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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.



All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
education, ethics Malherbe et al (2014) 430, 442
epicureanism, ethical, theory Malherbe et al (2014) 335
ethic Binder (2012) 40, 89
Niehoff (2011) 71, 182
ethic, avot, virtue Hayes (2022) 518, 519
ethic, in avot, intention, virtue Hayes (2022) 518
ethic, of entrustedness Morgan (2022) 312
ethic, rhetoric and Matthews (2010) 22, 23
ethic, value of mosaic law Niehoff (2011) 183
ethic, virtue Tite (2009) 144, 167, 244
ethical, agōn Malherbe et al (2014) 742
ethical, aim of knowledge/science, epistêmê, ἐπιστήμη‎ d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 193
ethical, allegories, acusmata, pythagorean, interpretation of Wolfsdorf (2020) 12, 13, 14, 15
ethical, allegory, aristeas, letter of Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 47
ethical, cheng, chinese concept Kaster(2005) 143
ethical, claims of ghost of clytemnestra Shilo (2022) 151, 153, 156, 160, 162, 164, 171
ethical, code of hades Shilo (2022) 73, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198
ethical, community, congregations, as an Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 238, 242, 244
ethical, concept, authenticity, as an Kaster(2005) 135
ethical, contingency, euripides Liapis and Petrides (2019) 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269
ethical, contingency, motifs, in postclassical tragedy Liapis and Petrides (2019) 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269
ethical, development, purification, stage in Joosse (2021) 65, 75, 116, 117, 118, 119, 129, 133, 134, 137, 215
ethical, divine-human trust as Morgan (2022) 69, 92, 133, 201, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318
ethical, education, gnosticism/gnostic christianity Damm (2018) 23, 190, 215, 216, 217, 218, 222
ethical, education, ideals of Damm (2018) 68
ethical, education, in book of proverbs Damm (2018) 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
ethical, education, judaism Damm (2018) 22, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70
ethical, education, material place and Damm (2018) 60, 61
ethical, education, related/relationships between Damm (2018) 4, 5, 51, 67, 68, 69, 70, 110, 127, 143, 194
ethical, equality, as an ancient category Keener(2005) 205, 206
ethical, existential questions, aggada in mishna, points to wider social Hayes (2022) 477, 478, 482, 500
ethical, hedonism Wolfsdorf (2020) 385, 386
ethical, honesty, as label Kaster(2005) 143, 144
ethical, imitation Joosse (2021) 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 50, 60, 68
ethical, impact of reading Dawson (2001) 116
ethical, implications of fastidium Kaster(2005) 131
ethical, inquiry, ethnography, and Wolfsdorf (2020) 504, 505, 506, 507, 508
ethical, instruction/teaching Stuckenbruck (2007) 160, 164, 249, 376
ethical, intellectualism Ramelli (2013) 272, 427, 481
ethical, intellectualism, socratic-platonic Ramelli (2013) 113, 123, 178
ethical, intellectualism, stoic Ramelli (2013) 123, 178
ethical, interpretation Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 30, 73
ethical, interpretation as part of literal interpretation Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 3, 30, 74, 251, 286, 313
ethical, interpretation of sacrifice of isaac Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 120, 121, 123, 312, 313, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326
ethical, interpretation, as part of a literal interpretation Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 3, 30, 74, 251, 286, 313
ethical, interpretation, sections lacking Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 3
ethical, interpretations of migrations of abraham, literal and Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 103, 107, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 228, 229, 230, 231
ethical, interpretations of sodom, literal and Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 114, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290
ethical, interpretations of the three visitors, literal and Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 50, 51, 110, 111, 112, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260
ethical, issues in interpetation of john Azar (2016) 42, 44, 120, 209
ethical, ly Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 46, 123
ethical, model, zeus, as poor Wolfsdorf (2020) 28
ethical, or of moral character, virtue Tsouni (2019) 139, 140
ethical, paradigm, epictetus Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 298
ethical, paradigms, paraenesis Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 297
ethical, parts conjoined, natural questions, physical and Williams (2012) 2, 3, 4, 77
ethical, perfectionism Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 187, 189, 191
ethical, philosophy, galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, and even progress towards Sorabji (2000) 260
ethical, philosophy, xenophanes, and criteria for Wolfsdorf (2020) 20
ethical, positions, carneadea carneades, his division of divisio Tsouni (2019) 60, 70, 90, 91, 93
ethical, practice, historiography, as Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022) 325
ethical, principles of pythagorean precepts, aristoxenus Wolfsdorf (2020) 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 711
ethical, quality, integritas, as an Kaster(2005) 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148
ethical, reflex, fastidium, as Kaster(2005) 110, 111, 112, 128
ethical, relativism Wolfsdorf (2020) 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 91
ethical, restrictions, of legal and magic Bortolani et al (2019) 8, 75, 77, 173, 174, 227, 276
ethical, teachers, money, payment of Wolfsdorf (2020) 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 391, 392, 393, 693
ethical, teachings Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 228, 245, 246, 247
ethical, traits, disposition, and emotion, and Kaster(2005) 154
ethical, values, associations involvement ethics, and with Gabrielsen and Paganini (2021) 22, 87, 110, 111, 115, 164, 167, 170, 172, 178, 184, 185, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 239, 240, 256
ethical, virtue Joosse (2021) 45, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 100, 101, 112, 123, 124
Schibli (2002) 243, 272
ethical, virtus Agri (2022) 18
ethical, virtus, martial vs Agri (2022) 5
ethical, vocabulary, acts of andrew Bremmer (2017) 117, 118
ethical, vs. religious meaning of hosios Peels (2016) 4, 5, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 110, 111
ethical/moral, values Ker and Wessels (2020) 9, 93
ethics Avery Peck et al. (2014) 6
Albrecht (2014) 273
Balberg (2014) 166, 178
Champion (2022) 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51, 84, 85, 96, 97, 137, 147, 150, 151, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205
Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 12, 48, 53, 54, 58, 60, 189, 251, 257, 277, 318, 325, 470, 472, 497, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 508, 509, 513, 517, 520, 525, 529, 531, 532, 534, 535, 539, 540, 552, 585, 626
Del Lucchese (2019) 138, 139, 188, 225, 251
Erler et al (2021) 18, 33, 80, 92, 95, 96, 103, 104, 109, 127, 128, 137, 203, 205, 211, 230, 239
Gagné (2020) 20, 21, 223
Geljon and Runia (2013) 23, 24, 102, 104, 107, 109
Jenkyns (2013) 231, 232
Jouanna (2012) 280
Lampe (2003) 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 207, 208, 209, 210, 213, 214, 219, 224, 225, 226, 273, 274, 275, 276, 280, 281, 282, 283, 415, 417, 420, 421, 423, 424
Levison (2009) 140
Lieu (2004) 119, 158, 159, 174, 175, 261
Lynskey (2021) 39, 230
Malherbe et al (2014) 460, 465, 490, 502, 508, 637, 742, 761, 762, 763, 824, 829
Motta and Petrucci (2022) 7, 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 35, 40, 47, 61, 62, 65, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 119, 131, 134, 135, 144, 148, 149, 203
Oksanish (2019) 38, 53, 54
Osborne (2001) 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248
Pinheiro et al (2015) 96
Poorthuis and Schwartz (2014) 205, 222
Rohmann (2016) 170
Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 8, 65, 66, 68, 69
Tuori (2016) 134, 135, 136, 137, 145, 285, 286, 290
Vinzent (2013) 29, 53, 62, 63, 79
d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 223
Černušková (2016) 17, 32, 62, 82, 86, 93, 114, 115, 117, 119, 122, 152, 222, 278, 296, 326
ethics, abortion, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 537, 538
ethics, aggada in mishna Hayes (2022) 503, 504, 506, 507, 508
ethics, al significance of proportion d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 271
ethics, and beauty d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 283, 284
ethics, and habituation Champion (2022) 57, 58, 126, 127, 175, 187, 192, 206, 207, 208
ethics, and humility Champion (2022) 125
ethics, and knowledge, hierarchy of Champion (2022) 79
ethics, and letters Champion (2022) 103
ethics, and mortality, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 531, 532
ethics, and physics, parts of philosophy, interrelatedness of Brouwer (2013) 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
ethics, and pilgrimage metaphor Champion (2022) 155, 156
ethics, and politics of aristotle Long (2006) 4, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 26, 27, 29, 162, 192, 340, 341, 349, 350, 359, 368, 369, 385, 391
ethics, and popular, ethics, Champion (2022) 192
ethics, and ritual Neusner Green and Avery-Peck (2022) 14
ethics, and soul theory, aristotle Singer and van Eijk (2018) 106
ethics, applied Sorabji (2000) 167, 168
ethics, apuleius on Hoenig (2018) 139, 140, 141
ethics, aristotelian virtue Langlands (2018) 89
ethics, aristotle Gray (2021) 73, 75, 193
ethics, aristotle on d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 259, 260, 263
ethics, aristotle, nichomachean Singer and van Eijk (2018) 106
ethics, aristotle, nicomachean Finkelberg (2019) 247, 253, 254, 264, 328
Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 28, 36, 364
Tsouni (2019) 55, 56, 118, 119, 129, 134, 135, 151, 165, 166, 168, 170, 173
Yona (2018) 18
van der EIjk (2005) 95, 210, 262
ethics, aristotle, on the founder of greek Huffman (2019) 135
ethics, as foundation of platonic curriculum Hoenig (2018) 107
ethics, as part of philosophy d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 184
ethics, as practical philosophy Hoenig (2018) 175
ethics, bourgeois Malherbe et al (2014) 464
ethics, change, metabolē, to wisdom, in Brouwer (2013) 58, 59, 60, 61
ethics, christian Bay (2022) 64
ethics, comparison with plato, in Brouwer (2013) 69, 70
ethics, consent and compliance, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 539, 540, 541
ethics, corresponding with human matters Brouwer (2013) 19, 22, 50
ethics, curriculum, exegesis and d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 41, 44, 221, 268, 269, 270
ethics, decorum, and stoic Bexley (2022) 49, 50, 51, 71, 72
ethics, democracy, and protagorean Wolfsdorf (2020) 88
ethics, desire for glory, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 531
ethics, didymus, arius?, epitome of peripatetic Tsouni (2019) 121, 126, 127, 129, 159, 162, 170, 179
ethics, diogenes of sinope xx, xxv, virtue Wolfsdorf (2020) 665, 666, 667
ethics, dual Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013) 179
ethics, epicurean Nisula (2012) 19
ethics, ethical, , also Singer and van Eijk (2018) 2, 4, 11, 14, 29, 83, 106, 119, 139
ethics, etymology Long (2006) 239, 249
ethics, eudemian Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 168
ethics, eudemian, aristotle Harte (2017) 248
ethics, exceptionality, in exemplarist Langlands (2018) 131
ethics, for moral progress Malherbe et al (2014) 126
ethics, galen Jouanna (2012) 273
ethics, gentleness, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 538
ethics, hippocratic, medical Jouanna (2012) 265
ethics, hippolytus, and stoic Bexley (2022) 225, 226, 227, 284, 285, 286, 287
ethics, human vocation, and paul’s theology and Dürr (2022) 274, 275
ethics, in avot Hayes (2022) 518, 519
ethics, in avot, exceeding formal halakha Hayes (2022) 503, 507, 589
ethics, in avot, in relations with gentiles Hayes (2022) 589
ethics, in avot, interpersonal relations Hayes (2022) 503, 504, 585
ethics, in avot, mental states and inner life Hayes (2022) 506
ethics, in avot, piety and righteousness Hayes (2022) 507, 508
ethics, in middle platonism d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 260, 261
ethics, in plato, socrates’ Wolfsdorf (2020) 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 451, 452
ethics, influence of socrates on Long (2006) 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 25, 337, 385
ethics, kosmos, and Horkey (2019) 109, 268
ethics, manicheanism, sexual Hayes (2022) 439
ethics, marital sex, sexual Hayes (2022) 553, 591
ethics, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542
ethics, memory, and Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019) 20, 177, 178, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301
ethics, metaphysical background of d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 270, 271, 272, 273
ethics, methods of interpretation, ancient rhetoric and Matthews (2010) 22, 23, 33, 34
ethics, mishnah, and Fonrobert and Jaffee (2007) 318
ethics, modern compared with ancient Long (2006) 25, 29, 30, 36
ethics, morality Frede and Laks (2001) 9, 91, 93, 94, 112, 123, 124, 126, 127, 143, 160, 163, 166
ethics, nicomachean d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 259
ethics, nicomachean x, xv Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 168, 320, 322, 487
ethics, nicomachean, aristotle Harte (2017) 149, 203, 248
ethics, normative Shilo (2022) 171
ethics, object of Brouwer (2013) 20
ethics, of architect Oksanish (2019) 20, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186
ethics, of care Morgan (2022) 82, 83, 295
ethics, of care, care / Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 55, 64, 67, 68, 105, 115, 120, 126, 127, 139, 148, 157, 281, 282, 283
ethics, of commitments, and integrity, values and Kaster(2005) 3
ethics, of environment Rubenstein (2018) 13
ethics, of epicureanism Long (2006) 161, 162, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 341
ethics, of hellenistic philosophy Long (2006) 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 38
ethics, of lying, philopseudes Mheallaigh (2014) 76, 77, 78, 79
ethics, of manichaeism Nisula (2012) 145, 159
ethics, of pyrrhonism Long (2006) 4, 6, 11
ethics, of stoicism Long (2006) 181, 188, 189, 280, 281, 311, 318, 319, 321, 324, 325, 326, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393
ethics, of zeno of citium Long (2006) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 27
ethics, paul, pauline Frey and Levison (2014) 307
ethics, payment, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 530, 531
ethics, persona, in stoic Bexley (2022) 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85, 86
ethics, plato Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 217, 218
ethics, plato on d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 260
ethics, plato, naturalistic Wolfsdorf (2020) 55, 57, 58, 59, 71
ethics, plato, on Horkey (2019) 109, 112, 116, 119, 140
ethics, plotinus on d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 261
ethics, popular, habituation, and Champion (2022) 192
ethics, purity, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 541, 542
ethics, relevance of mathematics for d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 178, 179
ethics, religion, and Malherbe et al (2014) 180
ethics, risk and caution, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 538, 539
ethics, role of nature in van der EIjk (2005) 214
ethics, role of σοφία‎, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 308
ethics, sexual Malherbe et al (2014) 476, 477, 494
van , t Westeinde (2021) 122
ethics, sexual celibacy, christian Hayes (2022) 428, 429
ethics, socrates, and Hoenig (2018) 14
ethics, socrates, as founder of greek Huffman (2019) 135, 136
ethics, socrates, influence on Long (2006) 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 337, 385
ethics, stoic Pinheiro et al (2015) 23
ethics, stoicism Malherbe et al (2014) 620, 765
Wynne (2019) 122, 271
ethics, stoicism, stoic Najman (2010) 90, 96, 98, 112
ethics, stoicism/stoics/stoic d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 267, 270
ethics, theology and d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 273
ethics, tragedy, and Shilo (2022) 156
ethics, treatment of disease, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 533, 534, 535, 536, 537
ethics, virtue Harte (2017) 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 210, 217, 218, 219
ethics, zoroastrian, sexual Hayes (2022) 405, 406, 407, 416
ethics, “do no harm”, medical Wolfsdorf (2020) 535, 536, 537
hippocratic, ethics Jouanna (2012) 265, 283, 284
justice/ethics, social Corley (2002) 18, 20, 21, 137, 153, 208, 209

List of validated texts:
69 validated results for "ethics"
1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 3.14, 20.5, 20.17, 21.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Deuteronomy, as ethical discourse • Qumran, ethics • ethical teachings • ethical(ly) • ethics • sacrifice of Isaac, ethical interpretation of • the three visitors, literal and ethical interpretations of

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 245; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 112, 322; Brooke et al (2008) 122; Geljon and Runia (2013) 24; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 123; Černušková (2016) 222

3.14. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־מֹשֶׁה אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶהְיֶה שְׁלָחַנִי אֲלֵיכֶם׃
20.5. לֹא־תִשְׁתַּחְוֶה לָהֶם וְלֹא תָעָבְדֵם כִּי אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֵל קַנָּא פֹּקֵד עֲוֺן אָבֹת עַל־בָּנִים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִים לְשֹׂנְאָי׃
20.17. וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־הָעָם אַל־תִּירָאוּ כִּי לְבַעֲבוּר נַסּוֹת אֶתְכֶם בָּא הָאֱלֹהִים וּבַעֲבוּר תִּהְיֶה יִרְאָתוֹ עַל־פְּנֵיכֶם לְבִלְתִּי תֶחֱטָאוּ׃
21.16. וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ וְנִמְצָא בְיָדוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת׃''. None
3.14. And God said unto Moses: ‘I AM THAT I AM’; and He said: ‘Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: I AM hath sent me unto you.’
20.5. thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me;
20.17. And Moses said unto the people: ‘Fear not; for God is come to prove you, and that His fear may be before you, that ye sin not.’
21.16. And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death.''. None
2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.26, 1.28, 17.1, 17.5, 17.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Qumran, ethics • ethic • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics • ethics of care • migrations of Abraham, literal and ethical interpretations of • sacrifice of Isaac, ethical interpretation of • social justice/ethics • the three visitors, literal and ethical interpretations of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 50, 208, 250, 256, 323; Brooke et al (2008) 119; Corley (2002) 153; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 12; Morgan (2022) 69, 82, 83; Niehoff (2011) 182; Osborne (2001) 234; Černušková (2016) 32

1.26. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
1.28. וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם אֱלֹהִים פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְכִבְשֻׁהָ וּרְדוּ בִּדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבְכָל־חַיָּה הָרֹמֶשֶׂת עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃
17.1. וַיְהִי אַבְרָם בֶּן־תִּשְׁעִים שָׁנָה וְתֵשַׁע שָׁנִים וַיֵּרָא יְהוָה אֶל־אַבְרָם וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו אֲנִי־אֵל שַׁדַּי הִתְהַלֵּךְ לְפָנַי וֶהְיֵה תָמִים׃
17.1. זֹאת בְּרִיתִי אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְרוּ בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם וּבֵין זַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר׃
17.5. וְלֹא־יִקָּרֵא עוֹד אֶת־שִׁמְךָ אַבְרָם וְהָיָה שִׁמְךָ אַבְרָהָם כִּי אַב־הֲמוֹן גּוֹיִם נְתַתִּיךָ׃

17.17. וַיִּפֹּל אַבְרָהָם עַל־פָּנָיו וַיִּצְחָק וַיֹּאמֶר בְּלִבּוֹ הַלְּבֶן מֵאָה־שָׁנָה יִוָּלֵד וְאִם־שָׂרָה הֲבַת־תִּשְׁעִים שָׁנָה תֵּלֵד׃' '. None
1.26. And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’
1.28. And God blessed them; and God said unto them: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth.’
17.1. And when Abram was ninety years old and nine, the LORD appeared to Abram, and said unto him: ‘I am God Almighty; walk before Me, and be thou wholehearted.
17.5. Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham; for the father of a multitude of nations have I made thee.

17.17. Then Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart: ‘Shall a child be born unto him that is a hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?’' '. None
3. Hebrew Bible, Hosea, 6.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristeas, Letter of, Ethical allegory • ethical, divine-human trust as

 Found in books: Morgan (2022) 316; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 47

6.6. כִּי חֶסֶד חָפַצְתִּי וְלֹא־זָבַח וְדַעַת אֱלֹהִים מֵעֹלוֹת׃''. None
6.6. For I desire mercy, and not sacrifice, And the knowledge of God rather than burnt-offerings.''. None
4. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 23.9 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • entrustedness, ethic of • ethical education, Judaism • ethical education, in Book of Proverbs • ethical, divine-human trust as

 Found in books: Damm (2018) 35; Morgan (2022) 312

23.9. בְּאָזְנֵי כְסִיל אַל־תְּדַבֵּר כִּי־יָבוּז לְשֵׂכֶל מִלֶּיךָ׃''. None
23.9. Speak not in the ears of a fool; for he will despise the wisdom of thy words.''. None
5. None, None, nan (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • equality (as an ancient ethical category) • social justice/ethics

 Found in books: Corley (2002) 208, 209; Keener(2005) 206

6. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 6.9-6.10, 61.1 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Instruction/Teaching, Ethical • ethical(ly) • methods of interpretation, ancient rhetoric and ethics • social justice/ethics

 Found in books: Corley (2002) 209; Matthews (2010) 33; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 123; Stuckenbruck (2007) 160

6.9. וַיֹּאמֶר לֵךְ וְאָמַרְתָּ לָעָם הַזֶּה שִׁמְעוּ שָׁמוֹעַ וְאַל־תָּבִינוּ וּרְאוּ רָאוֹ וְאַל־תֵּדָעוּ׃' '
61.1. רוּחַ אֲדֹנָי יְהוִה עָלָי יַעַן מָשַׁח יְהוָה אֹתִי לְבַשֵּׂר עֲנָוִים שְׁלָחַנִי לַחֲבֹשׁ לְנִשְׁבְּרֵי־לֵב לִקְרֹא לִשְׁבוּיִם דְּרוֹר וְלַאֲסוּרִים פְּקַח־קוֹחַ׃'
61.1. שׂוֹשׂ אָשִׂישׂ בַּיהוָה תָּגֵל נַפְשִׁי בֵּאלֹהַי כִּי הִלְבִּישַׁנִי בִּגְדֵי־יֶשַׁע מְעִיל צְדָקָה יְעָטָנִי כֶּחָתָן יְכַהֵן פְּאֵר וְכַכַּלָּה תַּעְדֶּה כֵלֶיהָ׃ '. None
6.9. And He said: ‘Go, and tell this people: Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not. 6.10. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they, seeing with their eyes, and hearing with their ears, and understanding with their heart, return, and be healed.’
61.1. The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; Because the LORD hath anointed me To bring good tidings unto the humble; He hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, To proclaim liberty to the captives, And the opening of the eyes to them that are bound;''. None
7. Hesiod, Works And Days, 287-292 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Diogenes of Sinope xx, xxv, virtue ethics • ethic(s)

 Found in books: Maciver (2012) 78; Wolfsdorf (2020) 665

287. τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι'288. ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δʼ ἐγγύθι ναίει· 289. τῆς δʼ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν 290. ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν 291. καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δʼ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, 292. ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. '. None
287. Perses, remember this, serve righteousne'288. And wholly sidestep the iniquity 289. of force. The son of Cronus made this act 290. For men - that fish, wild beasts and birds should eat 291. Each other, being lawless, but the pact 292. He made with humankind is very meet – '. None
8. Hesiod, Theogony, 453 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Care / Ethics of Care • Ethics

 Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 539; Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 55

453. Ῥείη δὲ δμηθεῖσα Κρόνῳ τέκε φαίδιμα τέκνα,''. None
453. of her fear father, and Zeus gave her fame''. None
9. Homer, Iliad, 2.214-2.215, 2.220, 3.156-3.158, 21.264, 23.205-23.207 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethic(s) • ethical qualities, adaptability, flexibility, versatility • ethical qualities, anger, wrath (ira, mênis) • ethical qualities, candor, frankness • ethical qualities, courage, valor (virtus, andreia, aretê) • ethical qualities, craftiness, deceit, deception, disguise, feigning, guile, sleight of hand, trickery (dolus, dolos) • ethical qualities, intelligence (sapientia, mêtis) • ethical qualities, stratagem, strategy • ethics • ethics, Iliadic or Achillean v. Odyssean ethics • ethics, of architect • ethnography, and ethical inquiry

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 72, 73, 74, 101, 161, 253, 272, 278, 279; Maciver (2012) 92, 123; Oksanish (2019) 170, 171, 183; Wolfsdorf (2020) 508

2.214. μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν, 2.215. ἀλλʼ ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοίϊον Ἀργείοισιν
2.220. ἔχθιστος δʼ Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστʼ ἦν ἠδʼ Ὀδυσῆϊ·
3.156. οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς 3.157. τοιῇδʼ ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν· 3.158. αἰνῶς ἀθανάτῃσι θεῇς εἰς ὦπα ἔοικεν·
21.264. καὶ λαιψηρὸν ἐόντα· θεοὶ δέ τε φέρτεροι ἀνδρῶν.
23.205. οὐχ ἕδος· εἶμι γὰρ αὖτις ἐπʼ Ὠκεανοῖο ῥέεθρα 23.206. Αἰθιόπων ἐς γαῖαν, ὅθι ῥέζουσʼ ἑκατόμβας 23.207. ἀθανάτοις, ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ μεταδαίσομαι ἱρῶν.''. None
2.214. thundereth on the long beach, and the deep roareth.Now the others sate them down and were stayed in their places, only there still kept chattering on Thersites of measureless speech, whose mind was full of great store of disorderly words, wherewith to utter revilings against the kings, idly, and in no orderly wise, 2.215. but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon.
2.220. Hateful was he to Achilles above all, and to Odysseus, for it was they twain that he was wont to revile; but now again with shrill cries he uttered abuse against goodly Agamemnon. With him were the Achaeans exceeding wroth, and had indignation in their hearts.
3.156. oftly they spake winged words one to another:Small blame that Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans should for such a woman long time suffer woes; wondrously like is she to the immortal goddesses to look upon. But even so, for all that she is such an one, let her depart upon the ships,
21.264. and as it floweth all the pebbles beneath are swept along therewith, and it glideth swiftly onward with murmuring sound down a sloping place and outstrippeth even him that guideth it;—even thus did the flood of the River
23.205. I may not sit, for I must go back unto the streams of Oceanus, unto the land of the Ethiopians, where they are sacrificing hecatombs to the immortals, that I too may share in the sacred feast. But Achilles prayeth the North Wind and the noisy West Wind to come, and promiseth them fair offerings, that so ye may rouse the pyre to burn whereon lieth 23.207. I may not sit, for I must go back unto the streams of Oceanus, unto the land of the Ethiopians, where they are sacrificing hecatombs to the immortals, that I too may share in the sacred feast. But Achilles prayeth the North Wind and the noisy West Wind to come, and promiseth them fair offerings, that so ye may rouse the pyre to burn whereon lieth ''. None
10. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics • Ethics • ethical qualities, anger, wrath (ira, mênis) • ethical qualities, force, violence • ethical qualities, foresight, prudence • ethical qualities, intelligence (sapientia, mêtis) • ethical qualities, restraint, self-control, self-restraint • ethical qualities, stratagem, strategy • ethics • ethics, Iliadic or Achillean v. Odyssean ethics

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 163, 203; Finkelberg (2019) 247; Fowler (2014) 159; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 103

11. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • money, payment of ethical teachers • virtue, ethical or of moral character

 Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 140; Wolfsdorf (2020) 98

280b. in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper.''. None
12. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, ethics • relevance of mathematics for ethics

 Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 218; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 179

508a. γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος''. None
508a. and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order, not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry. Very well: either we must refute this statement, that it is by the possession''. None
13. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, ethics • ethics, xi, • expression, Plato on ethical • phantastic mimesis,, on ethical expression in art

 Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 218; Rutter and Sparkes (2012) 114; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 59

247c. νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.' '. None
247c. pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven. But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colorless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region' '. None
14. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Nicomachean Ethics, x, xv • Plato, ethics • ethics • morality, ethics

 Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 322; Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 217; Erler et al (2021) 33; Frede and Laks (2001) 160, 163

500c. πραγματείας, καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλʼ εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτʼ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτʼ ἀδικούμενα ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο;'596a. βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον. '. None
500c. to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration? Impossible, he said. Then the lover of wisdom'596a. that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener. That is so, he said; but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it. Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand? I do. In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; '. None
15. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Plato, ethics • morality, ethics

 Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 12; Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 217, 218; Frede and Laks (2001) 163

90a. διὸ φυλακτέον ὅπως ἂν ἔχωσιν τὰς κινήσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους. τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπʼ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὀρθότατα λέγοντες· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν' '. None
90a. wherefore care must be taken that they have their motions relatively to one another in due proportion. And as regards the most lordly kind of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven. And herein we speak most truly; for it is by suspending our head and root from that region whence the substance of our soul first came that the Divine Power' '. None
16. Xenophon, Memoirs, 2.1.1-2.1.17, 2.1.21-2.1.33 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • Socrates, influence on ethics • ethical hedonism • ethics • ethics, ethical philosophy • ethics, influence of Socrates on • money, payment of ethical teachers

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 115; Long (2006) 9; Wolfsdorf (2020) 386, 391

2.1.1. ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοὺς γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μέν, ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δʼ, ὅπως μηδʼ ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; βούλει σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων· καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῴη γʼ ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο. 2.1.2. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 2.1.3. τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ ὀψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρῲ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, ἔφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε μὴ διὰ ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλʼ ἐθελοντὴν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. τί δέ, τὸ μαθεῖν εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; πολὺ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων. 2.1.4. οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἧττον ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα ἁλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γὰρ δήπου τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα, καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ ἁλίσκεται, τὰ δὲ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ λαγνείας, οἷον οἵ τε ὄρτυγες καὶ οἱ πέρδικες, πρὸς τὴν τῆς θηλείας φωνὴν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι τῶν ἀφροδισίων φερόμενοι καὶ ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τὰ δεινὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι; συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα. 2.1.5. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταὐτὰ πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων; ὥσπερ οἱ μοιχοὶ εἰσέρχονται εἰς τὰς εἰρκτάς, εἰδότες ὅτι κίνδυνος τῷ μοιχεύοντι ἅ τε ὁ νόμος ἀπειλεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἐνεδρευθῆναι καὶ ληφθέντα ὑβρισθῆναι· καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τὰ ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν; 2.1.6. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τάς τε πολεμικὰς καὶ τὰς γεωργικὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν; 2.1.7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς μηδʼ ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τὴν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτʼ ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτὸν δικαίως ἂν τάττοις; 2.1.8. ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καὶ οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω ἐμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί; 2.1.9. καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἅπτεσθαι, αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.
2.1.10. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότερον ἥδιον ζῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἥδιον οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν;
2.1.11. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλʼ εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει.
2.1.12. ἀλλʼ εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδὲ διʼ ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι·
2.1.13. ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται; ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδʼ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι.
2.1.14. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ· ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται·
2.1.15. σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δʼ ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὤν, καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἦ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα;
2.1.16. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἆρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἄν τι λαβεῖν ᾖ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τὴν ἀργίαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς;
2.1.17. κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅ τι διαφέρει τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν.
2.1.21. καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδέ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι. φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὡρμᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν διʼ ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέψονται ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται· 2.1.22. καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιέναι μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἁπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι· κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν ἀποβλέπειν. 2.1.23. ὡς δʼ ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπῃ. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥᾴστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώσῃ. 2.1.24. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος διέσῃ τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὕροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης ἢ τίνων ὀσφραινόμενος ἢ ἁπτόμενος, τίσι δὲ παιδικοῖς ὁμιλῶν μάλιστʼ ἂν εὐφρανθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. 2.1.25. ἐὰν δέ ποτε γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφʼ ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσῃ, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω. 2.1.26. καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; ἡ δέ, οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν. 2.1.27. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· καὶ ἐγὼ ἥκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρʼ ἄν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλʼ ᾗπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετʼ ἀληθείας. 2.1.28. τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλʼ εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεούς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἴει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τούς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρῶτι. 2.1.29. καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος· ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε. 2.1.30. καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· ὦ τλῆμον, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιοὺς μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίῃς, οἴνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζῃ καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλίνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις παρασκευάζῃ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅ τι ποιῇς ὕπνου ἐπιθυμεῖς· τὰ δʼ ἀφροδίσια πρὸ τοῦ δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καὶ γυναιξὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γὰρ παιδεύεις τοὺς σεαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μὲν νυκτὸς ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δʼ ἡμέρας τὸ χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα. 2.1.31. ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζῃ· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δʼ ἄν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δʼ ἂν δεομένῃ τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἳ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι. 2.1.32. ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλὸν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτʼ ἀνθρώπειον χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίγνεται. τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκω, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενὴς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός. 2.1.33. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γὰρ ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν· ὕπνος δʼ αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθιᾶσι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται· καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἥδονται πράττοντες, διʼ ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δʼ ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι.''. 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2.1.1. In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practise self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food? Oh yes, replied Aristippus, food does seem to come first; for one can’t live without food. 2.1.2. Well, now, will not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times? Yes, naturally. Now which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger? The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State business might be neglected during his tenure. And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink? Certainly. 2.1.3. And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be? To the same again. And the power to control his passions, so that he may not be hindered in doing necessary work? To the same again. And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task, but undertaking it willingly? That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule. And to which would the knowledge needful for overcoming enemies be more appropriately given? Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge. 2.1.4. Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink. Yes, certainly. Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so? 2.1.5. He agreed again. Now, don’t you think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women’s quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer’s head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger? Yes, I think it is. 2.1.6. And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don’t you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat? He agreed again. Don’t you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly? Certainly. 2.1.7. If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as fit to rule, shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers? He agreed again. Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself? 2.1.8. I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. Cyropaedia I. vi. 7; vii. ii, 26 f. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. 2.1.9. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with those fitted to be rulers : but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had. Here Socrates asked:
2.1.10. Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life? Certainly, replied Aristippus. To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life?
2.1.11. Nay, replied Aristippus, for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness.
2.1.12. Ah, said Socrates, if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers
2.1.13. — I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk? Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land.
2.1.14. A very cunning trick, that! cried Socrates, for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes Highwaymen slain by Theseus, Plutarch, Thes. c. 8 f. no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged.
2.1.15. But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living?
2.1.16. But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can’t run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants?
2.1.17. I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering.
2.1.21. Aye, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect concerning Virtue in the essay On Heracles that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it: When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth’s estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place, 2.1.22. and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature making towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow. 2.1.23. When they drew nigh to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me, and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road. You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you shall never know. 2.1.24. First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find, what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume; what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble. 2.1.25. And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you shall have the fruits of others’ toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will. 2.1.26. Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, Lady, pray what is your name? My friends call me Happiness, she said, but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice. 2.1.27. Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said: I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and I have taken note of your character during the time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. 2.1.28. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas : if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat. 2.1.29. And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness. And Virtue said: 2.1.30. What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. 2.1.31. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. 2.1.32. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. 2.1.33. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness. ''. None
17. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, ethics • democracy, and Protagorean ethics

 Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 217; Wolfsdorf (2020) 88

18. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Imitation, ethical • Purification, stage in ethical development • ethics • morality, ethics

 Found in books: Fowler (2014) 134, 159; Frede and Laks (2001) 163; Joosse (2021) 39, 215

19. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on ethics • Aristotle, ethics • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Plato on ethics • Purification, stage in ethical development • ethics in Middle Platonism • ethics, of Stoicism • ethics, stoic • virtue ethics • virtue, ethical

 Found in books: Gray (2021) 75; Harte (2017) 200, 205, 206, 210, 217, 218; Hockey (2019) 81; Joosse (2021) 65; Long (2006) 368, 378, 391; Schibli (2002) 243; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 260

20. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics • ethics, of Stoicism

 Found in books: Fowler (2014) 114; Long (2006) 378

21. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.17, 5.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Didymus (Arius?), epitome of Peripatetic ethics • Epicureanism, ethics of • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • ethics, of Epicureanism

 Found in books: Long (2006) 28, 341; Tsouni (2019) 129, 159

3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <
5.65. \xa0But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I\xa0speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. <''. None
22. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.17, 3.22, 3.73, 4.4, 5.14, 5.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Carneades, his division of ethical positions (carneadea divisio) • Didymus (Arius?), epitome of Peripatetic ethics • Epicureanism, ethics of • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • ethics • ethics, object of • ethics, of Epicureanism • ethics, stoic • ethics, xi, • parts of philosophy, interrelatedness of ethics and physics

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 20, 29; Erler et al (2021) 95, 96; Hockey (2019) 80; Jouanna (2012) 280; Long (2006) 28, 341; Tsouni (2019) 60, 121, 129, 159; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 61

3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint.
3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.
3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum
4.4. qui cum viderent ita nos esse natos, ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essemus, quae notae illustresque sunt, iustitiam dico, temperantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem—quae omnes similes artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem partem et tractatione differunt—, easque ipsas virtutes viderent nos magnificentius appetere et ardentius, habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius insitam quandam vel potius dett. insitamque quandam velut ( etiam A, velud BEN) potius (pocius) (insitam quasi quandam cod. Glogav. ) innatam cupiditatem scientiae natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani, eaque in maximis ingeniis maxime elucere, totam philosophiam tris in partis diviserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus.
5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet.
5.65. in omni autem autem enim BE honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia.''. None
3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <' "
3.22. \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" '
3.73. \xa0"The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to \'obey occasion,\' \'follow God,\' \'know thyself,\' and \'moderation in all things.\' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature\'s secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. <
4.4. \xa0Well, these philosophers observed (1)\xa0that we are so constituted as to have a natural aptitude for the recognized and standard virtues in general, I\xa0mean Justice, Temperance and the others of that class (all of which resemble the end of the arts, and differ only by excelling them in the material with which they work and in their treatment of it); they observed moreover that we pursue these virtues with a more lofty enthusiasm than we do the arts; and (2)\xa0that we possess an implanted or rather an innate appetite for knowledge, and (3)\xa0that we are naturally disposed towards social life with our fellow men and towards fellowship and community with the human race; and that these instincts are displayed most clearly in the most highly endowed natures. Accordingly they divided philosophy into three departments, a division that was retained, as we notice, by Zeno. <
5.14. \xa0"I\xa0pass over a\xa0number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I\xa0know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. <
5.65. \xa0But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I\xa0speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. <''. None
23. Cicero, On Duties, 1.15, 1.107-1.115 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • Zeno of Citium, ethics of • ethics, of Stoicism • ethics, of architect • persona, in Stoic ethics

 Found in books: Bexley (2022) 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 84; Long (2006) 15, 311, 368; Oksanish (2019) 182

1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere.' '. None
1.107. \xa0We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. <' "1.108. \xa0Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏ\x81Ï\x89ν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. <" '1.109. \xa0Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â\x80\x94 both father and son â\x80\x94 and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I\xa0have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â\x80\x94 the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â\x80\x94 had no such gracious manner in social intercourse .\xa0.\xa0., and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. < 1.110. \xa0Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one\'s nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â\x80\x94 that is, if it is in direct opposition to one\'s natural genius. <' "1.111. \xa0If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. <" '1.112. \xa0Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another under the same circumstances a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. <' "1.113. \xa0How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a\xa0thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. <" '1.114. \xa0Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I\xa0remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. < 1.115. \xa0To the two above-mentioned characters is added a\xa0third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a\xa0fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another. <' '. None
24. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 15.11-15.20, 25.10-25.11, 34.25-34.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethical • Instruction/Teaching, Ethical • ethical education, Judaism • ethical education, in Book of Proverbs • ethics • social justice/ethics

 Found in books: Corley (2002) 18, 137; Damm (2018) 49; Ruzer (2020) 116; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 68; Stuckenbruck (2007) 249

15.11. Do not say, "Because of the Lord I left the right way";for he will not do what he hates. 15.12. Do not say, "It was he who led me astray";for he had no need of a sinful man. 15.13. The Lord hates all abominations,and they are not loved by those who fear him. 15.14. It was he who created man in the beginning,and he left him in the power of his own inclination. 15.15. If you will, you can keep the commandments,and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. 15.16. He has placed before you fire and water:stretch out your hand for whichever you wish. 15.17. Before a man are life and death,and whichever he chooses will be given to him. 15.18. For great is the wisdom of the Lord;he is mighty in power and sees everything; 15.19. his eyes are on those who fear him,and he knows every deed of man. 25.11. The fear of the Lord surpasses everything;to whom shall be likened the one who holds it fast?
34.25. If a man washes after touching a dead body,and touches it again,what has he gained by his washing? 34.26. So if a man fasts for his sins,and goes again and does the same things,who will listen to his prayer?And what has he gained by humbling himself?' '. None
25. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 104; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 94

26. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics, of Stoicism • virtus, ethical

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 18; Long (2006) 381

27. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Deuteronomy, as ethical discourse • Qumran, ethics • ethical education, Judaism • ethical education, ideals of • ethical education, related/relationships between • ethics

 Found in books: Brooke et al (2008) 120, 124; Damm (2018) 59, 68

28. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 204 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Instruction/Teaching, Ethical • ethics

 Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 8; Stuckenbruck (2007) 249

204. nevertheless, though it belongs to me, I have no objection to those who deserve it enjoying a share of it. But who can be deserving to do so, save he who obeys me and my will? for to this man it shall be given to feel as little grief as possible and as little fear as possible, proceeding along that road which is inaccessible to passions and vices, but which is frequented by excellence of soul and virtue." ''. None
29. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 101 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Sodom, literal and ethical interpretations of • ethics

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 282; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 8

101. For the indulgences of intemperance and gluttony, and whatever other vices the immoderate and insatiable pleasures, when completely filled with an abundance of all external things, produce and bring forth, do not allow the soul to proceed onwards by the plain and straight road, but compel it to fall into ravines and gulfs, until they utterly destroy it; but those practices which adhere to patience, and endurance, and moderation, and all other virtues, keep the soul in the straight road, leaving no stumbling block in the way, against which it can stumble and fall. Very naturally, therefore, has Moses declared that temperance clings to the right way, because it is plain that the contrary habit, intemperance, is always straying from the road. XXIII. ''. None
30. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 92-93 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics • migrations of Abraham, literal and ethical interpretations of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 229; Černušková (2016) 114

92. Nor does it follow, because the feast is the symbol of the joy of the soul and of its gratitude towards God, that we are to repudiate the assemblies ordained at the periodical seasons of the year; nor because the rite of circumcision is an emblem of the excision of pleasures and of all the passions, and of the destruction of that impious opinion, according to which the mind has imagined itself to be by itself competent to produce offspring, does it follow that we are to annul the law which has been enacted about circumcision. Since we shall neglect the laws about the due observance of the ceremonies in the temple, and numbers of others too, if we exclude all figurative interpretation and attend only to those things which are expressly ordained in plain words. '93. But it is right to think that this class of things resembles the body, and the other class the soul; therefore, just as we take care of the body because it is the abode of the soul, so also must we take care of the laws that are enacted in plain terms: for while they are regarded, those other things also will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are the symbols, and in the same way one will escape blame and accusation from men in general. '. None
31. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 72-75, 79-80, 88, 128, 157 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Ethics, • Sodom, literal and ethical interpretations of • ethics • migrations of Abraham, literal and ethical interpretations of • the three visitors, literal and ethical interpretations of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 213, 258, 281, 284, 287; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 12, 189; Del Lucchese (2019) 251; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 8

72. And he would not err who should raise the question why Moses attributed the creation of man alone not to one creator, as he did that of other animals, but to several. For he introduces the Father of the universe using this language: "Let us make man after our image, and in our likeness." Had he then, shall I say, need of any one whatever to help him, He to whom all things are subject? Or, when he was making the heaven and the earth and the sea, was he in need of no one to co-operate with him; and yet was he unable himself by his own power to make man an animal so short-lived and so exposed to the assaults of fate without the assistance of others? It is plain that the real cause of his so acting is known to God alone, but one which to a reasonable conjecture appears probable and credible, I think I should not conceal; and it is this. 73. of existing things, there are some which partake neither of virtue nor of vice; as for instance, plants and irrational animals; the one, because they are destitute of soul, and are regulated by a nature void of sense; and the other, because they are not endowed with mind of reason. But mind and reason may be looked upon as the abode of virtue and vice; as it is in them that they seem to dwell. Some things again partake of virtue alone, being without any participation in any kind of vice; as for instance, the stars, for they are said to be animals, and animals endowed with intelligence; or I might rather say, the mind of each of them is wholly and entirely virtuous, and unsusceptible of every kind of evil. Some things again are of a mixed nature, like man, who is capable of opposite qualities, of wisdom and folly, of temperance and dissoluteness, of courage and cowardice, of justice and injustice, in short of good and evil, of what is honourable and what is disgraceful, of virtue and vice. 74. Now it was a very appropriate task for God the Father of all to create by himself alone, those things which were wholly good, on account of their kindred with himself. And it was not inconsistent with his dignity to create those which were indifferent since they too are devoid of evil, which is hateful to him. To create the beings of a mixed nature, was partly consistent and partly inconsistent with his dignity; consistent by reason of the more excellent idea which is mingled in them; inconsistent because of the opposite and worse one. 75. It is on this account that Moses says, at the creation of man alone that God said, "Let us make man," which expression shows an assumption of other beings to himself as assistants, in order that God, the governor of all things, might have all the blameless intentions and actions of man, when he does right attributed to him; and that his other assistants might bear the imputation of his contrary actions. For it was fitting that the Father should in the eyes of his children be free from all imputation of evil; and vice and energy in accordance with vice are evil.
79. This is the first reason on account of which it seems that man was created after all other animals. And there is another not altogether unreasonable, which I must mention. At the moment of his first birth, man found all the requisites for life ready prepared for him that he might teach them to those who should come afterwards. Nature all but crying out with a distinct voice, that men, imitating the Author of their being, should pass their lives without labour and without trouble, living in the most ungrudging abundance and plenty. And this would be the case if there were neither irrational pleasures to obtain mastery over the soul raising up a wall of gluttony and lasciviousness, nor desires of glory, or power, or riches, to assume dominion over life, nor pains to contract and warp the intellect, nor that evil councillor--fear, to restrain the natural inclinations towards virtuous actions, nor folly and cowardice, and injustice, and the incalculable multitude of other evils to attack them. 80. But now that all the evils which I have now been mentioning are vigorous, and that men abandon themselves without restraint to their passions, and to those unbridled and guilty inclinations, which it is impious even to mention, justice encounters them as a suitable chastiser of wicked habits; and therefore, as a punishment for wrong doers, the necessaries of life have been made difficult of acquisition. For men ploughing up the plains with difficulty, and bringing streams from rivers, and fountains by channels, and sowing and planting, and submitting indefatigably day and night to the labour of cultivating the ground, provide themselves every year with what is necessary, even that at times being attended with pain; and not very sufficient in quantity, from being injured by many causes. For either a fall of incessant rain has carried away the crops, or the weight of hail which has fallen upon them has crushed them altogether, or snow has chilled them, or the violence of the winds has torn them up by the roots; for water and air cause many alterations, tending to destroy and productiveness of the crops.
88. for the charioteers sit behind their beasts of burden, and are placed at, their backs, and yet when they have the reins in their hands, they guide them wherever they choose, and at one time they urge them on to a swift pace, and at another time they hold them back, if they are going on at a speed greater than is desirable. And pilots again, sitting in the hindmost part of the ship, that is the stern are, as one may say, the most important of all the people in the ship, inasmuch as they have the safety of the ship and of all those who are in it, in their hands. And so the Creator has made man to be as it were a charioteer and pilot over all other animals, in order that he may hold the reins and direct the course of every thing upon earth, having the superintendence of all animals and plants, as a sort of viceroy of the principal and mighty King. XXX.
128. These things, and more still are said in a philosophical spirit about the number seven, on account of which it has received the highest honours, in the highest nature. And it is honoured by those of the highest reputation among both Greeks and barbarians, who devote themselves to mathematical sciences. It was also greatly honoured by Moses, a man much attached to excellence of all sorts, who described its beauty on the most holy pillars of the law, and wrote it in the hearts of all those who were subject to him, commanding them at the end of each period of six days to keep the seventh holy; abstaining from all other works which are done in the seeking after and providing the means of life, devoting that day to the single object of philosophizing with a view to the improvement of their morals, and the examination of their consciences: for conscience being seated in the soul as a judge, is not afraid to reprove men, sometimes employing pretty vehement threats; at other times by milder admonitions, using threats in regard to matters where men appear to be disobedient, of deliberate purpose, and admonitions when their offences seem involuntary, through want of foresight, in order to prevent their hereafter offending in a similar manner. XLIV. '
157. And these things are not mere fabulous inventions, in which the race of poets and sophists delights, but are rather types shadowing forth some allegorical truth, according to some mystical explanation. And any one who follows a reasonable train of conjecture, will say with great propriety, that the aforesaid serpent is the symbol of pleasure, because in the first place he is destitute of feet, and crawls on his belly with his face downwards. In the second place, because he uses lumps of clay for food. Thirdly, because he bears poison in his teeth, by which it is his nature to kill those who are bitten by him. '. None
32. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 2.13, 2.67 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Sodom, literal and ethical interpretations of • Stoicism (Stoic ethics) • ethical interpretation, as part of a literal interpretation • ethics • literal interpretation, ethical interpretation as part of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 282, 286; Najman (2010) 90; Černušková (2016) 115

2.13. if any one examines them by his reason, he will find to be put in motion in an innumerable multitude of pretexts, either because of wars, or of tyrannies, or of some other unexpected events which come upon nations through the various alterations and innovations of fortune; and very often luxury, abounding in all kind of superfluity and unbounded extravagance, has overturned laws, from the multitude not being able to bear unlimited prosperity, but having a tendency to become insolent through satiety, and insolence is in opposition to law.
2.67. Therefore he, with a few other men, was dear to God and devoted to God, being inspired by heavenly love, and honouring the Father of the universe above all things, and being in return honoured by him in a particular manner. And it was an honour well adapted to the wise man to be allowed to serve the true and living God. Now the priesthood has for its duty the service of God. of this honour, then, Moses was thought worthy, than which there is no greater honour in the whole world, being instructed by the sacred oracles of God in everything that related to the sacred offices and ministrations.''. None
33. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics, of architect • patronage, and reciprocity ethic

 Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 18; Oksanish (2019) 154

34. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, ethics of • Ethics, • ethics, of architect • morality, ethics

 Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 138; Frede and Laks (2001) 160; Long (2006) 185; Oksanish (2019) 179, 180

35. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Instruction/Teaching, Ethical • ethics

 Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 8; Stuckenbruck (2007) 249

36. Anon., Didache, 2-4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • congregations, as an ethical community • ethical teachings • ethics

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 228, 238, 242; Lieu (2004) 174, 175

2. And the second commandment of the Teaching; You shall not commit murder, you shall not commit adultery, Exodus
20:13-14 you shall not commit pederasty, you shall not commit fornication, you shall not steal, Exodus
20:15 you shall not practice magic, you shall not practice witchcraft, you shall not murder a child by abortion nor kill that which is begotten. You shall not covet the things of your neighbour, Exodus
20:17 you shall not forswear yourself, Matthew 5:34 you shall not bear false witness, Exodus
20:16 you shall not speak evil, you shall bear no grudge. You shall not be double-minded nor double-tongued; for to be double-tongued is a snare of death. Your speech shall not be false, nor empty, but fulfilled by deed. You shall not be covetous, nor rapacious, nor a hypocrite, nor evil disposed, nor haughty. You shall not take evil counsel against your neighbour. You shall not hate any man; but some you shall reprove, and concerning some you shall pray, and some you shall love more than your own life. '3. My child, flee from every evil thing, and from every likeness of it. Be not prone to anger, for anger leads the way to murder; neither jealous, nor quarrelsome, nor of hot temper; for out of all these murders are engendered. My child, be not a lustful one; for lust leads the way to fornication; neither a filthy talker, nor of lofty eye; for out of all these adulteries are engendered. My child, be not an observer of omens, since it leads the way to idolatry; neither an enchanter, nor an astrologer, nor a purifier, nor be willing to look at these things; for out of all these idolatry is engendered. My child, be not a liar, since a lie leads the way to theft; neither money-loving, nor vainglorious, for out of all these thefts are engendered. My child, be not a murmurer, since it leads the way to blasphemy; neither self-willed nor evil-minded, for out of all these blasphemies are engendered. But be meek, since the meek shall inherit the earth. Matthew 5:5 Be long-suffering and pitiful and guileless and gentle and good and always trembling at the words which you have heard. You shall not exalt yourself, Luke 18:14 nor give over-confidence to your soul. Your soul shall not be joined with lofty ones, but with just and lowly ones shall it have its intercourse. The workings that befall you receive as good, knowing that apart from God nothing comes to pass. 4. My child, him that speaks to you the word of God remember night and day; and you shall honour him as the Lord; for in the place whence lordly rule is uttered, there is the Lord. And you shall seek out day by day the faces of the saints, in order that you may rest upon their words. You shall not long for division, but shall bring those who contend to peace. You shall judge righteously, you shall not respect persons in reproving for transgressions. You shall not be undecided whether it shall be or no. Be not a stretcher forth of the hands to receive and a drawer of them back to give. If you have anything, through your hands you shall give ransom for your sins. You shall not hesitate to give, nor murmur when you give; for you shall know who is the good repayer of the hire. You shall not turn away from him that is in want, but you shall share all things with your brother, and shall not say that they are your own; for if you are partakers in that which is immortal, how much more in things which are mortal? You shall not remove your hand from your son or from your daughter, but from their youth shall teach them the fear of God. Ephesians 6:4 You shall not enjoin anything in your bitterness upon your bondman or maidservant, who hope in the same God, lest ever they shall fear not God who is over both; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1 for he comes not to call according to the outward appearance, but unto them whom the Spirit has prepared. And you bondmen shall be subject to your masters as to a type of God, in modesty and fear. Ephesians 6:5; Colossians 3:
2 You shall hate all hypocrisy and everything which is not pleasing to the Lord. Forsake in no way the commandments of the Lord; but you shall keep what you have received, neither adding thereto nor taking away therefrom . Deuteronomy 1
2 In the church you shall acknowledge your transgressions, and you shall not come near for your prayer with an evil conscience. This is the way of life. '. None
37. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.27.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epictetus, Ethical paradigm • ethics, of Stoicism

 Found in books: Long (2006) 387; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 298

1.27.10. APPEARANCES are to us in four ways: for either things appear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the PeloponnesusIliad. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety. See Levin’s Six Lectures, 1871 . Lecture II., On the Pyrrhonian Ethic; Lecture III., On the grounds of Scepticism. and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit? The contrary habit. You hear the ignorant say: That unfortunate person is dead: his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land. Hear the contrary way of speaking: Tear yourself from these expressions: oppose to one habit the contrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have manifest praecognitions ( προλήψεις ) cleared of all impurities and ready to hand. When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way: I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing any thing myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble.—Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death: discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to me?—Yes, but you will be an impious man.—In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now?—To sum up, remember this that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary (true)? Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence of common consent (opinion). If I had a suit even about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which belongs to the matter in hand. The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this, whether there is a criterion of truth; and in the first place, the question is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those things which are perceived by the senses. —Schweighaeuser. The strength of the Stoic system was that it furnishes a groundwork of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life: on the other hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the word, was abandoned. Levin’s Six Lectures, p. 70. How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow any thing, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you yourselves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill? What then? Ought we not with all our power to hold to this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortifying ourselves against the arguments which are directed against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well, he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better on something else.''. None
38. Mishnah, Peah, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethical • aggada in Mishna, points to wider social, ethical, existential questions

 Found in books: Hayes (2022) 500; Ruzer (2020) 116

1.1. אֵלּוּ דְבָרִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם שִׁעוּר. הַפֵּאָה, וְהַבִּכּוּרִים, וְהָרֵאָיוֹן, וּגְמִילוּת חֲסָדִים, וְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה. אֵלּוּ דְבָרִים שֶׁאָדָם אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹתֵיהֶן בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה וְהַקֶּרֶן קַיֶּמֶת לוֹ לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. כִּבּוּד אָב וָאֵם, וּגְמִילוּת חֲסָדִים, וַהֲבָאַת שָׁלוֹם בֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ, וְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה כְּנֶגֶד כֻּלָּם:''. None
1.1. These are the things that have no definite quantity: The corners of the field. First-fruits; The offerings brought on appearing at the Temple on the three pilgrimage festivals. The performance of righteous deeds; And the study of the torah. The following are the things for which a man enjoys the fruits in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come: Honoring one’s father and mother; The performance of righteous deeds; And the making of peace between a person and his friend; And the study of the torah is equal to them all.''. None
39. New Testament, 1 Peter, 2.5, 4.13-4.14, 4.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • equality (as an ancient ethical category) • ethics • ethics of care

 Found in books: Hockey (2019) 105, 245; Keener(2005) 205; Morgan (2022) 295; Černušková (2016) 296

2.5. καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομεῖσθε οἶκος πνευματικὸς εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον, ἀνενέγκαι πνευματικὰς θυσίας εὐπροσδέκτους θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ·
4.13. ἀλλὰ καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν χαίρετε, ἵνα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι. 4.14. εἰὀνειδίζεσθεἐν ὀνόματιΧριστοῦ,μακάριοι, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δόξης καὶτὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεῦμα ἐφʼὑμᾶςἀναπαύεται.
4.17. ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς τοῦἄρξασθαιτὸ κρίμαἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκουτοῦ θεοῦ· εἰ δὲ πρῶτον ἀφʼ ἡμῶν, τί τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀπειθούντων τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ εὐαγγελίῳ;''. None
2.5. You also, as living stones, are built up as a spiritual house, to be a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God through Jesus Christ. ' "
4.13. But because you are partakers of Christ's sufferings, rejoice; that at the revelation of his glory also you may rejoice with exceeding joy. " '4.14. If you are insulted for the name of Christ, blessed are you; because the Spirit of glory and of God rests on you. On their part he is blasphemed, but on your part he is glorified. ' "
4.17. For the time has come for judgment to begin at the house of God. If it begins first with us, what will happen to those who don't obey the gospel of God? "'. None
40. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 4.1, 4.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epictetus, Ethical paradigm • Ethics • Paraenesis, Ethical paradigms • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics

 Found in books: Lampe (2003) 99, 213; Lieu (2004) 158; Morgan (2022) 69, 316, 317; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 297, 298

4.1. Οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ.

4.13. δυσφημούμενοι παρακαλοῦμεν· ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν, πάντων περίψημα, ἕως ἄρτι.' '. None
4.1. So let a man think of us as Christ's servants, and stewards ofGod's mysteries." '

4.13. Being defamed, we entreat. We are made as the filthof the world, the dirt wiped off by all, even until now.' ". None
41. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 4.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics • religion, and ethics

 Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 180, 763; Morgan (2022) 69

4.9. Περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾷν ἀλλήλους·''. None
4.9. But concerning brotherly love, you have no need that one write to you. For you yourselves are taught by God to love one another, ''. None
42. New Testament, 1 Timothy, 2.2, 2.7-2.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics • ethics, bourgeois • ethics, sexual

 Found in books: Lampe (2003) 213, 226; Malherbe et al (2014) 460, 464, 477

2.2. ὑπὲρ βασιλέων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντων, ἵνα ἤρεμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον διάγωμεν ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι.
2.7. εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην ἐγὼ κῆρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος, — ἀλήθειαν λέγω, οὐ ψεύδομαι, — διδάσκαλος ἐθνῶν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ. 2.8. Βούλομαι οὖν προσεύχεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, ἐπαίροντας ὁσίους χεῖρας χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμῶν. 2.9. Ὡσαύτως γυναῖκας ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς, μὴ ἐν πλέγμασιν καὶ χρυσίῳ ἢ μαργαρίταις ἢ ἱματισμῷ πολυτελεῖ,''. None
2.2. for kings and all who are in high places; that we may lead a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and reverence.
2.7. to which I was appointed a preacher and an apostle (I am telling the truth in Christ, not lying), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth. 2.8. I desire therefore that the men in every place pray, lifting up holy hands without wrath and doubting. 2.9. In the same way, that women also adorn themselves in decent clothing, with modesty and propriety; not just with braided hair, gold, pearls, or expensive clothing; ''. None
43. New Testament, Acts, 17.18, 17.28 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Stoicism, ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 232; Malherbe et al (2014) 763, 765; Rohmann (2016) 170

17.18. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων καὶ Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καί τινες ἔλεγον Τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; οἱ δέ Ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι·
17.28. ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, ὡς καί τινες τῶν καθʼ ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασιν
17.18. Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers also encountered him. Some said, "What does this babbler want to say?"Others said, "He seems to be advocating foreign demons," because he preached Jesus and the resurrection. ' "
17.28. 'For in him we live, and move, and have our being.' As some of your own poets have said, 'For we are also his offspring.' "'. None
44. New Testament, Hebrews, 6.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Lampe (2003) 94; Vinzent (2013) 53

6.4. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοὺς ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας γευσαμένους τε τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς ἐπουρανίου καὶ μετόχους γενηθέντας πνεύματος ἁγίου''. None
6.4. For concerning those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, ''. None
45. New Testament, Philippians, 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethical, divine-human trust as

 Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 273; Morgan (2022) 69

4.1. Ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ ἐπιπόθητοι, χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου, οὕτως στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ, ἀγαπητοί.''. None
4.1. Therefore, my brothers, beloved and longed for, my joy and crown, so stand firm in the Lord, my beloved. ''. None
46. New Testament, Romans, 12.2, 13.9-13.10, 14.15, 15.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • equality (as an ancient ethical category) • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics • ethics, and habituation • human vocation, and Paul’s theology and ethics • perfectionism, ethical • sacrifice of Isaac, ethical interpretation of

 Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 273; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 324; Champion (2022) 175, 187; Dürr (2022) 274, 275; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 187; Keener(2005) 205; Lampe (2003) 98, 213; Morgan (2022) 69; Osborne (2001) 245, 246

12.2. καὶ μὴ συνσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον.
13.9. τὸ γάρΟὐ μοιχεύσεις, Οὐ φονεύσεις, Οὐ κλέψεις, Οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις,καὶ εἴ τις ἑτέρα ἐντολή, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται, ἐν τῷἈγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν. 13.10. ἡ ἀγάπη τῷ πλησίον κακὸν οὐκ ἐργάζεται· πλήρωμα οὖν νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη.
14.15. εἰ γὰρ διὰ βρῶμα ὁ ἀδελφός σου λυπεῖται, οὐκέτι κατὰ ἀγάπην περιπατεῖς. μὴ τῷ βρώματί σου ἐκεῖνον ἀπόλλυε ὑπὲρ οὗ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν.
15.16. εἰς τὸ εἶναί με λειτουργὸν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἡγιασμένη ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ.' '. None
12.2. Don't be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, so that you may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God. " '
13.9. For the commandments, "You shall not commit adultery," "You shall not murder," "You shall not steal," "You shall not give false testimony," "You shall not covet," and whatever other commandments there are, are all summed up in this saying, namely, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."' "13.10. Love doesn't harm a neighbor. Love therefore is the fulfillment of the law. " "
14.15. Yet if because of food your brother is grieved, you walk no longer in love. Don't destroy with your food him for whom Christ died. " '
15.16. that I should be a servant of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles, ministering as a priest the gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gentiles might be made acceptable, sanctified by the Holy Spirit. ' ". None
47. New Testament, John, 1.9-1.14, 1.17-1.18, 10.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethical • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics

 Found in books: Morgan (2022) 201; Ruzer (2020) 88; Černušková (2016) 278

1.9. Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον. 1.10. ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω. 1.11. Εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον. 1.12. ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, 1.13. οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν. 1.14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔
1.17. ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωυσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο. 1.18. θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.
10.27. τὰ πρόβατα τὰ ἐμὰ τῆς φωνῆς μου ἀκούουσιν, κἀγὼ γινώσκω αὐτά, καὶ ἀκολουθοῦσίν μοι,''. None
1.9. The true light that enlightens everyone was coming into the world. ' "1.10. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world didn't recognize him. " "1.11. He came to his own, and those who were his own didn't receive him. " "1.12. But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become God's children, to those who believe in his name: " '1.13. who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. 1.14. The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth.
1.17. For the law was given through Moses. Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. 1.18. No one has seen God at any time. The one and only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him.
10.27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me. ''. None
48. New Testament, Luke, 6.27-6.28, 6.35-6.36, 6.43-6.44, 18.11, 18.18-18.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Virtue ethic • equality (as an ancient ethical category) • ethical teachings • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics

 Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 273; Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 245, 246; Champion (2022) 43; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 54; Keener(2005) 206; Malherbe et al (2014) 829; Morgan (2022) 201; Tite (2009) 167; Černušková (2016) 32, 93

6.27. Ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, 6.28. εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς καταρωμένους ὑμᾶς, προσεύχεσθε περὶ τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ὑμᾶς.
6.35. πλὴν ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ ἀγαθοποιεῖτε καὶ δανίζετε μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες· καὶ ἔσται ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολύς, καὶ ἔσεσθε υἱοὶ Ὑψίστου, ὅτι αὐτὸς χρηστός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους καὶ πονηρούς. 6.36. Γίνεσθε οἰκτίρμονες καθὼς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν·
6.43. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν δένδρον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρόν, οὐδὲ πάλιν δένδρον σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλόν. ἕκαστον γὰρ δένδρον ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου καρποῦ γινώσκεται· 6.44. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκανθῶν συλλέγουσιν σῦκα, οὐδὲ ἐκ βάτου σταφυλὴν τρυγῶσιν.
18.11. ὁ Φαρισαῖος σταθεὶς ταῦτα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν προσηύχετο Ὁ θεός, εὐχαριστῶ σοι ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ ὥσπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἅρπαγες, ἄδικοι, μοιχοί, ἢ καὶ ὡς οὗτος ὁ τελώνης·
18.18. Καὶ ἐπηρώτησέν τις αὐτὸν ἄρχων λέγων Διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, τί ποιήσας ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσω; 18.19. εἶπεν δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός. 18.20. τὰς ἐντολὰς οἶδας Μὴ μοιχεύσῃς, Μὴ φονεύσῃς, Μὴ κλέψῃς, Μὴ ψευδομαρτυρήσῃς, Τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα. 18.21. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν Ταῦτα πάντα ἐφύλαξα ἐκ νεότητος. 18.22. ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ἔτι ἕν σοι λείπει· πάντα ὅσα ἔχεις πώλησον καὶ διάδος πτωχοῖς, καὶ ἕξεις θησαυρὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολούθει μοι. 18.23. ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ταῦτα περίλυπος ἐγενηθη, ἦν γὰρ πλούσιος σφόδρα. 18.24. Ἰδὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν Πῶς δυσκόλως οἱ τὰ χρήματα ἔχοντες εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσπορεύονται· 18.25. εὐκοπώτερον γάρ ἐστιν κάμηλον διὰ τρήματος βελόνης εἰσελθεῖν ἢ πλούσιον εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσελθεῖν. 18.26. εἶπαν δὲ οἱ ἀκούσαντες Καὶ τίς δύναται σωθῆναι; 18.27. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν Τὰ ἀδύνατα παρὰ ἀνθρώποις δυνατὰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστίν.''. None
6.27. "But I tell you who hear: love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, 6.28. bless those who curse you, and pray for those who insult you.
6.35. But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing back; and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High; for he is kind toward the unthankful and evil. 6.36. Therefore be merciful, Even as your Father is also merciful.
6.43. For there is no good tree that brings forth rotten fruit; nor again a rotten tree that brings forth good fruit. ' "6.44. For each tree is known by its own fruit. For people don't gather figs from thorns, nor do they gather grapes from a bramble bush. " "
18.11. The Pharisee stood and prayed to himself like this: 'God, I thank you, that I am not like the rest of men, extortioners, unrighteous, adulterers, or even like this tax collector. " '
18.18. A certain ruler asked him, saying, "Good Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" 18.19. Jesus asked him, "Why do you call me good? No one is good, except one -- God. 18.20. You know the commandments: \'Don\'t commit adultery,\' \'Don\'t murder,\' \'Don\'t steal,\' \'Don\'t give false testimony,\' \'Honor your father and your mother.\'" 18.21. He said, "I have observed all these things from my youth up." 18.22. When Jesus heard these things, he said to him, "You still lack one thing. Sell all that you have, and distribute it to the poor. You will have treasure in heaven. Come, follow me." 18.23. But when he heard these things, he became very sad, for he was very rich. 18.24. Jesus, seeing that he became very sad, said, "How hard it is for those who have riches to enter into the Kingdom of God! 18.25. For it is easier for a camel to enter in through a needle\'s eye, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God." 18.26. Those who heard it said, "Then who can be saved?" 18.27. But he said, "The things which are impossible with men are possible with God."''. None
49. New Testament, Mark, 10.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethical teachings • ethics

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 246; Černušková (2016) 32

10.19. τὰς ἐντολὰς οἶδας Μὴ φονεύσῃς, Μὴ μοιχεύσῃς, Μὴ κλέψῃς, Μὴ ψευδομαρτυρήσῃς, Μὴ ἀποστερήσῃς, Τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα.''. None
10.19. You know the commandments: \'Do not murder,\' \'Do not commit adultery,\' \'Do not steal,\' \'Do not give false testimony,\' \'Do not defraud,\' \'Honor your father and mother.\'"''. None
50. New Testament, Matthew, 5.28, 5.44-5.45, 5.48, 7.6, 7.20, 19.19, 19.21, 21.33 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethical • Ethics • acusmata (Pythagorean), interpretation of ethical allegories • ethical teachings • ethical, divine-human trust as • ethics • ethics of care

 Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 273; Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 245, 246, 247; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 54; Geljon and Runia (2013) 109; Malherbe et al (2014) 829; Morgan (2022) 295, 313, 314; Osborne (2001) 245; Ruzer (2020) 116; Wolfsdorf (2020) 14; Černušková (2016) 32, 222

5.28. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ.
5.44. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν διωκόντων ὑμᾶς· 5.45. ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους.
5.48. Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν.
7.6. Μὴ δῶτε τὸ ἅγιον τοῖς κυσίν, μηδὲ βάλητε τοὺς μαργαρίτας ὑμῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν χοίρων, μή ποτε καταπατήσουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ποσὶν αὐτῶν καὶ στραφέντες ῥήξωσιν ὑμᾶς.
7.20. ἄραγε ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνώσεσθε αὐτούς.
19.19. Τίμα τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα, καί Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν.
19.21. ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Εἰ θέλεις τέλειος εἶναι, ὕπαγε πώλησόν σου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ δὸς τοῖς πτωχοῖς, καὶ ἕξεις θησαυρὸν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολούθει μοι.
21.33. Ἄλλην παραβολὴν ἀκούσατε. Ἄνθρωπος ἦν οἰκοδεσπότης ὅστις ἐφύτευσεν ἀμπελῶνα καὶ φραγμὸν αὐτῷ περιέθηκεν καὶ ὤρυξεν ἐν αὐτῷ ληνὸν καὶ ᾠκοδόμησεν πύργον, καὶ ἐξέδετο αὐτὸν γεωργοῖς, καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν.' '. None
5.28. but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart.
5.44. But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 5.45. that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust.
5.48. Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect.
7.6. "Don\'t give that which is holy to the dogs, neither throw your pearls before the pigs, lest perhaps they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.
7.20. Therefore, by their fruits you will know them.
19.19. \'Honor your father and mother.\' And, \'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.\'"
19.21. Jesus said to him, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."
21.33. "Hear another parable. There was a man who was a master of a household, who planted a vineyard, set a hedge about it, dug a winepress in it, built a tower, leased it out to farmers, and went into another country. ' '. None
51. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 6.1, 41.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Ethics • ethics • ethics, of Stoicism

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 232; Lampe (2003) 273; Long (2006) 369, 372, 373

6.1. I feel, my dear Lucilius, that I am being not only reformed, but transformed. I do not yet, however, assure myself, or indulge the hope, that there are no elements left in me which need to be changed. of course there are many that should be made more compact, or made thinner, or be brought into greater prominence. And indeed this very fact is proof that my spirit is altered into something better, – that it can see its own faults, of which it was previously ignorant. In certain cases sick men are congratulated because they themselves have perceived that they are sick. ' "
41.1. You are doing an excellent thing, one which will be wholesome for you, if, as you write me, you are persisting in your effort to attain sound understanding; it is foolish to pray for this when you can acquire it from yourself. We do not need to uplift our hands towards heaven, or to beg the keeper of a temple to let us approach his idol's ear, as if in this way our prayers were more likely to be heard. God is near you, he is with you, he is within you. "'. None
52. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics, of Stoicism • persona, in Stoic ethics

 Found in books: Bexley (2022) 35, 41, 42; Long (2006) 376

53. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics • morality, ethics • parts of philosophy, interrelatedness of ethics and physics

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 24; Erler et al (2021) 95; Frede and Laks (2001) 123

54. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 3.11.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics

 Found in books: Estes (2020) 261; Osborne (2001) 239

3.11.9. These things being so, all who destroy the form of the Gospel are vain, unlearned, and also audacious; those, I mean, who represent the aspects of the Gospel as being either more in number than as aforesaid, or, on the other hand, fewer. The former class do so, that they may seem to have discovered more than is of the truth; the latter, that they may set the dispensations of God aside. For Marcion, rejecting the entire Gospel, yea rather, cutting himself off from the Gospel, boasts that he has part in the blessings of the Gospel. Others, again (the Montanists), that they may set at nought the gift of the Spirit, which in the latter times has been, by the good pleasure of the Father, poured out upon the human race, do not admit that aspect of the evangelical dispensation presented by John\'s Gospel, in which the Lord promised that He would send the Paraclete; but set aside at once both the Gospel and the prophetic Spirit. Wretched men indeed! who wish to be pseudo- prophets, forsooth, but who set aside the gift of prophecy from the Church; acting like those (the Encratitae) who, on account of such as come in hypocrisy, hold themselves aloof from the communion of the brethren. We must conclude, moreover, that these men (the Montanists) can not admit the Apostle Paul either. For, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, he speaks expressly of prophetical gifts, and recognises men and women prophesying in the Church. Sinning, therefore, in all these particulars, against the Spirit of God, they fall into the irremissible sin. But those who are from Valentinus, being, on the other hand, altogether reckless, while they put forth their own compositions, boast that they possess more Gospels than there really are. Indeed, they have arrived at such a pitch of audacity, as to entitle their comparatively recent writing "the Gospel of Truth," though it agrees in nothing with the Gospels of the Apostles, so that they have really no Gospel which is not full of blasphemy. For if what they have published is the Gospel of truth, and yet is totally unlike those which have been handed down to us from the apostles, any who please may learn, as is shown from the Scriptures themselves, that that which has been handed down from the apostles can no longer be reckoned the Gospel of truth. But that these Gospels alone are true and reliable, and admit neither an increase nor diminution of the aforesaid number, I have proved by so many and such arguments. For, since God made all things in due proportion and adaptation, it was fit also that the outward aspect of the Gospel should be well arranged and harmonized. The opinion of those men, therefore, who handed the Gospel down to us, having been investigated, from their very fountainheads, let us proceed also to the remaining apostles, and inquire into their doctrine with regard to God; then, in due course we shall listen to the very words of the Lord.''. None
55. Justin, First Apology, 14.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Lampe (2003) 102, 103, 275; Lieu (2004) 174

14.3. For we forewarn you to be on your guard, lest those demons whom we have been accusing should deceive you, and quite divert you from reading and understanding what we say. For they strive to hold you their slaves and servants; and sometimes by appearances in dreams, and sometimes by magical impositions, they subdue all who make no strong opposing effort for their own salvation. And thus do we also, since our persuasion by the Word, stand aloof from them (i.e., the demons), and follow the only unbegotten God through His Son - we who formerly delighted in fornication, but now embrace chastity alone; we who formerly used magical arts, dedicate ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who valued above all things the acquisition of wealth and possessions, now bring what we have into a common stock, and communicate to every one in need; we who hated and destroyed one another, and on account of their different manners would not live with men of a different tribe, now, since the coming of Christ, live familiarly with them, and pray for our enemies, and endeavour to persuade those who hate us unjustly to live conformably to the good precepts of Christ, to the end that they may become partakers with us of the same joyful hope of a reward from God the ruler of all. But lest we should seem to be reasoning sophistically, we consider it right, before giving you the promised explanation, to cite a few precepts given by Christ Himself. And be it yours, as powerful rulers, to inquire whether we have been taught and do teach these things truly. Brief and concise utterances fell from Him, for He was no sophist, but His word was the power of God. ''. None
56. Tertullian, Apology, 16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethic • Ethics,

 Found in books: Binder (2012) 40; Del Lucchese (2019) 188

16. For, like some others, you are under the delusion that our god is an ass's head. Cornelius Tacitus first put this notion into people's minds. In the fifth book of his histories, beginning the (narrative of the) Jewish war with an account of the origin of the nation; and theorizing at his pleasure about the origin, as well as the name and the religion of the Jews, he states that having been delivered, or rather, in his opinion, expelled from Egypt, in crossing the vast plains of Arabia, where water is so scanty, they were in extremity from thirst; but taking the guidance of the wild asses, which it was thought might be seeking water after feeding, they discovered a fountain, and thereupon in their gratitude they consecrated a head of this species of animal. And as Christianity is nearly allied to Judaism, from this, I suppose, it was taken for granted that we too are devoted to the worship of the same image. But the said Cornelius Tacitus (the very opposite of tacit in telling lies) informs us in the work already mentioned, that when Cneius Pompeius captured Jerusalem, he entered the temple to see the arcana of the Jewish religion, but found no image there. Yet surely if worship was rendered to any visible object, the very place for its exhibition would be the shrine; and that all the more that the worship, however unreasonable, had no need there to fear outside beholders. For entrance to the holy place was permitted to the priests alone, while all vision was forbidden to others by an outspread curtain. You will not, however, deny that all beasts of burden, and not parts of them, but the animals entire, are with their goddess Epona objects of worship with you. It is this, perhaps, which displeases you in us, that while your worship here is universal, we do homage only to the ass. Then, if any of you think we render superstitious adoration to the cross, in that adoration he is sharer with us. If you offer homage to a piece of wood at all, it matters little what it is like when the substance is the same: it is of no consequence the form, if you have the very body of the god. And yet how far does the Athenian Pallas differ from the stock of the cross, or the Pharian Ceres as she is put up uncarved to sale, a mere rough stake and piece of shapeless wood? Every stake fixed in an upright position is a portion of the cross; we render our adoration, if you will have it so, to a god entire and complete. We have shown before that your deities are derived from shapes modelled from the cross. But you also worship victories, for in your trophies the cross is the heart of the trophy. The camp religion of the Romans is all through a worship of the standards, a setting the standards above all gods. Well, as those images decking out the standards are ornaments of crosses. All those hangings of your standards and banners are robes of crosses. I praise your zeal: you would not consecrate crosses unclothed and unadorned. Others, again, certainly with more information and greater verisimilitude, believe that the sun is our god. We shall be counted Persians perhaps, though we do not worship the orb of day painted on a piece of linen cloth, having himself everywhere in his own disk. The idea no doubt has originated from our being known to turn to the east in prayer. But you, many of you, also under pretence sometimes of worshipping the heavenly bodies, move your lips in the direction of the sunrise. In the same way, if we devote Sun-day to rejoicing, from a far different reason than Sun-worship, we have some resemblance to those of you who devote the day of Saturn to ease and luxury, though they too go far away from Jewish ways, of which indeed they are ignorant. But lately a new edition of our god has been given to the world in that great city: it originated with a certain vile man who was wont to hire himself out to cheat the wild beasts, and who exhibited a picture with this inscription: The God of the Christians, born of an ass. He had the ears of an ass, was hoofed in one foot, carried a book, and wore a toga. Both the name and the figure gave us amusement. But our opponents ought straightway to have done homage to this biformed divinity, for they have acknowledged gods dog-headed and lion-headed, with horn of buck and ram, with goat-like loins, with serpent legs, with wings sprouting from back or foot. These things we have discussed ex abundanti, that we might not seem willingly to pass by any rumor against us unrefuted. Having thoroughly cleared ourselves, we turn now to an exhibition of what our religion really is. "". None
57. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 6.87, 7.33, 7.39-7.42, 7.84, 7.87-7.88, 7.121, 7.125, 7.134-7.136, 7.143, 7.156-7.157, 10.18 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Applied Ethics • Didymus (Arius?), epitome of Peripatetic ethics • Diogenes of Sinope xx, xxv, virtue ethics • Epicureanism, ethics of • Ethics • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • Zeno of Citium, ethics of • change (metabolē) to wisdom, in ethics • ethics • ethics, corresponding with human matters • ethics, of Pyrrhonism • ethics, of Stoicism • ethics, stoic • ethics,etymology • morality, ethics • parts of philosophy, interrelatedness of ethics and physics • virtue, ethical or of moral character

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 19, 22, 25, 27, 28, 60, 61; Erler et al (2021) 95; Frede and Laks (2001) 160; Hockey (2019) 81; Jenkyns (2013) 231; Jouanna (2012) 280; Levison (2009) 140; Long (2006) 11, 17, 181, 239, 383; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91, 98, 149; Sorabji (2000) 168; Tsouni (2019) 140, 162; Wolfsdorf (2020) 665, 666

6.87. He flourished in the 113th Olympiad.According to Antisthenes in his Successions, the first impulse to the Cynic philosophy was given to him when he saw Telephus in a certain tragedy carrying a little basket and altogether in a wretched plight. So he turned his property into money, – for he belonged to a distinguished family, – and having thus collected about 200 talents, distributed that sum among his fellow-citizens. And (it is added) so sturdy a philosopher did he become that he is mentioned by the comic poet Philemon. At all events the latter says:In summer-time a thick cloak he would wearTo be like Crates, and in winter rags.Diocles relates how Diogenes persuaded Crates to give up his fields to sheep pasture, and throw into the sea any money he had.
7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered.
7.39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric.
7.84. The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting. The foregoing is the subdivision adopted by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, and their disciples. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes treated the subject somewhat less elaborately, as might be expected in an older generation. They, however, did subdivide Logic and Physics as well as Ethics.
7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same;
7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues.
7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form. 7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.
7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite.
7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible. 7.157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.
10.18. And from the revenues made over by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates let them to the best of their power in consultation with Hermarchus make separate provision (1) for the funeral offerings to my father, mother, and brothers, and (2) for the customary celebration of my birthday on the tenth day of Gamelion in each year, and for the meeting of all my School held every month on the twentieth day to commemorate Metrodorus and myself according to the rules now in force. Let them also join in celebrating the day in Poseideon which commemorates my brothers, and likewise the day in Metageitnion which commemorates Polyaenus, as I have done hitherto.''. None
58. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8.19-8.23 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Purification, stage in ethical development

 Found in books: Joosse (2021) 75; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 89

8.19. Such revision was necessary: Plotinus could not bear to go back on his work even for one re-reading; and indeed the condition of his sight would scarcely allow it: his handwriting was slovenly; he misjoined his words; he cared nothing about spelling; his one concern was for the idea: in these habits, to our general surprise, he remained unchanged to the very end. He used to work out his design mentally from first to last: when he came to set down his ideas, he wrote out at one jet all he had stored in mind as though he were copying from a book. Interrupted, perhaps, by someone entering on business, he never lost hold of his plan; he was able to meet all the demands of the conversation and still keep his own train of thought clearly before him; when he was fee again, he never looked over what he had previously written--his sight, it has been mentioned, did not allow of such re-reading--but he linked on what was to follow as if no distraction had occurred. Thus he was able to live at once within himself and for others; he never relaxed from his interior attention unless in sleep; and even his sleep was kept light be an abstemiousness that often prevented him taking as much as a piece of bread, and by this unbroken concentration upon his own highest nature. 8.23. Such revision was necessary: Plotinus could not bear to go back on his work even for one re-reading; and indeed the condition of his sight would scarcely allow it: his handwriting was slovenly; he misjoined his words; he cared nothing about spelling; his one concern was for the idea: in these habits, to our general surprise, he remained unchanged to the very end. He used to work out his design mentally from first to last: when he came to set down his ideas, he wrote out at one jet all he had stored in mind as though he were copying from a book. Interrupted, perhaps, by someone entering on business, he never lost hold of his plan; he was able to meet all the demands of the conversation and still keep his own train of thought clearly before him; when he was fee again, he never looked over what he had previously written--his sight, it has been mentioned, did not allow of such re-reading--but he linked on what was to follow as if no distraction had occurred. Thus he was able to live at once within himself and for others; he never relaxed from his interior attention unless in sleep; and even his sleep was kept light be an abstemiousness that often prevented him taking as much as a piece of bread, and by this unbroken concentration upon his own highest nature. ''. None
59. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics, xi,

 Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 60; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 109

60. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics • ethics, xi,

 Found in books: Fowler (2014) 185; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 242

61. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics • Care / Ethics of Care • Ethics • Virtue, ethical • ethics, xi, • virtue, ethical

 Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 318, 503; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 28; Joosse (2021) 63; Schibli (2002) 272; Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 55, 148; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 59

62. Augustine, The City of God, 19.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics • Didymus (Arius?), epitome of Peripatetic ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 92; Tsouni (2019) 170

19.3. Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man's happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner. They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one's home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it? "". None
63. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on ethics • Imitation, ethical • Purification, stage in ethical development • Virtue, ethical

 Found in books: Joosse (2021) 60, 65; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 263

64. None, None, nan (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Imitation, ethical

 Found in books: Joosse (2021) 39; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 7

65. Vergil, Aeneis, 5.134-5.135, 8.276-8.277
 Tagged with subjects: • ethical qualities, anger, wrath (ira, mênis) • ethical qualities, artifice, skill (ars) • ethical qualities, cleverness • ethical qualities, courage, valor (virtus, andreia, aretê) • ethical qualities, craftiness, deceit, deception, disguise, feigning, guile, sleight of hand, trickery (dolus, dolos) • ethical qualities, endurance • ethical qualities, foresight, prudence • ethical qualities, insight • ethical qualities, intelligence (sapientia, mêtis) • ethical qualities, intransigence, inflexibility, obstinacy, stubbornness • ethical qualities, stealth • ethical qualities, stubbornness • ethical qualities, thievery • ethical qualities, wiliness • ethics • ethics, Iliadic or Achillean v. Odyssean ethics • ethics, ethical philosophy • ethics, of architect

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 14, 160, 162, 164, 166, 226, 229, 231, 232, 272; Oksanish (2019) 175, 176

5.134. cetera populea velatur fronde iuventus, 5.135. nudatosque umeros oleo perfilsa nitescit.
8.276. Dixerat, Herculea bicolor cum populus umbra 8.277. velavitque comas foliisque innexa pependit''. None
5.134. the wonted way, two swine, and, sable-hued, 5.135. the yoke of bulls; from shallow bowl he poured
8.276. the herd of monster bulls, which pastured free 8.277. along our river-valley. Cacus gazed ''. None
66. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, ethics and politics of • Ethics • Hellenistic philosophy, ethics of • Socrates, influence on ethics • Stoic ethics • Stoicism/Stoics/Stoic ethics • change (metabolē) to wisdom, in ethics • ethics • ethics, influence of Socrates on • parts of philosophy, interrelatedness of ethics and physics

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 24, 25, 26, 60; Erler et al (2021) 95; Long (2006) 20; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 98, 104; Pinheiro et al (2015) 23; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 267

67. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • Imitation, ethical • ethics, xi,

 Found in books: Joosse (2021) 50; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 99, 107; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 49

68. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Ethics • ethics

 Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 80; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 87

69. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • ethics • the three visitors, literal and ethical interpretations of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 260; Lieu (2004) 119

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