1. Hebrew Bible, Job, 5.13 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 489, 490; Osborne (2010) 62
5.13. לֹכֵד חֲכָמִים בְּעָרְמָם וַעֲצַת נִפְתָּלִים נִמְהָרָה׃''. None | 5.13. He taketh the wise in their own craftiness; And the counsel of the wily is carried headlong.''. None |
|
2. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 1.18 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 153, 161
1.18. לְכוּ־נָא וְנִוָּכְחָה יֹאמַר יְהוָה אִם־יִהְיוּ חֲטָאֵיכֶם כַּשָּׁנִים כַּשֶּׁלֶג יַלְבִּינוּ אִם־יַאְדִּימוּ כַתּוֹלָע כַּצֶּמֶר יִהְיוּ׃''. None | 1.18. Come now, and let us reason together, Saith the LORD; Though your sins be as scarlet, They shall be as white as snow; Though they be red like crimson, They shall be as wool.''. None |
|
3. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Parmenides, Doxa, Doxa as dialectical • determinism,dialectic
Found in books: Long (2006) 77; Tor (2017) 164
|
4. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic
Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 121; Wardy and Warren (2018) 41
| 21b. But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him. And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom,''. None |
|
5. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 282; Osborne (2010) 63
465c. ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δʼ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι''. None | 465c. as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them. For indeed, if the soul were not in command of the body, but the latter had charge of itself, and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed''. None |
|
6. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic
Found in books: Horkey (2019) 28; Wardy and Warren (2018) 67, 69
96a. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη: ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις''. None | 96a. Phaedo. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty. Certainly, said Cebes, I wish to hear your experiences. Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists;''. None |
|
7. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on logic/dialectic • Dialectic • analysis (ἀνάλυσις) in dialectic/logic • demonstration (apodeixis, ἀπόδειξις) as dialectical/mathematical method • dialectic • epistemology and logic/language/dialectic • mathematics/mathematical and dialectic • methods of dialectic • two kinds of dialectic
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 173; Lloyd (1989) 138; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 186
16c. ΣΩ. ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω. ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν'26e. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον· κοινὴ δʼ ἡ σκέψις. ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι. ΠΡΩ. ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν; ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς. '. None | 16c. Soc. One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean. Pro. Go on what is it? Soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This being the way in which these things are arranged,'26e. Soc. But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause. Pro. Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause? Soc. Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one? Pro. Yes. '. None |
|
8. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • demonstration (apodeixis, ἀπόδειξις) as dialectical/mathematical method • dialectic • dialectic, and context • dialectic, and mathematics • dialectics
Found in books: Bartels (2017) 15; Broadie (2021) 17, 47, 69, 70, 83, 224; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 363, 364; Osborne (2010) 169; Schibli (2002) 317; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 162
| 510b. of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don’t fully understand what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again,' '. None |
|
9. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic • dialectic/dialogue
Found in books: Kirichenko (2022) 125; Wardy and Warren (2018) 44
|
10. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic • dialect
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 124; Kanellakis (2020) 94
|
11. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic • dialectic, and hypotheses • dialectic, and mathematics
Found in books: Broadie (2021) 26; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 79
|
12. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic • dialectic, and practicality
Found in books: Broadie (2021) 158; King (2006) 116
|
13. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • determinism,dialectic • dialectic
Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 393; Long (2006) 303
|
14. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • determinism,dialectic • dialectic, and the Stoics
Found in books: James (2021) 32; Long (2006) 286
| 3.3. \xa0In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a\xa0reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I\xa0believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. <''. None |
|
15. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • determinism,dialectic • dialectic, and the Stoics
Found in books: James (2021) 32; Long (2006) 286
3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur.''. None | 3.3. \xa0In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a\xa0reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I\xa0believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. <''. None |
|
16. Cicero, On Duties, 1.37.134-1.37.135 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 153
| 1.37.134. \xa0There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the youth has been discharged by the consul, when he was serving in Macedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe. This also I\xa0observe â\x80\x94 that he who would properly have been called "a\xa0fighting enemy" (perduellis) was called "a\xa0guest" (hostis), thus relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for "enemy" (hostis) meant to our ancestors what we now call "stranger" (peregrinus). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: "Or a\xa0day fixed for trial with a stranger" (hostis). And again: "Right of ownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger" (hostis). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of "stranger" and has taken on the technical connotation of "an enemy under arms." < 1.37.135. \xa0There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the youth has been discharged by the consul, when he was serving in Macedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe. This also I\xa0observe â\x80\x94 that he who would properly have been called "a\xa0fighting enemy" (perduellis) was called "a\xa0guest" (hostis), thus relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for "enemy" (hostis) meant to our ancestors what we now call "stranger" (peregrinus). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: "Or a\xa0day fixed for trial with a stranger" (hostis). And again: "Right of ownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger" (hostis). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of "stranger" and has taken on the technical connotation of "an enemy under arms." <''. None |
|
17. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • determinism,dialectic • dialectic • dialectic,
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 112; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 141; Long (2006) 102, 108, 110, 112, 293; Wardy and Warren (2018) 274
|
18. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 154
|
19. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Burton (2009) 78; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 155
|
20. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • determinism,dialectic • dialectic • dialectic, • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 33; Burton (2009) 78; Long (2006) 65, 286, 303; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 155
|
21. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 14, 16 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 284; Geljon and Runia (2019) 233; Osborne (2010) 205
| 14. At all events, men say, that the ancients compared the principles of philosophy, as being threefold, to a field; likening natural philosophy to trees and plants, and moral philosophy to fruits, for the sake of which the plants are planted; and logical philosophy to the hedge or fence: '
16. for when it simplifies twofold and ambiguous expressions, and when it solves specious plausibilities entangled in sophisms, and utterly destroys seductive deceits, the greatest allurement and ruin to the soul, by means of its own expressive and clear language, and its unambiguous demonstrations, it makes the whole mind smooth like wax, and ready to receive all the innocent and very praiseworthy impressions of sound natural and moral philosophy. IV. '. None |
|
22. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 18 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic
Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 106, 108; Geljon and Runia (2019) 233
| 18. And dialectic science, which is the sister, the twin sister of rhetoric, as some persons have called it, separating true from false arguments, and refuting the plausibilities of sophistical arguments, will cure the great disease of the soul, deceit. It is profitable, therefore, to aide among these and other sciences resembling them, and to devote one's especial attention to them. For perhaps, I say, as has happened to many, we shall become known to the queenly virtues by means of their subjects and handmaidens. "". None |
|
23. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77, 78; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 154, 155
|
24. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 3.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 489, 490; Osborne (2010) 62, 172
3.19. ἡ γὰρ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστίν· γέγραπται γάρὉ δρασσόμενος τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτῶν·''. None | 3.19. Forthe wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written,"He has taken the wise in their craftiness."''. None |
|
25. New Testament, Acts, 17.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectics • dialectic
Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2019) 233; Rohmann (2016) 170
17.23. διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩ ΘΕΩ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν.''. None | 17.23. For as I passed along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: 'TO AN UNKNOWN GOD.' What therefore you worship in ignorance, this I announce to you. "". None |
|
26. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 9.2.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 153
| 9.2.31. \xa0Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term impersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some translate by the Latin sermocinatio.''. None |
|
27. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 9.2.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 77; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 153
| 9.2.31. \xa0Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term impersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some translate by the Latin sermocinatio.''. None |
|
28. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic
Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 850; Wardy and Warren (2018) 269
|
29. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic • dialectics
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 405; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 207; Černušková (2016) 144
|
30. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic • Dialectic, subordination to hermeneutics • dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 296; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 550; Malherbe et al (2014) 816; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 81, 98
|
31. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic • Dialectic, perversion of dialectic by heretics • Dialectic, positive assessment and use of • dialectic • dialectics
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 282, 286, 290, 294, 303, 391, 408; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 559; Osborne (2010) 63, 71, 72, 73, 123, 169, 204, 205, 224; Černušková (2016) 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
|
32. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.60, 3.66, 7.2, 7.4-7.6, 7.16, 7.24-7.25, 7.32-7.33, 7.40-7.49, 7.55-7.57, 7.62-7.63, 7.65-7.69, 7.71-7.75, 7.78-7.79, 7.82-7.83 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic • determinism,dialectic • dialectic • dialectic, Stoic • dialectic, and the Stoics • dialectic, corresponding with knowledge • dialectic, definition of • dialectic, part of logic • dialectic, studied by Zeno and Diodorus Cronus • dialectic, theory of knowledge as part of • dialectical arguments, the elusive argument • logic, dialectic and rhetoric as parts of
Found in books: Bartels (2017) 12; Brouwer (2013) 22, 82, 141; Geljon and Runia (2013) 108, 228, 229; Geljon and Runia (2019) 233; Horkey (2019) 37; James (2021) 32, 33, 34, 70, 77, 78, 80; Jedan (2009) 85, 86, 87, 88, 89; Long (2006) 105, 237, 238, 239, 241, 246, 247, 249; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 46, 98, 100; Wardy and Warren (2018) 246, 251, 257
| 3.60. The seventh tetralogy contains, first, two dialogues entitled Hippias, the former On Beauty, the latter On Falsehood, both refutative; next Ion or On the Iliad, which is tentative, and Menexenus or The Funeral Oration, which is ethical. The eighth tetralogy starts with Clitophon or Introduction, which is ethical, and is followed by the Republic or On Justice, political, Timaeus or On Nature, a physical treatise, and Critias or Story of Atlantis, which is ethical. The ninth tetralogy starts with Minos or On Law, a political dialogue, which is followed by the Laws or On Legislation, also political, Epinomis or Nocturnal Council, or Philosopher, political,' "
3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them." "
7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty." "
7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates." '7.5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the Stoa Poikile, which is also called the stoa or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy, the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous. 7.6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city, and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms:' "
7.16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countece. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off." '
7.24. One day at a banquet he was reclining in silence and was asked the reason: whereupon he bade his critic carry word to the king that there was one present who knew how to hold his tongue. Now those who inquired of him were ambassadors from King Ptolemy, and they wanted to know what message they should take back from him to the king. On being asked how he felt about abuse, he replied, As an envoy feels who is dismissed without an answer. Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said, The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo.' "
7.25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up. A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as The Reaper, and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod's lines thus:He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself." '
7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered.
7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.
7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.
7.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric.
7.43. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language;
7.44. these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers.The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style.
7.45. The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things.An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended.A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.' "
7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions." '
7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers.
7.48. Overhastiness in assertion affects the actual course of events, so that, unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness; and in no other way will the wise man approve himself acute, nimblewitted, and generally skilful in argument; for it belongs to the same person to converse well and to argue well, to put questions to the purpose and to respond to the questions put; and all these qualifications are qualifications belonging to the skilled dialectician.Such is, summarily stated, the substance of their logical teaching. And in order to give it also in detail, let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers. These are his words:
7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.' "
7.55. In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice. While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man's voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice, Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics." '7.56. For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as day; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. It is day. Dialect (διάλεκτος) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality; e.g. in Attic the word for sea is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic day is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη.Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. Letter, however, has three meanings: (1) the particular sound or element of speech; (2) its written symbol or character; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A. 7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse.
7.62. Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, of goods some are mental, others bodily.Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that A house has three times fallen, in the other that a dancing-girl has fallen.Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.' "
7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false." '7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place.' "7.67. An imperative is something which conveys a command: e.g.Go thou to the waters of Inachus.An adjurative utterance is something ... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one; for instance:Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men.A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon!How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is!" '7.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as It is day. Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions. 7.69. They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is day, or of more than one proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is light.With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is It is not day. of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. It is not not-day. Now this presupposes that it is day.
7.71. of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction If. Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, If it is day, it is light. An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction Since and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, Since it is day-time, it is light. This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact. 7.72. A coupled proposition is one which is put together by certain coupling conjunctions, e.g. It is day-time and it is light. A disjunctive proposition is one which is constituted such by the disjunctive conjunction Either, as e.g. Either it is day or it is night. This conjunction guarantees that one or other of the alternatives is false. A causal proposition is constructed by means of the conjunction Because, e.g. Because it is day, it is light. For the first clause is, as it were, the cause of the second. A proposition which indicates more or less is one that is formed by the word signifying rather and the word than in between the clauses, as, for example, It is rather day-time than night. 7.73. Opposite in character to the foregoing is a proposition which declares what is less the fact, as e.g. It is less or not so much night as day. Further, among propositions there are some which in respect of truth and falsehood stand opposed to one another, of which the one is the negative of the other, as e.g. the propositions It is day and It is not day. A hypothetical proposition is therefore true, if the contradictory of its conclusion is incompatible with its premiss, e.g. If it is day, it is light. This is true. For the statement It is not light, contradicting the conclusion, is incompatible with the premiss It is day. On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition is false, if the contradictory of its conclusion does not conflict with the premiss, e.g. If it is day, Dion is walking. For the statement Dion is not walking does not conflict with the premiss It is day. 7.74. An inferential proposition is true if starting from a true premiss it also has a consequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is day, the sun is above the horizon. But it is false if it starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is night, Dion is walking, if this be said in day-time. A causal proposition is true if its conclusion really follows from a premiss itself true, though the premiss does not follow conversely from the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is day, it is light, where from the it is day the it is light duly follows, though from the statement it is light it would not follow that it is day. But a causal proposition is false if it either starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion or has a premiss that does not correspond with the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is night, Dion is walking.' "7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking." '
7.78. of conclusive some are denoted by the common name of the whole class, conclusive proper, others are called syllogistic. The syllogistic are such as either do not admit of, or are reducible to such as do not admit of, immediate proof in respect of one or more of the premisses; e.g. If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion; but Dion is walking, therefore Dion is in motion. Conclusive specifically are those which draw conclusions, but not by syllogism; e.g. the statement It is both day and night is false: now it is day; therefore it is not night. Arguments not syllogistic are those which plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but are not cogent proof; e.g. If Dion is a horse, he is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore he is not an animal. 7.79. Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm. Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive. Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical.
7.82. There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Concealed, Sorites, Horned Folk, the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows: . . . It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is few, therefore so also is ten. . . . The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premiss consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premiss and conclusion; for example, If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes. . . . 7.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic.''. None |
|
33. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, criticism of • determinism,dialectic
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 142, 143; Long (2006) 102
|
34. Augustine, Confessions, 4.16.30, 4.19.30, 5.9.17, 9.10.23, 10.9.16, 10.12.19, 10.16.24, 11.9.11, 12.10.10, 13.19.24 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic • dialectic, logic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος
Found in books: Burton (2009) 22, 77, 78; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 153, 154, 155, 161
| 4.16.30. 28. And what did it profit me that, when scarce twenty years old, a book of Aristotle's, entitled The Ten Predicaments, fell into my hands - on whose very name I hung as on something great and divine, when my rhetoric master of Carthage, and others who were esteemed learned, referred to it with cheeks swelling with pride - I read it alone and understood it? And on my conferring with others, who said that with the assistance of very able masters - who not only explained it orally, but drew many things in the dust - they scarcely understood it, and could tell me no more about it than I had acquired in reading it by myself alone? And the book appeared to me to speak plainly enough of substances, such as man is, and of their qualities, - such as the figure of a man, of what kind it is; and his stature, how many feet high; and his relationship, whose brother he is; or where placed, or when born; or whether he stands or sits, or is shod or armed, or does or suffers anything; and whatever innumerable things might be classed under these nine categories, - of which I have given some examples - or under that chief category of substance. 29. What did all this profit me, seeing it even hindered me, when, imagining that whatsoever existed was comprehended in those ten categories, I tried so to understand, O my God, Your wonderful and unchangeable unity as if Thou also had been subjected to Your own greatness or beauty, so that they should exist in You as their subject, like as in bodies, whereas You Yourself art Your greatness and beauty? But a body is not great or fair because it is a body, seeing that, though it were less great or fair, it should nevertheless be a body. But that which I had conceived of You was falsehood, not truth - fictions of my misery, not the supports of Your blessedness. For You had commanded, and it was done in me, that the earth should bring forth briars and thorns to me, Isaiah 32:13 and that with labour I should get my bread. Genesis 3:19 30. And what did it profit me that I, the base slave of vile affections, read unaided, and understood, all the books that I could get of the so-called liberal arts? And I took delight in them, but knew not whence came whatever in them was true and certain. For my back then was to the light, and my face towards the things enlightened; whence my face, with which I discerned the things enlightened, was not itself enlightened. Whatever was written either on rhetoric or logic, geometry, music, or arithmetic, did I, without any great difficulty, and without the teaching of any man, understand, as You know, O Lord my God, because both quickness of comprehension and acuteness of perception are Your gifts. Yet did I not thereupon sacrifice to You. So, then, it served not to my use, but rather to my destruction, since I went about to get so good a portion of my substance Luke 15:12 into my own power; and I kept not my strength for You, but went away from You into a far country, to waste it upon harlotries. Luke 15:13 For what did good abilities profit me, if I did not employ them to good uses? For I did not perceive that those arts were acquired with great difficulty, even by the studious and those gifted with genius, until I endeavoured to explain them to such; and he was the most proficient in them who followed my explanations not too slowly. 31. But what did this profit me, supposing that Thou, O Lord God, the Truth, were a bright and vast body, and I a piece of that body? Perverseness too great! But such was I. Nor do I blush, O my God, to confess to You Your mercies towards me, and to call upon You - I, who blushed not then to avow before men my blasphemies, and to bark against You. What profited me then my nimble wit in those sciences and all those knotty volumes, disentangled by me without help from a human master, seeing that I erred so odiously, and with such sacrilegious baseness, in the doctrine of piety? Or what impediment was it to Your little ones to have a far slower wit, seeing that they departed not far from You, that in the nest of Your Church they might safely become fledged, and nourish the wings of charity by the food of a sound faith? O Lord our God, under the shadow of Your wings let us hope, defend us, and carry us. You will carry us both when little, and even to grey hairs will You carry us; Isaiah 46:4 for our firmness, when it is Thou, then is it firmness; but when it is our own, then it is infirmity. Our good lives always with You, from which when we are averted we are perverted. Let us now, O Lord, return, that we be not overturned, because with You our good lives without any eclipse, which good You Yourself art. And we need not fear lest we should find no place unto which to return because we fell away from it; for when we were absent, our home - Your Eternity - fell not. <" "
5.9.17. 16. And behold, there was I received by the scourge of bodily sickness, and I was descending into hell burdened with all the sins that I had committed, both against You, myself, and others, many and grievous, over and above that bond of original sin whereby we all die in Adam. 1 Corinthians 15:22 For none of these things had Thou forgiven me in Christ, neither had He abolished by His cross the enmity which, by my sins, I had incurred with You. For how could He, by the crucifixion of a phantasm, which I supposed Him to be? As true, then, was the death of my soul, as that of His flesh appeared to me to be untrue; and as true the death of His flesh as the life of my soul, which believed it not, was false. The fever increasing, I was now passing away and perishing. For had I then gone hence, whither should I have gone but into the fiery torments meet for my misdeeds, in the truth of Your ordice? She was ignorant of this, yet, while absent, prayed for me. But You, everywhere present, hearkened to her where she was, and had pity upon me where I was, that I should regain my bodily health, although still frenzied in my sacrilegious heart. For all that peril did not make me wish to be baptized, and I was better when, as a lad, I entreated it of my mother's piety, as I have already related and confessed. But I had grown up to my own dishonour, and all the purposes of Your medicine I madly derided, who would not suffer me, though such a one, to die a double death. Had my mother's heart been smitten with this wound, it never could have been cured. For I cannot sufficiently express the love she had for me, nor how she now travailed for me in the spirit with a far keener anguish than when she bore me in the flesh. 17. I cannot conceive, therefore, how she could have been healed if such a death of mine had transfixed the bowels of her love. Where then would have been her so earnest, frequent, and unintermitted prayers to You alone? But could Thou, most merciful God, despise the contrite and humble heart of that pure and prudent widow, so constant in almsdeeds, so gracious and attentive to Your saints, not permitting one day to pass without oblation at Your altar, twice a day, at morning and even-tide, coming to Your church without intermission - not for vain gossiping, nor old wives' fables, 1 Timothy 5:10 but in order that she might listen to You in Your sermons, and Thou to her in her prayers? Could You- You by whose gift she was such - despise and disregard without succouring the tears of such a one, wherewith she entreated You not for gold or silver, nor for any changing or fleeting good, but for the salvation of the soul of her son? By no means, Lord. Assuredly You were near, and were hearing and doing in that method in which You had predetermined that it should be done. Far be it from You that Thou should delude her in those visions and the answers she had from You - some of which I have spoken of, and others not, - which she kept Luke 2:19 in her faithful breast, and, always petitioning, pressed upon You as Your autograph. For Thou, because Your mercy endures for ever, condescendest to those whose debts You have pardoned, to become likewise a debtor by Your promises. " '
9.10.23. 23. As the day now approached on which she was to depart this life (which day Thou knew, we did not), it fell out - Thou, as I believe, by Your secret ways arranging it - that she and I stood alone, leaning in a certain window, from which the garden of the house we occupied at Ostia could be seen; at which place, removed from the crowd, we were resting ourselves for the voyage, after the fatigues of a long journey. We then were conversing alone very pleasantly; and, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, Philippians 3:13 we were seeking between ourselves in the presence of the Truth, which You are, of what nature the eternal life of the saints would be, which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man. But yet we opened wide the mouth of our heart, after those supernal streams of Your fountain, the fountain of life, which is with You; that being sprinkled with it according to our capacity, we might in some measure weigh so high a mystery. 24. And when our conversation had arrived at that point, that the very highest pleasure of the carnal senses, and that in the very brightest material light, seemed by reason of the sweetness of that life not only not worthy of comparison, but not even of mention, we, lifting ourselves with a more ardent affection towards the Selfsame, did gradually pass through all corporeal things, and even the heaven itself, whence sun, and moon, and stars shine upon the earth; yea, we soared higher yet by inward musing, and discoursing, and admiring Your works; and we came to our own minds, and went beyond them, that we might advance as high as that region of unfailing plenty, where You feed Israel for ever with the food of truth, and where life is that Wisdom by whom all these things are made, both which have been, and which are to come; and she is not made, but is as she has been, and so shall ever be; yea, rather, to have been, and to be hereafter, are not in her, but only to be, seeing she is eternal, for to have been and to be hereafter are not eternal. And while we were thus speaking, and straining after her, we slightly touched her with the whole effort of our heart; and we sighed, and there left bound the first-fruits of the Spirit; Romans 8:23 and returned to the noise of our own mouth, where the word uttered has both beginning and end. And what is like Your Word, our Lord, who remains in Himself without becoming old, and makes all things new? Wisdom 7:27 25. We were saying, then, If to any man the tumult of the flesh were silenced - silenced the phantasies of earth, waters, and air - silenced, too, the poles; yea, the very soul be silenced to herself, and go beyond herself by not thinking of herself - silenced fancies and imaginary revelations, every tongue, and every sign, and whatsoever exists by passing away, since, if any could hearken, all these say, We created not ourselves, but were created by Him who abides for ever: If, having uttered this, they now should be silenced, having only quickened our ears to Him who created them, and He alone speak not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His word, not by fleshly tongue, nor angelic voice, nor sound of thunder, nor the obscurity of a similitude, but might hear Him - Him whom in these we love- without these, like as we two now strained ourselves, and with rapid thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom which remains over all. If this could be sustained, and other visions of a far different kind be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and envelope its beholder amid these inward joys, so that his life might be eternally like that one moment of knowledge which we now sighed after, were not this Enter into the joy of Your Lord? Matthew 25:21 And when shall that be? When we shall all rise again; but all shall not be changed. 26. Such things was I saying; and if not after this manner, and in these words, yet, Lord, You know, that in that day when we were talking thus, this world with all its delights grew contemptible to us, even while we spoke. Then said my mother, Son, for myself, I have no longer any pleasure in anything in this life. What I want here further, and why I am here, I know not, now that my hopes in this world are satisfied. There was indeed one thing for which I wished to tarry a little in this life, and that was that I might see you a Catholic Christian before I died. My God has exceeded this abundantly, so that I see you despising all earthly felicity, made His servant - what do I here?
10.9.16. 16. And yet are not these all that the illimitable capacity of my memory retains. Here also is all that is apprehended of the liberal sciences, and not yet forgotten - removed as it were into an inner place, which is not a place; nor are they the images which are retained, but the things themselves. For what is literature, what skill in disputation, whatsoever I know of all the many kinds of questions there are, is so in my memory, as that I have not taken in the image and left the thing without, or that it should have sounded and passed away like a voice imprinted on the ear by that trace, whereby it might be recorded, as though it sounded when it no longer did so; or as an odour while it passes away, and vanishes into wind, affects the sense of smell, whence it conveys the image of itself into the memory, which we realize in recollecting; or like food, which assuredly in the belly has now no taste, and yet has a kind of taste in the memory, or like anything that is by touching felt by the body, and which even when removed from us is imagined by the memory. For these things themselves are not put into it, but the images of them only are caught up, with a marvellous quickness, and laid up, as it were, in most wonderful garners, and wonderfully brought forth when we remember. ' "
10.12.19. 19. The memory contains also the reasons and innumerable laws of numbers and dimensions, none of which has any sense of the body impressed, seeing they have neither color, nor sound, nor taste, nor smell, nor sense of touch. I have heard the sound of the words by which these things are signified when they are discussed; but the sounds are one thing, the things another. For the sounds are one thing in Greek, another in Latin; but the things themselves are neither Greek, nor Latin, nor any other language. I have seen the lines of the craftsmen, even the finest, like a spider's web; but these are of another kind, they are not the images of those which the eye of my flesh showed me; he knows them who, without any idea whatsoever of a body, perceives them within himself. I have also observed the numbers of the things with which we number all the senses of the body; but those by which we number are of another kind, nor are they the images of these, and therefore they certainly are. Let him who sees not these things mock me for saying them; and I will pity him, while he mocks me. " '
10.16.24. 24. When I name forgetfulness, and know, too, what I name, whence should I know it if I did not remember it? I do not say the sound of the name, but the thing which it signifies which, had I forgotten, I could not know what that sound signified. When, therefore, I remember memory, then is memory present with itself, through itself. But when I remember forgetfulness, there are present both memory and forgetfulness - memory, whereby I remember, forgetfulness, which I remember. But what is forgetfulness but the privation of memory? How, then, is that present for me to remember, since, when it is so, I cannot remember? But if what we remember we retain in memory, yet, unless we remembered forgetfulness, we could never at the hearing of the name know the thing meant by it, then is forgetfulness retained by memory. Present, therefore, it is, lest we should forget it; and being so, we do forget. Is it to be inferred from this that forgetfulness, when we remember it, is not present to the memory through itself, but through its image; because, were forgetfulness present through itself, it would not lead us to remember, but to forget? Who will now investigate this? Who shall understand how it is? 25. Truly, O Lord, I labour therein, and labour in myself. I have become a troublesome soil that requires overmuch labour. For we are not now searching out the tracts of heaven, or measuring the distances of the stars, or inquiring about the weight of the earth. It is I myself - I, the mind - who remember. It is not much to be wondered at, if what I myself am not be far from me. But what is nearer to me than myself? And, behold, I am not able to comprehend the force of my own memory, though I cannot name myself without it. For what shall I say when it is plain to me that I remember forgetfulness? Shall I affirm that which I remember is not in my memory? Or shall I say that forgetfulness is in my memory with the view of my not forgetting? Both of these are most absurd. What third view is there? How can I assert that the image of forgetfulness is retained by my memory, and not forgetfulness itself, when I remember it? And how can I assert this, seeing that when the image of anything is imprinted on the memory, the thing itself must of necessity be present first by which that image may be imprinted? For thus do I remember Carthage; thus, all the places to which I have been; thus, the faces of men whom I have seen, and things reported by the other senses; thus, the health or sickness of the body. For when these objects were present, my memory received images from them, which, when they were present, I might gaze on and reconsider in my mind, as I remembered them when they were absent. If, therefore, forgetfulness is retained in the memory through its image, and not through itself, then itself was once present, that its image might be taken. But when it was present, how did it write its image on the memory, seeing that forgetfulness by its presence blots out even what it finds already noted? And yet, in whatever way, though it be incomprehensible and inexplicable, yet most certain I am that I remember also forgetfulness itself, whereby what we do remember is blotted out. ' "
11.9.11. 11. In this Beginning, O God, have You made heaven and earth - in Your Word, in Your Son, in Your Power, in Your Wisdom, in Your Truth, wondrously speaking and wondrously making. Who shall comprehend? Who shall relate it? What is that which shines through me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I am unlike it; and I burn inasmuch as I am like it. It is Wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness, which again overwhelms me, fainting from it, in the darkness and amount of my punishment. For my strength is brought down in need, so that I cannot endure my blessings, until Thou, O Lord, who hast been gracious to all mine iniquities, heal also all mine infirmities; because You shall also redeem my life from corruption, and crown me with Your loving-kindness and mercy, and shall satisfy my desire with good things, because my youth shall be renewed like the eagle's. For by hope we are saved; and through patience we await Your promises. Romans 8:24-25 Let him that is able hear You discoursing within. I will with confidence cry out from Your oracle, How wonderful are Your works, O Lord, in Wisdom have You made them all. And this Wisdom is the Beginning, and in that Beginning have You made heaven and earth. " '
12.10.10. 10. Oh, let Truth, the light of my heart, not my own darkness, speak unto me! I have descended to that, and am darkened. But thence, even thence, did I love You. I went astray, and remembered You. I heard Your voice behind me bidding me return, and scarcely did I hear it for the tumults of the unquiet ones. And now, behold, I return burning and panting after Your fountain. Let no one prohibit me; of this will I drink, and so have life. Let me not be my own life; from myself have I badly lived - death was I unto myself; in You do I revive. Speak unto me; discourse unto me. In Your books have I believed, and their words are very deep.
13.19.24. 24. But first, Wash you, make you clean; put away iniquity from your souls, and from before my eyes, that the dry land may appear. Learn to do well; judge the fatherless; plead for the widow, that the earth may bring forth the green herb for meat, and the tree bearing fruit; and come let us reason together, says the Lord, Isaiah 1:l8 that there may be lights in the firmament of heaven, and that they may shine upon the earth. Genesis 1:15 That rich man asked of the good Master what he should do to attain eternal life. Matthew 19:16 Let the good Master, whom he thought a man, and nothing more, tell him (but He is good because He is God) - let Him tell him, that if he would enter into life he must keep the commandments; let him banish from himself the bitterness of malice and wickedness; 1 Corinthians 5:8 let him not kill, nor commit adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness; that the dry land may appear, and bud forth the honouring of father and mother, and the love of our neighbour. Matthew 19:16-19 All these, says he, have I kept. Whence, then, are there so many thorns, if the earth be fruitful? Go, root up the woody thicket of avarice; sell that you have, and be filled with fruit by giving to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven; and follow the Lord if you will be perfect, coupled with those among whom He speaks wisdom, Who knows what to distribute to the day and to the night, that you also may know it, that for you also there may be lights in the firmament of heaven, which will not be unless your heart be there; Matthew 6:21 which likewise also will not be unless your treasure be there, as you have heard from the good Master. But the barren earth was grieved, Matthew 19:22 and the thorns choked the word. Matthew 13:7, 22 25. But you, chosen generation, 1 Peter 2:9 you weak things of the world, who have forsaken all things that you might follow the Lord, go after Him, and confound the things which are mighty; 1 Corinthians 1:27 go after Him, you beautiful feet, Isaiah 52:7 and shine in the firmament, Daniel 12:3 that the heavens may declare His glory, dividing between the light of the perfect, though not as of the angels, and the darkness of the little, though not despised ones. Shine over all the earth, and let the day, lightened by the sun, utter unto day the word of wisdom; and let night, shining by the moon, announce unto night the word of knowledge. The moon and the stars shine for the night, but the night obscures them not, since they illumine it in its degree. For behold God (as it were) saying, Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven. There came suddenly a sound from heaven, as it had been the rushing of a mighty wind, and there appeared cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. Acts 2:3 And there were made lights in the firmament of heaven, having the word of life. 1 John 1:1 Run to and fro everywhere, you holy fires, you beautiful fires; for you are the light of the world, nor are you put under a bushel. Matthew 5:14 He to whom you cleave is exalted, and has exalted you. Run to and fro, and be known unto all nations. ' ". None |
|
35. Augustine, The City of God, 22.5 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Burton (2009) 76; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 152
| 22.5. But granting that this was once incredible, behold, now, the world has come to the belief that the earthly body of Christ was received up into heaven. Already both the learned and unlearned have believed in the resurrection of the flesh and its ascension to the heavenly places, while only a very few either of the educated or uneducated are still staggered by it. If this is a credible thing which is believed, then let those who do not believe see how stolid they are; and if it is incredible, then this also is an incredible thing, that what is incredible should have received such credit. Here then we have two incredibles - to wit, the resurrection of our body to eternity, and that the world should believe so incredible a thing; and both these incredibles the same God predicted should come to pass before either had as yet occurred. We see that already one of the two has come to pass, for the world has believed what was incredible; why should we despair that the remaining one shall also come to pass, and that this which the world believed, though it was incredible, shall itself occur? For already that which was equally incredible has come to pass, in the world's believing an incredible thing. Both were incredible: the one we see accomplished, the other we believe shall be; for both were predicted in those same Scriptures by means of which the world believed. And the very manner in which the world's faith was won is found to be even more incredible if we consider it. Men uninstructed in any branch of a liberal education, without any of the refinement of heathen learning, unskilled in grammar, not armed with dialectic, not adorned with rhetoric, but plain fishermen, and very few in number - these were the men whom Christ sent with the nets of faith to the sea of this world, and thus took out of every race so many fishes, and even the philosophers themselves, wonderful as they are rare. Let us add, if you please, or because you ought to be pleased, this third incredible thing to the two former. And now we have three incredibles, all of which have yet come to pass. It is incredible that Jesus Christ should have risen in the flesh and ascended with flesh into heaven; it is incredible that the world should have believed so incredible a thing; it is incredible that a very few men, of mean birth and the lowest rank, and no education, should have been able so effectually to persuade the world, and even its learned men, of so incredible a thing. of these three incredibles, the parties with whom we are debating refuse to believe the first; they cannot refuse to see the second, which they are unable to account for if they do not believe the third. It is indubitable that the resurrection of Christ, and His ascension into heaven with the flesh in which He rose, is already preached and believed in the whole world. If it is not credible, how is it that it has already received credence in the whole world? If a number of noble, exalted, and learned men had said that they had witnessed it, and had been at pains to publish what they had witnessed, it were not wonderful that the world should have believed it, but it were very stubborn to refuse credence; but if, as is true, the world has believed a few obscure, inconsiderable, uneducated persons, who state and write that they witnessed it, is it not unreasonable that a handful of wrong-headed men should oppose themselves to the creed of the whole world, and refuse their belief? And if the world has put faith in a small number of men, of mean birth and the lowest rank, and no education, it is because the divinity of the thing itself appeared all the more manifestly in such contemptible witnesses. The eloquence, indeed, which lent persuasion to their message, consisted of wonderful works, not words. For they who had not seen Christ risen in the flesh, nor ascending into heaven with His risen body, believed those who related how they had seen these things, and who testified not only with words but wonderful signs. For men whom they knew to be acquainted with only one, or at most two languages, they marvelled to hear speaking in the tongues of all nations. They saw a man, lame from his mother's womb, after forty years stand up sound at their word in the name of Christ; that handkerchiefs taken from their bodies had virtue to heal the sick; that countless persons, sick of various diseases, were laid in a row in the road where they were to pass, that their shadow might fall on them as they walked, and that they immediately received health; that many other stupendous miracles were wrought by them in the name of Christ; and, finally, that they even raised the dead. If it be admitted that these things occurred as they are related, then we have a multitude of incredible things to add to those three incredibles. That the one incredibility of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ may be believed, we accumulate the testimonies of countless incredible miracles, but even so we do not bend the frightful obstinacy of these sceptics. But if they do not believe that these miracles were wrought by Christ's apostles to gain credence to their preaching of His resurrection and ascension, this one grand miracle suffices for us, that the whole world has believed without any miracles. "". None |
|
36. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Burton (2009) 76; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 151
|
37. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • dialectic • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Burton (2009) 76; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 152
|
38. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, on dialectic, logic • Dialectic • dialectic, logic
Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 125; Pollmann and Vessey (2007) 190, 221
|
39. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • dialectic
Found in books: Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 282; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 29
|
40. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic, Socratic • demonstration (apodeixis, ἀπόδειξις) as dialectical/mathematical method • dialectic
Found in books: Joosse (2021) 63; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 50, 68
|
41. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Dialectic • dialectic
Found in books: Jedan (2009) 84; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 95
|
