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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
emotion Borg (2008) 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 413
Bricault and Bonnet (2013) 23, 87, 135, 136, 137, 142, 169, 171, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187
Burton (2009) 135
Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 71, 95, 98, 140, 203, 222
Flynn (2018) 7, 151, 153
Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 83, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 237, 369, 374
Graver (2007) 39, 42, 43, 56, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 231
Harkins and Maier (2022) 15, 40, 48, 66, 70, 75, 77, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 142, 182
Humphreys (2018) 233, 314, 316, 322
Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022) 267, 371
Konig and Wiater (2022) 78, 86, 87, 93, 107, 113, 166, 218, 221, 332, 333, 339, 356
König and Wiater (2022) 78, 86, 87, 93, 107, 113, 166, 218, 221, 332, 333, 339, 356
Levison (2009) 49, 54, 269
Long (2006) 4, 7, 31, 36, 37, 378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393
Mackey (2022) 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 119, 157, 158, 236
Maso (2022) 2, 13, 14, 17, 30, 34, 65, 104, 105, 123
Nuno et al (2021) 54, 152, 208, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 236, 247, 249, 367
Singer and van Eijk (2018) 127, 140
Wolfsdorf (2020) 126, 127
d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 259
van der EIjk (2005) 129, 172, 181, 224, 236
Čulík-Baird (2022) 44, 45, 58, 73, 99, 113, 131, 153, 171, 194, 195, 227
emotion, 2 senses in gregory of apatheia, freedom from, eradication of nyssa Sorabji (2000) 392, 393
emotion, about it, antipater of tarsus, stoic, hence intense motivation re target compatible with lack of Sorabji (2000) 185
emotion, accepted by aristotle, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 169
emotion, accepted by augustine, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 380, 398
emotion, accepted, but note different apatheia, freedom from, eradication of senses, by speusippus Sorabji (2000) 195
emotion, alternative apatheia, freedom from, eradication of ideals, though apatheia represents progress Sorabji (2000) 385, 386
emotion, an act of will, augustine Sorabji (2000) 316, 382, 383, 399
emotion, and character follows hot and cold in body, lucretius, epicurean Sorabji (2000) 264
emotion, and conduct, youth culture Huebner and Laes (2019) 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 145
emotion, and dance Nuno et al (2021) 8
emotion, and ethical traits, disposition, and Kaster(2005) 154
emotion, and its therapy, body, contribution of body to Sorabji (2000) 25, 96, 119, 142, 146, 153, 203, 204, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 293
emotion, and, domination Mermelstein (2021) 48, 49, 53, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotion, and, gender Mermelstein (2021) 55, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102
emotion, and, pain Mermelstein (2021) 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotion, animals, as criterion of Graver (2007) 94, 99, 238
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of antiochus Sorabji (2000) 196, 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia already rejected by aristotle in opposition to speusippus Sorabji (2000) 194, 195, 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia and metriopatheia suited to different callings Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia restores in humans the image of god Sorabji (2000) 391
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia to adam and eve before the fall Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia to next life Sorabji (2000) 190
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of apatheia, likeness to angels or likeness to god? Sorabji (2000) 387, 388, 391, 395
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of clement of alexandria Sorabji (2000) 188, 386, 387
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of cynics Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of did christ exhibit apatheia? Sorabji (2000) 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 392, 398, 399
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of does punishment require anger? Sorabji (2000) 191, 192, 203
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of does sex require pleasure? Sorabji (2000) 388, 406, 407, 408, 409
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of evagrius in special sense Sorabji (2000) 368
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of is apatheia intelligible? Sorabji (2000) 187, 188, 189
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of mercy substituted for pity Sorabji (2000) 162, 192, 390, 391
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of models, anaxagoras Sorabji (2000) 197, 391
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of nicasicrates Sorabji (2000) 201
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of not even then Sorabji (2000) 398, 399
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of origen Sorabji (2000) 386, 387
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of porphyry Sorabji (2000) 284
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of pyrrhonian sceptics Sorabji (2000) 198, 199, 200
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of reasons for and against apatheia Sorabji (2000) 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of should humans aspire to be divine? Sorabji (2000) 189, 190
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of socrates Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of socratics Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of stoic belief in apatheia misrepresented as verbal difference Sorabji (2000) 206
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of stoics Sorabji (2000) 194, 195, 196
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of to different people Sorabji (2000) 391, 392
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of to different stages Sorabji (2000) 197, 203, 284, 286
emotion, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of virtues not needed by gods or the blessed Sorabji (2000) 187, 188
emotion, aristotelians, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 191
emotion, aristotle, pain as an Mermelstein (2021) 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotion, as act of will, will Sorabji (2000) 316, 337
emotion, as being true chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, eupatheia distinguished from judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji (2000) 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
emotion, as emotion, posidonius, stoic, reply to chrysippus' intellectualist account of judgement, judgement not invariably needed for Sorabji (2000) 41, 42
emotion, as impulse, zeno of citium, stoic Sorabji (2000) 65
emotion, as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition, hupolēpsis, not mere andronicus of rhodes, aristotelian, appearance, of good or bad Sorabji (2000) 41, 133, 134
emotion, as movement of the soul, zeno of citium, stoic Sorabji (2000) 34
emotion, as well, chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, but chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of Sorabji (2000) 57, 58, 313
emotion, augustine, attack on stoic apatheia, misrepresents stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of Sorabji (2000) 207, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 385
emotion, basil of caesarea, church father, expresses Sorabji (2000) 391, 394
emotion, basil, gregory of apatheia, freedom from, eradication of nazianzus, and gregory of nyssa for some purposes Sorabji (2000) 207, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395
emotion, because reflection or familiarity can remove the relevant judgement, cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, time removes Sorabji (2000) 112
emotion, belief, and Mackey (2022) 100, 104
emotion, belief/s, role in Agri (2022) 3, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 73, 100, 101, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 144, 150, 173, 179, 194
emotion, beliefs, role in Graver (2007) 36, 39, 42, 43, 65, 79, 233
emotion, bile, as species Graver (2007) 56
emotion, but educative epibolē, stoics, see under individual stoics, esp. chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as stoic orthodoxy, so that conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, better kind not an Sorabji (2000) 281, 282, 283
emotion, but not for lust or pride, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 399
emotion, but not for schadenfreude, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 195
emotion, but only in special senses in zeno, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of panaetius, posidonius Sorabji (2000) 64, 105, 106, 107, 195, 196, 206
emotion, by kinship, damon, pythagorean, music arouses Sorabji (2000) 84
emotion, by kinship, diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses Sorabji (2000) 84, 90, 91
emotion, by kinship, plato, music arouses Sorabji (2000) 84
emotion, by kinship?, music, arouses Sorabji (2000) 84
emotion, by, babylonian rabbis, sages, evidence on expression of Kalmin (1998) 40, 41
emotion, by, palestinian rabbis, sages, evidence on expression of Kalmin (1998) 40, 41
emotion, can be produced by mere appearance, pace andronicus, and by appearance of aspasius, aristotelian, pleasure, rather than of good Sorabji (2000) 41, 133, 134
emotion, can be said to involve either, aristotle, but human Sorabji (2000) 41, 133
emotion, can fade through lack of attention, attention, as well as through change of judgement Sorabji (2000) 111, 115, 132
emotion, catharsis, seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not Sorabji (2000) 76, 77, 80, 228, 294
emotion, character, dispositions toward Graver (2007) 139, 141, 142, 144, 145
emotion, cicero, on beliefs in Graver (2007) 36, 43, 62, 229, 233
emotion, cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on consequent voluntariness of Sorabji (2000) 176
emotion, clement of alexandria, church father, christ was free of Sorabji (2000) 387, 392
emotion, clement of alexandria, church father, demons play a role in producing Sorabji (2000) 347, 348
emotion, clement of alexandria, church father, distinguished suppressing, enkrateia Sorabji (2000) 387
emotion, cognition, as element of Kaster(2005) 10, 67, 68, 77, 104, 105, 188, 189
emotion, consolation writings, christian consoling can express Sorabji (2000) 391, 392, 393, 394, 395
emotion, consolation writings, sympathy does not require Sorabji (2000) 390
emotion, crantor, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 196
emotion, defined as the irrational part of the soul being moved by the pleasant or distressing, aspasius, aristotelian Sorabji (2000) 134
emotion, delivery, and Bua (2019) 291
emotion, desire, as genus Graver (2007) 53, 54, 57, 204
emotion, discourse for, diaspora judaism Mermelstein (2021) 60, 111, 112
emotion, disposition, and Kaster(2005) 154
emotion, does punishment require anger?, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 191, 192, 203
emotion, does sex require pleasure?, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 192, 388, 406, 407, 408, 409
emotion, epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and Sorabji (2000) 376, 377, 379
emotion, epicureans, selective Sorabji (2000) 196, 201, 202, 203
emotion, eupatheiai, equanimous states, augustine hails stoic acceptance of eupatheia as acceptance of Sorabji (2000) 207
emotion, evagrius, desert father, this affects sense of freedom from, apatheia Sorabji (2000) 368
emotion, evagrius, desert father, up to us whether bad thoughts linger and arouse real Sorabji (2000) 359
emotion, experiencing another’s Mermelstein (2021) 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 210, 211, 213, 214
emotion, expression of by rabbis in presence of non-rabbis Kalmin (1998) 40, 41
emotion, expression of by tannaim more frequent than by amoraim Kalmin (1998) 129
emotion, fade because of new hopes, augustine, time makes Sorabji (2000) 241
emotion, fading, satiety, distinguished satisfaction as a reason for Sorabji (2000) 112, 113
emotion, fear Nuno et al (2021) 74, 77, 183, 224
emotion, fear, as deceptive Agri (2022) 100, 103, 106, 166, 167
emotion, fear, as pro-social Mermelstein (2021) 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197
emotion, fear, emasculating Agri (2022) 40, 64, 68, 74, 75, 81, 82, 83, 86, 107, 174, 180, 184, 188, 189
emotion, first movements, allow time for checking Sorabji (2000) 70
emotion, first movements, in stoics not the same as Sorabji (2000) 66, 377
emotion, following, emotion, jerome, st, church father, multiplies stages of emotional, struggle, assent to Sorabji (2000) 368
emotion, for apatheia, freedom from, eradication of christians, esp. pity and love Sorabji (2000) 387, 388, 389, 390, 391
emotion, for apatheia, freedom from, eradication of philo, repentance and pity Sorabji (2000) 233, 386, 389
emotion, for judgement that reaction appropriate, cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, on need in Sorabji (2000) 32, 176
emotion, freshness of judgement and fading of Sorabji (2000) 64, 65, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114
emotion, from chrysippus, zeno of citium, stoic, different view of Sorabji (2000) 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
emotion, from dispensability of second judgement, chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, cicero infers voluntariness of Sorabji (2000) 176
emotion, galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, complains of contradictions in chrysippus' account of Sorabji (2000) 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 101
emotion, gregory of nyssa, church father, apatheia an ideal, but even this consolation starts by permitting Sorabji (2000) 392, 393
emotion, happiness or joy Nuno et al (2021) 8
emotion, having yet occurred, first movements, 2 kinds. mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and Sorabji (2000) 66, 67, 68, 70
emotion, having yet occurred, first movements, physical, e.g. pallor, erection, glaring caused by appearance, without assent and Sorabji (2000) 68
emotion, having yet occurred, seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or Sorabji (2000) 66, 67, 68, 69
emotion, identity and, discourse of Mermelstein (2021) 24, 42, 68, 111, 112, 120, 121, 122, 123, 146, 147, 165, 166, 180, 219, 243, 244, 256
emotion, imagination, and Kaster(2005) 108, 109, 192
emotion, implies not medium emotion, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of quantity, but appropriate Sorabji (2000) 195
emotion, in the classical world Mermelstein (2021) 5, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotion, in the hebrew bible Mermelstein (2021) 5, 24, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotion, is impulse, emotions, agreed by stoics that Sorabji (2000) 33, 42, 43, 65, 113, 116, 118, 121
emotion, is impulse, posidonius, stoic Sorabji (2000) 116, 118, 125, 126
emotion, is not false emotions, zeno, judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement Sorabji (2000) 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61
emotion, is not false zeno of citium, stoic, judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement Sorabji (2000) 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61
emotion, is not judgement but occurs on the occasion of judgement, zeno of citium, stoic Sorabji (2000) 65
emotion, is not judgement, alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos, disowned emotions, show Sorabji (2000) 122
emotion, is not judgement, plotinus, neoplatonist, disowned emotion, shows Sorabji (2000) 122
emotion, is voluntary, zeno of citium, stoic, but since the occasioning judgement, unlike appearance, involves assent Sorabji (2000) 65
emotion, lactantius, church father, misrepresents stoic recognition of eupatheiai as general acceptance of Sorabji (2000) 207
emotion, lactantius, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 191, 195
emotion, living alone, women, youth and Huebner and Laes (2019) 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141
emotion, love, the right kind of homosexual love is not an, pathos, in stoics Sorabji (2000) 50, 208, 281, 282, 283
emotion, maximus of tyre, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 196
emotion, maximus, confessor, christian, assent of intellect follows Sorabji (2000) 368
emotion, may be explained by fading of second judgement, chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, roles of the second judgement, fading of Sorabji (2000) 33, 109, 110
emotion, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of iamblichus, phallic festivals may produce metriopatheia by catharsis Sorabji (2000) 286, 287
emotion, metriopatheia, moderation in Graver (2007) 128, 243
emotion, more concerned with present and future than with past, emotions Sorabji (2000) 110, 136, 137
emotion, motivation not require Sorabji (2000) 170, 171, 185
emotion, natural and/or necessary desires, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 26, 201, 283, 388
emotion, natural and/or necessary pleasures, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 201, 386, 388
emotion, natural and/or necessary preference, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 65
emotion, natural and/or necessary, emotions, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 201, 202, 386
emotion, natural thoughts, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 386
emotion, natural, necessary Sorabji (2000) 201, 202, 386
emotion, necessarily has the assent of reason, augustine, this obscures stoic position that Sorabji (2000) 383
emotion, necessary and useful, theodoret, christian, some Sorabji (2000) 386
emotion, needed for consoling, gregory of nazianzus Sorabji (2000) 392
emotion, needed for motivation, lactantius, church father Sorabji (2000) 185
emotion, neuroscience of experiencing another’s Mermelstein (2021) 59, 210
emotion, of women Graver (2007) 139, 165
emotion, on Champion (2022) 143, 144, 149, 150, 153, 154
emotion, on, memory, effect of Mermelstein (2021) 59
emotion, one is about present or future, but not chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, of the two judgements in past, harm or benefit Sorabji (2000) 30, 110, 136, 137
emotion, or the act, first movements, distinguished assent to appearance, to thought, to its lingering, to the pleasure of the thought or its lingering to the Sorabji (2000) 355, 360, 368, 372, 373, 374, 376
emotion, origen, church father, connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 359, 382
emotion, origin and transmission Graver (2007) 150, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 163
emotion, passion, desire or Gray (2021) 45, 49, 87, 88, 89, 95, 108, 133, 161, 162, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 208
emotion, pathos Damm (2018) 134, 135, 136
emotion, pathos, by being true eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji (2000) 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
emotion, pathos= lat. perturbatio, passion or Tsouni (2019) 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 139, 188
emotion, philo, clement of alexandria, basil, sympathy not imply Sorabji (2000) 390
emotion, philo, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 386
emotion, philosophy, has a role in calming Sorabji (2000) 161, 162, 163, 165, 166
emotion, platonists, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of crantor, alcinous Sorabji (2000) 191
emotion, plotinus, neoplatonist, stoics ignore contribution of body to Sorabji (2000) 142
emotion, plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, misrepresents stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of Sorabji (2000) 207
emotion, pneuma, changes in Graver (2007) 29, 30
emotion, posidonius, on causes of Graver (2007) 235, 236, 237
emotion, posidonius, stoic, and affecting Sorabji (2000) 85, 86
emotion, posidonius, stoic, contradictions in chrysippus' account of Sorabji (2000) 58, 59, 101
emotion, posidonius, stoic, so apatheia is only freedom from unnatural Sorabji (2000) 105, 106, 107
emotion, posidonius, stoic, yet judgement is typically involved in Sorabji (2000) 104, 105
emotion, posidonius, stoic, zeno's and chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of Sorabji (2000) 98, 111, 112
emotion, rage Nuno et al (2021) 74, 77
emotion, rationality, required for Graver (2007) 111, 130
emotion, remorse, and paenitentia, as moral Kaster(2005) 80, 81
emotion, ritual, and Bull Lied and Turner (2011) 255
emotion, ritual, and ritual, evolutionary theories of Bull Lied and Turner (2011) 503
emotion, role in exemplary learning Langlands (2018) 2, 3, 94
emotion, role-playing, and Kaster(2005) 15
emotion, scripts Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 129
emotion, search for apatheia attacked by lactantius, jerome, augustine in latin western, church, but flourishes in apatheia, freedom from, eradication of east, and restored in west by cassian Sorabji (2000) 397
emotion, sextus empiricus, pyrrhonian sceptic, apatheia for Sorabji (2000) 198, 199, 200
emotion, since they are capable of appearance but not of judgement, seneca, the younger, stoic, posidonius' animals also lack genuine Sorabji (2000) 72, 129, 377
emotion, social bond, and Kaster(2005) 15
emotion, sotion, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 196
emotion, specific aversions Graver (2007) 139, 165
emotion, stoicism, on Malherbe et al (2014) 441
emotion, stoicism, outlook on Mermelstein (2021) 5, 24, 33
emotion, stress, and Mermelstein (2021) 233
emotion, structure of thought, and Kaster(2005) 10, 67, 68, 69
emotion, subject to therapy, seneca, the younger, stoic, hence Sorabji (2000) 69, 70
emotion, suppression of seeenkrateia, karteria Sorabji (2000) 185
emotion, taurus, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 196
emotion, teacher of righteousness, in the dead sea scrolls, as prototype for shaping sectarian Mermelstein (2021) 203, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219
emotion, themistius, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 197
emotion, therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy, i, voluntariness of Sorabji (2000) 45, 46, 47, 69, 70
emotion, to another, emotions, shifting from one Sorabji (2000) 23, 34, 56, 57, 62, 360, 361, 362
emotion, to different apatheia, freedom from, eradication of purposes, consolation writings vs. discussion of ideals Sorabji (2000) 391, 392, 393, 394, 395
emotion, use for consolation writings, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 391, 392, 393, 394, 395
emotion, utility of Sorabji (2000) 162, 190, 191, 192, 197
emotion, utility of emotion, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of Sorabji (2000) 162, 190, 191, 192, 197
emotion, voluntariness of Sorabji (2000) 45, 46, 47, 69, 70
emotion, voluntary, chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, hence Sorabji (2000) 45, 46, 47, 65
emotion, voluntary?, emotions Sorabji (2000) 45, 46, 47, 65
emotion, which is a voluntary judgement, seneca, the younger, stoic, contrast with Sorabji (2000) 69, 70
emotion, wicked priest, in the dead sea scrolls, as prototype for shaping sectarian Mermelstein (2021) 203, 204, 205, 206, 210, 211
emotion, without emotions, seneca discounts posidonius' alleged examples of judgement, as mere first movements Sorabji (2000) 72, 73
emotion, without seneca, the younger, stoic, this answers posidonius' alleged judgements, which is only first movement Sorabji (2000) 72, 73
emotion, zeno of citium, definition of Graver (2007) 28, 79
emotion, zeno of citium, on causes of Graver (2007) 62, 65
emotion/emotional Despotis and Lohr (2022) 26, 111, 169, 274, 290, 293, 435
emotional, about ancient jews, stereotypes Mermelstein (2021) 97, 100, 101, 102, 110, 111, 112
emotional, and gender, stereotypes Mermelstein (2021) 71, 101, 102
emotional, as a form of marginalization, stereotypes Mermelstein (2021) 68, 69, 100
emotional, bagoas Gera (2014) 74, 181, 249, 418, 428, 429
emotional, behaviour Stavrianopoulou (2006) 16, 247, 257
emotional, character, philoponus, christian neoplatonist, power of the lecturer to affect however, works via bodily change Sorabji (2000) 269, 270
emotional, contagion Mermelstein (2021) 53, 54, 55, 56, 59
emotional, contagion and, performative power Mermelstein (2021) 53, 54, 55, 56, 59
emotional, control and, stoicism Mermelstein (2021) 38, 60, 107
emotional, counter-discourse, as source of power Mermelstein (2021) 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 59, 111
emotional, detachment, affection of need Graver (2007) 178
emotional, detachment, doctors, and Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 53
emotional, discursive power, authority and Mermelstein (2021) 164, 165, 171, 175
emotional, effect on audience, martyrdom Mermelstein (2021) 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59
emotional, element in soul ineradicable, posidonius, stoic, platonic Sorabji (2000) 105, 106, 107
emotional, episodes as, insanity Graver (2007) 111
emotional, experience Stavrianopoulou (2006) 229
emotional, experience, ritual performance, as Stavrianopoulou (2006) 230
emotional, female, as irrational Trott (2019) 11, 30
emotional, heresy Schremer (2010) 25
emotional, inversion, translation Pillinger (2019) 79, 95
emotional, model, maskil, instructor of the dead sea sect, as Mermelstein (2021) 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180
emotional, movements are spatial movements, posidonius, stoic, their Sorabji (2000) 86, 116, 117
emotional, movements can be sufficient posidonius, stoic, since, i, in music Sorabji (2000) 84, 130
emotional, movements of soul not identical with impulse, posidonius, stoic Sorabji (2000) 116, 131
emotional, movements unlike seneca's first movements, posidonius, stoic Sorabji (2000) 117, 118, 119, 120
emotional, part of the soul, evagrius, desert father, reflects platonism, including Sorabji (2000) 360, 367, 368
emotional, parts, augustine, favours plato's division of soul into reason and Sorabji (2000) 382, 383
emotional, posidonius, stoic, the last two capacities called the, pathētikon, element of the soul Sorabji (2000) 95
emotional, practice, ritual purity, ablutions as Mermelstein (2021) 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotional, practice, ritual, as Mermelstein (2021) 227, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
emotional, quality, affectionalis qualitas Nisula (2012) 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 332
emotional, resistance Mermelstein (2021) 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 55, 56, 59, 102, 111
emotional, responses to portrait, statues Kalinowski (2021) 36, 37
emotional, responses to the destruction of the second temple, romans Mermelstein (2021) 135, 147
emotional, responses to their conquest of the near east, romans Mermelstein (2021) 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214
emotional, signaling Dilley (2019) 70
emotional, situations, memory, of Mermelstein (2021) 233
emotional, states, impersonal passive, and Joho (2022) 57, 58
emotional, stereotypes Mermelstein (2021) 101, 102
emotional, strategy in cicero Bua (2019) 295, 296, 297
emotional, struggle, maximus, confessor, christian, multiplies stages of Sorabji (2000) 368
emotional, well-being, well-being Huebner (2013) 168
emotional, wellbeing, freedmen and inheritance law Huebner and Laes (2019) 97
emotional, wellbeing, of christian devotees Huebner and Laes (2019) 316, 317
emotional, wellbeing, of praesidia soldiers Huebner and Laes (2019) 70
emotional, wellbeing, of slaves Huebner and Laes (2019) 92, 93, 94
emotions Avery Peck et al. (2014) 97, 106, 108
Beck (2006) 136
Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 204
Brouwer (2013) 89
Champion (2022) 9, 17, 18, 19
Clay and Vergados (2022) 41, 352
Huffman (2019) 113, 425, 542, 543
Inwood and Warren (2020) 59, 64, 80, 81, 203, 204
King (2006) 31, 170, 179, 190, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 217
Nasrallah (2019) 165, 166
Poulsen and Jönsson (2021) 140, 209, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233, 236, 239, 243, 244, 245, 247, 253
Rupke (2016) 49, 94
Stavrianopoulou (2006) 198, 212, 218, 219, 226, 227, 230, 234, 244, 246, 249, 252, 259, 302, 303, 311
Tacoma (2020) 146, 148, 155
Van Nuffelen (2012) 21, 26, 70, 71, 72, 73, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 138, 139, 142, 143
emotions, / passions, stoicism, and Bexley (2022) 48, 49, 88, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 197, 198
emotions, [ passions ] Linjamaa (2019) 63, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 134, 195, 233, 234, 235, 236, 253
emotions, ], passions [ Linjamaa (2019) 15, 36, 51, 56, 57, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 117, 126, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 152, 166, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 224, 227, 233, 236, 242, 252, 253, 265, 266, 267, 270
emotions, aboutness of Kaster(2005) 32, 33, 67, 68, 69
emotions, acceptable, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of emotion, not all Sorabji (2000) 195, 208, 380, 386, 399
emotions, accepted by stoics during training, apatheia, freedom from, eradication of emotion, Sorabji (2000) 51, 52
emotions, affectionate language Stavrianopoulou (2006) 217
emotions, affectus Mueller (2002) 17, 18, 19, 20, 33, 44, 48, 63, 64, 65, 73, 75, 76, 77, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 101, 102, 103, 108, 111, 115, 116, 131, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 167, 168
emotions, alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos, utility of Sorabji (2000) 191
emotions, all desires?, emotions, are Sorabji (2000) 140
emotions, always augustine, exceptions to metriopatheia, some bad, pride Sorabji (2000) 335, 336, 337
emotions, and aesthetic appropriateness Bexley (2022) 42, 86, 87
emotions, and character traits Graver (2007) 133, 141, 164, 165
emotions, and civic community Stavrianopoulou (2006) 246
emotions, and cognition Champion (2022) 148, 149, 150, 151, 152
emotions, and demonic activity Champion (2022) 126, 127, 131, 138, 143, 144, 146, 148, 205, 209
emotions, and ekphrasis Champion (2022) 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31
emotions, and embodiment Champion (2022) 123
emotions, and ethopoeia Champion (2022) 30, 31, 33, 34
emotions, and godlikeness Champion (2022) 71, 74, 126
emotions, and hercules Bexley (2022) 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165
emotions, and oedipus Bexley (2022) 250, 251
emotions, and pathognomy Bexley (2022) 197, 198
emotions, and pathos Champion (2022) 149
emotions, and simple ascriptions of value Graver (2007) 39
emotions, and stoic materialism Bexley (2022) 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 200, 201, 202
emotions, and the body Bexley (2022) 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192
emotions, and thyestes Bexley (2022) 65
emotions, and tragic discovery Jouanna (2018) 445
emotions, and tragic irony Jouanna (2018) 424, 425
emotions, and tragic reversal Jouanna (2018) 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431
emotions, and worship, communal Champion (2022) 123, 124
emotions, and, martyrdom Mermelstein (2021) 24, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59
emotions, and, role-playing Kaster(2005) 15
emotions, and, social bond Kaster(2005) 15, 19
emotions, and, stoicism Kaster(2005) 162
emotions, and, structure of thought Kaster(2005) 10, 67, 68, 69
emotions, anger Champion (2022) 137, 138, 142, 143, 156, 157, 164, 165, 166, 167, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198
emotions, animals, their Sorabji (2000) 125, 126, 127, 128, 129
emotions, aristotelian/peripatetic view of Agri (2022) 14, 15, 86, 87, 157
emotions, aristotle, natural and necessary Sorabji (2000) 201, 202
emotions, aristotle, on Graver (2007) 57, 61, 217, 253
emotions, aristotle, physiological basis of Sorabji (2000) 25, 261, 263, 264
emotions, as action Graver (2007) 39, 68, 69, 94, 229
emotions, as actions Graver (2007) 39, 67, 68, 69, 94, 99, 229
emotions, as causes Graver (2007) 111, 120, 121, 123, 164, 165, 242, 249
emotions, as contumacious Graver (2007) 130, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255
emotions, as deceptive Agri (2022) 20, 102, 103
emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul Agri (2022) 17, 18, 19, 45, 46, 56, 125, 131, 132
emotions, as identical with judgements, contrast chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, intellectualist account of zeno Sorabji (2000) 29, 30
emotions, as judgments, chrysippus, on Graver (2007) 39, 79
emotions, as narrative Lateiner and Spatharas (2016) 33, 34, 46, 65, 117, 118, 129, 134, 136, 165, 184, 197, 223, 265
emotions, as othering Agri (2022) 44, 45, 46, 115, 125, 126, 172, 173
emotions, as physical events Graver (2007) 18, 28, 29, 30, 121
emotions, augustine, loss of awareness of past and future by saints in next life would reduce range of Sorabji (2000) 398
emotions, augustine, metriopatheia favoured for many Sorabji (2000) 380, 398
emotions, augustine, st paul recommended and christ experienced Sorabji (2000) 398
emotions, augustine, utility of Sorabji (2000) 191
emotions, basil of caesarea, church father, and christ had Sorabji (2000) 392
emotions, before the fall, aquinas, thomas Sorabji (2000) 398
emotions, but aspasius ignores desire Sorabji (2000) 134, 135
emotions, can be useful to the progressing novice, progressing Sorabji (2000) 51, 52, 235
emotions, cannot be understood without physical basis, emotions, per contra, aristotle, galen Sorabji (2000) 25, 68, 71, 72, 96, 119, 146, 153, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272
emotions, causal interconnections Sorabji (2000) 182, 183, 360, 361, 362, 365, 366
emotions, causation of Graver (2007) 42, 43, 65, 68, 69, 79, 237
emotions, causes, of Graver (2007) 42, 43, 68, 69, 79
emotions, central to moral philosophy and education, posidonius, stoic Sorabji (2000) 95
emotions, chrysippus, on Agri (2022) 16, 17
emotions, chrysippus, on overwhelming Graver (2007) 61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 197, 198
emotions, chrysippus, treatises of on Graver (2007) 39, 141, 154, 223, 234, 247
emotions, cicero Agri (2022) 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
emotions, cicero, division of Agri (2022) 17, 18, 19
emotions, classified by genus Graver (2007) 53, 54, 55, 104, 105, 203, 204, 231
emotions, classified by species Graver (2007) 55, 56, 57, 231, 232
emotions, classified under distress, pleasure, and aristotle, desire, not stoics' fear Sorabji (2000) 22, 135
emotions, classified under pleasure and aspasius, aristotelian, distress, not aristotle's desire Sorabji (2000) 134, 135
emotions, conservatism, of Kaster(2005) 11
emotions, control of Stavrianopoulou (2006) 230, 245, 254, 256
emotions, corrupting, corruptibility of Agri (2022) 3, 4, 54, 160, 185, 186
emotions, crantor, platonist, utility of Sorabji (2000) 191
emotions, darkness, effects on sensory perception and Nuno et al (2021) 148, 165, 183, 224
emotions, definition of King (2006) 203
emotions, definitions of Graver (2007) 28, 29, 30, 39, 42, 43, 67
emotions, demons, source of bad thoughts and Sorabji (2000) 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367
emotions, demonstration of Stavrianopoulou (2006) 16, 230
emotions, difficulty to tame Agri (2022) 152, 153
emotions, directive faculty, in Graver (2007) 233
emotions, disgust Feder (2022) 7, 28, 54, 55, 62, 176, 177, 178, 181, 192, 194, 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 214, 219, 223, 252
emotions, distress, distress depends on frustration of other Sorabji (2000) 365
emotions, distress, pleasure, zeno of citium, stoic, four generic appetite, fear Sorabji (2000) 65, 136
emotions, diversity of Champion (2022) 123
emotions, do not concern past harm or benefit, past, present, future, stoics think Sorabji (2000) 110, 136, 137, 228
emotions, doubt Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 215
emotions, emotional, emotion Athanassaki and Titchener (2022) 47, 55, 71, 83, 85, 132, 133, 164, 225, 229, 236, 238, 239, 253, 300, 303, 314, 318
emotions, eradication/ suppression of Agri (2022) 3, 16, 17
emotions, evagrius of pontus, ponticus, on Champion (2022) 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 152, 195, 196
emotions, examples of Graver (2007) 3, 55, 56, 57, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244
emotions, fade with time-lapse, effects of time, because of reassessment Sorabji (2000) 112, 236, 237
emotions, fading faster than posidonius, stoic, judgements never sufficient for emotion, i, irrational movements of emotional, part also required, as shown by judgements, due to satiety with movements Sorabji (2000) 112, 113, 114
emotions, fear Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 191
emotions, fear in education Champion (2022) 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 177, 189
emotions, fear, stoic division of Agri (2022) 17, 18, 19, 52, 53
emotions, feelings, in individuating species Graver (2007) 57
emotions, feminizing language of Agri (2022) 86
emotions, focalization of experience, in understanding Kaster(2005) 51, 52, 101, 102, 103, 122, 123, 124, 179, 188
emotions, follow bodily states, alexander of aphrodisias, aristotelian Sorabji (2000) 261, 263, 264
emotions, for stoics compatible with apatheia, freedom from, eradication of emotion, some apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love Sorabji (2000) 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 171, 208, 281, 282, 283
emotions, formation of human Agri (2022) 19, 20, 194
emotions, funeral, and Stavrianopoulou (2006) 244
emotions, gender, maternal Mermelstein (2021) 37
emotions, gender-based view of Agri (2022) 5, 6, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47
emotions, gods Van der Horst (2014) 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45
emotions, good Geljon and Runia (2019) 286, 290
emotions, helpful, philo of alexandria, jewish philosopher Sorabji (2000) 386
emotions, history of Mermelstein (2021) 5
emotions, human nature, and capacity for Graver (2007) 36, 51, 99, 100, 101, 202, 203, 204, 206
emotions, identified with false judgements by chrysippus Sorabji (2000) 21
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji (2000) 20, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
emotions, immobility, despite Mueller (2002) 142, 143
emotions, in rhetoric, aristotle Sorabji (2000) 22, 23, 24, 290
emotions, in ritual Stavrianopoulou (2006) 15, 16, 188
emotions, in social control, and emotions, socialization, role of Kaster(2005) 5, 19, 48
emotions, inscriptions reflect Kalinowski (2021) 25, 26, 27
emotions, inscriptions, reflect Kalinowski (2021) 25, 26, 27
emotions, intentional state, in defining Kaster(2005) 32, 40, 41, 48, 66, 69, 72, 197
emotions, judgement, as basis of Long (2006) 380, 381, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 392
emotions, lexicalization of Kaster(2005) 6, 10, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 84, 85, 92, 104, 129, 150, 160, 175, 179, 188
emotions, lexicalization, of Kaster(2005) 6, 10, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 84, 85, 92, 104
emotions, meaning of pathos Sorabji (2000) 7, 17, 68, 206
emotions, moderation in metriopatheia Graver (2007) 128, 243
emotions, moderation of Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 133, 327
emotions, modern theories Graver (2007) 223, 224, 228, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255
emotions, moral, emotions, Graver (2007) 193, 252, 253
emotions, moral, remorse as Kaster(2005) 80, 81
emotions, n., lexicalization of Kaster(2005) 6, 175, 179, 188
emotions, nan, intentional state, in defining Kaster(2005) 32, 40, 41, 48, 66, 69, 72, 197
emotions, natural, cassian, john, founder of monastery at monte cassino, some Sorabji (2000) 386
emotions, natural, climacus, christian ascetic, some Sorabji (2000) 386
emotions, natural, isaiah the solitary, st, some Sorabji (2000) 386
emotions, nature of Agri (2022) 3, 14, 15, 19, 20
emotions, negative Kaster(2005) 67, 154
emotions, norms, construction of Champion (2022) 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 202
emotions, of antigone Jouanna (2018) 488
emotions, of antiochus Mermelstein (2021) 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 119, 120, 126, 127, 128
emotions, of electra Jouanna (2018) 499, 500
emotions, of philoctetes Jouanna (2018) 447, 448, 449
emotions, of pity and grief, plato, including fearful Sorabji (2000) 291, 292
emotions, overwhelming Graver (2007) 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 118, 119, 120, 127, 128, 130
emotions, passio, perturbatio Nisula (2012) 2, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 47, 104, 193, 216, 219, 233, 234, 237, 240, 272
emotions, passio, perturbatio, as forms of will Nisula (2012) 233, 234, 237
emotions, passio, perturbatio, as passive states Nisula (2012) 215, 216
emotions, passio, perturbatio, christian versions of Nisula (2012) 242, 243
emotions, passio, perturbatio, disturbed Nisula (2012) 69, 244, 245
emotions, passio, perturbatio, eradication of Nisula (2012) 201, 243
emotions, passio, perturbatio, excessive Nisula (2012) 232, 234
emotions, passio, perturbatio, fictitious Nisula (2012) 199, 220
emotions, passio, perturbatio, irrationality of Nisula (2012) 23, 30, 31, 33, 195, 223
emotions, passio, perturbatio, movements, of Nisula (2012) 194, 196, 197, 199, 212, 214, 239, 260, 262
emotions, passio, perturbatio, of christ Nisula (2012) 30, 216, 224, 243, 349
emotions, passio, perturbatio, peripatetic views of Nisula (2012) 239
emotions, passio, perturbatio, platonic theory of Nisula (2012) 26, 194, 199, 203
emotions, passio, perturbatio, responsibility for Nisula (2012) 216, 235
emotions, passio, perturbatio, spatialiaty of Nisula (2012) 196, 197, 204
emotions, passio, perturbatio, stoic tetrachord of Nisula (2012) 19, 25, 26, 33, 34, 197, 203, 215, 218, 219
emotions, passio, perturbatio, therapy of Nisula (2012) 78, 205, 243, 247
emotions, passio, perturbatio, vocabulary of Nisula (2012) 28, 193, 238, 239
emotions, passion and desire Champion (2022) 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 160, 162, 186, 187
emotions, passions ], envy [ vices Linjamaa (2019) 84, 85, 89, 90, 228, 240, 243
emotions, passions ], vices [ Linjamaa (2019) 36, 103
emotions, physical sensations of Graver (2007) 18, 227
emotions, physiological basis of Braund and Most (2004) 106
emotions, plato, posidonius, galen, without irrational forces in the soul Sorabji (2000) 86, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 257, 258, 259
emotions, pleasure and distress, alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos, two generic Sorabji (2000) 134
emotions, pleasure, distress, chrysippus, stoic, already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus, four generic appetite, fear Sorabji (2000) 29, 65, 136
emotions, portrait statues evoke Kalinowski (2021) 36, 37
emotions, positive Kaster(2005) 154
emotions, prodigy reports and Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 164
emotions, propatheia Champion (2022) 149, 150
emotions, psychology, cultural Kaster(2005) 85, 102, 181
emotions, pyrrhonian sceptics, apatheia for Sorabji (2000) 198, 224
emotions, pyrrhonian sceptics, causal interconnection of Sorabji (2000) 182, 183
emotions, pythagoreans, avoidance of Huffman (2019) 542
emotions, rational Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 326
emotions, relationship with memory Galinsky (2016) 27, 70, 71
emotions, respond differently, catharsis, plutarch, different Sorabji (2000) 295
emotions, responsibility, moral, for actions and Graver (2007) 62, 65, 232
emotions, rhetoric, and Champion (2022) 124, 125, 126, 127, 129
emotions, ritual performance Stavrianopoulou (2006) 213
emotions, ritual, and Stavrianopoulou (2006) 211, 212, 213, 234, 235, 238
emotions, role, of cognition in Kaster(2005) 188, 189
emotions, scripts, of Kaster(2005) 85
emotions, see also laughter Conybeare (2006) 56, 57
emotions, seneca makes zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger Sorabji (2000) 61, 62, 63
emotions, senses, and Nuno et al (2021) 224, 228, 258
emotions, slipperiness of Agri (2022) 55, 56, 115
emotions, social control, and Kaster(2005) 23, 24, 25, 26, 27
emotions, soul, fallen to passions Champion (2022) 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 177, 178, 216
emotions, soul, tripartite Champion (2022) 137, 138, 140
emotions, source of intellectual error Agri (2022) 14, 15
emotions, stoic views Agri (2022) 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 51, 52, 53, 73, 74, 112, 113, 131, 132, 133, 144, 145, 156, 158, 166, 167, 173, 189
emotions, stoicism, and the Kaster(2005) 103, 162, 166, 181, 184
emotions, suspension judgement, as basis of of see justice Long (2006) 4, 10, 29, 184, 185, 189, 190, 191, 192, 198, 199, 311, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 343, 345, 347, 348, 351, 354, 357
emotions, swelling, as metaphor for Braund and Most (2004) 178, 273
emotions, teleology King (2006) 203
emotions, terror Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 191
emotions, the judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji (2000) 29, 30
emotions, themistius, orator, commentator on aristotle, utility of Sorabji (2000) 197
emotions, theorizing Champion (2022) 123, 124
emotions, to blends, galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, feedback from Sorabji (2000) 255
emotions, to each other, emotions, closeness of certain Sorabji (2000) 23
emotions, toward integral objects Graver (2007) 193, 195, 196, 199, 200, 210, 254
emotions, two brain tracks, one physical, one cognitive, with varying interconnection Sorabji (2000) 146, 153
emotions, two component model King (2006) 206, 207
emotions, tyranny of Agri (2022) 15, 16, 36, 37, 122, 129, 149, 150, 153
emotions, tyrant, ability to conceal Agri (2022) 53
emotions, uncontrollability of Agri (2022) 15, 16, 94, 127, 173
emotions, understood as, scorn, as lexical item, and fastidium, scripts Kaster(2005) 85
emotions, useful in training, epictetus, stoic, certain Sorabji (2000) 51, 52
emotions, vs. virtus Agri (2022) 174
emotions, wetness of Agri (2022) 76, 77
emotions, πάθη, stoic Merz and Tieleman (2012) 215
emotions, πάθη, stoic, extirpation of moderation of Merz and Tieleman (2012) 170, 171
emotive, capacity, movements, of Graver (2007) 235
emotive, pathetike kinesis movements Graver (2007) 235
god, emotions, of Levison (2009) 16, 42, 100

List of validated texts:
103 validated results for "emotion"
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 18.12 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotions, classified by genus • emotions, moderation of • pre-emotions • pre-emotions, in Scriptural exegesis • pre-emotions, term propatheia

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 327; Graver (2007) 104


18.12. וַתִּצְחַק שָׂרָה בְּקִרְבָּהּ לֵאמֹר אַחֲרֵי בְלֹתִי הָיְתָה־לִּי עֶדְנָה וַאדֹנִי זָקֵן׃''. None
18.12. And Sarah laughed within herself, saying: ‘After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?’''. None
2. Hebrew Bible, Jonah, 3.9-3.10 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bagoas, emotional • Emotions, Gods

 Found in books: Gera (2014) 181; Van der Horst (2014) 38


3.9. מִי־יוֹדֵעַ יָשׁוּב וְנִחַם הָאֱלֹהִים וְשָׁב מֵחֲרוֹן אַפּוֹ וְלֹא נֹאבֵד׃' '. None
3.9. Who knoweth whether God will not turn and repent, and turn away from His fierce anger, that we perish not?’ 3.10. And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil, which He said He would do unto them; and He did it not.''. None
3. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 14.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • domination, emotion and • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotions, disgust • pain, emotion and • ritual, as emotional practice

 Found in books: Feder (2022) 214; Mermelstein (2021) 249


14.7. וְהִזָּה עַל הַמִּטַּהֵר מִן־הַצָּרַעַת שֶׁבַע פְּעָמִים וְטִהֲרוֹ וְשִׁלַּח אֶת־הַצִּפֹּר הַחַיָּה עַל־פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה׃''. None
14.7. And he shall sprinkle upon him that is to be cleansed from the leprosy seven times, and shall pronounce him clean, and shall let go the living bird into the open field.''. None
4. None, None, nan (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bagoas, emotional • emotions/passions (πάθη), preliminary emotions (προπάθειαι)

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 304; Gera (2014) 418


5. None, None, nan (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotions • gender, emotion and • pain, emotion and

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 9; Mermelstein (2021) 84


6. Homer, Iliad, 14.271-14.280, 14.315-14.316, 16.458-16.461, 18.108-18.110, 22.71-22.73, 23.171-23.176 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Emotions • Emotions, and civic community • Emotions, in ritual • action, in relation to emotion • belief, involved in emotion • emotion • emotional detachment • emotions • emotions, anger, wrath (ira, mênis) • emotions, examples of • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion • rhetorical theory, emotion in

 Found in books: Burton (2009) 135; Farrell (2021) 53, 62, 65, 267, 272, 274; Fortenbaugh (2006) 71, 79, 196; Graver (2007) 3; Keane (2015) 31, 141; Sorabji (2000) 80; Stavrianopoulou (2006) 188, 246


14.271. ἄγρει νῦν μοι ὄμοσσον ἀάατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, 14.272. χειρὶ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρῃ μὲν ἕλε χθόνα πουλυβότειραν, 14.273. τῇ δʼ ἑτέρῃ ἅλα μαρμαρέην, ἵνα νῶϊν ἅπαντες 14.274. μάρτυροι ὦσʼ οἳ ἔνερθε θεοὶ Κρόνον ἀμφὶς ἐόντες, 14.275. ἦ μὲν ἐμοὶ δώσειν Χαρίτων μίαν ὁπλοτεράων 14.276. Πασιθέην, ἧς τʼ αὐτὸς ἐέλδομαι ἤματα πάντα. 14.277. ὣς ἔφατʼ, οὐδʼ ἀπίθησε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη, 14.278. ὄμνυε δʼ ὡς ἐκέλευε, θεοὺς δʼ ὀνόμηνεν ἅπαντας 14.279. τοὺς ὑποταρταρίους οἳ Τιτῆνες καλέονται. 14.280. αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥʼ ὄμοσέν τε τελεύτησέν τε τὸν ὅρκον,
14.315. οὐ γάρ πώ ποτέ μʼ ὧδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς 14.316. θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν,
16.458. ὣς ἔφατʼ, οὐδʼ ἀπίθησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· 16.459. αἱματοέσσας δὲ ψιάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε 16.460. παῖδα φίλον τιμῶν, τόν οἱ Πάτροκλος ἔμελλε 16.461. φθίσειν ἐν Τροίῃ ἐριβώλακι τηλόθι πάτρης.
18.108. καὶ χόλος, ὅς τʼ ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι, 18.109. ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο 18.110. ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται ἠΰτε καπνός·
22.71. κείσοντʼ ἐν προθύροισι. νέῳ δέ τε πάντʼ ἐπέοικεν 22.72. ἄρηϊ κταμένῳ δεδαϊγμένῳ ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ 22.73. κεῖσθαι· πάντα δὲ καλὰ θανόντι περ ὅττι φανήῃ·
23.171. πρὸς λέχεα κλίνων· πίσυρας δʼ ἐριαύχενας ἵππους 23.172. ἐσσυμένως ἐνέβαλλε πυρῇ μεγάλα στεναχίζων. 23.173. ἐννέα τῷ γε ἄνακτι τραπεζῆες κύνες ἦσαν, 23.174. καὶ μὲν τῶν ἐνέβαλλε πυρῇ δύο δειροτομήσας, 23.175. δώδεκα δὲ Τρώων μεγαθύμων υἱέας ἐσθλοὺς 23.176. χαλκῷ δηϊόων· κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ μήδετο ἔργα·''. None
14.271. So spake she, and Sleep waxed glad, and made answer saying:Come now, swear to me by the inviolable water of Styx, and with one hand lay thou hold of the bounteous earth, and with the other of the shimmering sea, that one and all they may be witnesses betwixt us twain, even the gods that are below with Cronos, 14.275. that verily thou wilt give me one of the youthful Graces, even Pasithea, that myself I long for all my days. So spake he, and the goddess, white-armed Hera, failed not to hearken, but sware as he bade, and invoked by name all the gods below Tartarus, that are called Titans. 14.280. But when she had sworn and made an end of the oath, the twain left the cities of Lemnos and Imbros, and clothed about in mist went forth, speeding swiftly on their way. To many-fountained Ida they came, the mother of wild creatures, even to Lectum, where first they left the sea; and the twain fared on over the dry land,
14.315. for never yet did desire for goddess or mortal woman so shed itself about me and overmaster the heart within my breast—nay, not when I was seized with love of the wife of Ixion, who bare Peirithous, the peer of the gods in counsel; nor of Danaë of the fair ankles, daughter of Acrisius,
16.458. until they come to the land of wide Lycia; and there shall his brethren and his kinsfolk give him burial with mound and pillar; for this is the due of the dead. So spake she, and the father of men and gods failed to hearken. Howbeit he shed bloody rain-drops on the earth, 16.460. hewing honour to his dear son—his own son whom Patroclus was about to slay in the deep-soiled land of Troy, far from his native land.Now when they were come near, as they advanced one against the other, then verily did Patroclus smite glorious Thrasymelus, that was the valiant squire of the prince Sarpedon;
18.108. I that in war am such as is none other of the brazen-coated Achaeans, albeit in council there be others better— so may strife perish from among gods and men, and anger that setteth a man on to grow wroth, how wise soever he be, and that sweeter far than trickling honey 18.110. waxeth like smoke in the breasts of men; even as but now the king of men, Agamemnon, moved me to wrath. Howbeit these things will we let be as past and done, for all our pain, curbing the heart in our breasts, because we must. But now will I go forth that I may light on the slayer of the man I loved,
22.71. which then having drunk my blood in the madness of their hearts, shall lie there in the gateway. A young man it beseemeth wholly, when he is slain in battle, that he lie mangled by the sharp bronze; dead though he be, all is honourable whatsoever be seen. But when dogs work shame upon the hoary head and hoary beard
23.171. And thereon he set two-handled jars of honey and oil, leaning them against the bier; and four horses with high arched neeks he cast swiftly upon the pyre, groaning aloud the while. Nine dogs had the prince, that fed beneath his table, and of these did Achilles cut the throats of twain, and cast them upon the pyre. 23.175. And twelve valiant sons of the great-souled Trojans slew he with the bronze—and grim was the work he purposed in his heart and thereto he set the iron might of fire, to range at large. Then he uttered a groan, and called on his dear comrade by name:Hail, I bid thee, O Patroclus, even in the house of Hades, 23.176. And twelve valiant sons of the great-souled Trojans slew he with the bronze—and grim was the work he purposed in his heart and thereto he set the iron might of fire, to range at large. Then he uttered a groan, and called on his dear comrade by name:Hail, I bid thee, O Patroclus, even in the house of Hades, ''. None
7. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion • emotion(s) • emotions/emotion theory • goal (end), of emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 49; Kanellakis (2020) 32; Liatsi (2021) 34


8. Euripides, Hippolytus, 375-389 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion • emotion(s)

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 43, 50; Liatsi (2021) 122


375. ἤδη ποτ' ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ"376. θνητῶν ἐφρόντις' ᾗ διέφθαρται βίος." '377. καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ κατὰ γνώμης φύσιν' "378. πράσσειν κάκιον: ἔστι γὰρ τό γ' εὖ φρονεῖν" "379. πολλοῖσιν: ἀλλὰ τῇδ' ἀθρητέον τόδε:" "380. τὰ χρήστ' ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γιγνώσκομεν," "381. οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ', οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο," "382. οἱ δ' ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ" "383. ἄλλην τιν'. εἰσὶ δ' ἡδοναὶ πολλαὶ βίου," '384. μακραί τε λέσχαι καὶ σχολή, τερπνὸν κακόν,' "385. αἰδώς τε. δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακή," "386. ἡ δ' ἄχθος οἴκων. εἰ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦν σαφής," "387. οὐκ ἂν δύ' ἤστην ταὔτ' ἔχοντε γράμματα." "388. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνω προγνοῦς' ἐγώ," "389. οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁποίῳ φαρμάκῳ διαφθερεῖν" "". None
375. oft ere now in heedless mood through the long hours of night have I wondered why man’s life is spoiled; and it seems to me their evil case is not due to any natural fault of judgment, for there be many dowered with sense, but we must view the matter in this light;'376. oft ere now in heedless mood through the long hours of night have I wondered why man’s life is spoiled; and it seems to me their evil case is not due to any natural fault of judgment, for there be many dowered with sense, but we must view the matter in this light; 380. by teaching and experience we learn the right but neglect it in practice, some from sloth, others from preferring pleasure of some kind or other to duty. Now life has many pleasures, protracted talk, and leisure, that seductive evil; 385. likewise there is shame which is of two kinds, one a noble quality, the other a curse to families; but if for each its proper time were clearly known, these twain could not have had the selfsame letters to denote them. '. None
9. Euripides, Medea, 1078-1079 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • emotion • emotions, examples of • emotions, overwhelming

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 43, 47, 48, 128, 169; Graver (2007) 3, 70, 234


1078. καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά,'1079. θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, '. None
1078. the soft young cheek, the fragrant breath! my children! Go, leave me; I cannot bear to longer look upon ye; my sorrow wins the day. At last I understand the awful deed I am to do; but passion, that cause of direst woes to mortal man,'1079. the soft young cheek, the fragrant breath! my children! Go, leave me; I cannot bear to longer look upon ye; my sorrow wins the day. At last I understand the awful deed I am to do; but passion, that cause of direst woes to mortal man, '. None
10. Euripides, Trojan Women, 108 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotions, physical sensations of • translation, emotional inversion

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 227; Pillinger (2019) 79


108. ὦ πολὺς ὄγκος συστελλόμενος''. None
108. Ah me! ah me! What else but tears is now my hapless lot, whose country, children, husband, all are lost? Ah! the high-blown pride of ancestors, humbled! how brought to nothing after all!''. None
11. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • gender, emotion and • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • pain, emotion and

 Found in books: Long (2006) 319; Mermelstein (2021) 80


197b. ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ διʼ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; ἀλλʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ''. None
197b. as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent act''. None
12. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition, and emotion • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, modern theories • emotions, toward integral objects

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 57; Graver (2007) 254; Hockey (2019) 65


69d. παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγάς, ἔτι δʼ αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δʼ εὐπαράγωγον· αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα, ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος συνέθεσαν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη, χωρὶς ἐκείνου κατοικίζουσιν εἰς''. None
69d. which has within it passions both fearful and unavoidable—firstly, pleasure, a most mighty lure to evil; next, pains, which put good to rout; and besides these, rashness and fear, foolish counsellors both and anger, hard to dissuade; and hope, ready to seduce. And blending these with irrational sensation and with all-daring lust, they thus compounded in necessary fashion the mortal kind of soul. Wherefore, since they scrupled to pollute the divine, unless through absolute necessity,''. None
13. Sophocles, Antigone, 911-912 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion • emotions, of Antigone

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 194; Jouanna (2018) 488


911. and if bereft of a child, there could be a second from some other man. But when father and mother are hidden in Hades, no brother could ever bloom for me again. Such was the law whereby I held you first in honor, but for that Creon judged me guilty of wrongdoing'912. and if bereft of a child, there could be a second from some other man. But when father and mother are hidden in Hades, no brother could ever bloom for me again. Such was the law whereby I held you first in honor, but for that Creon judged me guilty of wrongdoing '. None
14. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.23.6, 3.82.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Impersonal passive, and emotional states • connection between emotions • danger, hope as a dangerous emotion/state of mind • emotions as a destructive force,

 Found in books: Chaniotis (2012) 163; Hau (2017) 208; Joho (2022) 57, 58; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 113


1.23.6. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν: αἱ δ’ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ’ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ’ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.
3.82.8. πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῇσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.''. None
1.23.6. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side, which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.
3.82.8. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honor with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. ''. None
15. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • acoustic signal and emotional arousal • arousal of emotion • community, emotional

 Found in books: Chaniotis (2012) 363; Michalopoulos et al. (2021) 93


16. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • belief, involved in emotion • cognitive approach to emotions • emotion • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal • emotions, metaphors for • narrative, emotions as • pleasure, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 31, 35, 69, 311, 361; Lateiner and Spatharas (2016) 33; Michalopoulos et al. (2021) 100; Spatharas (2019) 25, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51, 75


17. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotional appeal • emotional intelligence

 Found in books: Chaniotis (2021) 148, 149; Fortenbaugh (2006) 396


18. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions [ Passions ] • Passions [ emotions ] • emotion, • emotions (passio, perturbatio), irrationality of

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 74, 77, 82; Nisula (2012) 195; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 2


19. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Accepted (but note different senses) by Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Implies not medium quantity, but appropriate emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Lactantius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for Schadenfreude • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • definition, of emotion • emotion • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 21; Sorabji (2000) 195


20. Aeschines, Letters, 1.131 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • emotions, scripts of

 Found in books: Michalopoulos et al. (2021) 53; Spatharas (2019) 20


1.131. in the case of Demosthenes, too, it was common report, and not his nurse, that gave him his nickname; and well did common report name him Batalus, for his effeminacy and lewdness! For, Demosthenes, if anyone should strip off those exquisite, pretty mantle of yours, and the soft, pretty shirts that you wear while you are writing your speeches against your friends,Writing speeches against his former friends is as brave an act as Demosthenes is capable of, and the only armor that he knows or needs is his soft shirt! Aeschines is smarting under the fact that Demosthenes, who, in the beginning of the negotiations with Philip for peace, had been on good terms with himself, has now caused his indictment for treason, and will shortly conduct the prosecution in court. and should pass them around among the jurors, I think, unless they were informed beforehand, they would be quite at a loss to say whether they had in their hands the clothing of a man or of a woman! ''. None
21. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • deification of emotions • personification of emotion • translation of emotional terms

 Found in books: Chaniotis (2012) 155; Stavrianopoulou (2006) 218


22. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, Emotions follow bodily states • Andronicus of Rhodes, Aristotelian, Emotion as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition (hupolēpsis), not mere appearance, of good or bad • Aristotle, But human emotion can be said to involve either • Aristotle, Emotions classified under distress, pleasure, and desire, not Stoics' fear • Aristotle, Emotions in rhetoric • Aristotle, Physiological basis of emotions • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotion can be produced by mere appearance, pace Andronicus, and by appearance of pleasure, rather than of good • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), But Chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of emotion as well • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Agreed by Stoics that emotion is impulse • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Lucretius, Epicurean, Emotion and character follows hot and cold in body • Passions [ emotions ] • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion • Stoic, anthropology of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • belief, involved in emotion • belief/s, role in emotion • cognition, and emotion • definition, of individual emotions, anger • emotion • emotion(s) • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, as othering • emotions, gender-based view of • evaluation, involved in emotion • pain, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 45; Fortenbaugh (2006) 51, 73, 164, 169, 170, 178; Hockey (2019) 58, 63, 65, 66; Liatsi (2021) 185; Linjamaa (2019) 75; Long (2006) 378; Sattler (2021) 111, 118; Sorabji (2000) 22, 24, 25, 41, 43, 71, 133, 261, 263, 264, 293, 313, 320, 322; van der EIjk (2005) 236


23. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 170; Sorabji (2000) 320


24. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, Emotions follow bodily states • Aristotle, Physiological basis of emotions • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Emotions, Seneca discounts Posidonius' alleged examples of emotion without judgement, as mere first movements • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Feedback from emotions to blends • Lucretius, Epicurean, Emotion and character follows hot and cold in body • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Posidonius' animals also lack genuine emotion, since they are capable of appearance but not of judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, This answers Posidonius' alleged emotion without judgements, which is only first movement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • emotion • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 178, 186; Sattler (2021) 113, 119; Sorabji (2000) 72, 77, 80, 255, 258, 264


25. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, in relation to emotion • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • bodily changes during emotion • definition of individual emotions, envy, kindness • definition, of emotion • emotion • emotional appeal • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), relation to virtues of character • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 40, 97, 135; Sattler (2021) 111, 138, 139; Sorabji (2000) 194, 327


26. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Accepted (but note different senses) by Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Not even then • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Aristotle, on emotions • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Augustine, Emotion an act of will • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), But Chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of emotion as well • Cicero, emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • Emotions, Zeno, Emotion is not false judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement • Epictetus, Stoic, But distinguished from first movements assent and emotion • First movements, distinguished assent to appearance, to thought, to its lingering, to the pleasure of the thought or its lingering to the emotion, or the act • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Love, The right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Accepted by Aristotle • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Implies not medium quantity, but appropriate emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Lactantius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for Schadenfreude • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for lust or pride • Passions [ emotions ] • Stoic, anthropology of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, in relation to emotion • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • belief/s, role in emotion • bodily changes during emotion • cognition, and emotion • emotion • emotion(s) • emotion, • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotional appeal • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), as passive-cum-active • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), as reasonable or unreasonable • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), relation to virtues of character • emotions, Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, nature of • emotions, source of intellectual error • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • goal (end), of emotion • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 14, 15; Fortenbaugh (2006) 33, 48, 58, 59, 67, 135, 148, 150, 170, 171, 179; Graver (2007) 240, 250, 253; Hockey (2019) 58, 66, 74, 81, 82; Liatsi (2021) 18, 94, 183; Linjamaa (2019) 74, 75, 136; Long (2006) 378, 391; Sattler (2021) 111, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139; Sorabji (2000) 56, 169, 194, 195, 208, 221, 250, 308, 310, 311, 313, 322, 325, 326, 327, 340, 376, 399, 413; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 169; van der EIjk (2005) 224


27. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Feedback from emotions to blends • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • analogy, emotion • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • emotion • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 184; Sattler (2021) 116, 117; Sorabji (2000) 255


28. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, in relation to emotion • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • definition of individual emotions, envy, kindness • definition, of emotion • emotion • emotional appeal • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 40, 135; Sattler (2021) 111


29. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, Emotions in rhetoric • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Plato, Including fearful emotions of pity and grief • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • belief, involved in emotion • emotion • emotional appeal • pain, involvement in emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 190, 251; Sorabji (2000) 24, 80, 290, 291


30. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Andronicus of Rhodes, Aristotelian, Emotion as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition (hupolēpsis), not mere appearance, of good or bad • Antiochus, emotions of • Aristotle, But human emotion can be said to involve either • Aristotle, Emotions classified under distress, pleasure, and desire, not Stoics' fear • Aristotle, Emotions in rhetoric • Aristotle, Physiological basis of emotions • Aristotle, on emotions • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotion can be produced by mere appearance, pace Andronicus, and by appearance of pleasure, rather than of good • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotions classified under pleasure and distress, not Aristotle's desire • Augustine, Time makes emotion fade because of new hopes • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Emotions • Emotions, But Aspasius ignores desire • Emotions, Closeness of certain emotions to each other • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • History of Emotions • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion • Stoicism, outlook on emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, in relation to emotion • animals, emotions (affections, passions) of • belief, involved in emotion • bodily changes during emotion • cognitive approach to emotions • definition of individual emotions, envy, fear • definition of individual emotions, envy, shame • definition, of emotion • definition, of individual emotions, anger • emotion • emotion(s) • emotion, ancient rhetorical theory of • emotion, categorisation of • emotion, contextualisation of • emotion, cultural construction of • emotion, dispositional emotions • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotion, logical communication of • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal • emotional counter-discourse, as source of power • emotional involvement of reader, • emotional repertoire • emotional scenarios, (proto)typical • emotions • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal • emotions, and ekphrasis • emotions, and ethopoeia • emotions, classified by species • emotions, examples of • emotions,lexicalization of • evaluation, involved in emotion • friendly feelings, emotion of friendship • goal (end), of emotion • goodwill (wishing well), an emotion • lexicalization of emotions • martyrdom, emotions and • pain, emotion and • pain, involvement in emotion • pleasure, involvement in emotion • resistance, emotional • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 31; Fortenbaugh (2006) 14, 17, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 74, 79, 80, 111, 138, 140, 149, 150, 331, 333, 360, 403; Fowler (2014) 114; Graver (2007) 217, 232; Hau (2017) 86; Hockey (2019) 92, 98, 99, 180, 181, 229; Kaster(2005) 84; Liatsi (2021) 180, 181, 183; Long (2006) 378; Mermelstein (2021) 5, 34; Michalopoulos et al. (2021) 80, 149; Sattler (2021) 111, 116, 117, 118, 119; Sorabji (2000) 22, 23, 24, 25, 41, 80, 135, 241, 290, 298, 322; Spatharas (2019) 38; Van Nuffelen (2012) 116


31. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion • emotion(s)

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 178; Liatsi (2021) 183; Sorabji (2000) 320, 322


32. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 196; Michalopoulos et al. (2021) 119


33. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.62-3.63, 3.65-3.66, 3.68 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice

 Found in books: Long (2006) 326, 348; Sorabji (2000) 174, 184, 280


3.62. \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63. \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '
3.65. \xa0"This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one\'s children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. < 3.66. \xa0Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. <
3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <''. None
34. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29, 3.17, 3.20-3.22, 3.24, 3.60-3.71, 4.14, 4.18, 4.20, 4.43, 4.72, 5.16-5.20, 5.28-5.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa for some purposes • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Nicasicrates • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Aristotle, Natural and necessary emotions • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Emotion • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, Augustine hails Stoic acceptance of eupatheia as acceptance of emotion • Lactantius, Church Father, Misrepresents Stoic recognition of eupatheiai as general acceptance of emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Plutarch of Chaeroneia, Middle Platonist, Misrepresents Stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • cognition, and emotion • emotion, • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, origin and transmission • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, modern theories • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • lexicalization of emotions • lexicalization of emotions, n. • pathos= Lat. perturbatio (passion or emotion)

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 159, 228, 246, 248, 250, 251, 255; Hockey (2019) 73, 80; Kaster(2005) 175; Long (2006) 326, 331, 348, 357; Maso (2022) 30, 105; Sorabji (2000) 97, 172, 174, 184, 201, 207, 280; Tsouni (2019) 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 188; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 103


3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint.' "
3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici." '3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.
3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.
3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 3.65. ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. 3.66. itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, ii edd. hi qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles viles NV cules A eules R civiles BE neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus. 3.67. Et Et Sed Mdv. quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint possint suam BE sine iniuria. Quoniamque quoniamque quēque R ea natura esset hominis, ut ei ei Lamb. et ABEN om. RV cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum iustum, qui migraret, migraret negaret A iniustum fore. sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum cum ut E commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque quodque BE cuiusque sit. 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.69. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta, quae w)felh/mata et bla/mmata appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera. neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. incommoda autem et commoda—ita enim eu)xrhsth/mata et dusxrhsth/mata appello—communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est. commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta diximus; dicimus BE ea possunt paria non esse. sed emolumenta communia emolumenta et detrimenta communia Lamb. esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia. 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V 3.71. Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, natura P. Man., Lamb. naturam alienumque alienumque V et ( corr. priore u ab alt. m. ) N alienamque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare sociare BE aut coniungere iniuriam, gravissimeque et gravissime et BE verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum vicissimque, quicquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore.
4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere.
4.18. Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, occultorum R quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque coniunctionum coniunctionum RNV coniunctium (coniunct iu pro coniunct iu m = coniunctionum) BE hominum ad ad R et B ac ENV societatem societatem R societatum BENV cf. III 66 inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus et p. 128, 15 sq., ubi de cognitione rerum respicit ad p. 127,23 (erat insitus menti cognitionis amor) et de coniunctione generis humani ad p. 127, 26 sq. (coniunctionum hominum ad societatem) animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut aut RN 2 ut BEN 1 V diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac ac BER et NV decore, his initiis, ut ante dixi, et et V om. BERN ( ad initiis, ut ante dixi, et seminibus cf. p. 127, 14 et 9 ) seminibus a natura datis temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est.
4.20. Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri veri ( corr., ut videtur, ex vere) N vere BEV vero R investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute virtute una BE consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant.
4.43. Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat, deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque quodcumque ( ante in) N quod cuique BEV cuique R in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. is hoc melior quam Pyrrho, quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri, quod penitus a a N 2 ( in ras. in fine versus ), om. BERV natura natura ( in marg. ad initium versus add. ) N 2 recessit. Stoici autem, quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium officii quaerunt, melius quam Pyrrho; quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea, quae que ( q B) et ad BE ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt, non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. ille enim occurrentia nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiungunt a finibus et a a ( post et) om. BE summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt, praeponunt A. (?) Man. proponunt ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quicquam ad beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt.
4.72. Quis istud, quaeso, quaeso Man., Lamb. ; quasi nesciebat? verum audiamus.— Ista, inquit, quae dixisti, valere, locupletem esse, non dolere, bona non dico, sed dicam Graece prohgme/na, Latine autem producta—sed praeposita proposita RNV aut praecipua malo, sit tolerabilius et mollius—; illa autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala, sed, si libet, si libet BE, N (libet ab alt. m. in ras. ); si lilibet R scilicet V reiectanea. itaque illa non dico me expetere, sed legere, nec optare, sed sumere, contraria autem non fugere, sed quasi secernere. Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Platonis alumni? Se omnia, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare, quae autem contra, mala. Videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis concinere, concinere C. F. W. Mue. consistere re re N 2 om. BERN 1 V dissidere, cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? discrepare BE disceptare cur igitur, cum de re conveniat, non malumus malimus NV usitate loqui? aut doceat paratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniam fore, si illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, fortioremque in patiendo dolore, si eum asperum et difficilem perpessu et contra perpessu et contra perpessi contra BE naturam esse quam si malum dixero.
5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh\\n o(rmh/n bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.19. ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo aliquo uno BE ex tribus illis congruere possit, possit. u aut non dolendi ita sit ut quanta ( v. 19 ) R rell. om. ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam secl. Mdv. non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam etiam N 2 in ras., aut BEV si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita ita N 2 aut non dolendi ita R ( cf. ad v. 14 ), N 1 V; aut nichil dolendi ita BE fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda. 5.20. expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. superiores tres erant, quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia, cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi nisi Urs. ne si etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt BE etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt.' "
5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est." "5.29. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'. et qui Et qui RV Equi BE et qui (et ab alt. m. in ras. add. ) N ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus inimicus esse BE atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum." '5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus.' "5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur?" "5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat." '. None
3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <
3.20. \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "3.21. \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" "3.22. \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" "
3.24. \xa0For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthÅ\x8dmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. <" "
3.60. \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" '3.61. \xa0For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. < 3.62. \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63. \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '3.64. \xa0"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâ\x80\x91abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. < 3.65. \xa0"This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one\'s children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. < 3.66. \xa0Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. < 3.67. \xa0"But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such, that as it were a code of law subsists between the individual and the human race, so that he who upholds this code will be just and he who departs from it, unjust. But just as, though the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of justice militates against the possession of private property. < 3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. < 3.69. \xa0"To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between man and man, the Stoics held that both \'benefits\' and \'injuries\' (in their terminology, Å\x8dphelÄ\x93mata and blammata) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounce them to be not only \'common\' but also \'equal.\' \'Disadvantages\' and \'advantages\' (for so I\xa0render euchrÄ\x93stÄ\x93mata and duschrÄ\x93stÄ\x93mata) they held to be \'common\' but not \'equal.\' For things \'beneficial\' and \'injurious\' are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but \'advantages\' and \'disadvantages\' belong to the class we speak of as \'preferred\' and \'rejected,\' and these may differ in degree. But whereas \'benefits\' and \'injuries\' are pronounced to be \'common,\' righteous and sinful acts are not considered \'common.\' < 3.70. \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <' "3.71. \xa0Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. <" '
4.14. \xa0"But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics\' conception of this \'End of Goods,\' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I\xa0also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being \'to live in accordance with nature.\' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, \'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.\' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno\'s, being an explanation of your phrase \'to live in agreement with nature.\' <' "
4.18. \xa0Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I\xa0called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. <" "
4.20. \xa0As I\xa0understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity. <" '
4.43. \xa0"In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the End of Goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who did not venture to leave a mere negation, but introduced as the Wise Man\'s motives of desire \'whatever chanced to enter his mind\' and \'whatever struck him.\' Aristo is better than Pyrrho in so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers already mentioned; but in trying to find a foundation for virtuous action they are an improvement upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary \'things that strike the mind\' they do better than Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as \'suitable to nature\' and \'to be adopted for their own sakes,\' and then refusing to include them in the End of Goods, they desert nature and approximate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented his vague \'things that strike the mind\'; while the Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary objects of nature, yet allow no connection between these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making the primary objects \'preferred,\' so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature. <
4.72. \xa0"Who, pray, did not know that? However, let us hear what he has to say. â\x80\x94 \'The things you mentioned,\' he continues, \'health, affluence, freedom from pain, I\xa0do not call goods, but I\xa0will call them in Greek proÄ\x93gmena, that is in your language "brought forward" (though I\xa0will rather use "preferred" or "preâ\x80\x91eminent," as these sound smoother and more acceptable) and on the other hand disease, poverty and pain I\xa0do not style evils, but, if you please, "things rejected." Accordingly I\xa0do not speak of "desiring" but "selecting" these things, not of "wishing" but "adopting" them, and not of "avoiding" their opposites but so to speak "discarding" them.\' What say Aristotle and the other pupils of Plato? That they call all things in accordance with nature good and all things contrary to nature bad. Do you see therefore that between your master Zeno and Aristo there is a verbal harmony but a real difference; whereas between him and Aristotle and the rest there is a real agreement and a verbal disagreement? Why, then, as we are agreed to the fact, do we not prefer to employ the usual terminology? Or else let him prove that I\xa0shall be readier to despise money if I\xa0believe it to be a \'thing preferred\' than if I\xa0believe it to be a good, and braver to endure pain if I\xa0say it is irksome and hard to bear and contrary to nature, than if I\xa0call it an evil. <
5.16. \xa0and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. < 5.17. \xa0Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ\x93. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â\x80\x94 as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. < 5.18. \xa0"One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. < 5.19. \xa0"Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. â\x80\x94 Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. < 5.20. \xa0"Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, â\x80\x94 that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one\'s being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics. <' "
5.28. \xa0Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A\xa0few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. <" "5.29. \xa0The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. <" '5.30. \xa0Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. <' "5.31. \xa0Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â\x80\x94 as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â\x80\x94 the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I\xa0am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' <" '5.32. \xa0Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be \')" onMouseOut="nd();"affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; \'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,\' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. <' '. None
35. Cicero, On Duties, 1.12, 1.14-1.15, 1.31, 1.65, 1.67, 1.69, 1.74-1.89, 1.107-1.114, 3.20-3.22, 3.26, 3.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Cicero, emotions • Emotion • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Posidonius, Stoic, Platonic emotional element in soul ineradicable • Posidonius, Stoic, So apatheia is only freedom from unnatural emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • cognition, and emotion • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, and aesthetic appropriateness • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, eradication/ suppression of • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • gender, emotion and • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • pain, emotion and • pathos= Lat. perturbatio (passion or emotion)

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 16; Bexley (2022) 42; Graver (2007) 244, 247, 248; Hockey (2019) 73, 80; Long (2006) 311, 319, 320, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 343, 347; Maso (2022) 30, 105; Mermelstein (2021) 73, 92, 94, 108; Sorabji (2000) 106, 249, 412; Tsouni (2019) 113; Čulík-Baird (2022) 45


1.31. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine eoque, quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque contraria, ut reddere depositum, facere promissum quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem, ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum. Referri enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio, fundamenta iustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur. Ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper est idem.
1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.
1.67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea. quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae.
1.69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari.
1.74. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et cupidi bellorum gerendorum; vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae res exstiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae. 1.75. Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit eius nomen quam Solonis illustrius citcturque Salamis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas, non minus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum est; illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc maiorum instituta servantur; et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at ille vere a se adiutum Themistoclem; est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus. 1.76. Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis partum putatur, tamen ne minima quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae confercndi sunt; quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habuerunt exercitus et fortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum versaremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur; parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi; nec plus Africanus, singularis et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia rei publicae profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. Gracchum interemit; quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione (attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est), sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu. 1.77. Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio: Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi. Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubertibus nonne togae arma cesserunt? neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. 1.78. Quae res igitur gesta umquam in bello tanta? qui triumphus conferendus? licet enim mihi, M. fill, apud te gloriari, ad quem et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet. Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus hoc tribuit, ut diceret frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in rem publicam beneficio, ubi triumpharet, esset habiturus. Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est. 1.79. Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo excelso magnificoque quaerimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen corpus et ita afficiendum est, ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. Honestum autem id, quod exquirimus, totum est positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non minorem utilitatem afferunt, qui togati rei publicae praesunt, quam qui bellum gerunt. Itaque eorum consilio saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta bella sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas. 1.80. Quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere. 1.81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: Non putaram. Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 1.82. De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. Idque est magni viri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere. Ut enim sunt, quem ad modum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas antepot, sic reperias multos, quibus periculosa et calida consilia quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur. 1.83. Numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles timidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quare in tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipiscare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali. Periculosae autem rerum actiones partim iis sunt, qui eas suscipiunt, partim rei publicae. Itemque alii de vita, alii de gloria et benivolentia civium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore et gloria quam de ceteris commodis. 1.84. Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam profundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant; quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque haec quidem Lacedaemoniis plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt. Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim, qui, quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant dicere. 1.85. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis praecepta teneant, unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum. 1.86. Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et fortis civis et in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit tradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur totamque eam sic tuebitur, ut omnibus consulat; nec vero criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque ita iustitiae honestatique adhaerescet, ut, dum ea conservet, quamvis graviter offendat mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat illa, quae dixi. 1.87. Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare apud eundem est Platonem, similiter facere eos, qui inter se contenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret. Idemque praecipit, ut eos adversaries existimemus, qui arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint, qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio. 1.88. Nec vero audiendi, qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et altitudo animi, quae dicitur, ne, si irascamur aut intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque dementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest. Omnis autem et animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, qui punitur aliquem aut verbis castigat, sed ad rei publicae utilitatem referri. 1.89. Cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. Prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo; numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent utiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est optandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur.
1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus.
3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.22. Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus.
3.26. Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius existimat. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio.
3.63. Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis. Huic Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec gratia est.' '. None
1.31. \xa0But occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most becoming to the just man and to the "good man," as we call him, undergo a change and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, not be a duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise, and it may become right and proper sometimes to evade and not to observe what truth and honour would usually demand. For we may well be guided by those fundamental principles of justice which I\xa0laid down at the outset: first, that no harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved. When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change and it does not always remain the same. <' "
1.65. \xa0So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. <" "
1.67. \xa0All the glory and greatness and, I\xa0may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1)\xa0if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2)\xa0if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. <" '
1.69. \xa0Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I\xa0speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers and certain other earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates. <' "
1.74. \xa0Most people think that the achievements of war are more important than those of peace; but this opinion needs to be corrected. For many men have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for fame. This is notably the case with men of great spirit and natural ability, and it is the more likely to happen, if they are adapted to a soldier's life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the facts, we shall find that there have been many instances of achievement in peace more important and no less renowned than in war. <" "1.75. \xa0However highly Themistocles, for example, may be extolled â\x80\x94 and deservedly â\x80\x94 and however much more illustrious his name may be than Solon's, and however much Salamis may be cited as witness of his most glorious victory â\x80\x94 a\xa0victory glorified above Solon's statesmanship in instituting the Areopagus â\x80\x94 yet Solon's achievement is not to be accounted less illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served the state once and only once; while Solon's work will be of service for ever. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the institutions of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles could not readily point to any instance in which he himself had rendered assistance to the Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert that Themistocles had received assistance from it; for the war was directed by the counsels of that senate which Solon had created. <" '1.76. \xa0The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Although it is thought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her supremacy, yet these are not even remotely to be compared with the legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, it was due to these that Pausanias and Lysander had armies so brave and so well disciplined. For my own part, I\xa0do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to Gaius Marius, when I\xa0was a lad, or Quintus Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey, when I\xa0was engaged in public life. For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater service to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same time by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official authority, by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that, executed as a political measure without the help of an army. < 1.77. \xa0The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I\xa0am told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail: "Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises, ye laurels." Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I\xa0was at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the most desperate traitors â\x80\x94 dropped to the ground of their own accord! What achievement in war, then, was ever so great? < 1.78. \xa0What triumph can be compared with that? For I\xa0may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds. And it was to me, too, that Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with the honour of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, when he said that his third triumph would have been gained in vain, if he were not to have through my services to the state a place in which to celebrate it. There are, therefore, instances of civic courage that are not inferior to the courage of the soldier. Nay, the former calls for even greater energy and greater devotion than the latter. <' "1.79. \xa0That moral goodness which we look for in a lofty, high-minded spirit is secured, of course, by moral, not by physical, strength. And yet the body must be trained and so disciplined that it can obey the dictates of judgment and reason in attending to business and in enduring toil. But that moral goodness which is our theme depends wholly upon the thought and attention given to it by the mind. And, in this way, the men who in a civil capacity direct the affairs of the nation render no less important service than they who conduct its wars: by their statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or terminated; sometimes also they are declared. Upon Marcus Cato's counsel, for example, the Third Punic War was undertaken, and in its conduct his influence was domit, even after he was dead. <" "1.80. \xa0And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace. But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not to swerve from the path of reason. <" '1.81. \xa0Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say, "I\xa0had not thought of that." These are the activities that mark a spirit strong, high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace. <' "1.82. \xa0As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness. And it is great man's duty in troublous times to single out the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honourable course. For whereas there are many, as I\xa0have said before, who place the achievements of war above those of peace, so one may find many to whom adventurous, hot-headed counsels seem more brilliant and more impressive than calm and well-considered measures. <" "1.83. \xa0We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming cowardly and craven in our avoidance of danger; but we must also beware of exposing ourselves to danger needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than that. Accordingly, in encountering danger we should do as doctors do in their practice: in light cases of illness they give mild treatment; in cases of dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply hazardous and even desperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm, would pray for a storm; a\xa0wise man's way is, when the storm does come, to withstand it with all the means at his command, and especially, when the advantages to be expected in case of a successful issue are greater than the hazards of the struggle. The dangers attending great affairs of state fall sometimes upon those who undertake them, sometimes upon the state. In carrying out such enterprises, some run the risk of losing their lives, others their reputation and the good-will of their fellow-citizens. It is our duty, then, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and to hazard honour and glory more readily than other advantages. <" '1.84. \xa0Many, on the other hand, have been found who were ready to pour out not only their money but their lives for their country and yet would not consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory â\x80\x94 even though the interests of their country demanded it. For example, when Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen to the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement with the Athenians. His answer to them was that "the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself." And yet what he did dealt only a slight blow to Sparta; there was another which proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism recklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that, the Spartan power fell. How much better was the conduct of Quintus Maximus! of him Ennius says: "One man â\x80\x94 and he alone â\x80\x94 restored our state by delaying. Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety; Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever brighter." This sort of offence must be avoided no less in political life. For there are men who for fear of giving offence do not dare to express their honest opinion, no matter how excellent. <' "1.85. \xa0Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element â\x80\x94 dissension and party strife. The result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole. <" '1.86. \xa0As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose at Athens, and in our own country not only dissensions but also disastrous civil wars broke out. All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and worthy of a leading place in the state will shun with abhorrence; he will dedicate himself unreservedly to his country, without aiming at influence or power for himself; and he will devote himself to the state in its entirety in such a way as to further the interests of all. Besides, he will not expose anyone to hatred or disrepute by groundless charges, but he will surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that he will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than be untrue to them, and will face death itself rather than renounce them. < 1.87. \xa0A\xa0most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering and scrambling for office. Concerning this also we find a fine thought in Plato: "Those who compete against one another," he says, "to see which of two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors quarrelling as to which one of them shall do the steering." And he likewise lays down the rule that we should regard only those as adversaries who take up arms against the state, not those who strive to have the government administered according to their convictions. This was the spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus: there was in it no trace of rancour. < 1.88. \xa0Neither must we listen to those who think that one should indulge in violent anger against one\'s political enemies and imagine that such is the attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For nothing is more commendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than courtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy equal rights before the law, we must school ourselves to affability and what is called "mental poise"; for if we are irritated when people intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make unreasonable requests, we shall develop a sour, churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and offensive to others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbearance are to be commended only with the understanding that strictness may be exercised for the good of the state; for without that, the government cannot be well administered. On the other hand, if punishment or correction must be administered, it need not be insulting; it ought to have regard to the welfare of the state, not to the personal satisfaction of the man who administers the punishment or reproof. < 1.89. \xa0We should take care also that the punishment shall not be out of proportion to the offence, and that some shall not be chastised for the same fault for which others are not even called to account. In administering punishment it is above all necessary to allow no trace of anger. For if any one proceeds in a passion to inflict punishment, he will never observe that happy mean which lies between excess and defect. This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics and wisely approved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But, in reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated; and it is to be desired that they who administer the government should be like the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice. <
1.107. \xa0We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. <' "1.108. \xa0Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏ\x81Ï\x89ν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. <" '1.109. \xa0Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â\x80\x94 both father and son â\x80\x94 and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I\xa0have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â\x80\x94 the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â\x80\x94 had no such gracious manner in social intercourse .\xa0.\xa0., and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. < 1.110. \xa0Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one\'s nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â\x80\x94 that is, if it is in direct opposition to one\'s natural genius. <' "1.111. \xa0If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. <" '1.112. \xa0Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another under the same circumstances a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. <' "1.113. \xa0How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a\xa0thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. <" '1.114. \xa0Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I\xa0remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. <' "
3.20. \xa0That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I\xa0am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. <" "3.21. \xa0Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. <" "3.22. \xa0Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. <" '
3.26. \xa0Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for himself he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of Nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of Nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he believes that, while such a course should be avoided, the other alternatives are much worse â\x80\x94 namely, death, poverty, pain â\x80\x94 he is mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his property are more serious than those affecting his soul. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed. <
3.63. \xa0Now I\xa0observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man\'s duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola\'s act, which I\xa0cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor gratitude. <' '. None
36. Polybius, Histories, 2.56, 6.56.6, 6.56.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotion • emotion, arousal of • emotion, collective • emotion, control of • emotion, management of • emotion, politics and • emotional involvement of reader, • emotions

 Found in books: Chaniotis (2021) 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188; Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 71; Hau (2017) 85, 137, 154; Van Nuffelen (2012) 118, 138


6.56.6. μεγίστην δέ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολίτευμα πρὸς βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει.
6.56.9. ἐμοί γε μὴν δοκοῦσι τοῦ πλήθους χάριν τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι.' '. None
2.56. 1. \xa0Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy,,2. \xa0it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I\xa0have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority.,3. \xa0In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements;,4. \xa0but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I\xa0must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I\xa0am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war.,5. \xa0This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work.,6. \xa0Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks.,7. \xa0In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery.,8. \xa0This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes.,9. \xa0Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history.,10. \xa0A\xa0historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace.,11. \xa0For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates,,12. \xa0since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners.,13. \xa0Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger.,14. \xa0Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise.,15. \xa0Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction.,16. \xa0So in every such case the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer. " '
6.56.6. \xa0But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature of their religious convictions. <
6.56.9. \xa0My own opinion at least is that they have adopted this course for the sake of the common people. <' ". None
37. Septuagint, 1 Maccabees, 1.28, 3.47, 3.53, 4.39-4.40 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus, emotions of • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Bagoas, emotional • discourse of emotion, identity and • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotional scenarios, (proto)typical • pain, emotion and

 Found in books: Gera (2014) 181, 429; Hockey (2019) 232; Mermelstein (2021) 123, 128


1.28. Even the land shook for its inhabitants,and all the house of Jacob was clothed with shame.
3.47. They fasted that day, put on sackcloth and sprinkled ashes on their heads, and rent their clothes.
3.53. How will we be able to withstand them,if thou dost not help us?"
4.39. Then they rent their clothes, and mourned with great lamentation, and sprinkled themselves with ashes. 4.40. They fell face down on the ground, and sounded the signal on the trumpets, and cried out to Heaven.''. None
38. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 221; König and Wiater (2022) 221


39. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Passions [ emotions ] • emotions, classified by species • emotions, examples of • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 232; Linjamaa (2019) 136


40. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism, and the emotions • emotion • emotional appeal • emotions (passio, perturbatio), movements) of

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 344; Kaster(2005) 184; Mackey (2022) 101; Nisula (2012) 214


41. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion, origin and transmission • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 159, 160; Long (2006) 325


42. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotion • emotions • emotions,

 Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 209; Maso (2022) 65; Van Nuffelen (2012) 117


43. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • definition, of emotion • definition, of individual emotions, anger • emotion • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal • rhetorical theory, emotion in

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 339, 340, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352; Keane (2015) 31; Konig and Wiater (2022) 221; König and Wiater (2022) 221


44. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alcinous, Middle Platonist author of Didasklikos, Utility of emotions • Antiochus, emotions of • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Antiochus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia and metriopatheia suited to different callings • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia to Adam and Eve before the Fall • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Cynics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Does punishment require anger? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Christians, esp. pity and love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Philo, repentance and pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Mercy substituted for pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Models, Anaxagoras • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Socrates • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Socratics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different stages • Aristotle, on emotions • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Attention, Emotion can fade through lack of attention, as well as through change of judgement • Augustine, Time makes emotion fade because of new hopes • Augustine, Utility of emotions • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Cicero infers voluntariness of emotion from dispensability of second judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast Zeno) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, on emotions as judgments • Chrysippus, on overwhelming emotions • Cicero, Platonizing Roman statesman, orator, On consequent voluntariness of emotion • Cicero, Platonizing Roman statesman, orator, On need in emotion for judgement that reaction appropriate • Cicero, Platonizing Roman statesman, orator, Time removes emotion because reflection or familiarity can remove the relevant judgement • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Crantor, Platonist, Utility of emotions • Emotion • Emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Causal interconnections • Emotions, Emotion more concerned with present and future than with past • Emotions, Emotion voluntary? • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Meaning of pathos • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • Emotions, The judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Emotions, Zeno, Emotion is not false judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement • Enkrateia, endurance, connotes suppression of emotion? • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • First movements, Allow time for checking emotion • Freshness of judgement and fading of emotion • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Love, The right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Aristotelians • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Crantor • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Does punishment require anger? • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Lactantius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Maximus of Tyre • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Platonists, Crantor, Alcinous • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Sotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Taurus • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Themistius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Utility of emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Past, present, future, Stoics think emotions do not concern past harm or benefit • Philosophy, Has a role in calming emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, Judgements never sufficient for emotion (i) irrational movements of emotional part also required, as shown by emotions fading faster than judgements, due to satiety with movements • Posidonius, Stoic, Platonic emotional element in soul ineradicable • Posidonius, Stoic, So apatheia is only freedom from unnatural emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, Zeno's and Chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Pyrrhonian sceptics, Apatheia for emotions • Pyrrhonian sceptics, Causal interconnection of emotions • Satiety, distinguished satisfaction as a reason for emotion fading • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Hence emotion subject to therapy • Stoicism, and the emotions • Stoicism, on emotion • Stoics/Stoicism, on emotions/passions (πάθη) • Themistius, orator, commentator on Aristotle, Utility of emotions • Therapy, Philosophical contributions to therapy (i) Voluntariness of emotion • Time-lapse, effects of, Emotions fade with time, because of reassessment • Utility of emotion • Vices [ Emotions, Passions ] • Voluntariness of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as movement of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, definition of emotion • action, emotions as • anger, as “first” emotion • belief/s, role in emotion • beliefs,role in emotion • causes, of emotions • cognition, and emotion • cognition, as element of emotion • desire, as genus emotion • directive faculty, in emotions • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotion, infection with • emotion, of women • emotion, specific aversions • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal • emotions (passio, perturbatio) • emotions, • emotions, Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, and character traits • emotions, as actions • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as deceptive • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, as othering • emotions, as physical events • emotions, causation of • emotions, classified by genus • emotions, classified by species • emotions, definitions of • emotions, examples of • emotions, formation of human • emotions, gender-based view of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, nature of • emotions, overwhelming • emotions, physical sensations of • emotions, source of intellectual error • emotions, toward integral objects • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • emotions,and Stoicism • emotions,and structure of thought • emotions,conservatism of • emotions,lexicalization of • emotions/passions (πάθη), Stoics on • emotions/passions (πάθη), good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) • emotions/passions (πάθη), will (βούλησις) as a good emotion • fear, Stoic division of emotions • fear, emasculating emotion • feelings, in individuating species emotions • gender, emotion and • human nature, and capacity for emotions • judgement, as basis of emotions • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • lexicalization of emotions • martyrdom, emotions and • pain, emotion and • pathos= Lat. perturbatio (passion or emotion) • pneuma, changes in emotion • pre-emotions, criticism • pre-emotions, origins of Stoic concept • psychology, cultural, emotions • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions • structure of thought, and emotion

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 5, 15, 18, 20, 45, 46, 47, 51, 132, 189; Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 157, 158, 159, 160, 263; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 36; Fortenbaugh (2006) 352; Graver (2007) 30, 36, 43, 57, 69, 79, 119, 165, 196, 197, 199, 200, 203, 204, 224, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 242, 244, 245, 248, 249, 252, 253, 255; Hockey (2019) 73; Inwood and Warren (2020) 203, 204; Kaster(2005) 10, 11, 162, 181; Keane (2015) 41, 82; Linjamaa (2019) 57, 91, 95, 96, 103; Long (2006) 7, 190, 319, 325, 381, 390; Mackey (2022) 103, 105; Malherbe et al (2014) 441; Maso (2022) 34, 105; Mermelstein (2021) 35, 76; Nisula (2012) 24; Sorabji (2000) 7, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55, 64, 67, 70, 107, 111, 112, 136, 161, 162, 165, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 191, 196, 197, 208, 223, 224, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 267, 329, 332, 389; Tsouni (2019) 109, 113, 114, 115; Čulík-Baird (2022) 44, 153


45. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 3.40.4-3.40.8, 3.44.4-3.44.5 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 107; König and Wiater (2022) 107


3.40.4. \xa0For ships, then, which are equipped with oars the place is suitable enough, since it rolls along no wave from a great distance and affords, furthermore, fishing in the greatest abundance; but the ships which carry the elephants, being of deep draft because of their weight and heavy by reason of their equipment, bring upon their crews great and terrible dangers.' "3.40.5. \xa0For running as they do under full sail and often times being driven during the night before the force of the winds, sometimes they will strike against rocks and be wrecked or sometimes run aground on slightly submerged spits. The sailors are unable to go over the sides of the ship because the water is deeper than a man's height, and when in their efforts to rescue their vessel by means of their punting-poles they accomplish nothing, they jettison everything except their provisions; but if even by this course they do not succeed in effecting an escape, they fall into great perplexity by reason of the fact that they can make out neither an island nor a promontory nor another ship near at hand; â\x80\x94 for the region is altogether inhospitable and only at rare intervals do men cross it in ships." "3.40.6. \xa0And to add to these evils the waves within a moment's time cast up such a mass of sand against the body of the ship and heap it up in so incredible a fashion that it soon piles up a mound round about the place and binds the vessel, as if of set purpose, to the solid land." "3.40.7. \xa0Now the men who have suffered this mishap, at the outset bewail their lot with moderation in the face of a deaf wilderness, having as yet not entirely abandoned hope of ultimate salvation; for oftentimes the swell of the flood-tide has intervened for men in such a plight and raised the ship aloft, and suddenly appearing, as might a deus ex machina, has brought succour to men in the extremity of peril. But when such god-sent aid has not been vouchsafed to them and their food fails, then the strong cast the weaker into the sea in order that for the few left the remaining necessities of life may last a greater number of days. But finally, when they have blotted out of their minds all their hopes, these perish by a more miserable fate than those who had died before; for whereas the latter in a moment's time returned to Nature the spirit which she had given them, these parcelled out their death into many separate hardships before they finally, suffering long-protracted tortures, were granted the end of life." "3.40.8. \xa0As for the ships which have been stripped of their crews in this pitiable fashion, there they remain for many years, like a group of cenotaphs, embedded on every side in a heap of sand, their masts and yard-arms si standing aloft, and they move those who behold them from afar to pity and sympathy for the men who have perished. For it is the king's command to leave in place such evidences of disasters that they may give notice to sailors of the region which works to their destruction." '
3.44.4. \xa0Beyond these islands there extends for about a\xa0thousand stades a coast which is precipitous and difficult for ships to sail past; for there is neither harbour beneath the cliffs nor roadstead where sailors may anchor, and no natural breakwater which affords shelter in emergency for mariners in distress. And parallel to the coast here runs a mountain range at whose summit are rocks which are sheer and of a terrifying height, and at its base are sharp undersea ledges in many places and behind them are ravines which are eaten away underneath and turn this way and that. 3.44.5. \xa0And since these ravines are connected by passages with one another and the sea is deep, the surf, as it at one time rushes in and at another time retreats, gives forth a sound resembling a mighty crash of thunder. At one place the surf, as it breaks upon huge rocks, rocks leaps on high and causes an astonishing mass of foam, at another it is swallowed up within the caverns and creates such a terrifying agitation of the waters that men who unwittingly draw near these places are so frightened that they die, as it were, a first death.''. None
46. Horace, Sermones, 1.1.24 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion • emotions, passions

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 78; Keane (2015) 9


1.1.24. 1. I suppose that, by my books of the Antiquities of the Jews, most excellent Epaphroditus, I have made it evident to those who peruse them, that our Jewish nation is of very great antiquity, and had a distinct subsistence of its own originally; as also I have therein declared how we came to inhabit this country wherein we now live. Those Antiquities contain the history of five thousand years, and are taken out of our sacred books; but are translated by me into the Greek tongue.
1.1.24. but after some considerable time, Armais, who was left in Egypt, did all those very things, by way of opposition, which his brother had forbidden him to do, without fear; for he used violence to the queen, and continued to make use of the rest of the concubines, without sparing any of them; nay, at the persuasion of his friends he put on the diadem, and set up to oppose his brother; '
1.1.24. but as for the place where the Grecians inhabit, ten thousand destructions have overtaken it, and blotted out the memory of former actions; so that they were ever beginning a new way of living, and supposed that every one of them was the origin of their new state. It was also late, and with difficulty, that they came to know the letters they now use; for those who would advance their use of these letters to the greatest antiquity pretend that they learned them from the Phoenicians and from Cadmus; '. None
47. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 2.792 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism, and the emotions • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 131, 132; Kaster(2005) 184


2.792. exuritque herbas et summa cacumina carpit,''. None
2.792. and even as captives would be led away'
2.792. her long protection, and degraded me '. None
48. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 257 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Alternative ideals, though apatheia represents progress • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Emotions [ Passions ] • Passions [ emotions ] • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 76; Sorabji (2000) 345, 385


257. And the advice was this; not to afflict himself beyond all measure, as if he were stricken down with a novel and unprecedented calamity; nor, on the other hand, to give way to indifference, as if nothing had happened calculated to give him sorrow. But rather to choose the middle way in preference to either extreme; and to endeavour to grieve in a moderate degree; not being indigt at nature for having reclaimed what belonged to her as her due; and bearing what had befallen him with a mild and gentle spirit. ''. None
49. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Alternative ideals, though apatheia represents progress • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Clement of Alexandria • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Philo, repentance and pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Origen • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Philo • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Philo of Alexandria, Jewish philosopher, Emotions helpful • Theodoret, Christian, Some emotion necessary and useful • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • gender, emotion and • pain, emotion and

 Found in books: Mermelstein (2021) 84; Sorabji (2000) 233, 386


177. For absolutely never to do anything wrong at all is a peculiar attribute of God, and perhaps one may also say of a God-like man. But when one has erred, then to change so as to adopt a blameless course of life for the future is the part of a wise man, and of one who is not altogether ignorant of what is expedient. ''. None
50. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 332, 333; König and Wiater (2022) 332, 333


51. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on emotions • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Clement of Alexandria, Platonism and Stoicism in,, good emotions of Stoics • Stoics/Stoicism, on emotions/passions (πάθη) • action, emotions as • belief/s, role in emotion • cognition, and emotion • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, cultural construction of • emotion, modern theory of • emotional repertoire • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, as actions • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, classified by genus • emotions, classified by species • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, toward integral objects • emotions/passions (πάθη), Stoics on • emotions/passions (πάθη), good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) • emotions/passions (πάθη), will (βούλησις) as a good emotion • fear, Stoic division of emotions • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 18; Ayres and Ward (2021) 140; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 36; Graver (2007) 229, 231, 232, 244, 251, 253, 254; Hockey (2019) 68, 110, 180, 181, 207


52. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Emotion • Love, The right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Better kind not an emotion, but educative epibolē • Time-lapse, effects of, Emotions fade with time, because of reassessment • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion(s) • emotions, anger, wrath (ira, mênis)

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 296; Liatsi (2021) 186, 196, 199; Nuno et al (2021) 54; Sorabji (2000) 222, 236, 237, 248, 275, 283, 320, 333


53. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Alternative ideals, though apatheia represents progress • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Clement of Alexandria • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Philo, repentance and pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Origen • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Philo • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Philo of Alexandria, Jewish philosopher, Emotions helpful • Theodoret, Christian, Some emotion necessary and useful • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotions (passio, perturbatio), therapy of • emotions, moderation of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 327; Nisula (2012) 205; Sorabji (2000) 385, 386


54. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • contraction (sustole), involuntary or pre-emotional • emotions, classified by genus • orientation, innate (oikeiosis), on pre-emotions • pre-emotions • pre-emotions, in Scriptural exegesis • pre-emotions, involuntary ‘bitings,’

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 105; Sorabji (2000) 51, 345


55. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 18.6-18.8, 18.13-18.17 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 332, 333, 339; König and Wiater (2022) 332, 333, 339


18.6. \xa0So first of all, you should know that you have no need of toil or exacting labour; for although, when a man has already undergone a great deal of training, these contribute very greatly to his progress, yet if he has had only a little, they will lessen his confidence and make him diffident about getting into action; just as with athletes who are unaccustomed to the training of the body, such training weakens them if they become fatigued by exercises which are too severe. But just as bodies unaccustomed to toil need anointing and moderate exercise rather than the training of the gymnasium, so you in preparing yourself for public speaking have need of diligence which has a tempering of pleasure rather than laborious training. So let us consider the poets: I\xa0would counsel you to read Meder of the writers of Comedy quite carefully, and Euripides of the writers of Tragedy, and to do so, not casually by reading them to yourself, but by having them read to you by others, preferably by men who know how to render the lines pleasurably, but at any rate so as not to offend. For the effect is enhanced when one is relieved of the preoccupation of reading. <' "18.7. \xa0And let no one of the more 'advanced' critics chide me for selecting Meder's plays in preference to the Old Comedy, or Euripides in preference to the earlier writers of Tragedy. For physicians do not prescribe the most costly diet for their patients, but that which is salutary. Now it would be a long task to enumerate all the advantages to be derived from these writers; indeed, not only has Meder's portrayal of every character and every charming trait surpassed all the skill of the early writers of Comedy, but the suavity and plausibility of Euripides, while perhaps not completely attaining to the grandeur of the tragic poet's way of deifying his characters, or to his high dignity, are very useful for the man in public life; and furthermore, he cleverly fills his plays with an abundance of characters and moving incidents, and strews them with maxims useful on all occasions, since he was not without acquaintance with philosophy. <" '18.8. \xa0But Homer comes first and in the middle and last, in that he gives of himself to every boy and adult and old man just as much as each of them can take. Lyric and elegiac poetry too, and iambics and dithyrambs are very valuable for the man of leisure, but the man who intends to have a public career and at the same time to increase the scope of his activities and the effectiveness of his oratory, will have no time for them. <
18.13. \xa0when we are convinced that in the comparison we should be found to be not inferior to them, with the chance, occasionally, of being even superior. I\xa0shall now turn to the Socratics, writers who, I\xa0affirm, are quite indispensable to every man who aspires to become an orator. For just as no meat without salt will be gratifying to the taste, so no branch of literature, as it seems to me, could possibly be pleasing to the ear if it lacked the Socratic grace. It would be a long task to eulogize the others; even to read them is no light thing. < 18.14. \xa0But it is my own opinion that Xenophon, and he alone of the ancients, can satisfy all the requirements of a man in public life. Whether one is commanding an army in time of war, or is guiding the affairs of a state, or is addressing a popular assembly or a senate, or even if he were addressing a court of law and desired, not as a professional master of eloquence merely, but as a statesman or a royal prince, to utter sentiments appropriate to such a character at the bar of justice, the best exemplar of all, it seems to me, and the most profitable for all these purposes is Xenophon. For not only are his ideas clear and simple and easy for everyone to grasp, but the character of his narrative style is attractive, pleasing, and convincing, being in a high degree true to life in the representation of character, with much charm also and effectiveness, so that his power suggests not cleverness but actual wizardry. <' "18.15. \xa0If, for instance, you should be willing to read his work on the March Inland very carefully, you will find no speech, such as you will one day possess the ability to make, whose subject matter he has not dealt with and can offer as a kind of norm to any man who wishes to steer his course by him or imitate him. If it is needful for the statesman to encourage those who are in the depths of despondency, time and again our writer shows how to do this; or if the need is to incite and exhort, no one who understands the Greek language could fail to be aroused by Xenophon's hortatory speeches. <" "18.16. \xa0My own heart, at any rate, is deeply moved and at times I\xa0weep even as I\xa0read his account of all those deeds of valour. Or, if it is necessary to deal prudently with those who are proud and conceited and to avoid, on the one hand, being affected in any way by their displeasure, or, on the other, enslaving one's own spirit to them in unseemly fashion and doing their will in everything, guidance in this also is to be found in him. And also how to hold secret conferences both with generals apart from the common soldiers and with the soldiers in the same way; the proper manner of conversing with kings and princes; how to deceive enemies to their hurt and friends for their own benefit; how to tell the plain truth to those who are needlessly disturbed without giving offence, and to make them believe it; how not to trust too readily those in authority over you, and the means by which such persons deceive their inferiors, and the way in which men outwit and are outwitted â\x80\x94 <" "18.17. \xa0on all these points Xenophon's treatise gives adequate information. For I\xa0imagine that it is because he combines deeds with words, because he did not learn by hearsay nor by copying, but by doing deeds himself as well as telling of them, that he made his speeches most convincingly true to life in all his works and especially in this one which I\xa0chanced to mention. And be well assured that you will have no occasion to repent, but that both in the senate and before the people you will find this great man reaching out a hand to you if you earnestly and diligently read him. <"'. None
56. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 1.1.12, 1.4.18, 1.17.21-1.17.28, 2.1.1-2.1.7, 2.6.9-2.6.10, 2.18.19, 3.3.2-3.3.3, 3.5.7, 3.23.37, 3.26, 3.28, 3.30, 4.1.72-4.1.73, 4.1.89-4.1.90, 4.1.100, 4.4.24-4.4.26, 4.7.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Aristotle, on emotions • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Clement of Alexandria, Platonism and Stoicism in,, good emotions of Stoics • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • Epictetus, on emotions (πάθη) • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Motivation not require emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Philosophy, Has a role in calming emotion • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Hence emotion subject to therapy • Stoics/Stoicism, on emotions/passions (πάθη) • Therapy, Philosophical contributions to therapy (i) Voluntariness of emotion • Voluntariness of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • belief/s, role in emotion • cognition, and emotion • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotions (πάθη) (Stoic), extirpation of, moderation of • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, toward integral objects • emotions/passions (πάθη), Epictetus on • emotions/passions (πάθη), freedom from • emotions/passions (πάθη), preliminary emotions (προπάθειαι) • judgement, as basis of emotions • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 101; Ayres and Ward (2021) 140; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 23, 101, 102; Graver (2007) 249, 250, 253, 254, 255; Hockey (2019) 70; Linjamaa (2019) 117, 136; Long (2006) 36, 345, 385, 388, 390, 393; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 171; Sorabji (2000) 51, 52, 53, 54, 69, 161, 170, 180, 219, 222, 225, 245, 252, 332


1.1. of the things which are in our power, and not in our power. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please. Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero’s freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master. What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you? What then did Agrippinus say? He said, I am not a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day —this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath— let us go and take our exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.
1.4.18. HE who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take the treatise on the active powers ( ὁρμή ), and see how I have studied it. I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making progress: but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will ( προαίρεσις ) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed abort with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles τὰ προηγούμενα ) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus say this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the perturbations ( πάθη ) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish. What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! 0 the great benefactor who points out the way! To Triptolemus all men have erectedtemples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?

1.17.21. SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets. 2.
1.1. THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do every thing both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind: if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so. We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding what he chooses: but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet who said Not death is evil, but a shameful death. Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness and indifference. These things Socrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will he separated afterwards. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open: if it does, bear (with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we have no trouble. What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: courageous in that which does not depend on your will; cautious in that which does depend on it. Well have I not read to you, and do you not know what I was doing? In what? In my little dissertations. —Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ); and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid: but as to these long and labored sentences you will take them and blot them out. What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so much?—But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon con. sequences. And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show, and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllogisms: do you labour at thinking about death, chains, the rack, exile; and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous: courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will.
2.6.9. The title of Indifference means of the indifference of things. of the things which are neither good nor bad. THE hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, I have learned them, and you have not. Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind. Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly.— But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window.—But still speak to him.—In what way? Not meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general’s command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them circumstances. What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been produced? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names. I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes: and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run? Is it not the hazard of your life? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own? how? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose? But is it as to another man’s opinion? and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opinions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome? Yes: what then if I should be sent to Gyara? If that suits you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were something great? It is not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished: never claim any thing which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison. But in our present disposition, consider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us, Would you like me to read Paeans to you?—Why do you trouble me? do you not know the evils which hold me? Can I in such circumstances (listen to paeans)?—What circumstances?—I am going to die.— And will other men be immortal?
2.18.19. EVERY habit and faculty is maintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit of walking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will know the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if you would make any thing a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it. So it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when you have been angry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced, when they did not exist before, and others not be increased and strengthened by corresponding acts. In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the mind grow up. For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. But if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is inflamed to desire quicker than before: and when this takes place continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before, unless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on it which will increase it: at first keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day; now every second day; then every third, then every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. I have not been vexed to—day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months; but I took care when some exciting things happened. Be assured that you are in a good way. To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is her husband; for he who says this says, Happy is her adulterer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind; the woman present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side. I stroke my head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is called the master sophism. And if even the woman is willing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is named the Liar, and the Quiescent. Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud; not for proposing the master sophism. How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says, Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his beauty: consider what a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself; what an Olympian victory; in what number he stood from Hercules; so that, by the Gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not these sorry boxers and pancratiasts, nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing these objects on the other side you will conquer the appearance: you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little: let me see who you are, and what you are about: let me put you to the test. And then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more. This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried way. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from perturbation. Remember God: call on him as a helper and protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscur in a storm. For what is a greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent and drive away the reason? For the storm itself, what else is it but an appearance? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm and serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true, With constant ills the dilatory strives.
3.3.2. THE material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar’s coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will reject Caesar’s coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God. For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relationship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted? Yes, for such is my nature; and this is the coin which God has given me. For this reason if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and brother and country, and every thing. But shall I overlook my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you? Why? I am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection? For who will eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, be receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy what you want. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, be will sell for it that which you want. For another compels him from within, he who has fixed determined) this coin. Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21–23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The another who compels is God, Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone every thing else to that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is man’s fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is compelled and allows himself to be carried away, etc. The notion of compulsion is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him who sees, as the Latin poet says, the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse. Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul’s office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand examination: cast it away: it is nothing to you. If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched: he has nothing to eat. We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling?. All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored.
3.5.7. I AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return home.—At home, I suppose, you were free from sickness. Do you not consider whether you are doing any thing here which may be useful to the exercise of your will, that it may be corrected? For if you are doing nothing towards this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling power cannot be maintained in a state conformable to nature, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to increase your money, you will take care of your father in his old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office: being bad you will do badly any thing else that you have to do. But if you understand yourself, and know that you are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in their place, and if you have changed your state of life from things which are not within your will to things which are within your will, and if you ever say, Alas! you are not saying what you say on account of your father, or your brother, but on account of yourself, do you still allege your sickness? Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise us while we are doing something? the husbandman while he is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage? what would you be doing when death surprises you, for you must be surprised when you are doing something? If you can be doing anything better than this when you are surprised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I wish to be found practising these things that I may be able to say to God, Have I in any respect transgressed thy commands? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which thou gavest me? have I misused my perceptions or my preconceptions ( προλήψεσι )? have I ever blamed thee? have I ever found fault with thy administration? I have been sick, because it was thy will, and so have others, but I was content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will, but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office, because it was not thy pleasure that I should: I have never desired it Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discontented? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countece, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy signals? Is it now thy will that I should depart from the assemblage of men? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administration. May death surprise me while I am thinking of these things, while I am thus writing and reading. But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick. Go to your mother then; for you are a fit person to have your head held when you are sick.—But at home I used to lie down on a delicious bed.—Go away to your bed: indeed you are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health: do not then lose what you can do there (at home). But what does Socrates say? As one man, he says, is pleased with improving his land, another with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing better. Better in what? in using nice little words? Man, do not say that. In little matters of speculation ( θεωρήματα )? what are you saying?—And indeed I do not see what else there is on which philosophers employ their time.—Does it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any person, neither with God nor man? to have blamed nobody? to carry the same face always in going out and coming in? This is what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he knew any thing or taught any thing. But if any man asked for nice little words or little speculations, he would carry him to Protagoras or to Hippias; and if any man came to ask for potherbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who then among you has this purpose (motive to action)? for if indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true.
3.23.37. FIRST say to yourself Who you wish to be: then do accordingly what you are doing; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, rubbing, and exercise: if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different; if he is a Pentathlete, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things: if a worker in metal, such things. For every thing that we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose; and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person’s mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you: take care first of all that you are not doing this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? Immediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of praise from the many? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geometrician. Do you then wish to be useful? in what? tell us that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received something useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any thing useful in the carpenter’s art, unless he is a carpenter; nor in the shoemaker’s art, unless he is a shoemaker. Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. Well; do we fulfill their promise? Tell me the truth; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs? Excellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a certain person contrary to your opinion? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons?—I hope not—Why then did you praise and flatter him? He is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses— How is this?—He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think? do not these very people secretly despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says except this, This man has some need of me? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown? Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading; has he become more modest? has he been turned to reflect on himself? has he perceived in what a bad state he is? has he cast away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him? He does. A man who will teach him to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect art, much better than Dion. This is altogether another thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations? and even if he did say it, I should say to him, Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, and then speak. You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others?—To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is nothing; suppose that there were a thousand—Dion never had so many hearers—How could he?—And they understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can move even a stone—See, these are the words of a philosopher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to others; here is a man who has listened to discourses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. I have often wondered by what arguments. Not so, but by what argument : this is more exact than that— What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending to such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words: Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me: and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best. Hence who ever heard Socrates say, I know something and I teach; but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him; and he would take them and recommend them.—Not so; but as he accompanied them he would say, Hear me to-day discoursing in the house of Quadratus. Why should I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what good will it do you?—But only praise me.—What do you mean by praising?—Say to me, admirable, wonderful.—Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name ( κατηγορία ) of good, what have I to praise in you? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.—What then? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure?— I hope not. For my part I do not listen even to a luteplayer without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear what Socrates says, Nor would it be seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you. Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or to speak, and while he is reading to say, There are not many who can do these things, I swear by all that you value. Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit? What physician invites a man to be treated by him? Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. I invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of invitation: and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say: If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose. Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man’s faults. The philosopher’s school, ye men, is a surgery: you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter: one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a head ache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their parents and their friends and kinsmen and property, that they may say to you, Wonderful! when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or Cleanthes? What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who denies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display? What is the hortatory style? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation that when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reaching or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well: I must no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person? He spoke finely about Xerxes; and another says, No, but about the battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher?
3.26. ARE you not ashamed at being more cowardly and more mean than fugitive slaves? How do they when they run away leave their masters? on what estates do they depend, and what domestics do they rely on? Do they not after stealing a little which is enough for the first days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea, contriving one method after another for maintaining their lives? And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger? But you are afraid lest necessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don’t you see the road to which the want of necessaries leads?—Well, where does it lead?—To the same place to which a fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not often said this yourself to your companions? have you not read much of this kind, and written much? and how often have you boasted that you were easy as to death? Yes: but my wife and children also suffer hunger.—Well then, does their hunger lead to any other place? Is there not the same descent to some place for them also? Is not there the same state below for them? Do you not choose then to look to that place full of boldness against every want and deficiency, to that place to which both the richest and those who have held the highest offices, and kings themselves and tyrants must descend? or to which you will descend hungry, if it should so happen, but they burst by indigestion and drunkenness. What beggar did you hardly ever see who was not an old man, and even of extreme old age? But chilled with cold day and night, and lying on the ground, and eating only what is absolutely necessary they approach near to the impossibility of dying. Cannot you write? Cannot you teach (take care of) children? Cannot you be a watchman at another person’s door?—But it is shameful to come to such a necessity.—Learn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tell us that you are a philosopher: but at present do not, even if any other man call you so, allow it. Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you are not the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a headache, as a fever? If your parents were poor, and left their property to others, and if while they live, they do not help you at all, is this shameful to you? Is this what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never hear that the thing which is shameful ought to be blamed, and that which is blameable is worthy of blame? Whom do you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not do himself? Did you then make your father such as he is, or is it in your power to improve him? Is this power given to you? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them? And have you also been accustomed awhile you were studying philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from yourself? Lament then and groan and eat with fear that you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaves lest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die. So live, and continue to live, you who in name only have approached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable to those who take them up; you who have never sought constancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions: you who have not sought any person for the sake of this object, but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who have never thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself, Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear? What remains for me to do? But as if all your affairs were well and secure, you have been resting on the third topic, that of things being unchanged, in order that you may possess unchanged—what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance ( ἔκκλισιν ) which fails in the attempt? About security in these things you have been anxious. Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and then to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see building a battlement all round and not encircling it with a wall? And what door-keeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in order to be able to prove—what? You practise that you may not be tossed as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Shew me first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and shew me the scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on measuring the dust? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the universe? Shew me these. see, I shew them: I will resolve syllogisms for you. —This is the measure, slave; but it is not the thing measured. Therefore you are now paying the penalty for what you neglected, philosophy: you tremble, you lie awake, you advise with all persons; and if your deliberations are not likely to please all, you think that you have deliberated ill. Then you fear hunger, as you suppose: but it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you will not have a cook, that you will not have another to purchase provisions for the table, a third to take off your shoes, a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, and to follow you, in order that in the bath, when you have taken off your clothes and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified you may be rubbed on this side and on that, and then the aliptes (rubber) may say (to the slave), Change his position, present the side, take hold of his head, shew the shoulder; and then when you have left the bath and gone home, you may call out, Does no one bring something to eat? And then, Take away the tables, sponge them: you are afraid of this, that you may not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those who are in health, how slaves live, how labourers, how those live who are genuine philosophers; how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes who attended to the school and drew water. If you choose to have these things, you will have them every where, and you will live in full confidence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not subject to hindrance, in that which cannot be taken away, that is, in your own will. And why have you made yourself so useless and good for nothing that no man will choose to receive you into his house, no man to take care of you?: but if a utensil entire and useful were cast abroad, every man who found it, would take it up and think it a gain; but no man will take you up, and every man will consider you a loss. So cannot you discharge the office even of a dog, or of a cock? Why then do you choose to live any longer, when you are what you are? Does any good man fear that he shall fail to have food? To the blind it does not fail, to the lame it does not: shall it fail to a good man? And to a good soldier there does not fail to be one who gives him pay, nor to a labourer, nor to a shoemaker: and to the good man shall there be wanting such a person? Does God thus neglect the things that he has established, his ministers, his witnesses, whom alone he employs as examples to the uninstructed, both that he exists, and administers well the whole, and does not neglect human affairs, and that to a good man there is no evil either when he is living or when he is dead? What then when he does not supply him with food? What else does he do than like a good general he has given me the signal to retreat? I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising his acts: for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him; and while I lived, it was my duty to praise God both by myself, and to each person severally and to many. He does not supply me with many things, nor with abundance, he does not will me to live luxuriously; for neither did he supply Hercules who was his own son; but another (Eurystheus) was king of Argos and Mycenae, and Hercules obeyed orders, and laboured, and was exercised. And Eurystheus was what he was, neither king of Argos nor of Mycenae, for he was not even king of himself; but Hercules was ruler and leader of the whole earth and sea, who purged away lawlessness, and introduced justice and holiness; and he did these things both naked and alone. And when Ulysses was cast out shipwrecked, did want humiliate him, did it break his spirit? but how did he go off to the virgins to ask for necessaries, to beg which is considered most shameful? As a lion bred in the mountains trusting in his strength. —Od. vi. 130. Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things which are in our power and those which are not. For these are the only things which make men free, which make them escape from hindrance, which raise the head (neck) of those who are depressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich and on tyrants. And this was (is) the gift given to the philosopher. But you will not come forth bold, but trembling about your trifling garments and silver vessels. Unhappy man, have you thus wasted your time till now? What then, if I shall be sick? You will be sick in such a way as you ought to be.—Who will take care of me?— God; your friends—I shall lie down on a hard bed—But you will lie down like a man—I shall not have a convenient chamber—You will be sick in an inconvenient chamber—Who will provide for me the necessary food?— Those who provide for others also. You will be sick like Manes.—And what also will be the end of the sickness? Any other than death?—Do you then consider that this the chief of all evils to man and the chief mark of mean spirit and of cowardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Against this fear then I advise you to exercise yourself: to this let all your reasoning tend, your exercises, and reading; and you will know that thus only are men made free.
4.1.72. HE is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ( ὁρμαί ) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ( ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι ). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free. If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις ) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugt to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume ( ὑποτάσσομεν ) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. —No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance? Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action ( ὁρμήν ) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements ( ὁρμάς , the acts) of God Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will ( τὰ προαιρετικὰ ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? He could not, and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole ( τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ( πανήγυρις ); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go. But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countece; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom ( καρπιοτήν ), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:— For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .) Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία ), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.
4.4.24. REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the difference between desiring power or being content with a private station; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labour. But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ( εὔσοια )? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.—And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar’s friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something: I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external; and then that I may attend to men, what they say, how they are moved; and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not: thanks to God. Come, when you have done these things and have attended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading? are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why then do you not act consistently in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach any person? If you maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady; if you look rather at the things which are done and happen than are looked at yourself; if you do not envy those who are I referred before you; if surrounding circumstances ( ὕλαι ) do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want? Books? How or for what purpose? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise; for this purpose were used the halteres (weights), the dust, the young men as antagonists; and do you seek for those things now when it is the time of action? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about comprehension ( κατάληψις ). What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in away conformable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action (efforts, ὁρμή ), not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well: if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read so many verses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have not employed my desire; I have used avoidance ( ἐκκλίσει ) only with respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we do not know that we also in another way are like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have power: you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates did, If so it pleases God, so let it be? Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served in military expeditions so often as he did; and would he not have lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am; I must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum? Why, was this your business, to sun yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be free from hindrance, free from impediment? And could he still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way: how would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison? In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition: not only occupation (business), but also leisure.—Now then must I live in this tumult?—Why do you say tumult?—I mean among many men.—Well what is the hardship? Suppose that you are at Olympia: imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, another is doing another thing, and a third is pushing another person: in the baths there is a crowd: and who of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens.—Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure it is a desert: I do not like a crowd; it is confusion.— But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought: talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival: try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen: we are delighted when we see many ships: who is pained when he sees many men?—But they deafen me with their cries.—Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered? And who prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it; and movement towards a thing and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this? Do you only bear in mind the general rules: what is mine, what is not mine; what is given (permitted) to me; what does God will that I should do now? what does he not will? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says to you: Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators.—But my wish is to live quietly.—Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things?—And how shall I release myself?—Have you not often heard, that you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turning away) to those things only which are within your power, that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private station? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity. Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. To Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhappy; and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things.— Athens is a good place.—But happiness is much better; and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation. But happiness is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick? But if you do not so, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius. There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl; nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning, But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power ( ἡγεμονικόν ), that he may keep it in a state conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); fur these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. If you see any thing which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province? These things come to you from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on?
4.7.9. WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife: and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will ( συνφέλω ). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar’s chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar’s) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant’s head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher’s school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews ( νεῦρα ), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs there and follows (understands) the appearances of things. Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you: on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty ( ἡγεμονικόν ): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.' '. None
57. New Testament, Colossians, 3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions [ Passions ] • Passions [ emotions ] • emotions, anger

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 193, 194; Linjamaa (2019) 76


3.5. Νεκρώσατε οὖν τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν, πάθος, ἐπιθυμίαν κακήν, καὶ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἥτις ἐστὶν εἰδωλολατρία,''. None
3.5. Put to death therefore your members which are on the earth: sexual immorality, uncleanness, depraved passion, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry; ''. None
58. New Testament, Matthew, 5.7, 5.28, 26.37 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia restores in humans the image of God • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia, likeness to angels or likeness to God? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa for some purposes • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Christians, esp. pity and love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Mercy substituted for pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Models, Anaxagoras • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different people • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different purposes, consolation writings vs. discussion of ideals • Basil of Caesarea, Church Father, Expresses emotion • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Consolation writings, Christian consoling can express emotion • Demons, Source of bad thoughts and emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • First movements, distinguished assent to appearance, to thought, to its lingering, to the pleasure of the thought or its lingering to the emotion, or the act • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Use for consolation writings • Origen, Church Father, Connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion/emotional

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 290, 293; Linjamaa (2019) 95; Sorabji (2000) 349, 351, 372, 391


5.7. μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται.
5.28. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ.
26.37. καὶ παραλαβὼν τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς δύο υἱοὺς Ζεβεδαίου ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν.''. None
5.7. Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy.
5.28. but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart.
26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled. ''. None
59. Plutarch, On Isis And Osiris, 27 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotion • emotions

 Found in books: Beck (2006) 136; Bricault and Bonnet (2013) 179


27. Stories akin to these and to others like them they say are related about Typhon; how that, prompted by jealousy and hostility, he wrought terrible deeds and, by bringing utter confusion upon all things, filled the whole Earth, and the ocean as well, with ills, and later paid the penalty therefor. But the avenger, the sister and wife of Osiris, after she had quenched and suppressed the madness and fury of Typhon, was not indifferent to the contests and struggles which she had endured, nor to her own wanderings nor to her manifold deeds of wisdom and many feats of bravery, nor would she accept oblivion and silence for them, but she intermingled in the most holy rites portrayals and suggestions and representations of her experiences at that time, and sanctified them, both as a lesson in godliness and an encouragement for men and women who find themselves in the clutch of like calamities. She herself and Osiris, translated for their virtues from good demigods into gods, Cf. 363 e, infra . as were Heracles and Dionysus later, Cf. Moralia, 857 d. not incongruously enjoy double honours, both those of gods and those of demigods, and their powers extend everywhere, but are greatest in the regions above the earth and beneath the earth. In fact, men assert that Pluto is none other than Serapis and that Persephonê is Isis, even as Archemachus Müller, Frag. Hist. Graec. iv. p. 315, no. 7. of Euboea has said, and also Heracleides Ponticus Ibid. ii. 198 or Frag. 103, ed. Voss. who holds the oracle in Canopus to be an oracle of Pluto.''. None
60. Plutarch, Sulla, 13.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 218; König and Wiater (2022) 218


13.1. δεινὸς γάρ τις ἄρα καὶ ἀπαραίτητος εἶχεν αὐτὸν ἔρως ἑλεῖν τὰς Ἀθήνας, εἴτε ζήλῳ τινὶ πρὸς τὴν πάλαι σκιαμαχοῦντα τῆς πόλεως δόξαν, εἴτε θυμῷ τὰ σκώμματα φέροντα καὶ τὰς βωμολοχίας, αἷς αὐτόν τε καὶ τὴν Μετέλλαν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἑκάστοτε γεφυρίζων καὶ κατορχούμενος ἐξηρέθιζεν ὁ τύραννος Ἀριστίων, ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀσελγείας ὁμοῦ καὶ ὠμότητος ἔχων συγκειμένην τὴν ψυχήν,''. None
13.1. ''. None
61. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.1.9, 6.1.13-6.1.14, 6.1.26-6.1.31, 6.1.44, 6.2.4, 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.13, 6.2.16, 6.2.19-6.2.20, 6.2.27, 6.2.30, 8.3.62 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, emotional strategy in • Delivery, and emotion • Emotions • Stoicism, and the emotions • cognition, and emotion • cognitive approach to emotions • emotion, ancient rhetorical theory of • emotion, categorisation of • emotion, contextualisation of • emotion, cultural construction of • emotion, irrationality of • emotion, physiological aspects of • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal • emotional repertoire • emotional scenarios, (proto)typical • emotions • emotions, scripts of • hope, as a collective emotion • pathos (emotion)

 Found in books: Bua (2019) 291, 297; Damm (2018) 135; Fortenbaugh (2006) 337, 351; Hockey (2019) 90, 91, 94, 96, 97, 98; Kaster(2005) 184; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 284; Papaioannou et al. (2021) 162; Spatharas (2019) 91, 92; Van Nuffelen (2012) 26, 116, 117, 120, 121, 132, 142, 143


6.1.9. \xa0Both parties as a general rule may likewise employ the appeal to the emotions, but they will appeal to different emotions and the defender will employ such appeals with greater frequency and fulness. For the accuser has to rouse the judge, while the defender has to soften him. Still even the accuser will sometimes make his audience weep by the pity excited for the man whose wrongs he seeks to avenge, while the defendant will at times develop no small vehemence when he complains of the injustice of the calumny or conspiracy of which he is the victim. It will therefore be best to treat this duties separately: as I\xa0have already said, they are much the same in the peroration as in the exordium, but are freer and wider in scope in the former.
6.1.13. \xa0Calvus for example in his speech against Vatinius makes an admirable remark: "You know, gentlemen, that bribery has been committed and everybody knows that you know it." Cicero again in the Verrines says that the ill-name acquired by the courts may be effaced by the condemnation of Verres, a statement that comes under the head of the conciliatory methods mentioned above. The appeal to fear also, if it is necessary to employ it to produce a like effect, occupies a more prominent place in the peroration than in the exordium, but I\xa0have expressed my views on this subject in an earlier book. 6.1.14. \xa0The peroration also provides freer opportunities for exciting the passions of jealousy, hatred or anger. As regards the circumstances likely to excite such feelings in the judge, jealousy will be produced by the influence of the accused, hatred by the disgraceful nature of his conduct, and anger by his disrespectful attitude to the court, if, for instance, he be contumacious, arrogant or studiously indifferent: such anger may be aroused not merely by specific acts or words, but by his looks, bearing and manner. In this connexion the remark made by the accuser of Cossutianus Capito in my young days was regarded with great approval: the words used were Greek, but may be translated thus:â\x80\x94 "You blush to fear even Caesar."' "
6.1.26. \xa0For then the judge seems no longer to be listening to a voice bewailing another's ills, but to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy victims, men whose appearance alone would call forth his tears even though they uttered never a word. And as their plea would awaken yet greater pity if they urged it with their own lips, so it is rendered to some extent all the more effective when it is, as it were, put into their mouth by their advocate: we may draw a parallel from the stage, where the actor's voice and delivery produce greater emotional effect when he is speaking in an assumed role than when he speaks in his own character." '6.1.27. \xa0Consequently Cicero, to quote him once again, although he will not put entreaties into Milo\'s mouth, and prefers to commend him by his staunchness of character, still lends him words in the form of such complaint as may become a brave man. "Alas!" he says, "my labours have been in vain! Alas for my blighted hopes! Alas for my baffled purpose!" Appeals to pity should, however, always be brief, and there is good reason for the saying that nothing dries so quickly as tears. 6.1.28. \xa0Time assuages even genuine grief, and it is therefore inevitable that the semblance of grief portrayed in our speech should vanish yet more rapidly. And if we spend too much time over such portrayal our hearer grows weary of his tears, and returns once more to the rational attitude from which he has been distracted by the impulse of the moment.' "6.1.29. \xa0We must not, therefore, allow the effect which we have produced to fall flat, and must consequently abandon our appeal to the emotion just when that emotion is at its height, nor must we expect anyone to weep for long over another's illness. For this reason our eloquence ought to be pitched higher in this portion of our speech than in any other, since, wherever it fails to add something to what has preceded, it seems even to diminish its previous effect, while a diminuendo is merely a step towards the rapid disappearance of the emotion." '6.1.30. \xa0Actions as well as words may be employed to move the court to tears. Hence the custom of bringing accused persons into court wearing squalid and unkempt attire, and of introducing their children and parents, and it is with this in view that we see blood-stained swords, fragments of bone taken from the wound, and garments spotted with blood, displayed by the accusers, wounds stripped of their dressings, and scourged bodies bared to view. 6.1.31. \xa0The impression produced by such exhibitions is generally enormous, since they seem to bring the spectators face to face with the cruel facts. For example, the sight of the bloodstains on the purple-bordered toga of Gaius Caesar, which was carried at the head of his funeral procession, aroused the Roman people to fury. They knew he had been killed; they had even seen his body stretched upon the bier: but his garment, still wet with his blood, brought such a vivid image of the crime before their minds, that Caesar seemed not to have been murdered, but to be being murdered before their very eyes.
6.1.44. \xa0There is one point which it is specially important to remember, that we should never attempt to move our audience to tears without drawing on all the resources of our eloquence. For while this form of emotional appeal is the most effective of all, when successful, its failure results in anti-climax, and if the pleader is a feeble speaker he would have been wiser to leave the pathos of the situation to the imagination of the judges.
6.2.4. \xa0And yet it is this emotional power that dominates the court, it is this form of eloquence that is the queen of all. For as a rule arguments arise out of the case itself, and the better cause has always the larger number to support it, so that the party who wins by means of them will have no further satisfaction than that of knowing that his advocate did not fail him.
6.2.7. \xa0Thus the verdict of the court shows how much weight has been carried by the arguments and the evidence; but when the judge has been really moved by the orator he reveals his feelings while he is still sitting and listening to the case. When those tears, which are the aim of most perorations, well forth from his eyes, is he not giving his verdict for all to see? It is to this, therefore, that the orator must devote all his powers, "There lie the task and toil!" Without this all else is bare and meagre, weak and devoid of charm. For it is in its power over the emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be found.
6.2.9. \xa0But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects; for the term morals includes every attitude of the mind. The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill.
6.2.13. \xa0The ethos which I\xa0have in my mind and which I\xa0desiderate in an orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognise it.
6.2.16. \xa0From the same source springs also that more powerful method of exciting hatred, when by a feigned submission to our opponents we pass silent censure on their violence. For the very fact of our yielding serves to demonstrate their insupportable arrogance, while orators who have a passion for abuse or are given to affect freedom of speech fail to realise that it is a far more effective course to make your antagonist unpopular than to abuse him. For the former course makes our antagonists disliked, the latter ourselves.
6.2.19. \xa0Consequently the style of oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and persuasively, and therefore the intermediate style of oratory is most suitable. 6.2.20. \xa0The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by emotion, is of a different character, and I\xa0cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate to such appeals and I\xa0have already spoken on the subject in discussing the exordium and the peroration.' "
6.2.27. \xa0Consequently, if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge. Will he grieve who can find no trace of grief in the words with which I\xa0seek to move him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring under the emotion which he demands from his audience? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eye are dry? It is utterly impossible." '
6.2.30. \xa0It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word εá½\x90Ï\x86ανÏ\x84αÏ\x83ίÏ\x89Ï\x84οÏ\x82; and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or day-dreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I\xa0am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it may be possible to turn this form of hallucination to some profit.
8.3.62. \xa0It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly. For oratory fails of its full effect, and does not assert itself as it should, if its appeal is merely to the hearing, and if the judge merely feels that the facts on which he has to give his decision are being narrated to him, and not displayed in their living truth to the eyes of the mind.''. None
62. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 5.7-5.9, 13.4, 23.4-23.6, 59.2, 59.15, 75.8, 77.6, 78.16, 85.3, 88.7, 101.8, 101.10, 113.18, 116.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Augustine, Time makes emotion fade because of new hopes • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • First movements, In Stoics not the same as emotion • Motivation not require emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Philosophy, Has a role in calming emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotional movements unlike Seneca's first movements • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Time-lapse, effects of, Emotions fade with time, because of reassessment • Vices [ Emotions, Passions ] • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • belief/s, role in emotion • cognition, and emotion • cognition, as element of emotion • danger, hope as a dangerous emotion/state of mind • desire, as genus emotion • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, categorisation of • emotion, contextualisation of • emotion, cultural construction of • emotion, role in exemplary learning • emotions (passio, perturbatio) • emotions (passio, perturbatio), Platonic theory of • emotions (passio, perturbatio), Stoic tetrachord of • emotions, Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as deceptive • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, causation of • emotions, classified by genus • emotions, examples of • emotions, formation of human • emotions, moderation in (metriopatheia) • emotions, modern theories • emotions, nature of • emotions, source of intellectual error • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • emotions,role of cognition in • fear, Stoic division of emotions • fear, as deceptive emotion • focalization of experience, in understanding, emotions • hope, as a collective emotion • lexicalization of emotions • lexicalization of emotions, n. • metriopatheia (moderation in emotion) • pathos= Lat. perturbatio (passion or emotion) • pre-emotions, criticism • pre-emotions, origins of Stoic concept • sociological implication, of emotional directives • symbolic universe, see worldview, of emotional directives

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 9, 15, 18, 20, 51, 52, 100, 102; Graver (2007) 53, 237, 242, 243, 246, 249; Hockey (2019) 76, 106, 110, 128; Kaster(2005) 188; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 200, 288; Langlands (2018) 3; Linjamaa (2019) 97, 103, 177; Mackey (2022) 103; Nisula (2012) 25, 26; Sorabji (2000) 52, 66, 119, 161, 171, 209, 211, 223, 235, 236, 241; Tsouni (2019) 115


5.7. But I wish to share with you to-day\'s profit also. I find in the writings of our2 Hecato that the limiting of desires helps also to cure fears: "Cease to hope," he says, "and you will cease to fear." "But how," you will reply, "can things so different go side by side?" In this way, my dear Lucilius: though they do seem at variance, yet they are really united. Just as the same chain fastens the prisoner and the soldier who guards him, so hope and fear, dissimilar as they are, keep step together; fear follows hope. 5.8. I am not surprised that they proceed in this way; each alike belongs to a mind that is in suspense, a mind that is fretted by looking forward to the future. But the chief cause of both these ills is that we do not adapt ourselves to the present, but send our thoughts a long way ahead. And so foresight, the noblest blessing of the human race, becomes perverted. 5.9. Beasts avoid the dangers which they see, and when they have escaped them are free from care; but we men torment ourselves over that which is to come as well as over that which is past. Many of our blessings bring bane to us; for memory recalls the tortures of fear, while foresight anticipates them. The present alone can make no man wretched. Farewell.
13.4. There are more things, Lucilius, likely to frighten us than there are to crush us; we suffer more often in imagination than in reality. I am not speaking with you in the Stoic strain but in my milder style. For it is our Stoic fashion to speak of all those things, which provoke cries and groans, as unimportant and beneath notice; but you and I must drop such great-sounding words, although, Heaven knows, they are true enough. What I advise you to do is, not to be unhappy before the crisis comes; since it may be that the dangers before which you paled as if they were threatening you, will never come upon you; they certainly have not yet come.
23.4. Real joy, believe me, is a stern matter. Can one, do you think, despise death with a care-free countece, or with a "blithe and gay" expression, as our young dandies are accustomed to say? Or can one thus open his door to poverty, or hold the curb on his pleasures, or contemplate the endurance of pain? He who ponders these things1 in his heart is indeed full of joy; but it is not a cheerful joy. It is just this joy, however, of which I would have you become the owner; for it will never fail you when once you have found its source. 23.5. The yield of poor mines is on the surface; those are really rich whose veins lurk deep, and they will make more bountiful returns to him who delves unceasingly. So too those baubles which delight the common crowd afford but a thin pleasure, laid on as a coating, and every joy that is only plated lacks a real basis. But the joy of which I speak, that to which I am endeavouring to lead you, is something solid, disclosing itself the more fully as you penetrate into it. 23.6. Therefore I pray you, my dearest Lucilius, do the one thing that can render you really happy: cast aside and trample under foot all those things that glitter outwardly and are held out to you2 by another or as obtainable from another; look toward the true good, and rejoice only in that which comes from your own store. And what do I mean by "from your own store"? I mean from your very self, that which is the best part of you. The frail body, also, even though we can accomplish nothing without it, is to be regarded as necessary rather than as important; it involves us in vain pleasures, short-lived, and soon to be regretted, which, unless they are reined in by extreme self-control, will be transformed into the opposite. This is what I mean: pleasure, unless it has been kept within bounds, tends to rush headlong into the abyss of sorrow. But it is hard to keep within bounds in that which you believe to be good. The real good may be coveted with safety.
59.2. I am aware that if we test words by our formula,1 even pleasure is a thing of ill repute, and joy can be attained only by the wise. For "joy" is an elation of spirit, – of a spirit which trusts in the goodness and truth of its own possessions. The common usage, however, is that we derive great "joy" from a friend\'s position as consul, or from his marriage, or from the birth of his child; but these events, so far from being matters of joy, are more often the beginnings of sorrow to come. No, it is a characteristic of real joy that it never ceases, and never changes into its opposite.2
59.15. All men of this stamp, I maintain, are pressing on in pursuit of joy, but they do not know where they may obtain a joy that is both great and enduring. One person seeks it in feasting and self-indulgence; another, in canvassing for honours and in being surrounded by a throng of clients; another, in his mistress; another, in idle display of culture and in literature that has no power to heal; all these men are led astray by delights which are deceptive and short-lived – like drunkenness for example, which pays for a single hour of hilarious madness by a sickness of many days, or like applause and the popularity of enthusiastic approval which are gained, and atoned for, at the cost of great mental disquietude.
75.8. You reply: "What? Are there no degrees of happiness below your \'happy\' man? Is there a sheer descent immediately below wisdom?" I think not. For though he who makes progress is still numbered with the fools, yet he is separated from them by a long interval. Among the very persons who are making progress there are also great spaces intervening. They fall into three classes,5 as certain philosophers believe.
77.6. There are these three serious elements in every disease: fear of death, bodily pain, and interruption of pleasures. Concerning death enough has been said, and I shall add only a word: this fear is not a fear of disease, but a fear of nature. Disease has often postponed death, and a vision of dying has been many a man's salvation.3 You will die, not because you are ill, but because you are alive; even when you have been cured, the same end awaits you; when you have recovered, it will be not death, but ill-health, that you have escaped. " '
77.6. but our Stoic friend, a rare man, and, to praise him in language which he deserves, a man of courage and vigour5 admonished him best of all, as it seems to me. For he began as follows: "Do not torment yourself, my dear Marcellinus, as if the question which you are weighing were a matter of importance. It is not an important matter to live; all your slaves live, and so do all animals; but it is important to die honourably, sensibly, bravely. Reflect how long you have been doing the same thing: food, sleep, lust, – this is one\'s daily round. The desire to die may be felt, not only by the sensible man or the brave or unhappy man, but even by the man who is merely surfeited." ' "
88.7. Do you raise the question, "Through what regions did Ulysses stray?" instead of trying to prevent ourselves from going astray at all times? We have no leisure to hear lectures on the question whether he was sea-tost between Italy and Sicily, or outside our known world (indeed, so long a wandering could not possibly have taken place within its narrow bounds); we ourselves encounter storms of the spirit, which toss us daily, and our depravity drives us into all the ills which troubled Ulysses. For us there is never lacking the beauty to tempt our eyes, or the enemy to assail us; on this side are savage monsters that delight in human blood, on that side the treacherous allurements of the ear, and yonder is shipwreck and all the varied category of misfortunes.7 Show me rather, by the example of Ulysses, how I am to love my country, my wife, my father, and how, even after suffering shipwreck, I am to sail toward these ends, honourable as they are.
88.7. Wisdom is that which the Greeks call σοφία. The Romans also were wont to use this word in the sense in which they now use "philosophy" also. This will be proved to your satisfaction by our old national plays, as well as by the epitaph that is carved on the tomb of Dossennus:9 Pause, stranger, and read the wisdom of Dossennus.
113.18. Every living thing possessed of reason is inactive if it is not first stirred by some external impression; then the impulse comes, and finally assent confirms the impulse.8 Now what assent is, I shall explain. Suppose that I ought to take a walk: I do walk, but only after uttering the command to myself and approving this opinion of mine. Or suppose that I ought to seat myself; I do seat myself, but only after the same process. This assent is not a part of virtue. ' '. None
63. Tacitus, Annals, 1.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion(s) • lexicalization of emotions • lexicalization of emotions, n.

 Found in books: Kaster(2005) 175; Poulsen and Jönsson (2021) 247


1.12. Inter quae senatu ad infimas obtestationes procumbente, dixit forte Tiberius se ut non toti rei publicae parem, ita quaecumque pars sibi mandaretur eius tutelam suscepturum. tum Asinius Gallus 'interrogo' inquit, 'Caesar, quam partem rei publicae mandari tibi velis.' perculsus inprovisa interrogatione paulum reticuit: dein collecto animo respondit nequaquam decorum pudori suo legere aliquid aut evitare ex eo cui in universum excusari mallet. rursum Gallus (etenim vultu offensionem coniectaverat) non idcirco interrogatum ait, ut divideret quae separari nequirent sed ut sua confessione argueretur unum esse rei publicae corpus atque unius animo regendum. addidit laudem de Augusto Tiberiumque ipsum victoriarum suarum quaeque in toga per tot annos egregie fecisset admonuit. nec ideo iram eius lenivit, pridem invisus, tamquam ducta in matrimonium Vipsania M. Agrippae filia, quae quondam Tiberii uxor fuerat, plus quam civilia agitaret Pollionisque Asinii patris ferociam retineret."". None
1.12. \xa0The senate, meanwhile, was descending to the most abject supplications, when Tiberius casually observed that, unequal as he felt himself to the whole weight of government, he would still undertake the charge of any one department that might be assigned to him. Asinius Gallus then said:â\x80\x94 "I\xa0ask you, Caesar, what department you wish to be assigned you." This unforeseen inquiry threw him off his balance. He was silent for a\xa0few moments; then recovered himself, and answered that it would not at all become his diffidence to select or shun any part of a burden from which he would prefer to be wholly excused. Gallus, who had conjectured anger from his look, resumed:â\x80\x94 "The question had been put to him, not with the hope that he would divide the inseparable, but to gain from his own lips an admission that the body politic was a single organism needing to be governed by a single intelligence." He added a panegyric on Augustus, and urged Tiberius to remember his own victories and the brilliant work which he had done year after year in the garb of peace. He failed, however, to soothe the imperial anger: he had been a hated man ever since his marriage to Vipsania (daughter of Marcus Agrippa, and once the wife of Tiberius), which had given the impression that he had ambitions denied to a subject and retained the temerity of his father Asinius Pollio. <''. None
64. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Aristotle, on emotions • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, toward integral objects

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 193, 253; Sorabji (2000) 53


65. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotion, infection with • emotions, gender-based view of • gender, emotion and • pain, emotion and

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 5; Keane (2015) 80; Mermelstein (2021) 76


66. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • Passions [ emotions ] • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Vices [ Emotions, Passions ] • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 103; Sorabji (2000) 52, 235


67. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alcinous, Middle Platonist author of Didasklikos, Utility of emotions • Andronicus of Rhodes, Aristotelian, Emotion as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition (hupolēpsis), not mere appearance, of good or bad • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Does punishment require anger? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Not even then • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Aristotle, But human emotion can be said to involve either • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotion can be produced by mere appearance, pace Andronicus, and by appearance of pleasure, rather than of good • Augustine, Emotion an act of will • Augustine, Utility of emotions • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast Zeno) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, on overwhelming emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Crantor, Platonist, Utility of emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Agreed by Stoics that emotion is impulse • Emotions, Are emotions all desires? • Emotions, Emotion voluntary? • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Meaning of pathos • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Emotions, Seneca discounts Posidonius' alleged examples of emotion without judgement, as mere first movements • Emotions, Seneca makes Zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • Emotions, The judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Emotions, Zeno, Emotion is not false judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • First movements, In Stoics not the same as emotion • First movements, Physical, e.g. pallor, erection, glaring caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Love, The right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Aristotelians • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Does punishment require anger? • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Lactantius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Platonists, Crantor, Alcinous • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Utility of emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for lust or pride • Origen, Church Father, Connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotional movements unlike Seneca's first movements • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Hence emotion subject to therapy • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Posidonius' animals also lack genuine emotion, since they are capable of appearance but not of judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, This answers Posidonius' alleged emotion without judgements, which is only first movement • Stoicism, and emotions / passions • Stoicism, emotional control and • Therapy, Philosophical contributions to therapy (i) Voluntariness of emotion • Utility of emotion • Voluntariness of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, emotions as • anger, as “first” emotion • animals, as criterion of emotion • belief/s, role in emotion • beliefs,role in emotion • causes, of emotions • contraction (sustole), involuntary or pre-emotional • directive faculty, in emotions • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotion, infection with • emotion, physiological aspects of • emotions (passio, perturbatio) • emotions (passio, perturbatio), Platonic theory of • emotions (passio, perturbatio), Stoic tetrachord of • emotions, Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, and Stoic materialism • emotions, and the body • emotions, as actions • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as deceptive • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, as othering • emotions, causation of • emotions, difficulty to tame • emotions, examples of • emotions, feminizing language of • emotions, formation of human • emotions, gender-based view of • emotions, moderation in (metriopatheia) • emotions, modern theories • emotions, nature of • emotions, overwhelming • emotions/passions (πάθη), preliminary emotions (προπάθειαι) • fear, Stoic division of emotions • fear, emasculating emotion • gender, emotion and • human nature, and capacity for emotions • insanity, emotional episodes as • metriopatheia (moderation in emotion) • pain, emotion and • pre-emotions • pre-emotions, criticism • pre-emotions, origins of Stoic concept • pre-emotions, preliminary or simple ‘impulse,’ • pre-emotions, ‘beginnings,’ • rationality, and pre-emotions • rationality, required for emotion • rhetorical education, and performance of emotions • rhetorical theory, emotion in • stereotypes, emotional, and gender

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 18, 19, 20, 43, 44, 45, 46, 68, 86, 108, 132, 133, 152; Bexley (2022) 88, 188, 189, 190, 191; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 23, 304; Graver (2007) 69, 70, 94, 99, 111, 127, 128, 130, 233, 234, 237, 238, 242, 243; Hockey (2019) 83; Keane (2015) 31, 39, 40, 53, 54, 80, 81, 82, 189; Linjamaa (2019) 63, 94; Mackey (2022) 157; Mermelstein (2021) 71, 106, 107; Nisula (2012) 25, 26; Sorabji (2000) 30, 31, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 56, 60, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 77, 119, 140, 191, 209, 214, 294, 303, 314, 328, 344, 349, 399


68. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism, and emotions / passions • belief/s, role in emotion • emotions • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, and Stoic materialism • emotions, and the body • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, examples of • emotions, moderation in (metriopatheia) • emotions, modern theories • metriopatheia (moderation in emotion)

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 112; Bexley (2022) 189, 190, 191; Graver (2007) 243; Nasrallah (2019) 165


69. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • fear, emasculating emotion • swelling, as metaphor for emotions

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 64; Braund and Most (2004) 273


70. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Andronicus of Rhodes, Aristotelian, Emotion as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition (hupolēpsis), not mere appearance, of good or bad • Aristotle, But human emotion can be said to involve either • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotion can be produced by mere appearance, pace Andronicus, and by appearance of pleasure, rather than of good • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • definition, of emotion • emotion, strong and weak emotions • emotional appeal

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 350; Sorabji (2000) 133


71. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Time-lapse, effects of, Emotions fade with time, because of reassessment • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, modern theories

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 250; Sorabji (2000) 184, 216, 236


72. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition, and emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, modern theory of • emotional regime • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, classified by species • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 232, 240, 246, 250; Hockey (2019) 66, 75, 77; Long (2006) 10


73. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • emotion • emotions/emotion theory • goal (end), of emotion

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 49; Kanellakis (2020) 32


74. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition, as element of emotion • emotion • emotional wellbeing, of slaves • emotions (passio, perturbatio) • emotions,lexicalization of • lexicalization of emotions • narrative, emotions as

 Found in books: Borg (2008) 122; Huebner and Laes (2019) 93; Kaster(2005) 104; Lateiner and Spatharas (2016) 223; Nisula (2012) 27


75. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (2 senses in Gregory of Nyssa) • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Accepted (but note different senses) by Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Alternative ideals, though apatheia represents progress • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia, likeness to angels or likeness to God? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa for some purposes • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Clement of Alexandria • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Does punishment require anger? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Does sex require pleasure? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Christians, esp. pity and love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Philo, repentance and pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Is apatheia intelligible? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Mercy substituted for pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Origen • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different people • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different purposes, consolation writings vs. discussion of ideals • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Virtues not needed by gods or the blessed • Basil of Caesarea, Church Father, And Christ had emotions • Cassian, John, Founder of monastery at Monte Cassino, Some emotions natural • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Clement of Alexandria, Church Father, Christ was free of emotion • Clement of Alexandria, Church Father, Demons play a role in producing emotion • Clement of Alexandria, Church Father, distinguished suppressing emotion (enkrateia) • Climacus, Christian ascetic, Some emotions natural • Consolation writings, Christian consoling can express emotion • Demons, Source of bad thoughts and emotions • Emotions [ Passions ] • Enkrateia, endurance, connotes suppression of emotion? • Gregory of Nazianzus, Emotion needed for consoling • Gregory of Nyssa, Church Father, Apatheia an ideal, But even this consolation starts by permitting emotion • Isaiah the Solitary, St, some emotions natural • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Does punishment require anger? • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Does sex require pleasure? • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Iamblichus, phallic festivals may produce metriopatheia by catharsis • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Implies not medium quantity, but appropriate emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Lactantius • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural thoughts • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Philo • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Use for consolation writings • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Utility of emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for Schadenfreude • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Origen, Church Father, Connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Philo of Alexandria, Jewish philosopher, Emotions helpful • Theodoret, Christian, Some emotion necessary and useful • Utility of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 77, 96; Sorabji (2000) 188, 192, 195, 275, 287, 298, 348, 386, 387, 389, 392, 407


76. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotion(s)/pathē • Emotions

 Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 80; Petridou (2016) 210


77. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alcinous, Middle Platonist author of Didasklikos, Disowned emotions show emotion is not judgement • Animals, Their emotions • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (2 senses in Gregory of Nyssa) • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa for some purposes • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Mercy substituted for pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different purposes, consolation writings vs. discussion of ideals • Aristotle, Physiological basis of emotions • Aristotle, on emotions • Attention, Emotion can fade through lack of attention, as well as through change of judgement • Augustine, Time makes emotion fade because of new hopes • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), But Chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of emotion as well • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast Zeno) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, on overwhelming emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Cicero, Platonizing Roman statesman, orator, Time removes emotion because reflection or familiarity can remove the relevant judgement • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Consolation writings, Christian consoling can express emotion • Damon, Pythagorean, Music arouses emotion by kinship • Diogenes of Babylon, Stoic, Music arouses emotion by kinship • Emotion(s)/pathē • Emotions, Agreed by Stoics that emotion is impulse • Emotions, Emotion more concerned with present and future than with past • Emotions, Emotion voluntary? • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Emotions, Seneca makes Zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • Emotions, The judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Emotions, Zeno, Emotion is not false judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • Freshness of judgement and fading of emotion • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Gregory of Nyssa, Church Father, Apatheia an ideal, But even this consolation starts by permitting emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary preference • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Use for consolation writings • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Utility of emotion • Music, Arouses emotion by kinship? • Music, Does it arouse emotion? • Past, present, future, Stoics think emotions do not concern past harm or benefit • Philosophy, Has a role in calming emotion • Plato, Music arouses emotion by kinship • Plotinus, Neoplatonist, Disowned emotion shows emotion is not judgement • Posidonius, Stoic, And affecting emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, Contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotion is impulse • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotional movements of soul not identical with impulse • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotional movements unlike Seneca's first movements • Posidonius, Stoic, Emotions central to moral philosophy and education • Posidonius, Stoic, Judgements never sufficient for emotion (i) irrational movements of emotional part also required, as shown by emotions fading faster than judgements, due to satiety with movements • Posidonius, Stoic, Platonic emotional element in soul ineradicable • Posidonius, Stoic, Since emotional movements can be sufficient (i) in music • Posidonius, Stoic, So apatheia is only freedom from unnatural emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, The last two capacities called the emotional (pathētikon) element of the soul • Posidonius, Stoic, Their emotional movements are spatial movements • Posidonius, Stoic, Zeno's and Chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Satiety, distinguished satisfaction as a reason for emotion fading • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Posidonius' animals also lack genuine emotion, since they are capable of appearance but not of judgement • Time-lapse, effects of, Emotions fade with time, because of reassessment • Utility of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, But since the occasioning judgement, unlike appearance, involves assent, emotion is voluntary • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as impulse • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as movement of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not judgement but occurs on the occasion of judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, emotions as • belief/s, role in emotion • beliefs,role in emotion • causes, of emotions • cognition, and emotion • directive faculty, in emotions • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, and age • emotion, origin and transmission • emotions • emotions, Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, as actions • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, as physical events • emotions, causation of • emotions, classified by species • emotions, definitions of • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, nature of • emotions, overwhelming • emotions, physical sensations of • emotions, source of intellectual error • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • fear, Stoic division of emotions • movements, of emotive capacity • pathetike kinesis (emotive movements) • pneuma, changes in emotion • pre-emotions, criticism • pre-emotions, origins of Stoic concept • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 15, 18; Graver (2007) 29, 67, 68, 119, 154, 155, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 242, 245, 247, 252, 253, 255; Hockey (2019) 69, 78; Keane (2015) 173; King (2006) 195; Petridou (2016) 207, 210; Sorabji (2000) 25, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 84, 85, 86, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 106, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 162, 163, 175, 204, 236, 241, 257, 258, 259, 330, 393


78. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Emotion voluntary? • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Meaning of pathos • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Epictetus, Stoic, But distinguished from first movements assent and emotion • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • First movements, In Stoics not the same as emotion • First movements, Physical, e.g. pallor, erection, glaring caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • First movements, distinguished assent to appearance, to thought, to its lingering, to the pleasure of the thought or its lingering to the emotion, or the act • Passions [ emotions ] • Posidonius, Stoic, Platonic emotional element in soul ineradicable • Posidonius, Stoic, So apatheia is only freedom from unnatural emotion • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Hence emotion subject to therapy • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Posidonius' animals also lack genuine emotion, since they are capable of appearance but not of judgement • Therapy, Philosophical contributions to therapy (i) Voluntariness of emotion • Voluntariness of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, on causes of emotion • beliefs,role in emotion • directive faculty, in emotions • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, physiological aspects of • emotions (passio, perturbatio), Peripatetic views of • emotions (passio, perturbatio), movements) of • emotions (passio, perturbatio), vocabulary of • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, causation of • emotions, eradication/ suppression of • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, overwhelming • emotions, tyranny of • emotions, uncontrollability of • emotions/passions (πάθη), preliminary emotions (προπάθειαι) • pre-emotions • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 16; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 304; Graver (2007) 65, 233, 236; Hockey (2019) 83; Konig and Wiater (2022) 78; König and Wiater (2022) 78; Linjamaa (2019) 75, 94, 136; Nisula (2012) 238, 239; Sorabji (2000) 45, 68, 69, 107, 375, 376, 377


79. Babylonian Talmud, Taanit, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Emotions • emotion, expression of, by Tannaim more frequent than by Amoraim

 Found in books: Avery Peck et al. (2014) 108; Kalmin (1998) 129


20b. נזדמן לו אדם אחד שהיה מכוער ביותר אמר לו שלום עליך רבי ולא החזיר לו אמר לו ריקה כמה מכוער אותו האיש שמא כל בני עירך מכוערין כמותך אמר לו איני יודע אלא לך ואמור לאומן שעשאני כמה מכוער כלי זה שעשית כיון שידע בעצמו שחטא ירד מן החמור ונשתטח לפניו ואמר לו נעניתי לך מחול לי אמר לו איני מוחל לך עד שתלך לאומן שעשאני ואמור לו כמה מכוער כלי זה שעשית,היה מטייל אחריו עד שהגיע לעירו יצאו בני עירו לקראתו והיו אומרים לו שלום עליך רבי רבי מורי מורי אמר להם למי אתם קורין רבי רבי אמרו לו לזה שמטייל אחריך אמר להם אם זה רבי אל ירבו כמותו בישראל אמרו לו מפני מה אמר להם כך וכך עשה לי אמרו לו אעפ"כ מחול לו שאדם גדול בתורה הוא,אמר להם בשבילכם הריני מוחל לו ובלבד שלא יהא רגיל לעשות כן מיד נכנס רבי אלעזר בן רבי שמעון ודרש לעולם יהא אדם רך כקנה ואל יהא קשה כארז ולפיכך זכה קנה ליטול הימנה קולמוס לכתוב בו ספר תורה תפילין ומזוזות:,וכן עיר שיש בה דבר או מפולת כו\': תנו רבנן מפולת שאמרו בריאות ולא רעועות שאינן ראויות ליפול ולא הראויות ליפול,הי ניהו בריאות הי ניהו שאינן ראויות ליפול הי ניהו רעועות הי ניהו ראויות ליפול לא צריכא דנפלו מחמת גובהייהו אי נמי דקיימן אגודא דנהרא,כי ההיא אשיתא רעועה דהואי בנהרדעא דלא הוה חליף רב ושמואל תותה אע"ג דקיימא באתרה תליסר שנין יומא חד איקלע רב אדא בר אהבה להתם אמר ליה שמואל לרב ניתי מר נקיף אמר ליה לא צריכנא האידנא דאיכא רב אדא בר אהבה בהדן דנפיש זכותיה ולא מסתפינא,רב הונא הוה ליה ההוא חמרא בההוא ביתא רעיעא ובעי לפנוייה עייליה לרב אדא בר אהבה להתם משכי\' בשמעתא עד דפנייה בתר דנפק נפל ביתא ארגיש רב אדא בר אהבה איקפד,סבר לה כי הא דאמר רבי ינאי לעולם אל יעמוד אדם במקום סכנה ויאמר עושין לי נס שמא אין עושין לו נס ואם תימצי לומר עושין לו נס מנכין לו מזכיותיו אמר רב חנן מאי קרא דכתיב (בראשית לב, יא) קטנתי מכל החסדים ומכל האמת,מאי הוה עובדיה דרב אדא בר אהבה כי הא דאתמר שאלו תלמידיו (את רבי זירא ואמרי לה) לרב אדא בר אהבה במה הארכת ימים אמר להם מימי לא הקפדתי בתוך ביתי ולא צעדתי בפני מי שגדול ממני,ולא הרהרתי במבואות המטונפות ולא הלכתי ד\' אמות בלא תורה ובלא תפילין ולא ישנתי בבית המדרש לא שינת קבע ולא שינת עראי ולא ששתי בתקלת חברי ולא קראתי לחבירי בהכינתו ואמרי לה בחניכתו,אמר ליה רבא לרפרם בר פפא לימא לן מר מהני מילי מעלייתא דהוה עביד רב הונא אמר ליה בינקותיה לא דכירנא בסיבותיה דכירנא דכל יומא דעיבא הוו מפקין ליה בגוהרקא דדהבא וסייר לה לכולה מתא וכל אשיתא דהוות רעיעתא הוה סתר לה אי אפשר למרה בני לה ואי לא אפשר בני לה איהו מדידיה,וכל פניא דמעלי שבתא הוה משדר שלוחא לשוקא וכל ירקא דהוה פייש להו לגינאי זבין ליה ושדי ליה לנהרא וליתביה לעניים זמנין דסמכא דעתייהו ולא אתו למיזבן ולשדייה לבהמה קסבר מאכל אדם אין מאכילין לבהמה,ולא ליזבניה כלל נמצאת מכשילן לעתיד לבא,כי הוה ליה מילתא דאסותא הוי מלי כוזא דמיא ותלי ליה בסיפא דביתא ואמר כל דבעי ליתי ולישקול ואיכא דאמרי מילתא דשיבתא הוה גמיר והוה מנח כוזא דמיא ודלי ליה ואמר כל דצריך ליתי וליעול דלא לסתכן,כי הוה כרך ריפתא הוה פתח לבביה ואמר כל מאן דצריך ליתי וליכול אמר רבא כולהו מצינא מקיימנא לבר מהא דלא מצינא למיעבד''. None
20b. He happened upon an exceedingly ugly person, who said to him: Greetings to you, my rabbi, but Rabbi Elazar did not return his greeting. Instead, Rabbi Elazar said to him: Worthless reika person, how ugly is that man. Are all the people of your city as ugly as you? The man said to him: I do not know, but you should go and say to the Craftsman Who made me: How ugly is the vessel you made. When Rabbi Elazar realized that he had sinned and insulted this man merely on account of his appearance, he descended from his donkey and prostrated himself before him, and he said to the man: I have sinned against you; forgive me. The man said to him: I will not forgive you go until you go to the Craftsman Who made me and say: How ugly is the vessel you made.,He walked behind the man, trying to appease him, until they reached Rabbi Elazar’s city. The people of his city came out to greet him, saying to him: Greetings to you, my rabbi, my rabbi, my master, my master. The man said to them: Who are you calling my rabbi, my rabbi? They said to him: To this man, who is walking behind you. He said to them: If this man is a rabbi, may there not be many like him among the Jewish people. They asked him: For what reason do you say this? He said to them: He did such and such to me. They said to him: Even so, forgive him, as he is a great Torah scholar.,He said to them: For your sakes I forgive him, provided that he accepts upon himself not to become accustomed to behave like this. Immediately, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, entered the study hall and taught: A person should always be soft like a reed and he should not be stiff like a cedar, as one who is proud like a cedar is likely to sin. And therefore, due to its gentle qualities, the reed merited that a quill is taken from it to write with it a Torah scroll, phylacteries, and mezuzot.,§ The mishna taught: And likewise, if a city is afflicted by pestilence or collapsing buildings, that city fasts and sounds the alarm, and all of its surrounding areas fast but they do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: They sound the alarm but they do not fast. The Sages taught: These collapsing buildings to which the Sages referred are those of sturdy and not dilapidated walls; they have walls that are not ready to fall, and not those that are ready to fall.,The Gemara expresses puzzlement with regard to the wording of the baraita: What are sound walls; what are walls that are not ready to fall; what are dilapidated walls; what are those that are ready to fall? The elements in each pair of walls are apparently the same, and the baraita is repetitive. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to specify that in the case of walls that fell due to their height, i.e., they are sound but also ready to fall, due to their excessive height. Alternatively, the baraita is referring to a case where the walls were positioned on a riverbank, as they are likely to fall despite the fact that they are not dilapidated, as the riverbank itself is unstable.,The Gemara relates: This is like that dilapidated wall that was in Neharde’a, under which Rav and Shmuel would not pass, although it stood in place thirteen years. One day Rav Adda bar Ahava happened to come there and walked with them. As they passed the wall, Shmuel said to Rav: Come, Master, let us circumvent this wall, so that we do not stand beneath it. Rav said to him: It is not necessary to do so today, as Rav Adda bar Ahava is with us, whose merit is great, and therefore I am not afraid of its collapse.,The Gemara relates another incident. Rav Huna had a certain quantity of wine in a certain dilapidated house and he wanted to move it, but he was afraid that the building would collapse upon his entry. He brought Rav Adda bar Ahava to there, to the ramshackle house, and he dragged out a discussion with him concerning a matter of halakha until they had removed all the wine. As soon as they exited, the building collapsed. Rav Adda bar Ahava realized what had happened and became angry.,The Gemara explains: Rav Adda bar Ahava holds in accordance with this statement, as Rabbi Yannai said: A person should never stand in a place of danger and say: A miracle will be performed for me, and I will escape unharmed, lest a miracle is not performed for him. And if you say that a miracle will be performed for him, they will deduct it from his merits. Rav Ḥa said: What is the verse that alludes to this idea? As it is written: “I have become small from all the mercies and all the truth that You have showed Your servant” (Genesis 32:11). In other words, the more benevolence one receives from God, the more his merit is reduced.,After recounting stories that reflect Rav Adda bar Ahava’s great merit, the Gemara asks: What were the exceptional deeds of Rav Adda bar Ahava? The Gemara reports that they are as it is stated: The students of Rabbi Zeira asked him, and some say that the students of Rav Adda bar Ahava asked him: To what do you attribute your longevity? He said to them: In all my days I did not become angry with my household, and I never walked before someone greater than myself; rather, I always gave him the honor of walking before me.,Rav Adda bar Ahava continued: And I did not think about matters of Torah in filthy alleyways; and I did not walk four cubits without engaging in Torah and without donning phylacteries; and I would not fall asleep in the study hall, neither a deep sleep nor a brief nap; and I would not rejoice in the mishap of my colleague; and I would not call my colleague by his nickname. And some say that he said: I would not call my colleague by his derogatory family name.,§ The Gemara relates another story about the righteous deeds of the Sages involving a dilapidated wall. Rava said to Rafram bar Pappa: Let the Master tell us some of those fine deeds that Rav Huna performed. He said to him: I do not remember what he did in his youth, but the deeds of his old age I remember. As on every cloudy day they would take him out in a golden carriage guharka, and he would survey the entire city. And he would command that every unstable wall be torn down, lest it fall in the rain and hurt someone. If its owner was able to build another, Rav Huna would instruct him to rebuild it. And if he was unable to rebuild it, Rav Huna would build it himself with his own money.,Rafram bar Pappa further relates: And every Shabbat eve, in the afternoon, Rav Huna would send a messenger to the marketplace, and he would purchase all the vegetables that were left with the gardeners who sold their crops, and throw them into the river. The Gemara asks: But why did he throw out the vegetables? Let him give them to the poor. The Gemara answers: If he did this, the poor would sometimes rely on the fact that Rav Huna would hand out vegetables, and they would not come to purchase any. This would ruin the gardeners’ livelihood. The Gemara further asks: And let him throw them to the animals. The Gemara answers: He holds that human food may not be fed to animals, as this is a display of contempt for the food.,The Gemara objects: But if Rav Huna could not use them in any way, he should not purchase the vegetables at all. The Gemara answers: If nothing is done, you would have been found to have caused a stumbling block for them in the future. If the vegetable sellers see that some of their produce is left unsold, the next week they will not bring enough for Shabbat. Therefore, Rav Huna made sure that the vegetables were all bought, so that the sellers would continue to bring them.,Another custom of Rav Huna was that when he had a new medicine, he would fill a water jug with the medicine and hang it from the doorpost of his house, saying: All who need, let him come and take from this new medicine. And there are those who say: He had a remedy against the demon Shivta that he knew by tradition, that one must wash his hands for protection against this evil spirit. And to this end, he would place a water jug and hang it by the door, saying: Anyone who needs, let him come to the house and wash his hands, so that he will not be in danger.,The Gemara further relates: When Rav Huna would eat bread, he would open the doors to his house, saying: Whoever needs, let him come in and eat. Rava said: I can fulfill all these customs of Rav Huna, except for this one, which I cannot do,''. None
80. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 5.31, 5.49, 7.33, 7.84-7.88, 7.96, 7.98, 7.102, 7.110-7.116, 7.120, 7.158, 7.173, 10.22, 10.118, 10.120 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus, emotions of • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Antiochus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; But only in special senses in Zeno, Panaetius, Posidonius • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Emotions accepted by Stoics during training • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Christians, esp. pity and love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; For Philo, repentance and pity • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Nicasicrates • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Porphyry • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Reasons for and against apatheia • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Some emotions for Stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Stoics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different stages • Aristotle, Natural and necessary emotions • Aristotle, Physiological basis of emotions • Aristotle, on emotions • Aristotle, pain as an emotion • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, on emotions as judgments • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Cicero, division of emotions • Cicero, emotions • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Clement of Alexandria, Platonism and Stoicism in,, good emotions of Stoics • Emotions [ Passions ] • Emotions, Emotion more concerned with present and future than with past • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Emotions, Per contra, Aristotle, Galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Emotions, Shifting from one emotion to another • Epictetus, Stoic, Certain emotions useful in training • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • First movements, 2 kinds. Mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred • Freshness of judgement and fading of emotion • Love, The right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in Stoics • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Crantor • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Maximus of Tyre • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary pleasures • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Sotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Taurus • Motivation not require emotion • Natural, necessary, Emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Past, present, future, Stoics think emotions do not concern past harm or benefit • Philosophy, Has a role in calming emotion • Progressing, Emotions can be useful to the progressing novice • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, First movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Better kind not an emotion, but educative epibolē • Stoics/Stoicism, on emotions/passions (πάθη) • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as movement of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, emotions as • analogy, emotion • belief/s, role in emotion • beliefs,role in emotion • character, dispositions toward emotion • cognition, and emotion • directive faculty, in emotions • emotion • emotion, ancient philosophical theory of • emotion, ancient rhetorical theory of • emotion, categorisation of • emotion, in the Hebrew Bible • emotion, in the classical world • emotion, of women • emotion, specific aversions • emotion/emotional • emotional repertoire • emotions • emotions (πάθη) (Stoic) • emotions, Stoic views • emotions, and Stoic materialism • emotions, and character traits • emotions, and simple ascriptions of value • emotions, as actions • emotions, as causes • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul • emotions, classified by genus • emotions, classified by species • emotions, definitions of • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • emotions, physical sensations of • emotions, toward integral objects • emotions/passions (πάθη), Stoics on • emotions/passions (πάθη), good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) • emotions/passions (πάθη), will (βούλησις) as a good emotion • fear, Stoic division of emotions • good emotions • human nature, and capacity for emotions • judgement, as basis of emotions • judgement, as basis of emotions, suspension of, see justice • martyrdom, emotions and • pain, emotion and • pathos= Lat. perturbatio (passion or emotion) • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Agri (2022) 18, 73; Ayres and Ward (2021) 140; Bexley (2022) 200; Brouwer (2013) 89; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 35, 36; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 169; Fortenbaugh (2006) 183; Geljon and Runia (2019) 290; Graver (2007) 39, 139, 141, 202, 227, 231, 232, 233, 240, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254; Hockey (2019) 69, 72, 76, 81, 88, 180, 181; Linjamaa (2019) 57, 91, 95, 96, 137, 177; Long (2006) 29, 191, 383; Mermelstein (2021) 35; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 215; Sorabji (2000) 25, 34, 35, 44, 48, 49, 51, 64, 67, 97, 136, 165, 168, 170, 184, 196, 201, 221, 233, 275, 278, 280, 281, 284, 389; Tsouni (2019) 115


5.31. He held that the virtues are not mutually interdependent. For a man might be prudent, or again just, and at the same time profligate and unable to control his passions. He said too that the wise man was not exempt from all passions, but indulged them in moderation.He defined friendship as an equality of reciprocal good-will, including under the term as one species the friendship of kinsmen, as another that of lovers, and as a third that of host and guest. The end of love was not merely intercourse but also philosophy. According to him the wise man would fall in love and take part in politics; furthermore he would marry and reside at a king's court. of three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the pleasure-loving life, he gave the preference to the contemplative. He held that the studies which make up the ordinary education are of service for the attainment of virtue." "
5.49. Epitomes of Aristotle's work on Animals, six books.Two books of Refutative Arguments.Theses, three books.of Kingship, two books.of Causes, one book.On Democritus, one book.of Calumny, one book.of Becoming, one book.of the Intelligence and Character of Animals, one book.On Motion, two books.On Vision, four books.Relating to Definitions, two books.On Data, one book.On Greater and Less, one book.On the Musicians, one book.of the Happiness of the Gods, one book.A Reply to the Academics, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.How States can best be governed, one book.Lecture-Notes, one book.On the Eruption in Sicily, one book.On Things generally admitted, one book.On Problems in Physics, one book.What are the methods of attaining Knowledge, one book.On the Fallacy known as the Liar, three books." '
7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered.
7.84. The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting. The foregoing is the subdivision adopted by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, and their disciples. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes treated the subject somewhat less elaborately, as might be expected in an older generation. They, however, did subdivide Logic and Physics as well as Ethics.' "7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it." "7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." '7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
7.96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy.Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high-spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends.' "
7.98. of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one's children or in one's old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise." '
7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred.
7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.' "7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." '7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty.' "7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue." '7.115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like. 7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.
7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct.
7.158. We hear when the air between the sot body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion, a vibration which spreads spherically and then forms waves and strikes upon the ears, just as the water in a reservoir forms wavy circles when a stone is thrown into it. Sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, which affects the ruling part of the soul. They consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath.Semen is by them defined as that which is capable of generating offspring like the parent. And the human semen which is emitted by a human parent in a moist vehicle is mingled with parts of the soul, blended in the same ratio in which they are present in the parent.' "
7.173. He was present in the theatre when the poet Sositheus uttered the verse –Driven by Cleanthes' folly like dumb herds,and he remained unmoved in the same attitude. At which the audience were so astonished that they applauded him and drove Sositheus off the stage. Afterwards when the poet apologized for the insult, he accepted the apology, saying that, when Dionysus and Heracles were ridiculed by the poets without getting angry, it would be absurd for him to be annoyed at casual abuse. He used to say that the Peripatetics were in the same case as lyres which, although they give forth sweet sounds, never hear themselves. It is said that when he laid it down as Zeno's opinion that a man's character could be known from his looks, certain witty young men brought before him a rake with hands horny from toil in the country and requested him to state what the man's character was. Cleanthes was perplexed and ordered the man to go away; but when, as he was making off, he sneezed, I have it, cried Cleanthes, he is effeminate." '
10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again.' "
10.118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse." ". None
81. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.4, 3.1.8, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Not even then • Aquinas (Thomas), Emotions before the Fall • Augustine, Loss of awareness of past and future by saints in next life would reduce range of emotions • Augustine, Metriopatheia favoured for many emotions • Augustine, St Paul recommended and Christ experienced emotions • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Cicero, on beliefs in emotion • Clement of Alexandria, Church Father, Demons play a role in producing emotion • Demons, Source of bad thoughts and emotions • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Accepted by Augustine • Origen, Church Father, Connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion • Passions [ emotions ] • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • action, emotions as • emotions, as actions • emotions/passions (πάθη), preliminary emotions (προπάθειαι)

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 304; Graver (2007) 229; Linjamaa (2019) 148; Sorabji (2000) 320, 348, 349, 350, 398


3.1.4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect cause of annulling his determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined himself ), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire.' "
3.1.4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an external cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is impossible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or evil, let the holder of this opinion turn his attention for a little upon himself, and carefully inspect the movements of his own mind, unless he has discovered already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that, after the statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the judgment of reason. For, to take an illustration: if, to a man who has determined to live continently and chastely, and to keep himself free from all pollution with women, a woman should happen to present herself, inciting and alluring him to act contrary to his purpose, that woman is not a complete and absolute cause or necessity of his transgressing, since it is in his power, by remembering his resolution, to bridle the incitements to lust, and by the stern admonitions of virtue to restrain the pleasure of the allurement that solicits him; so that, all feeling of indulgence being driven away, his determination may remain firm and enduring. Finally, if to any men of learning, strengthened by divine training, allurements of that kind present themselves, remembering immediately what they are, and calling to mind what has long been the subject of their meditation and instruction, and fortifying themselves by the support of a holier doctrine, they reject and repel all incitement to pleasure, and drive away opposing lusts by the interposition of the reason implanted within them.
3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost." '
3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons.' '. None
82. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 4.20 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Porphyry • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different stages • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotions

 Found in books: King (2006) 170; Sorabji (2000) 284


4.20. 20.For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not being mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence, they thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not from dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which is animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But they conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, and the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living; and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once sensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living being. Hence, universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in rejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are appropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are attended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of the female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and causing her to be pregt, defiles the soul, through its association with the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in consequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with males defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery, and emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes mingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of the soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a certain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things of an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this mixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are produced through mixture, one species being complicated with another, this mixture is denominated a defilement. As when some woman with a lively red Stains the pure iv'ry --- says Homer 22. And again painters call the mixtures of colours, |134 corruptions. It is usual, likewise to denominate that which is unmingled and pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted. For water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. But water, which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves behind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream. When from a limpid and perennial fount It defluous runs --- as Hesiod says 23. For such water is salubrious, because it is uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive into herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that the mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture of dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once living and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be reasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature; just, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body; and he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different and foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, it is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoetic, therefore, or discursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes dianoetically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a separation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper nutriment likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves it. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its composition. It is one thing, however, |135 to nourish, and another to fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various also is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly endeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of the rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron, though most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather, by contracting hat is necessary to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, he himself nourished, by adhering to God more closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homer 24 says, we were not in want either of meat or drink, that we might be truly immortal! --- the poet in thus speaking beautifully signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of death. If therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant that, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it. 25 Hence, it is much |136 to be wished that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which hunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the everyway-flowing river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him who truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call on them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, dismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to what remains to be discussed?
83. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Does punishment require anger? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different stages • Attention, Emotion can fade through lack of attention, as well as through change of judgement • Body, Contribution of body to emotion and its therapy • Emotions, Plato, Posidonius, Galen, without irrational forces in the soul • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Does punishment require anger? • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotion

 Found in books: Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 237; Sorabji (2000) 115, 203


84. Augustine, Confessions, 3.1-3.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Catharsis, Seneca discounts theatre as using first movement, not emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotions (passio, perturbatio), fictitious

 Found in books: Nisula (2012) 220; Sorabji (2000) 77, 401


3.1. 1. To Carthage I came, where a cauldron of unholy loves bubbled up all around me. I loved not as yet, yet I loved to love; and with a hidden want, I abhorred myself that I wanted not. I searched about for something to love, in love with loving, and hating security, and a way not beset with snares. For within me I had a dearth of that inward food, Yourself, my God, though that dearth caused me no hunger; but I remained without all desire for incorruptible food, not because I was already filled thereby, but the more empty I was the more I loathed it. For this reason my soul was far from well, and, full of ulcers, it miserably cast itself forth, craving to be excited by contact with objects of sense. Yet, had these no soul, they would not surely inspire love. To love and to be loved was sweet to me, and all the more when I succeeded in enjoying the person I loved. I befouled, therefore, the spring of friendship with the filth of concupiscence, and I dimmed its lustre with the hell of lustfulness; and yet, foul and dishonourable as I was, I craved, through an excess of vanity, to be thought elegant and urbane. I fell precipitately, then, into the love in which I longed to be ensnared. My God, my mercy, with how much bitterness did You, out of Your infinite goodness, besprinkle for me that sweetness! For I was both beloved, and secretly arrived at the bond of enjoying; and was joyfully bound with troublesome ties, that I might be scourged with the burning iron rods of jealousy, suspicion, fear, anger, and strife. ' "3.2. 2. Stage-plays also drew me away, full of representations of my miseries and of fuel to my fire. Why does man like to be made sad when viewing doleful and tragical scenes, which yet he himself would by no means suffer? And yet he wishes, as a spectator, to experience from them a sense of grief, and in this very grief his pleasure consists. What is this but wretched insanity? For a man is more affected with these actions, the less free he is from such affections. Howsoever, when he suffers in his own person, it is the custom to style it misery but when he compassionates others, then it is styled mercy. But what kind of mercy is it that arises from fictitious and scenic passions? The hearer is not expected to relieve, but merely invited to grieve; and the more he grieves, the more he applauds the actor of these fictions. And if the misfortunes of the characters (whether of olden times or merely imaginary) be so represented as not to touch the feelings of the spectator, he goes away disgusted and censorious; but if his feelings be touched, he sits it out attentively, and sheds tears of joy. 3. Are sorrows, then, also loved? Surely all men desire to rejoice? Or, as man wishes to be miserable, is he, nevertheless, glad to be merciful, which, because it cannot exist without passion, for this cause alone are passions loved? This also is from that vein of friendship. But where does it go? Where does it flow? Wherefore runs it into that torrent of pitch, seething forth those huge tides of loathsome lusts into which it is changed and transformed, being of its own will cast away and corrupted from its celestial clearness? Shall, then, mercy be repudiated? By no means. Let us, therefore, love sorrows sometimes. But beware of uncleanness, O my soul, under the protection of my God, the God of our fathers, who is to be praised and exalted above all for ever, beware of uncleanness. For I have not now ceased to have compassion; but then in the theatres I sympathized with lovers when they sinfully enjoyed one another, although this was done fictitiously in the play. And when they lost one another, I grieved with them, as if pitying them, and yet had delight in both. But now-a-days I feel much more pity for him that delights in his wickedness, than for him who is counted as enduring hardships by failing to obtain some pernicious pleasure, and the loss of some miserable felicity. This, surely, is the truer mercy, but grief has no delight in it. For though he that condoles with the unhappy be approved for his office of charity, yet would he who had real compassion rather there were nothing for him to grieve about. For if goodwill be ill-willed (which it cannot), then can he who is truly and sincerely commiserating wish that there should be some unhappy ones, that he might commiserate them. Some grief may then be justified, none loved. For thus do You, O Lord God, who loves souls far more purely than do we, and art more incorruptibly compassionate, although You are wounded by no sorrow. And who is sufficient for these things? 2 Corinthians 2:16 4. But I, wretched one, then loved to grieve, and sought out what to grieve at, as when, in another man's misery, though reigned and counterfeited, that delivery of the actor best pleased me, and attracted me the most powerfully, which moved me to tears. What marvel was it that an unhappy sheep, straying from Your flock, and impatient of Your care, I became infected with a foul disease? And hence came my love of griefs - not such as should probe me too deeply, for I loved not to suffer such things as I loved to look upon, but such as, when hearing their fictions, should lightly affect the surface; upon which, like as with poisoned nails, followed burning, swelling, putrefaction, and horrible corruption. Such was my life! But was it life, O my God? "'. None
85. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4, 14.8 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa for some purposes • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Did Christ exhibit apatheia? • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Not even then • Aquinas (Thomas), Emotions before the Fall • Augustine, Attack on Stoic apatheia, misrepresents Stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Augustine, Emotion an act of will • Augustine, Favours Plato's division of soul into reason and emotional parts • Augustine, Loss of awareness of past and future by saints in next life would reduce range of emotions • Augustine, Metriopatheia favoured for many emotions • Augustine, St Paul recommended and Christ experienced emotions • Augustine, This obscures Stoic position that emotion necessarily has the assent of reason • Christ, Did Christ have emotions? • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Epictetus, Stoic, But distinguished from first movements assent and emotion • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, Augustine hails Stoic acceptance of eupatheia as acceptance of emotion • Lactantius, Church Father, Misrepresents Stoic recognition of eupatheiai as general acceptance of emotion • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Accepted by Augustine • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Not all emotions acceptable • Origen, Church Father, Connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion • Plutarch of Chaeroneia, Middle Platonist, Misrepresents Stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of emotion • Posidonius, on causes of emotion • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • emotions, as contumacious • emotions, causation of • emotions, examples of • emotions, modern theories • emotions, moral emotions • pre-emotions, criticism • pre-emotions, origins of Stoic concept

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 237, 252; Sorabji (2000) 35, 207, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 398, 404


9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call &
14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call &". None
86. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Antiochus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia already rejected by Aristotle in opposition to Speusippus • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia and metriopatheia suited to different callings • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Apatheia to Adam and Eve before the Fall • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Cynics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Models, Anaxagoras • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Socrates • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; Socratics • Apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; To different stages