιροι καθεστῶτες. 2.17.10. διὰ γὰρ τὸ στιβαδοκοιτεῖν καὶ κρεαφαγεῖν, ἔτι δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωργίαν· ἀσκεῖν ἁπλοῦς εἶχον τοὺς βίους, οὔτʼ ἐπιστήμης ἄλλης οὔτε τέχνης παρʼ αὐτοῖς τὸ παράπαν γινωσκομένης. 2.17.11. ὕπαρξίς γε μὴν ἑκάστοις ἦν θρέμματα καὶ χρυσὸς διὰ τὸ μόνα ταῦτα κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις ῥᾳδίως δύνασθαι πανταχῇ περιαγαγεῖν καὶ μεθιστάναι κατὰ τὰς αὑτῶν προαιρέσεις. 2.17.12. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἑταιρείας μεγίστην σπουδὴν ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τὸ καὶ φοβερώτατον καὶ δυνατώτατον εἶναι παρʼ αὐτοῖς τοῦτον ὃς ἂν πλείστους ἔχειν δοκῇ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καὶ συμπεριφερομένους αὐτῷ. 2.19.4. τοῦτο δὲ σύνηθές ἐστι Γαλάταις πράττειν, ἐπειδὰν σφετερίσωνταί τι τῶν πέλας, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ πλησμονάς. 2.32.8. τὰ δὲ συλλογισάμενοι τήν τε Γαλατικὴν ἀθεσίαν καὶ διότι πρὸς ὁμοφύλους τῶν προσλαμβανομένων μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, εὐλαβοῦντο τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν τοιούτου καιροῦ καὶ πράγματος κοινωνεῖν. 3.26.1. τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ τηρουμένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἔτι νῦν ἐν χαλκώμασι παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Καπετώλιον ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀγορανόμων ταμιείῳ, 4.73.9. δοκοῦσι δέ μοι πάντα ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος μὲν τῆς χώρας τὸ παλαιὸν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ νομοθετῆσαι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντά ποτε παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἱερὸν βίον, 4.73.10. ὅτε λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συγχώρημα διὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἱερὰν καὶ ἀπόρθητον ᾤκουν τὴν Ἠλείαν, ἄπειροι παντὸς ὄντες 5.85.11. ὁ δʼ Ἀντίοχος, ὡς ἂν ἄπειρος καὶ νέος, ὑπολαμβάνων ἐκ τοῦ καθʼ ἑαυτὸν μέρους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παραπλησίως αὑτῷ πάντα νικᾶν, ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν. 5.85.12. ὀψὲ δέ ποτε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὸς ἐπιστήσαντος αὐτόν, καὶ δείξαντος φερόμενον τὸν κονιορτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρεμβολήν, τότε συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον ἀνατρέχειν ἐπειρᾶτο μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς παρατάξεως τόπον. 6.53.1. ὅταν γὰρ μεταλλάξῃ τις παρʼ αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν, συντελουμένης τῆς ἐκφορᾶς κομίζεται μετὰ τοῦ λοιποῦ κόσμου πρὸς τοὺς καλουμένους ἐμβόλους εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ποτὲ μὲν ἑστὼς ἐναργής, σπανίως δὲ κατακεκλιμένος. 6.53.2. πέριξ δὲ παντὸς τοῦ δήμου στάντος, ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους, ἂν μὲν υἱὸς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ καταλείπηται καὶ τύχῃ παρών, οὗτος, εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις ἀπὸ γένους ὑπάρχει, λέγει περὶ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιτετευγμένας ἐν τῷ ζῆν πράξεις. 6.53.3. διʼ ὧν συμβαίνει τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναμιμνησκομένους καὶ λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰ γεγονότα, μὴ μόνον τοὺς κεκοινωνηκότας τῶν ἔργων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκτός, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γίνεσθαι συμπαθεῖς ὥστε μὴ τῶν κηδευόντων ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν τοῦ δήμου φαίνεσθαι τὸ σύμπτωμα. 9.17.9. τί οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν τῆς περιπετείας αἴτιον γεγονέναι; τὸ ποιήσασθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν ἁπλοῦν τὸ σύνθημα, νέον ἀκμὴν ὄντα καὶ τῆς τῶν διπλῶν συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυνθημάτων ἀκριβείας ἄπειρον. 15.36.3. δυεῖν γὰρ ὑπαρχόντων τελῶν, ὠφελείας καὶ τέρψεως, πρὸς ἃ δεῖ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἢ διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως βουλομένους τι πολυπραγμονεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας γένει τούτου καθήκοντος, ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ὁ πλεονασμὸς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκπληκτικῶν συμπτωμάτων ἐκτὸς πίπτει. 16.34.6. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐξαπορήσας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ἔφησεν αὐτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ὑπερηφάνως ὁμιλοῦντι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι νέος ἐστὶ καὶ πραγμάτων ἄπειρος, δεύτερον ὅτι κάλλιστος ὑπάρχει τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸν — καὶ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο κατʼ ἀλήθειαν — μάλιστα δʼ ὅτι Ῥωμαῖος. 18.28.4. χρήσιμον καὶ καλὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐρευνῆσαι, καὶ παρὰ τί συμβαίνει Ῥωμαίους ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον ἐκφέρεσθαι τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀγώνων, 18.28.5. ἵνα μὴ τύχην λέγοντες μόνον μακαρίζωμεν τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἀλόγως, καθάπερ οἱ μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλʼ εἰδότες τὰς ἀληθεῖς αἰτίας ἐπαινῶμεν καὶ θαυμάζωμεν κατὰ λόγον τοὺς ἡγουμένους. 30.18.3. ὅς γε πρῶτον μέν, πρεσβευτῶν παραγεγονότων Ῥωμαϊκῶν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐξυρημένος τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πιλίον ἔχων λευκὸν καὶ τήβενναν καὶ καλικίους ἀπήντα τούτοις, καὶ καθόλου τοιαύτῃ διασκευῇ κεχρημένος οἵαν ἔχουσιν οἱ προσφάτως ἠλευθερωμένοι παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, οὓς καλοῦσι λιβέρτους· 30.22.1. Λεύκιος δὲ Ἀνίκιος, καὶ αὐτὸς Ῥωμαίων στρατηγήσας, Ἰλλυριοὺς καταπολεμήσας καὶ αἰχμάλωτον ἀγαγὼν Γένθιον τὸν τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν βασιλέα σὺν τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀγῶνας ἐπιτελῶν τοὺς ἐπινικίους ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ παντὸς γέλωτος ἄξια πράγματα ἐποίησεν, ὡς Πολύβιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ. 30.22.2. μεταπεμψάμενος γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπιφανεστάτους τεχνίτας καὶ σκηνὴν κατασκευάσας μεγίστην ἐν τῷ κίρκῳ πρώτους εἰσῆγεν αὐλητὰς ἅμα πάντας. 30.22.3. οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν Θεόδωρος ὁ Βοιώτιος, Θεόπομπος, Ἕρμιππος, [ὁ] Λυσίμαχος, οἵτινες ἐπιφανέστατοι ἦσαν. 30.22.4. τούτους οὖν στήσας ἐπὶ τὸ προσκήνιον μετὰ τοῦ χοροῦ αὐλεῖν ἐκέλευσεν ἅμα πάντας. 30.22.5. τῶν δὲ διαπορευομένων τὰς κρούσεις μετὰ τῆς ἁρμοζούσης κινήσεως προσπέμψας οὐκ ἔφη καλῶς αὐτοὺς αὐλεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀγωνίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐκέλευσεν. 30.22.6. τῶν δὲ διαπορούντων ὑπέδειξέν τις τῶν ῥαβδούχων ἐπιστρέψαντας ἐπαγαγεῖν ἐφʼ αὑτοὺς καὶ ποιεῖν ὡσανεὶ μάχην. 30.22.7. ταχὺ δὲ συννοήσαντες οἱ αὐληταὶ καὶ λαβόντες οἰκείαν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀσελγείαις μεγάλην ἐποίησαν σύγχυσιν. 30.22.8. συνεπιστρέψαντες δὲ τοὺς μέσους χοροὺς πρὸς τοὺς ἄκρους οἱ μὲν αὐληταὶ φυσῶντες ἀδιανόητα καὶ διαφέροντες τοὺς αὐλοὺς ἐπῆγον ἀνὰ μέρος ἐπʼ ἀλλήλους. 30.22.9. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ἐπικτυποῦντες οἱ χοροὶ καὶ συνεπεισιόντες τὴν σκηνὴν ἐπεφέροντο τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ πάλιν ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ μεταβολῆς. 30.22.10. ὡς δὲ καὶ περιζωσάμενός τις τῶν χορευτῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ στραφεὶς ἦρε τὰς χεῖρας ἀπὸ πυγμῆς πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον αὐλητήν, τότʼ ἤδη κρότος ἐξαίσιος ἐγένετο καὶ κραυγὴ τῶν θεωμένων. 30.22.11. ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἐκ παρατάξεως ἀγωνιζομένων ὀρχησταὶ δύο εἰσήγοντο μετὰ συμφωνίας εἰς τὴν ὀρχήστραν, καὶ πύκται τέτταρες ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν μετὰ σαλπιγκτῶν καὶ βυκανιστῶν. 30.22.12. ὁμοῦ δὲ τούτων πάντων ἀγωνιζομένων ἄλεκτον ἦν τὸ συμβαῖνον. περὶ δὲ τῶν τραγῳδῶν, φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος, ὅ,τι ἂν ἐπιβάλωμαι λέγειν, δόξω τισὶ διαχλευάζειν. 31.2.7. ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὑπιδομένη τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ Δημητρίου, μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ διαδεδεγμένου τὴν βασιλείαν. 31.13.8. διόπερ ἀγωνιάσας ὁ προειρημένος μὴ τῆς συνηθείας ἑλκυσθείσης, ἅτε τοῦ Δημητρίου συμποτικοῦ φυσικῶς καὶ νεωτέρου τελέως ὑπάρχοντος, ἀπόρημά τι γένηται περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον διὰ τὴν μέθην, 32.5.7. τότε λαβὼν ὁ Χάροψ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὃ βούλοιτο πράττειν, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν δεινῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ἐποίει, 32.5.8. τὰ μὲν διʼ αὑτοῦ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν φίλων, ἅτε νέος μὲν ὢν αὐτὸς κομιδῇ, συνδεδραμηκότων δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν χειρίστων καὶ τῶν εἰκαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων νοσφισμόν. 33.13.8. διορθώσασθαι δὲ Προυσίαν καὶ τὴν καταφθορὰν τῆς χώρας τῆς τε Μηθυμναίων καὶ τῶν Αἰγαιέων καὶ τῆς Κυμαίων καὶ Ἡρακλειωτῶν, ἑκατὸν τάλαντα δόντα τοῖς προειρημένοις. 38.9.6. ἐξ ὧν καὶ λίαν δῆλον ἐγένετο διότι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Αὐρήλιον ἔδωκε τὰς ἐντολὰς οὐ διασπάσαι βουλομένη τὸ ἔθνος, ἀλλὰ πτοῆσαι καὶ καταπλήξασθαι [βουλομένη] τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. 38.9.7. τινὲς μὲν οὖν ὑπελάμβανον καθʼ ὑπόκρισιν τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διὰ τὸ μένειν ἀτελῆ τὰ κατὰ Καρχηδόνα· τὸ δʼ ἀληθὲς οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν, 38.9.8. ἀλλʼ ἀποδεδεγμένοι τὸ ἔθνος ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου καὶ νομίζοντες ἔχειν αὐτὸ πιστὸν μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀνασοβῆσαι μὲν ἔκριναν διὰ τὸ φρονηματίζεσθαι πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, πόλεμον δʼ ἀναλαβεῖν ἢ διαφορὰν ὁλοσχερῆ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς οὐδαμῶς ἐβούλοντο. — 38.10.4. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σέξτον εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ διαλεγομένων τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν Αἰγιέων πόλει καὶ προφερομένων πολλοὺς καὶ φιλανθρώπους λόγους, 38.10.5. καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς ἔγκλημα παραπεμπόντων καὶ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον δικαιολογίας, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἐκδεχομένων τὸ γεγονὸς αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καθόλου δὲ παρακαλούντων μὴ πορρωτέρω προβῆναι τῆς ἁμαρτίας μήτε τῆς εἰς αὑτοὺς μήτε τῆς εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, 38.12.2. οἳ καὶ συνηγμένων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς Κόρινθον, κατὰ τύχην ἐλθόντες εἰς τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν καὶ παραχθέντες εἰς τὰ πλήθη διετίθεντο πολλοὺς οὗτοι καὶ φιλανθρώπους λόγους παραπλησίους τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σέξτον, 38.12.3. πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνύμενοι φιλοτιμίαν χάριν τοῦ μὴ προβῆναι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς ὁλοσχερεστέραν ἀπέχθειαν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μήτʼ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους προφάσεως μήτε διὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους ἀλλοτριότητος. 2.7.5.  To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? 2.17.9.  They lived in unwalled villages, without any superfluous furniture; 2.17.10.  for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. 2.17.11.  Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. 2.17.12.  They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most power­ful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates. 2.19.4.  This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and surfeiting. 2.32.8.  but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were wary of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. 3.26.1.  The treaties being such, and preserved as they are on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the Quaestors, 4.73.9.  As it seems to me, they have adopted such a system from old time and legislated accordingly in a measure because of the large extent of their territory, but chiefly owing to the sacrosanct life they formerly led, 4.73.10.  having, ever since the Greeks conferred immunity on them owing to the Olympian games, dwelt in a country which was holy and safe from pillage, with no experience of danger and entirely unmenaced by war. 5.85.11.  Antiochus all this time, being still young and inexperienced and supposing from his own success that his army was victorious in other parts of the field too, was following up the fugitives. 5.85.12.  But at length on one of his elder officers calling his attention to the fact that the cloud of dust was moving from the phalanx towards his own camp he realized what had happened, and attempted to return to the battle-field with his horse-guards. 6.53. 1.  Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the so‑called rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined.,2.  Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and success­ful achievements of the dead.,3.  As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people.,4.  Next after the interment and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine.,5.  This image is a mask reproducing with remarkable fidelity both the features and complexion of the deceased.,6.  On the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and carriage.,7.  These representatives wear togas, with a purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar.,8.  They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the offices of state held by each during his life;,9.  and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue.,10.  For who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this? 6.53.1.  Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the so‑called rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined. 6.53.2.  Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and success­ful achievements of the dead. 6.53.3.  As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people. 9.17.9.  If we ask what was the cause of the disaster, the answer must be that it was the use of a single signal by the commander, who was still young and ignorant of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter signals. 15.36.3.  For since there are two objects, improvement and pleasure, which those who wish to study any subject either by the use of their ears or of their eyes, should keep before them, and since this is especially true of the study of history, a too generous treatment of sensational events contributes to neither. 16.34.6.  The king was much taken aback and said that he pardoned him for speaking so haughtily for three reasons, first because he was young and inexperienced in affairs, next because he was the handsomest man of his time — and this was a fact — and chiefly because he was a Roman. 18.28.4.  it will prove useful and beneficial to inquire into the difference, and into the reason why on the battle-field the Romans have always had the upper hand and carried off the palm, 18.28.5.  so that we may not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any reason for it, but may, knowing the true causes of their success, give them a reasoned tribute of praise and admiration. 18.46. 1.  This having been decided and the Isthmian games being now close at hand, the most distinguished men from almost the whole world having assembled there owing to their expectation of what would take place, many and various were the reports prevalent during the whole festival,,2.  some saying that it was impossible for the Romans to abandon certain places and cities, and others declaring that they would abandon the places which were considered famous, but would retain those, which while less illustrious, would serve their purpose equally well,,3.  even at once naming these latter out of their own heads, each more ingenious than the other.,4.  Such was the doubt in men's minds when, the crowd being now collected in the stadium to witness the games, the herald came forward and, having imposed universal silence by his bugler, read this proclamation:,5.  "The senate order and Titus Quintius the proconsul having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, leave the following peoples free, without garrisons and subject to no tribute and governed by their countries' laws — the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians.",6.  At once at the very commencement a tremendous shout arose, and some did not even hear the proclamation, while others wanted to hear it again.,7.  But the greater part of the crowd, unable to believe their ears and thinking that they were listening to the words as if in a dream owing to the event being so unexpected, demanded loudly, each prompted by a different impulse,,8.  that the herald and bugler should advance into the middle of the stadium and repeat the announcement, wishing, as I suppose, not only to hear the speaker, but to see him owing to the incredible character of his proclamation.,9.  But when the herald, coming forward to the middle of the stadium and again silencing the noise by his bugler, made the same identical proclamation, such a mighty burst of cheering arose that those who listen to the tale to‑day cannot easily conceive what it was.,10.  When at length the noise had subsided, not a soul took any further interest in the athletes, but all, talking either to their neighbours or to themselves, were almost like men beside themselves.,11.  So much so indeed that after the games were over they very nearly put an end to Flamininus by their expressions of thanks.,12.  For some of them, longing to look him in the face and call him their saviour, others in their anxiety to grasp his hand, and the greater number throwing crowns and fillets on him, they all but tore the man in pieces.,13.  But however excessive their gratitude may seem to have been, one may confidently say that it was far inferior to the greatness of the event.,14.  For it was a wonderful thing, to begin with, that the Romans and their general Flamininus should entertain this purpose incurring every expense and facing every danger for the freedom of Greece; it was a great thing that they brought into action a force adequate to the execution of their purpose; and greatest of all was the fact that no mischance of any kind counteracted their design, but everything without exception conduced to this one crowning moment, when by a single proclamation all the Greeks inhabiting Asia and Europe became free, ungarrisoned, subject to no tribute and governed by their own laws. 30.18.3.  In the first place when some Roman legates had come to his court, he went to meet them with his head shorn, and wearing a white hat and toga and shoes, exactly the costume worn at Rome by slaves recently manumitted or "liberti" as the Romans call them. 30.22.1.  Lucius Anicius, the Roman praetor, upon conquering the Illyrians and bringing back as his prisoners Genthius, the king of Illyria, and his children, in celebrating games in honour of his victory, behaved in the most absurd manner, as Polybius tells us in his Thirtieth Book. 30.22.2.  For having sent for the most celebrated scenic artists from Greece and constructed an enormous stage in the circus, he first brought on all the flute-players at once. 30.22.3.  These were Theodorus of Boeotia, Theopompus, Hermippus and Lysimachus, who were then at the height of their fame. 30.22.4.  Stationing them with the chorus on the proscenium he ordered them to play all together. When they went through their performance with the proper rhythmic movements, he sent to them to show more competitive spirit. They were at a loss to know what he meant, when one of the lictors explained that they should turn and go for each other and make a sort of fight of it. The players soon understood, and having got an order that suited their own appetite for licence, made a mighty confusion. Making the central groups of dancers face those on the outside, the flute-players blowing loud in unintelligible discord and turning their flutes about this way and that, advanced towards each other in turn, and the dancers, clapping their hands and mounting the stage all together, attacked the adverse party and then faced about and retreated in their turn. 30.22.10.  And when one of the dancers girt up his robes on the spur of the moment, and turning round lifted up his hands in boxing attitude against the flute-player who was advancing towards him, there was tremendous applause and cheering on the part of the spectators. 30.22.11.  And while they were thus engaged in a pitched battle, two dancers with musicians were introduced into the orchestra and four prize-fighters mounted the stage accompanied by buglers and clarion-players 30.22.12.  and with all these men struggling together the scene was indescribable. As for the tragic actors Polybius says, "If I tried to describe them some people would think I was making fun of my readers."V. Affairs of Greece Cretan and Rhodian Matters 31.2.7.  The senate acted thus, in my opinion, because they were suspicious of a king in the prime of life like Demetrius and thought that the youth and incapacity of the boy who had succeeded to the throne would serve their purpose better. 31.13.8.  So being very much afraid that if the banquet were unduly prolonged, as Demetrius was naturally fond of his cups and extremely young, he might find some difficulty in going out owing to the effects of drink, 32.5.7.  Charops, being now at liberty to do what he wished, 32.5.8.  committed every kind of crime either personally or through his friends, being himself very young, and all the worst and most unprincipled characters having gathered about him in the hope of stealing other people's property. 33.13.8.  Prusias also undertook to repair the damage he had done to the territory of Methymna, Aegae, Cyme, and Heracleia, paying a hundred talents to those cities. 36.17. 1.  For my part, says Polybius, in finding fault with those who ascribe public events and incidents to Fate and Chance, I now wish to state my opinion on this subject as far as it is admissible to do so in a strictly historical work.,2.  Now indeed as regards things the causes of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere man to understand, we may perhaps be justified in getting out of the difficulty by setting them down to the action of a god or of chance, I mean such things as exceptionally heavy and continuous rain or snow, or on the other hand the destruction of crops by severe drought or frost, or a persistent outbreak of plague or other similar things of which it is not easy to detect the cause.,3.  So in regard to such matters we naturally bow to public opinion, as we cannot make out why they happen, and attempting by prayer and sacrifice to appease the heavenly powers, we send to ask the gods what we must do and say, to set things right and cause the evil that afflicts us to cease.,4.  But as for matters the efficient and final cause of which it is possible to discover we should not, I think, put them down to divine action.,5.  For instance, take the following case. In our own time the whole of Greece has been subject to a low birth-rate and a general decrease of the population, owing to which cities have become deserted and the land has ceased to yield fruit, although there have neither been continuous wars nor epidemics.,6.  If, then, any one had advised us to send and ask the gods about this, and find out what we ought to say or do, to increase in number and make our cities more populous, would it not seem absurd, the cause of the evil being evident and the remedy being in our own hands?,7.  For as men had fallen into such a state of pretentiousness, avarice, and indolence that they did not wish to marry, or if they married to rear the children born to them, or at most as a rule but one or two of them, so as to leave these in affluence and bring them up to waste their substance, the evil rapidly and insensibly grew.,8.  For in cases where of one or two children the one was carried off by war and the other by sickness, it is evident that the houses must have been left unoccupied, and as in the case of swarms of bees, so by small degrees cities became resourceless and feeble.,9.  About this it was of no use at all to ask the gods to suggest a means of deliverance from such an evil.,10.  For any ordinary man will tell you that the most effectual cure had to be men's own action, in either striving after other objects, or if not, in passing laws making it compulsory to rear children. Neither prophets nor magic were here of any service,,11.  and the same holds good for all particulars.,12.  But in cases where it is either impossible or difficult to detect the cause the question is open to doubt. One such case is that of Macedonia.,13.  For the Macedonians had met with many signal favours from Rome; the country as a whole had been delivered from the arbitrary rule and taxation of autocrats, and, as all confessed, now enjoyed freedom in place of servitude, and the several cities had, owing to the beneficent action of Rome, been freed from serious civil discord and internecine massacres. . . . But now they witnessed in quite a short time more of their citizens exiled, tortured and murdered by this false Philip than by any of their previous real kings. . . .,14.  But while they were defeated by the Romans in fighting for Demetrius and Perseus, yet now fighting for a hateful man and displaying great valour in defence of his throne, they worsted the Romans.,15.  How can anyone fail to be nonplused by such an event? for here it is most difficult to detect the cause. So that in pronouncing on this and similar phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of God, as will be evident from what follows. ◂ previous next â–¸ Images with borders lead to more information. The thicker the border, the more information. (Details here.) UP TO: Polybius Classical Texts LacusCurtius Home A page or image on this site is in the public domain ONLY if its URL has a total of one *asterisk. If the URL has two **asterisks, the item is copyright someone else, and used by permission or fair use. If the URL has none the item is © Bill Thayer. See my copyright page for details and contact information. Page updated: 29 Mar 22 38.10.4.  When upon reaching the Peloponnesus they conversed with the Achaeans in Aegium their language was most courteous; they scarcely alluded to the charge of ill-treating the legates or demanded any justification of the conduct of the Achaeans, but taking a most favourable view of what had occurred than the Achaeans themselves, begged them not to give any further offence either to the Romans or to the Lacedaemonians. 38.12.2.  They happened to arrive when the General Assembly of the Achaeans was being held at Corinth, and when brought before the people addressed them at length in the same conciliatory terms as Sextus and his colleagues had done, employing every effort to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to acts of declared hostility towards Rome, either on account of their difference with Sparta or owing to their dislike of the Romans themselves.
112. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.2, 1.6, 1.8, 1.13, 1.46-1.47, 1.53, 1.69, 1.71-1.75, 1.97-1.99, 2.9, 2.13, 2.32, 3.3, 3.22, 3.22.53, 3.44-3.46, 3.53, 3.72, 3.79, 3.81, 4.70, 5.29, 5.33, 5.35-5.36, 5.54-5.66 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •caesar, julius •caesar c. julius •cicero, assessment of julius caesar •julius caesar, c. •caesar, c. julius, as author •caesar, c. julius •julius caesar •julius caesar, c., dictatorship of •caesar, gaius julius Found in books: Agri (2022), Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism, 5, 30; Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 190; Duffalo (2006), The Ghosts of the Past: Latin Literature, the Dead, and Rome's Transition to a Principate. 66, 141; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 89; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy,