1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 9.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 225, 228, 229 | 9.20. "And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.", |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 3.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 51| 3.14. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־מֹשֶׁה אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶהְיֶה שְׁלָחַנִי אֲלֵיכֶם׃", | 3.14. "And God said unto Moses: ‘I AM THAT I AM’; and He said: ‘Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: I AM hath sent me unto you.’", |
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| 3. Homer, Odyssey, 5.392, 11.575, 12.169 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 73 |
4. Homer, Iliad, 2.284, 3.30 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 228; Long (2006) 73 | 2.284. / in the likeness of a herald, bade the host keep silence, that the sons of the Achaeans, both the nearest and the farthest, might hear his words, and lay to heart his counsel. He with good intent addressed their gathering and spake among them:Son of Atreus, now verily are the Achaeans minded to make thee, O king, 3.30. / But when godlike Alexander was ware of him as he appeared among the champions, his heart was smitten, and back he shrank into the throng of his comrades, avoiding fate. And even as a man at sight of a snake in the glades of a mountain starteth back, and trembling seizeth his limbs beneath him, |
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5. Hesiod, Theogony, 115, 114 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 73 | 114. Such is the precious gift of each goddess. |
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| 6. Heraclitus of Ephesus, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41 |
| 7. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1.7.33, 4.11.1-4.11.4 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 239, 243 |
| 8. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1.7.17, 1.7.33, 4.5.7 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41, 49 |
| 9. Aeschylus, Libation-Bearers, 1.7.17, 1.7.33, 4.21.2 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 147, 149 |
| 10. Aristophanes, Wasps, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123 |
| 11. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 166 |
| 12. Septuagint, Prayer of Azariah, 1.1, 1.13, 1.21-1.24, 3.2-3.4, 3.219 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 57, 73, 114, 116 |
| 13. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 90 |
14. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 52| 439d. ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶναι . ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλʼ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν; ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν; ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη. | 439d. Cratylus. I think there is, Socrates. Socrates. Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is? Cratylus. That is inevitable. Socrates. Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is? Cratylus. That is inevitable. |
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15. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 166| 824a. τινὶ νέων. πεζῶν δὴ μόνον θήρευσίς τε καὶ ἄγρα λοιπὴ τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν ἀθληταῖς, ὧν ἡ μὲν τῶν εὑδόντων αὖ κατὰ μέρη, νυκτερεία κληθεῖσα, ἀργῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἀξία ἐπαίνου, οὐδʼ ἧττον διαπαύματα πόνων ἔχουσα, ἄρκυσίν τε καὶ πάγαις ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλοπόνου ψυχῆς νίκῃ χειρουμένων τὴν ἄγριον τῶν θηρίων ῥώμην· μόνη δὴ πᾶσιν λοιπὴ καὶ ἀρίστη ἡ τῶν τετραπόδων ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶν καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν θήρα σώμασιν, ὧν ἁπάντων κρατοῦσιν δρόμοις καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ βολαῖς αὐτόχειρες θηρεύοντες, ὅσοις ἀνδρείας τῆς θείας ἐπιμελές. ΚΛ. καλῶς ἂν λέγοις. | 824a. no very gentlemanly pursuit! Thus there is left for our athletes only the hunting and capture of land-animals. of this branch of hunting, the kind called night-stalking, which is the job of lazy men who sleep in turn, is one that deserves no praise; nor does that kind deserve praise in which there are intervals of rest from toil, when men master the wild force of beasts by nets and traps instead of doing so by the victorious might of a toil-loving soul. Accordingly, the only kind left for all, and the best kind, is the hunting of quadrupeds with horses and dogs and the hunter’s own limbs, when men hunt in person, and subdue all the creatures by means of their own running, striking and shooting—all the men, that is to say, who cultivate the courage that is divine. Concerning the whole of this subject, the exposition we have now given will serve as the praise and blame; and the law will run thus,— None shall hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting wheresoever and howsoever they wish; but the night-trapper who trusts to nets and snares no one shall ever allow to hunt anywhere. The fowler no man shall hinder on fallow land or mountain; but he that finds him on tilled fields or on sacred glebes shall drive him off. The fisherman shall be allowed to hunt in all waters except havens and sacred rivers and pools and lakes, but only on condition that he makes no use of muddying juices. So now, at last, we may say that all our laws about education are complete. Clin. You may rightly say so. |
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| 16. Eupolis, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123 |
| 17. Eupolis, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123 |
| 18. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 19. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 20. Aristotle, History of Animals, 4.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 247 |
| 21. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 57 |
| 22. Aristotle, Soul, 2.8 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 247 |
| 23. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 101 |
| 24. Timon of Phlius, Fragments, 11, 20-21, 46, 48-51, 58, 63-64, 7, 841-842, 844, 1 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 73 |
| 25. Timaeus of Tauromenium, Fragments, 566 32 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 92, 123 |
| 26. Theophrastus, De Pietate, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 114 |
| 27. Theophrastus, Characters, 15.10 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 101 |
| 28. Aristotle, Meteorology, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Williams (2012) 277 |
| 29. Cicero, In Pisonem, 68-72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 189 |
| 30. Cicero, Academica, 2.119 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 125 |
31. Cicero, On Divination, 2.14, 2.61, 2.89-2.90 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon •diogenes of babylon, reinterpretation of zenos argument for the existence of the gods Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 102; Frede and Laks (2001) 249, 263; Maso (2022) 82| 2.14. Atqui ne illa quidem divitis esse dicebas, ventos aut imbres inpendentes quibusdam praesentire signis (in quo nostra quaedam Aratea memoriter a te pronuntiata sunt), etsi haec ipsa fortuita sunt; plerumque enim, non semper eveniunt. Quae est igitur aut ubi versatur fortuitarum rerum praesensio, quam divinationem vocas? Quae enim praesentiri aut arte aut ratione aut usu aut coniectura possunt, ea non divinis tribuenda putas, sed peritis. Ita relinquitur, ut ea fortuita divinari possint, quae nulla nec arte nec sapientia provideri possunt; ut, si quis M. Marcellum illum, qui ter consul fuit, multis annis ante dixisset naufragio esse periturum, divinasset profecto; nulla enim arte alia id nec sapientia scire potuisset. Talium ergo rerum, quae in fortuna positae sunt, praesensio divinatio est. 2.61. Quorum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeram, ipse ille divinationis auctor numquam illa dicet facta fortuito naturalemque rationem omnium reddet; nihil enim fieri sine causa potest; nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest; nec, si id factum est, quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri; nulla igitur portenta sunt. Nam si, quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; saepius enim mulam peperisse arbitror quam sapientem fuisse. Illa igitur ratio concluditur: nec id, quod non potuerit fieri, factum umquam esse, nec, quod potuerit, id portentum esse; 2.89. Sed ut ratione utamur omissis testibus, sic isti disputant, qui haec Chaldaeorum natalicia praedicta defendunt: Vim quandam esse aiunt signifero in orbe, qui Graece zwdiako/s dicitur, talem, ut eius orbis una quaeque pars alia alio modo moveat inmutetque caelum, perinde ut quaeque stellae in his finitumisque partibus sint quoque tempore, eamque vim varie moveri ab iis sideribus, quae vocantur errantia; cum autem in eam ipsam partem orbis venerint, in qua sit ortus eius, qui nascatur, aut in eam, quae coniunctum aliquid habeat aut consentiens, ea triangula illi et quadrata nomit. Etenim cum †tempore anni tempestatumque caeli conversiones commutationesque tantae fiant accessu stellarum et recessu, cumque ea vi solis efficiantur, quae videmus, non veri simile solum, sed etiam verum esse censent perinde, utcumque temperatus sit ae+r, ita pueros orientis animari atque formari, ex eoque ingenia, mores, animum, corpus, actionem vitae, casus cuiusque eventusque fingi. 2.90. O delirationem incredibilem! non enim omnis error stultitia dicenda est. Quibus etiam Diogenes Stoicus concedit aliquid, ut praedicere possint dumtaxat, qualis quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxume rem aptus futurus sit; cetera, quae profiteantur, negat ullo modo posse sciri; etenim geminorum formas esse similis, vitam atque fortunam plerumque disparem. Procles et Eurysthenes, Lacedaemoniorum reges, gemini fratres fuerunt. | 2.14. And you went on to say that even the foreknowledge of impending storms and rains by means of certain signs was not divination, and, in that connexion, you quoted a number of verses from my translation of Aratus. Yet such coincidences happen by chance, for though they happen frequently they do not happen always. What, then, is this thing you call divination — this foreknowledge of things that happen by chance — and where is it employed? You think that whatever can be foreknown by means of science, reason, experience, or conjecture is to be referred, not to diviners, but to experts. It follows, therefore, that divination of things that happen by chance is possible only of things which cannot be foreseen by means of skill or wisdom. Hence, if someone had declared many years in advance that the famous Marcus Marcellus, who was consul three times, would perish in a shipwreck, this, by your definition, undoubtedly would have been a case of divination, since that calamity could not have been foreseen by means of any other skill or by wisdom. That is why you say that divination is the foreknowledge of such things as depend upon chance. [6] 2.61. If I were to ask Chrysippus the causes of all the phenomena just mentioned, that distinguished writer on divination would never say that they happened by chance, but he would find an explanation for each of them in the laws of nature. For he would say: Nothing can happen without a cause; nothing actually happens that cannot happen; if that has happened which could have happened, then it should not be considered a portent; therefore there are no such things as portents. Now if a thing is to be considered a portent because it is seldom seen, then a wise man is a portent; for, as I think, it oftener happens that a mule brings forth a colt than that nature produces a sage. Chrysippus, in this connexion, gives the following syllogism: That which could not have happened never did happen; and that which could have happened is no portent; therefore, in any view, there is no such thing as a portent. 2.89. But let us dismiss our witnesses and employ reasoning. Those men who defend the natal-day prophecies of the Chaldeans, argue in this way: In the starry belt which the Greeks call the Zodiac there is a certain force of such a nature that every part of that belt affects and changes the heavens in a different way, according to the stars that are in this or in an adjoining locality at a given time. This force is variously affected by those stars which are called planets or wandering stars. But when they have come into that sign of the Zodiac under which someone is born, or into a sign having some connexion with or accord with the natal sign, they form what is called a triangle or square. Now since, through the procession and retrogression of the stars, the great variety and change of the seasons and of temperature take place, and since the power of the sun produces such results as are before our eyes, they believe that it is not merely probable, but certain, that just as the temperature of the air is regulated by this celestial force, so also children at their birth are influenced in soul and body and by this force their minds, manners, disposition, physical condition, career in life and destinies are determined. [43] 2.90. What inconceivable madness! For it is not enough to call an opinion foolishness when it is utterly devoid of reason. However, Diogenes the Stoic makes some concessions to the Chaldeans. He says that they have the power of prophecy to the extent of being able to tell the disposition of any child and the calling for which he is best fitted. All their other claims of prophetic powers he absolutely denies. He says, for example, that twins are alike in appearance, but that they generally unlike in career and in fortune. Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians, were twin brothers. |
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32. Cicero, De Finibus, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 189 | 2.119. I would press my question and drag an answer from you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the arduous labours that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!" Here I concluded. "I am at no loss for authorities," said Torquatus, "to whom to refer your arguments. I might be able to do some execution myself, but I prefer to find better equipped champions." "No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned friends Siro and Philodemus." "You are right," he replied. "Very well then," said I; "but it would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some verdict on our dispute." "I formally object to him as prejudiced," he rejoined with a smile, "at all events on this issue. You have shown us some mercy, but Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic." "Oh," interposed Triarius, "I'll fight more boldly still next time, for I shall have the arguments I have just heard ready to my hand, though I won't attack you till I see you have been armed by the instructors whom you mention." And with these words we brought our promenade and our discussion to an end together. |
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| 33. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 6.11.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 189 |
34. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.18-1.43, 1.57-1.124, 2.2, 2.4, 2.20-2.22, 2.36, 2.43, 2.45-2.49, 2.54, 2.57-2.59, 2.76, 2.85, 2.88, 2.93, 2.115, 2.148, 2.153, 2.160-2.162, 3.5-3.6, 3.29-3.34, 3.38, 3.44, 3.65, 7.156-7.157 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 187, 188, 189; Frey and Levison (2014) 41; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114; Long (2006) 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 240 | 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? 1.21. Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? for though the world did not exist, it does not follow that ages did not exist — meaning by ages, not periods made up of a number of days and nights in annual courses, for ages in this sense I admit could not have been produced without the circular motion of the firmament; but from the infinite past there has existed an eternity not measured by limited divisions of time, but of a nature intelligible in terms of extension; since it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. 1.22. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. 1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; 1.24. for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. 1.25. "So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? 1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. 1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. 1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.57. Then Cotta took up the discussion. "Well, Velleius," he rejoined, with his usual suavity, "unless you had stated a case, you certainly would have had no chance of hearing anything from me. I always find it much easier to think of arguments to prove a thing false than to prove it true. This often happens to me, and did so just now while I was listening to you. Ask me what I think that the divine nature is like, and very probably I shall make no reply; but inquire whether I believe that it resembles the description of it which you have just given, and I shall say that nothing seems to me less likely. But before proceeding to examine your arguments, I will give my opinion of yourself. 1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours [Lucius Crassus] declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. 1.60. Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. 1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? 'It is difficult to deny their existence.' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 1.62. But mark how generously I deal with you. I will not attack those tenets which are shared by your school with all other philosophers — for example the one in question, since almost all men, and I myself no less than any other, believe that the gods exist, and this accordingly I do not challenge. At the same time I doubt the adequacy of the argument which you adduce to prove it. You said that a sufficient reason for our admitting that the gods exist was the fact that all the nations and races of mankind believe it. But argument is both inconclusive and untrue. In the first place, how do you know what foreign races believe? For my part I think that there are many nations so uncivilized and barbarous as to have no notion of any gods at all. 1.63. Again, did not Diagoras, called the Atheist, and later Theodorus openly deny the divine existence? Since as for Protagoras of Abdera, the greatest sophist of that age, to whom you just now alluded, for beginning a book with the words 'About the gods I am unable to affirm either how they exist or how they do not exist,' he was sentenced by a decree of the Athenian assembly to be banished from the city and from the country, and to have his books burnt in the market-place: an example that I can well believe has discouraged many people since from professing atheism, since the mere expression of doubt did not succeed in escaping punishment. What are we to say about the men guilty of sacrilege or impiety or perjury? Suppose that ever Lucius Tubulus, Lupus or Carbo, or some son of Neptune, as Lucilius has it, had believed in the gods, would he have been such a perjurer and scoundrel? 1.64. We find then that your argument is not so well-established a proof of the view which you uphold as you imagine it to be. Still, as it is a line of reasoning that is followed by other philosophers as well, I will pass it over for the present, and turn rather to doctrines peculiar to your school. 1.65. "I grant the existence of the gods: do you then teach me their origin, their dwelling-place, their bodily and spiritual nature, their mode of life; for these are the things which I want to know. In regard to all of them you make great play with the lawless domination of the atoms; from these you construct and create everything that comes upon the ground, as he says. Now in the first place, there are no such things as atoms. For there is nothing . . . incorporeal, but all space is filled with material bodies; hence there can be no such thing as void, and no such thing as an indivisible body. 1.66. In all of this I speak for the time being only as the mouthpiece of our oracles of natural philosophy; whether their utterances are true or false I do not know, but at all events they are more probable than those of your school. As for the outrageous doctrines of Democritus, or perhaps of his predecessor Leucippus, that there are certain minute particles, some smooth, others rough, some round, some angular, some curved or hook-shaped, and that heaven and earth were created from these, not by compulsion of any natural law but by a sort of accidental colliding — this is the belief to which you, Gaius Velleius, have clung all your life long, and it would be easier to make you alter all your principles of conduct than abandon the teachings of your master; for you made up your mind that the Epicureanism claimed your allegiance before you learned these doctrines: so that you were faced with the alternative of either accepting these outrageous notions or surrendering the title of the school of your adoption. 1.67. For what would you take to cease to be an Epicurean? 'For no consideration,' you reply, 'would I forsake the principles of happiness and the truth.' Then is Epicureanism the truth? For as to happiness I don't join issue, since in your view even divine happiness involves being bored to death with idleness. But where is the truth to be found? I suppose in an infinite number of worlds, some coming to birth and others hurled into ruin at every minutest moment of time? or in the indivisible particles that produce all the marvels of creation without any controlling nature or reason? But I am forgetting the indulgence which I began to show you just now, and am taking too wide a range. I will grant therefore that everything is made out of indivisible bodies; but this takes us no farther, for we are trying to discover the nature of the gods. 1.68. Suppose we allow that the gods are made of atoms: then it follows that they are not eternal. For what is made of atoms came into existence at some time; but if the gods came into existence, before they came into existence there were no gods; and if the gods had a beginning, they must also perish, as you were arguing a little time ago about the world as conceived by Plato. Where then do we find that happiness and that eternity which in your system are the two catchwords that denote divinity? When you wish to make this out, you take cover in a thicket of jargon; you gave us the formula just now — God has not body but a semblance of body, not blood but a kind of blood. 1.69. "This is a very common practice with your school. You advance a paradox, and then, when you want to escape censure, you adduce in support of it some absolute impossibility; so that you would have done better to abandon the point in dispute rather than to offer so shameless a defence. For instance, Epicurus saw that if the atoms travelled downwards by their own weight, we should have no freedom of the will, since the motion of the atoms would be determined by necessity. He therefore invented a device to escape from determinism (the point had apparently escaped the notice of Democritus): he said that the atom while travelling vertically downward by the force of gravity makes a very slight swerve to the side. 1.70. This defence discredits him more than if he had had to abandon his original position. He does the same in his battle with the logicians. Their accepted doctrine is that in every disjunctive proposition of the form 'so‑and‑so either is or is not,' one of the two alternatives must be true. Epicurus took alarm; if such a proposition as 'Epicurus either will or will not be alive to‑morrow' were granted, one or other alternative would be necessary. Accordingly he denied the necessity of a disjunctive proposition altogether. Now what could be stupider than that? Arcesilas used to attack Zeno because, whereas he himself said that all sense-presentations are false, Zeno said that some were false, but not all. Epicurus feared that if a single sensation were admitted to be false, none would be true: he therefore said that all the senses give a true report. In none of these cases did he behave very cleverly, for to parry a lighter blow he laid himself open to one that was more severe. 1.71. "He does the same as regards the nature of the gods. In his desire to avoid the assumption of a dense cluster of atoms, which would involve the possibility of destruction and dissipation, he says that the gods have not a body but a semblance of body, and not blood but a semblance of blood. It is thought surprising that an augur can see an augur without smiling; but it is more surprising that you Epicureans keep a grave face when by yourselves. 'It is not body but a semblance of body.' I could understand what this supposition meant if it related to waxen images or figures of earthenware, but what 'a semblance of body' or 'a semblance of blood' may mean in the case of god, I cannot understand; nor can you either, Velleius, only you won't admit it. 1.72. "The fact is that you people merely repeat by rote the idle vapourings that Epicurus uttered when half asleep; for, as we read in his writings, he boasted that he had never had a teacher. This I for my part could well believe, even if he did not proclaim it, just as I believe the owner of an ill‑built house when he boasts that he did not employ an architect! He shows not the faintest trace of the Academy or the Lyceum, or even of the ordinary schoolboy studies. He might have heard Xenocrates — by heaven, what a master! — and some people think that he did, but he himself denies it, and he ought to know! He states that he heard a certain Pamphilus, a pupil of Plato, at Samos (where he resided in his youth with his father and brother — his father Neocles had gone there to take up land, but failing to make a living out of his farm, I believe kept a school). 1.73. However Epicurus pours endless scorn on this Platonist, so afraid is he of appearing ever to have learnt anything from a teacher. He stands convicted in the case of Nausiphanes, a follower of Democritus, whom he does not deny he heard lecture, but whom nevertheless he assails with every sort of abuse. Yet if he had not heard from him these doctrines of Democritus, what had he heard? for what is there in Epicurus's natural philosophy that does not come from Democritus? Since even if he introduced some alterations, for instance the swerve of the atoms, of which I spoke just now, yet most of his system is the same, the atoms, the void, the images, the infinity of space, and the countless number of worlds, their births and their destructions, in fact almost everything that is comprised in natural science. 1.74. "As to your formula 'a semblance of body' and 'a semblance of blood,' what meaning do you attach to it? That you have a better knowledge of the matter than I have I freely admit, and what is more, am quite content that this should be so; but once it is expressed in words, why should one of us be able to understand it and not the other? Well then, I do understand what body is and what blood is, but what 'a semblance of body' and 'a semblance of blood' are I don't understand in the very least. You are not trying to hide the truth from me, as Pythagoras used to hide it from strangers, nor yet are you speaking obscurely on purpose like Heraclitus, but (to speak candidly between ourselves) you don't understand it yourself any more than I do. 1.75. I am aware that what you maintain is that the gods possess a certain outward appearance, which has no firmness or solidity, no definite shape or outline, and which is free from gross admixture, volatile, transparent. Therefore we shall use the same language as we should of the Venus of Cos: her's is not real flesh but the likeness of flesh, and the mantling blush that dyes her fair cheek is not real blood but something that counterfeits blood; similarly in the god of Epicurus we shall say that there is no real substance but something that counterfeits substance. But assume that I accept as true a dogma that I cannot even understand: exhibit to me, pray, the forms and features of your shadow-deities. 1.76. On this topic you are at no loss for arguments designed to prove that the gods have the form of men: first because our minds possess a preconceived notion of such a character that, when a man thinks of god, it is the human form that presents itself to him; secondly, because inasmuch as the divine nature surpasses all other things, the divine form also must needs be the most beautiful, and no form is more beautiful than that of man. The third reason you advance is that no other shape is capable of being the abode of intelligence. 1.77. Well then, take these arguments one by one and consider what they amount to; for in my view they based on an arbitrary and quite inadmissible assumption on your part. First of all, was there ever any student so blind as not to see that human shape has been thus assigned to the gods either by the deliberate contrivance of philosophers, the better to enable them to turn the hearts of the ignorant from vicious practices to the observance of religion, or by superstition, to supply images for men to worship in the belief that in so doing they had direct access to the divine presence? These notions moreover have been fostered by poets, painters and artificers, who found it difficult to represent living and active deities in the likeness of any other shape than that of man. Perhaps also man's belief in his own superior beauty, to which you referred, may have contributed to the result. But surely you as a natural philosopher are aware what an insinuating go‑between and pander of her own charms nature is! Do you suppose that there is a single creature on land or in the sea which does not prefer an animal of its own specie to any other? If this were not so, why should not a bull desire to couple with a mare, or a horse with a cow? Do you imagine that an eagle or lion or dolphin thinks any shape more beautiful than its own? Is it then surprising if nature has likewise taught man to think his own species the most beautiful . . . that this was a reason why we should think the gods resemble man? 1.78. "Suppose animals possessed reason, do you not think that they would each assign pre‑eminence to their own species? For my part I protest (if I am to say what I think) that although I am not lacking in self-esteem yet I don't presume to call myself more beautiful than the famous bull on which Europa rode; for the question is not here of our intellectual and oratorical powers but of our outward form and aspect. Indeed if we choose to make imaginary combinations of shapes, would you not like to resemble the merman Triton who is depicted riding upon swimming monsters attached to his man's body? I am on ticklish ground here, for natural instinct is so strong that every man wishes to be like a man and nothing else. 1.79. Yes, and every ant like an ant! Still, the question is, like what man? How small a percentage of handsome people there are! When I was at Athens, there was scarcely one to be found in each platoon of the training-corps — I see why you smile, but the fact is all the same. Another point: we, who with the sanction of the philosophers of old are fond of the society of young men, often find even their defects agreeable. Alcaeus 'admires a mole upon his favourite's wrist'; of course a mole is a blemish, but Alcaeus thought it a beauty. Quintus Catulus, the father of our colleague and friend to‑day, was warmly attached to your fellow-townsman Roscius, and actually wrote the following verses in his honour: By chance abroad at dawn, I stood to pray To the uprising deity of day; When lo! upon my left — propitious sight — Suddenly Roscius dawned in radiance bright. Forgive me, heavenly pow'rs, if I declare, Meseem'd the mortal than the god more fair. To Catulus, Roscius was fairer than a god. As a matter of fact he had, as he has to‑day, a pronounced squint; but no matter — in the eyes of Catulus this in itself gave him piquancy and charm. 1.80. "I return to the gods. Can we imagine any gods, I do not say as cross-eyed as Roscius, but with a slight cast? Can we picture any of them with a mole, a snub nose, protruding ears, prominent brows and too large a head — defects not unknown among us men —, or are they entirely free from personal blemishes? Suppose we grant you that, are we also to say that they are all exactly alike? If not, there will be degrees of beauty among them, and therefore a god can fall short of supreme beauty. If on the other hand they are all alike, then the Academic school must have a large following in heaven, since if there is no difference between one god and another, among the gods knowledge and perception must be impossible. 1.81. "Furthermore, Velleius, what if your assumption, that when we think of god the only form that presents itself to us is that of a man, be entirely untrue? will you nevertheless continue to maintain your absurdities? Very likely we Romans do imagine god as you say, because from our childhood Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan and Apollo have been known to us with the aspect with which painters and sculptors have chosen to represent them, and not with that aspect only, but having that equipment, age and dress. But they are not so known to the Egyptians or Syrians, or any almost of the uncivilized races. Among these you will find a belief in certain animals more firmly established than is reverence for the holiest sanctuaries and images of the gods with us. 1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. 1.83. Should not the physical philosopher therefore, that is, the explorer and tracker-out of nature, be ashamed to go to minds besotted with habit for evidence of truth? On your principle it will be legitimate to assert that Jupiter always wears a beard and Apollo never, and that Minerva has grey eyes and Neptune blue. Yes, and at Athens there is a much-praised statue of Vulcan made by Alcamenes, a standing figure, draped, which displays a slight lameness, though not enough to be unsightly. We shall therefore deem god to be lame, since tradition represents Vulcan so. Tell me now, do we also make out the gods to have the same names as those by which they are known to us? 1.84. But in the first place the gods have as many names as mankind has languages. You are Velleius wherever you travel, but Vulcan has a different name in Italy, in Africa and in Spain. Again, the total number of names even in our pontifical books is not great, but there are gods innumerable. Are they without names? You Epicureans at all events are forced to say so, since what is the point of more names when they are all exactly alike? How delightful it would be, Velleius, if when you did not know a thing you would admit your ignorance, instead of uttering this drivel, which must make even your own gorge rise with disgust? Do you really believe that god resembles me, or yourself? of course you do not. "What then? Am I to say that the sun is a god, or the moon, or the sky? If so, we must also say that it is happy; but what forms of enjoyment constitute its happiness? and wise; but how can wisdom reside in a senseless bulk like that? These are arguments employed by your own school. 1.85. Well then, if the gods do not possess the appearance of men, as I have proved, nor some such form as that of the heavenly bodies, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny their existence? You do not dare to. Well, that is no doubt wise — although in this matter it is not the public that you fear, but the gods themselves: I personally am acquainted with Epicureans who worship every paltry image, albeit I am aware that according to some people's view Epicurus really abolished the gods, but nominally retained them in order not to offend the people of Athens. Thus the first of his selected aphorisms or maxims, which you call the Kyriai Doxai, runs, I believe, thus: That which is blessed and immortal neither experiences trouble nor causes it to anyone. Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional, though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly; their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind. 1.86. It is in fact doubtful whether he means that there is a blessed and immortal being, or that, if there is, that being is such as he describes. They fail to notice that although his language is ambiguous here, yet in many other places both he and Metrodorus speak as plainly as you yourself did just now. Epicurus however does actually think that the gods exist, nor have I ever met anybody more afraid than he was of those things which he says are not terrible at all, I mean death and the gods. Terrors that do not very seriously alarm ordinary people, according to Epicurus haunt the minds of all mortal men: so many thousands commit brigandage, for which the penalty is death, and other men rob temples whenever they have the chance; I suppose the former are haunted by the fear of death and the latter by the terrors of religion! 1.87. "But as you have not the courage (for I will now address myself to Epicurus in person) to deny that the gods exist, what should hinder you from reckoning as divine the sun, or the world, or some form of ever-living intelligence? 'I have never seen a mind endowed with reason and with purpose,' he replies, 'that was embodied in any but a human form.' Well, but have you ever seen anything like the sun or the moon or the five planets? The sun, limiting his motion by the two extreme points of one orbit, completes his courses yearly. The moon, lit by the sun's rays, achieves this solar path in the space of a month. The five planets, holding the same orbit, but some nearer to and others farther from the earth, from the same starting-points complete the same distances in different periods of time. 1.88. Now, Epicurus, have you ever seen anything like this? Well, then, let us deny the existence of the sun, moon and planets, inasmuch as nothing can exist save that which we have touched or seen. And what of god himself? You have never seen him, have you? Why then do you believe in his existence? On this principle we must sweep aside everything unusual of which history or science informs us. The next thing would be for inland races to refuse to believe in the existence of the sea. How can such narrowness of mind be possible? It follows that, if you had been born in Seriphus and had never left the island, where you had been used to seeing nothing larger than hares and foxes, when lions and panthers were described to you, you would refuse to believe in their existence; and if somebody told you about an elephant, you would actually think that he was making fun of you! 1.89. "For your part, Velleius, you forsook the practice of your school for that of the logicians — a science of which your clan is entirely ignorant — and expressed the doctrine in the form of a syllogism. You assumed that the gods are happy: we grant it. But no one, you said, can be happy without virtue. This also we give you, and willingly. But virtue cannot exist without reason. To this also we must agree. You add, neither can reason exist save embodied in human form. Who do you suppose will grant you this? for if it were true, what need had you to arrive at it by successive steps? you might have taken it for granted. But what about your successive steps? I see how you proceeded step by step from happiness to virtue, from virtue to reason; but how from reason do you arrive at human form? That is not a step, it is a headlong plunge. 1.90. "Nor indeed do I understand why Epicurus preferred to say that gods are like men rather than that men are like gods. 'What is the difference?' you will ask me, 'for if A is like B, B is like A.' I am aware of it; but what I mean is, that the gods did not derive the pattern of their form from men; since the gods have always existed, and were never born — that is, if they are to be eternal; whereas men were born; therefore the human form existed before mankind, and it was the form of the immortal gods. We ought not to say that the gods have human form, but that our form is divine. "However, as to that, you may take your choice. What I want to know is, how did such a piece of good luck happen (for according to your school nothing in the universe was caused by design) — but be that as it may, 1.91. what accident was so potent, how did such a fortunate concourse of atoms come about, that suddenly men were born in the form of gods? Are we to think that divine seed fell from heaven to earth, and that thus men came into being resembling their sires? I wish that this were your story, for I should be glad to acknowledge my divine relations! But you do not say anything of the sort — you say that our likeness to the gods was caused by chance. "And now is there any need to search for arguments to refute this? I only wish I could discover the truth as easily as I can expose falsehood. For you gave a full and accurate review, which caused me for one to wonder at so much learning in a Roman, of the theological doctrines of the philosophers from Thales of Miletus downward. 1.92. Did you think they were all out of their minds because they pronounced that god can exist without hands or feet? Does not even a consideration of the adaptation of man's limbs to their functions convince you that the gods do not require human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if nothing has to be grasped, or for the rest of the list of the various parts of the body, in which nothing is useless, nothing without a reason, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork? It seems then that god will have a tongue, and will not speak; teeth, a palate, a throat, for no use; the organs that nature has attached to the body for the purpose of procreation — these god will possess, but to no purpose; and not only the external but also the internal organs, the heart, lungs, liver and the rest, which if they are not useful are assuredly not beautiful — since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. 1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. 1.94. You yourself just now, when reeling off the list of philosophers like the censor calling the roll of the Senate, said that all those eminent men were fools, idiots and madmen. But if none of these discerned the truth about the divine nature, it is to be feared that the divine nature is entirely non‑existent. "For as for your school's account of the matter, it is the merest fairy-story, hardly worthy of old wives at work by lamplight. You don't perceive what a number of things you are let in for, if we consent to admit that men and gods have the same form. You will have to assign to god exactly the same physical exercises and care of the person as are proper to men: he will walk, run, recline, bend, sit, hold things in the hand, and lastly even converse and make speeches. 1.95. As for your saying that the gods are male and female, well, you must see what the consequence of that will be. For my part, I am at a loss to imagine how your great founder arrived at such notions. All the same you never cease vociferating that we must on no account relinquish the divine happiness and immortality. But what prevents god from being happy without having two legs? and why cannot your 'beatitude' or 'beatity,' whichever form we are to use — and either is certainly a hard mouthful, but words have to be softened by use — but whatever it is, why can it not apply to the sun yonder, or to this world of ours, or to some eternal intelligence devoid of bodily shape and members? 1.96. Your only answer is: 'I have never seen a happy sun or world.' Well, but have you ever seen any other world but this one? No, you will reply. Then why did you venture to assert the existence of, not thousands and thousands, but a countless number of worlds? 'That is what reason teaches.' Then will not reason teach you that when we seek to find a being who shall be supremely excellent, and happy and eternal as well — and nothing else constitutes divinity —, even as that being will surpass us in immortality, so also will it surpass us in mental excellence, and even as in mental excellence, so also in bodily. Why then, if we are inferior to god in all else, are we his equals in form? for man came nearer to the divine image in virtue than in outward aspect. 1.97. [Can you mention anything so childish (to press the same point still further) as to deny the existence of the various species of huge animals that grow in the Red Sea or in India? Yet not even the most diligent investigators could possibly collect information about all the vast multitude of creatures that exist on land and in the sea, the marshes and the rivers: the existence of which we are to deny, because we have never seen them!] "Then take your favourite argument from resemblance: how utterly pointless it really is! Why, does not a dog resemble a wolf? — and, to quote Ennius, How like us is that ugly brute, the ape! — but the two differ in habits. The elephant is the wisest of beasts, but the most ungainly in shape. 1.98. I speak of animals, but is it not the case even with men that when very much alike in appearance they differ widely in character, and when very much alike in character they are unlike in appearance? In fact, Velleius, if once we embark on this line of argument, see how far it takes us. You claimed it as axiomatic that reason can only exist in human form; but someone else will claim that it can only exist in a terrestrial creature, in one that has been born, has grown up, has been educated, consists of a soul and a body liable to decay and disease — in fine, that it can only exist in a mortal man. If you stand out against each of these assumptions, why be troubled about shape only? Rational intelligence exists in man, as you saw, only in conjunction with all the attributes that I have set out; yet you say that you can recognize god even with all these attributes stripped off, provided that the outward form remains. This is not to weigh the question, it is to toss up for what you are to say. 1.99. Unless indeed you happen never to have observed this either, that not only in a man but even in a tree whatever is superfluous or without a use is harmful. What a nuisance it is to have a single finger too many! Why is this? Because, given five fingers, there is no need of another either for appearance or for use. But your god has got not merely one finger more than he wants, but a head, neck, spine, sides, belly, back, flanks, hands, feet, thighs, legs. If this is to secure him immortality, what have these members to do with life? What has even the face? It depends more on the brain, heart, lungs and liver, for they are the abode of life: a man's countece and features have nothing to do with his vitality. 1.100. "Then you censured those who argued from the splendour and the beauty of creation, and who, observing the world itself, and the parts of the world, the sky and earth and sea, and the sun, moon and stars that adorn them, and discovering the laws of the seasons and their periodic successions, conjectured that there must exist some supreme and transcendent being who had created these things, and who imparted motion to them and guided and governed them. Though this guess may be wide of the mark, I can see what they are after; but as for you, what mighty masterpiece pray do you adduce as apparently the creation of divine intelligence, leading you to conjecture that gods exist? 'We have an idea of god implanted in our minds,' you say. Yes, and an idea of Jupiter with a beard, and Minerva in a helmet; but do you therefore believe that those deities are really like that? 1.101. The unlearned multitude are surely wiser here — they assign to god not only a man's limbs, but the use of those limbs. For they give him bow, arrows, spear, shield, trident, thunderbolt; and if they cannot see what actions the gods perform, yet they cannot conceive of god as entirely inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom we laugh at, deified animals solely on the score of some utility which they derived from them; for instance, the ibis, being a tall bird with stiff legs and a long horny beak, destroys a great quantity of snakes: it protects Egypt from plague, by killing and eating the flying serpents that are brought from the Libyan desert by the south-west wind, and so preventing them from harming the natives by their bite while alive and their stench when dead. I might describe the utility of the ichneumon, the crocodile and the cat, but I do not wish to be tedious. I will make my point thus: these animals are at all events deified by the barbarians for the benefits which they confer, but your gods not only do no service you can point to, but they don't do anything at all. 1.102. 'God,' he says, 'is free from trouble.' Obviously Epicurus thinks, as spoilt children do, that idleness is the best thing there is. Yet these very children even when idle amuse themselves with some active game: are we to suppose that god enjoys so complete a holiday, and is so sunk in sloth, that we must fear lest the least movement may jeopardize his happiness? This language not merely robs the gods of the movements and activities suitable to the divine nature, but also tends to make men slothful, if even god cannot be happy when actively employed. 1.103. "However, granting your view that god is the image and the likeness of man, what is his dwelling-place and local habitation? in what activities does he spend his life? what constitutes that happiness which you attribute to him? For a person who is to be happy must actively enjoy his blessings. As for locality, even the iimate elements each have their own particular region: earth occupies the lowest place, water covers the earth, to air is assigned the upper realm, and the ethereal fires occupy the highest confines of all. Animals again are divided into those that live on land and those that live in the water, while a third class are amphibious and dwell in both regions, and there are also some that are believed to be born from fire, and are occasionally seen fluttering about in glowing furnaces. 1.104. About your deity therefore I want to know, first, where he dwells; secondly, what motive he has for moving in space, that is, if he ever does so move; thirdly, it being a special characteristic of animate beings to desire some end that is appropriate their nature, what is the thing that god desires; fourthly, upon what subject does he employ his mental activity and reason; and lastly, how is he happy, and how eternal? For whichever of these questions you raise, you touch a tender spot. An argument based on such insecure premisses can come to no valid conclusion. 1.105. Your assertion was that the form of god is perceived by thought and not by the senses, that it has no solidity nor numerical persistence, and that our perception of it is such that it is seen owing to similarity and succession, a never-ceasing stream of similar forms arriving continually from the infinite number of atoms, and that thus it results that our mind, when its attention is fixed on these forms, conceives the divine nature to be happy and eternal. Now in the name of the very gods about whom we are talking, what can possibly be the meaning of this? If the gods only appeal to the faculty of thought, and have no solidity or definite outline, what difference does it make whether we think of a god or of a hippocentaur? Such mental pictures are called by all other philosophers mere empty imaginations, but you say they are the arrival and entrance into our minds of certain images. 1.106. Well then, when I seem to see Tiberius Gracchus in the middle of his speech in the Capitol producing the ballot‑box for the vote on Marcus Octavius, I explain this as an empty imagination of the mind, but your explanation is that the images of Gracchus and Octavius have actually remained on the spot, so that when I come to the Capitol these images are borne to my mind; the same thing happens, you say, in the case of god, whose appearance repeatedly impinges on men's minds, and so gives rise to the belief in happy and eternal deities. 1.107. Suppose that there are such images constantly impinging on our minds: but that is only the presentation of a certain form — surely not also of a reason for supposing that this form is happy and eternal? "But what is the nature of these images of yours, and whence do they arise? This extravagance, it is true, is borrowed from Democritus; but he has been widely criticized, nor can you find a satisfactory explanation, and the whole affair is a lame and impotent business. For how can be more improbable than that images of Homer, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras and Plato should impinge on me at all — much less that they should do so in the actual shape that those men really bore? How then do these images arise? and of whom are they the images? Aristotle tells us that the poet Orpheus never existed, and the Pythagoreans say that the Orphic poem which we possess was the work of a certain Cecrops; yet Orpheus, that is, according to you, the image of him, often comes into my mind. 1.108. What of the fact that different images of the same person enter my mind and yours? or that images come to us of things that never existed at all and never can have existed — for instance, Scylla, and the Chimaera? or of people, places and cities which we have never seen? What of the fact that I can call up an image instantaneously, the very moment that I choose to do so? or that they come to me unbidden, even when I am asleep? Velleius, the whole affair is humbug. Yet you stamp these images not only on our eyes but also on our minds — so irresponsibly do you babble. 1.109. And how extravagantly! There is a constant passage or stream of visual presentations which collectively produce a single visual impression. I should be ashamed to say that I do not understand the doctrine, if you who maintain it understood it yourselves! How can you prove that the stream of images is continuous, or if it is, how are the images eternal? You say that there is an innumerable supply of atoms. Are you going to argue then that everything is eternal, for the same reason? You take refuge in the principle of 'equilibrium' (for so with your consent we will translate isonomia), and you say that because there is mortal substance there must also be immortal substance. On that showing, because there are mortal men, there are also some that are immortal, and because there are men born on land, there are men born in the water. 'And because there are forces of destruction, there are also forces of preservation.' Suppose there were, they would only preserve things that already exist; but I am not aware that your gods do exist. 1.110. But be that as it may, how do all your pictures of objects arise out of the atoms? even if the atoms existed, which they do not, they might conceivably be capable of pushing and jostling one another about by their collisions, but they could not create form, shape, colour, life. You fail entirely therefore to prove divine immortality. "Now let us consider divine happiness. Happiness is admittedly impossible without virtue. But virtue is in its nature active, and your god is entirely inactive. Therefore he is devoid of virtue. Therefore he is not happy either. 1.111. In what then does his life consist? 'In a constant succession of things good,' you reply, 'without any admixture of evils.' Things good — what things? Pleasures, I suppose — that is, of course, pleasures of the body, for your school recognizes no pleasures of the mind that do not arise from and come back to the body. I don't suppose that you, Velleius, are like the rest of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of certain utterances of Epicurus, in which he protests that he cannot conceive any good that is unconnected with the pleasures of the voluptuary and the sensualist, pleasures which in fact he proceeds without a blush to enumerate by name. 1.112. Well then, what viands and beverages, what harmonies of music and flowers of various hue, what delights of touch and smell will you assign to the gods, so as to keep them steeped in pleasure? The poets array banquets of nectar and ambrosia, with Hebe or Ganymede in attendance as cup‑bearer; but what will you do, Epicurean? I don't see either where your god is to procure these delights or how he is to enjoy them. It appears then that mankind is more bountifully equipped for happiness than is the deity, since man can experience a wider range of pleasures. 1.113. You tell me that you consider these pleasures inferior, which merely 'tickle' the senses (the expression is that of Epicurus). When will you cease jesting? Why, even our friend Philo was impatient with the Epicureans for affecting to despise the pleasures of senseless indulgence; for he had an excellent memory and could quote verbatim a number of maxims from the actual writings of Epicurus. As for Metrodorus, Epicurus's co‑partner in philosophy, he supplied him with many still more outspoken quotations; in fact Metrodorus takes his brother Timocrates to task for hesitating to measure every element of happiness by the standard of the belly, nor is this an isolated utterance, but he repeats it several times. I see you nod your assent, as you are acquainted with the passages; and did you deny it, I would produce the volumes. Not that I am at the moment criticizing your making pleasure the sole standard of value — that belongs to another inquiry. What I am trying to prove is that your gods are incapable of pleasure, and therefore by your verdict can have no happiness either. 1.114. 'But they are free from pain.' Does that satisfy the ideal of perfect bliss, overflowing with good things? 'God is engaged (they say) in ceaseless contemplation of his own happiness, for he has no other object for his thoughts.' I beg of you to realize in your imagination a vivid picture of a deity solely occupied for all eternity in reflecting 'What a good time I am having! How happy I am!' And yet I can't see how this happy god of yours is not to fear destruction, since he is subjected without a moment's respite to the buffeting and jostling of a horde of atoms that eternally assail him, while from his own person a ceaseless stream of images is given off. Your god is therefore neither happy nor eternal. 1.115. " 'Yes, but Epicurus actually wrote books about holiness and piety.' But what is the language of these books? Such that you think you are listening to a Coruncanius or a Scaevola, high priests, not to the man who destroyed the very foundations of religion, and overthrew — not by main force like Xerxes, but by argument — the temples and the altars of the immortal gods. Why, what reason have you for maintaining that men owe worship to the gods, if the gods not only pay no respect to men, but care for nothing and do nothing at all? 1.116. 'But deity possesses an excellence and pre‑eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise.' Now how can there be any excellence in a being so engrossed in the delights of his own pleasure that he always has been, is, and will continue to be entirely idle and inactive? Furthermore how can you owe piety to a person who has bestowed nothing upon you? or how can you owe anything at all to one who has done you no service? Piety is justice towards the gods; but how can any claims of justice exist between us and them, if god and man have nothing in common? Holiness is the science of divine worship; but I fail to see why the gods should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them. 1.117. On the other hand what reason is there for adoring the gods on the ground of our admiration for the divine nature, if we cannot see that that nature possesses any special excellence? "As for freedom from superstition, which is the favourite boast of your school, that is easy to attain when you have deprived the gods of all power; unless perchance you think that it was possible for Diagoras or Theodorus to be superstitious, who denied the existence of the gods altogether. For my part, I don't see how it was possible even for Protagoras, who was not certain either that the gods exist or that they do not. For the doctrines of all these thinkers abolish not only superstition, which implies a groundless fear of the gods, but also religion, which consists in piously worshipping them. 1.118. Take again those who have asserted that the entire notion of the immortal gods is a fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state, to the end that those whom reason was powerless to control might be led in the path of duty by religion; surely this view was absolutely and entirely destructive of religion. Or Prodicus of Ceos,',WIDTH,)" onmouseout="nd();" º who said that the gods were personifications of things beneficial to the life of man — pray what religion was left by his theory? 1.119. Or those who teach that brave or famous or powerful men have been deified after death, and that it is these who are the real objects of the worship, prayers and adoration which we are accustomed to offer — are not they entirely devoid of all sense of religion? This theory was chiefly developed by Euhemerus, who was translated and imitated especially by our poet Ennius. Yet Euhemerus describes the death and burial of certain gods; are we then to think of him as upholding religion, or rather as utterly and entirely destroying it? I say nothing of the holy and awe‑inspiring sanctuary of Eleusis, Where tribes from earth's remotest confines seek Initiation, and I pass over Samothrace and those occult mysteries Which throngs of worshippers at dead of night In forest coverts deep do celebrate at Lemnos, since such mysteries when interpreted and rationalized prove to have more to do with natural science than with theology. 1.120. "For my own part I believe that even that very eminent man Democritus, the fountain-head from which Epicurus derived the streams that watered his little garden, has no fixed opinion about the nature of the gods. At one moment he holds the view that the universe includes images endowed with divinity; at another he says that there exist in this same universe the elements from which the mind is compounded, and that these are gods; at another, that they are animate images, which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us; and again that they are certain vast images of such a size as to envelop and enfold the entire world. All these fancies are more worthy of Democritus's native city than of himself; 1.121. for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. 1.122. But as for you, what mischief you cause when you reckon kindness and benevolence as weaknesses! Apart altogether from the nature and attributes of deity, do you think that even human beneficence and benignity are solely due to human infirmity? Is there no natural affection between the good? There is something attractive in the very sound of the word 'love,' from which the Latin term for friendship is derived. If we base our friendship on its profit to ourselves, and not on its advantage to those whom we love, it will not be friendship at all, but a mere bartering of selfish interests. That is our standard of value for meadows and fields and herds of cattle: we esteem them for the profits that we derive from them; but affection and friendship between men is disinterested; how much more so therefore is that of the gods, who, although in need of nothing, yet both love each other and care for the interests of men. If this be not so, why do we worship and pray to them? why have pontiffs and augurs to preside over our sacrifices and auspices? why make petitions and vow offerings to heaven? 'Why, but Epicurus (you tell me) actually wrote a treatise on holiness.' 1.123. Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man's affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man's limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them. 1.124. Secondly, even if god exists, yet is of such a nature that he feels no benevolence or affection towards men, good‑bye to him, say I — not 'God be gracious to me,' why should I say that? for he cannot be gracious to anybody, since, as you tell us, all benevolence and affection is a mark of weakness." 2.2. "For my part," rejoined Balbus, "I had rather listen to Cotta again, using the same eloquence that he employed in abolishing false gods to present a picture of the true ones. A philosopher, a pontiff and a Cotta should possess not a shifting and unsettled conception of the immortal gods, like the Academics, but a firm and definite one like our school. As for refuting Epicurus, that has been accomplished and more than achieved already. But I am eager to hear what you think yourself, Cotta." "Have you forgotten," said Cotta, "what I said at the outset, that I find it more easy, especially on such subjects as these, to say what I don't think than what I do? 2.4. "The first point," resumed Lucilius, "seems not even to require arguing. For when we gaze upward to the sky and contemplate the heavenly bodies, what can be so obvious and so manifest as that there must exist some power possessing transcendent intelligence by whom these things are ruled? Were it not so, how comes it that the words of Ennius carry conviction to all readers — Behold this dazzling vault of heaven, which all mankind as Jove invoke, ay, and not only as Jove but as sovereign of the world, ruling all things with his nod, and as Ennius likewise says — father of gods and men, a deity omnipresent and omnipotent? If a man doubts this, I really cannot see why he should not also be capable of doubting the existence of the sun; 2.20. "When one expounds these doctrines in a fuller and more flowing style, as I propose to do, it is easier for them to evade the captious objections of the Academy; but when they are reduced to brief syllogistic form, as was the practice of Zeno, they lie more open to criticism. A running river can almost or quite entirely escape pollution, whereas an enclosed pool is easily sullied; similarly a flowing stream of eloquence sweeps aside the censures of the critic, but a closely reasoned argument defends itself with difficult. The thoughts that we expound at length Zeno used to compress into this form: 2.21. 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: 2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? 2.36. Now this is the grade on which universal nature stands; and since she is of such a character as to be superior to all things and incapable of frustration by any, it follows of necessity that the world is an intelligent being, and indeed also a wise being. "Again, what can be more illogical than to deny that the being which embraces all things must be the best of all things, or, admitting this, to deny that it must be, first, possessed of life, secondly, rational and intelligent, and lastly, endowed with wisdom? How else can it be the best of all things? If it resembles plants or even animals, so far from being highest, it must be reckoned lowest in the scale of being. If again it be capable of reason yet has not been wise from the beginning, the world must be in a worse condition than mankind; for a man can become wise, but if in all the eternity of past time the world has been foolish, obviously it will never attain wisdom; and so it will be inferior to man, which is absurd. Therefore the world must be deemed to have been wise from the beginning, and divine. 2.43. moreover the substance employed as food is also believed to have some influence on mental acuteness; it is therefore likely that the stars possess surpassing intelligence, since they inhabit the ethereal region of the world and also are nourished by the moist vapours of sea and earth, rarefied in their passage through the wide intervening space. Again, the consciousness and intelligence of the stars is most clearly evinced by their order and regularity; for regular and rhythmical motion is impossible without design, which contains no trace of casual or accidental variation; now the order and eternal regularity of the constellations indicates neither a process of nature, for it is highly rational, nor chance, for chance loves variation and abhors regularity; it follows therefore that the stars move of their own free-will and because of their intelligence and divinity. 2.45. "It remains for us to consider the qualities of the divine nature; and on this subject nothing is more difficult than to divert the eye of the mind from following the practice of bodily sight. This difficulty has caused both uneducated people generally and those philosophers who resemble the uneducated to be unable to conceive of the immortal gods without setting before themselves the form of men: a shallow mode of thought which Cotta has exposed and which therefore calls for no discussion from me. But assuming that we have a definite and preconceived idea of a deity as, first, a living being, and secondly, a being unsurpassed in excellence by anything else in the whole of nature, I can see nothing that satisfies this preconception or idea of ours more fully than, first, the judgement that this world, which must necessarily be the most excellent of all things, is itself a living being and a god. 2.46. Let Epicurus jest at this notion as he will — and he is a person who jokes with difficulty, and has but the slightest smack of his native Attic wit, — let him protest his inability to conceive of god as a round and rotating body. Nevertheless he will never dislodge me from one belief which even he himself accepts: he holds that gods exist, on the ground that there must necessarily be some mode of being of outstanding and supreme excellence; now clearly nothing can be more excellent than the world. Nor can it be doubted that a living being endowed with sensation, reason and intelligence must excel a being devoid of those attributes; 2.47. hence it follows that the world is a living being and possesses sensation, intelligence and reason; and this argument leads to the conclusion that the world is god. "But these points will appear more readily a little later merely from a consideration of the creatures that the world produces. In the meantime, pray, Velleius, do not parade your school's utter ignorance of science. You say that you think a cone, a cylinder and a pyramid more beautiful than a sphere. Why, even in matters of taste you Epicureans have a criterion of your own! However, assuming that the figures which you mention are more beautiful to the eye — though for my part I don't think them so, for what can be more beautiful than the figure that encircles and encloses in itself all other figures, and that can possess no roughness or point of collision on its defence, no indentation of the concavity, no protuberance or depression? There are two forms that excel all others, among solid bodies the globe (for so we may translate the Greek sphaera), and among plane figures the round or circle, the Greek kyklos; well then, these two forms alone possess the property of absolute uniformity in all their parts and of having every point on the circumference equidistant from the centre; and nothing can be more compact than that. 2.48. Still, if you Epicureans cannot see this, as you have never meddled with that learned dust, could you not have grasped even so much of natural philosophy as to understand that the uniform motion and regular disposition of the heavenly bodies could not have been maintained with any other shape? Hence nothing could be more unscientific than your favourite assertion, that it is not certain that our world itself is round, since it may possibly have some other form, and there are countless numbers of worlds, all of different shapes. 2.49. Had but Epicurus learnt that twice two are four he certainly would not talk like that; but while making his palate the test of the chief good, he forgets to lift up his eyes to what Ennius calls 'the palate of the sky.' "For there are two kinds of heavenly bodies, some that travel from east to west in unchanging paths, without ever making the slightest deviation in their course, while the others perform two unbroken revolutions in the same paths and courses. Now both of these facts indicate at once the rotatory motion of the firmament, which is only possible with a spherical shape, and the circular revolutions of the heavenly bodies. "Take first of all the sun, which is the chief of the celestial bodies. Its motion is such that it first fills the countries of the earth with a flood of light, and then leaves them in darkness now on one side and now on the other; for night is caused merely by the shadow of the earth, which intercepts the light of the sun. Its daily and nightly paths have the same regularity. Also the sun by at one time slightly approaching and at another time slightly receding causes a moderate variation of temperature. For the passage of about ¼ diurnal revolutions of the sun completes the circuit of a year; and by bending its course now towards the north and now towards the south the sun causes summers and winters and the two seasons of which one follows the waning of winter and the other that of summer. Thus from the changes of the four seasons are derived the origins and causes of all those creatures which come into existence on land and in the sea. 2.54. "This regularity therefore in the stars, this exact punctuality throughout all eternity notwithstanding the great variety of their courses, is to me incomprehensible without rational intelligence and purpose. And if we observe these attributes in the planets, we cannot fail to enrol even them among the number of the gods. "Moreover the so‑called fixed stars also indicate the same intelligence and wisdom. Their revolutions recur daily with exact regularity. It is not the case that they are carried along by the aether or that their courses are fixed in the firmament, as most people ignorant of natural philosophy aver; for the aether is not of such a nature as to hold the stars and cause them to revolve by its own force, since being rare and translucent and of uniform diffused heat, the aether does not appear to be well adapted to contain the stars. 2.57. "I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: 'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that 'craftsmanlike' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is 'craftsmanlike,' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, 2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. 2.59. "We have discussed the world as a whole, and we have also discussed the heavenly bodies; so that there now stands fairly well revealed to our view a vast company of gods who are neither idle nor yet perform their activities with irksome and laborious toil. For they have no framework of veins and sinews and bones; nor do they consume such kinds of food and drink as to make them contract too sharp or too sluggish a condition of the humours; nor are their bodies such as to make them fear falls or blows or apprehend disease from exhaustion of their members — dangers which led Epicurus to invent his unsubstantial, do‑nothing gods. 2.76. "In the first place therefore one must either deny the existence of the gods, which in a manner is done by Democritus when he represents them as 'apparitions' and by Epicurus with his 'images'; or anybody who admits that the gods exist must allow them activity, and activity of the most distinguished sort; now nothing can be more distinguished than the government of the world; therefore the world is governed by the wisdom of the gods. If this is not so, there must clearly be something better and more powerful than god, be it what it may, whether iimate nature or necessity speeding on with mighty force to create the supremely beautiful objects that we see; 2.85. And this world-structure must either be everlasting in this same form in which we see it or at all events extremely durable, and destined to endure for an almost immeasurably protracted period of time. Whichever alternative be true, the inference follows that the world is governed by nature. For consider the navigation of a fleet, the marshalling of an army, or (to return to instances from the processes of nature) the budding of a vien or of a tree, or even the shape and structure of the limbs of an animal — when do these ever evidence such a degree of skill in nature as the world itself? Either therefore there is nothing that is ruled by a sentient nature, or we must admit that the world is so ruled. 2.88. Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit. 2.93. "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! 2.115. Can any sane person believe that all this array of stars and this vast celestial adornment could have been created out of atoms rushing thenceforth fortuitously and at random? or could any other being devoid of intelligence and reason have created them? Not merely did their creation postulate intelligence, but it is impossible to understand their nature without intelligence of a high order. "but not only are these things marvellous, but nothing is more remarkable than the stability and coherence of the world, which is such that it is impossible even to imagine anything better adapted to endure. For all its parts in every direction gravitate with a uniform pressure towards the centre. Moreover busy conjoined maintain their union most permanently when they have some bond encompassing them to bind them together; and this function is fulfilled by that rational and intelligent substance which pervades the whole world as the efficient cause of all things and which draws and collects the outermost particles towards the centre. 2.148. it is by collating and comparing our precepts that we also create the arts that serve either practical necessities or the purpose of amusement. Then take the gift of speech, the queen of arts as you are fond of calling it — what a glorious, what a divine faculty it is! In the first place it enables us both to learn things we do not know and to teach things we do know to others; secondly it is our instrument for exhortation and persuasion, for consoling the afflicted and assuaging the fears of the terrified, for curbing passion and quenching appetite and anger; it is this that has united us in the bonds of justice, law and civil order, this that has sped us from savagery and barbarism. 2.153. "Then moreover hasn't man's reason penetrated even to the sky? We alone of living creatures know the risings and settings and the courses of the stars, the human race has set limits to the day, the month and the year, and has learnt the eclipses of the sun and moon and foretold for all future time their occurrence, their extent and their dates. And contemplating the heavenly bodies the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, with its comrades justice and the rest of the virtues, the sources of a life of happiness that vies with and resembles the divine existence and leaves us inferior to the celestial beings in nothing else save immortality, which is immaterial for happiness. I think that my exposition of these matters has been sufficient to prove how widely man's nature surpasses all other living creatures; and this should make it clear that neither such a conformation and arrangement of the members nor such power of mind and intellect can possibly have been created by chance. 2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. 2.161. The great beasts of the forest again we take by hunting, both for food and in order to exercise ourselves in the mimic warfare of the chase, and also, as in the case of elephants, to train and discipline them for our employment, and to procure from their busy a variety of medicines for diseases and wounds, as also we do from certain roots and herbs whose values we have learnt by long-continued use and trial. Let the mind's eye survey the whole earth and all the seas, and you will behold now fruitful plains of measureless extent and mountains thickly clad with forests and pastures filled with flocks, now vessels sailing with marvellous swiftness across the sea. 2.162. Nor only on the surface of the earth, but also in its darkest recesses there lurks an abundance of commodities which were created for men's use and which men alone discover. "The next subject is one which each of you perhaps will seize upon for censure, Cotta because Carneades used to enjoy tilting at the Stoics, Velleius because nothing provokes the ridicule of Epicurus so much as the art of prophecy; but in my view it affords the very strongest proof that man's welfare is studied by divine providence. I refer of course to Divination, which we see practised in many regions and upon various matters and occasions both private and more especially public. 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.6. There, Balbus, is the opinion of a Cotta and a pontife; now oblige me by letting me know yours. You are a philosopher, and I ought to receive from you a proof of your religion, whereas I must believe the word of our ancestors even without proof." "What proof then do you require of me, Cotta?" replied Balbus. "You divided your discourse under four heads," said Cotta; "first you designed to prove the existence of the gods; secondly, to describe their nature; thirdly, to show that the world is governed by them; and lastly, that they care for the welfare of men. These, if I remember rightly, were the headings that you laid down." "You are quite right," said Balbus; "but now tell me what it is that you want to know." 3.29. "Then, how does your school refute the following arguments of Carneades? If no body is not liable to death, no body can be everlasting; but no body is not liable to death, nor even indiscerptible nor incapable of decomposition and dissolution. And every living thing is by its nature capable of feeling; therefore there is no living thing that can escape unavoidable liability to undergo impressions from without, that is to suffer and to feel; and if every living thing is liable to suffering, no living thing is not liable to death. Therefore likewise, if every living thing can be cut up into parts, no living thing is indivisible, and none is everlasting. But every living thing is so constructed as to be liable to undergo and to suffer violence from without; it therefore follows that every living thing is liable to death and dissolution, and is divisible. 3.30. For just as, if all wax were capable of change, nothing made of wax would be incapable of change, and likewise nothing made of silver or bronze if silver and bronze were substances capable of change, therefore similarly, if all the elements of which all things are composed are liable to change, there can be no body not liable to change; but the elements of which, according to your school, all things are composed are liable to change; therefore every body is liable to change. But if any body were not liable to death, then not every body would be liable to change. Hence incessant follows that every body is liable to death. In fact every body consists of either water or air or fierce or earth, or of a combination of these elements or some of them; but none of these lets is exempt from destruction; 3.31. for everything of an earthy nature is divisible, and also liquid substance is soft and therefore easily crushed and broken up, while fire and air are by readily impelled by impacts of all kinds, and are of a consistency that is extremely yielding and easily dissipated; and besides, all these elements perish when they undergo transmutation, which occurs when earth turns into water, and when from water arises air, and from air aether, and when alternately the same processes are reversed; but if those elements of which every living thing consists can perish, no living thing is everlasting. 3.32. And, to drop this line of argument, nevertheless no living thing can be found which either was never born or will live for ever. For every living thing has sensation; therefore it perceives both heat and cold, both sweetness and sourness — it cannot through any of the senses receive pleasant sensations and not receive their opposites; if therefore it is capable of feeling pleasure, it is also capable of feeling pain; but a being which can experience pleasure mt necessity also be liable to destruction; therefore it must be admitted that every living thing is liable to death. 3.33. Besides, if there be anything that cannot feel either pleasure or pain, this cannot be a living thing, and if on the other hand anything is alive, this must necessarily feel pleasure and pain; and that which feels pleasure and pain cannot be everlasting; and every living thing feels them; therefore no living thing is everlasting. Besides, there can be no living thing which does not possess natural instincts of appetition and avoidance; but the objects of appetition are the things which are in accordance with nature, and the objects of avoidance are the contrary; ne v living thing seeks certain things and flees from certain things, but that which it flees from is contrary to nature, and that which is contrary to nature has the power of destruction; therefore every living thing must of necessity perish. 3.34. There are proofs too numerous to count by which it can be irrefragably established that there is nothing possessed of sensation that does not perish; in fact the actual objects of sensation, such as cold and heat, pleasure and pain, and the rest, when felt in an intense degree cause destruction; nor is any living thing devoid of sensation; therefore no living thing is everlasting. For every living thing must either be of a simple substance, and composed of either earth or fire or breath or moisture — and such an animal is inconceivable —, or else of a substance compounded of several elements, each having its own place towards which it travels by natural inclination, one to the bottom, another to the top and another to the middle; such elements can cohere for a certain time, but cannot possibly do so for ever, for each must of necessity be borne away by nature to its own place; therefore no living thing is everlasting. 3.38. "But what can we make of a god not endowed with any virtue? Well, are we to assign to god prudence, which consists in the knowledge of things good, things evil, and things neither good nor evil? to a being who experiences and can experience nothing evil, what need is there of the power to choose between things good and evil? Or of reason, or of intelligence? these faculties we employ for the purpose of proceeding from the known to the obscure; but nothing can be obscure to god. Then justice, which assigns to each his own — what has this to do with the gods? justice, as you tell us, is the offspring of human society and of the commonwealth of man. And temperance consists in forgoing bodily pleasures; so if there is room for topic in heaven, there is also room for pleasure. As for courage, how can god be conceived as brave? in enduring pain? or toil? or danger? to none of these is god liable. 3.44. No, you say, we must draw the line at that; well then, orcus is not a god either; what are you to say about his brothers then?' These arguments were advanced by Carneades, not with the object of establishing atheism (for what could less befit a philosopher?) but in order to prove the Stoic theology worthless; accordingly he used to pursue his inquiry thus: 'Well now,' he would say, 'if these brothers are included among the gods, can we deny the divinity of their father Saturation, who is held in the highest reverence by the common people in the west? And if he is a god, we must also admit that his father Caelus is a god. And if so, the parents of Caelus, the Aether and the Day, must be held to be gods, and their brothers and sisters, whom the ancient genealogists name Love, Guile, Dear, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favour, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Parcae, the Daughters of Hesperus, the Dreams: all of these are fabled to be the children of erebus and Night.' Either therefore you must accept these monstrosities or you must discard the first claimants also. 3.65. Now let us consider the next topics — first whether the world is ruled by divine providence, and then whether the gods have regard for the affairs of mankind. For these are the two that I have left of the heads into which you divided the subject; and if you gentlemen approve, I feel that they require a somewhat detailed discussion." "For my part," said Velleius, "I approve entirely, for I anticipate something more important still to come, and I also strongly agree with what has been said already." 'I do not want to interrupt you with questions," added Balbus, "we will take another time for that: I warrant I will bring you to agree. But . . . . . . . . Nay, 'twill not be; a struggle is in store, What, should I fawn on him and speak him fair, Save for my purpose — |
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35. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.46-1.47, 1.53, 1.71-1.75, 1.97-1.99, 2.51, 3.24-3.25, 3.74-3.75, 4.21, 5.35-5.36 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon •diogenes of babylon, reinterpretation of zenos argument for the existence of the gods Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 102; Graver (2007) 228; Long (2006) 253| 1.46. nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim enim est V 2 B ullus sensus in corpore, sed, ut non physici phisici KRH solum docent verum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris aures...nares ex -is V 1? a sede animi perforatae. itaque saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus, ut ut quo ss. V 2 facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis quae quasi fenestrae sint animi, non... 10 sunt animi Non. 36, 12 quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit. quid, quod quid quod V ( sed quod corr. in cū 1 ) qui quod GK 1 ( corr. c ) R eadem mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, cũ ( ex cō) prendimus V ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus animi in animis corr. V 1 cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset. atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, fertur K c liber animus pervenerit. illam ... 24 vult 239, 15 nulla vero est celeritas...240, 16 excitavit 240, 26 quod tandem ... 241,17 pervenerit H 1.47. nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quae patent ad animum animos Non. a corpore, callidissimo calidissimo K 1 RV artificio natura fabricata nam 19 natura fabricatur Non. 35, 26 est, tamen terrenis concretisque corporibus sunt intersaepta intersepta X quodam modo: cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit. Quamvis copiose haec diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia, quanta spectacula animus in locis caelestibus esset esse R 1 habiturus. 1.53. Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, nesci aet K dic quaeso, ne esse ne esse ex non esse K c quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro Phaedr. 245 c, cf. Cic. rep. 6, 27. Ciceronem sequitur Lact. inst. 7, 8, 4 et Serv. Aen. 6, 727 phedro KRV explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re p.: “Quod semper movetur, aeternum et aet. X ( sed et exp. V vet K c ) aet. Somn. Macr. est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, aliunde ( u(p' a)/llou ) H e corr. s Somn. pars Macr. alicunde X quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, quia a se s. u. add. V 2 numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc hoc o in r. R c principium est movendi. 1.71. in animi autem autem om. H cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex: quod cum ita sit, certe nec ne nec HK (c 2 aut c ) add. Mdv. ad Fin. exc. III secerni nec dividi nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne interire quidem igitur. est enim interitus quasi discessus et secretio ac diremptus diremptus s V rec direptus X earum partium, quae ante interitum iunctione aliqua tenebantur. non valet animus... 253,22 tenebantur H His et talibus rationibus adductus aductus GR 1 (corr. c ) V 1 (corr. 1 ) Socrates nec patronum quaesivit ad iudicium capitis nec iudicibus supplex 254,12 saep. q; in r. R al.m. ( ex que ut v. ) fuit adhibuitque liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia, et supremo vitae die de hoc ipso multa disseruit et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit, et tum, tum ex cum V 1 paene in manu iam mortiferum illud tenens poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in caelum videretur escendere. aescendere V asc. KB s 1.72. Ita Plato Phaedon 80sqq. enim censebat itaque disseruit, duas ut ante duas eras. in K esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium: nam cf. Lact. inst. 7, 10, 10 qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent et se totos toto GV 1 ( s add. 2 ) R 1 ut v. (s add. ipse, tum lib- ex bib-) libidinibus dedissent, quibus caecati vel velut X (sed ut exp. V vet ) domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent vel re publica violanda rei publicae violandae V 2 fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent, concoepissent GR concęp. K is devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum; qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio seseque contagiose seque V 1 ab is semper sevocavissent s evocavissent V ( exp. vet ) essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, is ad illos a quibus essent profecti reditum facilem patere. 1.73. Itaque Phaed. 85b commemorat, ut cygni, qui non sine causa Apollini dicati sint, si nt V( 2) sunt Serv. sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur, ut cycni ... 17 videantur Serv. Aen. 1,393 qua providentes quid in morte boni sit cum cantu et voluptate moriantur, sic omnibus bonis et doctis esse faciendum. faciundum K 2 (nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare posset, possit K 2 nisi idem nobis accideret diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod is quo his X (quod his V c ) saepe usu venit, qui cum Phaed. 99d d el. Man. ant cum aut ut v. acriter oculis deficientem solem intuerentur, ut del. Bentl. ut in vel mut. Se. Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 247 aspectum omnino amitterent; sic mentis acies se ipsa intuens non numquam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus. itaque dubitans circumspectans haesitans, multa adversa reverens revertens X ( sed t exp. in V) tamquam in rate in rate cf. e)pi\ sxedi/as Phaid. 85d ratis V 2 Se. imm. R in mari inmenso 1.74. nostra vehitur oratio ratio Camerar. ). sed haec haec add. V 2 et vetera sunt post vetera add. K 2 et a Graecis; Cato autem sic abiit e vita, ut causam moriendi moriundi K 2 nactum se esse gauderet. vetat enim domis ille in in om. V nobis deus iniussu hinc nos suo demigrare; cum vero causam iustam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc tum GV Socrati, nunc Catoni, saepe multis, ne ille me Dius Fidius vir sapiens laetus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit, nec tamen ille ille Lb. ilia rup erit V vincla carceris ruperit—leges enim vetant—, sed tamquam a magistratu aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a deo evocatus atque emissus exierit. Tota Plato Phaedon 80e enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est. 1.75. nam quid nam quid quid enim V 2 aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, vol. G 1 a uuol. K 1 id est id ( pro id est) V a corpore, cum a re familiari, quae est ministra et famula corporis, cum a re publica, cum a negotio omni sevocamus omni sev. (s. i. r. V c )V omni sev. ex omnis ev. R animum, quid, inquam, in quantum GR 1 V 1 tum agimus nisi animum ad se ipsum advocamus, advocamus s avoc. X (voc. K 1 a add. K c ) secum esse cogimus cogita mus G 1 maximeque a corpore abducimus? secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quicquam post animum add. V 2 : id est se ipsum nec quicquam K ( c K c ) aliud, est mori est mori Bentl. ēmori K emori GRVH ( post aliud add. quam R al.m. nisi V rec ) cf. Plato Phaed. 67d Lact. epit. 41 : deum vere colere id est, nec quicquam aliud, sapientia. discere. quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disiungamusque credidis iung. GR 1 (corr. 1? ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) credi disi. H credi siung K 1 nos a corporibus, id est id ( pro id est) V consuescamus mori. hoc, et dum erimus in terris, erit illi illi K caelesti vitae simile, et cum illuc ex his vinclis vinculis K 2 V 2 emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum. Tota... 23 animorum H nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur, ut i qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt. fuerint V 1 quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus. nam haec quidem vita vita s. v. add. K 1 mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet. nam haec... 5 liberet Aug. epist. 155,4 liberetur GKR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (ur eras. ) liberet Aug. Satis tu quidem in Consolatione es lamentatus; 1.97. vadit enim enim om. s in eundem carcerem atque in eundem paucis post annis scyphum Socrates, eodem scelere iudicum quo tyrannorum Theramenes. QHPAMENHC X Apol. 40csqq. (libere reddita) quae est igitur eius oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud iudices iam morte multatum? magna me inquit “spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus, ut aut sensus omnino omnes omnis K (acst s = accusativus ss. 2 ) mors auferat aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur. meretur K quam ob rem, sive sensus extinguitur morsque ei somno similis est, qui non numquam etiam sine visis somniorum placatissimam quietem adfert, di dii GRV boni, quid lucri est emori! aut quam multi dies reperiri repp. GR (corr. 1 ) V possunt, qui tali nocti antepotur! cui si si V 2 s om. X similis est perpetuitas omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior? 1.98. sin vera sunt quae dicuntur, migrationem esse mortem in eas oras, horas K 1 V 2 quas qui e vita excesserunt incolunt, id hic in id corr. K c multo iam beatius est. tene, cum ab is, qui se iudicum numero numerū V 1 haberi volunt, evaseris, ad eos venire, qui vere iudices appellentur, Minoem Rhadamanthum Aeacum Aeacum s Aiacem X Triptolemum, convenireque eos qui iuste et et s om. X ( e)ge/nonto e)n tw=|n e(autw=n bi/w| ) cum fide vixerint— haec peregrinatio mediocris vobis videri potest? ut vero conloqui cum Orpheo Musaeo Homero Hesiodo liceat, quanti tandem aestimatis? equidem saepe emori, si fieri posset, vellem, ut ea quae dico mihi liceret invisere. invisere V (ise in r. V c ) invenire rell. quanta delectatione autem adficerer, cum Palamedem, cum Aiacem, cum alios iudicio iniquo iniquorum ventos GR iniquorũ ventos K iniquo ( eras. 3—4 litt., tum circum in fine versus V c ) ventos V ( ei)/ tis a)/llos dia\ kri/din a)/dikon te/qnhken circumventos convenirem! temptarem etiam summi regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Troiam, et Ulixi ulixis V 2 Sisyphique prudentiam, nec ob eam rem, cum haec exquirerem sicut hic faciebam, capite damnarer.—Ne vos quidem, iudices i qui me absolvistis, hi X si V 2 mortem timueritis. 1.99. nec nec c in r. V c enim cuiquam bono mali quicquam evenire potest nec vivo nec mortuo, nec umquam eius res a dis inmortalibus imm. KR neglegentur, nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito. nec vero ego is, a quibus accusatus aut a quibus condemnatus sum, habeo quod suscenseam, succenseam K 2 in mg. V c nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt.” et haec quidem hoc modo; nihil autem melius extremo: sed tempus est inquit iam hinc abire, habire G 1 R 1 me, ut moriar, vos, ut vitam agatis. utrum autem sit melius, dii inmortales imm. V 2 sciunt, hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem. utrum... 26 neminem libere Lact. inst. 7,2, 10 Ne ego h' supra ego V 2 haud aut X haud V 2 paulo hunc animum malim mallim G ( 2. l in r. ) K 1 RV 1 quam eorum omnium fortunas, qui de hoc iudicaverunt. etsi, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit scit sit V 1 ipse utrum sit melius—nam dixit ante—, sed suum illud, nihil ut adfirmet, tenet ad extremum; 2.51. Huius animi pars illa mollior molior K 1 V 1 rationi sic paruit ut severo imperatori miles pudens. pudens prudens G 2 R c K 2 in quo vero vero Bentl. viro erit perfecta sapientia—quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus vidimus s videmus X cf. orat. 19. 100. Lael. 18 al. neminem; sed philosophorum sententiis, qualis hic futurus futuris G 1 K 1 ut v. sit, si modo aliquando fuerit, exponitur—, is igitur sive ea ratio, quae erit in eo perfecta atque absoluta, sic illi parti imperabit inferiori ut iustus parens probis filiis; nutu, quod volet, conficiet, nullo labore, nulla molestia; eriget ipse se, suscitabit, suscitabit s suscitabitur X instruet, armabit, ut tamquam ut aquam V 1 hosti sic obsistat dolori. quae sunt ista arma? contentio cotentio K 1 R confirmatio sermoque intumus, cum ipse secum: 3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 4.21. Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi poen. ex pen. V 2 pun. HV rec eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo modo W ( o)rgh\ e)narxome/nh ) sine modo Non. existens, excandescentia... 9 existens Non. 103, 14 desistens V 3 quae qu/mwsis Graece dicitur, odium Qg M w ClC fere X ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo animo Lb. ( cf. Th. 1. 1. 4, 940 ) odio et corde concepta, indigentia Idigentia K 1 libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. distinguunt distingunt X illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae kathgorh/mata K a TH G opphm a T L fere X dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia diligentia X indigentia s V 3 quod verum videtur, etsi Cic. non bene expressit spa/nin duplici sensu adhiberi ( de re cf. St. fr. 3, 91 rerum ipsarum sit, sit Man. est ( def. Küh. ) ut honorum, ut St. fr. 3, 379 pecuniae. ut pec. et pec. H 5.35. 'numquam enim cum eo conlocutus sum.—ain tu? an aliter an tu an aliter X sed prius an in ain corr. V 2 an tu aliter s ( ti/ de/; suggeno/menos a)\n gnoi/hs, a)/llws de\ an)to/qen on) gignw/sxeis xtl .;) cf. Att. 4,5,1. ain tu? aliter Or. id id om. G scire non potes?—nullo modo.—tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege rege nego V 1 magno potes dicere, beatusne sit? beatus nescit K 1 —an ego possim, cum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—ita prorsus existimo, bonos beatos, improbos miseros.—miser ergo Archelaus?—certe, si iniustus.' 5.36. videturne omnem hic beatam vitam in una virtute ponere? Quid vero? in Epitaphio Menex. 247 e quo modo idem? nam cui viro inquit ex se ex se s esse X (e se V) ipso apta sunt omnia, quae ad beate vivendum ferunt, nec suspensa aliorum aut bono casu aut contrario pendere ex alterius eventis et errare coguntur, huic optume vivendi ratio comparata est. hic est ille moderatus, hic fortis, hic sapiens, hic et nascentibus et cadentibus candentibus GR cum reliquis commodis, commodis cum modis K 1 tum maxime tumaxime GR liberis parebit et oboediet praecepto illi veteri: neque enim laetabitur umquam nec maerebit manebit GRV 1 nimis, quod quod qui V rec semper in se ipso ipso V c s ( dia\ to\ au(tw= pepoiqe/nai ) cf. Lael. 30 ipse X omnem spem reponet sui. ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto augustoque fonte nostra omnis manabit oratio. Unde igitur ordiri ordiri s V rec oriri X rectius possumus quam a communi parente natura? | |
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36. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 189| 2.119. elicerem Elicerem N 2 eligerem ABERN 1 exigerem V ( idem a poster. man. in marg. add. in N) ex te cogeremque, ut responderes, nisi vererer ne Herculem ipsum ea, quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset, voluptatis causa gessisse diceres. Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores. Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos. Recte, inquit, intellegis. Age sane, inquam. sed erat aequius Triarium aliquid de dissensione nostra iudicare. Eiuro, Eiuro Gz. Iuro (Itiro R) inquit adridens, iniquum, hac quidem de re; tu enim ista lenius, levius BENV levius an le- nius incert. in R hic Stoicorum more nos vexat. Tum Triarius: Posthac quidem, inquit, audacius. nam haec ipsa mihi erunt in promptu, quae modo audivi, nec ante aggrediar, quam te ab istis, quos dicis, instructum videro. Quae cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et disputandi. | 2.119. I would press my question and drag an answer from you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the arduous labours that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!" Here I concluded. "I am at no loss for authorities," said Torquatus, "to whom to refer your arguments. I might be able to do some execution myself, but I prefer to find better equipped champions." "No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned friends Siro and Philodemus." "You are right," he replied. "Very well then," said I; "but it would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some verdict on our dispute." "I formally object to him as prejudiced," he rejoined with a smile, "at all events on this issue. You have shown us some mercy, but Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic." "Oh," interposed Triarius, "I'll fight more boldly still next time, for I shall have the arguments I have just heard ready to my hand, though I won't attack you till I see you have been armed by the instructors whom you mention." And with these words we brought our promenade and our discussion to an end together. |
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37. Cicero, Republic, 3.8-3.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 223| 3.8. cati. Et Philus: Praeclaram vero causam ad me defertis, cum me improbitatis patrocinium suscipere voltis. Atqui id tibi, inquit Laelius, verendum est, si ea dixeris, quae contra iustitiam dici solent, ne sic etiam sentire videare, cum et ipse sis quasi unicum exemplum antiquae probitatis et fidei neque sit ignota consuetudo tua contrarias in partis disserendi, quod ita facillume verum inveniri putes. Et Philus: Heia vero, inquit, geram morem vobis et me oblinam sciens; quod quoniam, qui aurum quaerunt, non putant sibi recusandum, nos, cum iustitiam quaeramus, rem multo omni auro cariorem, nullam profecto molestiam fugere debemus. Atque utinam, quem ad modum oratione sum usurus aliena, sic mihi ore uti liceret alieno! Nunc ea dicenda sunt L. Furio Philo, quae Carneades, Graecus homo et consuetus, quod commodum esset, verbis 3.9. Non. 263M ut Carneadi respondeatis, qui saepe optimas causas ingenii calumnia ludificari solet. 3.11. Non. 373M Iustitia foras spectat et proiecta tota est atque eminet. Non. 299M Quae virtus praeter ceteras totam se ad alienas porrigit utilitatis atque explicat. | |
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| 38. Philodemus of Gadara, De Pietate \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 205 |
| 39. Philodemus of Gadara, De Musica \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 165 |
| 40. Varro, On The Latin Language, 6.56 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 79 |
41. Polybius, Histories, 4.20.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 110| 4.20.9. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς Φιλοξένου καὶ Τιμοθέου νόμους μανθάνοντες πολλῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ χορεύουσι κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν τοῖς Διονυσιακοῖς αὐληταῖς ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, οἱ μὲν παῖδες τοὺς παιδικοὺς ἀγῶνας, οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι τοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν λεγομένους. | |
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| 42. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 251 |
| 43. Cicero, Letters, 12.52.3, 13.38.1, 13.39.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 188, 189 |
44. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 35 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 147 | 35. for some bodies he has endowed with habit, others with nature, others with soul, and some with rational soul; for instance, he has bound stones and beams, which are torn from their kindred materials, with the most powerful bond of habit; and this habit is the inclination of the spirit to return to itself; for it begins at the middle and proceeds onwards towards the extremities, and then when it has touched the extreme boundary, it turns back again, until it has again arrived at the same place from which it originally started. |
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| 45. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.4 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 46. Philo of Alexandria, De Providentia, 1.84-1.86 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 263 |
| 47. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 149 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 225 |
48. Philo of Alexandria, On The Eternity of The World, 47, 77, 76 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 125 | 76. But some of those who used to hold a different opinion, being overpowered by truth, have changed their doctrine; for beauty has a power which is very attractive, and the truth is beyond all things beautiful, as falsehood on the contrary is enormously ugly; therefore Boethus, and Posidonius, and Panaetius, men of great learning in the Stoic doctrines, as if seized with a sudden inspiration, abandoning all the stories about conflagrations and regeneration, have come over to the more divine doctrine of the incorruptibility of the world; |
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| 49. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 18 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91 |
| 50. Epictetus, Discourses, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 169 |
| 51. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 7.165 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 263 |
| 52. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
53. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 1.10.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music affects character by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, not by imitation Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 91 | 1.10.32. We are told that Pythagoras on one occasion, when some young men were led astray by their passions to commit an outrage on a respectable family, calmed them by ordering the piper to change her strain to a spondaic measure, while Chrysippus selects a special tune to be used by nurses to entice their little charges to sleep. |
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| 54. Plutarch, Dinner of The Seven Wise Men, 5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, and the custom of singing homer and hesiod Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 188 |
55. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 1.10.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music affects character by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, not by imitation Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 91 | 1.10.32. We are told that Pythagoras on one occasion, when some young men were led astray by their passions to commit an outrage on a respectable family, calmed them by ordering the piper to change her strain to a spondaic measure, while Chrysippus selects a special tune to be used by nurses to entice their little charges to sleep. |
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| 56. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.3-2.2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •catharsis, diogenes of babylon Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 294 |
| 57. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 16.3, 22.4, 23.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, end or goal of life •end or goal of life (telos), diogenes of babylon Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170, 171 |
58. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 23.5, 117.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 228; Long (2006) 242; Sorabji (2000) 171| 117. ab inferis reversus, hic prosit mihi | |
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| 59. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 6.14, 7.4-7.12, 7.17-7.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Williams (2012) 277 |
| 60. Plutarch, Greek And Roman Parallel Stories, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 118 |
| 61. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 187, 188 |
| 62. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 228 |
| 63. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
64. New Testament, John, 3.17, 3.34, 4.34, 5.23-5.24, 5.30, 5.36-5.38, 6.29, 6.38-6.39, 6.44, 6.57, 7.16, 7.18, 7.28-7.29, 7.33, 8.16, 8.18, 8.26, 8.29, 8.42, 9.4, 10.36, 11.42, 12.44-12.45, 12.49, 13.20, 14.24, 15.21, 16.5, 17.3, 17.8, 17.18, 17.26, 17.29, 20.22 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 149| 3.17. οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἵνα κρίνῃ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλʼ ἵνα σωθῇ ὁ κόσμος διʼ αὐτοῦ. 3.34. ὃν γὰρ ἀπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ θεοῦ λαλεῖ, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μέτρου δίδωσιν τὸ πνεῦμα. 4.34. λέγει αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιήσω τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με καὶ τελειώσω αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔργον. 5.23. ἵνα πάντες τιμῶσι τὸν υἱὸν καθὼς τιμῶσι τὸν πατέρα. ὁ μὴ τιμῶν τὸν υἱὸν οὐ τιμᾷ τὸν πατέρα τὸν πέμψαντα αὐτόν. 5.24. Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ὁ τὸν λόγον μου ἀκούων καὶ πιστεύων τῷ πέμψαντί με ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν. 5.30. Οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ ποιεῖν ἀπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδέν· καθὼς ἀκούω κρίνω, καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἡ ἐμὴ δικαία ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐ ζητῶ τὸ θέλημα τὸ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με. 5.36. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔχω τὴν μαρτυρίαν μείζω τοῦ Ἰωάνου, τὰ γὰρ ἔργα ἃ δέδωκέν μοι ὁ πατὴρ ἵνα τελειώσω αὐτά, αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα ἃ ποιῶ, μαρτυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι ὁ πατήρ με ἀπέσταλκεν, 5.37. καὶ ὁ πέμψας με πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος μεμαρτύρηκεν περὶ ἐμοῦ. οὔτε φωνὴν αὐτοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε οὔτε εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἑωράκατε, 5.38. καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε ἐν ὑμῖν μένοντα, ὅτι ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ ὑμεῖς οὐ πιστεύετε. 6.29. ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς Τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος. 6.38. ὅτι καταβέβηκα ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐχ ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θέλημα τὸ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με· 6.39. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με ἵνα πᾶν ὃ δέδωκέν μοι μὴ ἀπολέσω ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸ τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. 6.44. οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν, κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. 6.57. καθὼς ἀπέστειλέν με ὁ ζῶν πατὴρ κἀγὼ ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὁ τρώγων με κἀκεῖνος ζήσει διʼ ἐμέ. 7.16. ἀπεκρίθη οὖν αὐτοῖς Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν Ἡ ἐμὴ διδαχὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὴ ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέμψαντός με· 7.18. ὁ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ λαλῶν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἰδίαν ζητεῖ· ὁ δὲ ζητῶν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν οὗτος ἀληθής ἐστιν καὶ ἀδικία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν. 7.28. Ἔκραξεν οὖν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ διδάσκων [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς καὶ λέγων Κἀμὲ οἴδατε καὶ οἴδατε πόθεν εἰμί· καὶ ἀπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθα, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς ὁ πέμψας με, ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε· 7.29. ἐγὼ οἶδα αὐτόν, ὅτι παρʼ αὐτοῦ εἰμὶ κἀκεῖνός με ἀπέστειλεν. 7.33. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ἔτι χρόνον μικρὸν μεθʼ ὑμῶν εἰμὶ καὶ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με. 8.16. καὶ ἐὰν κρίνω δὲ ἐγώ, ἡ κρίσις ἡ ἐμὴ ἀληθινή ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνος οὐκ εἰμί, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πέμψας με [πατήρ]. 8.18. ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ μαρτυρῶν περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ μαρτυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ. 8.26. πολλὰ ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν λαλεῖν καὶ κρίνειν· ἀλλʼ ὁ πέμψας με ἀληθής ἐστιν, κἀγὼ ἃ ἤκουσα παρʼ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα λαλῶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον. 8.29. καὶ ὁ πέμψας με μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἀφῆκέν με μόνον, ὅτι ἐγὼ τὰ ἀρεστὰ αὐτῷ ποιῶ πάντοτε. 8.42. εἶπεν αὐτοῖς [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς Εἰ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἦν ἠγαπᾶτε ἂν ἐμέ, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἥκω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐλήλυθα, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνός με ἀπέστειλεν. 9.4. ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με ἕως ἡμέρα ἐστίν· ἔρχεται νὺξ ὅτε οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐργάζεσθαι. 10.36. ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἡγίασεν καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι Βλασφημεῖς, ὅτι εἶπον Υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἰμί; 11.42. ἐγὼ δὲ ᾔδειν ὅτι πάντοτέ μου ἀκούεις· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὄχλον τὸν περιεστῶτα εἶπον ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας. 12.44. Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἔκραξεν καὶ εἶπεν Ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ πιστεύει εἰς ἐμὲ ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸν πέμψαντά με, 12.45. καὶ ὁ θεωρῶν ἐμὲ θεωρεῖ τὸν πέμψαντά με. 12.49. ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐλάλησα, ἀλλʼ ὁ πέμψας με πατὴρ αὐτός μοι ἐντολὴν δέδωκεν τί εἴπω καὶ τί λαλήσω. 13.20. ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ λαμβάνων ἄν τινα πέμψω ἐμὲ λαμβάνει, ὁ δὲ ἐμὲ λαμβάνων λαμβάνει τὸν πέμψαντά με. 14.24. ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν με τοὺς λόγους μου οὐ τηρεῖ· καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ἀκούετε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέμψαντός με πατρός. 15.21. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσουσιν εἰς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὸ ὄνομά μου, ὅτι οὐκ οἴδασιν τὸν πέμψαντά με. 16.5. νῦν δὲ ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν πέμψαντά με καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐρωτᾷ με Ποῦ ὑπάγεις; 17.3. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ ἵνα γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεὸν καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν. 17.8. ὅτι τὰ ῥήματα ἃ ἔδωκάς μοι δέδωκα αὐτοῖς, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔλαβον καὶ ἔγνωσαν ἀληθῶς ὅτι παρὰ σοῦ ἐξῆλθον, καὶ ἐπίστευσαν ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας. 17.18. καθὼς ἐμὲ ἀπέστειλας εἰς τὸν κόσμον, κἀγὼ ἀπέστειλα αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον· 17.26. καὶ ἐγνώρισα αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄνομά σου καὶ γνωρίσω, ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ἣν ἠγάπησάς με ἐν αὐτοῖς ᾖ κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς. 20.22. καὶ τοῦτο εἰπὼν ἐνεφύσησεν καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς Λάβετε πνεῦμα ἅγιον· | 3.17. For God didn't send his Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world should be saved through him. 3.34. For he whom God has sent speaks the words of God; for God gives the Spirit without measure. 4.34. Jesus said to them, "My food is to do the will of him who sent me, and to accomplish his work. 5.23. that all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He who doesn't honor the Son doesn't honor the Father who sent him. 5.24. "Most assuredly I tell you, he who hears my word, and believes him who sent me, has eternal life, and doesn't come into judgment, but has passed out of death into life. 5.30. I can of myself do nothing. As I hear, I judge, and my judgment is righteous; because I don't seek my own will, but the will of my Father who sent me. 5.36. But the testimony which I have is greater than that of John, for the works which the Father gave me to accomplish, the very works that I do, testify about me, that the Father has sent me. 5.37. The Father himself, who sent me, has testified about me. You have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his form. 5.38. You don't have his word living in you; because you don't believe him whom he sent. 6.29. Jesus answered them, "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent." 6.38. For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me. 6.39. This is the will of my Father who sent me, that of all he has given to me I should lose nothing, but should raise him up at the last day. 6.44. No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up in the last day. 6.57. As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father; so he who feeds on me, he will also live because of me. 7.16. Jesus therefore answered them, "My teaching is not mine, but his who sent me. 7.18. He who speaks from himself seeks his own glory, but he who seeks the glory of him who sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him. 7.28. Jesus therefore cried out in the temple, teaching and saying, "You both know me, and know where I am from. I have not come of myself, but he who sent me is true, whom you don't know. 7.29. I know him, because I am from him, and he sent me." 7.33. Then Jesus said, "I will be with you a little while longer, then I go to him who sent me. 8.16. Even if I do judge, my judgment is true, for I am not alone, but I am with the Father who sent me. 8.18. I am one who testifies about myself, and the Father who sent me testifies about me." 8.26. I have many things to speak and to judge concerning you. However he who sent me is true; and the things which I heard from him, these I say to the world." 8.29. He who sent me is with me. The Father hasn't left me alone, for I always do the things that are pleasing to him." 8.42. Therefore Jesus said to them, "If God were your Father, you would love me, for I came out and have come from God. For I haven't come of myself, but he sent me. 9.4. I must work the works of him who sent me, while it is day. The night is coming, when no one can work. 10.36. Do you say of him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, 'You blaspheme,' because I said, 'I am the Son of God?' 11.42. I know that you always listen to me, but because of the multitude that stands around I said this, that they may believe that you sent me." 12.44. Jesus cried out and said, "Whoever believes in me, believes not in me, but in him who sent me. 12.45. He who sees me sees him who sent me. 12.49. For I spoke not from myself, but the Father who sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak. 13.20. Most assuredly I tell you, he who receives whomever I send, receives me; and he who receives me, receives him who sent me." 14.24. He who doesn't love me doesn't keep my words. The word which you hear isn't mine, but the Father's who sent me. 15.21. But all these things will they do to you for my name's sake, because they don't know him who sent me. 16.5. But now I am going to him who sent me, and none of you asks me, 'Where are you going?' 17.3. This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true God, and him whom you sent, Jesus Christ. 17.8. for the words which you have given me I have given to them, and they received them, and knew for sure that I came forth from you, and they have believed that you sent me. 17.18. As you sent me into the world, even so I have sent them into the world. 17.26. I made known to them your name, and will make it known; that the love with which you loved me may be in them, and I in them." 20.22. When he had said this, he breathed on them, and said to them, "Receive the Holy Spirit! |
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| 65. Plutarch, On The Principle of Cold, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Vazques and Ross (2022) 203 |
| 66. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 72 |
| 67. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
68. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 4.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 263 | 4.5. In this way, the art practised by the Chaldeans will be shown to be unstable. Should any one, however, allege that, by questions put to him who inquires from the Chaldeans, the birth can be ascertained, not even by this plan is it possible to arrive at the precise period. For if, supposing any such attention on their part in reference to their art to be on record, even these do not attain - as we have proved- unto accuracy either, how, we ask, can an unsophisticated individual comprehend precisely the time of parturition, in order that the Chaldean acquiring the requisite information from this person may set the horoscope correctly? But neither from the appearance of the horizon will the rising star seem the same everywhere; but in one place its declination will be supposed to be the horoscope, and in another the ascension (will be thought) the horoscope, according as the places come into view, being either lower or higher. Wherefore, also, from this quarter an accurate prediction will not appear, since many may be born throughout the entire world at the same hour, each from a different direction observing the stars. But the supposed comprehension (of the period of parturition) by means of clepsydras is likewise futile. For the contents of the jar will not flow out in the same time when it is full as when it is half empty; yet, according to their own account, the pole itself by a single impulse is whiffed along at an equable velocity. If, however, evading the argument, they should affirm that they do not take the time precisely, but as it happens in any particular latitude, they will be refuted almost by the sidereal influences themselves. For those who have been born at the same time do not spend the same life, but some, for example, have been made kings, and others have grown old in fetters. There has been born none equal, at all events to Alexander the Macedonian, though many were brought forth along with him throughout the earth; (and) none equal to the philosopher Plato. Wherefore the Chaldean, examining the time of the birth in any particular latitude, will not be able to say accurately, whether a person born at this time will be prosperous. Many, I take it, born at this time, have been unfortunate, so that the similarity according to dispositions is futile. Having, then, by different reasons and various methods, refuted the ineffectual mode of examination adopted by the Chaldeans, neither shall we omit this, namely, to show that their predictions will eventuate in inexplicable difficulties. For if, as the mathematicians assert, it is necessary that one born under the barb of Sagittarius' arrow should meet with a violent death, how was it that so many myriads of the Barbarians that fought with the Greeks at Marathon or Salamis were simultaneously slaughtered? For unquestionably there was not the same horoscope in the case, at all events, of them all. And again, it is said that one born under the urn of Aquarius will suffer shipwreck: (yet) how is it that so many of the Greeks that returned from Troy were overwhelmed in the deep around the indented shores of Euboea? For it is incredible that all, distant from one another by a long interval of duration, should have been born under the urn of Aquarius. For it is not reasonable to say, that frequently, for one whose fate it was to be destroyed in the sea, all who were with him in the same vessel should perish. For why should the doom of this man subdue the (destinies) of all? Nay, but why, on account of one for whom it was allotted to die on land, should not all be preserved? |
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| 69. Hierocles Stoicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.33 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 147 |
| 70. Hierocles Stoicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.33 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 147 |
| 71. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 94.7-100.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 100 |
| 72. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 |
| 73. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 3.216, 10.224 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 74. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 251 |
| 75. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 191 |
| 76. Galen, On The Differences of The Pulses, 3.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 79 |
| 77. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91 |
| 78. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.9.4-19.9.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123 |
| 79. Polyaenus, Stratagems, 5.3.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 110 |
| 80. Aelius Aristides, Sacred Tales, 1.7.17, 1.7.33, 4.5.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41, 49 |
| 81. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 251 |
| 82. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.234, 9.71-9.72, 9.110 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 83. Tertullian, On The Soul, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41 |
84. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.72, 4.48, 6.62 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; James (2021) 78 | 2.72. After the above statements, he continues: If he wished to remain hid, why was there heard a voice from heaven proclaiming him to be the Son of God? And if he did not seek to remain concealed, why was he punished? Or why did he die? Now, by such questions he thinks to convict the histories of discrepancy, not observing that Jesus neither desired all things regarding Himself to be known to all whom He happened to meet, nor yet all things to be unknown. Accordingly, the voice from heaven which proclaimed Him to be the Son of God, in the words, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased, is not stated to have been audible to the multitudes, as this Jew of Celsus supposed. The voice from the cloud on the high mountain, moreover, was heard only by those who had gone up with Him. For the divine voice is of such a nature, as to be heard only by those whom the speaker wishes to hear it. And I maintain, that the voice of God which is referred to, is neither air which has been struck, nor any concussion of the air, nor anything else which is mentioned in treatises on the voice; and therefore it is heard by a better and more divine organ of hearing than that of sense. And when the speaker will not have his voice to be heard by all, he that has the finer ear hears the voice of God, while he who has the ears of his soul deadened does not perceive that it is God who speaks. These things I have mentioned because of his asking, Why was there heard a voice from heaven proclaiming him to be the Son of God? while with respect to the query, Why was he punished, if he wished to remain hid? what has been stated at greater length in the preceding pages on the subject of His suffering may suffice. 4.48. In the next place, as if he had devoted himself solely to the manifestation of his hatred and dislike of the Jewish and Christian doctrine, he says: The more modest of Jewish and Christian writers give all these things an allegorical meaning; and, Because they are ashamed of these things, they take refuge in allegory. Now one might say to him, that if we must admit fables and fictions, whether written with a concealed meaning or with any other object, to be shameful narratives when taken in their literal acceptation, of what histories can this be said more truly than of the Grecian? In these histories, gods who are sons castrate the gods who are their fathers, and gods who are parents devour their own children, and a goddess-mother gives to the father of gods and men a stone to swallow instead of his own son, and a father has intercourse with his daughter, and a wife binds her own husband, having as her allies in the work the brother of the fettered god and his own daughter! But why should I enumerate these absurd stories of the Greeks regarding their gods, which are most shameful in themselves, even though invested with an allegorical meaning? (Take the instance) where Chrysippus of Soli, who is considered to be an ornament of the Stoic sect, on account of his numerous and learned treatises, explains a picture at Samos, in which Juno was represented as committing unspeakable abominations with Jupiter. This reverend philosopher says in his treatises, that matter receives the spermatic words of the god, and retains them within herself, in order to ornament the universe. For in the picture at Samos Juno represents matter, and Jupiter god. Now it is on account of these, and of countless other similar fables, that we would not even in word call the God of all things Jupiter, or the sun Apollo, or the moon Diana. But we offer to the Creator a worship which is pure, and speak with religious respect of His noble works of creation, not contaminating even in word the things of God; approving of the language of Plato in the Philebus, who would not admit that pleasure was a goddess, so great is my reverence, Protarchus, he says, for the very names of the gods. We verily entertain such reverence for the name of God, and for His noble works of creation, that we would not, even under pretext of an allegorical meaning, admit any fable which might do injury to the young. 6.62. Celsus, again, having perhaps misunderstood the words, For the mouth of the Lord has spoken it, or perhaps because some ignorant individuals had rashly ventured upon the explanation of such things, and not understanding, moreover, on what principles parts called after the names of the bodily members are assigned to the attributes of God, asserts: He has neither mouth nor voice. Truly, indeed, God can have no voice, if the voice is a concussion of the air, or a stroke on the air, or a species of air, or any other definition which may be given to the voice by those who are skilled in such matters; but what is called the voice of God is said to be seen as God's voice by the people in the passage, And all the people saw the voice of God; the word saw being taken, agreeably to the custom of Scripture, in a spiritual sense. Moreover, he alleges that God possesses nothing else of which we have any knowledge; but of what things we have knowledge he gives no indication. If he means limbs, we agree with him, understanding the things of which we have knowledge to be those called corporeal, and pretty generally so termed. But if we are to understand the words of which we have knowledge in a universal sense, then there are many things of which we have knowledge, (and which may be attributed to God); for He possesses virtue, and blessedness, and divinity. If we, however, put a higher meaning upon the words, of which we have knowledge, since all that we know is less than God, there is no absurdity in our also admitting that God possesses none of those things of which we have knowledge. For the attributes which belong to God are far superior to all things with which not merely the nature of man is acquainted, but even that of those who have risen far above it. And if he had read the writings of the prophets, David on the one hand saying, But You are the same, and Malachi on the other, I am (the Lord), and change not, he would have observed that none of us assert that there is any change in God, either in act or thought. For abiding the same, He administers mutable things according to their nature, and His word elects to undertake their administration. |
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85. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 251 | 5.32. In the sphere of natural science he surpassed all other philosophers in the investigation of causes, so that even the most insignificant phenomena were explained by him. Hence the unusual number of scientific notebooks which he compiled. Like Plato he held that God was incorporeal; that his providence extended to the heavenly bodies, that he is unmoved, and that earthly events are regulated by their affinity with them (the heavenly bodies). Besides the four elements he held that there is a fifth, of which the celestial bodies are composed. Its motion is of a different kind from that of the other elements, being circular. Further, he maintained the soul to be incorporeal, defining it as the first entelechy [i.e. realization] of a natural organic body potentially possessed of life. |
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| 86. Origen, On Prayer, 26.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 51 |
| 87. Origen, Homilies On Numbers, 2.2.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 51 |
| 88. Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 220 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41 |
89. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 3.26.1 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 149 | 3.26.1. Meder, who succeeded Simon Magus, showed himself in his conduct another instrument of diabolical power, not inferior to the former. He also was a Samaritan and carried his sorceries to no less an extent than his teacher had done, and at the same time reveled in still more marvelous tales than he. |
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| 90. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.26-14.18.28, 15.14.2, 15.20.2, 15.20.6, 15.21.3 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 149; Long (2006) 72 |
| 91. Origen, Commentary On John, 20.3.16, 20.29.267 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 52 |
| 92. Origen, Selecta In Genesim (Fragmenta E Catenis), 17.5 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 51 |
| 93. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 84 |
| 94. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 7.432-7.435, 9.133-9.136 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, reinterpretation of zenos argument for the existence of the gods •wisdom (sophia), reinterpreted by diogenes of babylon Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 100, 101, 102 |
95. Augustine, The City of God, 5.1-5.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 249, 263 | 5.1. The cause, then, of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judgment or opinion of those who call those things fortuitous which either have no causes, or such causes as do not proceed from some intelligible order, and those things fatal which happen independently of the will of God and man, by the necessity of a certain order. In a word, human kingdoms are established by divine providence. And if any one attributes their existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God itself by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his language. For why does he not say at first what he will say afterwards, when some one shall put the question to him, What he means by fate? For when men hear that word, according to the ordinary use of the language, they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular position of the stars which may exist at the time when any one is born or conceived, which some separate altogether from the will of God, while others affirm that this also is dependent on that will. But those who are of opinion that, apart from the will of God, the stars determine what we shall do, or what good things we shall possess, or what evils we shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not only by those who hold the true religion, but by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does this opinion really amount to but this, that no god whatever is to be worshipped or prayed to? Against these, however, our present disputation is not intended to be directed, but against those who, in defense of those whom they think to be gods, oppose the Christian religion. They, however, who make the position of the stars depend on the divine will, and in a manner decree what character each man shall have, and what good or evil shall happen to him, if they think that these same stars have that power conferred upon them by the supreme power of God, in order that they may determine these things according to their will, do a great injury to the celestial sphere, in whose most brilliant senate, and most splendid senate-house, as it were, they suppose that wicked deeds are decreed to be done - such deeds as that, if any terrestrial state should decree them, it would be condemned to overthrow by the decree of the whole human race. What judgment, then, is left to God concerning the deeds of men, who is Lord both of the stars and of men, when to these deeds a celestial necessity is attributed? Or, if they do not say that the stars, though they have indeed received a certain power from God, who is supreme, determine those things according to their own discretion, but simply that His commands are fulfilled by them instrumentally in the application and enforcing of such necessities, are we thus to think concerning God even what it seemed unworthy that we should think concerning the will of the stars? But, if the stars are said rather to signify these things than to effect them, so that that position of the stars is, as it were, a kind of speech predicting, not causing future things - for this has been the opinion of men of no ordinary learning - certainly the mathematicians are not wont so to speak saying, for example, Mars in such or such a position signifies a homicide, but makes a homicide. But, nevertheless, though we grant that they do not speak as they ought, and that we ought to accept as the proper form of speech that employed by the philosophers in predicting those things which they think they discover in the position of the stars, how comes it that they have never been able to assign any cause why, in the life of twins, in their actions, in the events which befall them, in their professions, arts, honors, and other things pertaining to human life, also in their very death, there is often so great a difference, that, as far as these things are concerned, many entire strangers are more like them than they are like each other, though separated at birth by the smallest interval of time, but at conception generated by the same act of copulation, and at the same moment? 5.2. Cicero says that the famous physician Hippocrates has left in writing that he had suspected that a certain pair of brothers were twins, from the fact that they both took ill at once, and their disease advanced to its crisis and subsided in the same time in each of them. Posidonius the Stoic, who was much given to astrology, used to explain the fact by supposing that they had been born and conceived under the same constellation. In this question the conjecture of the physician is by far more worthy to be accepted, and approaches much nearer to credibility, since, according as the parents were affected in body at the time of copulation, so might the first elements of the fœtuses have been affected, so that all that was necessary for their growth and development up till birth having been supplied from the body of the same mother, they might be born with like constitutions. Thereafter, nourished in the same house, on the same kinds of food, where they would have also the same kinds of air, the same locality, the same quality of water - which, according to the testimony of medical science, have a very great influence, good or bad, on the condition of bodily health - and where they would also be accustomed to the same kinds of exercise, they would have bodily constitutions so similar that they would be similarly affected with sickness at the same time and by the same causes. But, to wish to adduce that particular position of the stars which existed at the time when they were born or conceived as the cause of their being simultaneously affected with sickness, manifests the greatest arrogance, when so many beings of most diverse kinds, in the most diverse conditions, and subject to the most diverse events, may have been conceived and born at the same time, and in the same district, lying under the same sky. But we know that twins do not only act differently, and travel to very different places, but that they also suffer from different kinds of sickness; for which Hippocrates would give what is in my opinion the simplest reason, namely, that, through diversity of food and exercise, which arises not from the constitution of the body, but from the inclination of the mind, they may have come to be different from each other in respect of health. Moreover, Posidonius, or any other asserter of the fatal influence of the stars, will have enough to do to find anything to say to this, if he be unwilling to im pose upon the minds of the uninstructed in things of which they are ignorant. But, as to what they attempt to make out from that very small interval of time elapsing between the births of twins, on account of that point in the heavens where the mark of the natal hour is placed, and which they call the horoscope, it is either disproportionately small to the diversity which is found in the dispositions, actions, habits, and fortunes of twins, or it is disproportionately great when compared with the estate of twins, whether low or high, which is the same for both of them, the cause for whose greatest difference they place, in every case, in the hour on which one is born; and, for this reason, if the one is born so immediately after the other that there is no change in the horoscope, I demand an entire similarity in all that respects them both, which can never be found in the case of any twins. But if the slowness of the birth of the second give time for a change in the horoscope, I demand different parents, which twins can never have. |
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| 96. Augustine, Against Julian, 5.5.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music affects character by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, not by imitation Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 84, 91 |
| 97. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 84 |
| 98. Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria, 16.23-16.27 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: James (2021) 52 |
| 99. Boethius, De Institutione Musica, 184.10-185.11, 185.23-186.1 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 91 |
| 100. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 168 |
| 101. Ammonius Hermiae, In Porphyrii Isagogen Sive V Voces, 13.25 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music affects character by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, not by imitation Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 91 |
| 102. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 165 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 117 |
| 103. David, Prolegomena Philosophiae, 31.8-31.25 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music affects character by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, not by imitation Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 91 |
| 104. Fds, Fds, 40 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, reinterpretation of zenos argument for the existence of the gods Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 100 |
| 105. Epigraphy, Syll. , 15, 577-578, 960, 959 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 110 |
| 106. Epigraphy, Cig, 3088, 2214 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 110 |
| 107. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 123 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 114 |
| 108. Damon Atheniensis V5. Jh., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, music arouses emotion by kinship •diogenes of babylon, stoic, scientific perception for perceiving harmony vs. irrational perception for perceiving pitch Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 90 |
| 109. Cicero, Posterior Academics, 1.38 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 228 |
| 110. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, None Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 111. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 73 |
| 112. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 228 |
| 113. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 3 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 118 |
| 114. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 249 |
115. Strabo, Geography, 1.1.8-1.1.9, 3.1.5 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 153 | 1.1.8. Perception and experience alike inform us, that the earth we inhabit is an island: since wherever men have approached the termination of the land, the sea, which we designate ocean, has been met with: and reason assures us of the similarity of those places which our senses have not been permitted to survey. For in the east the land occupied by the Indians, and in the west by the Iberians and Maurusians, is wholly encompassed [by water], and so is the greater part on the south and north. And as to what remains as yet unexplored by us, because navigators, sailing from opposite points, have not hitherto fallen in with each other, it is not much, as any one may see who will compare the distances between those places with which we are already acquainted. Nor is it likely that the Atlantic Ocean is divided into two seas by narrow isthmuses so placed as to prevent circumnavigation: how much more probable that it is confluent and uninterrupted! Those who have returned from an attempt to circumnavigate the earth, do not say they have been prevented from continuing their voyage by any opposing continent, for the sea remained perfectly open, but through want of resolution, and the scarcity of provision. This theory too accords better with the ebb and flow of the ocean, for the phenomenon, both in the increase and diminution, is everywhere identical, or at all events has but little difference, as if produced by the agitation of one sea, and resulting from one cause. 1.1.9. We must not credit Hipparchus, who combats this opinion, denying that the ocean is every where similarly affected; or that even if it were, it would not follow that the Atlantic flowed in a circle, and thus continually returned into itself. Seleucus, the Babylonian, is his authority for this assertion. For a further investigation of the ocean and its tides we refer to Posidonius and Athenodorus, who have fully discussed this subject: we will now only remark that this view agrees better with the uniformity of the phenomenon; and that the greater the amount of moisture surrounding the earth, the easier would the heavenly bodies be supplied with vapours from thence. 3.1.5. It is quite possible that these things are so, and we ought not to disbelieve them. Not so however with regard to the other common and vulgar reports; for Posidonius tells us the common people say that in the countries next the ocean the sun appears larger as he sets, and makes a noise resembling the sound of hot metal in cold water, as though the sea were hissing as the sun was submerged in its depths. The statement [of Artemidorus] is also false, that night follows immediately on the setting of the sun: it does not follow immediately, although certainly the interval is short, as in other great seas. For when he sets behind mountains the agency of the false light continues the day for a long period; over the sea the twilight is shorter, still darkness does not immediately supervene. The same thing may be remarked in large plains. The image of the sun is enlarged on the seas at its rising as well as at its setting, because at these times a larger mass of exhalations rises from the humid element; and the eye looking through these exhalations, sees images refracted into larger forms, as observed through tubes. The same thing happens when the setting sun or moon is seen through a dry and thin cloud, when those bodies likewise appear reddish. Posidonius tells us that, having himself passed thirty days at Gades, during which time he carefully observed the setting of the sun, he is convinced of the falsity of Artemidorus's account. This latter writer tells us, that at the time of its setting the sun appears a hundred times larger than its ordinary size, and that night immediately succeeds. If we attend to his account, we cannot believe that he himself remarked this phenomenon at the Sacred Promontory, for he tells us that no one can approach during the night; therefore they cannot approach at sunset, since night immediately supervenes thereupon. Neither did he observe it from any other part of the coast washed by the ocean, for Gades is upon the ocean, and both Posidonius and many others testify that there such is not the case. |
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| 116. Demetrius of Laconia, Pherc., 42.9-42.10 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 100 |
| 118. Rufus of Ephesus, Scholia In Hom. Iliad, 2.857 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 149 |
| 120. Epigraphy, Ig Ii², 7.2712 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, and the custom of singing homer and hesiod •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123, 133, 187, 188 |
| 121. Achilles Tatius, Leuc. Et Clit., 2.1.1 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, and the custom of singing homer and hesiod Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 188 |
| 122. Plutarch, Qc, 5.5.2, 9.14.1, 14.1 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, purpose of symposion •diogenes of babylon, and the custom of singing homer and hesiod Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 188, 355 |
| 123. Ps.-Plutarch, Mus., 3 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, and the custom of singing homer and hesiod •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123, 133 |
| 124. Philodemus, Mus., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 92, 111, 123 |
| 125. Epicrates, Antilais, None Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, on poets that should not be taught in school Found in books: Cosgrove (2022) 123 |
| 126. Plutarch, Sr, None Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Vazques and Ross (2022) 203 |
| 127. Plutarch, On Virtue of Character, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 169 |
| 128. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 2.67, 2.70 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 129. Galen, Medical Introduction, 14.726 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 133. Hierocles Historicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.33 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 147 |
| 134. Heraclitus Lesbius, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 41 |
| 135. Posidonius, Testimonia And Fragments, 287 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon Found in books: Long (2006) 73 |
| 137. Anon., Corpus Hermeticum, 4.11 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of seleucia (also, of babylon) Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 149 |
