1. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Asklepios, as protector of health • Hygieia (Health),oaths invoking
Found in books: Renberg (2017) 262; Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 374
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2. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Health (variations in definition of) • Hippocrates, works,, Regimen in Health • harmony, as bodily health and mixture • health, Hippocratic notions of • health, as blending • health, equated with the mixed constitution
Found in books: Jouanna (2012) 321; Petridou (2016) 380; Walters (2020) 19
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3. Anon., Testament of Benjamin, 8.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • health • health, and purity
Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 51; Faßbeck and Killebrew (2016) 56
| 8.3. For as the sun is not defiled by shining on dung and mire, but rather drieth up both and driveth away the evil smell; so also the pure mind, though encompassed by the defilements of earth, rather cleanseth (them) and is not itself defiled.''. None |
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4. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.16-3.17, 3.50, 5.71 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • health • health,
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 174, 181; Long (2006) 28; Tsouni (2019) 111, 129, 176
| 3.16. \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <
3.50. \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <
5.71. \xa0Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. <''. None |
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5. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.16-3.17, 3.21, 3.50, 5.71 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • health • health, • health, bodily, as preferred indifferent
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 174, 181; Graver (2007) 159; Long (2006) 28; Tsouni (2019) 111, 129, 176
3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo." '3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint.
3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum.
3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE
5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere;'". None | 3.16. \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <' "
3.21. \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" '
3.50. \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <
5.71. \xa0Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. <''. None |
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6. New Testament, Titus, 2.7-2.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • health, of true teaching • health, virtue as • teaching, healthy teaching
Found in books: Damm (2018) 151, 153; Malherbe et al (2014) 117, 195
2.7. περὶ πάντα σεαυτὸν παρεχόμενος τύπον καλῶν ἔργων, ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀφθορίαν, σεμνότητα, 2.8. λόγον ὑγιῆ ἀκατάγνωστον, ἵνα ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐντραπῇ μηδὲν ἔχων λέγειν περὶ ἡμῶν φαῦλον.''. None | 2.7. in all things showing yourself an example of good works; in your teaching showing integrity, seriousness, incorruptibility, ' "2.8. and soundness of speech that can't be condemned; that he who opposes you may be ashamed, having no evil thing to say about us. "'. None |
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7. New Testament, Mark, 3.1, 3.6, 7.15, 9.35, 10.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Healing/Healing/Health [, Medicine] • health, and purity • health, of expendables • health, of urban non-elite
Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 80; Esler (2000) 205, 206; Tite (2009) 260
3.1. Καὶ εἰσῆλθεν πάλιν εἰς συναγωγήν, καὶ ἦν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωπος ἐξηραμμένην ἔχων τὴν χεῖρα·
3.6. Καὶ ἐξελθόντες οἱ Φαρισαῖοι εὐθὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἡρῳδιανῶν συμβούλιον ἐδίδουν κατʼ αὐτοῦ ὅπως αὐτὸν ἀπολέσωσιν.
7.15. οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς αὐτὸν ὃ δύναται κοινῶσαι αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκπορευόμενά ἐστιν τὰ κοινοῦντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
9.35. καὶ καθίσας ἐφώνησεν τοὺς δώδεκα καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς Εἴ τις θέλει πρῶτος εἶναι ἔσται πάντων ἔσχατος καὶ πάντων διάκονος.
10.2. Καὶ προσελθόντες Φαρισαῖοι ἐπηρώτων αὐτὸν εἰ ἔξεστιν ἀνδρὶ γυναῖκα ἀπολῦσαι, πειράζοντες αὐτόν.''. None | 3.1. He entered again into the synagogue, and there was a man there who had his hand withered.
3.6. The Pharisees went out, and immediately conspired with the Herodians against him, how they might destroy him.
7.15. There is nothing from outside of the man, that going into him can defile him; but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man.
9.35. He sat down, and called the twelve; and he said to them, "If any man wants to be first, he shall be last of all, and servant of all."
10.2. Pharisees came to him testing him, and asked him, "Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?"''. None |
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8. New Testament, Matthew, 18.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Healing/Healing/Health [, Medicine] • Schweitzer, Quest, Jesus, mental health
Found in books: Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 523; Tite (2009) 260
18.4. ὅστις οὖν ταπεινώσει ἑαυτὸν ὡς τὸ παιδίον τοῦτο, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μείζων ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν·''. None | 18.4. Whoever therefore humbles himself as this little child, the same is the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven. ''. None |
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9. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.34.3-1.34.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Asklepios, as protector of health • Health, Hygieia • health
Found in books: Renberg (2017) 262; Trapp et al (2016) 57, 60; Wilding (2022) 66, 93
1.34.3. παρέχεται δὲ ὁ βωμὸς μέρη· τὸ μὲν Ἡρακλέους καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι Παιῶνος, τὸ δὲ ἥρωσι καὶ ἡρώων ἀνεῖται γυναιξί, τρίτον δὲ Ἑστίας καὶ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἀμφιαράου καὶ τῶν παίδων Ἀμφιλόχου· Ἀλκμαίων δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐς Ἐριφύλην ἔργον οὔτε ἐν Ἀμφιαράου τινά, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ τῷ Ἀμφιλόχῳ τιμὴν ἔχει. τετάρτη δέ ἐστι τοῦ βωμοῦ μοῖρα Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Πανακείας, ἔτι δὲ Ἰασοῦς καὶ Ὑγείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Παιωνίας· πέμπτη δὲ πεποίηται νύμφαις καὶ Πανὶ καὶ ποταμοῖς Ἀχελῴῳ καὶ Κηφισῷ. τῷ δὲ Ἀμφιλόχῳ καὶ παρʼ Ἀθηναίοις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βωμὸς καὶ Κιλικίας ἐν Μαλλῷ μαντεῖον ἀψευδέστατον τῶν ἐπʼ ἐμοῦ. 1.34.4. ἔστι δὲ Ὠρωπίοις πηγὴ πλησίον τοῦ ναοῦ, ἣν Ἀμφιαράου καλοῦσιν, οὔτε θύοντες οὐδὲν ἐς αὐτὴν οὔτʼ ἐπὶ καθαρσίοις ἢ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι νομίζοντες· νόσου δὲ ἀκεσθείσης ἀνδρὶ μαντεύματος γενομένου καθέστηκεν ἄργυρον ἀφεῖναι καὶ χρυσὸν ἐπίσημον ἐς τὴν πηγήν, ταύτῃ γὰρ ἀνελθεῖν τὸν Ἀμφιάραον λέγουσιν ἤδη θεόν. Ἰοφῶν δὲ Κνώσσιος τῶν ἐξηγητῶν χρησμοὺς ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ παρείχετο, Ἀμφιάραον χρῆσαι φάμενος τοῖς ἐς Θήβας σταλεῖσιν Ἀργείων. ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη τὸ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπαγωγὸν ἀκρατῶς εἶχε· χωρὶς δὲ πλὴν ὅσους ἐξ Ἀπόλλωνος μανῆναι λέγουσι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, μάντεών γʼ οὐδεὶς χρησμολόγος ἦν, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ὀνείρατα ἐξηγήσασθαι καὶ διαγνῶναι πτήσεις ὀρνίθων καὶ σπλάγχνα ἱερείων.''. None | 1.34.3. The altar shows parts. One part is to Heracles, Zeus, and Apollo Healer, another is given up to heroes and to wives of heroes, the third is to Hestia and Hermes and Amphiaraus and the children of Amphilochus. But Alcmaeon, because of his treatment of Eriphyle, is honored neither in the temple of Amphiaraus nor yet with Amphilochus. The fourth portion of the altar is to Aphrodite and Panacea, and further to Iaso, Health and Athena Healer. The fifth is dedicated to the nymphs and to Pan, and to the rivers Achelous and Cephisus. The Athenians too have an altar to Amphilochus in the city, and there is at Mallus in Cilicia an oracle of his which is the most trustworthy of my day. 1.34.4. The Oropians have near the temple a spring, which they call the Spring of Amphiaraus; they neither sacrifice into it nor are wont to use it for purifications or for lustral water. But when a man has been cured of a disease through a response the custom is to throw silver and coined gold into the spring, for by this way they say that Amphiaraus rose up after he had become a god. Iophon the Cnossian, a guide, produced responses in hexameter verse, saying that Amphiaraus gave them to the Argives who were sent against Thebes . These verses unrestrainedly appealed to popular taste. Except those whom they say Apollo inspired of old none of the seers uttered oracles, but they were good at explaining dreams and interpreting the flights of birds and the entrails of victims.''. None |
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10. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Asklepios, as protector of health • health
Found in books: Renberg (2017) 173; Trapp et al (2016) 14
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11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.103 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • health • health, bodily, as preferred indifferent
Found in books: Graver (2007) 49; Long (2006) 18
| 7.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.''. None |
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12. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 4.20 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • health, and purity • health, disease
Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 32, 177; King (2006) 170
| 4.20. 20.For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not being mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence, they thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not from dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which is animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But they conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, and the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living; and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once sensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living being. Hence, universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in rejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are appropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are attended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of the female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and causing her to be pregt, defiles the soul, through its association with the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in consequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with males defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery, and emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes mingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of the soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a certain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things of an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this mixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are produced through mixture, one species being complicated with another, this mixture is denominated a defilement. As when some woman with a lively red Stains the pure iv'ry --- says Homer 22. And again painters call the mixtures of colours, |134 corruptions. It is usual, likewise to denominate that which is unmingled and pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted. For water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. But water, which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves behind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream. When from a limpid and perennial fount It defluous runs --- as Hesiod says 23. For such water is salubrious, because it is uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive into herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that the mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture of dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once living and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be reasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature; just, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body; and he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different and foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, it is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoetic, therefore, or discursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes dianoetically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a separation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper nutriment likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves it. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its composition. It is one thing, however, |135 to nourish, and another to fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various also is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly endeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of the rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron, though most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather, by contracting hat is necessary to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, he himself nourished, by adhering to God more closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homer 24 says, we were not in want either of meat or drink, that we might be truly immortal! --- the poet in thus speaking beautifully signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of death. If therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant that, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it. 25 Hence, it is much |136 to be wished that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which hunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the everyway-flowing river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him who truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call on them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, dismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to what remains to be discussed? |
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13. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 2.5.6
Tagged with subjects: • frugality, as the mother of health • public health
Found in books: Viglietti and Gildenhard (2020) 299; Walters (2020) 27
| 2.5.6. Other gods they worshipped, so that the gods might do them good. But to Fever they built temples, so that she might do them less hurt. of these there was one on the Palatine, another in the court of the Marian monuments, and a third at the upper end of Long Street. In them were many remedies stored up, appropriate for the sick. These were found out by experience to assuage the heats of the human spirit; but besides they preserved their health by the most certain assistance of hard work. Frugality was as it were the mother of their health, an enemy to luxurious banquets, and altogether averse from riotous drinking, and immoderate love-making.''. None |
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14. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Asklepios, as protector of health • Hygieia (Health),oaths invoking
Found in books: Renberg (2017) 173, 174; Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 375
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