The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Index Database

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

360 results for "human"

1. Hebrew Bible, Ruth, 28.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

2. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 5.4, 5.6, 15.7, 34.10 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature •nature, human Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126, 180

5.4. "פָּנִים בְּפָנִים דִּבֶּר יְהוָה עִמָּכֶם בָּהָר מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ׃", 5.6. "אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר הוֹצֵאתִיךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים׃", 15.7. "כִּי־יִהְיֶה בְךָ אֶבְיוֹן מֵאַחַד אַחֶיךָ בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ בְּאַרְצְךָ אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ לֹא תְאַמֵּץ אֶת־לְבָבְךָ וְלֹא תִקְפֹּץ אֶת־יָדְךָ מֵאָחִיךָ הָאֶבְיוֹן׃",

5.4. "The LORD spoke with you face to face in the mount out of the midst of the fire—", 5.6. "I am the LORD thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.", 15.7. "If there be among you a needy man, one of thy brethren, within any of thy gates, in thy land which the LORD thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not harden thy heart, nor shut thy hand from thy needy brother;", 34.10. "And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the LORD knew face to face;",

3. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 8.35 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 289

8.35. "כִּי מֹצְאִי מצאי [מָצָא] חַיִּים וַיָּפֶק רָצוֹן מֵיְהוָה׃",

8.35. "For whoso findeth me findeth life, And obtaineth favour of the LORD.",

4. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 12.8, 15.22-15.31, 24.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature •humanity, compound nature of •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 256

12.8. "פֶּה אֶל־פֶּה אֲדַבֶּר־בּוֹ וּמַרְאֶה וְלֹא בְחִידֹת וּתְמֻנַת יְהוָה יַבִּיט וּמַדּוּעַ לֹא יְרֵאתֶם לְדַבֵּר בְּעַבְדִּי בְמֹשֶׁה׃", 15.22. "וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כָּל־הַמִּצְוֺת הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה׃", 15.23. "אֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד־מֹשֶׁה מִן־הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם׃", 15.24. "וְהָיָה אִם מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה נֶעֶשְׂתָה לִשְׁגָגָה וְעָשׂוּ כָל־הָעֵדָה פַּר בֶּן־בָּקָר אֶחָד לְעֹלָה לְרֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַיהוָה וּמִנְחָתוֹ וְנִסְכּוֹ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׂעִיר־עִזִּים אֶחָד לְחַטָּת׃", 15.25. "וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל־כָּל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִסְלַח לָהֶם כִּי־שְׁגָגָה הִוא וְהֵם הֵבִיאוּ אֶת־קָרְבָּנָם אִשֶּׁה לַיהוָה וְחַטָּאתָם לִפְנֵי יְהוָה עַל־שִׁגְגָתָם׃", 15.26. "וְנִסְלַח לְכָל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם כִּי לְכָל־הָעָם בִּשְׁגָגָה׃", 15.27. "וְאִם־נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה וְהִקְרִיבָה עֵז בַּת־שְׁנָתָהּ לְחַטָּאת׃", 15.28. "וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל־הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת בְּחֶטְאָה בִשְׁגָגָה לִפְנֵי יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו וְנִסְלַח לוֹ׃", 15.29. "הָאֶזְרָח בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה לָכֶם לָעֹשֶׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה׃", 15.31. "כִּי דְבַר־יְהוָה בָּזָה וְאֶת־מִצְוָתוֹ הֵפַר הִכָּרֵת תִּכָּרֵת הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא עֲוֺנָה בָהּ׃", 24.17. "אֶרְאֶנּוּ וְלֹא עַתָּה אֲשׁוּרֶנּוּ וְלֹא קָרוֹב דָּרַךְ כּוֹכָב מִיַּעֲקֹב וְקָם שֵׁבֶט מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וּמָחַץ פַּאֲתֵי מוֹאָב וְקַרְקַר כָּל־בְּנֵי־שֵׁת׃",

12.8. "with him do I speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the LORD doth he behold; wherefore then were ye not afraid to speak against My servant, against Moses?’", 15.22. "And when ye shall err, and not observe all these commandments, which the LORD hath spoken unto Moses,", 15.23. "even all that the LORD hath commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the LORD gave commandment, and onward throughout your generations;", 15.24. "then it shall be, if it be done in error by the congregation, it being hid from their eyes, that all the congregation shall offer one young bullock for a burnt-offering, for a sweet savour unto the LORD—with the meal-offering thereof, and the drink-offering thereof, according to the ordice—and one he-goat for a sin-offering.", 15.25. "And the priest shall make atonement for all the congregation of the children of Israel, and they shall be forgiven; for it was an error, and they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire unto the LORD, and their sin-offering before the LORD, for their error.", 15.26. "And all the congregation of the children of Israel shall be forgiven, and the stranger that sojourneth among them; for in respect of all the people it was done in error.", 15.27. "And if one person sin through error, then he shall offer a she-goat of the first year for a sin-offering.", 15.28. "And the priest shall make atonement for the soul that erreth, when he sinneth through error, before the LORD, to make atonement for him; and he shall be forgiven,", 15.29. "both he that is home-born among the children of Israel, and the stranger that sojourneth among them: ye shall have one law for him that doeth aught in error.", 15.30. "But the soul that doeth aught with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, the same blasphemeth the LORD; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people.", 15.31. "Because he hath despised the word of the LORD, and hath broken His commandment; that soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him.", 24.17. "I see him, but not now; I behold him, but not nigh; There shall step forth a star out of Jacob, And a scepter shall rise out of Israel, And shall smite through the corners of Moab, And break down all the sons of Seth.",

5. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.18, 26.13 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 180

19.18. "לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃", 26.13. "אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר הוֹצֵאתִי אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִהְיֹת לָהֶם עֲבָדִים וָאֶשְׁבֹּר מֹטֹת עֻלְּכֶם וָאוֹלֵךְ אֶתְכֶם קוֹמְמִיּוּת׃",

19.18. "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.", 26.13. "I am the LORD your God, who brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, that ye should not be their bondmen; and I have broken the bars of your yoke, and made you go upright.",

6. Hebrew Bible, Job, 15.14-15.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 15

15.14. "מָה־אֱנוֹשׁ כִּי־יִזְכֶּה וְכִי־יִצְדַּק יְלוּד אִשָּׁה׃", 15.15. "הֵן בקדשו [בִּקְדֹשָׁיו] לֹא יַאֲמִין וְשָׁמַיִם לֹא־זַכּוּ בְעֵינָיו׃", 15.16. "אַף כִּי־נִתְעָב וְנֶאֱלָח אִישׁ־שֹׁתֶה כַמַּיִם עַוְלָה׃",

15.14. "What is man, that he should be clean? And he that is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?", 15.15. "Behold, He putteth no trust in His holy ones; Yea, the heavens are not clean in His sight.", 15.16. "How much less one that is abominable and impure, Man who drinketh iniquity like water! .",

7. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 8.4-8.5, 77.10, 82.6, 144.3-144.4 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •human being, views of, dual nature of Found in books: Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 40; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 15; Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 166

8.4. "כִּי־אֶרְאֶה שָׁמֶיךָ מַעֲשֵׂי אֶצְבְּעֹתֶיךָ יָרֵחַ וְכוֹכָבִים אֲשֶׁר כּוֹנָנְתָּה׃", 8.5. "מָה־אֱנוֹשׁ כִּי־תִזְכְּרֶנּוּ וּבֶן־אָדָם כִּי תִפְקְדֶנּוּ׃", 82.6. "אֲ‍נִי־אָמַרְתִּי אֱלֹהִים אַתֶּם וּבְנֵי עֶלְיוֹן כֻּלְּכֶם׃", 144.3. "יְהוָה מָה־אָדָם וַתֵּדָעֵהוּ בֶּן־אֱנוֹשׁ וַתְּחַשְּׁבֵהוּ׃", 144.4. "אָדָם לַהֶבֶל דָּמָה יָמָיו כְּצֵל עוֹבֵר׃",

8.4. "When I behold Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, The moon and the stars, which Thou hast established;", 8.5. "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that Thou thinkest of him?", 77.10. "Hath God forgotten to be gracious? Hath He in anger shut up his compassions?' Selah", 82.6. "I said: Ye are godlike beings, and all of you sons of the Most High.", 144.3. "LORD, what is man, that Thou takest knowledge of him? Or the son of man, that Thou makest account of him?", 144.4. "Man is like unto a breath; His days are as a shadow that passeth away.",

8. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 4.6-4.7, 4.22, 4.27, 6.6-6.8, 9.12, 20.1, 33.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 166; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126, 180

4.6. "וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לוֹ עוֹד הָבֵא־נָא יָדְךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ וַיָּבֵא יָדוֹ בְּחֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ וְהִנֵּה יָדוֹ מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג׃", 4.7. "וַיֹּאמֶר הָשֵׁב יָדְךָ אֶל־חֵיקֶךָ וַיָּשֶׁב יָדוֹ אֶל־חֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ מֵחֵיקוֹ וְהִנֵּה־שָׁבָה כִּבְשָׂרוֹ׃", 4.22. "וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל־פַּרְעֹה כֹּה אָמַר יְהוָה בְּנִי בְכֹרִי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃", 4.27. "וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־אַהֲרֹן לֵךְ לִקְרַאת מֹשֶׁה הַמִּדְבָּרָה וַיֵּלֶךְ וַיִּפְגְּשֵׁהוּ בְּהַר הָאֱלֹהִים וַיִּשַּׁק־לוֹ׃", 6.6. "לָכֵן אֱמֹר לִבְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנִי יְהוָה וְהוֹצֵאתִי אֶתְכֶם מִתַּחַת סִבְלֹת מִצְרַיִם וְהִצַּלְתִּי אֶתְכֶם מֵעֲבֹדָתָם וְגָאַלְתִּי אֶתְכֶם בִּזְרוֹעַ נְטוּיָה וּבִשְׁפָטִים גְּדֹלִים׃", 6.7. "וְלָקַחְתִּי אֶתְכֶם לִי לְעָם וְהָיִיתִי לָכֶם לֵאלֹהִים וִידַעְתֶּם כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הַמּוֹצִיא אֶתְכֶם מִתַּחַת סִבְלוֹת מִצְרָיִם׃", 6.8. "וְהֵבֵאתִי אֶתְכֶם אֶל־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר נָשָׂאתִי אֶת־יָדִי לָתֵת אֹתָהּ לְאַבְרָהָם לְיִצְחָק וּלְיַעֲקֹב וְנָתַתִּי אֹתָהּ לָכֶם מוֹרָשָׁה אֲנִי יְהוָה׃", 9.12. "וַיְחַזֵּק יְהוָה אֶת־לֵב פַּרְעֹה וְלֹא שָׁמַע אֲלֵהֶם כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה׃", 20.1. "וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא־תַעֲשֶׂה כָל־מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ־וּבִתֶּךָ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ", 20.1. "וַיְדַבֵּר אֱלֹהִים אֵת כָּל־הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה לֵאמֹר׃", 33.11. "וְדִבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים כַּאֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ וְשָׁב אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה וּמְשָׁרְתוֹ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן־נוּן נַעַר לֹא יָמִישׁ מִתּוֹךְ הָאֹהֶל׃",

4.6. "And the LORD said furthermore unto him: ‘Put now thy hand into thy bosom.’ And he put his hand into his bosom; and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous, as white as snow.", 4.7. "And He said: ‘Put thy hand back into thy bosom.—And he put his hand back into his bosom; and when he took it out of his bosom, behold, it was turned again as his other flesh.—", 4.22. "And thou shalt say unto Pharaoh: Thus saith the LORD: Israel is My son, My first-born.", 4.27. "And the LORD said to Aaron: ‘Go into the wilderness to meet Moses.’ And he went, and met him in the mountain of God, and kissed him.", 6.6. "Wherefore say unto the children of Israel: I am the LORD, and I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians, and I will deliver you from their bondage, and I will redeem you with an outstretched arm, and with great judgments;", 6.7. "and I will take you to Me for a people, and I will be to you a God; and ye shall know that I am the LORD your God, who brought you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians.", 6.8. "And I will bring you in unto the land, concerning which I lifted up My hand to give it to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob; and I will give it you for a heritage: I am the LORD.’", 9.12. "And the LORD hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them; as the LORD had spoken unto Moses.", 20.1. "And God spoke all these words, saying:", 33.11. "And the LORD spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. And he would return into the camp; but his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, a young man, departed not out of the Tent.",

9. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, None (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 40; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 6, 10, 27, 69, 71, 217, 225; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 59, 60, 99, 110, 122, 125; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 103, 104; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 27, 207, 299, 321, 328; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5, 129

1.26. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃", 1.27. "וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃", 2.7. "וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃", 2.8. "וַיִּטַּע יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים גַּן־בְעֵדֶן מִקֶּדֶם וַיָּשֶׂם שָׁם אֶת־הָאָדָם אֲשֶׁר יָצָר׃", 2.16. "וַיְצַו יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים עַל־הָאָדָם לֵאמֹר מִכֹּל עֵץ־הַגָּן אָכֹל תֹּאכֵל׃", 2.17. "וּמֵעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְךָ מִמֶּנּוּ מוֹת תָּמוּת׃", 2.21. "וַיַּפֵּל יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים תַּרְדֵּמָה עַל־הָאָדָם וַיִּישָׁן וַיִּקַּח אַחַת מִצַּלְעֹתָיו וַיִּסְגֹּר בָּשָׂר תַּחְתֶּנָּה׃", 2.24. "עַל־כֵּן יַעֲזָב־אִישׁ אֶת־אָבִיו וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ וְדָבַק בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד׃", 2.25. "וַיִּהְיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲרוּמִּים הָאָדָם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְלֹא יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ׃", 3.1. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֶת־קֹלְךָ שָׁמַעְתִּי בַּגָּן וָאִירָא כִּי־עֵירֹם אָנֹכִי וָאֵחָבֵא׃", 3.1. "וְהַנָּחָשׁ הָיָה עָרוּם מִכֹּל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אַף כִּי־אָמַר אֱלֹהִים לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן׃", 3.2. "וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה אֶל־הַנָּחָשׁ מִפְּרִי עֵץ־הַגָּן נֹאכֵל׃", 3.2. "וַיִּקְרָא הָאָדָם שֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ חַוָּה כִּי הִוא הָיְתָה אֵם כָּל־חָי׃", 3.3. "וּמִפְּרִי הָעֵץ אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹךְ־הַגָּן אָמַר אֱלֹהִים לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ וְלֹא תִגְּעוּ בּוֹ פֶּן־תְּמֻתוּן׃", 3.4. "וַיֹּאמֶר הַנָּחָשׁ אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה לֹא־מוֹת תְּמֻתוּן׃", 3.5. "כִּי יֹדֵעַ אֱלֹהִים כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְכֶם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנִפְקְחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם וִהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע׃", 3.6. "וַתֵּרֶא הָאִשָּׁה כִּי טוֹב הָעֵץ לְמַאֲכָל וְכִי תַאֲוָה־הוּא לָעֵינַיִם וְנֶחְמָד הָעֵץ לְהַשְׂכִּיל וַתִּקַּח מִפִּרְיוֹ וַתֹּאכַל וַתִּתֵּן גַּם־לְאִישָׁהּ עִמָּהּ וַיֹּאכַל׃", 3.7. "וַתִּפָּקַחְנָה עֵינֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם וַיֵּדְעוּ כִּי עֵירֻמִּם הֵם וַיִּתְפְּרוּ עֲלֵה תְאֵנָה וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם חֲגֹרֹת׃", 3.16. "אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אָמַר הַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה עִצְּבוֹנֵךְ וְהֵרֹנֵךְ בְּעֶצֶב תֵּלְדִי בָנִים וְאֶל־אִישֵׁךְ תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ וְהוּא יִמְשָׁל־בָּךְ׃", 3.17. "וּלְאָדָם אָמַר כִּי־שָׁמַעְתָּ לְקוֹל אִשְׁתֶּךָ וַתֹּאכַל מִן־הָעֵץ אֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ לֵאמֹר לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ אֲרוּרָה הָאֲדָמָה בַּעֲבוּרֶךָ בְּעִצָּבוֹן תֹּאכֲלֶנָּה כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ׃", 3.18. "וְקוֹץ וְדַרְדַּר תַּצְמִיחַ לָךְ וְאָכַלְתָּ אֶת־עֵשֶׂב הַשָּׂדֶה׃", 3.19. "בְּזֵעַת אַפֶּיךָ תֹּאכַל לֶחֶם עַד שׁוּבְךָ אֶל־הָאֲדָמָה כִּי מִמֶּנָּה לֻקָּחְתָּ כִּי־עָפָר אַתָּה וְאֶל־עָפָר תָּשׁוּב׃", 3.22. "וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים הֵן הָאָדָם הָיָה כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ לָדַעַת טוֹב וָרָע וְעַתָּה פֶּן־יִשְׁלַח יָדוֹ וְלָקַח גַּם מֵעֵץ הַחַיִּים וְאָכַל וָחַי לְעֹלָם׃", 3.23. "וַיְשַׁלְּחֵהוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים מִגַּן־עֵדֶן לַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר לֻקַּח מִשָּׁם׃", 3.24. "וַיְגָרֶשׁ אֶת־הָאָדָם וַיַּשְׁכֵּן מִקֶּדֶם לְגַן־עֵדֶן אֶת־הַכְּרֻבִים וְאֵת לַהַט הַחֶרֶב הַמִּתְהַפֶּכֶת לִשְׁמֹר אֶת־דֶּרֶךְ עֵץ הַחַיִּים׃", 5.1. "זֶה סֵפֶר תּוֹלְדֹת אָדָם בְּיוֹם בְּרֹא אֱלֹהִים אָדָם בִּדְמוּת אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֹתוֹ׃", 5.1. "וַיְחִי אֱנוֹשׁ אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת־קֵינָן חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת׃", 6.5. "וַיַּרְא יְהוָה כִּי רַבָּה רָעַת הָאָדָם בָּאָרֶץ וְכָל־יֵצֶר מַחְשְׁבֹת לִבּוֹ רַק רַע כָּל־הַיּוֹם׃", 8.21. "וַיָּרַח יְהוָה אֶת־רֵיחַ הַנִּיחֹחַ וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־לִבּוֹ לֹא־אֹסִף לְקַלֵּל עוֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה בַּעֲבוּר הָאָדָם כִּי יֵצֶר לֵב הָאָדָם רַע מִנְּעֻרָיו וְלֹא־אֹסִף עוֹד לְהַכּוֹת אֶת־כָּל־חַי כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשִׂיתִי׃", 9.16. "וְהָיְתָה הַקֶּשֶׁת בֶּעָנָן וּרְאִיתִיהָ לִזְכֹּר בְּרִית עוֹלָם בֵּין אֱלֹהִים וּבֵין כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה בְּכָל־בָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃", 17.12. "וּבֶן־שְׁמֹנַת יָמִים יִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם יְלִיד בָּיִת וּמִקְנַת־כֶּסֶף מִכֹּל בֶּן־נֵכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזַּרְעֲךָ הוּא׃", 17.13. "הִמּוֹל יִמּוֹל יְלִיד בֵּיתְךָ וּמִקְנַת כַּסְפֶּךָ וְהָיְתָה בְרִיתִי בִּבְשַׂרְכֶם לִבְרִית עוֹלָם׃", 17.14. "וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמּוֹל אֶת־בְּשַׂר עָרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מֵעַמֶּיהָ אֶת־בְּרִיתִי הֵפַר׃", 17.26. "בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה נִמּוֹל אַבְרָהָם וְיִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ׃", 18.11. "וְאַבְרָהָם וְשָׂרָה זְקֵנִים בָּאִים בַּיָּמִים חָדַל לִהְיוֹת לְשָׂרָה אֹרַח כַּנָּשִׁים׃", 18.12. "וַתִּצְחַק שָׂרָה בְּקִרְבָּהּ לֵאמֹר אַחֲרֵי בְלֹתִי הָיְתָה־לִּי עֶדְנָה וַאדֹנִי זָקֵן׃", 25.2. "וַתֵּלֶד לוֹ אֶת־זִמְרָן וְאֶת־יָקְשָׁן וְאֶת־מְדָן וְאֶת־מִדְיָן וְאֶת־יִשְׁבָּק וְאֶת־שׁוּחַ׃", 25.2. "וַיְהִי יִצְחָק בֶּן־אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה בְּקַחְתּוֹ אֶת־רִבְקָה בַּת־בְּתוּאֵל הָאֲרַמִּי מִפַּדַּן אֲרָם אֲחוֹת לָבָן הָאֲרַמִּי לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה׃", 28.11. "וַיִּפְגַּע בַּמָּקוֹם וַיָּלֶן שָׁם כִּי־בָא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ וַיִּקַּח מֵאַבְנֵי הַמָּקוֹם וַיָּשֶׂם מְרַאֲשֹׁתָיו וַיִּשְׁכַּב בַּמָּקוֹם הַהוּא׃", 28.12. "וַיַּחֲלֹם וְהִנֵּה סֻלָּם מֻצָּב אַרְצָה וְרֹאשׁוֹ מַגִּיעַ הַשָּׁמָיְמָה וְהִנֵּה מַלְאֲכֵי אֱלֹהִים עֹלִים וְיֹרְדִים בּוֹ׃", 28.13. "וְהִנֵּה יְהוָה נִצָּב עָלָיו וַיֹּאמַר אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אַבְרָהָם אָבִיךָ וֵאלֹהֵי יִצְחָק הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה שֹׁכֵב עָלֶיהָ לְךָ אֶתְּנֶנָּה וּלְזַרְעֶךָ׃", 28.14. "וְהָיָה זַרְעֲךָ כַּעֲפַר הָאָרֶץ וּפָרַצְתָּ יָמָּה וָקֵדְמָה וְצָפֹנָה וָנֶגְבָּה וְנִבְרֲכוּ בְךָ כָּל־מִשְׁפְּחֹת הָאֲדָמָה וּבְזַרְעֶךָ׃", 28.15. "וְהִנֵּה אָנֹכִי עִמָּךְ וּשְׁמַרְתִּיךָ בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר־תֵּלֵךְ וַהֲשִׁבֹתִיךָ אֶל־הָאֲדָמָה הַזֹּאת כִּי לֹא אֶעֱזָבְךָ עַד אֲשֶׁר אִם־עָשִׂיתִי אֵת אֲשֶׁר־דִּבַּרְתִּי לָךְ׃", 28.16. "וַיִּיקַץ יַעֲקֹב מִשְּׁנָתוֹ וַיֹּאמֶר אָכֵן יֵשׁ יְהוָה בַּמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה וְאָנֹכִי לֹא יָדָעְתִּי׃", 28.17. "וַיִּירָא וַיֹּאמַר מַה־נּוֹרָא הַמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה אֵין זֶה כִּי אִם־בֵּית אֱלֹהִים וְזֶה שַׁעַר הַשָּׁמָיִם׃", 32.31. "וַיִּקְרָא יַעֲקֹב שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם פְּנִיאֵל כִּי־רָאִיתִי אֱלֹהִים פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים וַתִּנָּצֵל נַפְשִׁי׃", 46.2. "וַיִּוָּלֵד לְיוֹסֵף בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יָלְדָה־לּוֹ אָסְנַת בַּת־פּוֹטִי פֶרַע כֹּהֵן אֹן אֶת־מְנַשֶּׁה וְאֶת־אֶפְרָיִם׃", 46.2. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמַרְאֹת הַלַּיְלָה וַיֹּאמֶר יַעֲקֹב יַעֲקֹב וַיֹּאמֶר הִנֵּנִי׃", 46.3. "וַיֹּאמֶר אָנֹכִי הָאֵל אֱלֹהֵי אָבִיךָ אַל־תִּירָא מֵרְדָה מִצְרַיְמָה כִּי־לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל אֲשִׂימְךָ שָׁם׃", 46.3. "וַיֹּאמֶר יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־יוֹסֵף אָמוּתָה הַפָּעַם אַחֲרֵי רְאוֹתִי אֶת־פָּנֶיךָ כִּי עוֹדְךָ חָי׃", 46.4. "אָנֹכִי אֵרֵד עִמְּךָ מִצְרַיְמָה וְאָנֹכִי אַעַלְךָ גַם־עָלֹה וְיוֹסֵף יָשִׁית יָדוֹ עַל־עֵינֶיךָ׃",

1.26. "And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’", 1.27. "And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.", 2.7. "Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.", 2.8. "And the LORD God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed.", 2.16. "And the LORD God commanded the man, saying: ‘of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat;", 2.17. "but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.’", 2.21. "And the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the place with flesh instead thereof.", 2.24. "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh.", 2.25. "And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.", 3.1. "Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman: ‘Yea, hath God said: Ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?’", 3.2. "And the woman said unto the serpent: ‘of the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat;", 3.3. "but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said: Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.’", 3.4. "And the serpent said unto the woman: ‘Ye shall not surely die;", 3.5. "for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.’", 3.6. "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.", 3.7. "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves girdles.", 3.16. "Unto the woman He said: ‘I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.’", 3.17. "And unto Adam He said: ‘Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying: Thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.", 3.18. "Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field.", 3.19. "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.’", 3.22. "And the LORD God said: ‘Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.’", 3.23. "Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken.", 3.24. "So He drove out the man; and He placed at the east of the garden of Eden the cherubim, and the flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way to the tree of life.", 5.1. "This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him;", 6.5. "And the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.", 8.21. "And the LORD smelled the sweet savour; and the LORD said in His heart: ‘I will not again curse the ground any more for man’s sake; for the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth; neither will I again smite any more every thing living, as I have done.", 9.16. "And the bow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may remember the everlasting covet between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth.’", 17.12. "And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every male throughout your generations, he that is born in the house, or bought with money of any foreigner, that is not of thy seed.", 17.13. "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised; and My covet shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covet.", 17.14. "And the uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken My covet.’", 17.26. "In the selfsame day was Abraham circumcised, and Ishmael his son.", 18.11. "Now Abraham and Sarah were old, and well stricken in age; it had ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of women.—", 18.12. "And Sarah laughed within herself, saying: ‘After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?’", 25.2. "And she bore him Zimran, and Jokshan, and Medan, and Midian, and Ishbak, and Shuah.", 28.11. "And he lighted upon the place, and tarried there all night, because the sun was set; and he took one of the stones of the place, and put it under his head, and lay down in that place to sleep.", 28.12. "And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it.", 28.13. "And, behold, the LORD stood beside him, and said: ‘I am the LORD, the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac. The land whereon thou liest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed.", 28.14. "And thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth, and thou shalt spread abroad to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south. And in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed.", 28.15. "And, behold, I am with thee, and will keep thee whithersoever thou goest, and will bring thee back into this land; for I will not leave thee, until I have done that which I have spoken to thee of.’", 28.16. "And Jacob awaked out of his sleep, and he said: ‘Surely the LORD is in this place; and I knew it not.’", 28.17. "And he was afraid, and said: ‘How full of awe is this place! this is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.’", 32.31. "And Jacob called the name of the place Peniel: ‘for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved.’", 46.2. "And God spoke unto Israel in the visions of the night, and said: ‘Jacob, Jacob.’ And he said: ‘Here am I.’", 46.3. "And He said: ‘I am God, the God of thy father; fear not to go down into Egypt; for I will there make of thee a great nation.", 46.4. "I will go down with thee into Egypt; and I will also surely bring thee up again; and Joseph shall put his hand upon thine eyes.’",

10. Hesiod, Theogony, 223 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, as essential to human nature •nature, human nature Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 105

223. With her the moment she was born: all three

11. Hesiod, Works And Days, 200 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, as essential to human nature •nature, human nature Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 105

200. That’s given to the honest, just and kind.

12. Homer, Iliad, 8.20-8.22, 24.258-24.265 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, as essential to human nature •nature, human nature Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 80, 169

8.20. / and lay ye hold thereof, all ye gods and all goddesses; yet could ye not drag to earth from out of heaven Zeus the counsellor most high, not though ye laboured sore. But whenso I were minded to draw of a ready heart, then with earth itself should I draw you and with sea withal; 8.21. / and lay ye hold thereof, all ye gods and all goddesses; yet could ye not drag to earth from out of heaven Zeus the counsellor most high, not though ye laboured sore. But whenso I were minded to draw of a ready heart, then with earth itself should I draw you and with sea withal; 8.22. / and lay ye hold thereof, all ye gods and all goddesses; yet could ye not drag to earth from out of heaven Zeus the counsellor most high, not though ye laboured sore. But whenso I were minded to draw of a ready heart, then with earth itself should I draw you and with sea withal; 24.258. / Woe is me, that am all unblest, seeing that I begat sons the best in the broad land of Troy, yet of them I avow that not one is left, not godlike Nestor, not Troilus the warrior charioteer, not Hector that was a god among men, neither seemed he as the son of a mortal man, but of a god: 24.259. / Woe is me, that am all unblest, seeing that I begat sons the best in the broad land of Troy, yet of them I avow that not one is left, not godlike Nestor, not Troilus the warrior charioteer, not Hector that was a god among men, neither seemed he as the son of a mortal man, but of a god: 24.260. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way? 24.261. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way? 24.262. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way? 24.263. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way? 24.264. / all them hath Ares slain, yet these things of shame are all left me, false of tongue, nimble of foot, peerless at beating the floor in the dance, robbers of lambs and kids from your own folk. Will ye not make me ready a waggon, and that with speed, and lay all these things therein, that we may get forward on our way? 24.265. / So spake he, and they, seized with fear of the rebuke of their father, brought forth the light-running waggon drawn of mules, fair and newly-wrought, and bound upon it the wicker box; and down from its peg they took the mule-yoke, a box-wood yoke with a knob thereon, well-fitted with guiding-rings;

13. Hebrew Bible, Jeremiah, 38.10 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature •nature, human nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 65; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 153

38.10. "Then the king commanded Ebed-melech the Ethiopian, saying: ‘Take from hence thirty men with thee, and take up Jeremiah the prophet out of the pit, before he die.’",

14. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 6.9, 6.10, 45.5-6.18, 46.9 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126

46.9. "זִכְרוּ רִאשֹׁנוֹת מֵעוֹלָם כִּי אָנֹכִי אֵל וְאֵין עוֹד אֱלֹהִים וְאֶפֶס כָּמוֹנִי׃",

46.9. "Remember the former things of old: That I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like Me;",

15. Homer, Odyssey, 11.601-11.602, 13.297-13.299 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, binary nature of •desire, and human nature •fear, and human nature •irrational impulses, and human nature Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 266; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 207

16. Theognis, Elegies, 472 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 504

17. Hebrew Bible, Ezekiel, 20.35 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158

20.35. "וְהֵבֵאתִי אֶתְכֶם אֶל־מִדְבַּר הָעַמִּים וְנִשְׁפַּטְתִּי אִתְּכֶם שָׁם פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים׃",

20.35. "and I will bring you into the wilderness of the peoples, and there will I plead with you face to face.",

18. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 165

64b. εὐκινήτου τε καὶ δυσκινήτου φύσεως ὅτι διειλόμεθα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν· ταύτῃ γὰρ δὴ μεταδιωκτέον πάντα ὅσα ἐπινοοῦμεν ἑλεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον, ὅταν καὶ βραχὺ πάθος εἰς αὐτὸ ἐμπίπτῃ, διαδίδωσιν κύκλῳ μόρια ἕτερα ἑτέροις ταὐτὸν ἀπεργαζόμενα, μέχριπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον ἐλθόντα ἐξαγγείλῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν δύναμιν· τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον ἑδραῖον ὂν κατʼ οὐδένα τε κύκλον ἰὸν πάσχει μόνον,

64b. bearing in mind the distinction we previously drew between mobile and immobile substances; for it is in this way that we must track down all those facts that we intend to grasp. Whenever what is naturally mobile is impressed by even a small affection, it transmits it in a circle, the particles passing on to one another this identical impression until they reach the organ of intelligence and announce the quality of the agent. But a substance of the opposite kind, being stable and having no circular movement, is only affected in itself and does not move any other adjacent particle; consequently,

19. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 102

20. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 114

230a. τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἆρʼ οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφʼ ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς;

230a. when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

21. Euripides, Hippolytus, 1434, 28, 323, 464, 507, 615, 27 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 132

22. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 98

212a. γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;

212a. Do you call it a pitiful life for a man to lead—looking that way, observing that vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him? Do but consider, she said, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal.

23. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 72

320b. at a loss what to do with him. And there are a great many others whom I could mention to you as having never succeeded, though virtuous themselves, in making anyone else better, either of their own or of other families. I therefore, Protagoras, in view of these facts, believe that virtue is not teachable: but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over, and suppose there is something in what you say, because I consider you to have gained experience in many things and to have learnt many, besides finding out some for yourself. So if you can demonstrate to us more explicitly that virtue is teachable,

24. Hippocrates, On The Diet of Acute Diseases, 37-38, 40-66, 39 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 195

25. Hippocrates, The Sacred Disease, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 51

26. Hippocrates, Nature of Woman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature of disease Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 52

27. Herodotus, Histories, 1.28-29.1, 1.55.2, 1.56.1, 1.89 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 265

1.89. Cyrus thought about what Croesus had said and, telling the rest to withdraw, asked Croesus what fault he saw in what was being done. “Since the gods have made me your slave,” replied the Lydian, “it is right that if I have any further insight I should point it out to you. ,The Persians being by nature violent men are poor; so if you let them seize and hold great possessions, you may expect that he who has got most will revolt against you. Therefore do this, if you like what I say. ,Have men of your guard watch all the gates; let them take the spoil from those who are carrying it out, and say that it must be paid as a tithe to Zeus. Thus you shall not be hated by them for taking their wealth by force, and they, recognizing that you act justly, will give up the spoil willingly.”

28. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 529

29. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 205

30. Sophocles, Antigone, 616-618, 620-625, 619 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 123

31. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 144

20a. τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ὑεῖ— ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ ὑεῖ πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι ὃς

20a. to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him—for he has two sons— Callias, said I, if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them

32. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.23.5-1.23.6, 1.33.2, 1.44.2, 1.68.1, 1.75.1, 1.75.3-1.75.4, 1.76.1-1.76.4, 1.77.2, 1.81.6, 1.84.3-1.84.4, 1.121.3, 1.122.1, 1.138.3, 1.139.4, 1.140.1, 2.22.1, 2.34.6, 2.53, 2.55.2, 2.59.2-2.59.3, 2.63.2, 2.65, 2.65.5-2.65.13, 3.38.1, 3.39.4-3.39.5, 3.42.1, 3.42.5, 3.43.4, 3.44.1, 3.44.3-3.44.4, 3.45.2-3.45.7, 3.46-3.47, 3.46.1, 3.48.2, 3.82-3.84, 3.82.2, 3.82.8, 3.83.3, 4.17.3-4.17.4, 4.18.2, 4.41.3, 4.60.1-4.60.2, 4.61.1-4.61.2, 4.61.5, 4.65.4, 4.108.4, 5.14.3, 5.25.3, 5.87, 5.89, 5.97, 5.103.1-5.103.2, 5.105.2, 5.113, 6.6.1-6.6.2, 6.8.4, 6.9.3, 6.10.5, 6.11.2, 6.11.4, 6.12.2, 6.13.1, 6.15.2-6.15.3, 6.18.2-6.18.7, 6.19.1-6.19.2, 6.20.1, 6.24.1-6.24.3, 6.26.1, 6.83.4, 6.90.3, 7.18.2, 8.2.4, 8.96.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •irrational impulses, and human nature •diodotus, on human nature •desire, and human nature •fear, and human nature •human nature •alcibiades, and human nature •codex vaticanus graecus, human nature, view of •human nature and human beings Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 52; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 114, 115, 265; Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 105, 106, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 132, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 196, 199, 200, 201, 212, 222, 223, 224, 225, 230, 231, 233, 253, 254, 263, 264, 266, 271, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 309, 310, 311, 312; Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 74

1.23.5. διότι δ’ ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. 1.23.6. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν: αἱ δ’ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ’ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ’ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν. 1.33.2. καὶ σκέψασθε: τίς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἢ τίς τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἂν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσγενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν, καὶ προσέτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετήν, οἷς δὲ ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν, ὑμῖν δ’ αὐτοῖς ἰσχύν: ἃ ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον οὐχ ἧσσον διδόντες ἢ ληψόμενοι παραγίγνονται. 1.44.2. ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὣς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν, ἤν τι δέῃ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. 1.68.1. ‘τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ’ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους ἤν τι λέγωμεν καθίστησιν: καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. 1.75.1. ‘ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; 1.75.3. ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. 1.75.4. καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ’ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο. 1.76.1. ὑμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε: καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπομείναντες διὰ παντὸς ἀπήχθεσθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὖ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἧσσον ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἢ ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς ἢ αὐτοὺς κινδυνεύειν. 1.76.2. οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ <τριῶν> τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ’ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. 1.76.3. ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται. 1.76.4. ἄλλους γ’ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν: ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. 1.77.2. καὶ οὐδεὶς σκοπεῖ αὐτῶν τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθί που ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ ἧσσον ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὖσι διότι τοῦτο οὐκ ὀνειδίζεται: βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῇ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται. 1.81.6. μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθήσεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωμεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν: οὕτως εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεῦσαι μήτε ὥσπερ ἀπείρους καταπλαγῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ. 1.84.3. πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία, εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς. 1.84.4. αἰεὶ δὲ ὡς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευαζόμεθα: καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὡς ἁμαρτησομένων ἔχειν δεῖ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς προνοουμένων. πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται. 1.121.3. ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων: δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ’ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία: ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν. 1.122.1. ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὖσα τῶν προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἄν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον: ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ’ ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει. 1.138.3. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι: οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἐπιμαθών, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι’ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής: καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε, ὧν δ’ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο: τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. 1.139.4. καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρῄνει τοιάδε. 1.140.1. ‘τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια ξυμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἢν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: δι’ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. 2.22.1. Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι’ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν. 2.34.6. ἐπειδὰν δὲ κρύψωσι γῇ, ἀνὴρ ᾑρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ, λέγει ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπέρχονται. 2.55.2. Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὢν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐσβολῇ. 2.59.2. καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς πολεμεῖν καὶ δι’ ἐκεῖνον ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες,πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὥρμηντο ξυγχωρεῖν: καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες ὡς αὐτοὺς ἄπρακτοι ἐγένοντο. πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες ἐνέκειντο τῷ Περικλεῖ. 2.59.3. ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας ʽἔτι δ’ ἐστρατήγεἰ ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι: παρελθὼν δὲ ἔλεξε τοιάδε. 2.63.2. ἧς οὐδ’ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. 2.65.5. ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδή τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. 2.65.6. ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἔτη καὶ ἓξ μῆνας: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. 2.65.7. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο. 2.65.8. αἴτιον δ’ ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἔχων ἐπ’ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. 2.65.9. ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. 2.65.10. οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ’ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. 2.65.11. ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῇσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. 2.65.12. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλῃ τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως † τρία † μὲν ἔτη ἀντεῖχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν. 2.65.13. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ’ ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ. 3.38.1. ‘ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου διατριβὴν ἐμποιησάντων, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων μᾶλλον ʽὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὂν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνεἰ, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἀξιώσων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν Μυτιληναίων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὠφελίμους οὔσας, τὰς δ’ ἡμετέρας ξυμφορὰς τοῖς ξυμμάχοις βλάβας καθισταμένας. 3.39.4. εἴωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μάλιστα καὶ δι’ ἐλαχίστου ἀπροσδόκητος εὐπραγία ἔλθῃ, ἐς ὕβριν τρέπειν: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦντα ἀσφαλέστερα ἢ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾷον ἀπωθοῦνται ἢ εὐδαιμονίαν διασῴζονται. 3.39.5. χρῆν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν: πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεῦον ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαυμάζειν. 3.42.1. ‘οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι, οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλεύεσθαι ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. 3.42.5. χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν τῷ τε πλεῖστα εὖ βουλεύοντι μὴ προστιθέναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἐλασσοῦν τῆς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ζημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἀτιμάζειν. 3.43.4. χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. 3.44.1. ‘ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας. 3.44.3. νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ τοῦτο ὃ μάλιστα Κλέων ἰσχυρίζεται, ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμφέρον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἧσσον ἀφίστασθαι θάνατον ζημίαν προθεῖσι, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἐς τὸ μέλλον καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀντισχυριζόμενος τἀναντία γιγνώσκω. 3.44.4. καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους τάχ’ ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο: ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν. 3.45.2. πόλις τε ἀφισταμένη τίς πω ἥσσω τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν παρασκευὴν ἢ οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ξυμμαχίᾳ τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησεν; 3.45.3. πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου, ἐπεὶ διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι προστιθέντες, εἴ πως ἧσσον ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας κεῖσθαι αὐτάς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν: καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως παραβαίνεται. 3.45.4. ἢ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τι τούτου δέος εὑρετέον ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ’ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ’ ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. 3.45.5. ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ’ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν. 3.45.6. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ξυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν: ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὑτὸν ἐδόξασεν. 3.45.7. ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας,ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ. 3.46.1. ‘οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τῇ ζημίᾳ ὡς ἐχεγγύῳ πιστεύσαντας χεῖρον βουλεύσασθαι οὔτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστῆσαι τοῖς ἀποστᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καταλῦσαι. 3.48.2. τάδε γὰρ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἤδη φοβερά: ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ’ ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών.’ 3.82.2. καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ. 3.82.8. πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῇσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο. 3.83.3. καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο: τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι τό τε αὑτῶν ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνετόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν. 4.17.3. λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μηδ’ ὡς ἀξύνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. 4.17.4. ‘ὑμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ἔχουσι μὲν ὧν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγαθὸν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων: αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχῆσαι. 4.18.2. καίτοι οὔτε δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ ἐπάθομεν αὐτὸ οὔτε μείζονος προσγενομένης ὑβρίσαντες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ σφαλέντες, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. 4.41.3. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἱλώτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον, ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὐ βουλόμενοι ἔνδηλοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπρεσβεύοντο παρ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπειρῶντο τήν τε Πύλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομίζεσθαι. 4.60.1. ‘καίτοι γνῶναι χρὴ ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων δυνησόμεθα ἔτι διασῶσαι: καὶ διαλλακτὰς πολὺ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶνδε Ἀθηναίους νομίσαι, οἳ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες, καὶ ὀνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας τὸ φύσει πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἐς τὸ ξυμφέρον καθίστανται. 4.60.2. πόλεμον γὰρ αἰρομένων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς, ἄνδρας οἳ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλουμένοις αὐτοὶ ἐπιστρατεύουσι, κακῶς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ποιούντων τέλεσι τοῖς οἰκείοις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἅμα προκοπτόντων ἐκείνοις, εἰκός, ὅταν γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς τετρυχωμένους, καὶ πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι. 4.61.1. ‘καίτοι τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑτοῖμα βλάπτοντας ξυμμάχους τε ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαμβάνειν, νομίσαι τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἧς γε οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν. 4.61.2. ἃ χρὴ γνόντας καὶ ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτῃ καταλλαγῆναι καὶ πόλιν πόλει, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι κοινῇ σῴζειν τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, παρεστάναι δὲ μηδενὶ ὡς οἱ μὲν Δωριῆς ἡμῶν πολέμιοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Χαλκιδικὸν τῇ Ἰάδι ξυγγενείᾳ ἀσφαλές. 4.61.5. καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν: πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπιόν. 4.65.4. οὕτω τῇ [τε] παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι. αἰτία δ’ ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος. 4.108.4. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις μὲν τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὕστερον διεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι. 5.14.3. οἱ δ’ αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρὰ γνώμην μὲν ἀποβαίνοντος σφίσι τοῦ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ᾤοντο ὀλίγων ἐτῶν καθαιρήσειν τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν, εἰ τὴν γῆν τέμνοιεν, περιπεσόντες δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορᾷ, οἵα οὔπω ἐγεγένητο τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου καὶ Κυθήρων, αὐτομολούντων τε τῶν Εἱλώτων καὶ αἰεὶ προσδοκίας οὔσης μή τι καὶ οἱ ὑπομένοντες τοῖς ἔξω πίσυνοι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφίσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον νεωτερίσωσιν. 5.25.3. καὶ ἐπὶ ἓξ ἔτη μὲν καὶ δέκα μῆνας ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑκατέρων γῆν στρατεῦσαι, ἔξωθεν δὲ μετ’ ἀνοκωχῆς οὐ βεβαίου ἔβλαπτον ἀλλήλους τὰ μάλιστα: ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες λῦσαι τὰς μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη σπονδὰς αὖθις ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. 5.103.1. ΑΘ. ἐλπὶς δὲ κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὖσα τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτῇ, κἂν βλάψῃ, οὐ καθεῖλεν: τοῖς δ’ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι ʽδάπανος γὰρ φύσεἰ ἅμα τε γιγνώσκεται σφαλέντων καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ ἔτι φυλάξεταί τις αὐτὴν γνωρισθεῖσαν οὐκ ἐλλείπει. 5.103.2. ΑΘ. ὃ ὑμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ ἐπὶ ῥοπῆς μιᾶς ὄντες μὴ βούλεσθε παθεῖν μηδὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς παρὸν ἀνθρωπείως ἔτι σῴζεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμοὺς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ’ ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται. 5.105.2. ΑΘ. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν: καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό. 6.6.1. τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾤκει,καὶ ἐπὶ τοσήνδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμηντο, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις. 6.6.2. μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταίων [τε] πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι. ὅμοροι γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον καθέστασαν περί τε γαμικῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου, καὶ οἱ Σελινούντιοι Συρακοσίους ἐπαγόμενοι ξυμμάχους κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν: ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμιμνῄσκοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμῦναι, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακόσιοι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ἅπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχήσουσι, κίνδυνον εἶναι μή ποτε μεγάλῃ παρασκευῇ Δωριῆς τε Δωριεῦσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ ἅμα ἄποικοι τοῖς ἐκπέμψασι Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσαντες καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν ξυγκαθέλωσιν: σῶφρον δ’ εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἄλλως τε καὶ χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά. 6.8.4. καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχείᾳ καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἁπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι, παρελθὼν ἀποτρέψαι ἐβούλετο, καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοιάδε. 6.9.3. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενὴς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν: ὡς δὲ οὔτε ἐν καιρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ῥᾴδιά ἐστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ’ ἃ ὥρμησθε, ταῦτα διδάξω. 6.10.5. ὥστε χρὴ σκοπεῖν τινὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τε <τῇ> πόλει ἀξιοῦν κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἣν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφεστῶτες ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀχείρωτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἠπείρους ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀκροῶνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὖσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν: ὑφ’ ὧν δ’ αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι. 6.11.2. Σικελιῶται δ’ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὥς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἧσσον δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρξειαν αὐτῶν Συρακόσιοι: ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσιν. 6.11.4. ἡμᾶς δ’ ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπεπληγμένοι εἶεν εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι’ ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν: τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα καὶ τὰ πεῖραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα. εἰ δὲ σφαλείημέν τι, τάχιστ’ ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο. 6.12.2. εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος αἱρεθεὶς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἷον νεωτέρῳ βουλεύσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσαι. 6.13.1. ‘οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῴ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ᾽, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης ἀντιχειροτονεῖν, καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἷσπερ νῦν ὅροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ παρὰ γῆν ἤν τις πλέῃ, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὑτῶν νεμομένους καθ’ αὑτοὺς καὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι: 6.15.2. ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. 6.15.3. ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας: ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. 6.18.2. τήν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἦρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἕλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιεν πάντες ἢ φυλοκρινοῖεν οἷς χρεὼν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἄν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. τὸν γὰρ προύχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει. 6.18.3. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε. 6.18.4. ‘λογισάμενοι οὖν τάδε μᾶλλον αὐξήσειν, ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα ἢν ἴωμεν, ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι: καὶ ἅμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξομεν, ἢ κακώσομέν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελησόμεθα. 6.18.5. τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἤν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν: ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιωτῶν. 6.18.6. καὶ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἡ Νικίου τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰωθότι κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἅμα νέοι γεραιτέροις βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦραν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειρᾶσθε προαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ’ ἂν ἰσχύειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡσυχάζῃ, τρίψεσθαί τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὑτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσεσθαι, ἀγωνιζομένην δὲ αἰεὶ προσλήψεσθαί τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ξύνηθες ἕξειν. 6.18.7. παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστ’ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν.’ 6.19.1. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπεν: οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φυγάδων, οἳ παρελθόντες ἐδέοντό τε καὶ τῶν ὁρκίων ὑπομιμνῄσκοντες ἱκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὥρμηντο στρατεύειν. 6.19.2. καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ’ ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτούς, παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε. 6.20.1. ‘ἐπειδὴ πάντως ὁρῶ ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡρμημένους στρατεύειν, ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἃ γιγνώσκω σημανῶ. 6.24.1. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα εἶπε νομίζων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ἀποτρέψειν ἤ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μάλιστ’ <ἂν> οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι: 6.24.2. οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξῃρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀχλώδους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ: εὖ τε γὰρ παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι. 6.24.3. καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ’ ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν. 6.26.1. ἀκούσαντες δ’ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς πράσσειν ᾗ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι [Ἀθηναίοις ]. 6.83.4. τήν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι, καὶ οὐ δουλωσόμενοι, μὴ παθεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο κωλύσοντες. 6.90.3. εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους, τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίᾳ λαβόντες, τὰς δ’ ἐντειχισάμενοι, ῥᾳδίως ἠλπίζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν. 7.18.2. μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς: ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. 8.2.4. πανταχόθεν τε εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀπροφασίστως ἅπτεσθαι διενοοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου, λογιζόμενοι καλῶς τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ κινδύνων τε τοιούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν οἷος καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων περιέστη ἂν αὐτούς, εἰ τὸ Σικελικὸν προσέλαβον, καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι. 8.96.5. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι: μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.

1.23.5. To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. 1.23.6. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens , and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon , made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side, which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war. 1.33.2. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and moral strength, should present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honor as she will receive. 1.44.2. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth ; though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. 1.68.1. ‘Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other powers with a certain skepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but hence also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing with foreign politics. 1.75.1. Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. 1.75.3. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in. 1.75.4. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. 1.76.1. You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. 1.76.2. It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. 1.76.3. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do. 1.76.4. We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of approval. 1.77.2. And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. 1.81.6. For let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war. 1.84.3. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honor as a chief constituent, and honor bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters,—such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in practice,—but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. 1.84.4. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. 1.121.3. which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the monies at Olympia and Delphi . A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. 1.122.1. We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. 1.138.3. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. 1.139.4. There were many speakers who came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens , ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:— 1.140.1. ‘There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war, is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you, who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. 2.22.1. He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and confident of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly, he addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible, 2.34.6. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. 2.55.2. But Pericles, who was still general, held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians march out against them. 2.59.2. They began to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Lacedaemon , and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself upon Pericles. 2.59.3. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows: 2.63.2. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. 2.65.5. For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. 2.65.6. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. 2.65.7. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. 2.65.8. The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. 2.65.9. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. 2.65.10. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. 2.65.11. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. 2.65.12. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily , and with faction already domit in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. 2.65.13. So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. 3.38.1. For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. 3.39.4. The truth is that great good fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people insolent: in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success in reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity than to preserve prosperity. 3.39.5. Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration, as it is awed by firmness. 3.42.1. ‘I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. 3.42.5. The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor will not even regard him as disgraced. 3.43.4. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little further than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. 3.44.1. However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene ; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests. 3.44.3. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I who consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. 3.44.4. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against Mitylene ; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens . 3.45.2. Again, was there ever city rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances resources adequate to the enterprise? 3.45.3. All, states and individuals, are alike prone to err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or why should men have exhausted the list of punishments in search of enactments to protect them from evil-doers? It is probable that in early times the penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like manner. 3.45.4. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to drive men into danger. 3.45.5. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. 3.45.6. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion, and by the unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. 3.45.7. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever. 3.46.1. We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error. 3.48.2. This is at once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force.’ 3.82.2. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their fortunes. 3.82.8. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honor with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. 3.83.3. In this contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action: 4.17.3. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. 4.17.4. You can now, if you choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and gain honor and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something further, through having already succeeded without expecting it. 4.18.2. Nevertheless; we have not been brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are equally liable. 4.41.3. The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens , and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners. 4.60.1. And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is also the question whether we have still time to save Sicily , the whole of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought to find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for peace than any which I can advance, when we see the first power in Hellas watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters, and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to account the natural hostility that exists between us. 4.60.2. If we go to war, and call in to help us a people that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not invited; and if we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the same time serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may expect when they see us worn out, that they will one day come with a larger armament, and seek to bring all of us into subjection. 4.61.1. And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily , if we, its inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy. 4.61.2. These considerations should reconcile individual with individual, and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of Sicily . Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of Athens , while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood; 4.61.5. That the Athenians should cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are over ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not less invariable than the other. 4.65.4. So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. 4.108.4. Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. 5.14.3. Lacedaemon , on the other hand, found the event of the war falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of the power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta ; she saw her country plundered from Pylos and Cythera ; the Helots were deserting, and she was in constant apprehension that those who remained in Peloponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the situation to renew their old attempts at revolution. 5.25.3. and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities. 5.103.1. ‘Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colors only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. 5.103.2. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.’ 5.105.2. of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. 6.6.1. Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily , and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. 6.6.2. But they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital argument, that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily , and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war. 6.8.4. and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight and specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily , a great matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:— 6.9.3. Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough; if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment. 6.10.5. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment. 6.11.2. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than before. 6.11.4. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. 6.12.2. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own—especially if he be still too young to command—who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such an one to maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember that such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand. 6.13.1. When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; 6.15.2. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage , and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. 6.15.3. For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. 6.18.2. It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. 6.18.3. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs. 6.18.4. Be convinced then that we shall augment our power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily , and letting them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies. 6.18.5. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. 6.18.6. And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. 6.18.7. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can.’ 6.19.1. Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before. 6.19.2. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:— 6.20.1. ‘I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture. 6.24.1. With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. 6.24.2. The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. 6.24.3. All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. 6.26.1. Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of Athens . 6.83.4. Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas , and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily , and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved. 6.90.3. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese , bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy ; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name. 7.18.2. But the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that Athens , with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen them. 8.2.4. With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from Athens , if she had become mistress of Sicily , and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas . 8.96.5. But here, as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens . Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them.

33. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 1.1, 3.17, 40.1 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •human nature, human condition Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 29; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 92, 255

1.1. "יֵשׁ דָּבָר שֶׁיֹּאמַר רְאֵה־זֶה חָדָשׁ הוּא כְּבָר הָיָה לְעֹלָמִים אֲשֶׁר הָיָה מִלְּפָנֵנוּ׃", 1.1. "דִּבְרֵי קֹהֶלֶת בֶּן־דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ בִּירוּשָׁלִָם׃", 3.17. "אָמַרְתִּי אֲנִי בְּלִבִּי אֶת־הַצַּדִּיק וְאֶת־הָרָשָׁע יִשְׁפֹּט הָאֱלֹהִים כִּי־עֵת לְכָל־חֵפֶץ וְעַל כָּל־הַמַּעֲשֶׂה שָׁם׃",

1.1. "THE WORDs OF the Koheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem.", 3.17. "I said in my heart: ‘The righteous and the wicked God will judge; for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work.’",

34. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 132

35. Xenophon, On Hunting, 13.10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •irrational impulses, and human nature Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 106

36. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature and human beings Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 187

37. Plato, Letters, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan

38. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 122

39. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 165

733a. σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς, ἄν τις ἐθέλῃ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ νέος ὢν φυγὰς ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γένηται, κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα. ὡς δὲ ἔσται τοῦτο σαφές, ἂν γεύηταί τις ὀρθῶς, ἑτοίμως καὶ σφόδρα φανήσεται. ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς; τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν· εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν, βίον χρὴ παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν. ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι,

733a. but also because, if a man consents to taste it and not shun it in his youth, it is superior likewise in that which all men covet,—an excess, namely, of joy and a deficiency of pain throughout the whole of life. That this will clearly be the result, if a man tastes of it rightly, will at once be fully evident. But wherein does this rightness consist? That is the question which we must now, under the instruction of our Argument, consider; comparing the more pleasant life with the more painful, we must in this wise consider whether this mode is natural to us, and that other mode unnatural. We desire that pleasure should be ours,

40. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 123

464a. ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δʼ οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν,

464a. Gorg. of course. Soc. And each of these again you believe to have a good condition? Gorg. I do. Soc. And again, a good condition that may seem so, but is not? As an example, let me give the following: many people seem to be in good bodily condition when it would not be easy for anyone but a doctor, or one of the athletic trainers, to perceive that they are not so. Gorg. You are right. Soc. Something of this sort I say there is in body and in soul, which makes the body or the soul seem to be in good condition, though it is none the more so in fact.

41. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 128

42. Plato, Epinomis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 190

43. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 205

44. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 222

45. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 132; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 264

46. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan

47. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 164

48. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 80

49. Aristotle, Problems, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 157

50. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63

51. Theophrastus, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 61

52. Aristotle, Great Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 136

53. Timon of Phlius, Fragments, 48-50, 844 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 72

54. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 61

55. Aristotle, Categories, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 321

56. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 99

57. Aristotle, Prophesying By Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63

58. Aristotle, On Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63

59. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63

60. Aristotle, Sense And Sensibilia, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 61

61. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 172

62. Aristotle, History of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 222

63. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 169

64. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 217; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 110, 118, 119, 122

65. Anon., 1 Enoch, 22.1-22.13, 32.3-32.6, 102.4-102.5 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 147; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 99

22.1. And thence I went to another place, and he mountain [and] of hard rock. 22.1. water. And such has been made for sinners when they die and are buried in the earth and judgement has not been executed on them in their" 22.2. And there was in it four hollow places, deep and wide and very smooth. How smooth are the hollow places and deep and dark to look at. 22.3. Then Raphael answered, one of the holy angels who was with me, and said unto me: 'These hollow places have been created for this very purpose, that the spirits of the souls of the dead should 22.4. assemble therein, yea that all the souls of the children of men should assemble here. And these places have been made to receive them till the day of their judgement and till their appointed period [till the period appointed], till the great judgement (comes) upon them.' I saw (the spirit of) a dead man making suit, 22.5. and his voice went forth to heaven and made suit. And I asked Raphael the angel who was" 22.6. with me, and I said unto him: 'This spirit which maketh suit, whose is it, whose voice goeth forth and maketh suit to heaven ' 22.7. And he answered me saying: 'This is the spirit which went forth from Abel, whom his brother Cain slew, and he makes his suit against him till his seed is destroyed from the face of the earth, and his seed is annihilated from amongst the seed of men.' 22.8. The I asked regarding it, and regarding all the hollow places: 'Why is one separated from the other' 22.9. And he answered me and said unto me: 'These three have been made that the spirits of the dead might be separated. And such a division has been make (for) the spirits of the righteous, in which there is the bright spring of 22.11. lifetime. Here their spirits shall be set apart in this great pain till the great day of judgement and punishment and torment of those who curse for ever and retribution for their spirits. There" 22.12. He shall bind them for ever. And such a division has been made for the spirits of those who make their suit, who make disclosures concerning their destruction, when they were slain in the day 22.13. of the sinners. Such has been made for the spirits of men who were not righteous but sinners, who were complete in transgression, and of the transgressors they shall be companions: but their spirits shall not be slain in the day of judgement nor shall they be raised from thence.' 32.3. I and from afar off trees more numerous than I these trees and great-two trees there, very great, beautiful, and glorious, and magnificent, and the tree of knowledge, whose holy fruit they eat and know great wisdom. 32.4. That tree is in height like the fir, and its leaves are like (those of) the Carob tree: and its fruit 32.5. is like the clusters of the vine, very beautiful: and the fragrance of the tree penetrates afar. Then 32.6. I said: 'How beautiful is the tree, and how attractive is its look!' Then Raphael the holy angel, who was with me, answered me and said: 'This is the tree of wisdom, of which thy father old (in years) and thy aged mother, who were before thee, have eaten, and they learnt wisdom and their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked and they were driven out of the garden.' 102.4. Fear ye not, ye souls of the righteous, And be hopeful ye that have died in righteousness. 102.5. And grieve not if your soul into Sheol has descended in grief, And that in your life your body fared not according to your goodness, But wait for the day of the judgement of sinners And for the day of cursing and chastisement.

66. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.29-1.30, 1.37, 1.66-1.70, 2.9, 2.16, 2.35, 2.45, 3.16-3.17, 3.42, 3.62-3.63, 4.38, 5.24-5.26, 5.34, 5.36-5.38, 5.40, 5.43, 5.46, 5.59, 5.65-5.66, 5.68, 5.71, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86, 5.91-5.92, 5.94 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •nature, human Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 28, 30, 348, 349; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 62, 74, 99, 123, 130, 136, 159, 164, 172, 175, 177, 200

2.9. "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" 2.16. For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself â anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations â that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses â this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 2.35. Thus there are three Ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades; three that comprise moral goodness together with some additional element, those of Polemo, Callipho and Diodorus; and one theory that is simple, of which Zeno was the author, and which is based entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus were consistent, and made their final ends agree with their first principles, â Aristippus holding the End to be Pleasure, Hieronymus freedom from pain, Carneades the enjoyment of the primary natural objects. Whereas Epicurus, if in saying that pleasure was the primary object of attraction, he meant pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus; or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of Aristippus, the primary attraction? 2.45. "By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to carry on several operations at the same time with extreme speed, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the causes and effects of things, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 4.38. Thus she added to sensation reason, and after creating reason did not discard sensation. Suppose the art of viticulture, whose function is to bring the vine with all its parts into the most thriving condition â at least let us assume it to be so (for we may invent an imaginary case, as you are fond of doing, for purposes of illustration); suppose then the art of viticulture were a faculty residing in the vine itself, this faculty would doubtless desire every condition requisite for the health of the vine as before, but would rank itself above all the other parts of the vine, and would consider itself the noblest element in the vine's organism. Similarly when an animal organism has acquired the faculty of sensation, this faculty protects the organism, it is true, but also protects itself; but when reason has been superadded, this is placed in such a position of domice that all those primary gifts of nature are placed under its protection. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.34. "Having made it sufficiently clear that self-love is an instinct of nature, we must next examine what is the nature of man; for it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the mind plays the more important part and the body the less. Next we further observe both that man's body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the domit factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man's nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. In fact the faculties of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind. Moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them. 5.36. And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body has the appearance of being in harmony with nature. "Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving sensible objects. The mind, on the other hand, and that domit part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called nonâvolitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 'virtues' in the more special sense; and the latter are the preâeminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of 'talent,' and their possessors are spoken of as 'talented.' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.46. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâeminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. 5.59. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. 5.65. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all.

67. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29-1.30, 1.37, 1.66-1.70, 2.9, 2.16, 2.35, 2.45, 2.48-2.49, 3.16-3.17, 3.21, 3.24, 3.42, 3.62-3.63, 4.38, 5.24-5.26, 5.34, 5.36-5.38, 5.40, 5.43, 5.46, 5.59, 5.65-5.66, 5.68, 5.71, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86, 5.91-5.92, 5.94 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •nature, human •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature •human nature, social instinct Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 159, 175, 176, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 28, 30, 348, 349; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 62, 74, 99, 123, 130, 136, 159, 164, 172, 175, 177, 200

1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.37. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum inp. R intellegaturque ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, disciplinata ABER quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 )] difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? 2.16. si enim idem dicit, dicat RNV quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat putat BE putat dicat ARN dicat V adiungendam eam, quae sit in motu—sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: 'in motu', illam nihil dolentis 'in stabilitate'—, quid tendit? cum efficere non possit ut cuiquam, qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus inbuti sumus. quis enim est, est enim BEN qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum, cum in voluptate sumus, alterum, cum in dolore, tertium hoc, in quo nunc equidem sum, equidem sum Mdv. quidem sumus ARNV sumus BE credo item item Ernest. idem ABER 2 N 1 V quidem N 2 et fort. R 1, ubi littera i scripta est super ras. (////dē), cuius in loco fuisse potest q vos, nec vos AN 1 V nos BERN 2 in dolore nec in voluptate; ut in voluptate sit, qui epuletur, in dolore, qui torqueatur. tu autem inter haec tantam multitudinem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium nec dolentium? 2.35. ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi carneadis A 2 V tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; id est in honestate dett. id est honestate BERNV idē honestate A nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam, quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum, quod ille; sin eam, quam Hieronymus, ne add. Se. cf. § 32: Epicurus semper hoc utitur... inest nihil dolere) fecisset idem, ut voluptatem illam Aristippi Aristippi secl. cum allis Mdv. aristippo BE in prima commendatione poneret. 2.45. Honestum igitur id intellegimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se fructibusve per se A 2 fructibus vespere A 1 BER fructibus ve ( om. per se) NV ipsum possit iure laudari. quod quale sit, non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest, quamquam aliquantum potest, quam communi omnium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis, qui permulta ob eam unam causam unam causam causam unam BE causam una R faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem habent habent dett. habeant a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul simul multa BE agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. eademque ratio fecit hominem hominem fecit BE appet. BENV hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium mortalium omnium BE societate atque, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur. 2.48. Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor hys quattuor BE his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint qui hy qui BE ii qui Mdv. honestate honestate edd. honestatem summum bonum metiantur. Si Si Sic BE enim ad honestatem honestatem enim (om. ad) A 1 ad honestatem enim A 2 omnia referant referant Bentl. referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce ii ii voce R sonare— his enim ipsis verbis utitur—neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem hanc vocem Wes. apud Mdv. hac voce honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. 'Quod', inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissensio? 2.49. philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit non sit Mdv. non est in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore rumore mi|nore R timore NV laudetur. ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile, non ob eam causam tamen tamen non ob eam causam BE illud dici esse honestum, honestum esse BE quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines, vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante paulo ante ante paulo E ante populo B dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste. 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. 3.42. An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 4.38. itaque sensibus rationem adiunxit et ratione effecta sensus non reliquit. relinquit NV Ut si cultura vitium, cuius hoc munus est, ut efficiat, ut vitis cum partibus suis omnibus omnibus partibus suis BE quam optime se habeat—, sed sic intellegamus—licet enim, ut vos quoque soletis, fingere aliquid docendi causa—: si igitur illa cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, cetera, credo, velit, quae ad colendam vitem attinebunt, sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus praeferat statuatque nihil esse melius melius esse BE in vite quam se. similiter sensus, cum accessit ad naturam, tuetur illam quidem, sed etiam se tuetur; cum autem assumpta autem hijs assumpta N ratio est, est ratio BE tanto in dominatu locatur, ut omnia illa prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.34. Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit hominis natura. id est enim, de quo quaerimus. atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque que om. B ita constitutum, aliis ... constitutum om. E ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. iam iam (' aptius scriberetur : iam quae cet. ') Mdv. nam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. itaque ab his ordiamur. 5.36. itaque e contrario moderati aequabilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti esse ad naturam videntur. Iam vero animus non esse solum, sed etiam cuiusdam modi cuiusdam modi cuiusmodi BE debet esse, ut et omnis partis suas habeat incolumis et de virtutibus nulla desit. atque atque BE atqui NV at qui R in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis, quae subiectae sunt sensibus. animi autem et eius animi partis, quae princeps est, quaeque mens nominatur, plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum earum, quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum autem earum, quae in voluntate positae magis proprio proprio proprie eo Dav. nomine appellari solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine, easque virtutes qui habent, ingeniosi vocantur. alterum autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum, quas appellamus voluntarias, ut ut N 2 et prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas eiusdem generis. generis eiusdem BE Et summatim quidem haec erant de corpore animoque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est quid quid NV quod hominis natura postulet. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.40. at vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam moveatur, quid facturam putas? an ea, quae per vinitorem antea ante BE consequebatur, per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam curabit? sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta erit, erit ( priore loco ) C.F. W. Mue. sit vivere. ita similis erit ei ei Bentl., Gz. ; et finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. quid, si quod si R (Quod), NV non sensus modo ei modo sensus non ei BE non sensus ei modo R sit datus, datus sit BE verum etiam animus hominis? eciam animus hominis N 2 V etiam animus (animus R) est animus hominis RN 1 animus est etiam animus hominis BE etiam animus, et animus hominis Vict. non necesse est et illa pristina manere, ut Inter RN 1 ad tuendas inter BE ut tuenda Inter N 2 V tuenda sint, et ut tuenda sint, et Or. ut tuendas. haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione expletione explanatione R naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? sic, quod est sic, quod est Se. sitque BERN 1 V sicque N 2 Sic extitit Mdv. Librarius archetypi pro ē legit que extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum ductum (uc ab alt. m. in ras. ) N doctum commendatione Lamb. commutatione BE commutate V comunitate R c oi tate N a prima commendatione naturae, multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta. 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 5.46. Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe summe M. Brutus apud Dav. ; summa nostra sponte moveamur. atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut, si ut si dett. si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? etenim, cum omnes omnis BERN natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur. 5.59. Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur. animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; indigerent Brem. indigeret quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea, quae inerant, tamquam elementa virtutis. sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius. 5.65. in omni autem autem enim BE honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. 5.66. nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam quoddam BE ingenitum ingenitum B E innatum RN in natum V quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam quam que RN exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet fundet se BE in in N post fundet ab alt. m. superscr. est (= scilicet) usu ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti forte RNV viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus in rebus R et (ī ab alt. m. superscr. ) N 2 vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. 5.68. ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur. 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.78. Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene pene BENV porro R minima. quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. quare attende, quaeso. nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque quid ad id, quod quaerebam, quaerebam ( p. 194, 14-18 ) Mdv. et Wes. ( apud Mdv. ); queram respondeas. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.91. At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum paulum Brem. parum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo audeo R igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt V bona appellare nec fraudare fraudari BR suo vetere vetere Wes. ad or. p. Sest. p. 7 (sec. Mdv) veteri nomine neque iam neque iam Se. quam aliquod aliquod Lamb. aliquid RV ali- quam BE potius novum exquirere, acquirere E virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. 5.92. terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at at Ascens. an hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita ait in vita om. Sacerd. risisse quem ... risisse Sacerd. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil VI 442) Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat acciderat V accideret ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, Oroete Vict. oronte BE oriente R orente V praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At At V ad R et BE multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. 5.94. nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum oculorum g-|enu R (num legendum sit renum sec. Tusc. II 60 incertum est) dolorem. quasi quasi Lamb. quis vero hoc hoc vero R didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse et esse P. Man. et esset ferendum viro. viro dett. vero hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui qui BE qm (= quoniam) RV dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis. is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides charmides BE carimdes R carneades V Epicureus Epicureus Mdv. epicurus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide carmide B carnide E carimde R carneades V noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. ostendit pedes et pectus. ac tamen hic mallet non dolere.

2.9. "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" 2.16. For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself â anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations â that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses â this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 2.35. Thus there are three Ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades; three that comprise moral goodness together with some additional element, those of Polemo, Callipho and Diodorus; and one theory that is simple, of which Zeno was the author, and which is based entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus were consistent, and made their final ends agree with their first principles, â Aristippus holding the End to be Pleasure, Hieronymus freedom from pain, Carneades the enjoyment of the primary natural objects. Whereas Epicurus, if in saying that pleasure was the primary object of attraction, he meant pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus; or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of Aristippus, the primary attraction? 2.45. "By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to carry on several operations at the same time with extreme speed, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the causes and effects of things, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. 2.48. "There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance 'moral' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. 2.49. Do you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is? Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure; unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude. For my part I hold that what is popular is often positively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only when the multitude happens to applaud something that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which even so is not called 'moral' (honourable) because it is widely applauded, but because it is of such a nature that even if men were unaware of its existence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of instinct to say in another passage what you also said just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly without also living morally (honourably). 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.24. For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthÅmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 4.38. Thus she added to sensation reason, and after creating reason did not discard sensation. Suppose the art of viticulture, whose function is to bring the vine with all its parts into the most thriving condition â at least let us assume it to be so (for we may invent an imaginary case, as you are fond of doing, for purposes of illustration); suppose then the art of viticulture were a faculty residing in the vine itself, this faculty would doubtless desire every condition requisite for the health of the vine as before, but would rank itself above all the other parts of the vine, and would consider itself the noblest element in the vine's organism. Similarly when an animal organism has acquired the faculty of sensation, this faculty protects the organism, it is true, but also protects itself; but when reason has been superadded, this is placed in such a position of domice that all those primary gifts of nature are placed under its protection. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.34. "Having made it sufficiently clear that self-love is an instinct of nature, we must next examine what is the nature of man; for it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the mind plays the more important part and the body the less. Next we further observe both that man's body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the domit factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man's nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. In fact the faculties of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind. Moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them. 5.36. And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body has the appearance of being in harmony with nature. "Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving sensible objects. The mind, on the other hand, and that domit part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called nonâvolitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 'virtues' in the more special sense; and the latter are the preâeminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of 'talent,' and their possessors are spoken of as 'talented.' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.46. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâeminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. 5.59. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. 5.65. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all.

68. Cicero, On Invention, 2.6.18, 2.53.161 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 29

69. Cicero, On Laws, 1.18, 1.27, 1.29, 1.31-1.33, 1.47, 2.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature •human nature, social instinct •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 159, 161, 248; Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 200

70. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.34, 2.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71

2.34. Upon the animals she bestowed sensation and motion, and an appetite or impulse to approach things wholesome and retire from things harmful. For man she amplified her gift by the addition of reason, whereby the appetites might be controlled, and alternately indulged and held in check. But the fourth and highest grade is that of beings born by nature good and wise, and endowed from the outset with the innate attributes of right reason and consistency; this must be held to be above the level of man: it is the attribute of god, that is, of the world, which must needs possess that perfect and absolute reason of which I spoke. 2.39. but no being is more perfect than the world, and nothing is better than virtue; therefore virtue is an essential attribute of the world. Again, man's nature is not perfect, yet virtue may be realized in man; how much more readily then in the world! therefore the world possesses virtue. Therefore it is wise, and consequently divine. "Having thus perceived the divinity of the world, we must also assign the same divinity to the stars, which are formed from the most mobile and the purest part of the aether, and are not compounded of any other element besides; they are of a fiery heat and translucent throughout. Hence they too have the fullest right to be pronounced to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence.

71. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2, 1.5, 1.11-1.17, 1.22, 1.49, 1.65, 1.106-1.117, 2.73, 3.20-3.21, 3.27, 3.29-3.30, 3.52, 3.101 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature •human nature Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 247, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 330, 336, 342, 348, 349; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71, 73

1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.5. Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest. 1.11. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se, vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque, quae sint ad vivendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis adpetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. 1.12. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit. 1.13. In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio. 1.14. Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque. quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 1.16. Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque verissimum sit. quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur, subiecta est veritas. 1.17. Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et societas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo autem et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia, versantur in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum mentis agitatio. Iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam et ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus. 1.22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 1.49. Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium, quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo quisque animo, studio, benivolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque delata sunt. Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum sperant, etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt. 1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 1.106. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia, eamque contemni et reici oportere; sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie. 1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere. 1.116. Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. 1.117. Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas consilii, tur id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod maxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare. 2.73. In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit—sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, non esse in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem baberent. Capitalis oratio est, ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur hominess, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. 3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.27. Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum. 3.29. Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? Minime vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nonne faciat? 3.30. Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.101. At stulte, qui non modo non censuerit captivos remittendos, verum etiam dissuaserit. Quo modo stulte? etiamne, si rei publicae conducebat? potest autem, quod inutile rei publicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse? Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt fundamenta naturae, cum utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui utilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur? Sed quia nusquam possumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia reperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non tam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus.

1.22. But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. 1.49. Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours received; for, as a matter of course the greater the favour, the greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection that prompted the favour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration. But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first rule of duty requires us â other things being equal â to lend assistance preferably to people in proportion to their individual need. Most people adopt the contrary course: they put themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to receive the greatest favours even though he has no need of their help. 1.65. So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. 1.106. From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; but if someone should be found who sets some value upon sensual gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits of moderate indulgence. One's physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety. 1.107. We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. 1.108. Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call Îµá¼´ÏÏÎ½ in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. 1.109. Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â both father and son â and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. 1.110. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. 1.111. If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. 1.112. Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 1.113. How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. 1.114. Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rÃ´le upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rÃ´le to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. 1.115. To the two above-mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rÃ´le we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another. 1.116. They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in some particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same department of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that distinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some have added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus, Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture and intellectual power. It happens sometimes, too, that a man declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a vocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve signal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their aims high. 1.117. All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in mind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we must decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in life we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the world. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgement is most immature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that to which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in some particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide intelligently what is best for him. 2.73. The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities. 3.20. That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. 3.21. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. 3.27. And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of Nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. 3.29. But, perhaps, someone may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?" 3.30. These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society â if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure. But, if such is not the case, each one must bear his own burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is more repugt to Nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests is repugt to Nature; for it is unjust. 3.52. "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." 3.101. "But," you will say, "it was foolish of him not only not to advocate the exchange of prisoners but even to plead against such action!" How was it foolish? Was it so, even if his policy was for the good of the state? Nay; can what is inexpedient for the state be expedient for any individual citizen? People overturn the fundamental principles established by Nature, when they divorce expediency from moral rectitude. For we all seek to obtain what is to us expedient; we are irresistibly drawn toward it, and we cannot possibly be otherwise. For who is there that would turn his back upon what is to him expedient? Or rather, who is there that does not exert himself to the utmost to secure it? But because we cannot discover it anywhere except in good report, propriety, and moral rectitude, we look upon these three for that reason as the first and the highest objects of endeavour, while what we term expediency we account not so much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary incident to living.

72. Cicero, Republic, 2.26, 2.33, 2.38, 2.59, 3.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •human nature Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 330; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71

2.26. Ac primum agros, quos bello Romulus ceperat, divisit viritim civibus docuitque sine depopulatione atque praeda posse eos colendis agris abundare commodis omnibus amoremque eis otii et pacis iniecit, quibus facillime iustitia et fides convalescit, et quorum patrocinio maxime cultus agrorum perceptioque frugum defenditur. Idemque Pompilius et auspiciis maioribus inventis ad pristinum numerum duo augures addidit et sacris e principum numero pontifices quinque praefecit et animos propositis legibus his, quas in monumentis habemus, ardentis consuetudine et cupiditate bellandi religionum caerimoniis mitigavit adiunxitque praeterea flamines, Salios virginesque Vestales omnisque partis religionis statuit sanctissime. 2.33. neque enim serpit, sed volat in optimum statum instituto tuo sermone res publica. S. Post eum Numae Pompilii nepos ex filia rex a populo est Ancus Marcius constitutus, itemque de imperio suo legem curiatam tulit. Qui cum Latinos bello devicisset, adscivit eos in civitatem, atque idem Aventinum et Caelium montem adiunxit urbi, quosque agros ceperat, divisit et silvas maritimas omnis publicavit, quas ceperat, et ad ostium Tiberis urbem condidit colonisque firmavit. Atque ita cum tres et viginti regnavisset annos, est mortuus. Tum Laelius: Laudandus etiam iste rex; sed obscura est historia Romana, siquidem istius regis matrem habemus, ignoramus patrem. S. Ita est, inquit; sed temporum illorum tantum fere regum inlustrata sunt nomina. 2.38. Sed cum Tarquinius insidiis Anci filiorum interisset Serviusque, ut ante dixi, regnare coepisset non iussu, sed voluntate atque concessu civium, quod, cum Tarquinius ex vulnere aeger fuisse et vivere falso diceretur, ille regio ornatu ius dixisset obaeratosque pecunia sua liberavisset multaque comitate usus iussu Tarquinii se ius dicere probavisset, non commisit se patribus, sed Tarquinio sepulto populum de se ipse consuluit iussusque regnare legem de imperio suo curiatam tulit. Et primum Etruscorum iniurias bello est ultus; ex quo cum ma 2.59. †Fuerat fortasse aliqua ratio maioribus nostris in illo aere alieno medendi, quae neque Solonem Atheniensem non longis temporibus ante fugerat neque post aliquanto nostrum senatum, cum sunt propter unius libidinem omnia nexa civium liberata nectierque postea desitum; semperque huic generi, cum plebes publica calamitate inpendiis debilitata deficeret, salutis omnium causa aliqua sublevatio et medicina quaesita est. Quo tum consilio praetermisso causa populo nata est, duobus tribunis plebis per seditionem creatis ut potentia senatus atque auctoritas minueretur; quae tamen gravis et magna remanebat sapientissimis et fortissimis et armis et consilio civitatem tuentibus, quorum auctoritas maxime florebat, quod, cum honore longe antecellerent ceteris, voluptatibus erant inferiores nec pecuniis ferme superiores; eoque erat cuiusque gratior in re publica virtus, quod in rebus privatis diligentissime singulos cives opera, consilio, re tuebantur. 3.33. Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit.

73. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.109-1.110, 2.63-2.64, 3.2-3.4, 3.15, 4.12-4.15, 4.67, 4.80, 5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature •human nature, and capacity for emotions •nature, of humans •nature, of human beings Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 36, 161, 203, 204, 247, 248; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 245; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 204

1.109. quantum famaeque V (ae in r. V c ) autem consuetudini famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intellegant nihil id id ss. G 1 ad mortuos pertinere. Sed profecto mors tum aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis virtutis -utis in r. V c perfectae perfecto perfecto exp. V 2 functus est munere. multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt. quam quam Dav. quae (idem error p. 274, 16 saep.) utinam potuissem obire! nihil enim iam adquirebatur, cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortuna fortunae K 2 B bella restabant. quare si ipsa ratio minus perficiat, perficiet V 2 ut mortem neglegere possimus, at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. videamus V 1 quamquam enim en im V (si et ... 2 ) sensus abierit, tamen suis suis Lb. (cf.p.253,9) summis et propriis bonis laudis et gloriae, quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. etsi enim nihil habet habe t G( eras. n) in se gloria cur expetatur, expectatur X (c exp. in V) vir tutē V ( ss. 2? ) tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur. sequatur V 2? 1.110. verum suppl. Po. (obl. Bitschofsky, Berl. ph. Woch. 1913,173) ante verum quod pro adi. habent add. et Bentl. igitur Sey multitudinis iudicium de bonis bonum si quando est, magis laudandum est quam illi ob eam rem beati. non possum autem dicere, quoquo quo V 1 ( add. c ) modo hoc accipietur, Lycurgum Solonem legum et publicae publicę V (-ce K publi G 1 ) disciplinae carere gloria, Themistoclem Epaminondam et epam. V 2 bellicae virtutis. ante enim Salamina salamina Man. salaminam cf. We. salamini GK 1 (i add. 2 ) V ipsam Neptunus obruet quam Salaminii tropaei trop hi G 1 K ( add. 2 ) trop ei m. V ( ss. 2 ) memoriam, priusque e V 2 om. X e Boeotia bootia X (boetia K 2 V 2 B) Leuctra leuctrae V 2 leuctrha K 1 R 1 tollentur quam quam K quae GRV 1 ( supra ae add. V rec ) pugnae Leuctricae gloria. multo autem tardius fama deseret desseret GV 1 Curium Fabricium Calatinum, duo Scipiones duo duos V rec Africanos, Maximum Marcellum Paulum, Catonem Laelium, innumerabilis alios; quorum similitudinem aliquam qui arripuerit, non eam fama populari, sed vera bonorum laude metiens, fidenti animo, anima G si ita res feret, res feret V 2 s Lact. refert X gradietur ad mortem; in qua aut summum bonum aut nullum malum esse cognovimus. fidenti...24 cognovimus Lact. inst. 7, 10, 9 secundis vero suis rebus volet etiam mori; non enim tam tam add. G 1 cumulus bonorum iucundus esse potest quam molesta decessio. hanc sententiam significare videtur Laconis illa vox, qui, cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympionices olimp. X (10 solus V) nobilis, uno die duo suos filios victores Olympiae vidisset, accessit ad senem et gratulatus: 2.63. sed tamen hoc evenit, ut in vulgus insipientium insipientum G 1 ( corr. 1 et 2 ) opinio valeat valet G 1 honestatis, cum ipsam videre videri X ( corr. R 2 V rec ) non possint. itaque fama et multitudinis iudicio moventur, movetur V 1 cum id honestum putent, quod a plerisque laudetur. te autem, si in oculis sis multitudinis, tamen eius iudicio stare nolim nec, quod illa putet, idem putare pulcherrimum. tuo tibi iudicio est utendum; tibi si recta probanti placebis, tum non modo tete tete V 1? viceris, tecevisceris K 1 quod paulo ante praecipiebam, sed omnis et omnia. 2.64. hoc igitur tibi propone: propono K 1 amplitudinem animi animi del. Bai. et quasi quandam exaggerationem quam altissimam animi, quae maxime eminet contemnendis et despiciendis doloribus, dolorem G 1 unam esse omnium rem pulcherrimam, eoque pulchriorem, si vacet populo neque plausum captans se se G 1 tamen tamen tantum edd. vett. ipsa delectet. quin etiam mihi quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quae sine venditatione et sine populo teste fiunt, quin... 22 fiunt Non. 189, 12 non quo fugiendus sit sit V 1 —omnia enim bene facta in luce se conlocari volunt omnia recte facta... 24 volunt Aug. civ. 14, 18 —, sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti virtuti V conscientia maius est. 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.4. illa autem, quae se eius imitatricem esse volt, uult R e corr. H temeraria atque inconsiderata et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama popularis, simulatione honestatis formam forme G 1 eius pulchritudinemque corrumpit. qua caecitate homines, cum quaedam etiam praeclara cuperent eaque que om. H nescirent nec ubi nec qualia essent, funditus alii everterunt everterent X corr. K 2 R c V 1? suas civitates, alii ipsi occiderunt. atque hi quidem optuma petentes non tam voluntate quam cursus errore falluntur. quid? qui quid qui K c R 2 V 1? e corr. quid- que GR 1 V 1 quiqui K 1 pecuniae cupiditate, qui voluptatum libidine feruntur, quid...12 feruntur om. H quorumque ita perturbantur animi, ut non multum absint ab insania, quod insipientibus contingit contigit G 1 omnibus, quod 14 omnibus del. Ba. is is H his rell. nullane ne om. G 1 est adhibenda curatio? utrum quod minus noceant animi aegrotationes quam corporis, an quod corpora curari possint, animorum medicina nulla sit? 3.15. Praeterea necesse est, qui fortis sit, eundem esse magni animi; qui magni animi BK 2 om. X qui autem magni animi V c ( ft. rec- tius cf. 326,11 Str. Phil. 49 p. 60 ) qui magni animi sit, invictum; qui invictus sit, eum eum om. H res humanas despicere atque infra se positas arbitrari. despicere autem nemo potest eas res, eas res nemo potest H propter quas aegritudine adfici potest; post potest add. nisi fortis V c ex quo efficitur fortem virum aegritudine numquam adfici. omnes autem sapientes fortes: non cadit igitur in sapientem aegritudo. Et quem ad modum oculus conturbatus turbatus H non est probe adfectus ad suum munus fungendum, fugendum K 1 V 1 et reliquae partes totumve corpus statu cum est motum, deest officio suo et muneri, sic conturbatus siconturbatus G 1 K 1 adxequendum V 1 animus non est aptus ad exequendum ad ex seq. G munus suum. munus autem animi est ratione bene uti; et sapientis animus ita semper adfectus est, ut ratione optime utatur; numquam igitur est perturbatus. at ad G 1 (14 G 1 K 1 ) aegritudo perturbatio est animi: semper igitur ea sapiens vacabit. primo iam si 325, 6 vacabit H 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.67. illud iam supra supra cf. p. 368, 2 diximus, contractionem contractione X corr. V 3 s animi recte fieri numquam posse, elationem posse. aliter enim Naevianus ille gaudet Hector: Hect. profic. 15 haector GK h octor V( e2) Lae/tus sum lauda/ri me abs te, pa/ter, a laudato/ viro, aliter ille apud Trabeam: Trab. fr. 1 Le/na deleni/ta argento argento ex -tum V nu/tum observabi/t meum, Qui/d velim, quid stu/deam. adveniens di/gito impellam ia/nuam, genuam K Fo/res patebunt. de i/nproviso Chry/sis ubi me aspe/xerit, A/lacris ob via/m mihi veniet co/mplexum exopta/ns meum, Mi/hi se dedet. se dedit K sedet V quam haec pulchra putet, ipse iam dicet: Fo/rtunam ipsam antei/bo fortuni/s meis. 4.80. Et si fidentia, id est firma animi confisio, scientia quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis, metus quoque est diffidentia loco desperato sententia tole- rabilis efficiatur, si scribas : metus quoque qui est diffidentia inbecilla est adsensio ( cf. p. 368, 26 ) expectati et impendentis mali. propter haec ultima autem verba proximum enuntiatum et si spes — metum ante et si fidentia — imp. mali ponen- dum videtur. ut igitur metus — in malo = w(/ste e)n tw=| fau/lw| ( gen. masc. cf. St. fr. 3, 548 p. 147, 9 to\n sofo\n ou)k a)pistei=n th\n ga\r a)pisti/an ei/(nai Yeu/dous u(po/lhYin, th\n de/ pi/stin a)stei=on u(pa/rxein, ei/)nai ga\r kata/lhWin i)sxura/n ktl. ) ei/)nai to\n fo/bon, a(sau/tws de\ kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/qh pa/nta ? sed quid Cicero peccauerit quid librarii, incertum. difidentia KV 3 (itiae V 1 ) defidentia GR expectati et impendentis inp. V mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. ut igitur metus, metum mecum G 1 V 1 sic reliquae reliqui K 1 perturbationes sunt in malo. ergo ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem natura dicuntur iracundi aut misericordes aut invidi aut tale quid, ei sunt constituti quasi mala valetudine valitudini V animi, sanabiles sanabiles s sanabile est tamen, ut Socrates dicitur: cum multa in conventu vitia conlegisset in eum Zopyrus, zopirus GK qui se naturam cuiusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent, ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi sic nata, sic nata Po signa (insita vel innata Bentl. Dav. quod potius de eis rebus dicitur quas etiamnunc habe- mus ) cf. fin. 2, 33 ut bacillum aliud est inflexum de industria, aliud ita natum fat. 9 al. sed ratione a se adse R 1 deiecta deiec ta di ceret K valitudine R diceret. 5.95. Totumque fr. 439 hoc de voluptate sic ille praecipit, ut voluptatem ipsam per se, quia voluptas sit, semper optandam et et add. s cf. p. 423, 4 de orat. 1, 231 al. (asyndeton ipsum tolerari potest cf. exsibilatur exploditur parad. 26) expetendam putet, eademque ratione dolorem ob id ipsum, quia dolor sit, semper esse fugiendum; itaque hac usurum compensatione conpensatione K sapientem, ut et ut et s ut om. X et om. voluptatem fugiat, si ea eam maiorem dolorem effectura sit, et dolorem suscipiat maiorem efficientem voluptatem; omniaque iucunda, iocunda GR 1 ( ss. 1 ) quamquam sensu corporis iudicentur, ad animum referri tamen.

74. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 1.1-1.16, 3.1, 3.4, 4.16, 6.18, 7.1, 14.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •human being, views of, dual nature of Found in books: Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 40; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 131, 153

1.1. Love righteousness, you rulers of the earth,think of the Lord with uprightness,and seek him with sincerity of heart; 1.2. because he is found by those who do not put him to the test,and manifests himself to those who do not distrust him. 1.3. For perverse thoughts separate men from God,and when his power is tested, it convicts the foolish; 1.4. because wisdom will not enter a deceitful soul,nor dwell in a body enslaved to sin. 1.5. For a holy and disciplined spirit will flee from deceit,and will rise and depart from foolish thoughts,and will be ashamed at the approach of unrighteousness. 1.6. For wisdom is a kindly spirit and will not free a blasphemer from the guilt of his words;because God is witness of his inmost feelings,and a true observer of his heart, and a hearer of his tongue. 1.7. Because the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world,and that which holds all things together knows what is said; 1.8. therefore no one who utters unrighteous things will escape notice,and justice, when it punishes, will not pass him by. 1.9. For inquiry will be made into the counsels of an ungodly man,and a report of his words will come to the Lord,to convict him of his lawless deeds; 1.10. because a jealous ear hears all things,and the sound of murmurings does not go unheard. 1.11. Beware then of useless murmuring,and keep your tongue from slander;because no secret word is without result,and a lying mouth destroys the soul. 1.12. Do not invite death by the error of your life,nor bring on destruction by the works of your hands; 1.13. because God did not make death,and he does not delight in the death of the living. 1.14. For he created all things that they might exist,and the generative forces of the world are wholesome,and there is no destructive poison in them;and the dominion of Hades is not on earth. 1.15. For righteousness is immortal." 1.16. But ungodly men by their words and deeds summoned death;considering him a friend, they pined away,and they made a covet with him,because they are fit to belong to his party. 3.1. But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,and no torment will ever touch them. 3.4. For though in the sight of men they were punished,their hope is full of immortality. 4.16. The righteous man who had died will condemn the ungodly who are living,and youth that is quickly perfected will condemn the prolonged old age of the unrighteous man. 6.18. and love of her is the keeping of her laws,and giving heed to her laws is assurance of immortality, 7.1. I also am mortal, like all men,a descendant of the first-formed child of earth;and in the womb of a mother I was molded into flesh, 14.17. When men could not honor monarchs in their presence, since they lived at a distance,they imagined their appearance far away,and made a visible image of the king whom they honored,so that by their zeal they might flatter the absent one as though present.

75. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 7.24, 14.17, 15.11, 15.12, 15.13, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.17, 15.18, 15.19, 15.20, 16.24-18.14, 17.2, 17.18, 23.17, 24, 27, 30.14, 30.15, 30.16, 33.7, 33.8, 33.9, 33.10, 33.11, 33.12, 33.13, 33.14, 33.15, 34.5, 34.6, 38.16, 39.1, 40.1, 40.2, 40.3, 40.4, 40.5, 40.6, 40.7, 40.8, 40.9, 40.10, 41.11, 44.14, 44.19, 44.20, 44.21, 44.22, 44.23, 46.13, 46.14, 46.15, 46.16, 46.17, 46.18, 46.19, 46.20, 47.19, 48.13, 51.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

44.22. To Isaac also he gave the same assurance for the sake of Abraham his father.

76. Anon., Jubilees, 6.1-6.7, 10.1-10.7, 12.19-12.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 181, 194; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77

6.1. And on the new moon of the third month he went forth from the ark, and built an altar on that mountain. 6.2. And he made atonement for the earth, and took a kid and made atonement by its blood for all the guilt of the earth; for everything that had been on it had been destroyed, save those that were in the ark with Noah. 6.3. And he placed the fat thereof on the altar, and he took an ox, and a goat, and a sheep and kids, and salt, and a turtle-dove, and the young of a dove, 6.4. and placed a burnt sacrifice on the altar, and poured thereon an offering mingled with oil, and sprinkled wine and strewed frankincense over everything, and caused a goodly savour to arise, acceptable before the Lord. 6.5. And the Lord smelt the goodly savour, and He made a covet with him that there should not be any more a flood to destroy the earth; 6.6. that all the days of the earth seed-time and harvest should never cease; cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night should not change their order, nor cease for ever. 6.7. "And you, increase ye and multiply upon the earth, and become many upon it, and be a blessing upon it. 10.1. And in the third week of this jubilee the unclean demons began to lead astray the children of the sons of Noah; and to make to err and destroy them. 10.2. And the sons of Noah came to Noah their father, and they told him concerning the demons which were, leading astray and blinding and slaying his sons' sons. 10.3. And he prayed before the Lord his God, and said: God of the spirits of all flesh, who hast shown mercy unto me, And hast saved me and my sons from the waters of the flood, And hast not caused me to perish as Thou didst the sons of perdition; 10.4. For Thy grace hath been great towards me, And great hath been Thy mercy to my soul; 10.5. Let Thy grace be lift up upon my sons, 10.6. But do Thou bless me and my sons, that we may increase and multiply and replenish the earth. 10.7. And Thou knowest how Thy Watchers, the fathers of these spirits, acted in my day: 12.19. Why do I search (them) out? If He desireth, He causeth it to rain, morning and evening; And if He desireth, He withholdeth it, And all things are in His hand." 12.20. And he prayed that night and said "My God, God Most High, Thou alone art my God, And Thee and Thy dominion have I chosen. And Thou hast created all things, And all things that are are the work of Thy hands.

77. Dead Sea Scrolls, Damascus Covenant, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 197

78. Dead Sea Scrolls, War Scroll, 4.2-4.3, 17.2-17.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 247

79. Dead Sea Scrolls, (Cairo Damascus Covenant) Cd-A, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 197

80. Dead Sea Scrolls, 11Qpsa, 19.13-19.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 181, 194, 225

81. Dead Sea Scrolls, Community Rule, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 244

82. Dead Sea Scrolls, Compositions 11Q5, 19.13-19.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 181, 194, 225

83. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 7 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 110

84. Dead Sea Scrolls, Hodayot, 4, 4.22, 4.29, 4.30, 4.31, 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, 4.39, 4.40, 7.25, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.32, 7.34, 8.28, 8.29, 10.8, 16.27, 16.28, 16.29, 16.30, 16.31, 16.32, 16.33, 16.34, 16.35, 16.36, 16.37, 16.38, 16.39, 16.40, 16.41, 20.7-22.42, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 20.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 10

85. Dead Sea Scrolls, Hodayot, 4, 4.22, 4.29, 4.30, 4.31, 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, 4.39, 4.40, 7.25, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.32, 7.34, 8.28, 8.29, 10.8, 16.27, 16.28, 16.29, 16.30, 16.31, 16.32, 16.33, 16.34, 16.35, 16.36, 16.37, 16.38, 16.39, 16.40, 16.41, 20.7-22.42, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 20.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 24

86. Cicero, On Fate, 5.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of humans Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 245

87. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q444, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 192

88. Cicero, Academica, 2.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63

89. Hebrew Bible, Daniel, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 156

90. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, innate orientations Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 247

91. Philodemus, (Pars I) \ On Piety, 40.18-40.20, 81.11-81.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 64

92. Anon., Testament of Solomon, 1.1-1.4, 4.5, 4.8-4.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 193

93. Anon., Testament of Naphtali, 1.2-1.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 109

1.2. When his sons were gathered together in the seventh month, on the first day of the month, while still in good health, he made them a feast of food and wine. 1.3. And after he was awake in the morning, he said to them, I am dying; and they believed him not.

94. Anon., Testament of Levi, 18 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77

95. Anon., Testament of Issachar, 6.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 225

96. Philo of Alexandria, On Flight And Finding, 112, 68-69, 163 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 79

163. "For the place," says God, "on which thou standest is holy Ground." What kind of place is that? Is it not plain that it is that which relates to the principles of causes, which is the only one that he has adapted to the divine natures, not thinking any more competent to aim at a clear understanding of the principle of causes?

97. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 118, 25, 28-29, 31, 30 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 77, 99

30. and the cause of this the want of union, and participation existing not merely between the Greeks and the barbarians, or between the barbarians and the Greeks, but also between the different tribes of each of these respective nations. Then they, as it would seem, blaming those things which do not deserve blame, such as unexpected occurrences or opportunities, deficiency of crops, badness of soil, their own situation either as being by the sea-side, or inland, or insular, or on the continent, or anything of that sort, are silent as to the real truth. The real truth is their covetousness, their want of good faith towards and confidence in one another, on which account they have not been satisfied with the laws of nature, but have called those regulations, which have appeared to be for the common advantage of the agreeing and uimous multitudes, laws, so that the individual constitutions do naturally appear rather in the light of additions to the one great general constitution of nature;

98. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 206, 68, 78, 207 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73

207. But if any one has outrun him in speed, and has become a follower of Moses, though he is not yet able to keep pace with him, he will use a compound and mixed number, namely, that of five and seventy, which is the symbol of the nature which is both perceptible by the outward senses and intelligible by the intellect, the two uniting together for the production of one irreproachable species. XXXVIII.

99. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 14, 140, 184, 197-199, 219, 225, 46, 7, 71, 84-86, 117 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70

117. Therefore they will say that there were not the same causes why they should run back with such exceeding speed, making the double course from the objects of the outward sense and to the objects of the outward sense, without stopping to take breath, and with excessive impetuosity; but that the cause was rather the man who delivered them from the shepherds of the wild flock. And they call Moses an Egyptian, a man who was not only a Hebrew, but even a Hebrew of the very purest race, of the only tribe which is consecrated, because they are unable to rise above their own nature;

100. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 130, 133-135, 145, 16, 19-22, 3, 44, 46, 69, 73, 82-85, 96-97, 95 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69

95. And we must also pass on to the other species of the number seven, which is contained in the number ten, and which displays an admirable nature, and one not inferior to the previously mentioned species. The number seven consists of one, and two and four, numbers which have two most harmonious ratios, the twofold and the fourfold ratio; the former of which affects the diapason harmony, while the fourfold ratio causes that of the double diapason. It also comprehends other divisions, existing in some kind of yoke-like combination. For it is divided first of all into the number one, and the number six; then into the two and the five; and last of all, into the three and the four.

101. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 79

26. On which account Moses says, in another place, "Cursed of God is he that hangeth on a Tree;" because what he ought to hang upon is God. But such a man has, of his own accord, bound himself to the body, which is a wooden burden upon us, exchanging hope for desire and a perfect hope for the greatest of evils; for hope, being the expectation of good things, causes the mind to depend upon the bounteous God; but appetite, creating only unreasonable desires, depends on the body, which nature has made to be a sort of receptacle and abode for the soul. IX.

102. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 4, 68-69 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70

69. But Pharaoh, the squanderer of all things, not being able himself to receive the conception of virtues unconnected with time, inasmuch as he was mutilated as to the eyes of his soul, by which alone incorporeal natures are comprehended, would not endure to be benefited by virtues unconnected with time; but being weighed down by soulless opinions, I mean here by the frogs, animals which utter a sound and noise wholly void and destitute of reality, when Moses says, "appoint a time to me when I may pray for you and for your servants that God will make the frogs to Disappear," though he ought, as he was in very imminent necessity, to have said, Pray this moment, nevertheless postponed it, saying, "Pray to-morrow," in order that he might in every case preserve the folly of his impiety.

103. Philo of Alexandria, On Sobriety, 53 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73

104. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.2, 1.6, 1.27, 1.109-1.111, 1.135-1.137, 1.143, 1.171-1.172, 1.176, 1.188-1.189, 1.232, 1.236 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70, 73, 78, 79

1.2. Now the second species is that in which our mind, being moved simultaneously with the mind of the universe, has appeared to be hurried away by itself and to be under the influence of divine impulses, so as to be rendered capable of comprehending beforehand, and knowing by anticipation some of the events of the future. Now the first dream which is akin to the species which I have been describing, is that which appeared on the ladder which reached up to heaven, and which was of this kind. 1.6. Let us then at once begin and consider the first of these points. To me, then, the well appears to be an emblem of knowledge; for its nature is not superficial, but very deep. Nor does it lie in an open place, but a well is fond of being hidden somewhere in secret. Nor is it found with ease, but only after great labour and with difficulty; and this too is seen to be the case with sciences, not only with such as have great and indescribable subjects of speculation, but even with respect to such as are the most insignificant. 1.27. And with respect to the outward senses, we are not, so far as that is concerned, utterly dull and mutilated, but we are able to say that that also is divided into five divisions, and that there are appropriate organs for the development of each sense formed by nature; for instance, the eyes for seeing, the ears for hearing, the nostrils for smelling, and the other organs for the exercise of the respective senses to which they are adapted, and also that we may call these outward senses messengers of the mind which inform it of colours, and shapes and sounds, and the peculiar differences of vapours, and flavours, and, in short, which describe to it all bodies, and all the distinctive qualities which exist in them. They also may be looked upon as body-guards of the soul, informing it of all that they see or hear; and if anything injurious attacks it from without, they foresee it, and guard against it, so that it may not enter by chance and unawares, and so become the cause of irremediable disaster to their mistress. 1.109. On which account the scripture adds, "This is the only covering of his nakedness;" for what can so becomingly overshadow and conceal the reproaches and disgraces of life, as speech? For ignorance is a disgrace akin to irrational nature, but education is the brother of speech, and an ornament properly belonging to man. 1.110. In what then will a man lie down to rest? That is to say, in what will a man find tranquillity and a respite from his labours, except in speech? For speech is a relief to our most miserable and afflicted race. As therefore, when men have been overwhelmed by grief, or by fear, or by any other evil, tranquillity, and constancy, and the kindness of friends have often restored them; so it happens, not often, but invariably, that speech, the only real averter of evil, wards off that most heavy burden which the necessities of that body in the which we are bound up, and the unforeseen accidents of external circumstances which attack us, impose upon us; 1.111. for speech is a friend, and an acquaintance, and a kinsman, and a companion bound up within us; I should rather say, fitted close and united to us by some indissoluble and invisible cement of nature. On this account it is, that it forewarns us of what will be expedient for us, and when any unexpected event befalls us it comes forward of its own accord to assist us; not only bringing advantage of one kind only, such as that which he who is an adviser without acting, or an agent who can give no advice, may supply, but of both kinds: 1.135. This air is the abode of incorporeal souls, since it seemed good to the Creator of the universe to fill all the parts of the world with living creatures. On this account he prepared the terrestrial animals for the earth, the aquatic animals for the sea and for the rivers, and the stars for the heaven; for every one of these bodies is not merely a living animal, but is also properly described as the very purest and most universal mind extending through the universe; so that there are living creatures in that other section of the universe, the air. And if these things are not comprehensible by the outward senses, what of that? For the soul is also invisible. 1.136. And yet it is probable that the air should nourish living animals even more than the land or the water. Why so? Because it is the air which has given vitality to those animals which live on the earth and in the water. For the Creator of the universe formed the air so that it should be the habit of those bodies which are immovable, and the nature of those which are moved in an invisible manner, and the soul of such as are able to exert an impetus and visible sense of their own. 1.137. Is it not then absurd that that element, by means of which the other elements have been filled with vitality, should itself be destitute of living things? Therefore let no one deprive the most excellent nature of living creatures of the most excellent of those elements which surrounds the earth; that is to say, of the air. For not only is it not alone deserted by all things besides, but rather, like a populous city, it is full of imperishable and immortal citizens, souls equal in number to the stars. 1.143. having received a notion of which he once entreated one of those mediators, saying: "Do thou speak for us, and let not God speak to us, lest we Die." For not only are we unable to endure his chastisements, but we cannot bear even his excessive and unmodified benefits, which he himself proffers us of his own accord, without employing the ministrations of any other beings. 1.171. If, however, this practiser of virtue runs on vigorously towards the end and learns to see clearly what he previously only dreamed of in an indistinct way, being altered and re-stamped with a better character, and being called Israel, that is, "the man who sees God," instead of Jacob, that is, "the supplanter," he then is no longer set down as the son of Abraham, as his father, of him who derived wisdom from instruction, but as the son of Israel, who was born excellent by nature. 1.172. These statements are not fables of my own invention, but are the oracle written on the sacred pillars. For, says the scripture: "Israel having departed, he and all that he had came to the well of the oath, and there he sacrificed a sacrifice to the God of his father Isaac." Do you not now perceive that this present assertion has reference not to the relationship between mortal men, but, as was said before, to the nature of things? For look at what is before us. At one time, Jacob is spoken of as the son of his father Abraham, and at another time he is called Israel, the son of Isaac, on account of the reason which we have thus accurately investigated. XVIII. 1.176. But the wise and virtuous man is not only a blessing to himself, but he is also a common good to all men, diffusing advantages over all from his own ready store. For as the sun is the light of all those beings who have eyes, so also is the wise man light to all those who partake of a rational nature. XXIX. 1.188. According to analogy, therefore, the knowledge of the world appreciable by the intellect is attained to by means of our knowledge of that which is perceptible by the outward senses, which is as it were a gate to the other. For as men who wish to see cities enter in through the gates, so also they who wish to comprehend the invisible world are conducted in their search by the appearance of the visible one. And the world of that essence which is only open to the intellect without any visible appearance or figure whatever, and which exists only in the archetypal idea which exists in the mind, which is fashioned according to its appearance, will be brought on without any shade; all the walls, and all the gates which could impede its progress being removed, so that it is not looked at through any other medium, but by itself, putting forth a beauty which is susceptible of no change, presenting an indescribable and exquisite spectacle. XXXIII. 1.189. But enough of this. There is another dream also which belongs to the same class, that one I mean about the spotted flock, which the person who beheld it relates after he had awoke, saying, "The angel of God spake unto me in a dream, and said, Jacob; and I said, What is it? And he said unto me, Look up with thine eyes, and see the goats and the rams mounting on the flocks, and the she-goats, some white, and spotted, and ring-straked, and speckled: for I have beheld all that Laban does unto thee. I am that God who was seen by thee in the place of God, where thou anointedst the pillar, and vowedst a vow unto me. Now therefore, rise up and depart out of the land, and go into the land of thy birth, and I will be with Thee." 1.232. Accordingly, to the incorporeal souls which are occupied in his service, it is natural for him to appear as he is, conversing with them as a friend with his friends; but to those souls which are still in the body he must appear in the resemblance of the angels, though without changing his nature (for he is unchangeable), but merely implanting in those who behold him an idea of his having another form, so that they fancy that it is his image, not an imitation of him, but the very archetypal appearance itself. 1.236. for the writers knew that some men are very dull in their natures, so as to be utterly unable to form any conception whatever of God apart from a body, whom it will be impossible to admonish if they were to speak in any other style than the existing one, of representing God as coming and departing like a man; and as descending and ascending, and as using his voice, and as being angry with sinners, and being implacable in his anger; and speaking too of his darts and swords, and whatever other instruments are suitable to be employed against the wicked, as being all previously ready.

105. Philo of Alexandria, On The Contemplative Life, 70, 28 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73

28. And the interval between morning and evening is by them devoted wholly to meditation on and to practice of virtue, for they take up the sacred scriptures and philosophise concerning them, investigating the allegories of their national philosophy, since they look upon their literal expressions as symbols of some secret meaning of nature, intended to be conveyed in those figurative expressions.

106. Philo of Alexandria, On Giants, 25, 30, 60-63 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 72

63. But when he became improved, and was about to have his name changed, he then became a man born of God, according to the oracle which was delivered to him, "I am thy God, take care that thou art approved before me, and be thou Blameless."

107. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.2-1.7, 1.21-1.22, 1.26-1.28, 1.59-1.60, 1.117, 1.158, 2.48, 2.58, 2.65, 2.281 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature •humanity, compound nature of •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 71; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 70, 77, 79

1.2. for the glory of the laws which he left behind him has reached over the whole world, and has penetrated to the very furthest limits of the universe; and those who do really and truly understand him are not many, perhaps partly out of envy, or else from the disposition so common to many persons of resisting the commands which are delivered by lawgivers in different states, since the historians who have flourished among the Greeks have not chosen to think him worthy of mention, 1.3. the greater part of whom have both in their poems and also in their prose writings, disparaged or defaced the powers which they have received through education, composing comedies and works full of Sybaritish profligacy and licentiousness to their everlasting shame, while they ought rather to have employed their natural endowments and abilities in preserving a record of virtuous men and praiseworthy lives, so that honourable actions, whether ancient or modern, might not be buried in silence, and thus have all recollection of them lost, while they might shine gloriously if duly celebrated; and that they might not themselves have seemed to pass by more appropriate subjects, and to prefer such as were unworthy of being mentioned at all, while they were eager to give a specious appearance to infamous actions, so as to secure notoriety for disgraceful deeds. 1.4. But I disregard the envious disposition of these men, and shall proceed to narrate the events which befell him, having learnt them both from those sacred scriptures which he has left as marvellous memorials of his wisdom, and having also heard many things from the elders of my nation, for I have continually connected together what I have heard with what I have read, and in this way I look upon it that I am acquainted with the history of his life more accurately than other people. 1.5. And I will begin first with that with which it is necessary to begin. Moses was by birth a Hebrew, but he was born, and brought up, and educated in Egypt, his ancestors having migrated into Egypt with all their families on account of the long famine which oppressed Babylon and all the adjacent countries; for they were in search of food, and Egypt was a champaign country blessed with a rich soil, and very productive of every thing which the nature of man requires, and especially of corn and wheat, 1.6. for the river of that country at the height of summer, when they say that all other rivers which are derived from winter torrents and from springs in the ground are smaller, rises and increases, and overflows so as to irrigate all the lands, and make them one vast lake. And so the land, without having any need of rain, supplies every year an unlimited abundance of every kind of good food, unless sometimes the anger of God interrupts this abundance by reason of the excessive impiety of the inhabitants. 1.7. And his father and mother were among the most excellent persons of their time, and though they were of the same time, still they were induced to unite themselves together more from an uimity of feeling than because they were related in blood; and Moses is the seventh generation in succession from the original settler in the country who was the founder of the whole race of the Jews. 1.21. And immediately he had all kinds of masters, one after another, some coming of their own accord from the neighbouring countries and the different districts of Egypt, and some being even procured from Greece by the temptation of large presents. But in a short time he surpassed all their knowledge, anticipating all their lessons by the excellent natural endowments of his own genius; so that everything in his case appeared to be a ecollecting rather than a learning, while he himself also, without any teacher, comprehended by his instinctive genius many difficult subjects; 1.22. for great abilities cut out for themselves many new roads to knowledge. And just as vigorous and healthy bodies which are active and quick in motion in all their parts, release their trainers from much care, giving them little or no trouble and anxiety, and as trees which are of a good sort, and which have a natural good growth, give no trouble to their cultivators, but grow finely and improve of themselves, so in the same manner the well disposed soul, going forward to meet the lessons which are imparted to it, is improved in reality by itself rather than by its teachers, and taking hold of some beginning or principle of knowledge, bounds, as the proverb has it, like a horse over the plain. 1.26. And he tamed, and appeased, and brought under due command every one of the other passions which are naturally and as far as they are themselves concerned frantic, and violent, and unmanageable. And if any one of them at all excited itself and endeavoured to get free from restraint he administered severe punishment to it, reproving it with severity of language; and, in short, he repressed all the principal impulses and most violent affections of the soul, and kept guard over them as over a restive horse, fearing lest they might break all bounds and get beyond the power of reason which ought to be their guide to restrain them, and so throw everything everywhere into confusion. For these passions are the causes of all good and of all evil; of good when they submit to the authority of domit reason, and of evil when they break out of bounds and scorn all government and restraint. 1.27. Very naturally, therefore, those who associated with him and every one who was acquainted with him marvelled at him, being astonished as at a novel spectacle, and inquiring what kind of mind it was that had its abode in his body, and that was set up in it like an image in a shrine; whether it was a human mind or a divine intellect, or something combined of the two; because he had nothing in him resembling the many, but had gone beyond them all and was elevated to a more sublime height. 1.28. For he never provided his stomach with any luxuries beyond those necessary tributes which nature has appointed to be paid to it, and as to the pleasures of the organs below the stomach he paid no attention to them at all, except as far as the object of having legitimate children was concerned. 1.59. So they made haste, and went after him, and overtook him at no great distance from the fountain; and when they had delivered their father's message to him, they persuaded him to return home with them. And their father was at once greatly struck by his appearance, and soon afterwards he learnt to admire his wisdom, for great natures are very easily discovered, and do not require a length of time to be appreciated, and so he gave him the most beautiful of his daughters to be his wife, conjecturing by that one action of his how completely good and excellent he was, and testifying that what is good is the only thing which deserves to be loved, and that it does not require any external recommendation, but bears in itself proofs by which it may be known and understood. 1.60. And after his marriage, Moses took his father-in-law's herds and tended them, being thus instructed in the lessons proper to qualify him for becoming the leader of a people, for the business of a shepherd is a preparation for the office of a king to any one who is destined to preside over that most manageable of all flocks, mankind, just as hunting is a good training-school for men of warlike dispositions; for they who are practising with a view to learning the management of an army, previously study the science of hunting, brute animals being as some raw material exposed to their attacks in order for them to practise the art of commanding on each occasion of war or of peace, 1.117. but nature does not expend her powers to no purpose when they are not wanted, so as to provide rain for a land which does not require it, but it rejoices in the variety and diversity of scientific operations, and arranges the harmony of the universe from a number of opposite qualities. And for this reason it supplies the benefits which are derivable from water, to some countries, by bestowing it on them from above, namely from heaven, and to others it gives it from below by means of springs and rivers; 1.158. What more shall I say? Has he not also enjoyed an even greater communion with the Father and Creator of the universe, being thought unworthy of being called by the same appellation? For he also was called the god and king of the whole nation, and he is said to have entered into the darkness where God was; that is to say, into the invisible, and shapeless, and incorporeal world, the essence, which is the model of all existing things, where he beheld things invisible to mortal nature; for, having brought himself and his own life into the middle, as an excellently wrought picture, he established himself as a most beautiful and Godlike work, to be a model for all those who were inclined to imitate him. 2.48. for he was not like any ordinary compiler of history, studying to leave behind him records of ancient transactions as memorials to future ages for the mere sake of affording pleasure without any advantage; but he traced back the most ancient events from the beginning of the world, commencing with the creation of the universe, in order to make known two most necessary principles. First, that the same being was the father and creator of the world, and likewise the lawgiver of truth; secondly, that the man who adhered to these laws, and clung closely to a connection with and obedience to nature, would live in a manner corresponding to the arrangement of the universe with a perfect harmony and union, between his words and his actions and between his actions and his words. 2.58. But when the whole of that district was thus burnt, inhabitants and all, by the impetuous rush of the heavenly fire, one single man in the country, a sojourner, was preserved by the providence of God because he had never shared in the transgressions of the natives, though sojourners in general were in the habit of adopting the customs of the foreign nations, among which they might be settled, for the sake of their own safety, since, if they despised them, they might be in danger from the inhabitants of the land. And yet this man had not attained to any perfection of wisdom, so as to be thought worthy of such an honour by reason of the perfect excellence of his nature; but he was spared only because he did not join the multitude who were inclined to luxury and effeminacy, and who pursued every kind of pleasure and indulged every kind of appetite, gratifying them abundantly, and inflaming them as one might inflame fire by heaping upon it plenty of rough fuel. 2.65. These are the rewards and honours for pre-eminent excellence given to good men, by means of which, not only did they themselves and their families obtain safety, having escaped from the greatest dangers which were thus aimed against all men all over the earth, by the change in the character of the elements; but they became also the founders of a new generation, and the chiefs of a second period of the world, being left behind as sparks of the most excellent kind of creatures, namely, of men, man having received the supremacy over all earthly creatures whatsoever, being a kind of copy of the powers of God, a visible image of his invisible nature, a created image of an uncreated and immortal Original.{1}{yonge's translation includes a separate treatise title at this point: On the Life of Moses, That Is to Say, On the Theology and Prophetic office of Moses, Book III. Accordingly, his next paragraph begins with roman numeral I (= XIII in the Loeb 2.281. and this shall be discerned in the end of their life: for it they receive the ordinary death according to nature, then I have invented these oracles; but if they experience a new and unprecedented destruction, then my truth will be testified to; for I see chasms of the earth opening against them, and widened to the greatest extent, and numbers of men perishing in them, dragged down into the gulf with all their kindred, and their very houses swallowed up, and the men going down alive into hell."

108. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, On Thucydides, 24.362.16-24.362.18 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diodotus, on human nature •irrational impulses, and human nature Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 124

109. Philo of Alexandria, On The Embassy To Gaius, 75, 118 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71, 78

118. but in this case what was put in motion was not a trifle, but a thing of the very greatest importance, namely, the erecting the created and perishable nature of a man, as far at least as appearance went, into the uncreated and imperishable nature of God, which the nation correctly judged to be the most terrible of all impieties (for it would have been easier to change a god into man, than a man into God), besides the fact of such an action letting in other most enormous wickedness, infidelity and ingratitude towards the Benefactor of the whole world, who by his own power givers abundant supplies of all kinds of blessings to every part of the universe. XVII.

110. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 1.18, 1.52, 1.63-1.78, 1.92-1.94, 1.107, 2.1-2.3, 2.105, 3.7, 3.21, 3.24-3.25, 3.27-3.29, 3.64, 3.75, 3.77-3.81, 3.83-3.89, 3.104, 3.145-3.147, 3.206-3.207, 3.252 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 157; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 109; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78

111. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Exodus, 2.1, 2.106 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71, 77

112. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 1.4-1.8, 1.56, 1.62, 2.6, 2.57, 4.9, 4.42, 4.62, 4.152, 4.184, 4.243 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature •human nature •law of nature, its relation to human law •human nature, perfected in christ Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77, 99; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 105; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 72, 73, 77, 79, 100

113. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 46, 84, 45 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 72

45. But there are three kinds of life. The first life, to God; the second, with respect to the creature; the third, is on the borders of both, being compounded of the two others. Now, the life to God has not descended to us, and has not come to the necessities of the body. Again, life with respect to the creature has not wholly ascended up to heaven, nor has it sought to ascend, but it lurks in unapproachable recesses, and rejoices in a life which is no life.

114. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 274, 83, 86-87, 89, 84 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70

115. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.11.40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 29

116. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 151, 55, 61-63 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70

63. But those who have received a duller and more sluggish nature, and who have been wrongly brought up as children, and who are unable to see acutely, stand in need of physicians for lawgivers, who may be able to devise an appropriate remedy for the existing complaint,

117. Philo of Alexandria, Plant., 91 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 78

118. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.116, 1.227, 1.259, 1.325, 2.48, 2.50-2.52, 2.58, 2.170-2.173, 3.45-3.48, 3.121, 4.61 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature •humanity, compound nature of •law of nature, its relation to human law Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 73, 77, 79, 100

1.116. For the law designs that he should be the partaker of a nature superior to that of man; inasmuch as he approaches more nearly to that of the Deity; being, if one must say the plain truth, on the borders between the two, in order that men may propitiate God by some mediator, and that God may have some subordinate minister by whom he may offer and give his mercies and kindnesses to mankind.XXIV. 1.227. Also there is a distinction made, which is very necessary, as to whether they are voluntary or involuntary, with reference to those who, after they have erred, change for the better, confessing that they have sinned, and reproaching themselves for the offences that they have committed, and turning, for the future, to an irreproachable way of life. 1.259. What, then, is the mode of purifying the soul? "Look," says the law, "take care that the victim which thou bringest to the altar is perfect, wholly without participation in any kind of blemish, selected from many on account of its excellence, by the uncorrupted judgments of the priests, and by their most acute sight, and by their continual practice derived from being exercised in the examination of faultless victims. For if you do not see this with your eyes more than with your reason, you will not wash off all the imperfections and stains which you have imprinted on your whole life, partly in consequence of unexpected events, and partly by deliberate purpose; 1.325. Therefore, as it was aware that no inconsiderable number of wicked men are often mingled in these assemblies, and escape notice by reason of the crowds collected there, in order to prevent that from being the case in this instance, he previously excludes all who are unworthy from the sacred assembly, beginning in the first instance with those who are afflicted with the disease of effeminacy, men-women, who, having adulterated the coinage of nature, are willingly driven into the appearance and treatment of licentious women. He also banishes all those who have suffered any injury or mutilation in their most important members, and those who, seeking to preserve the flower of their beauty so that it may not speedily wither away, have altered the impression of their natural manly appearance into the resemblance of a woman. 2.48. But if men everywhere agreed with this small number, and became, as nature originally designed that they should, all blameless and irreproachable, lovers of wisdom, delighting in all that is virtuous and honourable, and thinking that and that alone good, and looking on everything else as subordinate and slaves, as if they themselves were the masters of them, then all the cities would be full of happiness, being wholly free from all the things which are the causes of pain or fear, and full of all those which produce joy and cheerfulness. So that no time would ever cease to be the time of a happy life, but that the whole circle of the year would be one festival.XIV. 2.50. since he uses the first for the utterance of things which ought to be secret and buried in silence, and the second he fills full of abundance of strong wine and immoderate quantities of food out of gluttony, and the rest of his members he uses for the indulgence of unlawful desires and illicit connections, not only seeking to violate the marriage bed of others, but lusting unnaturally, and seeking to deface the manly character of the nature of man, and to change it into a womanlike appearance, for the sake of the gratification of his own polluted and accursed passions. 2.51. On which account the all-great Moses, seeing the pre-eminence of the beauty of that which is the real festival, looked upon it as too perfect for human nature and dedicated it to God himself, speaking thus, in these very words: "The feast of the Lord."{7}{#le 23:2.} 2.52. In considering the melancholy and fearful condition of the human race, and how full it is of innumerable evils, which the covetousness of the soul begets, which the defects of the body produce, and which all the inequalities of the soul inflict upon us, and which the retaliations of those among whom we live, both doing and suffering innumerable evils, are continually causing us, he then wondered whether any one being tossed about in such a sea of troubles, some brought on deliberately and others unintentionally, and never being able to rest in peace nor to cast anchor in the safe haven of a life free from danger, could by any possibility really keep a feast, not one in name, but one which should really be so, enjoying himself and being happy in the contemplation of the world and all the things in it, and in obedience to nature, and in a perfect harmony between his words and his actions, between his actions and his words. 2.58. But Moses, from a most honourable cause, called it consummation and perfection; attributing to the number six the origination of all the parts of the world, and to the number seven their perfection; for the number six is an oddeven number, being composed of twice three, having the odd number for the male and the even number for the female, from the union of which, production takes place in accordance with the unalterable laws of nature. 2.170. In addition to these things, they did not receive a desolate land, but one in which there was a populous nation and great cities abounding in men. Yet the cities were emptied of their inhabitants and the entire race disappeared except for a small part: some as a result of wars and others as a result of divinely sent attacks because of their new and strange practices of wrongs and all of the impieties they used to commit through their great efforts to demolish the laws of nature. These things happened so that those who replaced them might be sobered by the calamities of others, and learn from their deeds that those who become devotees of evil deeds will suffer the same fate but those who have honored a life of virtue will possess their assigned portion, numbered not among emigrants but among the native residents. 2.171. That the first fruit is a handful for their own land and for all lands, offered in thanksgiving for prosperity and a good season which the nation and the entire race of human beings were hoping to enjoy, has been demonstrated. We should not be unaware that many benefits have come by means of the first fruit: first, memory of God--it is not possible to find a more perfect good than this; then, the most just recompense to the real Cause of the fruitfulness. 2.172. For the things which occur as a result of agricultural skill are few or none at all: to build up furrows, to dig and spade all around a plant, to deepen a trench, to cut off excessive growths, or to perform any similar task. But the things which come from nature are all essential and useful: the most fertile ground, a land well-watered by springs and both spring-fed and seasonal rivers and sprinkled with annual rains, mild temperatures of air moved by breezes which are most conducive for life, countless types of crops and plants. For which of these has a human either discovered or engendered? 2.173. Nature which has engendered these things has not begrudged a man its own goods, but considered him to be the governing part of mortal animals because he has a share in reason and good sense. She therefore chose him on the basis of his merit and summoned him to participate in her own goods. For these things it is right that the host, God, be praised and admired since he sees to it that the truely hospitable earth, all of it, is always full of not only the necessities but even of the things which make for a luxurious life. 3.45. And it is very likely that there may be other Pasipha's also, with passions equally unbridled, and that not women only, but men likewise may fall madly in love with animals, from whom, perhaps, indescribable monsters may be born, being memorials of the excessive pollution of men; owing to which, perhaps, those unnatural creations of unprecedented and fabulous monsters will exist, such as hippocentaurs and chimaeras, and other similar animals. 3.46. But so great are the precautions which are taken against them in the holy laws of God, that in order to prevent the possibility of men ever desiring any unlawful connection, it is expressly commanded that even animals of different kinds shall not be put together. And no Jewish shepherd will endeavour to cross a sheep with a he-goat, or a ram with a she-goat, or a cow with a horse; and if he does, he must pay the penalty as breaking a solemn law of nature who is desirous to keep the original kinds of animals free from all spurious admixture. 3.47. And some persons prefer mules to every other kind of animal for the yoke, since their bodies are very compact, and are very strong and powerful; and accordingly, in the pastures and stalls where they keep their horses, they also keep asses of an extraordinary size, which they call celones, in order that they may breed with the mares; and then the mares produce a mixed animal, half horse and half ass, which, since Moses knew that its production was wholly contrary to nature, he forbade the existence of with all his might by a general injunction, that that no union or combination between different kinds of animals should on any account be permitted. 3.48. Therefore he provided thus against those evils in a manner suited to and consistent with nature; and from a long distance off, as from a watchtower, he admonished men and kept them in the straight path, in order that both men and women, learning from these percepts of his, might abstain from unlawful connections. 3.121. For the merciful and forgiving God can never be supposed to have given up any innocent person to be put to death; but whoever ingeniously escapes the judgment of a human tribunal by means of his own cunning and wariness, he is convicted when brought before the invisible tribunal of nature, by which alone the uncorrupted truth is discerned without being kept in the dark by the artifices of sophistical arguments. For such an investigation does not admit of arguments at all, laying bare all devices and intentions, and bringing the most secret counsels to light; and, in one sense, it does not look upon a man who has slain another as liable to justice, inasmuch as he has only sinned to be the minister of a divine judgment, but still he will have incurred an obscure and slight kind of defilement, which, however, may obtain allowance and pardon. 4.61. for which reasons some of the lawgivers among the Greeks, having transcribed some of the laws from the two tables of Moses, appear to have established very wise regulations, forbidding any one to mention in his testimony anything that he has heard, on the ground that it is right to look upon what a man has seen as trustworthy, but on what he has heard as not in all respects certain.XI.

119. Philo of Alexandria, On The Decalogue, 1, 142, 150, 41-43, 132 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 77

120. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 176, 180, 56 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 70

56. who was always studying that knowledge which is conversant about the body and vain opinions, not being able to rule and govern irrational nature (for it is customary for old men to be appointed to offices of irresponsible authority; but this man is always young, even if after a lapse of time he may come to support old age, which has at last reached him); and being accustomed to nourish this and to lead it on to growth, he expects to be able to persuade the lovers of virtue to change and come over to him, in order that in so changing to irrational and iimate objects, they may have no leisure for applying themselves to the studies of a rational soul.

121. Philo of Alexandria, On The Confusion of Tongues, 180-181, 68, 87, 46 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 71

46. For when he sees war stirred up in the midst of tranquil peace, so as to be continued and incessant among all men, both public and private, not existing only among nations and countries, and cities and villages, but also in every house, and between each particular individual; who is there who does not reproach and admonish and seek to correct the foolish men whom he sees, and not by day only, but also by night, his soul being unable to remain tranquil by reason of the hatred of wickedness implanted in his nature?

122. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 122, 61 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 78

123. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 86 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 78

86. And the doctrine is this: God alone keeps festival in reality, for he alone rejoices, he alone is delighted, he alone feels cheerfulness, and to him alone is it given, to pass an existence of perfect peace unmixed with war. He is free from all pain, and free from all fear; he has no participation in any evils, he yields to no one, he suffers no sorrow, he knows no fatigue, he is full of unalloyed happiness; his nature is entirely perfect, or rather God is himself the perfection, and completion, and boundary of happiness, partaking of nothing else by which he can be rendered better, but giving to every individual thing a portion of what is suited to it, from the fountain of good, namely, from himself; for the beautiful things in the world would never have been such as they are, if they had not been made after an archetypal pattern, which was really beautiful, the uncreate, and blessed, and imperishable model of all things. XXVI. 86. For an oath is the calling of God to give his testimony concerning the matters which are in doubt; and it is a most impious thing to invoke God to be witness to a lie. Come now, if you please, and with your reason look into the mind of the man who is about to swear to a falsehood; and you will see that it is not tranquil, but full of disorder and confusion, accusing itself, and enduring all kinds of insolence and evil speaking;

124. Philo of Alexandria, On The Eternity of The World, 164-167, 193, 36-37, 57-59, 80-81, 35 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69, 72

35. Moreover this point is manifest to every one, that every nature is desirous to keep and preserve, and if it were possible to make immortal, everything of which it is the nature; the nature of trees, for instance, desires to preserve trees, and the nature of animals desires to preserve each individual animal.

125. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 16, 194-195, 202, 193 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 69

193. In the second place, though it was not the custom in the land in which he as living, as perhaps it is among some nations, to offer human sacrifices, and custom, by its frequency, often removes the horror felt at the first appearance of evils, he himself was about to be the first to set the example of a novel and most extraordinary deed, which I do not think that any human being would have brought himself to submit to, even if his soul had been made of iron or of adamant; for as some one has said, -- "Tis a hard task with nature to contend."

126. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1.89-1.93 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 71

1.89. Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae vindice nullo, 1.90. sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat. 1.91. Poena metusque aberant, nec verba mitia fixo 1.92. aere legebantur, nec supplex turba timebat 1.93. iudicis ora sui, sed erant sine vindice tuti.

127. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.55-1.57, 2.75-2.79, 2.569-2.580, 2.991-2.1012, 3.145, 3.931-3.949, 5.9, 5.958-5.959, 5.961, 5.1014, 5.1019-5.1027, 5.1146-5.1150 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •nature, human •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, 169; Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 73; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 194, 204, 211

1.55. disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam, 1.56. unde omnis natura creet res, auctet alatque, 1.57. quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat, 2.75. nec remorantur ibi. sic rerum summa novatur 2.76. semper, et inter se mortales mutua vivunt. 2.77. augescunt aliae gentes, aliae minuuntur, 2.78. inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum 2.79. et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt. 2.569. Nec superare queunt motus itaque exitiales 2.570. perpetuo neque in aeternum sepelire salutem, 2.571. nec porro rerum genitales auctificique 2.572. motus perpetuo possunt servare creata. 2.573. sic aequo geritur certamine principiorum 2.574. ex infinito contractum tempore bellum. 2.575. nunc hic nunc illic superant vitalia rerum 2.576. et superantur item. miscetur funere vagor, 2.577. quem pueri tollunt visentis luminis oras; 2.578. nec nox ulla diem neque noctem aurora secutast, 2.579. quae non audierit mixtos vagitibus aegris 2.580. ploratus, mortis comites et funeris atri. 2.991. / l 2.992. omnibus ille idem pater est, unde alma liquentis 2.993. umoris guttas mater cum terra recepit, 2.994. feta parit nitidas fruges arbustaque laeta 2.995. et genus humanum, parit omnia saecla ferarum, 2.996. pabula cum praebet, quibus omnes corpora pascunt 2.997. et dulcem ducunt vitam prolemque propagant; 2.998. qua propter merito maternum nomen adepta est. 2.999. cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante, 2.1000. in terras, et quod missumst ex aetheris oris, 2.1001. id rursum caeli rellatum templa receptant. 2.1002. nec sic interemit mors res ut materiai 2.1003. corpora conficiat, sed coetum dissupat ollis; 2.1004. inde aliis aliud coniungit et efficit, omnis 2.1005. res ut convertant formas mutentque colores 2.1006. et capiant sensus et puncto tempore reddant; 2.1007. ut noscas referre earum primordia rerum 2.1008. cum quibus et quali positura contineantur 2.1009. et quos inter se dent motus accipiantque, 2.1010. neve putes aeterna penes residere potesse 2.1011. corpora prima quod in summis fluitare videmus 2.1012. rebus et interdum nasci subitoque perire. 3.145. idque sibi solum per se sapit et sibi gaudet, 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 5.9. qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae 5.958. nec commune bonum poterant spectare neque ullis 5.959. moribus inter se scibant nec legibus uti. 5.961. sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere doctus. 5.1014. tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit. 5.1019. tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes 5.1020. finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, 5.1021. et pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, 5.1022. vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent 5.1023. imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. 5.1024. nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, 5.1025. sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; 5.1026. aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne peremptum 5.1027. nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecla propago. 5.1146. ex inimicitiis languebat; quo magis ipsum 5.1147. sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura. 5.1148. acrius ex ira quod enim se quisque parabat 5.1149. ulcisci quam nunc concessumst legibus aequis, 5.1150. hanc ob rem est homines pertaesum vi colere aevom.

128. New Testament, Colossians, 3.1-3.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 238

3.1. Εἰ οὖν συνηγέρθητε τῷ χριστῷ, τὰ ἄνω ζητεῖτε, οὗ ὁ χριστός ἐστινἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ καθήμενος· 3.2. τὰ ἄνω φρονεῖτε, μὴ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἀπεθάνετε γάρ, 3.3. καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν κέκρυπται σὺν τῷ χριστῷ ἐν τῷ θεῷ·

3.1. If then you were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated on the right hand of God. 3.2. Set your mind on the things that are above, not on the things that are on the earth. 3.3. For you died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God.

129. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.13, 2.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •human nature, human condition Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 279; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 329

1.13. ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες, ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ, 2.3. ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημέν ποτε ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν, καὶ ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί·—

1.13. in whom you also, having heard the word of the truth, the gospel of your salvation, -- in whom, having also believed, you were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, 2.3. among whom we also all once lived in the lust of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.

130. Anon., The Life of Adam And Eve, 29.5 (1st cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 59, 77, 99

131. New Testament, Galatians, 1.6-1.7, 2.20-2.21, 3.1, 3.2.4, 3.26-3.29, 4.1-4.9, 4.19, 5.1-5.13, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 159; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 63, 190, 192, 255, 316; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 170, 180

1.6. Θαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτως ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, 1.7. ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο· εἰ μή τινές εἰσιν οἱ ταράσσοντες ὑμᾶς καὶ θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ χριστοῦ. 2.20. ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. 2.21. Οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ· εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν. 3.1. Ὦ ἀνόητοι Γαλάται, τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν, οἷς κατʼ ὀφθαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεγράφη ἐσταυρωμένος; 3.26. Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστὲ διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 3.27. ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε· 3.28. οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 3.29. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστέ, κατʼ ἐπαγγελίαν κληρονόμοι. 4.1. Λέγω δέ, ἐφʼ ὅσον χρόνον ὁ κληρονόμος νήπιός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου κύριος πάντων ὤν, 4.2. ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶ καὶ οἰκονόμους ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρός. 4.3. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτε ἦμεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἤμεθα δεδουλωμένοι· 4.4. ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον, 4.5. ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν. 4.6. Ὅτι δέ ἐστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, κρᾶζον Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ. 4.7. ὥστε οὐκέτι εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ κληρονόμος διὰ θεοῦ. 4.8. Ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσι θεοῖς· 4.9. νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ, πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλεῦσαι θέλετε; 4.19. τεκνία μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν· 5.1. Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν· στήκετε οὖν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε.— 5.2. Ἴδε ἐγὼ Παῦλος λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐὰν περιτέμνησθε Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει. 5.3. μαρτύρομαι δὲ πάλιν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτεμνομένῳ ὅτι ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸν νόμον ποιῆσαι. 5.4. κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε. 5.5. ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα. 5.6. ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ [Ἰησοῦ] οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ πίστις διʼ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη. 5.7. Ἐτρέχετε καλῶς· τίς ὑμᾶς ἐνέκοψεν ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι; 5.8. ἡ πεισμονὴ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς. 5.9. μικρὰ ζύμη ὅλον τὸ φύραμα ζυμοῖ. 5.10. ἐγὼ πέποιθα εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν κυρίῳ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φρονήσετε· ὁ δὲ ταράσσων ὑμᾶς βαστάσει τὸ κρίμα, ὅστις ἐὰν ᾖ. 5.11. Ἐγὼ δέ, ἀδελφοί, εἰ περιτομὴν ἔτι κηρύσσω, τί ἔτι διώκομαι; ἄρα κατήργηται τὸ σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ. 5.12. Ὄφελον καὶ ἀποκόψονται οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες ὑμᾶς. Ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε, ἀδελφοί· 5.13. μόνον μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις· 5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε.

1.6. I marvel that you are so quickly deserting him who called you in the grace of Christ to a different gospel; 1.7. and there isn'tanother gospel. Only there are some who trouble you, and want topervert the gospel of Christ. 2.20. I have been crucified with Christ, andit is no longer I that live, but Christ living in me. That life which Inow live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me,and gave himself up for me. 2.21. I don't make void the grace of God.For if righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for nothing! 3.1. Foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you not to obey thetruth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth among you as crucified? 3.26. For you are all sons ofGod, through faith in Christ Jesus. 3.27. For as many of you as werebaptized into Christ have put on Christ. 3.28. There is neither Jewnor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither malenor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 3.29. If you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's seed and heirs according to promise. 4.1. But I say that so long as the heir is a child, he is nodifferent from a bondservant, though he is lord of all; 4.2. but isunder guardians and stewards until the day appointed by the father. 4.3. So we also, when we were children, were held in bondage under theelements of the world. 4.4. But when the fullness of the time came,God sent out his Son, born to a woman, born under the law, 4.5. thathe might redeem those who were under the law, that we might receive theadoption of sons. 4.6. And because you are sons, God sent out theSpirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, "Abba, Father!" 4.7. Soyou are no longer a bondservant, but a son; and if a son, then an heirof God through Christ. 4.8. However at that time, not knowing God, youwere in bondage to those who by nature are not gods. 4.9. But now thatyou have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, why do youturn back again to the weak and miserable elements, to which you desireto be in bondage all over again? 4.19. My little children, of whom I am again in travail untilChrist is formed in you-- 5.1. Stand firm therefore in the liberty by which Christ has madeus free, and don't be entangled again with a yoke of bondage. 5.2. Behold, I, Paul, tell you that if you receive circumcision, Christ willprofit you nothing. 5.3. Yes, I testify again to every man whoreceives circumcision, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. 5.4. You are alienated from Christ, you who desire to be justified by thelaw. You have fallen away from grace. 5.5. For we, through the Spirit,by faith wait for the hope of righteousness. 5.6. For in Christ Jesusneither circumcision amounts to anything, nor uncircumcision, but faithworking through love. 5.7. You were running well! Who interfered withyou that you should not obey the truth? 5.8. This persuasion is notfrom him who calls you. 5.9. A little yeast grows through the wholelump. 5.10. I have confidence toward you in the Lord that you willthink no other way. But he who troubles you will bear his judgment,whoever he is. 5.11. But I, brothers, if I still preach circumcision, why am Istill persecuted? Then the stumbling-block of the cross has beenremoved. 5.12. I wish that those who disturb you would cut themselvesoff. 5.13. For you, brothers, were called for freedom. Only don't useyour freedom for gain to the flesh, but through love be servants to oneanother. 5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire.

132. New Testament, Hebrews, 4.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diadochus, bishopof photice, christ's human nature •jerome, st, church father, christ's human nature Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 351, 352

4.15. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἀρχιερέα μὴ δυνάμενον συνπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν, πεπειρασμένον δὲ κατὰ πάντα καθʼ ὁμοιότητα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας.

4.15. For we don't have a high priest who can't be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one who has been in all points tempted like we are, yet without sin.

133. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 111

134. New Testament, James, 3.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 190

3.8. τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων· ἀκατάστατον κακόν, μεστὴ ἰοῦ θανατηφόρου.

3.8. But nobody can tame the tongue. It is a restless evil, full of deadly poison.

135. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 10, 9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 321

136. Plutarch, On The Face Which Appears In The Orb of The Moon, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, binary nature of Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 207

137. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 345

138. New Testament, Philippians, 1.9, 2.2, 2.6-2.7, 2.9-2.10, 2.13, 3.12-3.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature •nature, human •unity, of the human nature •human nature, human condition Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158, 161; Hellholm et al. (2010), Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity, 1211; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 194, 201; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 199

1.9. καὶ τοῦτο προσεύχομαι ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ὑμῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον περισσεύῃ ἐν ἐπιγνώσει καὶ πάσῃ αἰσθήσει, 2.2. πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαρὰν ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, σύνψυχοι, τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες, 2.6. ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, 2.7. ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος 2.9. διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν, καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα, 2.10. ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦπᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων, 2.13. θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας· 3.12. διώκω δὲ εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφʼ ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ [Ἰησοῦ]. ἀδελφοί, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν οὔπω λογίζομαι κατειληφέναι· 3.13. ἓν δέ, τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω ἐπιλανθανόμενος τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος, 3.14. κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

1.9. This I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge and all discernment; 2.2. make my joy full, by being like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind; 2.6. who, existing in the form of God, didn't consider it robbery to be equal with God, 2.7. but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men. 2.9. Therefore God also highly exalted him, and gave to him the name which is above every name; 2.10. that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, those on earth, and those under the earth, 2.13. For it is God who works in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure. 3.12. Not that I have already obtained, or am already made perfect; but I press on, if it is so that I may take hold of that for which also I was taken hold of by Christ Jesus. 3.13. Brothers, I don't regard myself as yet having taken hold, but one thing I do. Forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward to the things which are before, 3.14. I press on toward the goal for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus.

139. Phlegon of Tralles, On Miraculous Things, 9.35 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •phlegon of tralles, marvels of human nature Found in books: Cueva et al. (2018b), Re-Wiring the Ancient Novel. Volume 2: Roman Novels and Other Important Texts, 249

140. Ps.-Philo, Biblical Antiquities, 19.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77, 99

141. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 1.8, 3.6, 4.7, 4.17, 12.2-12.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature •human nature, human condition •humanity, nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 154; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 60; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 183

1.8. Οὐ γὰρ θέλομεν ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ἀδελφοί, ὑπὲρ τῆς θλίψεως ἡμῶν τῆς γενομένης ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ὅτι καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ὑπὲρ δύναμιν ἐβαρήθημεν, ὥστε ἐξαπορηθῆναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ζῇν· 3.6. ὃς καὶ ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς διακόνους καινῆς διαθήκης, οὐ γράμματος ἀλλὰ πνεύματος, τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ. 4.7. Ἔχομεν δὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν, ἵνα ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς δυνάμεως ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἡμῶν· 4.17. τὸ γὰρ παραυτίκα ἐλαφρὸν τῆς θλίψεως καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν αἰώνιον βάρος δόξης κατεργάζεται ἡμῖν, 12.2. οἶδα ἄνθρωπον ἐν Χριστῷ πρὸ ἐτῶν δεκατεσσάρων, —εἴτε ἐν σώματι οὐκ οἶδα, εἴτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν, —ἁρπαγέντα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἕως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ. 12.3. καὶ οἶδα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον,—εἴτε ἐν σώματι εἴτε χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος [οὐκ οἶδα,] ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν, 12.4. —ὅτι ἡρπάγη εἰς τὸν παράδεισον καὶ ἤκουσεν ἄρρητα ῥήματα ἃ οὐκ ἐξὸν ἀνθρώπῳ λαλῆσαι.

142. New Testament, Acts, 2.4, 8.26-8.40, 9.1, 28.22, 28.26-28.27 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •humanity, nature •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 279, 280; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 99; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126

2.4. καὶ ἐπλήσθησαν πάντες πνεύματος ἁγίου, καὶ ἤρξαντο λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις καθὼς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐδίδου ἀποφθέγγεσθαι αὐτοῖς. 8.26. Ἄγγελος δὲ Κυρίου ἐλάλησεν πρὸς Φίλιππον λέγων Ἀνάστηθι καὶ πορεύου κατὰ μεσημβρίαν ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν καταβαίνουσαν ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλὴμ εἰς Γάζαν· αὕτη ἐστὶν ἔρημος. 8.27. καὶ ἀναστὰς ἐπορεύθη, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἀνὴρ Αἰθίοψ εὐνοῦχος δυνάστης Κανδάκης βασιλίσσης Αἰθιόπων, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς γάζης αὐτῆς, [ὃς] ἐληλύθει προσκυνήσων εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, 8.28. ἦν δὲ ὑποστρέφων καὶ καθήμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεγίνωσκεν τὸν προφήτην Ἠσαίαν. 8.29. εἶπεν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τῷ Φιλίππῳ Πρόσελθε καὶ κολλήθητι τῷ ἅρματι τούτῳ. 8.30. προσδραμὼν δὲ ὁ Φίλιππος ἤκουσεν αὐτοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος Ἠσαίαν τὸν προφήτην, καὶ εἶπεν Ἆρά γε γινώσκεις ἃ ἀναγινώσκεις; 8.31. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν Πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην ἐὰν μή τις ὁδηγήσει με; παρεκάλεσέν τε τὸνΦίλιππον ἀναβάντα καθίσαι σὺν αὐτῷ. 8.32. ἡ δὲ περιοχὴ τῆς γραφῆς ἣν ἀνεγίνωσκεν ἦν αὕτη 8.33. 8.34. ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ εὐνοῦχος τῷ Φιλίππῳ εἶπεν Δέομαί σου, περὶ τίνος ὁ προφήτης λέγει τοῦτο; περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ περὶ ἑτέρου τινός; 8.35. ἀνοίξας δὲ ὁ Φίλιππος τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς γραφῆς ταύτης εὐηγγελίσατο αὐτῷ τὸν Ἰησοῦν. 8.36. ὡς δὲ ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ἦλθον ἐπί τι ὕδωρ, καί φησιν ὁ εὐνοῦχος Ἰδοὺ ὕδωρ· τί κωλύει με βαπτισθῆναι; 8.37. 8.38. καὶ ἐκέλευσεν στῆναι τὸ ἅρμα, καὶ κατέ βησαν ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ ὅ τε Φίλιππος καὶ ὁ εὐνοῦχος, καὶ ἐβάπτισεν αὐτόν. 8.39. ὅτε δὲ ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἥρπασεν τὸν Φίλιππον, καὶ οὐκ εἶδεν αὐτὸν οὐκέτι ὁ εὐνοῦχος, ἐπορεύετο γὰρ τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ χαίρων. 8.40. Φίλιππος δὲ εὑρέθη εἰς Ἄζωτον, καὶ διερχόμενος εὐηγγελίζετο τὰς πόλεις πάσας ἕως τοῦ ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν εἰς Καισαρίαν. 9.1. Ὁ δὲ Σαῦλος, ἔτι ἐνπνέων ἀπειλῆς καὶ φόνου εἰς τοὺς μαθητὰς τοῦ κυρίου, 28.22. ἀξιοῦμεν δὲ παρὰ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ φρονεῖς, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης γνωστὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἀντιλέγεται. 28.26. λέγων 28.27.

2.4. They were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other languages, as the Spirit gave them the ability to speak. 8.26. But an angel of the Lord spoke to Philip, saying, "Arise, and go toward the south to the way that goes down from Jerusalem to Gaza. This is a desert." 8.27. He arose and went. Behold, there was a man of Ethiopia, a eunuch of great authority under Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, who was over all her treasure, who had come to Jerusalem to worship. 8.28. He was returning and sitting in his chariot, and was reading the prophet Isaiah. 8.29. The Spirit said to Philip, "Go near, and join yourself to this chariot." 8.30. Philip ran to him, and heard him reading Isaiah the prophet, and said, "Do you understand what you are reading?" 8.31. He said, "How can I, unless someone explains it to me?" He begged Philip to come up and sit with him. 8.32. Now the passage of the Scripture which he was reading was this, "He was led as a sheep to the slaughter. As a lamb before his shearer is silent, So he doesn't open his mouth. 8.33. In his humiliation, his judgment was taken away. Who will declare His generations? For his life is taken from the earth." 8.34. The eunuch answered Philip, "Please tell who the prophet is talking about: about himself, or about some other?" 8.35. Philip opened his mouth, and beginning from this Scripture, preached to him Jesus. 8.36. As they went on the way, they came to some water, and the eunuch said, "Behold, here is water. What is keeping me from being baptized?" 8.37. 8.38. He commanded the chariot to stand still, and they both went down into the water, both Philip and the eunuch, and he baptized him. 8.39. When they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught Philip away, and the eunuch didn't see him any more, for he went on his way rejoicing. 8.40. But Philip was found at Azotus. Passing through, he preached the gospel to all the cities, until he came to Caesarea. 9.1. But Saul, still breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, went to the high priest, 28.22. But we desire to hear from you what you think. For, as concerning this sect, it is known to us that everywhere it is spoken against." 28.26. saying, 'Go to this people, and say, In hearing, you will hear, And will in no way understand. In seeing, you will see, And will in no way perceive. 28.27. For this people's heart has grown callous. Their ears are dull of hearing. Their eyes they have closed. Lest they should see with their eyes, Hear with their ears, Understand with their heart, And would turn again, And I would heal them.'

143. New Testament, 1 Timothy, 2.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 264

2.4. ὃς πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν.

2.4. who desires all people to be saved and come to full knowledge of the truth.

144. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 1.3-1.5, 1.10, 2.3, 2.16, 3.12, 4.1, 4.9-4.10, 5.9, 5.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 154, 164, 183

1.3. ἀδιαλείπτως μνημονεύοντες ὑμῶν τοῦ ἔργου τῆς πίστεως καὶ τοῦ κόπου τῆς ἀγάπης καὶ τῆς ὑπομονῆς τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, 1.4. εἰδότες, ἀδελφοὶ ἠγαπημένοι ὑπὸ [τοῦ] θεοῦ, τὴν ἐκλογὴν ὑμῶν, 1.5. ὅτι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πληροφορίᾳ πολλῇ, καθὼς οἴδατε οἷοι ἐγενήθημεν ὑμῖν διʼ ὑμᾶς· 1.10. καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὃν ἤγειρεν ἐκ [τῶν] νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦν τὸν ῥυόμενον ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης. 2.3. ἡ γὰρ παράκλησις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ, 2.16. κωλυόντων ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἔθνεσιν λαλῆσαι ἵνα σωθῶσιν, εἰς τὸἀναπληρῶσαιαὐτῶντὰς ἁμαρτίαςπάντοτε. ἔφθασεν δὲ ἐπʼ αὐτοὺς ἡ ὀργὴ εἰς τέλος. 3.12. ὑμᾶς δὲ ὁ κύριος πλεονάσαι καὶ περισσεύσαι τῇ ἀγάπῃ εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ εἰς πάντας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς, 4.1. Λοιπὸν, ἀδελφοί, ἐρωτῶμεν ὑμᾶς καὶ παρακαλοῦ μεν ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ, [ἵνα] καθὼς παρελάβετε παρʼ ἡμῶν τὸ πῶς δεῖ ὑμᾶς περιπατεῖν καὶ ἀρέσκειν θεῷ, καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε,— ἵνα περισσεύητε μᾶλλον. 4.9. Περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾷν ἀλλήλους· 4.10. καὶ γὰρ ποιεῖτε αὐτὸ εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς [τοὺς] ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ. Παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, περισσεύειν μᾶλλον, 5.9. ὅτι οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ὀργὴν ἀλλὰ εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ [Χριστοῦ], 5.14. εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. Παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους, παραμυθεῖσθε τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους, ἀντέχεσθε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, μακροθυμεῖτε πρὸς πάντας.

1.3. remembering without ceasing your work of faith and labor of love and patience of hope in our Lord Jesus Christ, before our God and Father. 1.4. We know, brothers loved by God, that you are chosen, 1.5. and that our gospel came to you not in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Spirit, and with much assurance. You know what kind of men we showed ourselves to be among you for your sake. 1.10. and to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead -- Jesus, who delivers us from the wrath to come. 2.3. For our exhortation is not of error, nor of uncleanness, nor in deception. 2.16. forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they may be saved; to fill up their sins always. But wrath has come on them to the uttermost. 3.12. and the Lord make you to increase and abound in love one toward another, and toward all men, even as we also do toward you, 4.1. Finally then, brothers, we beg and exhort you in the Lord Jesus, that as you received from us how you ought to walk and to please God, that you abound more and more. 4.9. But concerning brotherly love, you have no need that one write to you. For you yourselves are taught by God to love one another, 4.10. for indeed you do it toward all the brothers who are in all Macedonia. But we exhort you, brothers, that you abound more and more; 5.9. For God didn't appoint us to wrath, but to the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, 5.14. We exhort you, brothers, admonish the disorderly, encourage the fainthearted, support the weak, be patient toward all.

145. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 163

14.2. ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν γλώσσῃ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις λαλεῖ ἀλλὰ θεῷ, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀκούει, πνεύματι δὲ λαλεῖ μυστήρια·

14.2. For he who speaks in anotherlanguage speaks not to men, but to God; for no one understands; but inthe Spirit he speaks mysteries.

146. Mishnah, Kilayim, 8.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humans, as embedded in nature •nature, humans embedded in Found in books: Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 106

8.6. "שׁוֹר בָּר, מִין בְּהֵמָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, מִין חַיָּה. כֶּלֶב, מִין חַיָּה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, מִין בְּהֵמָה. חֲזִיר, מִין בְּהֵמָה. עָרוֹד, מִין חַיָּה. הַפִּיל וְהַקּוֹף, מִין חַיָּה. וְאָדָם מֻתָּר עִם כֻּלָּם לִמְשֹׁךְ וְלַחֲרֹשׁ וּלְהַנְהִיג: \n",

8.6. "The wild ox [it is in the category of] behemah. But Rabbi Yose says: [it is in the category] of hayyah. The dog [it is in the category of] hayyah. But Rabbi Yose says: [it is in the category] of behemah. The pig [it is in the category of] behemah. The wild donkey [it is in the category of] hayyah. The elephant and the monkey [they are in the category of] hayyah. A human being is permitted to draw, plow, or lead with any of them.",

147. Mishnah, Avot, 3.14-3.15 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 68, 283

3.14. "הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, חָבִיב אָדָם שֶׁנִּבְרָא בְצֶלֶם. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לוֹ שֶׁנִּבְרָא בְצֶלֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית ט) כִּי בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת הָאָדָם. חֲבִיבִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בָנִים לַמָּקוֹם. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לָהֶם שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ בָנִים לַמָּקוֹם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יד) בָּנִים אַתֶּם לַה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם. חֲבִיבִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּתַּן לָהֶם כְּלִי חֶמְדָּה. חִבָּה יְתֵרָה נוֹדַעַת לָהֶם שֶׁנִּתַּן לָהֶם כְּלִי חֶמְדָּה שֶׁבּוֹ נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ד) כִּי לֶקַח טוֹב נָתַתִּי לָכֶם, תּוֹרָתִי אַל תַּעֲזֹבוּ:", 3.15. "הַכֹּל צָפוּי, וְהָרְשׁוּת נְתוּנָה, וּבְטוֹב הָעוֹלָם נִדּוֹן. וְהַכֹּל לְפִי רֹב הַמַּעֲשֶׂה:"

3.14. "He used to say:Beloved is man for he was created in the image [of God]. Especially beloved is he for it was made known to him that he had been created in the image [of God], as it is said: “for in the image of God He made man” (Genesis 9:6). Beloved are Israel in that they were called children to the All-Present. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that they are called children of the All-Present, as it is said: “your are children to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1). Beloved are Israel in that a precious vessel was given to them. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that the desirable instrument, with which the world had been created, was given to them, as it is said: “for I give you good instruction; forsake not my teaching” (Proverbs 4:2).", 3.15. "Everything is foreseen yet freedom of choice is granted, And the world is judged with goodness; And everything is in accordance with the preponderance of works."

148. New Testament, Luke, 1.28, 4.1-4.13, 10.25-10.37, 16.17, 23.43, 24.13-24.35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition •jerome, st, church father, christ's human nature •human, nature •nature, human •weakness, of human nature •humanity, nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 157; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 282; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 99, 118; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 289; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

1.28. καὶ εἰσελθὼν πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶπεν Χαῖρε, κεχαριτωμένη, ὁ κύριος μετὰ σοῦ. 4.1. Ἰησοῦς δὲ πλήρης πνεύματος ἁγίου ὑπέστρεψεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, καὶ ἤγετο ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ 4.2. ἡμέρας τεσσεράκοντα πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. Καὶ οὐκ ἔφαγεν οὐδὲν ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐκείναις, καὶ συντελεσθεισῶν αὐτῶν ἐπείνασεν. 4.3. εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ διάβολος Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὲ τῷ λίθῳ τούτῳ ἵνα γένηται ἄρτος. 4.4. καὶ ἀπεκρίθη πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰησοῦς Γέγραπται ὅτι Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 4.5. Καὶ ἀναγαγὼν αὐτὸν ἔδειξεν αὐτῷ πάσας τὰς βασιλείας τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐν στιγμῇ χρόνου· 4.6. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ διάβολος Σοὶ δώσω τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἅπασαν καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται καὶ ᾧ ἂν θέλω δίδωμι αὐτήν· 4.7. σὺ οὖν ἐὰν προσκυνήσῃς ἐνώπιον ἐμοῦ, ἔσται σοῦ πᾶσα. 4.8. καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτῷ Γέγραπται Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις. 4.9. Ἤγαγεν δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ ἔστησεν ἐπὶ τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ, καὶ εἶπεν [αὐτῷ] Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν ἐντεῦθεν κάτω· 4.10. γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σοῦ τοῦ διαφυλάξαι σε, 4.11. καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε μή ποτε προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου. 4.12. καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὅτι Εἴρηται 4.13. Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου. Καὶ συντελέσας πάντα πειρασμὸν ὁ διάβολος ἀπέστη ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ ἄχρι καιροῦ. 10.25. Καὶ ἰδοὺ νομικός τις ἀνέστη ἐκπειράζων αὐτὸν λέγων Διδάσκαλε, τί ποιήσας ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσω; 10.26. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν Ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τί γέγραπται; πῶς ἀναγινώσκεις; 10.27. ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν Ἀγαπήσεις Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας σου καὶ ἐν ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ἰσχύι σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου, καὶ τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν. 10.28. εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ Ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίθης· τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ. 10.29. Ὁ δὲ θέλων δικαιῶσαι ἑυντὸν εἶπεν πρὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν Καὶ τίς ἐστίν μου πλησίον; 10.30. ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν Ἄνθρωπός τις κατέβαινεν ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλὴμ εἰς Ἰερειχὼ καὶ λῃσταῖς περιέπεσεν, οἳ καὶ ἐκδύσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ πληγὰς ἐπιθέντες ἀπῆλθον ἀφέντες ἡμιθανῆ. 10.31. κατὰ συγκυρίαν δὲ ἱερεύς τις κατέβαινεν [ἐν] τῇ ὁδῷ ἐκείνῃ, καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἀντιπαρῆλθεν· 10.32. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λευείτης κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἐλθὼν καὶ ἰδὼν ἀντιπαρῆλθεν. 10.33. Σαμαρείτης δέ τις ὁδεύων ἦλθεν κατʼ αὐτὸν καὶ ἰδὼν ἐσπλαγχνίσθη, 10.34. καὶ προσελθὼν κατέδησεν τὰ τραύματα αὐτοῦ ἐπιχέων ἔλαιον καὶ οἶνον, ἐπιβιβάσας δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον κτῆνος ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν εἰς πανδοχεῖον καὶ ἐπεμελήθη αὐτοῦ. 10.35. καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὔριον ἐκβαλὼν δύο δηνάρια ἔδωκεν τῷ πανδοχεῖ καὶ εἶπεν Ἐπιμελήθητι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι ἂν προσδαπανήσῃς ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ ἐπανέρχεσθαί με ἀποδώσω σοι. 10.36. τίς τούτων τῶν τριῶν πλησίον δοκεῖ σοι γεγονέναι τοῦ ἐμπεσόντος εἰς τοὺς λῃστάς; 10.37. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν Ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔλεος μετʼ αὐτοῦ. εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς Πορεύου καὶ σὺ ποίει ὁμοίως. 16.17. Εὐκοπώτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν παρελθεῖν ἢ τοῦ νόμου μίαν κερέαν πεσεῖν. 23.43. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ἀμήν σοι λέγω, σήμερον μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ. 24.13. Καὶ ἰδοὺ δύο ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἦσαν πορευόμενοι εἰς κώμην ἀπέχουσαν σταδίους ἑξήκοντα ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλήμ, ᾗ ὄνομα Ἐμμαούς, 24.14. καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡμίλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ πάντων τῶν συμβεβηκότων τούτων. 24.15. καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ ὁμιλεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ συνζητεῖν [καὶ] αὐτὸς Ἰησοῦς ἐγγίσας συνεπορεύετο αὐτοῖς, 24.16. οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτῶν ἐκρατοῦντο τοῦ μὴ ἐπιγνῶναι αὐτόν. 24.17. εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς Τίνες οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οὓς ἀντιβάλλετε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περιπατοῦντες; καὶ ἐστάθησαν σκυθρωποί. 24.18. ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ εἷς ὀνόματι Κλεόπας εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν Σὺ μόνος παροικεῖς Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ οὐκ ἔγνως τὰ γενόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις; 24.19. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς Ποῖα; οἱ δὲ εἶπαν αὐτῷ Τὰ περὶ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Ναζαρηνοῦ, ὃς ἐγένετο ἀνὴρ προφήτης δυνατὸς ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ἐναντίον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ, 24.20. ὅπως τε παρέδωκαν αὐτὸν οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἡμῶν εἰς κρίμα θανάτου καὶ ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτόν. 24.21. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἠλπίζομεν ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ μέλλων λυτροῦσθαι τὸν Ἰσραήλ· ἀλλά γε καὶ σὺν πᾶσιν τούτοις τρίτην ταύτην ἡμέραν ἄγει ἀφʼ οὗ ταῦτα ἐγένετο. 24.22. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκές τινες ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξέστησαν ἡμᾶς, γενόμεναι ὀρθριναὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μνημεῖον 24.23. καὶ μὴ εὑροῦσαι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἦλθαν λέγουσαι καὶ ὀπτασίαν ἀγγέλων ἑωρακέναι, οἳ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν ζῇν. 24.24. καὶ ἀπῆλθάν τινες τῶν σὺν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὸ μνημεῖον, καὶ εὗρον οὕτως καθὼς αἱ γυναῖκες εἶπον, αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ εἶδον. 24.25. καὶ αὐτὸς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς Ὦ ἀνόητοι καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ πιστεύειν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἐλάλησαν οἱ προφῆται· 24.26. οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν χριστὸν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ; 24.27. καὶ ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ Μωυσέως καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προφητῶν διερμήνευσεν αὐτοῖς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς γραφαῖς τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. 24.28. Καὶ ἤγγισαν εἰς τὴν κώμην οὗ ἐπορεύοντο, καὶ αὐτὸς προσεποιήσατο πορρώτερον πορεύεσθαι. 24.29. καὶ παρεβιάσαντο αὐτὸν λέγοντες Μεῖνον μεθʼ ἡμῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἐστὶν καὶ κέκλικεν ἤδη ἡ ἡμέρα. καὶ εἰσῆλθεν τοῦ μεῖναι σὺν αὐτοῖς. 24.30. Καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ κατακλιθῆναι αὐτὸν μετʼ αὐτῶν λαβὼν τὸν ἄρτον εὐλόγησεν καὶ κλάσας ἐπεδίδου αὐτοῖς· 24.31. αὐτῶν δὲ διηνοίχθησαν οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ἐπέγνωσαν αὐτόν· καὶ αὐτὸς ἄφαντος ἐγένετο ἀπʼ αὐτῶν. 24.32. καὶ εἶπαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους Οὐχὶ ἡ καρδία ἡμῶν καιομένη ἦν ὡς ἐλάλει ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, ὡς διήνοιγεν ἡμῖν τὰς γραφάς; 24.33. Καὶ ἀναστάντες αὐτῇ τῇ ὥρᾳ ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, καὶ εὗρον ἠθροισμένους τοὺς ἕνδεκα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτοῖς, 24.34. λέγοντας ὅτι ὄντως ἠγέρθη ὁ κύριος καὶ ὤφθη Σίμωνι. 24.35. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξηγοῦντο τὰ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ καὶ ὡς ἐγνώσθη αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου.

1.28. Having come in, the angel said to her, "Rejoice, you highly favored one! The Lord is with you. Blessed are you among women!" 4.1. Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the wilderness 4.2. for forty days, being tempted by the devil. He ate nothing in those days. Afterward, when they were completed, he was hungry. 4.3. The devil said to him, "If you are the Son of God, command this stone to become bread." 4.4. Jesus answered him, saying, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God.'" 4.5. The devil, leading him up on a high mountain, showed him all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time. 4.6. The devil said to him, "I will give you all this authority, and their glory, for it has been delivered to me; and I give it to whomever I want. 4.7. If you therefore will worship before me, it will all be yours." 4.8. Jesus answered him, "Get behind me Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.'" 4.9. He led him to Jerusalem, and set him on the pinnacle of the temple, and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, cast yourself down from here, 4.10. for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge concerning you, to guard you;' 4.11. and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, Lest perhaps you dash your foot against a stone.'" 4.12. Jesus answering, said to him, "It has been said, 'You shall not tempt the Lord your God.'" 4.13. When the devil had completed every temptation, he departed from him until another time. 10.25. Behold, a certain lawyer stood up and tested him, saying, "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" 10.26. He said to him, "What is written in the law? How do you read it?" 10.27. He answered, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself." 10.28. He said to him, "You have answered correctly. Do this, and you will live." 10.29. But he, desiring to justify himself, asked Jesus, "Who is my neighbor?" 10.30. Jesus answered, "A certain man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who both stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. 10.31. By chance a certain priest was going down that way. When he saw him, he passed by on the other side. 10.32. In the same way a Levite also, when he came to the place, and saw him, passed by on the other side. 10.33. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was. When he saw him, he was moved with compassion, 10.34. came to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. He set him on his own animal, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. 10.35. On the next day, when he departed, he took out two denarii, and gave them to the host, and said to him, 'Take care of him. Whatever you spend beyond that, I will repay you when I return.' 10.36. Now which of these three do you think seemed to be a neighbor to him who fell among the robbers?" 10.37. He said, "He who showed mercy on him."Then Jesus said to him, "Go and do likewise." 16.17. But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one tiny stroke of a pen in the law to fall. 23.43. Jesus said to him, "Assuredly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise." 24.13. Behold, two of them were going that very day to a village named Emmaus, which was sixty stadia from Jerusalem. 24.14. They talked with each other about all of these things which had happened. 24.15. It happened, while they talked and questioned together, that Jesus himself came near, and went with them. 24.16. But their eyes were kept from recognizing him. 24.17. He said to them, "What are you talking about as you walk, and are sad?" 24.18. One of them, named Cleopas, answered him, "Are you the only stranger in Jerusalem who doesn't know the things which have happened there in these days?" 24.19. He said to them, "What things?"They said to him, "The things concerning Jesus, the Nazarene, who was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people; 24.20. and how the chief priests and our rulers delivered him up to be condemned to death, and crucified him. 24.21. But we were hoping that it was he who would redeem Israel. Yes, and besides all this, it is now the third day since these things happened. 24.22. Also, certain women of our company amazed us, having arrived early at the tomb; 24.23. and when they didn't find his body, they came saying that they had also seen a vision of angels, who said that he was alive. 24.24. Some of us went to the tomb, and found it just like the women had said, but they didn't see him." 24.25. He said to them, "Foolish men, and slow of heart to believe in all that the prophets have spoken! 24.26. Didn't the Christ have to suffer these things and to enter into his glory?" 24.27. Beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he explained to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself. 24.28. They drew near to the village, where they were going, and he acted like he would go further. 24.29. They urged him, saying, "Stay with us, for it is almost evening, and the day is almost over."He went in to stay with them. 24.30. It happened, that when he had sat down at the table with them, he took the bread and gave thanks. Breaking it, he gave to them. 24.31. Their eyes were opened, and they recognized him, and he vanished out of their sight. 24.32. They said one to another, "Weren't our hearts burning within us, while he spoke to us along the way, and while he opened the Scriptures to us?" 24.33. Rising rose up that very hour, they returned to Jerusalem, and found the eleven gathered together, and those who were with them, 24.34. saying, "The Lord is risen indeed, and has appeared to Simon!" 24.35. They related the things that happened along the way, and how he was recognized by them in the breaking of the bread.

149. New Testament, Mark, 1.12-1.13, 9.1, 10.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •jerome, st, church father, christ's human nature •human being, views of, dual nature of •human nature, human condition Found in books: Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 41; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 306; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

1.12. Καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν ἐκβάλλει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον. 1.13. καὶ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρας πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ, καὶ ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων, καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 9.1. καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι εἰσίν τινες ὧδε τῶν ἑστηκότων οἵτινες οὐ μὴ γεύσωνται θανάτου ἕως ἂν ἴδωσιν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐληλυθυῖαν ἐν δυνάμει. 10.14. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἠγανάκτησεν καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς Ἄφετε τὰ παιδία ἔρχεσθαι πρός με, μὴ κωλύετε αὐτά, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.

1.12. Immediately the Spirit drove him out into the wilderness. 1.13. He was there in the wilderness forty days tempted by Satan. He was with the wild animals; and the angels ministered to him. 9.1. He said to them, "Most assuredly I tell you, there are some standing here who will in no way taste death, until they see the Kingdom of God come with power." 10.14. But when Jesus saw it, he was moved with indignation, and said to them, "Allow the little children to come to me! Don't forbid them, for the Kingdom of God belongs to such as these.

150. New Testament, Matthew, 4.1-4.11, 13.14-13.15, 17.24-17.27, 18.10, 19.5-19.6, 26.37 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •jerome, st, church father, christ's human nature •nature, human •human nature, human condition •weakness, of human nature •diadochus, bishopof photice, christ's human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 235, 321; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 351, 353

4.1. Τότε [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς ἀνήχθη εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. 4.2. καὶ νηστεύσας ἡμέρας τεσσεράκοντα καὶ νύκτας τεσσεράκοντα ὕστερον ἐπείνασεν. 4.3. Καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ πειράζων εἶπεν αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὸν ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται. 4.4. ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν Γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ. 4.5. Τότε παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν, καὶ ἔστησεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ, 4.6. καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν κάτω· γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι Τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε, μή ποτε προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου. 4.7. ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Πάλιν γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου. 4.8. Πάλιν παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν λίαν, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ πάσας τὰς βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, 4.9. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ταῦτά σοι πάντα δώσω ἐὰν πεσὼν προσκυνήσῃς μοι. 4.10. τότε λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ὕπαγε, Σατανᾶ· γέγραπται γάρ Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις. 4.11. Τότε ἀφίησιν αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄγγελοι προσῆλθον καὶ διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 13.14. καὶ ἀναπληροῦται αὐτοῖς ἡ προφητεία Ἠσαίου ἡ λέγουσα Ἀκοῇ ἀκούσετε καὶ οὐ μὴ συνῆτε, καὶ βλέποντες βλέψετε καὶ οὐ μὴ ἴδητε. 13.15. ἐπαχύνθη γὰρ ἡ καρδία τοῦ λαοῦ τούτου, καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν βαρέως ἤκουσαν, καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἐκάμμυσαν· μή ποτε ἴδωσιν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀκούσωσιν καὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ συνῶσιν καὶ ἐπιστρέψωσιν, καὶ ἰάσομαι αὐτούς. 17.24. Ἐλθόντων δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ προσῆλθον οἱ τὰ δίδραχμα λαμβάνοντες τῷ Πέτρῳ καὶ εἶπαν Ὁ διδάσκαλος ὑμῶν οὐ τελεῖ τὰ δίδραχμα; 17.25. λέγει Ναί. καὶ ἐλθόντα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν προέφθασεν αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγων Τί σοι δοκεῖ, Σίμων; οἱ βασιλεῖς τῆς γῆς ἀπὸ τίνων λαμβάνουσιν τέλη ἢ κῆνσον; ἀπὸ τῶν υἱῶν αὐτῶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; 17.26. εἰπόντος δέ Ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ἄραγε ἐλεύθεροί εἰσιν οἱ υἱοί· 17.27. ἵνα δὲ μὴ σκανδαλίσωμεν αὐτούς, πορευθεὶς εἰς θάλασσαν βάλε ἄγκιστρον καὶ τὸν ἀναβάντα πρῶτον ἰχθὺν ἆρον, καὶ ἀνοίξας τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ εὑρήσεις στατῆρα· ἐκεῖνον λαβὼν δὸς αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ. 18.10. Ὁρᾶτε μὴ καταφρονήσητε ἑνὸς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων, λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς διὰ παντὸς βλέπουσι τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς. 19.5. καὶ εἶπεν Ἕνεκα τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ κολληθήσεται τῇ γυναικὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν; 19.6. ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ σὰρξ μία· ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς συνέζευξεν ἄνθρωπος μὴ χωριζέτω. 26.37. καὶ παραλαβὼν τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς δύο υἱοὺς Ζεβεδαίου ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν.

4.1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil. 4.2. When he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was hungry afterward. 4.3. The tempter came and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread." 4.4. But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God.'" 4.5. Then the devil took him into the holy city. He set him on the pinnacle of the temple, 4.6. and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge concerning you.' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, So that you don't dash your foot against a stone.'" 4.7. Jesus said to him, "Again, it is written, 'You shall not test the Lord, your God.'" 4.8. Again, the devil took him to an exceedingly high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and their glory. 4.9. He said to him, "I will give you all of these things, if you will fall down and worship me." 4.10. Then Jesus said to him, "Get behind me, Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.'" 4.11. Then the devil left him, and behold, angels came and ministered to him. 13.14. In them the prophecy of Isaiah is fulfilled, which says, 'By hearing you will hear, And will in no way understand; Seeing you will see, And will in no way perceive: 13.15. For this people's heart has grown callous, Their ears are dull of hearing, They have closed their eyes; Or else perhaps they might perceive with their eyes, Hear with their ears, Understand with their heart, And should turn again; And I would heal them.' 17.24. When they had come to Capernaum, those who collected the didrachmas came to Peter, and said, "Doesn't your teacher pay the didrachma?" 17.25. He said, "Yes."When he came into the house, Jesus anticipated him, saying, "What do you think, Simon? From whom do the kings of the earth receive toll or tribute? From their sons, or from strangers?" 17.26. Peter said to him, "From strangers."Jesus said to him, "Therefore the sons are exempt. 17.27. But, lest we cause them to stumble, go to the sea, and cast a hook, and take up the first fish that comes up. When you have opened its mouth, you will find a stater. Take that, and give it to them for me and you." 18.10. See that you don't despise one of these little ones, for I tell you that in heaven their angels always see the face of my Father who is in heaven. 19.5. and said, 'For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall join to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh?' 19.6. So that they are no more two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, don't let man tear apart." 26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled.

151. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 141

152. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 8.5, 13.171, 18.11-18.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 193, 210, 269

8.5. but he desired her to be a means of obtaining a favor from his brother to him, and to persuade him to bestow on him in marriage Abishag, who had indeed slept by his father, but, because his father was too old, he did not lie with her, and she was still a virgin. 13.171. 9. At this time there were three sects among the Jews, who had different opinions concerning human actions; the one was called the sect of the Pharisees, another the sect of the Sadducees, and the other the sect of the Essenes. 18.11. 2. The Jews had for a great while had three sects of philosophy peculiar to themselves; the sect of the Essenes, and the sect of the Sadducees, and the third sort of opinions was that of those called Pharisees; of which sects, although I have already spoken in the second book of the Jewish War, yet will I a little touch upon them now. 18.12. 3. Now, for the Pharisees, they live meanly, and despise delicacies in diet; and they follow the conduct of reason; and what that prescribes to them as good for them they do; and they think they ought earnestly to strive to observe reason’s dictates for practice. They also pay a respect to such as are in years; nor are they so bold as to contradict them in any thing which they have introduced; 18.13. and when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament, whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. 18.14. They also believe that souls have an immortal rigor in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards or punishments, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again; 18.15. on account of which doctrines they are able greatly to persuade the body of the people; and whatsoever they do about divine worship, prayers, and sacrifices, they perform them according to their direction; insomuch that the cities give great attestations to them on account of their entire virtuous conduct, both in the actions of their lives and their discourses also. 18.16. 4. But the doctrine of the Sadducees is this: That souls die with the bodies; nor do they regard the observation of any thing besides what the law enjoins them; for they think it an instance of virtue to dispute with those teachers of philosophy whom they frequent: 18.17. but this doctrine is received but by a few, yet by those still of the greatest dignity. But they are able to do almost nothing of themselves; for when they become magistrates, as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to be, they addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees, because the multitude would not otherwise bear them. 18.18. 5. The doctrine of the Essenes is this: That all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for;

153. New Testament, John, 1.2-1.5, 1.14, 3.8, 4.46-4.54, 9.2-9.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human •human nature, human condition •human being, views of, dual nature of Found in books: Dunderberg (2008), Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus. 145; Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 235; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 206, 322, 328; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 129

1.2. Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. 1.3. πάντα διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν. 1.4. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· 1.5. καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν. 1.14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔ 3.8. τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ, καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει· οὕτως ἐστὶν πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος. 4.46. Ἦλθεν οὖν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Κανὰ τῆς Γαλιλαίας, ὅπου ἐποίησεν τὸ ὕδωρ οἶνον. Καὶ ἦν τις βασιλικὸς οὗ ὁ υἱὸς ἠσθένει ἐν Καφαρναούμ· 4.47. οὗτος ἀκούσας ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἥκει ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν ἀπῆλθεν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτα ἵνα καταβῇ καὶ ἰάσηται αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱόν, ἤμελλεν γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν. 4.48. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἰησοῦς πρὸς αὐτόν Ἐὰν μὴ σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα ἴδητε, οὐ μὴ πιστεύσητε. 4.49. λέγει πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ βασιλικός Κύριε, κατάβηθι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν τὸ παιδίον μου. 4.50. λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Πορεύου· ὁ υἱός σου ζῇ. ἐπίστευσεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ λόγῳ ὃν εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἐπορεύετο. 4.51. ἤδη δὲ αὐτοῦ καταβαίνοντος οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ ὑπήντησαν αὐτῷ λέγοντες ὅτι ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ ζῇ. 4.52. ἐπύθετο οὖν τὴν ὥραν παρʼ αὐτῶν ἐν ᾗ κομψότερον ἔσχεν· εἶπαν οὖν αὐτῷ ὅτι Ἐχθὲς ὥραν ἑβδόμην ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν ὁ πυρετός. 4.53. ἔγνω οὖν ὁ πατὴρ ὅτι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐν ᾗ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ὁ υἱός σου ζῇ, καὶ ἐπίστευσεν αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ οἰκία αὐτοῦ ὅλη. 4.54. Τοῦτο [δὲ] πάλιν δεύτερον σημεῖον ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐλθὼν ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν. 9.2. καὶ ἠρώτησαν αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες Ῥαββεί, τίς ἥμαρτεν, οὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῇ; 9.3. ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς Οὔτε οὗτος ἥμαρτεν οὔτε οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα φανερωθῇ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ.

1.2. The same was in the beginning with God. 1.3. All things were made through him. Without him was not anything made that has been made. 1.4. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. 1.5. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness hasn't overcome it. 1.14. The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth. 3.8. The wind blows where it wants to, and you hear its sound, but don't know where it comes from and where it is going. So is everyone who is born of the Spirit." 4.46. Jesus came therefore again to Cana of Galilee, where he made the water into wine. There was a certain nobleman whose son was sick at Capernaum. 4.47. When he heard that Jesus had come out of Judea into Galilee, he went to him, and begged him that he would come down and heal his son, for he was at the point of death. 4.48. Jesus therefore said to him, "Unless you see signs and wonders, you will in no way believe." 4.49. The nobleman said to him, "Sir, come down before my child dies." 4.50. Jesus said to him, "Go your way. Your son lives." The man believed the word that Jesus spoke to him, and he went his way. 4.51. As he was now going down, his servants met him and reported, saying "Your child lives!" 4.52. So he inquired of them the hour when he began to get better. They said therefore to him, "Yesterday at the seventh hour, the fever left him." 4.53. So the father knew that it was at that hour in which Jesus said to him, "Your son lives." He believed, as did his whole house. 4.54. This is again the second sign that Jesus did, having come out of Judea into Galilee. 9.2. His disciples asked him, "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" 9.3. Jesus answered, "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents; but, that the works of God might be revealed in him.

154. New Testament, Apocalypse, 22.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 158

22.4. καὶὄψονται τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ,καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὰὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν μετώπων αὐτῶν.

22.4. They will see his face, and his name will be on their foreheads.

155. New Testament, Romans, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 159

8.29. ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς·

8.29. For whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers.

156. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.4.2, 2.5.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, and capacity for emotions •human nature, compared with animals Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 99, 123

157. Ptolemy, Astrological Influences, None (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 149

158. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 1.16, 1.16.7, 2.59, 3.17-3.18, 6.1-6.3, 6.32, 7.31-7.32, 7.31.1-7.31.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, capacity for vice encoded in human nature Found in books: Williams (2012), The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca's 'Natural Questions', 87, 88

159. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 6.1-6.3, 7.3, 23.6, 41.8, 53.2-53.6, 54.1-54.5, 71.29, 92.30, 94.53-94.54, 104.5, 115.8-115.14, 117.13, 118.7-118.11, 118.15-118.16, 120.4, 121.14, 123.1, 123.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 128; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 100, 101, 173, 247, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 242, 352, 373; Williams (2012), The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca's 'Natural Questions', 87

160. Theon Aelius, Exercises, 8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 132

161. Tosefta, Kilayim, 1.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humans, as embedded in nature •nature, humans embedded in Found in books: Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 106

1.9. "הנותן מינה של תורמוס בצד מינה של דלעת כדי שתבקע [הארץ] מפניה חייב הזורע דבר המצמיח על גבי בצים ועל גבי חילת חייב על גבי סלע ועל גבי אמת המים פטור [ודבר שאין מצמיח בין ע\"ג בצים בין ע\"ג חילת בין ע\"ג סלע ובין ע\"ג אמת המים פטור].",

162. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 22 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 359

163. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 1.6.11-1.6.12, 1.18.1-1.18.2, 1.20.15-1.20.16, 1.27.10, 1.28.12-1.28.13, 3.2.1, 3.3.2, 3.24.17-3.24.19, 4.4.29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •nature, human Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 26; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 244, 345, 382, 385, 386, 387

164. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan

165. Artemidorus, Oneirocritica, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

166. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 72

167. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 2.4.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 65

168. Theophilus, To Autolycus, 2.17, 2.24-2.27 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 59, 60, 65, 77, 99, 117

2.17. And on the sixth day, God having made the quadrupeds, and wild beasts, and the land reptiles, pronounced no blessing upon them, reserving His blessing for man, whom He was about to create on the sixth day. The quadrupeds, too, and wild beasts, were made for a type of some men, who neither know nor worship God, but mind earthly things, and repent not. For those who turn from their iniquities and live righteously, in spirit fly upwards like birds, and mind the things that are above, and are well-pleasing to the will of God. But those who do not know nor worship God, are like birds which have wings, but cannot fly nor soar to the high things of God. Thus, too, though such persons are called men, yet being pressed down with sins, they mind grovelling and earthly things. And the animals are named wild beasts [θηρία], from their being hunted [θηρεύεσθαι], not as if they had been made evil or venomous from the first - for nothing was made evil by God, but all things good, yea, very good - but the sin in which man was concerned brought evil upon them. For when man transgressed, they also transgressed with him. For as, if the master of the house himself acts rightly, the domestics also of necessity conduct themselves well; but if the master sins, the servants also sin with him; so in like manner it came to pass, that in the case of man's sin, he being master, all that was subject to him sinned with him. When, therefore, man again shall have made his way back to his natural condition, and no longer does evil, those also shall be restored to their original gentleness. 2.24. God, then, caused to spring out of the earth every tree that is beautiful in appearance, or good for food. For at first there were only those things which were produced on the third day - plants, and seeds, and herbs; but the things which were in Paradise were made of a superior loveliness and beauty, since in it the plants were said to have been planted by God. As to the rest of the plants, indeed, the world contained plants like them; but the two trees - the tree of life and the tree of knowledge - the rest of the earth possessed not, but only Paradise. And that Paradise is earth, and is planted on the earth, the Scripture states, saying: Genesis 2:8 And the Lord God planted Paradise in Eden eastwards, and placed man there; and out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. By the expressions, therefore, out of the ground, and eastwards, the holy writing clearly teaches us that Paradise is under this heaven, under which the east and the earth are. And the Hebrew word Eden signifies delight. And it was signified that a river flowed out of Eden to water Paradise, and after that divides into four heads; of which the two called Pison and Gihon water the eastern parts, especially Gihon, which encompasses the whole land of Ethiopia, and which, they say, reappears in Egypt under the name of Nile. And the other two rivers are manifestly recognisable by us - those called Tigris and Euphrates - for these border on our own regions. And God having placed man in Paradise, as has been said, to till and keep it, commanded him to eat of all the trees - manifestly of the tree of life also; but only of the tree of knowledge He commanded him not to taste. And God transferred him from the earth, out of which he had been produced, into Paradise, giving him means of advancement, in order that, maturing and becoming perfect, and being even declared a god, he might thus ascend into heaven in possession of immortality. For man had been made a middle nature, neither wholly mortal, nor altogether immortal, but capable of either; so also the place, Paradise, was made in respect of beauty intermediate between earth and heaven. And by the expression, till it, no other kind of labour is implied than the observance of God's command, lest, disobeying, he should destroy himself, as indeed he did destroy himself, by sin. 2.25. The tree of knowledge itself was good, and its fruit was good. For it was not the tree, as some think, but the disobedience, which had death in it. For there was nothing else in the fruit than only knowledge; but knowledge is good when one uses it discreetly. But Adam, being yet an infant in age, was on this account as yet unable to receive knowledge worthily. For now, also, when a child is born it is not at once able to eat bread, but is nourished first with milk, and then, with the increment of years, it advances to solid food. Thus, too, would it have been with Adam; for not as one who grudged him, as some suppose, did God command him not to eat of knowledge. But He wished also to make proof of him, whether he was submissive to His commandment. And at the same time He wished man, infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and sincere. For this is holy, not only with God, but also with men, that in simplicity and guilelessness subjection be yielded to parents. But if it is right that children be subject to parents, how much more to the God and Father of all things? Besides, it is unseemly that children in infancy be wise beyond their years; for as in stature one increases in an orderly progress, so also in wisdom. But as when a law has commanded abstinence from anything, and some one has not obeyed, it is obviously not the law which causes punishment, but the disobedience and transgression;- for a father sometimes enjoins on his own child abstinence from certain things, and when he does not obey the paternal order, he is flogged and punished on account of the disobedience; and in this case the actions themselves are not the [cause of] stripes, but the disobedience procures punishment for him who disobeys - so also for the first man, disobedience procured his expulsion from Paradise. Not, therefore, as if there were any evil in the tree of knowledge; but from his disobedience did man draw, as from a fountain, labour, pain, grief, and at last fall a prey to death. 2.26. And God showed great kindness to man in this, that He did not allow him to remain in sin for ever; but, as it were, by a kind of banishment, cast him out of Paradise, in order that, having by punishment expiated, within an appointed time, the sin, and having been disciplined, he should afterwards be restored. Wherefore also, when man had been formed in this world, it is mystically written in Genesis, as if he had been twice placed in Paradise; so that the one was fulfilled when he was placed there, and the second will be fulfilled after the resurrection and judgment. For just as a vessel, when on being fashioned it has some flaw, is remoulded or remade, that it may become new and entire; so also it happens to man by death. For somehow or other he is broken up, that he may rise in the resurrection whole; I mean spotless, and righteous, and immortal. And as to God's calling, and saying, Where are you, Adam? God did this, not as if ignorant of this; but, being long-suffering, He gave him an opportunity of repentance and confession. 2.27. But some one will say to us, Was man made by nature mortal? Certainly not. Was he, then, immortal? Neither do we affirm this. But one will say, Was he, then, nothing? Not even this hits the mark. He was by nature neither mortal nor immortal. For if He had made him immortal from the beginning, He would have made him God. Again, if He had made him mortal, God would seem to be the cause of his death. Neither, then, immortal nor yet mortal did He make him, but, as we have said above, capable of both; so that if he should incline to the things of immortality, keeping the commandment of God, he should receive as reward from Him immortality, and should become God; but if, on the other hand, he should turn to the things of death, disobeying God, he should himself be the cause of death to himself. For God made man free, and with power over himself. That, then, which man brought upon himself through carelessness and disobedience, this God now vouchsafes to him as a gift through His own philanthropy and pity, when men obey Him. For as man, disobeying, drew death upon himself; so, obeying the will of God, he who desires is able to procure for himself life everlasting. For God has given us a law and holy commandments; and every one who keeps these can be saved, and, obtaining the resurrection, can inherit incorruption.

169. Hierocles Stoicus, , 1.34-1.39 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 51

170. Apuleius, On Plato, 1.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •origins, made by god, nature, or humans (calcidius) Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 181

171. Tertullian, On The Soul, 38 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 117

172. Hierocles Stoicus, Fragments, 6.23-6.53 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 352

173. Aelian, Varia Historia, 4.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •irrational impulses, and human nature Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 128

174. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126

175. Irenaeus, Demonstration of The Apostolic Teaching, 11-14, 16-18, 15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 190; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 125

176. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.258, 8.275-8.276, 8.284-8.285, 11.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 63, 72, 245

177. Palestinian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 3 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human nature Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 108

178. Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation To The Greeks, 11.111.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 190

179. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 3.89.1, 3.94.3, 3.98.5, 3.100.5, 3.103.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of •human nature, human condition Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41, 190, 194; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 306

180. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 17.188.15, 35.207 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of humans •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 248; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 245

181. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, innate orientations Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 247

182. Nag Hammadi, The Apocryphon of John, 2.19.25-10.19, 2.110.21, 2.110.20, 2.110.19, 2.113.8, 2.113.9, 2.113.26, 2.113.27, 2.113.28, 2.122.28-23.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 126

183. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 44.2.1-44.2.4, 47.39.1-47.39.5, 50.1.1, 52.19-52.30, 52.31.5-52.31.10, 52.32, 52.34.1, 53.2.6, 53.11.5, 53.19.1, 55.14.4-55.14.8, 55.15.1, 55.15.3, 55.16.3-55.16.6, 55.22.2, 56.44.1-56.44.2, 56.45.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •codex vaticanus graecus, human nature, view of Found in books: Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 15, 65, 69, 71, 74, 75

44.2.1. Democracy, indeed, has a fair-appearing name and conveys the impression of bringing equal rights to all through equal laws, but its results are seen not to agree at all with its title. Monarchy, on the contrary, has an unpleasant sound, but is a most practical form of government to live under. For it is easier to find a single excellent man than many of them, 44.2.2. and if even this seems to some a difficult feat, it is quite inevitable that the other alternative should be acknowledged to be impossible; for it does not belong to the majority of men to acquire virtue. And again, even though a base man should obtain supreme power, yet he is preferable to the masses of like character, as the history of the Greeks and barbarians and of the Romans themselves proves. 44.2.3. For successes have always been greater and more frequent in the case both of cities and of individuals under kings than under popular rule, and disasters do not happen so frequently under monarchies as under mob-rule. Indeed, if ever there has been a prosperous democracy, it has in any case been at its best for only a brief period, so long, that is, as the people had neither the numbers nor the strength sufficient to cause insolence to spring up among them as the result of good fortune or jealousy as the result of ambition. 44.2.4. But for a city, not only so large in itself, but also ruling the finest and the greatest part of the known world, holding sway over men of many and diverse natures, possessing many men of great wealth, occupied with every imaginable pursuit, enjoying every imaginable fortune, both individually and collectively, â for such a city, I say, to practise moderation under a democracy is impossible, and still more is it impossible for the people, unless moderation prevails, to be harmonious. 47.39.1. That this struggle proved tremendous and surpassed all previous civil conflicts of the Romans would be naturally surmised, â not that it was greater than they in either the number of the combatants or as regards their valour, since far larger masses and braver men than they had fought on many fields, but because now as never before liberty and popular government were the issues of the struggle. For though they again came to blows with one another just as they had done previously, 47.39.2. yet these later struggles were for the purpose of finding out what master they should obey, whereas on the present occasion the one side was trying to lead them to autocracy, the other side to self-government. Hence the people never attained again to absolute freedom of speech, even though vanquished by no foreign nation 47.39.3. (the subject and the allied forces then present with them were of course merely a kind of complement of the citizen army); but the people at one and the same time triumphed over and were vanquished by themselves, defeated themselves and were defeated, and consequently they exhausted the democratic element and strengthened the monarchical. 47.39.4. And yet I do not say that it was not beneficial for the people to be defeated at that time â what else, indeed, can one say regarding the contestants on both sides than that the vanquished were Romans and that the victor was Caesar! â for they were no longer capable of maintaining harmony in the established form of government. 47.39.5. It is, of course, impossible for an unadulterated democracy that has grown to so proud an empire to exercise moderation; and so they would later on have undertaken many similar conflicts one after another, and some day would certainly have been either enslaved or ruined. 50.1.1. The Roman people had been robbed of their democratic form of government, but had not become a monarchy in the strict sense of the term; Antony and Caesar still controlled affairs on an equal footing, having divided by lot most of the functions of government between them, and though nominally they considered all the rest as belonging to them in common, in reality they were trying to appropriate it to themselves, according as either of them was able to seize any advantage over the other. 52.19. 1. "I maintain, therefore, that you ought first and foremost to choose and select with discrimination the entire senatorial body, inasmuch as some who have not been fit have, on account of our dissensions, become senators. Such of them as possess any excellence you ought to retain, but the rest you should erase from the roll.,2. Do not, however, get rid of any good man because of his poverty, but even give him the money he requires. In the place of those who have been dropped introduce the noblest, the best, and the richest men obtainable, selecting them not only from Italy but also from the allies and the subject nations.,3. In this way you will have many assistants for yourself and will have in safe keeping the leading men from all the provinces; thus the provinces, having no leaders of established repute, will not begin rebellions, and their prominent men will regard you with affection because they have been made sharers in your empire.,4. "Take these same measures in the case of the knights also, by enrolling in the equestrian order such men as hold second place in their several districts as regards birth, excellence and wealth. Register as many new members in both classes as you please, without being over particular on the score of their number. For the more men of repute you have as your associates, the easier you will find it, for your own part, to administer everything in time of need and,,5. so far as your subjects are concerned, the more easily will you persuade them that you are not treating them as slaves or as in any way inferior to us, but that you are sharing with them, not only all the other advantages which we ourselves enjoy, but also the chief magistracy as well, and thus make them as devoted to that office as if it were their own.,6. And so far am I from retracting this last statement as rashly made, that I declare that the citizens ought every one actually to be given a share in the government, in order that, being on an equality with us in this respect also, they may be our faithful allies, living as it were in a single city, namely our own, and considering that this is in very truth a city, whereas their own homes are but the countryside and villages. "But regarding this matter we shall at a later time examine more carefully the question of what measures should be taken to prevent our granting the people every privilege at once. 52.20. 1. As for the matter of eligibility for office, now, we should put men on the roll of knights when they are eighteen years old, for at that age their physical soundness and their mental fitness can best be discerned; but we should not enrol them in the senate until they are twenty-five years old. For is it not disgraceful, and indeed hazardous, to entrust the public business to men younger than this, when we never commit our private affairs to any one before he has reached this age?,2. After they have served as quaestors and aediles or tribunes, let them be praetors when they reach the age of thirty. For it is my opinion that these offices, and that of consul, are the only ones at home which you ought to fill by election, and these merely out of regard for the institutions of our fathers and to avoid the appearance of making a complete change in the constitution.,3. But make all the appointments yourself and do not any longer commit the filling of one or another of these offices either to the plebs or to the people, for they will quarrel over them, or to the senate, for the senators will use them to further their own private ambitions. And do not maintain the traditional powers of these offices, either, for fear history may repeat itself, but preserve the honour attaching to them, at the same time abating their influence to such an extent that, although you will be depriving the office of none of its prestige, you will still be giving no opportunity to those who may desire to stir up a rebellion.,4. Now this will be accomplished if you assign them on appointment chiefly to home affairs and do not permit any of them to have armed forces during their term of office or immediately afterward, but only after the lapse of some time, as much as you think sufficient in each instance. In this way they will never be put in command of legions while still enjoying the prestige of their official titles and thus be led to stir up rebellions, and after they have been private citizens for a time they will be of milder disposition.,5. Let these magistrates conduct such of the festivals as naturally belong to their office, and let them severally sit as judges in all kinds of cases except homicide during their tenure of office in Rome. Courts should be established, to be sure, with the other senators and knights as members, but final authority should rest with these magistrates. 52.21. 1. "As for the prefect of the city, men should be appointed to that office who are leading citizens and have previously passed through the appropriate offices; it should be the prefect's duty, not to govern merely when the consuls are out of town,,2. but in general to be at all times in charge of the affairs of the city, and to decide the cases which come to him from all the other magistrates I have mentioned, whether on appeal or for review, together with those which involve the death penalty; and his jurisdiction should extend, not only to those who live in the city, except such as I shall name, but also to those who dwell outside the city for a distance of one hundred miles.,3. "Let still another magistrate be chosen, this man also from the class described, whose duties shall be to pass upon and supervise all matters pertaining to the families, property, and morals both of the senators and of the knights, alike of the men and of their wives and children.,4. He should personally correct such behaviour as deserves no punishment, yet if neglected becomes the cause of many evils; but above the more important matters of misconduct he should confer with you. For the officer to whom these duties are assigned should be a senator, and in fact the best one after the prefect of the city, rather than one of the knights.,5. As for the title of his office, he would naturally receive one derived from your censorial functions (for it is certainly appropriate that you should be in charge of the censuses), and be called sub-censor. Let these two, the city prefect and the sub-censor, hold office for life, unless one of them becomes demoralized in some way or is incapacitated by sickness or old age.,6. For no harm could result from their holding office for life, since the one would be entirely without armed forces and the other would have but few soldiers and would be acting for the most part under your eyes;,7. whereas the effect of the yearly tenure would be that they would shrink from offending any one and would be afraid to act with energy, since they would be looking ahead to their own retirement to private life and to the exercise of the power of the office by others. They should also draw a salary, not only to compensate them for the loss of their leisure but also to enhance the prestige of their office.,8. "This is the opinion I have to give you in regard to these officials. As for those who have served as praetors, let them hold some office among the subject nations (before they have been praetors I do not think they should have this privilege, but they ought first to serve for one or two terms as lieutets to the ex-praetors just mentioned); then they should next hold office as consuls, provided that they have proved satisfactory officials to the end of their terms, and after that they should receive the more important governorships. 52.22. 1. I advise you, namely, to arrange these positions as follows. Take Italy as a whole (I mean the part of it which is more than one hundred miles from the city), and all the rest of the territory which owns our sway, the islands and the continents, and divide it into districts, in each case according to races and nations, and take also all the cities that are strong and independent enough to be ruled by one governor with full powers.,2. Then station soldiers in them and send out as governor to each district or independent city one of the ex-consuls, who shall have general charge, and two of the ex-praetors. One of the latter, fresh from the city, should be put in charge of all matters pertaining to persons in private life and of the commissary; the other, a man who has had special training for this work, will administer the public business of the cities and will have command of the soldiers, except in cases that involve disfranchisement or death.,3. Such cases, of course, should be referred to the ex-consul who is governor, and to him alone, except where the persons involved are centurions recruited from the levies or private persons of prominence in their respective communities; as for both these classes, do not allow anybody but yourself to punish them, lest they come to fear some of these officials to such an extent as to take measures, on occasion, against you as well as against them.,4. As for my suggestion that the second of the ex-praetors should be put in charge of the soldiers, it is to be understood as follows: if only a small body of troops is serving abroad in the military posts or at home in a single post, my proposal is satisfactory; but if two citizen legions are wintering in the same province (and more than this number I should not advise you to trust to one commander),,5. it will no doubt be necessary for both the ex-praetors to hold the command over them, each having charge of one, and for each to have his share of authority similarly in matters affecting either the state or private citizens. Let the ex-consul, accordingly, have these duties, and let him also decide the cases which come to him on appeal and those which are referred to him by the praetors for review.,6. And do not be surprised that I recommend to you the dividing of Italy also into these administrative districts. It is large and populous, and so cannot possibly be well administered by the magistrates in the city; for a governor ought always to be present in the district he governs, and no duties should be laid upon our city magistrates which they cannot perform. 52.23. 1. "Let all these men to whom the commands outside the city are assigned receive salaries, the more important officers more, the less important less, and those between an intermediate amount. For they cannot live in a foreign land upon their own resources, nor should they indulge, as they do now, in unlimited and indefinite expenditure.,2. They should hold office not less than three years, unless they are guilty of misconduct, nor more than five. The reason is that offices held for only one year or for short periods merely teach the officials their bare duties and then dismiss them before they can put any of their acquired knowledge into use, while, on the other hand, the longer terms of many years' duration somehow have the effect, in many cases, of filling the officials with conceit and encouraging them to rebellion.,3. Hence, again, I think that the more important posts ought in no case to be given consecutively to the same man. For it makes no difference whether a man is governor in the same province or in several in succession, if he holds office for a period longer than is advisable; besides, appointees improve when there is an interval between their incumbencies during which they return home and resume the life of ordinary citizens. "As regards the senators, therefore, I declare that they ought to discharge the duties named and in the way described. 52.24. 1. of the knights the two best should command the bodyguard which protects you, for it is hazardous to entrust it to one man, and sure to lead to confusion to entrust it to more than two.,2. Therefore let the number of these prefects be two, in order that, if one of them feel indisposed, you may still not lack a person to guard you. And men should be appointed to this office who have served in many military campaigns and have, besides, held many administrative positions.,3. And they should have command both of the Pretorians and of all the other soldiers in Italy, with power even to put to death any of them who do wrong, with the exception of the centurions and of those in general who have been assigned to the staffs of magistrates of senatorial rank.,4. For these soldiers should be tried by the senatorial magistrates themselves, in order that the latter, by virtue of the authority they would thus possess of dealing out punishments to them as well as honours, may be able to command their unhesitating support. Over all the other soldiers in Italy, however, the prefects I have mentioned should be in command, having lieutets under them, and likewise over the Caesarians, both those who are in attendance upon you and such of the others as are of any account.,5. These duties will be both fitting and sufficient for them to discharge, for if they have more responsibilities assigned to them than they are able to carry satisfactorily, there is danger that they may have no time for the essential things, or, if they have, may prove incompetent to exercise oversight over all their duties.,6. These prefects also should hold office for life, like the prefect of the city and the sub-censor. Let another official be appointed to be commander of the night-watch and still another to be commissioner of grain and of the market in general, both of them from the equestrian order and the best men after the prefects, and let them hold their posts for a definite term, like the magistrates elected from the senatorial class. 52.25. 1. The management of the public funds, also, â I mean both those of the people and those of the empire, not only in Rome but also in the rest of Italy and outside Italy, â should be entirely in the hands of the knights, and they,,2. as well as all the other members of the equestrian order who are charged with an administrative position, should be on salary, greater or less in proportion to the dignity and importance of their duties.,3. The reason for the second part of this suggestion is that it is not possible for the knights, since they are poorer than the senators, to meet their expenditures out of their own means, even when their duties keep them in Rome, and for the first point, that it is neither practicable nor to your interest that the same men should be given authority over both the troops and the public funds.,4. And, furthermore, it is well that the whole business of the empire should be transacted by a number of agents, in order that many may at the same time receive the benefits and gain experience in public affairs; for in this way your subjects, reaping a manifold enjoyment of the common blessings, will be more favourably disposed towards you, and you will have at your disposal in the largest measure those who are at any particular time the best men for all urgent needs.,5. One official of the equestrian order is sufficient for each branch of the fiscal service in the city, and, outside the city, for each province, each one of them to have as many subordinates, drawn from the knights and from your own freedmen, as the needs of the case demand; for you need to associate with the officials such assistants in order that your service may offer a prize for merit, and that you may not lack those from whom you may learn the truth, even contrary to their wishes, in case any irregularity is committed.,6. "If any of the knights, after passing through many branches of the service, distinguishes himself enough to become a senator, his age ought not to hinder him at all from being enrolled in the senate. Indeed, some knights should be received into the senate, even if they have seen service only as company commanders in the citizen legions, except such as have served in the rank and file.,7. For it is both a shame and a reproach that men of this sort, who have carried faggots and charcoal, should be found on the roll of the senate; but in the case of knights who began their service with the rank of centurion, there is nothing to prevent the most notable of them from belonging to the senate. 52.26. 1. "With regard, then, to the senators and the knights, this is the advice I have to give you, â yes, and this also, that while they are still children they should attend the schools, and when they come out of childhood into youth they should turn their minds to horses and arms, and have paid public teachers in each of these departments.,2. In this way from their very boyhood they will have had both instruction and practice in all that they will themselves be required to do on reaching manhood, and will thus prove more serviceable to you for every undertaking. For the best ruler, â the ruler who is worth anything, â should not only perform himself all the duties which devolve upon him, but should make provision for the rest also, that they may become as excellent as possible.,3. And this title can be yours, not if you allow them to do whatever they please and then censure those who err, but if, before any mistakes are made, you give them instruction in everything the practice of which will render them more useful both to themselves and to you, and if you afford nobody any excuse whatever,,4. either wealth or nobility of birth or any other attribute of excellence, for affecting indolence or effeminacy or any other behaviour that is counterfeit. For many persons, fearing that, by reason of some such advantage, they may incur jealousy or danger, do many things that are unworthy of themselves, expecting by such behaviour to live in greater security.,5. As a consequence, not only do they, on their part, become objects of pity as being victims of injustice in precisely this respect, that men believe that they are deprived of the opportunity of leading upright lives, but their ruler also, on his part, suffers not only a loss, in that he is robbed of men who might have been good, but also ill-repute, because he is blamed for the others' condition. Therefore never permit this thing to happen, and have no fear, on the other hand, that anyone who has been reared and educated as I propose will ever venture upon a rebellion.,6. On the contrary, it is the ignorant and licentious that you should suspect; for it is such persons who are easily influenced to do absolutely any and every thing, even the most disgraceful and outrageous, first toward themselves and then toward others, whereas those who have been well reared and educated do not deliberately do wrong to anyone else and least of all to the one who has cared for their rearing and education.,7. If, however, one of these does show himself wicked and ungrateful, you have merely to refuse to entrust him with any position of such a kind as will enable him to do any mischief; and if even so he rebels, let him be convicted and punished. You need not, I assure you, be afraid that anyone will blame you for this, provided that you carry out all my injunctions.,8. For in taking vengeance on the wrongdoer you will be guilty of no sin, any more than the physician is who resorts to cautery and surgery; but all men will assuredly say that the offender has got his deserts, because, after partaking of the same rearing and education as the rest, he plotted against you. "Let this be your procedure, then, in the case of the senators and the knights. 52.27. 1. A standing army also should be supported, drawn from the citizens, the subject nations, and the allies, its size in the several provinces being greater or less according as the necessities of the case demand;,2. and these troops ought always to be under arms and to engage in the practice of warfare continually. They should have winter-quarters constructed for them at the most advantageous points, and should serve for a stated period, so that a portion of life may still be left for them between their retirement from service and old age.,3. The reason for such a standing army is this: far removed as we are from the frontiers of the empire, with enemies living near our borders on every side, we are no longer able at critical times to depend upon expeditionary forces; and if, on the other hand, we permit all the men of military age to have arms and to practise warfare, they will always be the source of seditions and civil wars.,4. If, however, we prevent them from all making arms their profession and afterwards need their aid in war, we shall be exposed to danger, since we shall never have anything but inexperienced and untrained soldiers to depend upon. For these reasons I give it as my opinion that, while in general the men of military age should have nothing to do with arms and walled camps during their lives, the hardiest of them and those most in need of a livelihood should be enlisted as soldiers and given a military training.,5. For they will fight better if they devote their time to this one business, and the rest will find it easier to carry on their farming, seafaring, and the other pursuits appropriate to peace, if they are not compelled to take part in military expeditions but have others to act as their defenders. Thus the most active and vigorous element of the population, which is generally obliged to gain its livelihood by brigandage, will support itself without molesting others, while all the rest will live without incurring dangers. 52.28. 1. "From what source, then, is the money to be provided for these soldiers and for the other expenses that will of necessity be incurred? I shall explain this point also, prefacing it with a brief reminder that even if we have a democracy we shall in any case, of course, need money. For we cannot survive without soldiers, and men will not serve as soldiers without pay.,2. Therefore let us not be oppressed by the idea that the necessity of raising money belongs only to a monarchy, and let us not be led by that consideration to turn our backs upon this form of government, but let us assume in our deliberations that, under whatever form of government we shall live, we shall certainly be constrained to secure funds.,3. My proposal, therefore, is that you shall first of all sell the property that belongs to the state, â and I observe that this has become vast on account of the wars, â reserving only a little that is distinctly useful or necessary to you; and that you lend out all the money thus realized at a moderate rate of interest.,4. In this way not only will the land be put under cultivation, being sold to owners who will cultivate it themselves, but also the latter will acquire a capital and become more prosperous, while the treasury will gain a permanent revenue that will suffice for its needs. In the second place, I advise you to make an estimate of the revenues from this source and of all the other revenues which can with certainty be derived from the mines or any other source,,5. and then to make and balance against this a second estimate of all the expenses, not only those of the army, but also of all those which contribute to the well-being of a state, and furthermore of those which will necessarily be incurred for unexpected campaigns and the other needs which are wont to arise in an emergency.,6. The next step is to provide for any deficiency by levying an assessment upon absolutely all property which produces any profit for its possessors, and by establishing a system of taxes among all the peoples we rule. For it is but just and proper that no individual or district be exempt from these taxes, inasmuch as they are to enjoy the benefits derived from the taxation as much as the rest.,7. And you should appoint tax-collectors to have supervision of this business in each district, and cause them to exact the entire amount that falls due during the term of their supervision from all the sources of revenue. This plan will not only render the work of collection easier for these officials, but will in particular benefit the tax-payers,,8. inasmuch, I mean, as these will bring in what they owe in the small instalments appointed, whereas now, if they are remiss for a brief period, the entire sum is added up and demanded of them in a single payment. 52.29. 1. "I am not unaware that some will object if this system of assessments and taxes is established. But I know this, too, â that if they are subjected to no further abuses and are indeed convinced that all these contributions of theirs will make for their own security and for their fearless enjoyment of the rest of their property,,2. and that, again, the larger part of their contributions will be received by none but themselves, as governors, procurators, or soldiers, they will be exceedingly grateful to you, since they will be giving but a slight portion of the abundance from which they derive the benefit without having to submit to abuses. Especially will this be true if they see that you live temperately and spend nothing foolishly.,3. For who, if he saw that you were quite frugal in your expenditures for the commonwealth, would not willingly contribute, believing that your wealth meant his own security and prosperity? 52.30. 1. "So far as funds are concerned, therefore, a great abundance would be supplied from these sources. And I advise you to conduct as follows the administration of such matters as have not yet been mentioned. Adorn this capital with utter disregard of expense and make it magnificent with festivals of every kind. For it is fitting that we who rule over many people should surpass all men in all things, and brilliance of this sort, also, tends in a way to inspire our allies with respect for us and our enemies with terror.,2. The affairs of the other cities you should order in this fashion: In the first place, the populace should have no authority in any matter, and should not be allowed to convene in any assembly at all; for nothing good would come out of their deliberations and they would always be stirring up a good deal of turmoil. Hence it is my opinion that our populace here in Rome, for that matter, should not come together either as a court or to hold the elections, or indeed in any meeting whose object is to transact business.,3. In the second place, the cities should not indulge in public buildings unnecessarily numerous or large, nor waste their resources on expenditures for a large number and variety of public games, lest they exhaust themselves in futile exertions and be led by unreasonable rivalries to quarrel among themselves.,4. They ought, indeed, to have their festivals and spectacles, â to say nothing of the Circensian games held here in Rome, â but not to such an extent that the public treasury or the estates of private citizens shall be ruined thereby, or that any stranger resident there should be compelled to contribute to their expense, or that maintece for life should be granted to every one without exception who has won a victory in a contest.,5. For it is unreasonable that the well-toâdo should be put under compulsion to spend their money outside their own countries; and as for the competitors in the games, the prizes which are offered in each event are enough, unless a man wins in the Olympian or Pythian games or in some contest here in Rome.,6. For these are the only victors who ought to receive their maintece, and then the cities will not be wearing themselves out to no purpose nor will any athlete go into training except those who have a chance of winning; the rest will be able to follow some occasion that will be more profitable both to themselves and to the commonwealth. This is my opinion about these matters.,7. But as to the horse-races in connection with which there are no gymnastic contests, I think that no city but Rome should be permitted to have them, the object being to prevent the wanton dissipation of vast sums of money and to keep the populace from becoming deplorably crazed over such a sport, and, above all, to give those who are serving in the army an abundant supply of the best horses.,8. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I would altogether forbid the holding of such races anywhere else than here in Rome; as to the other games, I have proposed to keep them within bounds, in order that each community, by putting upon an inexpensive basis its entertainments for both eye and ear, may live with greater moderation and less factious strife.,9. "None of the cities should be allowed to have its own separate coinage or system of weights and measures; they should all be required to use ours. They should send no embassy to you, unless its business is one that involves a judicial decision; they should rather make what representations they will to their governor and through him bring to your attention such of their petitions as he shall approve.,10. In this way they will be spared expense and be prevented from resorting to crooked practices to gain their object; and the answers they receive will be uncontaminated by their agents and will involve no expense or red tape. 52.31.5. "These suggestions have to do only with those offences regarding which laws have been established and judgments are rendered in accordance with these laws. For as to a charge that some one has vilified you or in some other way has used unseemly language regarding you, I would have you neither listen to the accuser nor follow up the accusation. 52.31.6. For it is disgraceful for you to believe that any one has wantonly insulted you if you are indeed doing no wrong and are but conferring benefits upon all, and it is only those who are ruling badly who believe such things; for they draw evidence from their own conscience of the credibility of the alleged slanders. 52.31.7. And it is, furthermore, a dangerous thing even to show anger at such imputations (for if they are true, it were better not to be angry, and if they are false, it were better to pretend not to be angry), since many a man in times past has, by adopting this course, caused to be circulated against himself scandals far more numerous and more difficult to bear. 52.31.8. This, then, is my advice concerning those who are accused of calumniating you; for you should be superior to any insult and too exalted to be reached by it, and you should never allow yourself even to imagine, or lead others to imagine, that it is possible for any one to treat you with contumely, since you desire that men shall think of you, as they do of the gods, that your sanctity is inviolable. 52.31.9. If, however, any one is accused of plotting against you (and such a thing might also happen), refrain, in his case also, from either giving judgment yourself or prejudging the charge (for it is absurd that the same man should be both accuser and judge), but bring him before the senate and let him plead his defence there, and if he is convicted, punish him, moderating the sentence as far as possible, in order that belief in his guilt may be fostered. 52.31.10. For most men are very reluctant to believe that an unarmed man is plotting against one who is armed; and the only way you can win them to the belief is by showing, so far as possible, neither resentment nor the desire to exact the utmost when you inflict the penalty. But I make an exception to this rule in the case of a commander of an army who openly revolts; for of course it is fitting that such an one should not be tried at all, but chastised as a public enemy. 52.32. 1. "These matters, then, should be referred by you to the senate, and also those others which are of the greatest importance to the state. For interests which are shared in common should be administered in common. Besides, it is doubtless a quality implanted by nature in all men that they take delight in any marks of esteem received from a superior which imply that they are his equals, and that they not only approve of all decisions made by another in consultation with themselves, as being their own decisions, but also submit to them as having been imposed by their own free choice.,2. Therefore I say that such business ought to be brought before the senate. Furthermore, all the senators alike, that is, all who are present, should vote on all other matters: but when one of their own number is accused, not all of them should do so, unless the one who is on trial is not yet sitting as a senator or is still in the ranks of the ex-quaestors.,3. For it is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an aedile should cast a vote against men who have held those offices, or, worse yet, that any one of the latter should vote against men who have been praetors, or one of these last against men who have been consuls. Rather, let the ex-consuls alone have authority to render decisions in the case of all senators, and let the rest of the senators vote only in the cases of senators of a rank equal or inferior to their own. 52.34.1. "Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do, this you should always say and do yourself. In this way you will be educating them, rather than intimidating them through the punishments prescribed by the laws. The former policy inspires zeal, the latter fear; and one finds it easier to imitate that which is good when he sees it actually practised than to avoid that which is evil when he hears it forbidden by mere words. 53.2.6. When, now, he obtained approbation and praise for this act, he desired to exhibit another instance of magimity, that by such a policy he might be honoured all the more and might have his sovereignty voluntarily confirmed by the people, so as to avoid the appearance of having forced them against their will. 53.11.5. His very first act was to secure a decree granting to the men who should compose his bodyguard double the pay that was given to the rest of the soldiers, so that he might be strictly guarded. When this was done, he was eager to establish the monarchy in very truth. 53.19.1. In this way the government was changed at that time for the better and in the interest of greater security; for it was no doubt quite impossible for the people to be saved under a republic. Nevertheless, the events occurring after this time can not be recorded in the same manner as those of previous times. 55.14.4. Then Livia, hearing this, said: "That you should be the object of plotting is neither remarkable nor contrary to human nature. For you do a great many things, possessing so large an empire as you do, and only cause grief to not a few. A ruler can not, of course, please everybody; nay, it is inevitable that even a king whose rule is altogether upright should make many men his enemies. 55.14.5. For those who wish to do wrong are far more numerous than those who do right, and it is impossible to satisfy their desires. Even among such as possess a certain excellence, some covet many great rewards which they can not obtain, and some chafe because they are less honoured than others; hence both these classes find fault with the ruler. 55.14.6. Therefore it is impossible to avoid meeting with mischief, either at the hands of these or, in addition, at the hands of those who attack, not you personally, but the monarchy. For if you were a private citizen, no one would willingly have done you any harm, unless he had previously received some injury; but all men covet the office of ruler and the good things that office affords, and those who already possess some power covet much more than those who are lacking in this respect. 55.14.7. It is, indeed, the way of men who are wicked and have very little sense to do so; in fact, it is implanted in their nature, just like any other instinct, and it is impossible either by persuasion or by compulsion to destroy such instincts in some of them; for there is no law and no fear stronger than the instincts implanted by nature. 55.14.8. Reflect on this, therefore, and do not be vexed at the shortcomings of the other sort of men, but as for your own person and your sovereignty, keep close guard of them, that we may hold the throne securely, not by the strictness of the punishments you inflict upon individuals, but by the strictness with which you guard it." 55.15.1. To this Augustus replied: "But, wife, I, too, am aware that no high position is ever free from envy and treachery, and least of all a monarchy. 55.15.3. "Yet," said Livia, "since some men are so constituted as to want to do wrong in any event, let us guard against them. We have many soldiers who protect us, some arrayed against foreign foes and others about your person, and also a large retinue, so that by their help we may live in security both at home and abroad." 55.16.3. If it indeed be true that man's nature persuades some persons to err under any and all conditions, and that there is no way to curb man's nature when it has once set out upon a course of action, and that even what some men look upon as good conduct (to leave out of consideration the vices of the many) is forthwith an incentive to wrongdoing to very many men (for example, boasting of high birth, pride of wealth, loftiness of honours, arrogance of bravery, conceit of power â all these bring many to grief); 55.16.4. if it be true that one can not make ignoble that which is noble, or cowardly that which is brave, or prudent that which is foolish (for that is impossible); if, on the other hand, one ought not to curtail the abundance of others or humble their ambitions, when they are guilty of no offence (for that were unjust); if, finally, the policy of defending oneself or even of trying to forestall the attacks of others inevitably leads to vexation and ill repute â if all this is true, come, let us change our policy and spare some of the plotters. 55.16.5. For it seems to me that far more wrongs are set right by kindness than by harshness. For those who forgive are not only loved by the objects of their clemency, who will therefore even strive to repay the favour, but are also respected and revered by all the rest, who will therefore not readily venture to harm them; 55.16.6. those, on the other hand, who indulge in inexorable resentment are not only hated by those who have something to fear, but are also disliked by all the rest, and are in consequence even plotted against by them in their desire to avoid meeting with destruction first. 55.22.2. As a result of this course he so conciliated both him and the other persons so treated that neither they nor any one of the rest thereafter either actually plotted against him or was suspected of doing so. It was rather Livia herself, who was chiefly responsible for saving the life of Cornelius, that was to be charged with plotting the death of Augustus. 56.44.1. If any of them remembered his former deeds in the course of the civil wars, they attributed them to the pressure of circumstances, and they thought it fair to seek for his real disposition in what he did after he was in undisputed possession of the supreme power; for this afforded in truth a mighty contrast. 56.44.2. Anybody who examines his acts in detail can establish this fact; but summing them all up briefly, I may state that he put an end to all the factional discord, transferred the government in a way to give it the greatest power, and vastly strengthened it. Therefore, even if an occasional deed of violence did occur, as is apt to happen in extraordinary situations, one might more justly blame the circumstances themselves than him. 56.45.1. Though the people understood all this during his lifetime, they nevertheless realized it more fully after he was gone; for human nature is so constituted that in good fortune it does not so fully perceive its happiness as it misses it when misfortune has come. This is what happened at that time in the case of Augustus. For when they found his successor Tiberius a different sort of man, they yearned for him who was gone.

184. Origen, Dialogue With Heraclides, 13.19-13.20, 16.11-16.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, two natures Found in books: Penniman (2017), Raised on Christian Milk: Food and the Formation of the Soul in Early Christianity, 110

185. Nag Hammadi, On The Origin of The World, 110.7-110.18, 120.29-120.33 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 59

186. Origen, On First Principles, 1.1.6, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 3.4.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Penniman (2017), Raised on Christian Milk: Food and the Formation of the Soul in Early Christianity, 114, 115

1.1.6. But it will not appear absurd if we employ another similitude to make the matter clearer. Our eyes frequently cannot look upon the nature of the light itself — that is, upon the substance of the sun; but when we behold his splendour or his rays pouring in, perhaps, through windows or some small openings to admit the light, we can reflect how great is the supply and source of the light of the body. So, in like manner. the works of Divine Providence and the plan of this whole world are a sort of rays, as it were, of the nature of God, in comparison with His real substance and being. As, therefore, our understanding is unable of itself to behold God Himself as He is, it knows the Father of the world from the beauty of His works and the comeliness of His creatures. God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind; so that He cannot be believed to have within him a greater and a less, but is such that He is in all parts Μονάς, and, so to speak, ῾Ενάς, and is the mind and source from which all intellectual nature or mind takes its beginning. But mind, for its movements or operations, needs no physical space, nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor color, nor any other of those adjuncts which are the properties of body or matter. Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or in some degree hampered by such adjuncts, and lest that which is the beginning of all things should be found composite and differing, and that which ought to be free from all bodily intermixture, in virtue of being the one sole species of Deity, so to speak, should prove, instead of being one, to consist of many things. That mind, moreover, does not require space in order to carry on its movements agreeably to its nature, is certain from observation of our own mind. For if the mind abide within its own limits, and sustain no injury from any cause, it will never, from diversity of situation, be retarded in the discharge of its functions; nor, on the other hand, does it gain any addition or increase of mobility from the nature of particular places. And here, if any one were to object, for example, that among those who are at sea, and tossed by its waves the mind is considerably less vigorous than it is wont to be on land, we are to believe that it is in this state, not from diversity of situation, but from the commotion or disturbance of the body to which the mind is joined or attached. For it seems to be contrary to nature, as it were, for a human body to live at sea; and for that reason it appears, by a sort of inequality of its own, to enter upon its mental operations in a slovenly and irregular manner, and to perform the acts of the intellect with a duller sense, in as great degree as those who on land are prostrated with fever; with respect to whom it is certain, that if the mind do not discharge its functions as well as before, in consequence of the attack of disease, the blame is to be laid not upon the place, but upon the bodily malady, by which the body, being disturbed and disordered, renders to the mind its customary services under by no means the well-known and natural conditions: for we human beings are animals composed of a union of body and soul, and in this way (only) was it possible for us to live upon the earth. But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite. Neither does the mind require bodily magnitude in order to perform any act or movement; as when the eye by gazing upon bodies of larger size is dilated, but is compressed and contracted in order to see smaller objects. The mind, indeed, requires magnitude of an intellectual kind, because it grows, not after the fashion of a body, but after that of intelligence. For the mind is not enlarged, together with the body, by means of corporal additions, up to the twentieth or thirtieth year of life; but the intellect is sharpened by exercises of learning, and the powers implanted within it for intelligent purposes are called forth; and it is rendered capable of greater intellectual efforts, not being increased by bodily additions, but carefully polished by learned exercises. But these it cannot receive immediately from boyhood, or from birth, because the framework of limbs which the mind employs as organs for exercising itself is weak and feeble; and it is unable to bear the weight of its own operations, or to exhibit a capacity for receiving training. 2.1.4. If now, in the course of our discussion, it has been ascertained that these things are so, it seems to follow that we next consider the nature of corporeal being, seeing the diversity in the world cannot exist without bodies. It is evident from the nature of things themselves, that bodily nature admits of diversity and variety of change, so that it is capable of undergoing all possible transformations, as, e.g., the conversion of wood into fire, of fire into smoke, of smoke into air, of oil into fire. Does not food itself, whether of man or of animals, exhibit the same ground of change? For whatever we take as food, is converted into the substance of our body. But how water is changed into earth or into air, and air again into fire, or fire into air, or air into water, although not difficult to explain, yet on the present occasion it is enough merely to mention them, as our object is to discuss the nature of bodily matter. By matter, therefore, we understand that which is placed under bodies, viz., that by which, through the bestowing and implanting of qualities, bodies exist; and we mention four qualities — heat, cold, dryness, humidity. These four qualities being implanted in the ὕλη, or matter (for matter is found to exist in its own nature without those qualities before mentioned), produce the different kinds of bodies. Although this matter is, as we have said above, according to its own proper nature without qualities, it is never found to exist without a quality. And I cannot understand how so many distinguished men have been of opinion that this matter, which is so great, and possesses such properties as to enable it to be sufficient for all the bodies in the world which God willed to exist, and to be the attendant and slave of the Creator for whatever forms and species He wished in all things, receiving into itself whatever qualities He desired to bestow upon it, was uncreated, i.e., not formed by God Himself, who is the Creator of all things, but that its nature and power were the result of chance. And I am astonished that they should find fault with those who deny either God's creative power or His providential administration of the world, and accuse them of impiety for thinking that so great a work as the world could exist without an architect or overseer; while they themselves incur a similar charge of impiety in saying that matter is uncreated, and co-eternal with the uncreated God. According to this view, then, if we suppose for the sake of argument that matter did not exist, as these maintain, saying that God could not create anything when nothing existed, without doubt He would have been idle, not having matter on which to operate, which matter they say was furnished Him not by His own arrangement, but by accident; and they think that this, which was discovered by chance, was able to suffice Him for an undertaking of so vast an extent, and for the manifestation of the power of His might, and by admitting the plan of all His wisdom, might be distinguished and formed into a world. Now this appears to me to be very absurd, and to be the opinion of those men who are altogether ignorant of the power and intelligence of uncreated nature. But that we may see the nature of things a little more clearly, let it be granted that for a little time matter did not exist, and that God, when nothing formerly existed, caused those things to come into existence which He desired, why are we to suppose that God would create matter either better or greater, or of another kind, than that which He did produce from His own power and wisdom, in order that that might exist which formerly did not? Would He create a worse and inferior matter, or one the same as that which they call uncreated? Now I think it will very easily appear to any one, that neither a better nor inferior matter could have assumed the forms and species of the world, if it had not been such as that which actually did assume them. And does it not then seem impious to call that uncreated, which, if believed to be formed by God, would doubtless be found to be such as that which they call uncreated? 2.2.2. If, however, it is impossible for this point to be at all maintained, viz., that any other nature than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can live without a body, the necessity of logical reasoning compels us to understand that rational natures were indeed created at the beginning, but that material substance was separated from them only in thought and understanding, and appears to have been formed for them, or after them, and that they never have lived nor do live without it; for an incorporeal life will rightly be considered a prerogative of the Trinity alone. As we have remarked above, therefore, that material substance of this world, possessing a nature admitting of all possible transformations, is, when dragged down to beings of a lower order, moulded into the crasser and more solid condition of a body, so as to distinguish those visible and varying forms of the world; but when it becomes the servant of more perfect and more blessed beings, it shines in the splendour of celestial bodies, and adorns either the angels of God or the sons of the resurrection with the clothing of a spiritual body, out of all which will be filled up the diverse and varying state of the one world. But if any one should desire to discuss these matters more fully, it will be necessary, with all reverence and fear of God, to examine the sacred Scriptures with greater attention and diligence, to ascertain whether the secret and hidden sense within them may perhaps reveal anything regarding these matters; and something may be discovered in their abstruse and mysterious language, through the demonstration of the Holy Spirit to those who are worthy, after many testimonies have been collected on this very point. 3.4.2. Now, of these opinions, let us first discuss that which is maintained by some, that there is in us a good and heavenly soul, and another earthly and inferior; and that the better soul is implanted within us from heaven, such as was that which, while Jacob was still in the womb, gave him the prize of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in the case of Jeremiah was sanctified from his birth, and in that of John was filled by the Holy Spirit from the womb. Now, that which they term the inferior soul is produced, they allege, along with the body itself out of the seed of the body, whence they say it cannot live or subsist beyond the body, on which account also they say it is frequently termed flesh. For the expression, The flesh lusts against the Spirit, they take to be applicable not to the flesh, but to this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words, moreover, they endeavour notwithstanding to make good the declaration in Leviticus: The life of all flesh is the blood thereof. For, from the circumstance that it is the diffusion of the blood throughout the whole flesh which produces life in the flesh, they assert that this soul, which is said to be the life of all flesh, is contained in the blood. This statement, moreover, that the flesh struggles against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the further statement, that the life of all flesh is the blood thereof, is, according to these writers, simply calling the wisdom of the flesh by another name, because it is a kind of material spirit, which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires. And it is with respect to this that they think the apostle uttered the words: I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. And if one were to object to them that these words were spoken of the nature of the body, which indeed, agreeably to the peculiarity of its nature, is dead, but is said to have sensibility, or wisdom which is hostile to God, or which struggles against the spirit; or if one were to say that, in a certain degree, the flesh itself was possessed of a voice, which should cry out against the endurance of hunger, or thirst, or cold, or of any discomfort arising either from abundance or poverty, — they would endeavour to weaken and impair the force of such (arguments), by showing that there were many other mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul, as it were, of which we have spoken above, and which is generated from the seed by a process of traducianism. They are accustomed also to adduce, in support of their assertion, the declaration of the apostle, Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, poisonings, hatred, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrelling, dissensions, heresies, sects, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and the like; asserting that all these do not derive their origin from the habits or pleasures of the flesh, so that all such movements are to be regarded as inherent in that substance which has not a soul, i.e., the flesh. The declaration, moreover, For you see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men among you according to the flesh are called, would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom, carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: Since the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the things that we would. What are these things now respecting which he says, that we cannot do the things that we would? It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be intended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant, because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains, then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself with the spirit, it produces men of the Spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual. And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, But you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit.

187. Origen, Against Celsus, 5.47 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, creation of, nature and condition Found in books: Laks (2022), Plato's Second Republic: An Essay on the Laws. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022 224

5.47. Now the reason why circumcision is practised among the Jews is not the same as that which explains its existence among the Egyptians and Colchians, and therefore it is not to be considered the same circumcision. And as he who sacrifices does not sacrifice to the same god, although he appears to perform the rite of sacrifice in a similar manner, and he who offers up prayer does not pray to the same divinity, although he asks the same things in his supplication; so, in the same way, if one performs the rite of circumcision, it by no means follows that it is not a different act from the circumcision performed upon another. For the purpose, and the law, and the wish of him who performs the rite, place the act in a different category. But that the whole subject may be still better understood, we have to remark that the term for righteousness is the same among all the Greeks; but righteousness is shown to be one thing according to the view of Epicurus; and another according to the Stoics, who deny the threefold division of the soul; and a different thing again according to the followers of Plato, who hold that righteousness is the proper business of the parts of the soul. And so also the courage of Epicures is one thing, who would undergo some labours in order to escape from a greater number; and a different thing that of the philosopher of the Porch, who would choose all virtue for its own sake; and a different thing still that of Plato, who maintains that virtue itself is the act of the irascible part of the soul, and who assigns to it a place about the breast. And so circumcision will be a different thing according to the varying opinions of those who undergo it. But on such a subject it is unnecessary to speak on this occasion in a treatise like the present; for whoever desires to see what led us to the subject, can read what we have said upon it in the Epistle of Paul to the Romans.

188. Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 23 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •origins, made by god, nature, or humans (calcidius) Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 181

189. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 180-183, 82, 251 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 113

190. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, 3.1 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

191. Origen, Fragments On Psalms 1-150, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 351

192. Origen, Homilies On Luke, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

193. Babylonian Talmud, Niddah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 283

16b. big strongגמ׳ /strong /big ת"ר אע"פ שאמרו המשמש מטתו לאור הנר הרי זה מגונה בש"א צריכה שני עדים על כל תשמיש או תשמש לאור הנר ובה"א דיה בשני עדים כל הלילה,תניא אמרו להם ב"ש לב"ה לדבריכם ליחוש שמא תראה טיפת דם כחרדל בביאה ראשונה ותחפנה שכבת זרע בביאה שניה,א"ל ב"ה אף לדבריכם ליחוש עד שהרוק בתוך הפה שמא נימוק והולך לו,אמרו להם לפי שאינו דומה נימוק פעם אחת לנימוק שתי פעמים,תניא א"ר יהושע רואה אני את דברי ב"ש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כמה הארכת עלינו אמר להם מוטב שאאריך עליכם בעוה"ז כדי שיאריכו ימיכם לעוה"ב,אמר ר' זירא מדברי כולם נלמד בעל נפש לא יבעול וישנה,רבא אמר בועל ושונה כי תניא ההיא לטהרות,תניא נמי הכי בד"א לטהרות אבל לבעלה מותרת ובד"א שהניחה בחזקת טהרה אבל הניחה בחזקת טמאה לעולם היא בחזקתה עד שתאמר לו טהורה אני,א"ר אבא א"ר חייא בר אשי אמר רב בדקה בעד ואבד אסורה לשמש עד שתבדוק מתקיף לה ר' אילא אילו איתא מי לא משמשה ואע"ג דלא ידעה השתא נמי תשמש,א"ל רבא זו מוכיחה קיים וזו אין מוכיחה קיים,א"ר יוחנן אסור לאדם שישמש מטתו ביום אמר רב המנונא מאי קרא שנאמר (איוב ג, ג) יאבד יום אולד בו והלילה אמר הורה גבר לילה ניתן להריון ויום לא ניתן להריון ריש לקיש אמר מהכא (משלי יט, טז) בוזה דרכיו ימות,ור"ל האי קרא דר' יוחנן מאי דריש ביה מבעי ליה לכדדריש רבי חנינא בר פפא דדריש ר' חנינא בר פפא אותו מלאך הממונה על ההריון לילה שמו ונוטל טפה ומעמידה לפני הקב"ה ואומר לפניו רבש"ע טפה זו מה תהא עליה גבור או חלש חכם או טיפש עשיר או עני,ואילו רשע או צדיק לא קאמר כדר' חנינא דא"ר חנינא הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים שנאמר (דברים י, יב) ועתה ישראל מה ה' אלהיך שואל מעמך כי אם ליראה וגו',ור' יוחנן א"כ נכתוב קרא גבר הורה מאי הורה גבר לילה ניתן להריון ויום לא ניתן להריון,ור' יוחנן האי קרא דר"ל מאי דריש ביה מבעי לי' לכדכתיב בספר בן סירא שלשה שנאתי וארבעה לא אהבתי שר הנרגל בבית המשתאות ואמרי לה שר הנרגן ואמרי לה שר הנרגז,והמושיב שבת במרומי קרת והאוחז באמה ומשתין מים והנכנס לבית חבירו פתאום אמר רבי יוחנן ואפילו לביתו,אמר רבי שמעון בן יוחאי ארבעה דברים הקב"ה שונאן ואני איני אוהבן הנכנס לביתו פתאום ואצ"ל לבית חבירו והאוחז באמה ומשתין מים

16b. strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna teaches that according to Beit Shammai it is permitted to engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. In this regard, b the Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Even though /b the Sages b said /b with regard to b one who engages in intercourse by the light of a lamp, /b that b this is disgraceful, Beit Shammai say: A woman is required /b to examine herself with b two cloths, /b once before and once after b each /b act of b intercourse, or /b she must b engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. And Beit Hillel say: /b It is b sufficient /b for her to examine herself b with two cloths throughout the night, /b once before the first act of intercourse and once after the final act of intercourse.,It b is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement /b that a woman may engage in intercourse several times in one night without an examination between each act of intercourse, b let us be concerned lest she will see, /b i.e., emit, b a drop of blood the size of a mustard /b seed b during the first /b act of b intercourse, /b and will thereby become impure, b and semen from the second /b act of b intercourse will cover it. /b Since the examination after the last act of intercourse will not reveal the drop of blood, the woman will erroneously think she is pure., b Beit Hillel said to them /b in response: b Even according to your statement, let us be concerned /b that b while the saliva /b was still b in the mouth, /b i.e., while the blood was in her vagina, b perhaps it was squashed and disappeared. /b Even if she examines herself after each act of intercourse, as mandated by Beit Shammai, it is possible that the semen of that act covered the blood, and it will not be revealed by the examination.,Beit Shammai b said to /b Beit Hillel: One cannot compare the two situations, b as a squashed /b drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse b once is not similar to a squashed /b drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse b twice, /b and therefore our concern is more reasonable.,It b is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Yehoshua said: I see /b as correct b the statement of Beit Shammai /b in this case. b His students said to him: /b Our b teacher, how you have weighed [ i he’erakhta /i ] us down /b with this stringent ruling. Rabbi Yehoshua b said to them: It is preferable that I weigh you down in this world, so that /b you do not sin by engaging in prohibited intercourse, i.e., so that b your days in the World-to-Come will be lengthened [ i sheya’arikhu /i ]. /b ,§ b Rabbi Zeira says: From the statements of all of them, /b i.e., both Beit Shammai, who permit engaging in intercourse a second time only after an examination, and Beit Hillel, who rule that the second examination must be performed only after the final act of intercourse of the night, b we can learn /b that their dispute relates only to that which is permitted after the fact. But b a pious person [ i ba’al nefesh /i ] should not engage in intercourse and repeat /b his act without an examination between each act., b Rava says: /b Even a pious person b may engage in intercourse and repeat /b the act without an examination in between, as b when that /b i baraita /i b is taught, /b it is referring b to /b a woman who handles b pure items. /b But with regard to intercourse with her husband, there is no cause for concern., b This /b opinion b is also taught /b in a i baraita /i : b In what /b case b is this statement said, /b i.e., that a woman must examine herself before and after every act of intercourse according to Beit Shammai, or before the first act and after the last act, according to Beit Hillel? It was said b with regard to /b a woman who handles b pure items; but /b a woman b is permitted to her husband /b even without any examination, and he is not required to ask her if she is pure. b But in what /b case b is this /b lenient b statement said? When /b her husband traveled and b left her with the presumptive status of ritual purity. But /b if he b left her with the presumptive status of ritual impurity, /b she remains b forever in her presumptive status /b of impurity b until she says to him: I am pure. /b ,§ b Rabbi Abba says /b that b Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi says /b that b Rav says: /b If a woman b examined /b herself at night b with a cloth, and /b the cloth b was /b then immediately b lost, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse /b again b until she examines /b herself with another cloth, as perhaps there was blood on the cloth that was lost. b Rabbi Ila objects to this: If /b this cloth b were intact, /b i.e., if it were not lost, b couldn’t /b this woman b engage in intercourse /b with her husband that night, on the basis that she will examine the cloth only the following day, b and /b isn’t this the i halakha /i b even though she does not know /b at the time of intercourse whether there is blood on the cloth? b Now too, /b although the cloth is lost, b let her engage in intercourse /b with her husband., b Rava said to him: /b There is a difference between the two cases, as when the cloth is intact, b this /b woman’s b proof exists, /b and if she discovers on the following day that she was impure they will be obligated to bring sin offerings for engaging in intercourse in a state of ritual impurity. b But /b with regard to b that /b woman who lost her cloth, b her proof does not exist, /b and therefore they will never know if they require atonement.,§ b Rabbi Yoḥa says: It is prohibited for a person to engage in intercourse by day. Rav Hamnuna says: What is the verse /b from which this is derived? b As it is stated: “Let the day perish on which I was born, and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child” /b (Job 3:3). It is derived from here that b nighttime is meant for conception, but daytime is not meant for conception. Reish Lakish says /b that the proof is b from here: “But he who despises his ways shall die” /b (Proverbs 19:16). One might see something unpleasing in his wife in the daylight and come to despise her.,The Gemara asks: b And how does Reish Lakish interpret this verse /b cited b by Rabbi Yoḥa? /b The Gemara answers that b he requires /b that verse b for that which Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa interpreted /b that verse in the following manner: b That angel that is appointed over conception is called: Night. And /b that angel b takes /b the b drop /b of semen from which a person will be formed b and presents it before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and says before Him: Master of the Universe, what will be of this drop? /b Will the person fashioned from it be b mighty or weak? /b Will he be b clever or stupid? /b Will he be b wealthy or poor? /b ,The Gemara notes: b But /b this angel b does not say: /b Will he be b wicked or righteous? /b This is b in accordance with /b a statement b of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hand of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven. /b People have free will to serve God or not, b as it is stated: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear /b the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10:12). The fact that God asks of the Jewish people to fear Him indicates that it is a person’s choice to do so.,The Gemara explains: b And Rabbi Yoḥa /b derives two i halakhot /i from the verse “and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child,” as he holds as follows: b If so, /b i.e., if it is referring only to the statement of the angel, b let the verse write: /b And the night that said: b A man-child is conceived. What /b is the meaning of: b “Conceived is a man-child”? /b It is derived from the juxtaposition of the word “night” and the word “conceived” that b nighttime is meant for conception but daytime is not meant for conception. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And Rabbi Yoḥa, how does he interpret that verse /b cited b by Reish Lakish? /b The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥa b requires /b that verse: “But he who despises his ways shall die,” b to /b teach b that which is written in the book of ben Sira: Three /b people b I have hated, and a fourth I have not loved: A minister who frequents [ i hanirgal /i ] drinking houses, /b as he disgraces himself and leads himself to ruin and death; b and some say /b a different version of the text: b A minister who chats [ i hanirgan /i ] /b in drinking houses; b and some say /b a third version: b A minister who is short-tempered [ i hanirgaz /i ] /b when in drinking houses.,That is the first that he hated. b And /b the others are b one who dwells at the highest point of the city, /b where everyone sees him; b and one who holds /b his b penis and urinates. And /b the fourth, whom he has not loved, is b one who enters the house of another suddenly, /b without warning. b Rabbi Yoḥa says: And /b this includes b even /b one who comes b into his /b own b house /b without prior warning, as the members of his household might be engaged in private activities.,The Gemara cites a similar saying. b Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Four matters the Holy One, Blessed be He, hates, and I do not love them, /b and they are: b One who enters his house suddenly, and needless to say /b one who suddenly enters b the house of another; and one who holds /b his b penis and urinates; /b

194. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.7.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 72

195. Porphyry, Aids To The Study of The Intelligibles, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 45

196. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.89, 2.91, 2.95, 4.36, 7.43, 7.49, 7.85-7.89, 7.149, 7.175, 9.61-9.62, 9.64, 9.66-9.68, 9.76, 10.37, 10.78, 10.118, 10.127 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings •human nature •nature, human •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, and capacity for emotions •humanity, compound nature of •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 27, 28, 161; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 202, 247, 248; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 6, 29, 30, 72, 111, 204, 205, 242, 352; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 73; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 85, 200

2.89. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. 2.91. They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; 2.95. Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. 4.36. A certain dialectic, a follower of Alexinus, was unable to repeat properly some argument of his teacher, whereupon Arcesilaus reminded him of the story of Philoxenus and the brickmakers. He found them singing some of his melodies out of tune; so he retaliated by trampling on the bricks they were making, saying, If you spoil my work, I'll spoil yours. He was, moreover, genuinely annoyed with any who took up their studies too late. By some natural impulse he was betrayed into using such phrases as I assert, and So-and-so (mentioning the name) will not assent to this. And this trait many of his pupils imitated, as they did also his style of speaking and his whole address. 7.43. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language; 7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.149. Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione, Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione. But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works. 9.61. 11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that. 9.62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis. 9.64. On being discovered once talking to himself, he answered, when asked the reason, that he was training to be good. In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination, so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him: at all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in disposition but himself in doctrine; and he would often remark that Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him for information about Pyrrho; and that he was so respected by his native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.Moreover, there were many who emulated his abstention from affairs, so that Timon in his Pytho and in his Silli says: 9.66. He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay On Wealth and Poverty, now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry perchance or pigs, and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word. 9.67. They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the lineAs leaves on trees, such is the life of man.He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man. 9.68. Posidonius, too, relates of him a story of this sort. When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the unperturbed state in which the wise man should keep himself. Numenius alone attributes to him positive tenets. He had pupils of repute, in particular one Eurylochus, who fell short of his professions; for they say that he was once so angry that he seized the spit with the meat on it and chased his cook right into the market-place. 9.76. But the Sceptics even refute the statement Not more (one thing than another). For, as forethought is no more existent than non-existent, so Not more (one thing than another) is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in the Pytho, the statement means just absence of all determination and withholding of assent. The other statement, Every saying, etc., equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge which drives the substance out and then in its turn is itself eliminated and destroyed. 10.37. Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. 10.78. Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this. 10.118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live.

197. Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah, 1.1.192-1.1.194 (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 74

198. Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 283

33b. אמר ליה רבינא לרבא הלכתא מאי אמר ליה כי קידוש מה קידוש אף על גב דמקדש בצלותא מקדש אכסא אף הבדלה נמי אע"ג דמבדיל בצלותא מבדיל אכסא:,ר' אליעזר אומר בהודאה:,ר' זירא הוה רכיב חמרא הוה קא שקיל ואזיל ר' חייא בר אבין בתריה אמר ליה ודאי דאמריתו משמיה דר' יוחנן הלכה כר' אליעזר ביום טוב שחל להיות אחר השבת אמר ליה אין,הלכה מכלל דפליגי,ולא פליגי והא פליגי רבנן,אימר דפליגי רבנן בשאר ימות השנה ביום טוב שחל להיות אחר השבת מי פליגי,והא פליג ר' עקיבא,אטו כל השנה כולה מי עבדינן כר' עקיבא דהשתא ניקו ונעביד כוותיה כל השנה כולה מאי טעמא לא עבדינן כרבי עקיבא דתמני סרי תקון תשסרי לא תקון הכא נמי שב תקון תמני לא תקון,אמר ליה לאו הלכה אתמר אלא מטין אתמר,דאתמר ר' יצחק בר אבדימי אמר משום רבינו הלכה ואמרי לה מטין,ר' יוחנן אמר מודים ור' חייא בר אבא אמר נראין,אמר ר' זירא נקוט דרבי חייא בר אבא בידך דדייק וגמר שמעתא מפומא דמרה שפיר כרחבא דפומבדיתא,דאמר רחבא אמר ר' יהודה הר הבית סטיו כפול היה והיה סטיו לפנים מסטיו,אמר רב יוסף אנא לא האי ידענא ולא האי ידענא אלא מדרב ושמואל ידענא דתקינו לן מרגניתא בבבל,ותודיענו ה' אלהינו את משפטי צדקך ותלמדנו לעשות חקי רצונך ותנחילנו זמני ששון וחגי נדבה ותורישנו קדושת שבת וכבוד מועד וחגיגת הרגל בין קדושת שבת לקדושת יום טוב הבדלת ואת יום השביעי מששת ימי המעשה קדשת הבדלת וקדשת את עמך ישראל בקדושתך ותתן לנו וכו':, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך ועל טוב יזכר שמך מודים מודים משתקין אותו:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big בשלמא מודים מודים משתקין אותו משום דמיחזי כשתי רשויות ועל טוב יזכר שמך נמי משמע על הטובה ולא על הרעה ותנן חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה אלא על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך מ"ט,פליגי בה תרי אמוראי במערבא רבי יוסי בר אבין ורבי יוסי בר זבידא חד אמר מפני שמטיל קנאה במעשה בראשית וחד אמר מפני שעושה מדותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזרות,ההוא דנחית קמיה דרבה ואמר אתה חסת על קן צפור אתה חוס ורחם עלינו אמר רבה כמה ידע האי צורבא מרבנן לרצויי למריה א"ל אביי והא משתקין אותו תנן,ורבה נמי לחדודי לאביי הוא דבעי,ההוא דנחית קמיה דר' חנינא אמר האל הגדול הגבור והנורא והאדיר והעזוז והיראוי החזק והאמיץ והודאי והנכבד,המתין לו עד דסיים כי סיים א"ל סיימתינהו לכולהו שבחי דמרך למה לי כולי האי אנן הני תלת דאמרינן אי לאו דאמרינהו משה רבינו באורייתא ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה ותקנינהו בתפלה לא הוינן יכולין למימר להו ואת אמרת כולי האי ואזלת משל למלך בשר ודם שהיו לו אלף אלפים דינרי זהב והיו מקלסין אותו בשל כסף והלא גנאי הוא לו:,ואמר רבי חנינא הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים שנאמר (דברים י, יב) ועתה ישראל מה ה' אלהיך שואל מעמך כי אם ליראה,אטו יראת שמים מילתא זוטרתא היא והא"ר חנינא משום ר' שמעון בן יוחי אין לו להקב"ה בבית גנזיו אלא אוצר של יראת שמים שנאמר (ישעיהו לג, ו) יראת ה' היא אוצרו,אין לגבי משה מילתא זוטרתא היא דאמר ר' חנינא משל לאדם שמבקשים ממנו כלי גדול ויש לו דומה עליו ככלי קטן קטן ואין לו דומה עליו ככלי גדול:,מודים מודים משתקין אותו:,אמר ר' זירא כל האומר שמע שמע כאומר מודים מודים דמי,מיתיבי הקורא את שמע וכופלה הרי זה מגונה מגונה הוא דהוי שתוקי לא משתקינן ליה,לא קשיא הא דאמר מילתא מילתא ותני לה והא דאמר פסוקא פסוקא ותני ליה,אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי ודילמא מעיקרא לא כוון דעתיה ולבסוף כוון דעתיה,אמר ליה

33b. There are conflicting opinions with regard to reciting i havdala /i over the cup of wine after reciting it in the i Amida /i prayer. One opinion holds that it is appropriate to recite i havdala /i a second time, while the other holds that it is prohibited. b Ravina said to Rava: What is the i halakha /i ? /b Rava b said to him: /b The i halakha /i in the case of i havdala /i is b like /b the i halakha /i in the case of b i kiddush /i . Just as /b in the case of b i kiddush /i , although one recited i kiddush /i in the /b i Amida /i b prayer /b he must, nevertheless, b recite i kiddush /i /b again b over the cup /b of wine, b so too with i havdala /i , although one recited i havdala /i in the /b i Amida /i b prayer /b he must b recite i havdala /i /b again b over the cup /b of wine.,The mishna states that b Rabbi Eliezer says: /b It is recited b in /b the seventeenth blessing of the i Amida /i prayer, the blessing of b thanksgiving. /b ,The Gemara cites the conclusion with regard to this i halakha /i by relating a story: b Rabbi Zeira was riding a donkey /b while b Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was coming and walking after him. He said to him: Is /b it b true that you said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥa /b that the b i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer /b in the case of b a Festival that occurs /b directly b after Shabbat? /b Since in that case, one cannot recite i havdala /i in the blessing of Who graciously grants knowledge, as it is not included in the i Amida /i prayer on the Festival, there is no alternative but to adopt Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling. b He said to him: Yes. /b ,The Gemara wonders: Saying that the b i halakha /i /b is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, b indicates that /b his peers b dispute /b his opinion. Where do we find that dispute?,The Gemara rejects this: b And don’t they dispute /b his opinion? b Don’t the Rabbis dispute /b his opinion, as, in their opinion the blessing of i havdala /i is recited in the blessing: Who graciously grants knowledge?,The Gemara replies: b Say that the Rabbis dispute /b Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion b during the rest of the days of the year, /b when the option to recite i havdala /i in the blessing: Who graciously grants knowledge exists, but b in the case of a Festival that occurs /b directly b after Shabbat, do they dispute /b his opinion? The Rabbis would agree with him in that case.,The Gemara continues: b Doesn’t Rabbi Akiva dispute /b his opinion? He holds that i havdala /i is recited as an independent fourth blessing, in which case there is a dispute.,The Gemara responds: b Is that to say that throughout the entire year we act in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Akiva /b in this matter, b so that now, /b on a Festival that occurs directly after Shabbat, b we will stand and act in accordance with /b his opinion? b What is the reason that throughout the whole, entire year, we do not act in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Akiva? Because /b the Sages b instituted eighteen /b blessings, b they did not institute nineteen /b blessings. b Here, too, /b the Sages b instituted seven /b blessings, b they did not institute eight /b blessings. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is not taken into consideration in this case.,In response to these questions, Rabbi Zeira b said to him /b that b it was not /b that b the i halakha /i /b is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer b that was stated /b in the name of Rabbi Yoḥa, from which one could infer that there was in fact a dispute; rather it was that one is b inclined /b to favor the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer b that was stated /b in the name of Rabbi Yoḥa., b As /b indeed b it was stated /b that there is a dispute among the Sages in this matter. b Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of Rabbeinu, /b Rav: b The i halakha /i /b is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. b And some say this /b statement: One is b inclined /b to favor the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer., b Rabbi Yoḥa said /b that there is no dispute here, and the Rabbis b agree /b with Rabbi Eliezer. b And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said /b that it was established that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion b appears /b to be correct.,With regard to this difference of opinion b Rabbi Zeira said: Take /b this statement of b Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba in your hand, as he is scrupulous and he learned the i halakha /i well from the mouth of its originator, like /b the Sage b Raḥava /b from the city b Pumbedita. /b Raḥava was famous for the precision with which he would transmit material that he learned from his teacher.,The Gemara cites an example: b Raḥava said /b that b Rabbi Yehuda said: The Temple Mount was a double i stav /i , and there was a i stav /i within a i stav /i . /b Here Raḥava used his Rabbi’s language in describing the structure of the Temple and the rows of columns it contained, a row within a row; but he did not employ the common term i itzteba /i , portico, but rather i stav /i , as he heard it from his Rabbi., b Rav Yosef said /b the conclusive i halakha /i on this topic: b I don’t know this and I don’t know that, but I do know from /b the statements of b Rav and Shmuel they have instituted a pearl for us in Babylonia. /b They established a version that combines the first blessing of the Festival with the formula of i havdala /i , parallel to the opinion of the Rabbis who include i havdala /i in the first blessing that follows the first three blessings. They instituted to recite:, b You have made known to us, Lord our God, Your righteous laws, /b br b and taught us to perform Your will’s decrees. /b br b You have given us as our heritage seasons of joy and Festivals of voluntary offerings. /b br b You have given us as our heritage the holiness of Shabbat, the glory of the festival and the festive offerings of the Pilgrim Festivals. /b br b You have distinguished between the holiness of Shabbat and the holiness of the Festival, /b br b and have made the seventh day holy over the six days of work. /b br b You have distinguished and sanctified Your people Israel with Your holiness, /b br b And You have given us, etc. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong Concluding the laws of prayer in this tractate, the mishna raises several prayer-related matters. This mishna speaks of certain innovations in the prayer formula that warrant the silencing of a communal prayer leader who attempts to introduce them in his prayers, as their content tends toward heresy. b One who recites /b in his supplication: Just as b Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, /b as You have commanded us to send away the mother before taking her chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), so too extend Your mercy to us; b and /b one who recites: b May Your name be mentioned with the good /b or one who recites: b We give thanks, we give thanks /b twice, they b silence him. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong Our mishna cited three instances where the communal prayer leader is silenced. The Gemara clarifies: b Granted, /b they silence one who repeats: b We give thanks, we give thanks, as it appears like /b he is acknowledging and praying to b two authorities. And /b granted that b they also silence /b one who says: b May Your name be mentioned with the good, /b as b clearly /b he is thanking God only b for the good and not for the bad, and we learned /b in a mishna: b One is required to bless /b God b for the bad just as he blesses /b Him b for the good. However, /b in the case of one who recites: Just as b Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, why /b do they silence him?, b Two i amora’im /i in Eretz Yisrael disputed this /b question; b Rabbi Yosei bar Avin and Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida; one said /b that this was b because he engenders jealousy among God’s creations, /b as it appears as though he is protesting the fact that the Lord favored one creature over all others. b And one said /b that this was b because he transforms the attributes of the Holy One, Blessed be He, into /b expressions of b mercy, when they are nothing but decrees /b of the King that must be fulfilled without inquiring into the reasons behind them.,The Gemara relates that b a particular /b individual b descended before the ark /b as prayer leader b in the presence of Rabba, and said /b in his prayers: b You have shown mercy to the bird’s nest, now have mercy and pity upon us. Rabba said: How much does this Torah scholar know to appease /b the Lord, b his Master. Abaye said to him: Didn’t we learn /b in a mishna that b they silence him? /b ,The Gemara explains: b And Rabba too /b held in accordance with this mishna but merely acted this way because b he wanted to hone Abaye’s /b intellect. Rabba did not make his statement to praise the scholar, but simply to test his nephew, Abaye, and to encourage him to articulate what he knows about that mishna.,With regard to additions to prayers formulated by the Sages, The Gemara relates that b a particular /b individual b descended before the ark /b as prayer leader b in the presence of Rabbi Ḥanina. /b He extended his prayer and b said: God, the great, mighty, awesome, powerful, mighty, awe-inspiring, strong, fearless, steadfast and honored. /b ,Rabbi Ḥanina b waited for him until he completed /b his prayer. b When he finished, /b Rabbi Ḥanina b asked him: Have you concluded all of the praises of your Master? Why do I need all of this /b superfluous praise? b Even these three /b praises b that we recite: /b The great, mighty and awesome, b had Moses our teacher not said them in the Torah and had the members of the Great Assembly not come and incorporated them into the /b i Amida /i prayer, b we would not be permitted to recite them. And you went on and recited all of these. It is comparable to a king who possessed many thousands of golden dinars, yet they were praising him for silver /b ones. b Isn’t that deprecatory? /b All of the praises we could possibly lavish upon the Lord are nothing but a few silver dinars relative to many thousands of gold dinars. Reciting a litany of praise does not enhance God’s honor.,Tangentially, the Gemara cites an additional statement by Rabbi Ḥanina concerning principles of faith. b And Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hands of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven. /b Man has free will to serve God or not, b as it is stated: “And now Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear /b the Lord your God, to walk in all of His ways, to love Him and to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 10:12). The Lord asks man to perform these matters because ultimately, the choice is in his hands.,The verse says: What does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear the Lord your God. The Gemara asks: b Is fear of Heaven a minor matter /b that it can be presented as if God is not asking anything significant? b Didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The Holy One, Blessed be He, has nothing in his treasury other than a treasure of fear of Heaven, as it is stated: “Fear of the Lord is his treasure” /b (Isaiah 33:6). The Lord values and treasures fear of Heaven over all else.,The Gemara responds: b Indeed, for Moses /b fear of Heaven b is a minor matter. As Rabbi Ḥanina stated: It is comparable to one who is asked for a large vessel and he has /b one, b it seems to him like a small vessel /b because he owns it. However, one who is asked for just a b small /b vessel and he does not have one, b it seems to him like a large vessel. /b Therefore, Moses could say: What does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear, because in his eyes it was a minor matter.,We learned in the mishna if one repeats: b We give thanks, we give thanks, they silence him. /b , b Rabbi Zeira said: One who /b repeats himself while reciting i Shema /i and b says: Listen /b Israel, b Listen /b Israel b is like one who says: We give thanks, we give thanks. /b ,The Gemara b raises an objection: /b It was taught in a i baraita /i : b One who recites i Shema /i and repeats it, it is reprehensible. /b One may infer: b It is reprehensible, but they do not silence him. /b ,The Gemara answers: b This is not difficult; this /b case, where although it is reprehensible when one repeats i Shema /i , they do not silence him, is referring to b one who recites and repeats each individual word /b as he says it. In so doing he ruins the recitation of i Shema /i . However, b this /b case, where Rabbi Zeira holds that one who repeats i Shema /i they silence him, refers to b one who recites and repeats an entire verse, /b as it appears that he is worshiping separate authorities., b Rav Pappa said to Abaye /b with regard to this i halakha /i : b And perhaps initially he did not focus his attention /b on the recitation of i Shema /i , so he repeated it b and ultimately he focused his attention /b as he recited it the second time?,Abaye b said to him: /b

199. Nag Hammadi, The Gospel of Philip, 55.6-55.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 125

200. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.1.12, 1.2.5-1.2.6, 2.3, 2.3.7-2.3.9, 2.3.14, 4.3.32, 6.7.6, 15.1.1, 15.8.1 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human being, binary nature of •nature, of human beings •nature, of humans •bodies, relation to human nature Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 266; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 149; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 48, 207

201. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.9, 14.18.26-14.18.28 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human •nature, of human beings Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 161; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 72

202. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 4.29.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 194

4.29.2. Those who are called Encratites, and who sprung from Saturninus and Marcion, preached celibacy, setting aside the original arrangement of God and tacitly censuring him who made male and female for the propagation of the human race. They introduced also abstinence from the things called by them animate, thus showing ingratitude to the God who made all things. And they deny the salvation of the first man.

203. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 7.6.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 200

204. Augustine, De Spiritu Et Littera, 2.4, 3.5, 4.6, 6.9, 8.13-8.14, 13.22, 14.23, 17.29, 19.32, 21.36, 24.41, 25.42, 26.43-26.44, 28.48, 29.51, 31.53-31.54, 33.57, 33.59 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 182, 183, 185, 187

205. Augustine, De Nuptiis Et Concupiscentia, 1.1.1, 1.20.22, 1.21.23, 1.22.24, 1.23.26, 1.27.30, 1.30.33, 1.33.38, 2.1.1, 2.3.7-2.3.9, 2.23.28, 2.35.60 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 299

206. Augustine, De Vera Religione Liber Unus, 6.10, 7.12, 16.32, 28.51, 55.113 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 32

207. Augustine, De Natura Et Gratia Ad Timasium Et Jacobum Contra Pelagium, 3.3, 7.8, 8.9, 9.10, 11.12, 15.16, 17.19, 19.21, 20.22, 22.24-23.25, 23.25, 25.28, 30.34, 38.45, 44.51, 45.53, 49.57, 50.58, 51.59, 53.61, 53.62, 55.65, 57.67, 59.69, 67.80 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 48; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 189

208. Augustine, On The Morals of The Manichaeans, 1.11.18 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 32

209. Philastrius of Brescia, Diversarum Hereseon Liber, 120 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 139

210. Augustine, De Peccatorum Meritis Et Remissione Et De Baptismo Parvulorum, 1.2.2, 1.28.56, 1.34.63-1.34.64, 2.2.2, 3.11.20, 3.12.21, 3.13.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 178

211. Augustine, Enarrationes In Psalmos, a b c d\n0 118(17).8 118(17).8 118(17) 8\n1 118(22).2 118(22).2 118(22) 2\n2 118(26).1 118(26).1 118(26) 1\n3 118(25).5 118(25).5 118(25) 5\n4 118(27).6 118(27).6 118(27) 6\n5 31(2).9 31(2).9 31(2) 9\n6 31(2).8 31(2).8 31(2) 8\n7 31(2).7 31(2).7 31(2) 7\n8 31(2).6 31(2).6 31(2) 6\n9 31(2).4 31(2).4 31(2) 4\n10 31(2).3 31(2).3 31(2) 3\n11 118(4).2 118(4).2 118(4) 2\n12 118(16).1 118(16).1 118(16) 1\n13 118(11).6 118(11).6 118(11) 6\n14 118(9).1 118(9).1 118(9) 1\n15 118(3).1 118(3).1 118(3) 1\n16 118(25).6 118(25).6 118(25) 6\n17 118(23).8 118(23).8 118(23) 8\n18 118(19).6 118(19).6 118(19) 6\n19 118(19).3 118(19).3 118(19) 3\n20 118(17).5 118(17).5 118(17) 5\n21 118(16).6 118(16).6 118(16) 6\n22 118(10).5 118(10).5 118(10) 5\n23 118(11).4 118(11).4 118(11) 4\n24 118(11).5 118(11).5 118(11) 5\n25 118(14).4 118(14).4 118(14) 4\n26 118(17).1 118(17).1 118(17) 1\n27 118(17).2 118(17).2 118(17) 2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 257

212. Basil of Caesarea, Homilia Exhortatoria Ad Sanctum Baptisma, 1.2.7 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 204

213. Augustine, Enchiridion, 8.27, 24.96-25.98, 26.102 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 49

214. Augustine, The City of God, 14.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41

14.13. Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of sin. Sirach 10:13 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then - that is to say, the trangression of eating the forbidden fruit - was committed by persons who were already wicked. That evil fruit Matthew 7:18 could be brought forth only by a corrupt tree. But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: You cast them down when they lifted up themselves. For he does not say, when they had been lifted up, as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but when they lifted up themselves even then they were cast down - that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God. The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, You shall be as gods, Genesis 3:5 which they would much more readily have accomplished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light - this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, Pride goes before destruction, and before honor is humility; Proverbs 18:12 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God's prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Your name, O Lord; that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with You in seeking Your glory.

215. Macrobius, Commentary On The Dream of Scipio, 1.3.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

216. Marinus, Vita Proclus, 3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature (φύσις), human Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 70

217. Methodius of Olympus, Symposium, 3.3, 9.3, 10.3 (4th cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 59, 65

218. Cassian, Conferences, 3.12, 13.7, 13.11-13.13, 13.15-13.18 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 287

219. Augustine, Retractiones, 1.9.1, 1.9.3-1.9.4, 1.10.3, 1.13.5, 1.15.2, 1.16.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 19, 188, 264

220. Augustine, Sermons, 56.9.13, 151.1, 151.4, 151.6, 151.8, 152.5, 152.11, 153.10, 154.2-154.4, 154.10-154.11, 154.14, 154.17, 155.4, 155.6-155.9, 155.13-155.14, 156.2, 156.4-156.5, 156.9, 156.11-156.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of •human nature, human condition Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 48; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 131, 235, 238, 239

221. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 19, 188

222. Augustine, De Perfectione Justitiae Hominis Liber, 1.1, 2.1-2.4, 4.9-4.10, 5.11, 6.12-6.15, 7.16, 8.19, 11.28, 12.29 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 191, 192, 194

223. Augustine, De Gratia Christi Et De Peccato Originali Contra Pelagium Et Coelestinum, 1.2.2, 1.3.4, 1.4.5, 1.5.6, 1.7.8, 1.12.13, 1.16.17, 1.17.18, 1.22.24, 1.31.33-1.31.34, 1.35.38, 1.41.45, 1.47.52, 2.13.14, 2.15.16, 2.16.17, 2.21.23-2.21.24, 2.24.28, 2.32.37, 2.33.38, 2.38.43, 2.41.47 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 200

224. Augustine, De Praedestinatione Sanctorum., 3.7, 4.8, 12.24, 14.29, 15.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 287, 289

225. Augustine, De Genesi Contra Manichaeos Libri Duo, 1.18.29, 1.19.30, 1.20.31, 1.22.34, 1.25.43, 2.3.5, 2.15.22, 2.16.24 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 27, 63

226. Evagrius, On Discrimination In Respect of Passions And Thoughts, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

227. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 9.108 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 27

228. Augustine, De Gestis Pelagi, 3.9-3.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 199

229. Augustine, Breviculus Collationis Cum Donatistis, 3.10.19-3.10.20 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 178

230. Augustine, Confessions, 2.4.9, 2.5.11, 2.6.14, 2.7.15, 3.3.5, 10.27.38, 15.9.16 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 92

231. Augustine, Contra Adversarium Legis Et Prophetarum, 1.1.1, 1.16.29-1.16.30, 1.16.32, 1.24.51, 2.11.37, 2.12.40 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 264

232. Augustine, Contra Cresconium Grammaticum Partis Donati, 2.12.15-13.16 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 185

233. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, 2.2.2-2.2.3, 2.7.13-2.7.14, 3.9.25, 12.14 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 297, 298, 311, 312, 325

234. Augustine, Against Julian, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

235. Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Makrina, 11-12, 18-19, 2, 21, 35-37, 39, 6, 38 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 225

236. Ambrosiaster, Quaest., 127.10, 127.17-127.18, 127.24 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 139

237. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum (Homiliae 15), None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Penniman (2017), Raised on Christian Milk: Food and the Formation of the Soul in Early Christianity, 148, 264

238. Gregory of Nyssa, De Vita Mosis, 2.26, 2.134, 2.268 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 166

239. Augustine, De Quantitate Animae, 1.2-2.3, 34.77 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 16

240. Augustine, Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae Cirtensis Episcopi, 2.23.51-2.23.52, 2.37.85-2.37.87 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 289, 340, 341

241. Augustine, The Soul And Its Origin, 1.16.26-1.16.27 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 325

242. Augustine, De Baptismo Contra Donatistas, 3.13.18, 4.18.25, 4.21.28 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 200, 201

243. Augustine, De Correptione Et Gratia, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 92

244. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus Ad Simplicianum, 31.1, 51.4, 68.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 16, 29, 57

245. Augustine, On Genesis Against The Manichaeans, 11.30, 11.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41

246. Gregory of Nyssa, Dialogus De Anima Et Resurrectione, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •unity, of the human nature Found in books: Hellholm et al. (2010), Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity, 1211

247. Ambrose, De Excesu Fratris Suis Satyri Libri Duo, 2.6 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 206

248. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 243.13-244.11 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 60

249. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, 210.21-211.3, 217.6, 217.7, 217.8, 217.9, 217.10, 217.11, 217.12, 217.13, 217.14, 217.15 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 45

250. Stobaeus, Anthology, 1.79.5-1.79.6, 1.79.12-1.79.20, 1.133.3-1.133.5, 2.76.8, 2.122 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan

251. Damaskios, De Principiis, 2.117-2.118 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •bodies, relation to human nature Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 48

252. Boethius, De Consolatione, 2.7.1 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 48

253. Damaskios, Vita Isidori, 364, 324 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 48

254. Damaskios, In Phaedonem (Versio 1), 1.138-1.144, 8.2, 8.2.2-8.2.3 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature (φύσις), human Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 60, 70

255. Jerome, Commentaria In Epistolam Ad Ephesios, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

256. Jerome, Commentary On Ezekiel, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 352, 353

257. Jerome, Commentaria In Matthaeum (Commentaria In Evangelium S. Matthaei), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

258. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

259. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

260. Justinian, Institutiones, 1.2-3.1 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 336

261. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •origins, made by god, nature, or humans (calcidius) Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 181, 182

262. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 353

263. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria, 3.6, 3.6.7-3.6.8, 8.18 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 48, 64

264. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria, None (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 70, 175

265. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii, 4.15, 4.15-5.1, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21, 20.4, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 177.8, 177.12-178.2, 177.14, 177.15 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 70

266. Augustine, Letters, 167.3.12-167.3.13, 186.6.19 (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 49; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 194

267. Anon., Abot De Rabbi Nathan, None (7th cent. CE - 9th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 119

268. Augustine, Epistolae Ad Galatas Expositio (Cont.), 63.5-63.7 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 63

269. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 12, 29 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 30

270. Iamblichus, De Anima, 4.1.49, 4.25.45 (missingth cent. CE - iamblicusth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 264

271. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 127-128, 130-132, 129 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 28, 30

272. Photius, Bibliotheca (Library, Bibl.), 71 Tagged with subjects: •codex vaticanus graecus, human nature, view of •thucydides, human nature, views on Found in books: Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 73

273. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 85

274. Zacharias of Mytilene, Life of Severus, 149, 207 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 115

275. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 13

276. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 23-25, 27-29, 38-39, 26 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 150

278. Anon, Anonymous Prolegomena To Plato'S Philosophy, 4 Tagged with subjects: •nature (φύσις), human Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 60

286. Cicero, Academic Books, 19 Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 177

287. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 172

288. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 77-78 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 65

289. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.87, 1.179-1.189, 1.537, 1.552, 1.555, 2.53, 2.836, 2.913-2.915, 3.4, 3.126-3.130, 3.585-3.586 Tagged with subjects: •nature, human •nature, of human beings Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 25, 26, 27, 28, 161; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 29, 242, 345

290. Anon., Scholia On Argonautika, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 113, 264, 504

291. Artapanus, Apud Eusebius, None Tagged with subjects: •humanity, compound nature of Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 153

295. Proclus, Psalms, 34.17 Tagged with subjects: •jerome, st, church father, christ's human nature Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 352

297. Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos, 1.2, 1.3.2 Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 149

299. Philo of Alexandria, De Animalibus, None Tagged with subjects: •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 73

300. Dead Sea Scrolls, Mezuzah, 33-34 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 71

301. Dead Sea Scrolls, Phylactery, 7 Tagged with subjects: •human law, as opposed to nature Found in books: Hayes (2015), What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives, 75

302. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human nature Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 48

304. Aristoxenus, Pythagorean Precepts, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 266

305. Fshg, Fragments, 32, 34-35, 33 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hellholm et al. (2010), Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity, 1211

306. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 5.22-5.36, 6.17-6.20 Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 164

307. Anon., 4 Ezra, 7.118-7.119, 7.123-7.124, 8.42-8.45, 8.50-8.52 Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 109; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 99, 110

8.42. I answered and said, "If I have found favor before thee, let me speak. 8.43. For if the farmer's seed does not come up, because it has not received thy rain in due season, or if it has been ruined by too much rain, it perishes. 8.44. But man, who has been formed by thy hands and is called thy own image because he is made like thee, and for whose sake thou hast formed all things -- hast thou also made him like the farmer's seed? 8.45. No, O Lord who art over us! But spare thy people and have mercy on thy inheritance, for thou hast mercy on thy own creation." 8.50. For many miseries will affect those who inhabit the world in the last times, because they have walked in great pride. 8.51. But think of your own case, and inquire concerning the glory of those who are like yourself, 8.52. because it is for you that paradise is opened, the tree of life is planted, the age to come is prepared, plenty is provided, a city is built, rest is appointed, goodness is established and wisdom perfected beforehand.

308. Heraclitus, Allegoriae, 53 Tagged with subjects: •nature, of human beings Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 111

309. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 1 Tagged with subjects: •weakness, of human nature Found in books: Allison (2020), Saving One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Moral Formation in Community, 64

310. Zeno of Verona, Tractatus, 1.3.5 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41

312. Marcian, Institutions, 1 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, innate orientations •human nature, intellectual and moral development •rationality, and human nature Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 248

314. Nt, Matthew, 26.38-26.39 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, and temptation •human nature, perfected in christ Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 106

320. Eusebius, Panopl. Dogm., 26 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 204

321. Lactantius, Liber Graduum, 15.2, 20.17 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 204

322. Ps.-Macarius, Hom., 15.49 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 204

323. Pelagius, Virg. Laus, 6 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 41

325. Melito of Sardis, On Pascha, 49-54, 56, 55 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 110

328. Pelagius, Phil., 2.13 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 182

329. Carmina, Paulinus Nolensis, 25 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 297

330. Vitae, Epistularium, 7.127 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 321

331. Augustine17,21, 17,21 Csel 41, 329F., 311; Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 312

332. Pelagius, Expositiones Xiii Ep. Pauli, None Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 183

333. Hebrew Bible, Iob, 1.1 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 194

334. Hebrew Bible, Psalmi, 118119.20 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 255

335. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi, 12, 25, 30, 50, 64, 75-76, 94, 20 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 166

336. Augustine, Epistolae Ad Galatas Expositio, 17.6-17.10, 30.10, 31.2, 38.3-38.4 Tagged with subjects: •human nature, human condition Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 63

337. Julius Cassian, Comm. Ep. Gal., 6.8 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 190

338. Julius Cassian, Stromata, 3.91.1-3.91.2, 3.94.1, 3.95.1-3.95.2, 3.97.2, 3.102.3-3.102.4, 3.104.1 Tagged with subjects: •sexual situation of first humans, sin of adam and eve, nature of Found in books: Beatrice (2013), The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources, 190

339. Origen, Pg, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 106

341. Hebrew Bible, Qoh, 5.2.6 Tagged with subjects: •nature, human Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 5

342. Anon., 4Aruch, 9.14-9.20 Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77

343. Anon., T. Ash., 1.8 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 225

344. Hebrew Bible1 Chron 28, 1 Chron 289, 1 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 217

345. Dead Sea Scrolls, 1Qfestival Prayers, 3.2.23 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 243

346. Dead Sea Scrolls, Qs, 5.5 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 218

347. Dead Sea Scrolls, 1Q29, 15-16 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 235

349. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Qpesher, 37 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 8

350. Dead Sea Scrolls, 11Q10, 4.3 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 167

351. Anon., Prayer of Levi, 10, 12-15, 5, 8, 17 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 183

352. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Qexorcismar, 1.3-1.4 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 192

353. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q436, None Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 225

354. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q370, None Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 218

355. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q468, None Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 225

356. Anon., Testament of Abraham, 4.1-4.3 Tagged with subjects: •humanity, nature Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 99

357. Anon., Psalms of Solomon, 9.4 Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 197, 229

358. Anon., Odes of Solomon, 11, 20 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 77

359. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q437, None Tagged with subjects: •human, nature •nature, human Found in books: Garcia (2021), On Human Nature in Early Judaism: Creation, Composition, and Condition, 167

360. Diogenes of Oenoanda, New Fragments, Fr., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database