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Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

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All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
intent Castelli and Sluiter 92023), Agents of Change in the Greco-Roman and Early Modern Periods: Ten Case Studies in Agency in Innovation. 36, 60, 113, 120
Hickson (1993), Roman prayer language: Livy and the Aneid of Vergil, 108, 125, 127, 133
Mueller (2002), Roman Religion in Valerius Maximus, 38, 39, 111, 113, 124, 126
Rupke (2016), Religious Deviance in the Roman World Superstition or Individuality?, 15
intent, as eupathic response, eunoia, good Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
intent, as memorisation, educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 88, 126, 204, 208, 346
intent, athenaeus, deipnosophists, moralising König (2012), Saints and Symposiasts: The Literature of Food and the Symposium in Greco-Roman and Early Christian Culture, 97
intent, authorial Azar (2016), Exegeting the Jews: the early reception of the Johannine "Jews", 152
Immendörfer (2017), Ephesians and Artemis : The Cult of the Great Goddess of Ephesus As the Epistle's Context 278, 292, 299, 311
intent, educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 145, 196
intent, good, eunoia, as eupathic response Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232
intent, good, eunoia, in friendship Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 179, 180
intent, greek tenses and idioms, infinitive of Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 177
intent, imagery of educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 88
intent, immersion Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 53
intent, lack of educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 149, 150
intent, legal concepts Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 501, 502
intent, mistrust of educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 149, 150, 151
intent, of individuals, educational Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 120, 121
intent, of lamentations, nations, reversing Cohen (2010), The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism, 41, 42
intent, of new testament, spiritual Azar (2016), Exegeting the Jews: the early reception of the Johannine "Jews", 60, 61
intent, of origen, pedagogical Azar (2016), Exegeting the Jews: the early reception of the Johannine "Jews", 62, 63, 64
intent, to harm, tort law Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 53, 55, 82, 85, 86
intent, to procreate, marriage, without Hug (2023), Fertility, Ideology, and the Cultural Politics of Reproduction at Rome, 15
intent, to violate a prohibition Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 94, 96, 97
intention Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 22, 26, 44, 45, 104
Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32, 40, 171
Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 22, 23, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 75, 82, 90, 122, 221
Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 12, 14, 141
Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212
Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 106, 165
Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 69, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 189, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 245, 249, 250, 251, 252, 263, 264, 265, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 324, 325, 337
Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 47, 126, 128, 134, 135, 164
Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 21, 24, 29, 39, 44, 57, 265, 307, 313, 325, 407, 413, 446, 451, 454, 467
Poorthuis and Schwartz (2014), Saints and role models in Judaism and Christianity, 31, 151, 204, 222, 229, 272, 300, 303, 306, 385, 387, 388, 393, 445, 448
Rubenstein(1995), The History of Sukkot in the Second Temple and Rabbinic Periods, 56, 156, 196, 208, 212, 213, 214, 218, 221, 225, 227
intention, action, and Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 72
intention, allegoresis, general, and authorial Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 363, 367, 368, 369, 370
intention, and allegoresis Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 363, 367, 368, 369, 370
intention, and deeds of israelite householder Avery-Peck (1981), The priestly gift in Mishnah: a study of tractate Terumot, 86, 141, 142, 147, 190, 201, 274, 314
intention, and desire Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 140, 141, 142
intention, and emergence of the ‘self’ Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 154
intention, and moral responsibility Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 132
intention, and purity Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 24
intention, and religious experience Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 506
intention, and validity Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 33, 39
intention, and work of blood Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 72, 73
intention, and, perception Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 281
intention, and, sin Rubenstein (2018), The Land of Truth: Talmud Tales, Timeless Teachings, 35, 46, 47, 48
intention, authorial Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 19, 20, 23, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 86, 93, 114, 183, 195, 214, 215, 234, 241, 242, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251
intention, author’s DeMarco, (2021), Augustine and Porphyry: A Commentary on De ciuitate Dei 10, 6, 7, 135, 152, 154, 159, 172, 195, 213, 230, 235, 236, 273, 275, 294, 302
intention, building a sukkah Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 69
intention, circumcision Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 67
intention, deriving benefit/pleasure Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 65, 86, 143, 145
intention, desire, and Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 140, 141, 142
intention, dimension added with aggada Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 585
intention, double effect Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 95
intention, editorial, arrangement of memrot and sugyot Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 252, 253, 254
intention, editorial, of baraitot Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 200, 202, 203
intention, forbidden labor on the sabbath Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 48, 53, 57, 64, 65, 66, 77, 78, 80, 87, 92, 93, 95, 97, 104, 138, 146
intention, fulfillment of mitzvot Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 67, 111, 112, 113, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130
intention, homicide Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 48, 53, 56, 76, 138, 141, 142
intention, hortatory Wilding (2022), Reinventing the Amphiareion at Oropos, 89
intention, in fulfilling mitsvot Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 489, 490, 506, 585
intention, in homicide law Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 136, 140
intention, in law, hermeneutical method Jassen (2014), Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 106, 116, 132, 133, 166, 198
intention, in legislation, rabbinic Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32, 33, 36, 46, 47
intention, in redaction Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 191, 192, 193, 196, 200, 203, 253, 254
intention, in repentance Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 501, 502
intention, intentionality, Balberg (2023), Fractured Tablets: Forgetfulness and Fallibility in Late Ancient Rabbinic Culture, 72, 98, 101, 151, 153, 162, 163
intention, mishna, redactional Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 191, 192, 193, 475, 476, 477, 482, 528, 530
intention, of author Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 45, 139, 142, 143, 144, 151
intention, of author, allegorical Niehoff (2011), Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 145
intention, of decrees Liddel (2020), Decrees of Fourth-Century Athens (403/2-322/1 BC): Volume 2, Political and Cultural Perspectives, 106, 112, 234
intention, of giver/owner Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 37, 38, 43
intention, of owner Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 33, 46, 48
intention, of priest/slaughterer Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 42, 62
intention, psychological mode Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 69
intention, purity, and Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 24
intention, ritual/law Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 184, 185, 186, 187
intention, to ignore augurs, vatinius, p., declares Walters (2020), Imagery of the Body Politic in Ciceronian Rome, 82
intention, versus action Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 48
intention, virtue ethic in avot Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 518
intention, διάνοια/ voluntas grammatical archive, commentarial assumptions, Ward (2022), Clement and Scriptural Exegesis: The Making of a Commentarial Theologian, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 44, 45, 48, 88, 89, 167, 168
intentional, action Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 113, 213, 260
intentional, damage Ferrándiz (2022), Shipwrecks, Legal Landscapes and Mediterranean Paradigms: Gone Under Sea, 18, 34, 37, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 63, 72, 79, 121, 122, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156
intentional, damage, tort law, justified Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 35, 82
intentional, editing, variants as result of Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 202, 253
intentional, fallacy Katzoff (2019), On Jews in the Roman World: Collected Studies. 160
intentional, history Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 8, 53
Marincola et al. (2021), Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and Calum Maciver, Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras: History Without Historians, 12
intentional, homicide Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 61, 144, 158, 159, 160, 283
intentional, killing Riess (2012), Performing interpersonal violence: court, curse, and comedy in fourth-century BCE Athens, 26, 35, 94
intentional, memory Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 156
intentional, objects Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 65, 67, 104, 107, 251
intentional, omissions, antiquities, josephus Noam (2018), Shifting Images of the Hasmoneans: Second Temple Legends and Their Reception in Josephus and Rabbinic Literature, 39, 43, 44, 49, 126, 127, 184, 197, 212
intentional, speech act Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 76
intentional, state, in defining emotions Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 32, 40, 41, 48, 66, 69, 72, 197
intentional, state, in defining emotions, nan Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 32, 40, 41, 48, 66, 69, 72, 197
intentional, subcultures, community, -ies Gazzarri and Weiner (2023), Searching for the Cinaedus in Ancient Rome. 2, 193, 200, 203, 208, 212, 219
intentional, transgression Balberg (2023), Fractured Tablets: Forgetfulness and Fallibility in Late Ancient Rabbinic Culture, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 121, 126, 133, 134, 151, 153, 162, 163
Schiffman (1983), Testimony and the Penal Code, 166, 169, 170, 184
intentions Rubenstein (2018), The Land of Truth: Talmud Tales, Timeless Teachings, 45, 46, 47, 48, 266
intentions, belief, and Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 325
intentions, of cyril of alexandria, paraenetic Azar (2016), Exegeting the Jews: the early reception of the Johannine "Jews", 157, 159, 161, 162, 174, 179, 184, 185, 195
intentions, of in caring out erga, darius Bosak-Schroeder (2020), Other Natures: Environmental Encounters with Ancient Greek Ethnography, 41, 42
intentions, of moses Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 8
intentions, taylor, j. e., theory of philos Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 69
intentions, via dino compagni catacombs, rome, patrons Galinsky (2016), Memory in Ancient Rome and Early Christianity, 281
‘intentional, history’, gehrke Williamson (2021), Urban Rituals in Sacred Landscapes in Hellenistic Asia Minor, 408

List of validated texts:
33 validated results for "intention"
1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 5.14-5.16, 5.18, 19.4-19.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, and emergence of the ‘self’ • hermeneutical method, intention in law • intention

 Found in books: Beck (2021), Repetition, Communication, and Meaning in the Ancient World, 340, 343; Jassen (2014), Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 132; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 44; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 154

sup>
5.14 וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל־מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ־וּבִתֶּךָ וְעַבְדְּךָ־וַאֲמָתֶךָ וְשׁוֹרְךָ וַחֲמֹרְךָ וְכָל־בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ לְמַעַן יָנוּחַ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ כָּמוֹךָ׃ 5.15 וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי־עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וַיֹּצִאֲךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִשָּׁם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה עַל־כֵּן צִוְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־יוֹם הַשַׁבָּת׃ 5.16 כַּבֵּד אֶת־אָבִיךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְמַעַן יַאֲרִיכֻן יָמֶיךָ וּלְמַעַן יִיטַב לָךְ עַל הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ׃
5.18
וְלֹא תַחְמֹד אֵשֶׁת רֵעֶךָ וְלֹא תִתְאַוֶּה בֵּית רֵעֶךָ שָׂדֵהוּ וְעַבְדּוֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ שׁוֹרוֹ וַחֲמֹרוֹ וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לְרֵעֶךָ׃
19.4
וְזֶה דְּבַר הָרֹצֵחַ אֲשֶׁר־יָנוּס שָׁמָּה וָחָי אֲשֶׁר יַכֶּה אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ בִּבְלִי־דַעַת וְהוּא לֹא־שֹׂנֵא לוֹ מִתְּמֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם׃ 19.5 וַאֲשֶׁר יָבֹא אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ בַיַּעַר לַחְטֹב עֵצִים וְנִדְּחָה יָדוֹ בַגַּרְזֶן לִכְרֹת הָעֵץ וְנָשַׁל הַבַּרְזֶל מִן־הָעֵץ וּמָצָא אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ וָמֵת הוּא יָנוּס אֶל־אַחַת הֶעָרִים־הָאֵלֶּה וָחָי׃'' None
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5.14 but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the LORD thy God, in it thou shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou. 5.15 And thou shalt remember that thou was a servant in the land of Egypt, and the LORD thy God brought thee out thence by a mighty hand and by an outstretched arm; therefore the LORD thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day. 5.16 Honour thy father and thy mother, as the LORD thy God commanded thee; that thy days may be long, and that it may go well with thee, upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.
5.18
Neither shalt thou covet thy neighbour’s wife; neither shalt thou desire thy neighbour’s house, his field, or his man-servant, or his maid-servant, his ox, or his ass, or any thing that is thy neighbour’s.
19.4
And this is the case of the manslayer, that shall flee thither and live: whoso killeth his neighbour unawares, and hated him not in time past; 19.5 as when a man goeth into the forest with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour, that he die; he shall flee unto one of these cities and live;'' None
2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 20.2-20.17, 21.12-21.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • hermeneutical method, intention in law • intention • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32; Beck (2021), Repetition, Communication, and Meaning in the Ancient World, 340, 343; Jassen (2014), Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 132; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 44; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 57

sup>
20.2 אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר הוֹצֵאתִיךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים׃
20.2
לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן אִתִּי אֱלֹהֵי כֶסֶף וֵאלֹהֵי זָהָב לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ לָכֶם׃ 20.3 לֹא יִהְיֶה־לְךָ אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים עַל־פָּנָיַ 20.4 לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה־לְךָ פֶסֶל וְכָל־תְּמוּנָה אֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וַאֲשֶׁר בָּאָרֶץ מִתַָּחַת וַאֲשֶׁר בַּמַּיִם מִתַּחַת לָאָרֶץ 20.5 לֹא־תִשְׁתַּחְוֶה לָהֶם וְלֹא תָעָבְדֵם כִּי אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֵל קַנָּא פֹּקֵד עֲוֺן אָבֹת עַל־בָּנִים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִים לְשֹׂנְאָי׃ 20.6 וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי וּלְשֹׁמְרֵי מִצְוֺתָי׃ 20.7 לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת־שֵׁם־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַשָּׁוְא כִּי לֹא יְנַקֶּה יְהוָה אֵת אֲשֶׁר־יִשָּׂא אֶת־שְׁמוֹ לַשָּׁוְא׃ 20.8 זָכוֹר אֶת־יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת לְקַדְּשׁוֹ 20.9 שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תַּעֲבֹד וְעָשִׂיתָ כָּל־מְלַאכְתֶּךָ' '20.11 כִּי שֵׁשֶׁת־יָמִים עָשָׂה יְהוָה אֶת־הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֶת־הַיָּם וְאֶת־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר־בָּם וַיָּנַח בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי עַל־כֵּן בֵּרַךְ יְהוָה אֶת־יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ׃ 20.12 כַּבֵּד אֶת־אָבִיךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּךָ לְמַעַן יַאֲרִכוּן יָמֶיךָ עַל הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ׃ 20.13 לֹא תִּרְצָח׃ לֹא תִּנְאָף׃ לֹא תִּגְנֹב׃ לֹא־תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר׃ 20.14 לֹא תַחְמֹד בֵּית רֵעֶךָ לֹא־תַחְמֹד אֵשֶׁת רֵעֶךָ וְעַבְדּוֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ וְשׁוֹרוֹ וַחֲמֹרוֹ וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לְרֵעֶךָ׃ 20.15 וְכָל־הָעָם רֹאִים אֶת־הַקּוֹלֹת וְאֶת־הַלַּפִּידִם וְאֵת קוֹל הַשֹּׁפָר וְאֶת־הָהָר עָשֵׁן וַיַּרְא הָעָם וַיָּנֻעוּ וַיַּעַמְדוּ מֵרָחֹק׃ 20.16 וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֶל־מֹשֶׁה דַּבֵּר־אַתָּה עִמָּנוּ וְנִשְׁמָעָה וְאַל־יְדַבֵּר עִמָּנוּ אֱלֹהִים פֶּן־נָמוּת׃ 20.17 וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־הָעָם אַל־תִּירָאוּ כִּי לְבַעֲבוּר נַסּוֹת אֶתְכֶם בָּא הָאֱלֹהִים וּבַעֲבוּר תִּהְיֶה יִרְאָתוֹ עַל־פְּנֵיכֶם לְבִלְתִּי תֶחֱטָאוּ׃
21.12
מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת׃ 21.13 וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה׃ 21.14 וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת׃'' None
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20.2 I am the LORD thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. 20.3 Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. 20.4 Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any manner of likeness, of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; 20.5 thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me; 20.6 and showing mercy unto the thousandth generation of them that love Me and keep My commandments. 20.7 Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain; for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh His name in vain. 20.8 Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. 20.9 Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work; 20.10 but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the LORD thy God, in it thou shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; 20.11 for in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it. 20.12 Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. 20.13 Thou shalt not murder. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. 20.14 Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour’s. 20.15 And all the people perceived the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the voice of the horn, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they trembled, and stood afar off. 20.16 And they said unto Moses: ‘Speak thou with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak with us, lest we die.’ 20.17 And Moses said unto the people: ‘Fear not; for God is come to prove you, and that His fear may be before you, that ye sin not.’
21.12
He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death. 21.13 And if a man lie not in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee. 21.14 And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die.' ' None
3. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 3.5, 7.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ritual/Law, intention • intention • intention,of priest/slaughterer • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 47, 62; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 185; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35, 39

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3.5 וְהִקְטִירוּ אֹתוֹ בְנֵי־אַהֲרֹן הַמִּזְבֵּחָה עַל־הָעֹלָה אֲשֶׁר עַל־הָעֵצִים אֲשֶׁר עַל־הָאֵשׁ אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַיהוָה׃
7.18
וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר־זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֹא יֵרָצֶה הַמַּקְרִיב אֹתוֹ לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב לוֹ פִּגּוּל יִהְיֶה וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ עֲוֺנָהּ תִּשָּׂא׃'' None
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3.5 And Aaron’s sons shall make it smoke on the altar upon the burnt-offering, which is upon the wood that is on the fire; it is an offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the LORD.
7.18
And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it; it shall be an abhorred thing, and the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity.'' None
4. Cicero, On Duties, 3.104-3.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • intent • intention

 Found in books: Hickson (1993), Roman prayer language: Livy and the Aneid of Vergil, 108, 125; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 301

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3.104 Non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque irasci solet nec nocere. Haec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum valet. Sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet intellegi; est enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam praeclare Ennius: Ó Fides alma ápta pinnis ét ius iurandúm Iovis! Qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio vicinam Iovis optimi maximi, ut in Catonis oratione est, maiores nostri esse voluerunt. 3.105 At enim ne iratus quidem Iuppiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi nocuit ipse Regulus. Certe, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem non modo non summum malum, sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi affirmant. Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an gravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare. Quem enim locupletiorem quaerimus quam principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa cruciatum subierit voluntarium? Nam quod aiunt: minima de malis, id est ut turpiter potius quam calamitose, an est ullum maius malum turpitudine? quae si in deformitate corporis habet aliquid offensionis, quanta illa depravatio et foeditas turpificati animi debet videri! 3.106 Itaque nervosius qui ista disserunt, solum audent malum dicere id, quod turpe sit, qui autem remissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere. Nam illud quidem: Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam idcirco recte a poeta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit, videant, ne quaeratur latebra periurio. 3.107 Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi saepe cum hoste servanda. Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periurium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus sit, ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata non est ex perduellium nurnero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. 3.108 Non enim falsum iurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite enim Euripides: Iurávi lingua, méntem iniuratám gero. Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles perturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos hostibus dedidisset.'' None
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3.104 \xa0"He need not have been afraid that Jupiter in anger would inflict injury upon him; he is not wont to be angry or hurtful." This argument, at all events, has no more weight against Regulus\'s conduct than it has against the keeping of any other oath. But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God as one\'s witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so admirably: "Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; thou oath in Jupiter\'s great name!" Whoever, therefore, violates his oath violates Good Faith; and, as we find it stated in Cato\'s speech, our forefathers chose that she should dwell upon the Capitol "neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best." < 3.105 \xa0"But," objection was further made, "even if Jupiter had been angry, he could not have inflicted greater injury upon Regulus than Regulus brought upon himself." Quite true, if there is no evil except pain. But philosophers of the highest authority assure us that pain is not only not the supreme evil but no evil at all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no unimportant witness â\x80\x94 nay, I\xa0am rather inclined to think he was the very best witness â\x80\x94 to the truth of their doctrine. For what more competent witness do we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of Rome, who voluntarily faced torture for the sake of being true to his moral duty? Again, they say, "of evils choose the least"\xa0â\x80\x94 that is, shall one "choose moral wrong rather than misfortune," or is there any evil greater than moral wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain amount of aversion, how offensive ought the deformity and hideousness of a demoralized soul to seem! < 3.106 \xa0Therefore, those who discuss these problems with more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is the only evil, while those who treat them with more laxity do not hesitate to call it the supreme evil. Once more, they quote the sentiment: "None have\xa0I given, none give\xa0I ever to the faithless." It was proper for the poet to say that, because, when he was working out his Atreus, he had to make the words fit the character. But if they mean to adopt it as a principle, that a pledge given to the faithless is no pledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury that they seek. <' "3.107 \xa0Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an oath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. For example, suppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as the price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception â\x80\x94 not even if one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so; for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the common foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding. <" '3.108 \xa0For swearing to what is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to perform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says: "My tongue has sworn; the mind I\xa0have has sworn no oath." But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covets of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an enemy, we have our whole fetial code as well as many other laws that are binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the senate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains to the enemy. <'' None
5. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 13.372 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiquities (Josephus), intentional omissions • intention,

 Found in books: Noam (2018), Shifting Images of the Hasmoneans: Second Temple Legends and Their Reception in Josephus and Rabbinic Literature, 126, 127, 212; Rubenstein(1995), The History of Sukkot in the Second Temple and Rabbinic Periods, 196

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13.372 ̓Αλέξανδρος δὲ τῶν οἰκείων πρὸς αὐτὸν στασιασάντων, ἐπανέστη γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ἔθνος ἑορτῆς ἀγομένης καὶ ἑστῶτος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ καὶ θύειν μέλλοντος κιτρίοις αὐτὸν ἔβαλλον, νόμου ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ̓Ιουδαίοις ἐν τῇ σκηνοπηγίᾳ ἔχειν ἕκαστον θύρσους ἐκ φοινίκων καὶ κιτρίων, δεδηλώκαμεν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλοις, προσεξελοιδόρησαν δ' αὐτὸν ὡς ἐξ αἰχμαλώτων γεγονότα καὶ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ θύειν ἀνάξιον,"" None
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13.372 5. As to Alexander, his own people were seditious against him; for at a festival which was then celebrated, when he stood upon the altar, and was going to sacrifice, the nation rose upon him, and pelted him with citrons which they then had in their hands, because the law of the Jews required that at the feast of tabernacles every one should have branches of the palm tree and citron tree; which thing we have elsewhere related. They also reviled him, as derived from a captive, and so unworthy of his dignity and of sacrificing.'' None
6. Mishnah, Makhshirin, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • intention

 Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 205; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 41

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1.1 כָּל מַשְׁקֶה שֶׁתְּחִלָּתוֹ לְרָצוֹן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹפוֹ לְרָצוֹן, אוֹ שֶׁסּוֹפוֹ לְרָצוֹן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין תְּחִלָּתוֹ לְרָצוֹן, הֲרֵי זֶה בְכִי יֻתַּן. מַשְׁקִין טְמֵאִים מְטַמְּאִין לְרָצוֹן וְשֶׁלֹּא לְרָצוֹן:'' None
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1.1 Any liquid which was desired at the beginning though it was not desired at the end, or which was desired at the end though it was not desired at the beginning, comes under the law of \\"if water be put.\\" Unclean liquids render unclean whether their action is desired or is not desired.'' None
7. Mishnah, Berachot, 2.1, 4.5, 5.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, circumcision • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention • intention, and religious experience • intention, in fulfilling mitsvot • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 204, 206; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 506; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35, 46; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 67, 111, 112

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2.1 הָיָה קוֹרֵא בַתּוֹרָה, וְהִגִּיעַ זְמַן הַמִּקְרָא, אִם כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ, יָצָא. וְאִם לָאו, לֹא יָצָא. בַּפְּרָקִים שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד וּמֵשִׁיב, וּבָאֶמְצַע שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַיִּרְאָה וּמֵשִׁיב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, בָּאֶמְצַע שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַיִּרְאָה, וּמֵשִׁיב מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד, בַּפְּרָקִים שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד, וּמֵשִׁיב שָׁלוֹם לְכָל אָדָם:
4.5
הָיָה רוֹכֵב עַל הַחֲמוֹר, יֵרֵד. וְאִם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לֵירֵד, יַחֲזִיר אֶת פָּנָיו, וְאִם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַחֲזִיר אֶת פָּנָיו, יְכַוֵּן אֶת לִבּוֹ כְּנֶגֶד בֵּית קֹדֶשׁ הַקָּדָשִׁים:
5.1
אֵין עוֹמְדִין לְהִתְפַּלֵּל אֶלָּא מִתּוֹךְ כֹּבֶד רֹאשׁ. חֲסִידִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים הָיוּ שׁוֹהִים שָׁעָה אַחַת וּמִתְפַּלְּלִים, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּכַוְּנוּ אֶת לִבָּם לַמָּקוֹם. אֲפִלּוּ הַמֶּלֶךְ שׁוֹאֵל בִּשְׁלוֹמוֹ, לֹא יְשִׁיבֶנּוּ. וַאֲפִלּוּ נָחָשׁ כָּרוּךְ עַל עֲקֵבוֹ, לֹא יַפְסִיק:'' None
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2.1 If one was reading in the Torah the section of the Shema and the time for its recital arrived, if he directed his heart to fulfill the mitzvah he has fulfilled his obligation. In the breaks between sections one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting; in the middle of a section one may give greeting out of fear and return it, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: in the middle one may give greeting out of fear and return it out of respect, in the breaks one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting to anyone.
4.5
If he is riding on a donkey, he gets down and prays. If he is unable to get down he should turn his face towards Jerusalem, and if he cannot turn his face, he should direct his heart to the Holy of Holies.
5.1
One should not stand up to say Tefillah except in a reverent state of mind. The pious men of old used to wait an hour before praying in order that they might direct their thoughts to God. Even if a king greets him while praying he should not answer him: even if a snake is wound round his heel he should not stop.'' None
8. Mishnah, Eduyot, 7.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • intention (editorial), arrangement of memrot and sugyot • intention, of giver/owner

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 38; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 252

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7.9 הֵעִיד רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶן גֻּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ, שֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה בְגֵט. וְעַל קְטַנָּה בַת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְכֹהֵן, שֶׁהִיא אוֹכֶלֶת בַּתְּרוּמָה, וְאִם מֵתָה, בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. וְעַל הַמָּרִישׁ הַגָּזוּל שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ בַבִּירָה, שֶׁיִּתֵּן אֶת דָּמָיו. וְעַל הַחַטָּאת הַגְּזוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא נוֹדְעָה לָרַבִּים, שֶׁהִיא מְכַפֶּרֶת, מִפְּנֵי תִקּוּן הַמִּזְבֵּחַ:'' None
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7.9 Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value; And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.'' None
9. Mishnah, Hulin, 2.7-2.8 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ritual/Law, intention • intention (editorial), of baraitot • intention, of giver/owner • offering, designation of, intention encapsulated in • redaction, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 43; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 184; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 203; Petropoulou (2012), Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200, 191

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2.7 הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנָכְרִי, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְשֵׁרָה. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֲפִלּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל הַנָּכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ, פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחֲשֶׁבֶת נָכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, קַל וָחֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּמֻקְדָּשִׁין, אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּחֻלִּין, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט: 2.8 הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם הָרִים, לְשֵׁם גְּבָעוֹת, לְשֵׁם יַמִּים, לְשֵׁם נְהָרוֹת, לְשֵׁם מִדְבָּרוֹת, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְסוּלָה. שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשֵׁם אַחַד מִכָּל אֵלּוּ, וְאֶחָד לְשֵׁם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְסוּלָה:'' None
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2.7 If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat only its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! 2.8 If one slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If two persons held a knife and slaughtered an animal, one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.'' None
10. Mishnah, Ketuvot, 7.5, 7.10 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Greek tenses and idioms, infinitive of intent • Intention • Mishna, redactional intention • redaction, intention in

 Found in books: Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 44; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 191, 192; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 177

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7.5 הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֵלֵךְ לְבֵית הָאֵבֶל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה, יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹעֵל בְּפָנֶיהָ. וְאִם הָיָה טוֹעֵן מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר, רַשָּׁאי. אָמַר לָהּ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֹּאמְרִי לִפְלוֹנִי מַה שֶּׁאָמַרְתְּ לִי אוֹ מַה שֶּׁאָמַרְתִּי לָךְ, אוֹ שֶׁתְּהֵא מְמַלְּאָה וּמְעָרָה לָאַשְׁפָּה, יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה:' ' None
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7.5 If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed peoples doors against her. If he claims that his vow was due to some other cause he is permitted to forbid her. If he said to her: “There shall be no prohibition provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” or “what I have told you” or “that you will fill and pour out in the garbage”, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.
7.10
These are the ones who are forced to divorce their wives: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer of dog feces for the treatment of hides, a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were in such a condition before they married or whether they arose after they had married. And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her that she accept him despite these defects she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.” The Sages say: she must accept such a person against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she by her intercourse will enervate him. It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. The Sages said: she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.”'' None
11. Mishnah, Kelim, 25.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • intention • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 204, 207

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25.9 כְּלֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין לָהֶם אֲחוֹרַיִם וָתוֹךְ, וְאֵין לָהֶם בֵּית צְבִיעָה. וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִים כֵּלִים בְתוֹךְ כֵּלִים לְקֹדֶשׁ. כָּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִין לִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן בְּמַחֲשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָן עוֹלִים מִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְשִׁנּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהַמַּעֲשֶׂה מְבַטֵּל מִיַּד הַמַּעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה, וּמַחֲשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מְבַטֶּלֶת לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה:'' None
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25.9 Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention.'' None
12. Mishnah, Megillah, 2.2 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, circumcision • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention

 Found in books: Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35, 46; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 67, 112

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2.2 קְרָאָהּ סֵרוּגִין, וּמִתְנַמְנֵם, יָצָא. הָיָה כוֹתְבָהּ, דּוֹרְשָׁהּ, וּמַגִּיהָהּ, אִם כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ, יָצָא. וְאִם לָאו, לֹא יָצָא. הָיְתָה כְּתוּבָה בְּסַם, וּבְסִקְרָא, וּבְקוֹמוֹס וּבְקַנְקַנְתּוֹם, עַל הַנְּיָר וְעַל הַדִּפְתְּרָא, לֹא יָצָא, עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָה אַשּׁוּרִית, עַל הַסֵּפֶר וּבִדְיוֹ:'' None
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2.2 If one reads it with breaks, or naps in between readings, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he was copying it, explaining it or correcting a scroll of Esther, if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If it was written with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper, or on paper or on scratch paper, he has not fulfilled his obligation, unless it is written in Assyrian on parchment and in ink.'' None
13. Mishnah, Menachot, 1.1, 13.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention • intention, and religious experience • intention, and validity • intention, in fulfilling mitsvot • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 36, 39; Hayes (2022), The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning, 506; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35, 39; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 112

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1.1 כָּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, כְּשֵׁרוֹת, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים מִשּׁוּם חוֹבָה, חוּץ מִמִּנְחַת חוֹטֵא, וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת. מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת שֶׁקְּמָצָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, נָתַן בַּכְּלִי, וְהִלֵּךְ, וְהִקְטִיר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן, פְּסוּלוֹת. כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן, לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא:
13.11
נֶאֱמַר בְּעוֹלַת הַבְּהֵמָה אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (ויקרא א), וּבְעוֹלַת הָעוֹף אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (שם), וּבַמִּנְחָה אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (שם ב), לְלַמֵּד, שֶׁאֶחָד הַמַּרְבֶּה וְאֶחָד הַמַּמְעִיט, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן אָדָם אֶת דַּעְתּוֹ לַשָּׁמָיִם:'' None
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1.1 All minhahs from which the handful was taken not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy. A sinner’s minhah and the minhah of jealousy from which he removed the handful not in their own name, or he put into the vessel, or brought to the altar, or burned not in their own name, or for their own name and not for their own name, or not for their own name and for their own name, they are invalid. How can they be “for their own name and not for their own name”? If offered it as a sinner's minhah and as a voluntary minhah. And how can they be “not for their own name and for their own name”? If offered it as a voluntary minhah and as a sinner's minhah." 13.11 It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Menahot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. It is no accident that the last mishnah of the tractate finishes with the message that we learned today. After having learned 14 chapters of Zevahim and 13 chapters of Menahot, there is a grave danger that one could learn that all God cares about, and all that is important in Judaism, is bringing the proper sacrifice in the proper manner. Our mishnah teaches that the important issue is the proper intent, that one’s intent in sacrifice should be to worship God. This is not to deny that that the minutiae of rules are extremely important, both in the eyes of the rabbis and surely in the eyes of the priests who served in the Temple while it still stood. Rather, what today’s mishnah seems to say is that the rules are an outer manifestation of the inner kavannah, intent, of the worshipper. Without following the rules, there is no way to bring that intent into the world. But without the intent, the rules are just empty exercises devoid of meaning. I believe that this is a message that is as true of Judaism today as it was in Temple times. Mishnah Menahot has probably been a great challenge for many of you; I know it was for me. So please accept an extra congratulations on completing it. Tomorrow we begin Hullin, the one tractate in all of Seder Kodashim that does not deal with sacrifices or the Temple.'" None
14. Mishnah, Pesahim, 3.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, building a sukkah • intention

 Found in books: Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 69

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3.7 הַהוֹלֵךְ לִשְׁחֹט אֶת פִּסְחוֹ, וְלָמוּל אֶת בְּנוֹ, וְלֶאֱכֹל סְעֻדַּת אֵרוּסִין בְּבֵית חָמִיו, וְנִזְכַּר שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ חָמֵץ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, אִם יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר וּלְבַעֵר וְלַחֲזֹר לְמִצְוָתוֹ, יַחֲזֹר וִיבַעֵר. וְאִם לָאו, מְבַטְּלוֹ בְלִבּוֹ. לְהַצִּיל מִן הַנָּכְרִים, וּמִן הַנָּהָר, וּמִן הַלִּסְטִים, וּמִן הַדְּלֵקָה, וּמִן הַמַּפֹּלֶת, יְבַטֵּל בְּלִבּוֹ. וְלִשְׁבֹּת שְׁבִיתַת הָרְשׁוּת, יַחֲזֹר מִיָּד:'' None
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3.7 He who is on his way to slaughter his Pesah sacrifice or to circumcise his son or to dine at a betrothal feast at the house of his father-in-law, and remembers that he has chametz at home: if he is able to go back, remove it, and then return to his religious duty, he must go back and remove it; but if not, he annuls it in his heart. If he is on his way to save from an invasion or from a river or from brigands or from a fire or from a collapse of a building, he annuls it in his heart. But if to rest for pleasure, he must return immediately.'' None
15. Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah, 3.7-3.8, 4.8 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention • Intention, circumcision • Intention, deriving benefit/pleasure • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention • intention, and validity • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 26; Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32, 39; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35, 46; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 65, 67, 112, 113, 118, 119

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3.7 הַתּוֹקֵעַ לְתוֹךְ הַבּוֹר אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַדּוּת אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַפִּטָּס, אִם קוֹל שׁוֹפָר שָׁמַע, יָצָא. וְאִם קוֹל הֲבָרָה שָׁמַע, לֹא יָצָא. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁהָיָה עוֹבֵר אֲחוֹרֵי בֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בֵיתוֹ סָמוּךְ לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, וְשָׁמַע קוֹל שׁוֹפָר אוֹ קוֹל מְגִלָּה, אִם כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ, יָצָא, וְאִם לָאו, לֹא יָצָא. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁזֶּה שָׁמַע וְזֶה שָׁמַע, זֶה כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ וְזֶה לֹא כִוֵּן לִבּוֹ:' "3.8 וְהָיָה כַּאֲשֶׁר יָרִים משֶׁה יָדוֹ וְגָבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגוֹ' (שמות יז), וְכִי יָדָיו שֶׁל משֶׁה עוֹשׂוֹת מִלְחָמָה אוֹ שׁוֹבְרוֹת מִלְחָמָה. אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לְךָ, כָּל זְמַן שֶׁהָיוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מִסְתַּכְּלִים כְּלַפֵּי מַעְלָה וּמְשַׁעְבְּדִין אֶת לִבָּם לַאֲבִיהֶם שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם הָיוּ מִתְגַּבְּרִים. וְאִם לָאו, הָיוּ נוֹפְלִין. כַּיּוֹצֵא בַדָּבָר אַתָּה אוֹמֵר (במדבר כא), עֲשֵׂה לְךָ שָׂרָף וְשִׂים אֹתוֹ עַל נֵס, וְהָיָה כָּל הַנָּשׁוּךְ וְרָאָה אֹתוֹ וָחָי. וְכִי נָחָשׁ מֵמִית, אוֹ נָחָשׁ מְחַיֶּה. אֶלָּא, בִּזְמַן שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל מִסְתַּכְּלִין כְּלַפֵּי מַעְלָה וּמְשַׁעְבְּדִין אֶת לִבָּם לַאֲבִיהֶן שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם, הָיוּ מִתְרַפְּאִים, וְאִם לָאו, הָיוּ נִמּוֹקִים. חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, אֵין מוֹצִיאִין אֶת הָרַבִּים יְדֵי חוֹבָתָן. זֶה הַכְּלָל, כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיָּב בַּדָּבָר, אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶת הָרַבִּים יְדֵי חוֹבָתָן:" 4.8 שׁוֹפָר שֶׁל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה, אֵין מַעֲבִירִין עָלָיו אֶת הַתְּחוּם, וְאֵין מְפַקְּחִין עָלָיו אֶת הַגַּל, לֹא עוֹלִין בְּאִילָן, וְלֹא רוֹכְבִין עַל גַּבֵּי בְהֵמָה, וְלֹא שָׁטִין עַל פְּנֵי הַמַּיִם, וְאֵין חוֹתְכִין אוֹתוֹ בֵּין בְּדָבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת, וּבֵין בְּדָבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשּׁוּם לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. אֲבָל אִם רָצָה לִתֵּן לְתוֹכוֹ מַיִם אוֹ יַיִן, יִתֵּן. אֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַתִּינוֹקוֹת מִלִּתְקוֹעַ, אֲבָל מִתְעַסְּקִין עִמָּהֶן עַד שֶׁיִּלְמְדוּ. וְהַמִּתְעַסֵּק, לֹא יָצָא, וְהַשּׁוֹמֵעַ מִן הַמִּתְעַסֵּק, לֹא יָצָא:'' None
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3.7 One who blows into a pit or a cistern or a jug, if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he hears the echo also, he has not fulfilled his obligation. And also one who was passing behind a synagogue or if his house was next to the synagogue and he heard the sound of the shofar or of the megillah being read, if he directed his heart (had intention), then he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not he has not fulfilled his obligation. Even though this one heard and this one heard, this one directed his heart and this one did not. 3.8 “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand Israel prevailed” etc. (Exodus 17:1. Did the hands of Moses wage war or break Israel’s ability to wage war? Rather this teaches that as long as Israel would look upwards and subject their hearts to their Father in heaven they prevailed, and if not they fell. Similarly, “Make for yourself a fiery serpent and mount it on a pole. And if anyone who is bitten shall look at it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Did the serpent kill or did the serpent keep alive? Rather, when Israel would look upwards and subject their hearts to their Father in heaven, they were healed, and if not their flesh would melt away. A deaf-mute, a lunatic and a minor cannot cause others to fulfill their religious obligation. This is the general principle: one who is not himself obligated in the matter cannot perform it on behalf of others.
4.8
For the sake of the shofar of Rosh Hashanah one is not allowed to go past the Shabbat border, nor remove a pile of rocks, nor climb a tree, nor ride on an animal, nor swim on the water. One may not cut it, neither with an instrument forbidden because of shevut, nor with an instrument forbidden by a negative commandment. But if he wants to pour wine or water into it he may do so. They need not prevent children from blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah; on the contrary, they may help them until they learn how to blow. One who is just practicing has not fulfilled his obligation, and the one hears the blast made by another when practicing has not fulfilled his obligation.'' None
16. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 9.2 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • Intention, homicide • intention • legislation, rabbinic, intention in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 32; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 34; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 57, 138

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9.2 נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם, לַנָּכְרִי וְהָרַג אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, לִנְפָלִים, וְהָרַג בֶּן קְיָמָא, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. אֲבָל נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה, פָּטוּר:'' None
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9.2 If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or he intended to kill a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or if he intended to kill a prematurely born child who was bound to die in any case and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill when struck on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill an adult, but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.'' None
17. Mishnah, Sukkah, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, building a sukkah • Intention, deriving benefit/pleasure • intention,

 Found in books: Rubenstein(1995), The History of Sukkot in the Second Temple and Rabbinic Periods, 218; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 69, 143

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1.1 בַּיִת שֶׁנִּפְחַת וְסִכֵּךְ עַל גַּבָּיו, אִם יֵשׁ מִן הַכֹּתֶל לַסִּכּוּךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, פְּסוּלָה. וְכֵן חָצֵר שֶׁהִיא מֻקֶּפֶת אַכְסַדְרָה. סֻכָּה גְדוֹלָה, שֶׁהִקִּיפוּהָ בְדָבָר שֶׁאֵין מְסַכְּכִים בּוֹ, אִם יֵשׁ תַּחְתָּיו אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, פְּסוּלָה:1.1 סֻכָּה שֶׁהִיא גְבוֹהָה לְמַעְלָה מֵעֶשְׂרִים אַמָּה, פְּסוּלָה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַכְשִׁיר. וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גְּבוֹהָה עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְשֶׁאֵין לָהּ שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּפָנוֹת, וְשֶׁחַמָּתָהּ מְרֻבָּה מִצִּלָּתָהּ, פְּסוּלָה. סֻכָּה יְשָׁנָה, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי פּוֹסְלִין, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַכְשִׁירִין. וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא סֻכָּה יְשָׁנָה, כָּל שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ קֹדֶם לֶחָג שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם. אֲבָל אִם עֲשָׂאָהּ לְשֵׁם חָג, אֲפִלּוּ מִתְּחִלַּת הַשָּׁנָה, כְּשֵׁרָה: ' None
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1.1 A sukkah which is more than twenty cubits high is not valid. Rabbi Judah validates it. One which is not ten handbreadths high, or which does not have three walls, or which has more sun than shade, is not valid. An old sukkah: Bet Shammai invalidates it and Bet Hillel validates it. What is an “old sukkah”? Any one which he made thirty days before the festival; but if he made it for the purpose of the festival, even at the beginning of the year, it is valid.'' None
18. Mishnah, Zevahim, 1.1, 2.3, 3.6, 4.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • Intention, homicide • action, and intention • intention • intention, and validity • intention, and work of blood, • intention, versus action • legislation, rabbinic, intention in • offering, designation of, intention encapsulated in • owner, intention of

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 39, 40, 46, 48, 72; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 207, 212; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 39, 40; Petropoulou (2012), Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200, 191; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 138

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1.1 כָּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, כְּשֵׁרִים, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה. חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וּמִן הַחַטָּאת. הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת, בְּכָל זְמָן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אַף הָאָשָׁם. הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם, בְּכָל זְמָן. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הַחַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְהָאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא. מַה חַטָּאת פְּסוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הָאָשָׁם פָּסוּל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ:
2.3
זֶה הַכְּלָל, כָּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמְקַבֵּל וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ וְהַזּוֹרֵק, לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל, לְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיִּקְרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ:
3.6
שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לְהַנִּיחַ דָּמוֹ אוֹ אֶת אֵמוּרָיו לְמָחָר, אוֹ לְהוֹצִיאָן לַחוּץ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פוֹסֵל, וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִתְּנוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הַכֶּבֶשׁ שֶׁלֹּא כְנֶגֶד הַיְסוֹד, לִתֵּן אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַטָּה, לְמַעְלָה, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַעְלָה, לְמַטָּה, אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בִּפְנִים, בַּחוּץ, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בַּחוּץ, בִּפְנִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, לְשַׁבֵּר עַצְמוֹת הַפֶּסַח וְלֶאֱכֹל הֵימֶנּוּ נָא, לְעָרֵב דָּמוֹ בְדַם פְּסוּלִין, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת אֶלָּא חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְהַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן:
4.6
לְשֵׁם שִׁשָּׁה דְבָרִים הַזֶּבַח נִזְבָּח, לְשֵׁם זֶבַח, לְשֵׁם זוֹבֵחַ, לְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁם, לְשֵׁם אִשִּׁים, לְשֵׁם רֵיחַ, לְשֵׁם נִיחוֹחַ. וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם, לְשֵׁם חֵטְא. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אַף מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְלִבּוֹ לְשֵׁם אַחַד מִכָּל אֵלּוּ, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין, שֶׁאֵין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה הוֹלֶכֶת אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד:'' None
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1.1 All sacrifices slaughtered not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the pesah and the hatat (sin-offering). This is true for a pesah in its proper time and a hatat at all times. Rabbi Eliezer says: also the asham (guilt-offering). This is true for a pesah in its proper time and a hatat and an asham at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said: the hatat comes on account of sin, and the asham comes on account of sin: just as a hatat slaughtered not in its own name is invalid, so the asham is invalid if slaughtered not in its own name.
2.3
This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives the blood, or carries it or sprinkles it intending to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn on the altar as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, the sacrifice is invalid, but it does not involve karet; Intending to eat or burn after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law.
3.6
If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies it, But the sages declare it valid. If he slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling the blood on the ascent, or on the altar but not against its base; or of applying below the scarlet line what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; Or with the intention that unclean persons should eat it, or that unclean priests should offer it; Or that uncircumcised persons should eat it, or that uncircumcised persons should offer it; Or with the intention of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid sacrifices; In all of these cases it is valid, because an illegitimate intention does not disqualify a sacrifice except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and in the case of a pesah and a hatat, the intention to slaughter them for the sake of their being a different sacrifice.
4.6
The sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things:For the sake of the sacrifice, For the sake of the sacrificer, For the sake of the Divine Name, For the sake of fire-offerings, For the sake of fragrance, For the sake of pleasing; And a hatat and an asham for the sake of sin. Rabbi Yose said: even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the court. Since the intention is determined only by the worshipper.'' None
19. New Testament, Acts, 10.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Greek tenses and idioms, infinitive of intent • intention

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 66; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 177

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10.9 Τῇ δὲ ἐπαύριον ὁδοιπορούντων ἐκείνων καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐγγιζόντων ἀνέβη Πέτρος ἐπὶ τὸ δῶμα προσεύξασθαι περὶ ὥραν ἕκτην.'' None
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10.9 Now on the next day as they were on their journey, and got close to the city, Peter went up on the housetop to pray at about noon. '' None
20. New Testament, Matthew, 5.27-5.28 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • hermeneutical method, intention in law • intentions

 Found in books: Jassen (2014), Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 133; Rubenstein (2018), The Land of Truth: Talmud Tales, Timeless Teachings, 45

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5.27 Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη Οὐ μοιχεύσεις. 5.28 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ.'' None
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5.27 "You have heard that it was said, \'You shall not commit adultery;\ '5.28 but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. '' None
21. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, deriving benefit/pleasure • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention

 Found in books: Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 35; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 65, 112

22. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, deriving benefit/pleasure • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • transgression, intentional

 Found in books: Balberg (2023), Fractured Tablets: Forgetfulness and Fallibility in Late Ancient Rabbinic Culture, 102; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 65

23. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention • hermeneutical method, intention in law • intention

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 64, 65, 66; Jassen (2014), Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 133; Poorthuis and Schwartz (2014), Saints and role models in Judaism and Christianity, 222, 229, 272, 300, 303, 306, 385, 387, 388, 393, 445, 448

24. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ritual/Law, intention • intention, and validity • legislation, rabbinic, intention in • owner, intention of

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 33; Fishbane (2003), Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking, 185, 186, 187

25. Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention

 Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 206; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 46; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 119, 121

13a לא שיעקר יעקב ממקומו אלא ישראל עיקר ויעקב טפל לו וכן הוא אומר (ישעיהו מג, יח) אל תזכרו ראשונות וקדמוניות אל תתבוננו אל תזכרו ראשונות זה שעבוד מלכיות וקדמוניות אל תתבוננו זו יציאת מצרים (ישעיהו מג, יט),הנני עושה חדשה עתה תצמח תני רב יוסף זו מלחמת גוג ומגוג,משל למה הדבר דומה לאדם שהיה מהלך בדרך ופגע בו זאב וניצל ממנו והיה מספר והולך מעשה זאב פגע בו ארי וניצל ממנו והיה מספר והולך מעשה ארי פגע בו נחש וניצל ממנו שכח מעשה שניהם והיה מספר והולך מעשה נחש אף כך ישראל צרות אחרונות משכחות את הראשונות:,(דברי הימים א א, כז) אברם הוא אברהם,בתחלה נעשה אב לארם ולבסוף נעשה אב לכל העולם כולו,שרי היא שרה,בתחלה נעשית שרי לאומתה ולבסוף נעשית שרה לכל העולם כולו:,תני בר קפרא כל הקורא לאברהם אברם עובר בעשה שנאמר (בראשית יז, ה) והיה שמך אברהם רבי אליעזר אומר עובר בלאו שנאמר (בראשית יז, ה) ולא יקרא עוד את שמך אברם,אלא מעתה הקורא לשרה שרי הכי נמי,התם קודשא בריך הוא אמר לאברהם (בראשית יז, טו) שרי אשתך לא תקרא את שמה שרי כי שרה שמה,אלא מעתה הקורא ליעקב יעקב ה"נ,שאני התם דהדר אהדריה קרא דכתיב (בראשית מו, ב) ויאמר אלהים לישראל במראות הלילה ויאמר יעקב יעקב,מתיב רבי יוסי בר אבין ואיתימא רבי יוסי בר זבידא (נחמיה ט, ז) אתה הוא ה\' האלהים אשר בחרת באברם,אמר ליה התם נביא הוא דקא מסדר לשבחיה דרחמנא מאי דהוה מעיקרא:,13a not that the name Jacob will be entirely uprooted from its place, but that the name Israel will be the primary name to which the name Jacob will be secondary, as the Torah continues to refer to him as Jacob after this event. And it also says that the ultimate redemption will overshadow the previous redemption in the verse: “Do not remember the former events, and do not ponder things of old” (Isaiah 43:18), and the Gemara explains: “Do not remember the former events,” that is the subjugation to the kingdoms, and “do not ponder things of old,” that is the exodus from Egypt, which occurred before the subjugation to the nations.,With regard to the following verse: “Behold, I will do new things, now it will spring forth” (Isaiah 43:19), Rav Yosef taught a baraita: This refers to the future war of Gog and Magog, which will cause all earlier events to be forgotten.,The Gemara cites a parable: To what is this comparable? To a person who was walking along the way and a wolf accosted him and he survived it, and he continued to relate the story of the wolf. A lion accosted him and he survived it, and he continued to relate the story of the lion. A snake accosted him and he survived it, he forgot both the lion and the wolf, and he continued to relate the story of the snake. Each encounter was more dangerous and each escape more miraculous than the last, so he would continue to relate the most recent story. So too with Israel; more recent troubles cause the earlier troubles to be forgotten.,Having mentioned the changing of Jacob’s name, the Gemara addresses the changing of the names of Abraham and Sarah. What is the meaning of changing Abram’s name to Abraham? As it is stated: “Abram is Abraham” (I Chronicles 1:27).,The Gemara explains: Initially he became a father, a minister, and prominent person, only to Aram, so he was called Abram, father av of Aram, and ultimately with God’s blessing he became the father of the entire world, so he was called Abraham, father of the masses av hamon, as it is stated: “I have made you the father of a multitude of nations” (Genesis 17:5).,Similarly, what is the meaning of changing Sarai’s name to Sarah? The same concept applies to Sarai as to Abram: Sarai is Sarah.”,The Gemara explains: Initially she was a princess only to her nation: My princess Sarai, but ultimately she became Sarah, a general term indicating that she was princess for the entire world.,Also, with regard to Abraham’s name, bar Kappara taught: Anyone who calls Abraham Abram transgresses a positive mitzva, as it is stated: “And your name will be Abraham” (Genesis 17:5). This is a positive mitzva to refer to him as Abraham. Rabbi Eliezer says: One who calls Abraham Abram transgresses a negative mitzva, as it is stated: “And your name shall no longer be called Abram, and your name will be Abraham, for I have made you the father of a multitude of nations” (Genesis 17:5).,The Gemara asks: But if we consider these obligatory statements, then from here we must infer that one who calls Sarah Sarai also transgresses a positive or negative mitzva.,The Gemara answers: There in the case of Sarah, it is not a general mitzva, rather the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Abraham alone: “And God said to Abraham, your wife Sarai, you shall not call her name Sarai; rather, Sarah is her name” (Genesis 17:15). In contrast, this is stated regarding Abraham in general terms: “Your name shall no longer be called Abram.”,Again, the Gemara asks: But if that is so, one who calls Jacob Jacob, about whom it is written: “Your name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel” (Genesis 32:29), also transgresses a mitzva.,The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse reverts back and God Himself refers to Jacob as Jacob, as it is written before his descent to Egypt: “And God said to Israel in the visions of the night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, and he said, ‘Here I am’” (Genesis 46:2).,Rabbi Yosei bar Avin, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida, raised an objection to the statements of bar Kappara and Rabbi Eliezer based on what is said in the recounting of the history of the Jewish people: “You are the Lord, God, Who chose Abram and took him out of Ur Kasdim and made his name Abraham” (Nehemiah 9:7). Here the Bible refers to him as Abram.,The Gemara responds: There, the prophet is recounting God’s praises, including that which was the situation originally, before his name was changed to Abraham. Indeed, the verse continues: “You took him out of Ur Kasdim and made his name Abraham, and found his heart faithful before You and made a covet with him to give him the land of Canaan…to give to his descendants, and You fulfilled Your words for You are righteous” (Nehemiah 9:7–8).,,One who was reading the sections of the Torah which comprise Shema, and the time for the recitation of the morning or evening Shema arrived, if he focused his heart, he fulfilled his obligation and need not repeat Shema in order to fulfill his obligation. This is true even if he failed to recite the requisite blessings (Rabbeinu Ḥael).,Ab initio, one may not interrupt the recitation of Shema. The tanna’im, however, disagree over how strict one must be in this regard. They distinguish between interruptions between paragraphs and interruptions within each paragraph. At the breaks between paragraphs, one may greet an individual due to the respect that he is obligated to show him, and one may respond to another’s greeting due to respect. And in the middle of each paragraph one may greet an individual due to the fear that the individual may harm him if he fails do so (Me’iri) and one may respond to another’s greeting due to fear. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.,Rabbi Yehuda says: There is a distinction between greeting someone and responding to his greeting. In the middle of each paragraph, one may greet another due to fear and respond due to respect. In the breaks between paragraphs, one may greet another due to respect and respond with a greeting to any person who greets him, whether or not he is obligated to show him respect.,As for what constitutes a paragraph, these are the breaks between the paragraphs: Between the first blessing and the second, between the second and Shema, between Shema and the second paragraph: If you indeed heed My commandments VeHaya im Shamoa, between VeHaya im Shamoa and the third paragraph: And the Lord spoke VaYomer and between VaYomer and True and Firm emet veyatziv, the blessing that follows Shema.,The Rabbis held that each blessing and each paragraph of Shema constitutes its own entity, and treat interruptions between them as between the paragraphs. Rabbi Yehuda, however, says: Between VaYomer and emet veyatziv, which begins the blessing that follows Shema, one may not interrupt at all. According to Rabbi Yehuda, these must be recited consecutively.,Since the paragraphs of Shema are not adjacent to one another in the Torah, and they are not recited in the order in which they appear, the mishna explains their placement. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: Why, in the mitzva of the recitation of Shema, did the portion of Shema precede that of VeHaya im Shamoa? This is so that one will first accept upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, the awareness of God and God’s unity, and only then accept upon himself the yoke of the mitzvot, which appears in the paragraph of VeHaya im Shamoa. Why did VeHaya im Shamoa precede VaYomer? Because the paragraph of VeHaya im Shamoa is practiced both by day and by night, while VaYomer, which discusses the mitzva of ritual fringes, is only practiced during the day.,Shema in the Torah in order to fulfill his obligation. From here, the Gemara seeks to conclude: Learn from this that mitzvot require intent, when one performs a mitzva, he must intend to fulfill his obligation. If he lacks that intention, he does not fulfill his obligation. With that statement, this Gemara hopes to resolve an issue that is raised several times throughout the Talmud.,The Gemara rejects this conclusion: What is the meaning of: If one focused his heart? It means that one had the intention to read. The Gemara attacks this explanation: How can you say that it means that one must have intention to read? Isn’t he already reading? The case in the mishna refers to a person who is reading from the Torah. Therefore, focused his heart must refer to intention to perform a mitzva.,The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna speaks of one who is reading the Torah not for the purpose of reciting the words, but in order to emend mistakes in the text. Therefore, if he focused his heart and intended to read the words and not merely emend the text, he fulfills his obligation. He need not have the intention to fulfill his obligation.,The Sages taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagreed with regard to the language in which Shema must be recited. This dispute serves as an introduction to a broader analysis of the question of intent: Shema must be recited as it is written, in Hebrew, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Shema may be recited in any language.,The Gemara seeks to clarify: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion? The Gemara answers: The source for his halakha lies in the emphasis on the word: “And these words, which I command you this day, will be upon your heart” (Deuteronomy 6:6). “Will be” means as they are, so shall they be; they should remain unchanged, in their original language.,The Gemara seeks to clarify further: And what is the reason for the Rabbis’ opinion? The Gemara answers: The source upon which the Rabbis base their opinion is, as it is stated: “Hear, Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4), which they understand to mean that Shema must be understood. Therefore, one may recite Shema in any language that you can hear and understand.,The Gemara explains how Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis each contend with the source cited by the other. And according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, isn’t it also stated: “Hear, Israel”? How does he explain this verse? The Gemara responds: He requires this verse in order to derive a different halakha: Make your ears hear what your mouth utters, i.e., one must recite Shema audibly so he hears it while reciting it.,And from where do the Rabbis derive that one must recite Shema audibly? The Rabbis do not accept the literal interpretation of the word Shema; rather, they hold in accordance with the one who said: One who recited Shema in a manner inaudible to his own ears, fulfilled his obligation.,The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, isn’t it also written: “And they will be”? How do the Sages explain that emphasis in the verse? The Gemara answers: They, too, require this expression to derive that one may not recite Shema out of order. One may not begin reciting Shema from the end, but only in the order in which it is written.,And from where does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derive the halakha that one may not recite Shema out of order? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives it from an additional emphasis in the verse: “And the words hadevarim, which I command you this day, will be upon your heart.” The verse could have conveyed the same idea had it written: Words devarim, without the definite article. However, it says the words hadevarim, employing the definite article, emphasizing that it must be recited in the specific order in which it is written. The Rabbis, however, do not derive anything from the fact that the words, with the definite article, was written in place of words, without the definite article.,The Gemara seeks to link this debate to another: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the entire Torah, i.e., any portion of the Torah which must be read publicly (Tosafot), or if one studies or reads the Torah in general (Me’iri), may be recited in any language? As if it should enter your mind to say that the entire Torah may only be recited in the holy tongue and not in any other, then why do I need that which the Torah wrote: “And they will be”? Prohibiting recitation of Shema in a language other than Hebrew is superfluous, if indeed one is prohibited from reciting any portion of the Torah in a language other than Hebrew. Since the Torah saw the need to specifically require Shema to be recited in Hebrew, it must be because the rest of the Torah may be recited in any language.,The Gemara rejects this: This is not necessarily so, as the phrase: And they will be is necessary in this case because Shema, hear, is also written. Had it not been for the phrase: And they will be, I would have understood hear, to allow Shema to be recited in any language, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Therefore, and they will be, was necessary.,The Gemara attempts to clarify: Is that to say that the Rabbis hold that the entire Torah may only be recited in the holy tongue and not in any other? As if it should enter your mind to say that the Torah may be recited in any language, then why do I require that which the Torah wrote: Shema, hear? One is permitted to recite the entire Torah in any language, rendering a specific requirement regarding Shema superfluous.,The Gemara rejects this: Shema is necessary in any case, because and they will be, is also written. Had it not been for Shema, I would have understood this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that one is prohibited from reciting Shema in any other language. Therefore, Shema, is necessary.,The interpretation of these verses is the source of a fundamental dispute concerning the obligation to recite Shema and the required intent during its recitation. The Rabbis taught: From: And they will be, it is derived that one may not recite Shema out of order. From: These words…upon your heart, it is derived that they must be recited with intent. I might have thought that the entire paragraph requires intent? Therefore the verse teaches: These, to indicate that to this point, one must have intent, but from here on one need not have intent, and even if he recites the rest of Shema without intent he fulfills his obligation. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.,Rabbi Akiva said to him: But the verse states:'' None
26. Babylonian Talmud, Niddah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Taylor, J. E., theory of Philos intentions • intention

 Found in books: Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 69; Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 106

31a מאי קרא (תהלים עא, ו) ממעי אמי אתה גוזי מאי משמע דהאי גוזי לישנא דאשתבועי הוא דכתיב (ירמיהו ז, כט) גזי נזרך והשליכי,ואמר רבי אלעזר למה ולד דומה במעי אמו לאגוז מונח בספל של מים אדם נותן אצבעו עליו שוקע לכאן ולכאן,תנו רבנן שלשה חדשים הראשונים ולד דר במדור התחתון אמצעיים ולד דר במדור האמצעי אחרונים ולד דר במדור העליון וכיון שהגיע זמנו לצאת מתהפך ויוצא וזהו חבלי אשה,והיינו דתנן חבלי של נקבה מרובין משל זכר,ואמר רבי אלעזר מאי קרא (תהלים קלט, טו) אשר עשיתי בסתר רקמתי בתחתיות ארץ דרתי לא נאמר אלא רקמתי,מאי שנא חבלי נקבה מרובין משל זכר זה בא כדרך תשמישו וזה בא כדרך תשמישו זו הופכת פניה וזה אין הופך פניו,תנו רבנן שלשה חדשים הראשונים תשמיש קשה לאשה וגם קשה לולד אמצעיים קשה לאשה ויפה לולד אחרונים יפה לאשה ויפה לולד שמתוך כך נמצא הולד מלובן ומזורז,תנא המשמש מטתו ליום תשעים כאילו שופך דמים מנא ידע אלא אמר אביי משמש והולך (תהלים קטז, ו) ושומר פתאים ה\',תנו רבנן שלשה שותפין יש באדם הקב"ה ואביו ואמו אביו מזריע הלובן שממנו עצמות וגידים וצפרנים ומוח שבראשו ולובן שבעין אמו מזרעת אודם שממנו עור ובשר ושערות ושחור שבעין והקב"ה נותן בו רוח ונשמה וקלסתר פנים וראיית העין ושמיעת האוזן ודבור פה והלוך רגלים ובינה והשכל,וכיון שהגיע זמנו להפטר מן העולם הקב"ה נוטל חלקו וחלק אביו ואמו מניח לפניהם אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי פוץ מלחא ושדי בשרא לכלבא,דרש רב חיננא בר פפא מאי דכתיב (איוב ט, י) עושה גדולות עד אין חקר ונפלאות עד אין מספר בא וראה שלא כמדת הקב"ה מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם נותן חפץ בחמת צרורה ופיה למעלה ספק משתמר ספק אין משתמר ואילו הקב"ה צר העובר במעי אשה פתוחה ופיה למטה ומשתמר,דבר אחר אדם נותן חפציו לכף מאזנים כל זמן שמכביד יורד למטה ואילו הקב"ה כל זמן שמכביד הולד עולה למעלה,דרש רבי יוסי הגלילי מאי דכתיב {תהילים קל״ט:י״ד } אודך (ה\') על כי נוראות נפליתי נפלאים מעשיך ונפשי יודעת מאד בא וראה שלא כמדת הקב"ה מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם אדם נותן זרעונים בערוגה כל אחת ואחת עולה במינו ואילו הקב"ה צר העובר במעי אשה וכולם עולין למין אחד,דבר אחר צבע נותן סמנין ליורה כולן עולין לצבע אחד ואילו הקב"ה צר העובר במעי אשה כל אחת ואחת עולה למינו,דרש רב יוסף מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו יב, א) אודך ה\' כי אנפת בי ישוב אפך ותנחמני במה הכתוב מדבר,בשני בני אדם שיצאו לסחורה ישב לו קוץ לאחד מהן התחיל מחרף ומגדף לימים שמע שטבעה ספינתו של חבירו בים התחיל מודה ומשבח לכך נאמר ישוב אפך ותנחמני,והיינו דאמר רבי אלעזר מאי דכתיב (תהלים עב, יח) עושה נפלאות (גדולות) לבדו וברוך שם כבודו לעולם אפילו בעל הנס אינו מכיר בנסו,דריש רבי חנינא בר פפא מאי דכתיב (תהלים קלט, ג) ארחי ורבעי זרית וכל דרכי הסכנת מלמד שלא נוצר אדם מן כל הטפה אלא מן הברור שבה תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל משל לאדם שזורה בבית הגרנות נוטל את האוכל ומניח את הפסולת,כדרבי אבהו דרבי אבהו רמי כתיב (שמואל ב כב, מ) ותזרני חיל וכתיב (תהלים יח, לג) האל המאזרני חיל אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע זיריתני וזרזתני,דרש רבי אבהו מאי דכתיב (במדבר כג, י) מי מנה עפר יעקב ומספר את רובע ישראל מלמד שהקב"ה יושב וסופר את רביעיותיהם של ישראל מתי תבא טיפה שהצדיק נוצר הימנה,ועל דבר זה נסמית עינו של בלעם הרשע אמר מי שהוא טהור וקדוש ומשרתיו טהורים וקדושים יציץ בדבר זה מיד נסמית עינו דכתיב (במדבר כד, ג) נאם הגבר שתום העין,והיינו דאמר רבי יוחנן מאי דכתיב (בראשית ל, טז) וישכב עמה בלילה הוא מלמד שהקב"ה סייע באותו מעשה שנאמר (בראשית מט, יד) יששכר חמור גרם חמור גרם לו ליששכר,אמר רבי יצחק אמר רבי אמי אשה מזרעת תחילה יולדת זכר איש מזריע תחילה יולדת נקבה שנאמר (ויקרא יג, כט) אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר,תנו רבנן בראשונה היו אומרים אשה מזרעת תחילה יולדת זכר איש מזריע תחלה יולדת נקבה ולא פירשו חכמים את הדבר עד שבא רבי צדוק ופירשו (בראשית מו, טו) אלה בני לאה אשר ילדה ליעקב בפדן ארם ואת דינה בתו תלה הזכרים בנקבות ונקבות בזכרים,(דברי הימים א ח, מ) ויהיו בני אולם אנשים גבורי חיל דורכי קשת ומרבים בנים ובני בנים וכי בידו של אדם להרבות בנים ובני בנים אלא מתוך'' None31a What is the verse from which it is derived that a fetus is administered an oath on the day of its birth? “Upon You I have relied from birth; You are He Who took me out gozi of my mother’s womb” (Psalms 71:6). From where may it be inferred that this word: Gozi,” is a term of administering an oath? As it is written: “Cut off gozi your hair and cast it away” (Jeremiah 7:29), which is interpreted as a reference to the vow of a nazirite, who must cut off his hair at the end of his term of naziriteship.,And Rabbi Elazar says: To what is a fetus in its mother’s womb comparable? It is comparable to a nut placed in a basin full of water, floating on top of the water. If a person puts his finger on top of the nut, it sinks either in this direction or in that direction.The Sages taught in a baraita: During the first three months of pregcy, the fetus resides in the lower compartment of the womb; in the middle three months, the fetus resides in the middle compartment; and during the last three months of pregcy the fetus resides in the upper compartment. And once its time to emerge arrives, it turns upside down and emerges; and this is what causes labor pains.,With regard to the assertion that labor pains are caused by the fetus turning upside down, the Gemara notes: And this is the explanation for that which we learned in a baraita: The labor pains experienced by a woman who gives birth to a female are greater than those experienced by a woman who gives birth to a male. The Gemara will explain this below.,And Rabbi Elazar says: What is the verse from which it is derived that a fetus initially resides in the lower part of the womb? “When I was made in secret, and I was woven together in the lowest parts of the earth” (Psalms 139:15). Since it is not stated: I resided in the lowest parts of the earth, but rather: “I was woven together in the lowest parts of the earth,” this teaches that during the initial stage of a fetus’s development, when it is woven together, its location is in the lower compartment of the womb.,The Gemara asks: What is different about the labor pains experienced by a woman who gives birth to a female, that they are greater than those experienced by a woman who gives birth to a male? The Gemara answers: This one, a male fetus, emerges in the manner in which it engages in intercourse. Just as a male engages in intercourse facing downward, so too, it is born while facing down. And that one, a female fetus, emerges in the manner in which it engages in intercourse, i.e., facing upward. Consequently, that one, a female fetus, turns its face around before it is born, but this one, a male fetus, does not turn its face around before it is born.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita: During the first three months of pregcy, sexual intercourse is difficult and harmful for the woman and is also difficult for the offspring. During the middle three months, intercourse is difficult for the woman but is beneficial for the offspring. During the last three months, sexual intercourse is beneficial for the woman and beneficial for the offspring; as a result of it the offspring is found to be strong and fair skinned.,The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with his wife on the ninetieth day of her pregcy, it is as though he spills her blood. The Gemara asks: How does one know that it is the ninetieth day of her pregcy? Rather, Abaye says: One should go ahead and engage in intercourse with his wife even if it might be the ninetieth day, and rely on God to prevent any ensuing harm, as the verse states: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6).,§ The Sages taught: There are three partners in the creation of a person: The Holy One, Blessed be He, and his father, and his mother. His father emits the white seed, from which the following body parts are formed: The bones, the sinews, the nails, the brain that is in its head, and the white of the eye. His mother emits red seed, from which are formed the skin, the flesh, the hair, and the black of the eye. And the Holy One, Blessed be He, inserts into him a spirit, a soul, his countece ukelaster, eyesight, hearing of the ear, the capability of speech of the mouth, the capability of walking with the legs, understanding, and wisdom.,And when a person’s time to depart from the world arrives, the Holy One, Blessed be He, retrieves His part, and He leaves the part of the person’s father and mother before them. Rav Pappa said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Remove the salt from a piece of meat, and you may then toss the meat to a dog, as it has become worthless.,§ Rav Ḥina bar Pappa taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Who does great deeds beyond comprehension, wondrous deeds without number” (Job 9:10)? Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that if one puts an article in a flask, even if the flask is tied and its opening faces upward, it is uncertain whether the item is preserved from getting lost, and it is uncertain whether it is not preserved from being lost. But the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s open womb, and its opening faces downward, and yet the fetus is preserved.,Another matter that demonstrates the difference between the attributes of God and the attributes of people is that when a person places his articles on a scale to be measured, the heavier the item is, the more it descends. But when the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms a fetus, the heavier the offspring gets, the more it ascends upward in the womb.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; wonderful are Your works, and that my soul knows very well” (Psalms 139:14)? Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that when a person plants seeds of different species in one garden bed, each and every one of the seeds emerges as a grown plant according to its species. But the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s womb, and all of the seeds, i.e., those of both the father and the mother, emerge when the offspring is formed as one sex.,Alternatively, when a dyer puts herbs in a cauldron leyora, they all emerge as one color of dye, whereas the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s womb, and each and every one of the seeds emerges as its own type. In other words, the seed of the father form distinct elements, such as the white of the eye, and the seed of the mother forms other elements, such as the black of the eye, as explained above.,Rav Yosef taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And on that day you shall say: I will give thanks to You, Lord, for You were angry with me; Your anger is turned away, and You comfort me” (Isaiah 12:1)? With regard to what matter is the verse speaking?,It is referring, for example, to two people who left their homes to go on a business trip. A thorn penetrated the body of one of them, and he was consequently unable to go with his colleague. He started blaspheming and cursing in frustration. After a period of time, he heard that the ship of the other person had sunk in the sea, and realized that the thorn had saved him from death. He then started thanking God and praising Him for his delivery due to the slight pain caused to him by the thorn. This is the meaning of the statement: I will give thanks to You, Lord, for You were angry with me. Therefore, it is stated at the end of the verse: “Your anger is turned away, and You comfort me.”,And this statement is identical to that which Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Blessed be the Lord God, the God of Israel, Who does wondrous things alone; and blessed be His glorious name forever” (Psalms 72:18–19)? What does it mean that God “does wondrous things alone”? It means that even the one for whom the miracle was performed does not recognize the miracle that was performed for him.,Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You measure zerita my going about orḥi and my lying down riv’i, and are acquainted with all my ways” (Psalms 139:3)? This verse teaches that a person is not created from the entire drop of semen, but from its clear part. Zerita can mean to winnow, while orḥi and riv’i can both be explained as references to sexual intercourse. Therefore the verse is interpreted homiletically as saying that God separates the procreative part of the semen from the rest. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a parable: This matter is comparable to a person who winnows grain in the granary; he takes the food and leaves the waste.,This is in accordance with a statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu raises a contradiction: It is written in one of King David’s psalms: “For You have girded me vatazreni with strength for battle” (II\xa0Samuel 22:40), without the letter alef in vatazreni; and it is written in another psalm: “Who girds me hame’azreni with strength” (Psalms 18:33), with an alef in hame’azreini. What is the difference between these two expressions? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, You selected me zeiritani, i.e., You separated between the procreative part and the rest of the semen in order to create me, and You have girded me zeraztani with strength.,Rabbi Abbahu taught: What is the meaning of that which is written in Balaam’s blessing: “Who has counted the dust of Jacob, or numbered the stock rova of Israel” (Numbers 23:10)? The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and counts the times that the Jewish people engage in intercourse revi’iyyoteihem, anticipating the time when the drop from which the righteous person will be created will arrive.,And it was due to this matter that the eye of wicked Balaam went blind. He said: Should God, who is pure and holy, and whose ministers are pure and holy, peek at this matter? Immediately his eye was blinded as a divine punishment, as it is written: “The saying of the man whose eye is shut” (Numbers 24:3).,And this statement is the same as that which Rabbi Yoḥa said: What is the meaning of that which is written, with regard to Leah’s conceiving Issachar: “And he lay with her that night” (Genesis 30:16)? The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, contributed to that act. The manner in which God contributed to this act is derived from another verse, as it is stated: “Issachar is a large-boned garem donkey” (Genesis 49:14). This teaches that God directed Jacob’s donkey toward Leah’s tent so that he would engage in intercourse with her, thereby causing garam Leah’s conceiving Issachar.Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Ami says: The sex of a fetus is determined at the moment of conception. If the woman emits seed first, she gives birth to a male, and if the man emits seed first, she gives birth to a female, as it is stated: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2).,The Sages taught: At first, people would say that if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male, and if the man emits seed first, she gives birth to a female. But the Sages did not explain from which verse this matter is derived, until Rabbi Tzadok came and explained that it is derived from the following verse: “These are the sons of Leah, whom she bore to Jacob in Paddan Aram, with his daughter Dinah” (Genesis 46:15). From the fact that the verse attributes the males to the females, as the males are called: The sons of Leah, and it attributes the females to the males,in that Dinah is called: His daughter, it is derived that if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male, whereas if the man emits seed first, she bears a female.,This statement is also derived from the following verse: “And the sons of Ulam were mighty men of valor, archers, and had many sons and sons’ sons” (I\xa0Chronicles 8:40). Is it in a person’s power to have many sons and sons’ sons? Rather, because'' None
27. Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, fulfillment of mitzvot • intention,

 Found in books: Rubenstein(1995), The History of Sukkot in the Second Temple and Rabbinic Periods, 213; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 123

114b אמר ר"ל זאת אומרת מצות צריכות כוונה כיון דלא בעידן חיובא דמרור הוא דאכיל ליה בבורא פה"א הוא דאכיל ליה ודילמא לא איכוון למרור הלכך בעי למהדר לאטבולי לשם מרור דאי סלקא דעתך מצוה לא בעיא כוונה למה לך תרי טיבולי והא טביל ליה חדא זימנא,ממאי דילמא לעולם מצות אין צריכות כוונה ודקאמרת תרי טיבולי למה לי כי היכי דליהוי היכירא לתינוקות,וכי תימא א"כ לישמעינן שאר ירקות אי אשמעינן שאר ירקות הוה אמינא היכא דאיכא שאר ירקות הוא דבעינן תרי טיבולי אבל חזרת לחודא לא בעי תרי טיבולי קמשמע לן דאפי\' חזרת בעינן תרי טיבולי כי היכי דליהוי ביה היכירא לתינוקות,ועוד תניא אכלן דמאי יצא אכלן בלא מתכוין יצא אכלן לחצאין יצא,ובלבד שלא ישהא בין אכילה לחבירתה יותר מכדי אכילת פרס,תנאי היא דתניא רבי יוסי אומר אע"פ שטיבל בחזרת מצוה להביא לפניו חזרת וחרוסת ושני תבשילין,ואכתי ממאי דילמא קסבר רבי יוסי מצות אין צריכות כוונה והאי דבעינן תרי טיבולי כי היכי דתיהוי היכירא לתינוקות א"כ מאי מצוה,מאי שני תבשילין אמר רב הונא סילקא וארוזא רבא הוה מיהדר אסילקא וארוזא הואיל ונפיק מפומיה דרב הונא,אמר רב אשי שמע מינה דרב הונא לית דחייש להא דרבי יוחנן בן נורי דתניא רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר אורז מין דגן הוא וחייבין על חימוצו כרת ואדם יוצא בו ידי חובתו בפסח,חזקיה אמר אפי\' דג וביצה שעליו רב יוסף אמר צריך שני מיני בשר אחד זכר לפסח וא\' זכר לחגיגה רבינא אמר אפילו גרמא ובישולא,פשיטא היכא דאיכא שאר ירקות מברך אשאר ירקות בורא פרי האדמה ואכיל והדר מברך על אכילת מרור ואכיל,היכא דליכא אלא חסא מאי אמר רב הונא מברך מעיקרא אמרור ב"פ האדמה ואכיל ולבסוף מברך עליה על אכילת מרור ואכיל'' None114b Reish Lakish said: That is to say that mitzvot require intent. One who performs a mitzva must do so with the intent to fulfill his obligation. The proof of this from the mishna is that since one does not eat the lettuce at the time of his obligation to eat bitter herbs, he eats it after reciting only one blessing: Who creates fruit of the ground. And clearly the reason is that perhaps he did not intend to fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs, and therefore he needs to dip it again for the purpose of bitter herbs. For if it could enter your mind that mitzvot do not require intent, why do you need two dippings? But he has already dipped the lettuce once.,The Gemara rejects this contention: From where do you know that this is the case? Perhaps I can say that actually mitzvot do not require intent. And that which you said, why do I need two dippings, perhaps the reason is so that there should be a conspicuous distinction for the children, which will cause them to inquire into the difference between this night and all others.,And if you say: If so, let the tanna teach us this halakha with regard to other vegetables as well, as there is no obvious reason that lettuce is chosen for this distinction. In response, I would say that had the mishna taught us about other vegetables, I would have said that it is only where there are other vegetables that one requires two dippings, one for the other vegetables and one for the bitter herbs; however, if one has only ḥazeret, he does not require two dippings, as one dipping is sufficient. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that even if one has just ḥazeret he requires two dippings, so that there be a conspicuous distinction for the children.,And furthermore, it was taught in a baraita: On Passover, if one ate vegetables of doubtfully tithed produce, i.e., he bought the vegetables from an am ha’aretz, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he ate them without the intent of the mitzva, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he ate them in halves, by eating half an olive-bulk of bitter herbs, pausing, and then eating an additional half an olive-bulk, he has fulfilled his obligation.,And the Gemara adds: With regard to this last case, one who eats an olive-bulk in halves, that is the halakha, provided that he does not pause between eating the first half an olive-bulk and the other half an olive-bulk more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. If one takes longer than this amount of time, the two parts of bitter herbs cannot combine. This baraita indicates that even if one eats the bitter herbs without intention he has fulfilled his obligation, which presents a difficulty for Reish Lakish.,The Gemara answers: The issue of whether or not mitzvot require intent is a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: Although one has already dipped the ḥazeret once, it is a mitzva to bring before him ḥazeret and ḥaroset, and two cooked dishes. Apparently, he lacked intention during his first consumption of lettuce, and therefore he must be given additional lettuce with which to fulfill his obligation.,The Gemara asks: And still this is no conclusive proof, as from where do I know that Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that mitzvot require intent? Perhaps Rabbi Yosei maintains that mitzvot do not require intent, and the reason that we require two dippings is so that there should be a conspicuous distinction for the children. The Gemara rejects this argument: If so, for what reason does Rabbi Yosei use the term mitzva? There is no mitzva from the Torah to provide a distinction to stimulate the curiosity of the young ones. The mitzva is to eat bitter herbs, and evidently this individual must return and eat them again because he lacked intention the first time.,The Gemara asks: What are these two cooked foods mentioned in the mishna? Rav Huna said: Beets and rice. The Gemara relates that Rava would seek beets and rice for his meal on Passover night, since this ruling came from Rav Huna’s mouth. Although Rava realized that Rav Huna was merely citing examples and did not mean that one must eat those specific foods, he wanted to fulfill the statement of his teacher precisely.,Rav Ashi said: Learn incidentally another halakha from this statement of Rav Huna, that there is no one who is concerned about that statement of Rabbi Yoḥa ben Nuri. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yoḥa ben Nuri says: Rice is a type of grain in all regards; and one is liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state on Passover; and one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover, if it was properly baked into matza. It can be inferred from Rav Huna’s suggestion to use cooked rice, that rice cannot become leavened.,Ḥizkiya said: The two cooked foods can even be fish and the egg that that was fried on it. Rav Yosef said: One requires two types of meat on Passover night, one in remembrance of the Paschal lamb and the other one in remembrance of the Festival peace-offering, which was also eaten on Passover night. Ravina said: For the two cooked foods one may use even the meat on the bone and the gravy in which it was cooked.,With regard to the halakha of eating vegetables, the Gemara clarifies: It is obvious that where there are other vegetables available besides bitter herbs, at the first dipping one recites over the other vegetables the blessing: Who creates fruit of the ground, and eats, with the intention of including in this blessing the bitter herbs he will eat later. And then, at the second dipping, he recites the blessing: Commanded us over eating bitter herbs, on the lettuce and eats it.,However, what is the halakha where there is only lettuce available? When should one recite each blessing? Rav Huna said: One initially recites the blessing: Who creates fruit of the ground, over the bitter herbs, i.e., the lettuce, and eats them. And ultimately, after the matza, one recites the blessing: Commanded us over eating bitter herbs, over the lettuce and eats it.'' None
28. Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • Intention, homicide • intention

 Found in books: Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 48; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 138

33b שנים ושלשה מקומות הוי מנומר ופסול,אלא אי אתמר הכי אתמר או שהיו ענביו מרובין מעליו פסול אמר רב חסדא דבר זה רבינו הגדול אמרו והמקום יהיה בעזרו ל"ש אלא ענביו שחורות אבל ענביו ירוקות מיני דהדס הוא וכשר,אמר רב פפא אדומות כשחורות דמיין דא"ר חנינא האי דם שחור אדום הוא אלא שלקה:,אם מיעטן כשר: דמעטינהו אימת אילימא מקמיה דלאגדיה פשיטא אלא לבתר דלאגדיה דחוי מעיקרא הוא תפשוט מינה דחוי מעיקרא לא הוי דחוי,לעולם בתר דאגדיה וקסבר אגד הזמנה בעלמא הוא והזמנה בעלמא לאו כלום הוא:,ואין ממעטין ביו"ט: הא עבר ולקטן מאי כשר דאשחור אימת אילימא דאשחור מאתמול דחוי מעיקרא הוא תפשוט מינה דחוי מעיקרא דלא הוי דחוי,אלא לאו דאשחור ביום טוב נראה ונדחה הוא שמעת מינה נראה ונדחה חוזר ונראה,לא לעולם דאשחור מעיקרא דחוי מעיקרא דלא הוי דחוי תפשוט מינה אבל נראה ונדחה חוזר ונראה לא תפשוט,ת"ר אין ממעטין ביום טוב משום ר\' אליעזר בר\' שמעון אמרו ממעטין והא קא מתקן מנא ביו"ט,אמר רב אשי כגון שלקטן לאכילה ור\' אליעזר בר\' שמעון סבר לה כאבוה דאמר דבר שאין מתכוין מותר,והא אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו מודה ר"ש בפסיק רישיה ולא ימות,הב"ע דאית ליה הושענא אחריתי,ת"ר הותר אגדו ביו"ט אוגדו כאגודה של ירק ואמאי ליענביה מיענב הא מני ר\' יהודה היא דאמר עניבה קשירה מעלייתא היא,אי ר\' יהודה אגד מעלייתא בעי האי תנא סבר לה כוותיה בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא:,33b If the berries are distributed in two or three places, the myrtle branch is speckled with different colors in different places. It lacks beauty and is certainly unfit.,Rather, emend the text: If this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Or, if its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is unfit. Rav Ḥisda said: This statement was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, and may the Omnipresent come to his assistance: The Sages taught this halakha only with regard to ripe, black berries, since they stand in stark contrast to the green leaves of the branch, which then appears speckled. However, if its berries are green, they are considered of the same type as the myrtle branch, as they are the same color. Consequently, the branch does not appear speckled, and therefore it is fit.,Rav Pappa said: The legal status of red berries is like that of black ones, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: In the case of menstrual blood, this black blood is actually red blood, except that it deteriorated. Red and black are considered two shades of the same color.,§ The mishna continues: If he diminished their number, it is fit. The Gemara asks: This is a case where he diminished their number when? If you say that he did so before he bound the lulav, it is obvious that it is fit. When he performs the mitzva with it, the leaves outnumber the berries. Rather, it must be that he diminished their number after he bound the lulav with the other species. If so, it is a case of disqualification from the outset, as it was unfit at the time that it was bound. Resolve from here the dilemma that was raised and conclude that disqualification from the outset is not permanent disqualification.,The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Actually, it is a case where he diminished the number of berries after he bound it. And that Sage holds that binding does not render the three bound species a lulav used for a mitzva. Rather, it is mere designation of the species for the mitzva, and mere designation is not anything of significance. The fact that the berries outnumbered the leaves at the time that it was bound is not disqualification from the outset, as binding is a stage prior to the outset.,§ The mishna continues: But one may not diminish the number on the Festival itself. The Gemara asks: But if one violated the prohibition and picked them, what is the halakha? The myrtle branch is fit, as the mishna prohibited doing so ab initio but did not deem it unfit. The Gemara clarifies: This is a case that the berries turned black when? If you say that they were black from yesterday, the Festival eve, the myrtle is disqualified from the outset, as it is unfit at the start of the Festival. If so, resolve from here that disqualification from the outset is not permanent disqualification, as the mishna says that if one picked the berries, the myrtle branch is fit.,Rather, is it not that they turned black on the Festival itself and he picked them that day. That then is a case where the myrtle branch was fit and then disqualified, as at the start of the Festival the berries were green and only later turned black, rendering the myrtle branch unfit. Conclude from it that an item that was fit and then disqualified can then be rendered fit again, thereby resolving an unresolved dilemma.,The Gemara rejects that conclusion. No, actually, it is a case where the berries turned black from the outset, prior to the Festival. Resolve from it that an item disqualified from the outset is not permanently disqualified. However, do not resolve the dilemma concerning whether an item that was fit and then disqualified can then be rendered fit, as no clear proof can be adduced from here.,The Sages taught: One may not diminish the number of berries on the Festival to render the myrtle branch fit. In the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, they said: One may diminish their number. The Gemara asks: But isn’t he preparing a vessel on a Festival, as he renders an unfit myrtle branch fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva?,Rav Ashi said: It is a case where he picked them for the purpose of eating them, as it is permitted to pick berries from a branch unattached to the ground, and preparing the myrtle branch for use is permitted because he did not intend to do so. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, who said: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues, is permitted on Shabbat or on a Festival. Here too, one’s intention is to eat the berries. Although the myrtle branch is prepared for use in the process, picking the berries is permitted because that was not his intention.,The Gemara challenges: But didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? Even Rabbi Shimon, who says that an unintentional act is permitted, said so only in cases where the prohibited result is possible but not guaranteed. However, when a prohibited result is inevitable, just as death inevitably ensues from decapitation, the act is prohibited. In the case of picking berries off of a myrtle branch for food, one cannot claim that he did not intend for the prohibited result of preparing the myrtle branch for use to ensue. In this case, the myrtle branch will inevitably be rendered fit; how is this permitted?,The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where he has another fit myrtle branch. Therefore, one is not considered to be preparing a vessel. Since the ultimate objective is to render the lulav and the accompanying species, which constitute the vessel in question, fit, and those species are already fit, picking the berries from the myrtle branch is not inevitable preparation of a vessel. Therefore, if one ate the berries, and the myrtle branch is thereby rendered fit, it is fit for use in the mitzva.,§ The Sages taught: If the binding of the lulav was untied on the Festival, one may bind it again. One may not bind it with a sophisticated knot as before, but with a knot like the one used in a binding of vegetables, by merely winding the string around the species. The Gemara asks: But why merely wind it? Let him tie a bow, which is permitted on Shabbat or a Festival, as he is not tying an actual knot. The Gemara answers: Whose opinion is it in this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a bow is a full-fledged knot, and therefore it is prohibited to tie one on the Festival.,The Gemara answers: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since he holds that a lulav requires binding, as he derived from the Paschal lamb, he requires the binding to be a full-fledged binding. How, then, can winding the string like the binding of vegetables suffice in fulfillment of the mitzva? The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with his opinion in one matter, i.e., that a bow is a full-fledged knot, and disagrees with him in one matter, as the tanna holds that binding the species is merely to enhance the beauty of the mitzva, but it is not a Torah requirement.,A willow branch that was stolen or is completely dry is unfit. One from a tree worshipped as idolatry asheira or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. If the top was severed, or its leaves were severed, or if it is the tzaftzafa, a species similar to, but not actually a willow, it is unfit. However, a willow branch that is slightly dried, and one that a minority of its leaves fell, and a branch from a willow that does not grow by the river, but instead is from a non-irrigated field, is fit.,The Sages taught: “Willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40) means willows that grow by the brook. Alternatively, “willows of the brook” is an allusion to the tree in question. It is a tree whose leaf is elongated like a brook.,It was taught in another baraita: From “willows of the brook,” I have derived only actual willows of the brook that grow on the banks of the brook. With regard to willows of the non-irrigated field and willows of the mountains, from where do I derive that they are fit as well? The verse states: “Willows of the brook,” in the plural, teaching that the branches of willows are fit in any case.'' None
29. Babylonian Talmud, Yoma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • intention • intentions • sin, intention and

 Found in books: Libson (2018), Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud, 50; Rubenstein (2018), The Land of Truth: Talmud Tales, Timeless Teachings, 47

29a הרהורי עבירה קשו מעבירה וסימניך ריחא דבישרא שילהי דקייטא קשיא מקייטא וסימניך תנורא שגירא,אישתא דסיתוא קשיא מדקייטא וסימניך תנורא קרירא מיגמר בעתיקתא קשיא מחדתא וסימניך טינא בר טינא,א"ר אבהו מ"ט דרבי דכתיב (תהלים כב, א) למנצח על אילת השחר מה אילה זו קרניה מפצילות לכאן ולכאן אף שחר זה מפציע לכאן ולכאן,א"ר זירא למה נמשלה אסתר לאילה לומר לך מה אילה רחמה צר וחביבה על בעלה כל שעה ושעה כשעה ראשונה אף אסתר היתה חביבה על אחשורוש כל שעה ושעה כשעה ראשונה א"ר אסי למה נמשלה אסתר לשחר לומר לך מה שחר סוף כל הלילה אף אסתר סוף כל הנסים,והא איכא חנוכה ניתנה לכתוב קא אמרינן הניחא למאן דאמר אסתר ניתנה לכתוב אלא למאן דאמר אסתר לא ניתנה לכתוב מאי איכא למימר,מוקים לה כר\' בנימין בר יפת אמר ר\' אלעזר דאמר רבי בנימין בר יפת אמר רבי אלעזר למה נמשלו תפלתן של צדיקים כאילת לומר לך מה אילה זו כל זמן שמגדלת קרניה מפצילות אף צדיקים כל זמן שמרבין בתפלה תפלתן נשמעת,שחטו את התמיד אימת אילימא בשאר ימות השנה לא סגיא דלאו כהן גדול אלא ביום הכפורים מאור הלבנה מי איכא,הכי קאמר וביום הכפורים כי אמר ברק ברקאי הורידו כ"ג לבית הטבילה,תני אבוה דרבי אבין לא זו בלבד אמרו אלא אף מליקת העוף וקמיצת מנחה בלילה תשרף בשלמא עולת העוף מאי דהוה הוה אלא קומץ'' None29a Thoughts of transgression are worse than transgression itself, and your mnemonic is the odor of meat. The smell of roasting meat is more appetizing than actually eating the meat. The heat of the end of summer is more oppressive than the heat of the summer itself, and your mnemonic is a heated oven. After an oven has been heated several times in the course of a day, lighting it again, even slightly, will produce powerful heat. So too, at the end of the summer, since everything is hot, the heat is more oppressive.,A fever in the winter is more powerful than a fever in the summer, and your mnemonic is a cold oven. Heating a cold oven requires greater heat than heating a hot oven. A fever that succeeds in raising the body temperature in the winter must be more powerful than a fever that raises the body temperature in the summer. Relearning old material that was known and forgotten is more difficult than learning from new material. And your mnemonic is mixing mortar from mortar. It is harder to take hardened mortar, crush it, and mix new mortar than it is to simply mix new mortar.,Apropos moonlight and sunlight discussed previously, Rabbi Abbahu said: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that sunlight diffuses and in that sense is dissimilar to moonlight? It is as it is written: “For the leader, about the morning hind” (Psalms 22:1); just as the antlers of a hind branch out to here and to there, so too, the light of dawn diffuses to here and to there.,In tractate Megilla, the Gemara states that Queen Esther prophetically recited this Psalm in reference to her situation as she was about to come before King Ahasuerus without being summoned. Rabbi Zeira said: Why is Esther likened to a hind? It is to tell you: Just as in the case of a hind its womb is narrow and it is desirable to its mate at each and every hour like it is at the first hour, so too, Esther was desirable to Ahasuerus at each and every hour like she was at the first hour. Rabbi Asi said: Why was Esther likened to the dawn? It is to tell you: Just as the dawn is the conclusion of the entire night, so too, Esther was the conclusion of all miracles performed for the entire Jewish people.,The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the miracle of Hanukkah, which was performed many years later? The Gemara answers: It is true that additional miracles were performed after the miracle of Purim; however, it is with regard to miracles for which permission was granted to write them in the Bible that we are saying that the miracle of Purim was the last one. The Gemara asks: That works out well according to the one who said: Permission was granted to write the Scroll of Esther in the Bible as a book whose sanctity equals that of the other books of the Bible. However, according to the one who said: Permission was not granted to write the Scroll of Esther in the Bible, and its sanctity does not reach the level of the other books of the Bible, what can be said?,The Gemara answers: Actually, Purim was not the conclusion of all miracles performed for the entire Jewish people, and the one who holds that permission was not granted for the Scroll of Esther to be written establishes the analogy between Esther and the hind in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet said that Rabbi Elazar said; as Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet said that Rabbi Elazar said: Why are the prayers of the righteous likened to a hind? It is to tell you: Just as with regard to a hind, as long as it grows its antlers they continue to branch out; so too, with regard to the righteous, as long as they engage more in prayer their prayer is heard.,§ The mishna relates that as a result of the confusion, they slaughtered the daily offering before dawn. The Gemara asks: When did this incident occur? If we say it occurred during the rest of the days of the year, is there no alternative to having the service performed by the High Priest? The mishna states that after slaughtering the daily offering, they led the High Priest down to the Hall of Immersion. On all the other days of the year, the High Priest need not perform the service and it may be performed by a common priest. Rather, it must be that this incident occurred on Yom Kippur, when the service is performed exclusively by the High Priest. However, in that case, is there moonlight? According to the lunar cycle, the moon never rises in the east adjacent to dawn on Yom Kippur.,The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: The incident occurred during the rest of the year, at which point they instituted that the appointed priest announce the arrival of dawn in the Temple. And on Yom Kippur, when the appointed priest said: The light flashed, they immediately led the High Priest down to the Hall of Immersion.,Apropos this fundamental halakha, the father of Rabbi Avin taught a baraita: Not only this, that a daily offering slaughtered before dawn is disqualified and burned, did they say; rather, even in the case of the pinching of the neck of a bird and the taking of the handful of a meal-offering that are performed at night, these items must be burned. The Gemara analyzes the baraita: Granted, a bird sacrificed as a burnt-offering is disqualified if pinched before dawn; what was, was. The situation can no longer be remedied, and the bird must be burned. However, why should the handful of a meal-offering be burned?'' None
30. Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim, None
 Tagged with subjects: • Intention, forbidden labor on the Sabbath • legislation, rabbinic, intention in • owner, intention of

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 46; Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 64

47a מנין למתעסק בקדשים שהוא פסול שנאמר (ויקרא א, ה) ושחט את בן הבקר לפני ה\' עד שתהא שחיטה לשם בן בקר,א"ל זו בידינו היא לעכב מנין א"ל (ויקרא יט, ה) לרצונכם תזבחהו לדעתכם זביחו:,שאין המחשבה הולכת אלא אחר העובד: מתני\' דלא כי האי תנא דתניא א"ר אלעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין אמר רבא מ"ט דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי דאמר קרא והקריב המקריב,אמר אביי רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי ורבי אליעזר ור"ש בן אלעזר כולהו סבירא להו זה מחשבה וזה עובד הויא מחשבה רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי הא דאמרן,רבי אליעזר דתנן השוחט לעובד כוכבים שחיטתו כשרה ורבי אליעזר פוסל,ר"ש בן אלעזר דתנן כלל אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר כל שאין כשר להצניע ואין מצניעין כמוהו הוכשר לזה והצניעו ובא אחר והוציאו נתחייב זה במחשבה של זה,תרוייהו אית להו דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי השתא בחוץ אמרינן בפנים מיבעיא,רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי לית להו דתרוייהו דלמא בפנים הוא דאמרינן בחוץ לא אמרינן,ר"ש בן אלעזר אית ליה דר\' אליעזר השתא בשבת אמרינן בעבודת כוכבים מיבעיא,רבי אליעזר לית ליה דרבי שמעון בן אלעזר דלמא בעבודת כוכבים הוא דאמרת כעין בפנים אבל שבת מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה:,47a From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the case of consecrated items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.,Shmuel said to Rav Huna: We have this as an established halakha already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but from where is it derived that this requirement is indispensable? Rav Huna said to him that the verse states: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., with your full awareness you shall slaughter it, in the form of a purposeful action.,§ The mishna teaches: Because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that even the owner of an offering can render it piggul through improper intention. Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering piggul with an improper intention.,Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that even in a case involving two people, where this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is the intention that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, is that which we just said, that the owner can render his offering piggul through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.,The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 38b): With regard to one who slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, his slaughter is valid and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.,The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as we learned in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: In the case of any item that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out on Shabbat the item that was stored, that one who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this one who stored it.,The Gemara notes: These two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara explains: Now that concerning matters outside the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to state that the same halakha applies to matters inside the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?,But Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not necessarily accept as halakha the rulings of these two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: Perhaps it is only concerning inside the Temple that we say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning outside the Temple, we do not say this.,The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer: Now that with regard to Shabbat we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to say that the same applies concerning idol worship, where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?,But Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is only with regard to idol worship that you say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat similar to service performed inside the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. But with regard to Shabbat, the Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor, i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.,,What is the location of the slaughtering and consumption of offerings? The principle is that with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard.,Specifically, with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, and upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and on the golden altar. Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As to the remainder of the blood, which is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering.,With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and upon the golden altar,'' None
31. Vergil, Aeneis, 6.376
 Tagged with subjects: • intention • intentions

 Found in books: Farrell (2021), Juno's Aeneid: A Battle for Heroic Identity, 243; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 301

sup>
6.376 Desine fata deum flecti sperare precando.'' None
sup>
6.376 Like Scylla, or the dragon Lerna bred, '' None
32. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • homicide, intentional • intention

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 22; Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 283

33. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • allegoresis (general), and authorial intention • grammatical archive, commentarial assumptions, intention (διάνοια/ voluntas ) • intention, and allegoresis

 Found in books: Ward (2022), Clement and Scriptural Exegesis: The Making of a Commentarial Theologian, 45; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 367




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