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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.



All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
being/properties/determination, absolute modes of d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 60
determination, / apprehension / cognitio / ἐπιβολή Maso (2022) 46, 54, 83, 124, 145
determination, and trait inheritance in embryo, sex Trott (2019) 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 206, 208
determination, seed, σπέρμα, in sex Trott (2019) 191
determined, birth, γένɛσις Schibli (2002) 342
determined, by destiny, life-span Griffiths (1975) 6, 166
determined, by fellow citizens, citizenship Raaflaub Ober and Wallace (2007) 76, 77, 96, 97, 165
determined, by knower, knowledge/science, epistêmê, ἐπιστήμη‎ d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 71, 105, 202
determined, by the song of songs, grooms qedushta, the, qallir, structure of not entirely Lieber (2014) 15, 16
determined, by, destiny, life-span Griffiths (1975) 6, 166
determined, first by greek identity, descent, later by culture Isaac (2004) 113
determined, for each species, time Schibli (2002) 359
determined, human beings, number of Schibli (2002) 360
determined, life Schibli (2002) 342, 343, 348, 359, 361
determined, risk, socially Eidinow (2007) 20
determines, wealth and poverty, god Gardner (2015) 142
determining, atlas fate, zeus Segev (2017) 131
determining, elements of cult, apollo of delphi on Mikalson (2010) 1, 57, 58, 63, 64, 73, 75, 76, 100, 105, 108, 109, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 163, 165, 172, 179, 213
determining, epigraphic habits, epigraphic agents Wilding (2022) 7, 12, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 179, 180, 184, 185, 187, 188, 229, 230, 237, 260, 262, 263, 264
determining, god’s will, astrology, as a means of Kalmin (2014) 176, 189, 190, 191, 192
determining, health and disease, health, factors Jouanna (2012) 156
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, absent in herodotus Gruen (2020) 43, 44, 45, 47, 48
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, absent in philo Gruen (2020) 159
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, and barbarians Gruen (2020) 11, 15, 22, 23, 26, 35, 39, 41
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, avoided by paul Gruen (2020) 190, 197
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, doubted by diodorus Gruen (2020) 23, 26
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, largely absent in josephus Gruen (2020) 39, 40, 41, 175, 176
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, not advocated by strabo Gruen (2020) 28, 29, 35
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, not implied by “third race” Gruen (2020) 207
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, questioned in general Gruen (2020) 87
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, rarely suggested by polybius Gruen (2020) 22, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68
determining, innate capacity as ethnicity, subordinated by jubilees Gruen (2020) 125
determining, inscribed location, epigraphic agents Wilding (2022) 57, 59, 115, 156, 184, 185, 187
determinism Crabb (2020) 30, 31, 43, 50, 59, 135, 146, 149, 154, 166, 171, 172, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 196, 203, 204, 205, 211, 221, 223, 224, 227, 228, 295, 297, 325, 332
Faure (2022) 52, 62
Frede and Laks (2001) 89, 96, 246
Garcia (2021) 29, 33, 50, 51, 55, 56, 66, 203, 213, 264
Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 89, 387, 408
Graver (2007) 62, 232
Karfíková (2012) 262, 272
Konig and Wiater (2022) 257, 260, 261, 262, 263, 267, 269, 271
König and Wiater (2022) 257, 260, 261, 262, 263, 267, 269, 271
Linjamaa (2019) 2, 29, 36, 42, 43, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 178, 179, 206, 246, 256
Long (2006) 152, 165, 174
Maso (2022) 54, 84, 85, 86, 99, 127, 148
Ramelli (2013) 190, 301, 478, 624, 655, 657, 673
Rohmann (2016) 191
Wilson (2018) 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62, 68, 69, 77, 82, 89, 100, 117, 123, 129, 130, 162, 173, 225, 234, 236, 251, 258, 263, 273, 276, 278, 280, 283, 284, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298
Wolfsdorf (2020) 125, 126
d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 240, 241
deSilva (2022) 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 269
van der EIjk (2005) 69
determinism, and judas’ redemption, astrological Scopello (2008) 308
determinism, and physiognomics, environmental Isaac (2004) 151
determinism, and the earth, environmental Isaac (2004) 114, 115, 307, 308
determinism, aristotle, on environmental Isaac (2004) 70, 71, 72, 73
determinism, astrological Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 195, 198
Scopello (2008) 127, 166, 167
determinism, causal Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 156, 160, 187, 188, 189
determinism, causes, causal Graver (2007) 62, 232
determinism, christians, on environmental Isaac (2004) 88, 89
determinism, cosmogonical structure and, astrological Scopello (2008) 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303
determinism, cultural Braund and Most (2004) 17
determinism, dialectic Long (2006) 47, 54, 65, 66, 75, 77, 78, 96, 101, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 127, 142, 151, 152, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 246, 247, 249, 251, 266, 286, 290, 293, 299, 302, 303, 305
determinism, earth, and environmental Isaac (2004) 8, 69, 81, 307
determinism, environmental Bosak-Schroeder (2020) 207
Gruen (2020) 51, 55
Konig (2022) 196, 197, 234
determinism, galen, on environmental Isaac (2004) 87
determinism, hippocrates, ps., airs, waters, places, and environmental Isaac (2004) 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69
determinism, in dialogue between judas and jesus, astrological Scopello (2008) 127
determinism, in gnostic eschatology, astrological Scopello (2008) 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308
determinism, in mousike, music, environmental Kowalzig (2007) 4, 5, 290
determinism, judaea, region of and Taylor (2012) 88, 89
determinism, julius caesar, on environmental Isaac (2004) 96, 97
determinism, lucan, on environmental Isaac (2004) 93
determinism, mazdaean zoroastrianism, astrological Scopello (2008) 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289
determinism, necessity, in thucydides, vs. causal Joho (2022) 20, 24, 265, 309, 310, 311
determinism, of essenes and rabbis Feldman (2006) 19
determinism, of firmicus maternus, on environmental Isaac (2004) 101
determinism, of stoicism, stoics Long (2006) 25, 165, 273, 274, 276
determinism, on germans and nomads, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 427, 428
determinism, on germans, and seneca, on environmental scythians Isaac (2004) 95, 205, 430, 431
determinism, on greek and roman eloquence, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 395
determinism, on jews, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 225, 226, 458, 459
determinism, on natural slavery, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 186
determinism, on the treatment of slaves, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 186
determinism, on theparthians and peoples of asia minor, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 317
determinism, paul Malherbe et al (2014) 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311
determinism, philosophical Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 238
determinism, physiognomics, and environmental Isaac (2004) 151, 157
determinism, plato, against astrological Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 198
determinism, pliny, the elder, on environmental Isaac (2004) 94
determinism, polybius, on environmental Isaac (2004) 82
determinism, posidonius, on the cimbri, on environmental Isaac (2004) 91
determinism, ptolemy of alexandria, claudius ptolemaeus, on astrological Isaac (2004) 94, 99, 100, 101
determinism, sceptical about autochthony, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 137
determinism, seneca, on environmental Isaac (2004) 80, 95
determinism, socrates, church historian, on environmental Isaac (2004) 99
determinism, stars as seducers, astrological Scopello (2008) 294, 295, 296, 297, 298
determinism, stoicism Malherbe et al (2014) 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311
determinism, stoicism, prayer/expiation and Williams (2012) 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324
determinism, strabo, on aristotle’s advice to alexander, on environmental Isaac (2004) 91, 92, 93
determinism, tacitus, on the britons, on environmental Isaac (2004) 95, 96
determinism, three varieties of Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 158
determinism, vitruvius, on environmental Isaac (2004) 83, 84
determinism/fate Despotis and Lohr (2022) 26, 102, 212, 331, 428, 429, 430, 431, 440, 445, 446

List of validated texts:
57 validated results for "determinism"
1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 6.8, 26.12 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • interiorities defined, prayers • interiorities defined, quorum for worship (synagogue) • interiorities defined, shares in God’s food • tsedaqah/tzdaka, defined • utility, factor in defining key terms

 Found in books: Gardner (2015) 31; Klawans (2019) 15; Neusner (2001) 62, 345

6.8. וּקְשַׁרְתָּם לְאוֹת עַל־יָדֶךָ וְהָיוּ לְטֹטָפֹת בֵּין עֵינֶיךָ׃
26.12. כִּי תְכַלֶּה לַעְשֵׂר אֶת־כָּל־מַעְשַׂר תְּבוּאָתְךָ בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁלִישִׁת שְׁנַת הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְנָתַתָּה לַלֵּוִי לַגֵּר לַיָּתוֹם וְלָאַלְמָנָה וְאָכְלוּ בִשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְשָׂבֵעוּ׃''. None
6.8. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand, and they shall be for frontlets between thine eyes.
26.12. When thou hast made an end of tithing all the tithe of thine increase in the third year, which is the year of tithing, and hast given it unto the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow, that they may eat within thy gates, and be satisfied,''. None
2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 5.3-5.5, 50.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • astrological determinism, Mazdaean Zoroastrianism • determinism • humanity, hope defining • narrative, defined • self-determination, αὐτεξούσιον

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 158; Crabb (2020) 211; Garcia (2021) 50; Scopello (2008) 277; Trudinger (2004) 267; Wilson (2018) 20, 60

5.3. וַיְחִי אָדָם שְׁלֹשִׁים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בִּדְמוּתוֹ כְּצַלְמוֹ וַיִּקְרָא אֶת־שְׁמוֹ שֵׁת׃
5.3. וַיְחִי־לֶמֶךְ אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת־נֹחַ חָמֵשׁ וְתִשְׁעִים שָׁנָה וַחֲמֵשׁ מֵאֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת׃ 5.4. וַיִּהְיוּ יְמֵי־אָדָם אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת־שֵׁת שְׁמֹנֶה מֵאֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת׃ 5.5. וַיִּהְיוּ כָּל־יְמֵי אָדָם אֲשֶׁר־חַי תְּשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת׃' '. None
5.3. And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begot a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth. 5.4. And the days of Adam after he begot Seth were eight hundred years; and he begot sons and daughters. 5.5. And all the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years; and he died.
50.20. And as for you, ye meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.' '. None
3. Hebrew Bible, 1 Samuel, 2.1, 14.4 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • astrological determinism • determinism • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, largely absent in Josephus

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 146; Gruen (2020) 176; Scopello (2008) 166; Wilson (2018) 20

2.1. וַתִּתְפַּלֵּל חַנָּה וַתֹּאמַר עָלַץ לִבִּי בַּיהוָה רָמָה קַרְנִי בַּיהוָה רָחַב פִּי עַל־אוֹיְבַי כִּי שָׂמַחְתִּי בִּישׁוּעָתֶךָ׃
2.1. יְהוָה יֵחַתּוּ מריבו מְרִיבָיו עלו עָלָיו בַּשָּׁמַיִם יַרְעֵם יְהוָה יָדִין אַפְסֵי־אָרֶץ וְיִתֶּן־עֹז לְמַלְכּוֹ וְיָרֵם קֶרֶן מְשִׁיחוֹ׃
14.4. וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־כָּל־יִשְׂרָאֵל אַתֶּם תִּהְיוּ לְעֵבֶר אֶחָד וַאֲנִי וְיוֹנָתָן בְּנִי נִהְיֶה לְעֵבֶר אֶחָד וַיֹּאמְרוּ הָעָם אֶל־שָׁאוּל הַטּוֹב בְּעֵינֶיךָ עֲשֵׂה׃'
14.4. וּבֵין הַמַּעְבְּרוֹת אֲשֶׁר בִּקֵּשׁ יוֹנָתָן לַעֲבֹר עַל־מַצַּב פְּלִשְׁתִּים שֵׁן־הַסֶּלַע מֵהָעֵבֶר מִזֶּה וְשֵׁן־הַסֶּלַע מֵהָעֵבֶר מִזֶּה וְשֵׁם הָאֶחָד בּוֹצֵץ וְשֵׁם הָאֶחָד סֶנֶּה׃ '. None
2.1. And Ĥanna prayed, and said, My heart rejoices in the Lord, my horn is exalted in the Lord: my mouth is enlarged over my enemies; because I rejoice in Thy salvation.
14.4. And between the passes, by which Yonatan sought to go over to the garrison of the Pelishtim, there was a sharp rock on the one side, and a sharp rock on the other side: and the name of the one was Bożeż, and the name of the other Sene.''. None
4. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 6.3 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • silluq, defined

 Found in books: Lieber (2014) 396; Wilson (2018) 21

6.3. וְקָרָא זֶה אֶל־זֶה וְאָמַר קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת מְלֹא כָל־הָאָרֶץ כְּבוֹדוֹ׃''. None
6.3. And one called unto another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, is the LORD of hosts; The whole earth is full of His glory.''. None
5. Hebrew Bible, Jeremiah, 25.11-25.12 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Periodization of history, defined • determinism

 Found in books: Collins (2016) 81; Crabb (2020) 297

25.11. וְהָיְתָה כָּל־הָאָרֶץ הַזֹּאת לְחָרְבָּה לְשַׁמָּה וְעָבְדוּ הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה אֶת־מֶלֶךְ בָּבֶל שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה׃ 25.12. וְהָיָה כִמְלֹאות שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה אֶפְקֹד עַל־מֶלֶךְ־בָּבֶל וְעַל־הַגּוֹי הַהוּא נְאֻם־יְהוָה אֶת־עֲוֺנָם וְעַל־אֶרֶץ כַּשְׂדִּים וְשַׂמְתִּי אֹתוֹ לְשִׁמְמוֹת עוֹלָם׃''. None
25.11. And this whole land shall be a desolation, and a waste; and these nations shall serve the king of Babylon seventy years. 25.12. And it shall come to pass, when seventy years are accomplished, that I will punish the king of Babylon, and that nation, saith the LORD, for their iniquity, and the land of the Chaldeans; and I will make it perpetual desolations.''. None
6. Herodotus, Histories, 3.98-3.100, 3.106, 5.3, 9.78-9.79 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Hippocrates (Ps.), Airs, Waters, Places, and environmental determinism • Theoxenia, Delphi, defining Hellenicity (Greekness) • citizenship,, determined by fellow citizens • environmental determinism • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, absent in Herodotus • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, and barbarians

 Found in books: Bosak-Schroeder (2020) 207; Gruen (2020) 15, 45, 48; Isaac (2004) 67; Kowalzig (2007) 207; Raaflaub Ober and Wallace (2007) 77

3.98. τὸν δὲ χρυσὸν τοῦτον τὸν πολλὸν οἱ Ἰνδοί, ἀπʼ οὗ τὸ ψῆγμα τῷ βασιλέι τὸ εἰρημένον κομίζουσι, τρόπῳ τοιῷδε κτῶνται. ἔστι τῆς Ἰνδικῆς χώρης τὸ πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα ψάμμος· τῶν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, τῶν καὶ πέρι ἀτρεκές τι λέγεται, πρῶτοι πρὸς ἠῶ καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολὰς οἰκέουσι ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἰνδοί· Ἰνδῶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἠῶ ἐρημίη ἐστὶ διὰ τὴν ψάμμον. ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ ἔθνεα Ἰνδῶν καὶ οὐκ ὁμόφωνα σφίσι, καὶ οἳ μὲν αὐτῶν νομάδες εἰσὶ οἳ δὲ οὔ, οἳ δὲ ἐν τοῖσι ἕλεσι οἰκέουσι τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ ἰχθύας σιτέονται ὠμούς, τοὺς αἱρέουσι ἐκ πλοίων καλαμίνων ὁρμώμενοι· καλάμου δὲ ἓν γόνυ πλοῖον ἕκαστον ποιέεται. οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τῶν Ἰνδῶν φορέουσι ἐσθῆτα φλοΐνην· ἐπεὰν ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ φλοῦν ἀμήσωσι καὶ κόψωσι, τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν φορμοῦ τρόπον καταπλέξαντες ὡς θώρηκα ἐνδύνουσι. 3.99. ἄλλοι δὲ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πρὸς ἠῶ οἰκέοντες τούτων νομάδες εἰσὶ κρεῶν ἐδεσταὶ ὠμῶν, καλέονται δὲ Παδαῖοι, νομαίοισι δὲ τοιοῖσιδε λέγονται χρᾶσθαι· ὃς ἂν κάμῃ τῶν ἀστῶν, ἤν τε γυνὴ ἤν τε ἀνήρ, τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα ἄνδρες οἱ μάλιστά οἱ ὁμιλέοντες κτείνουσι, φάμενοι αὐτὸν τηκόμενον τῇ νούσῳ τὰ κρέα σφίσι διαφθείρεσθαι· ὁ δὲ ἄπαρνος ἐστὶ μὴ μὲν νοσέειν, οἱ δὲ οὐ συγγινωσκόμενοι ἀποκτείναντες κατευωχέονται. ἣ δὲ ἂν γυνὴ κάμῃ, ὡσαύτως αἱ ἐπιχρεώμεναι μάλιστα γυναῖκες ταὐτὰ τοῖσι ἀνδράσι ποιεῦσι. τὸν γὰρ δὴ ἐς γῆρας ἀπικόμενον θύσαντες κατευωχέονται· ἐς δὲ τούτου λόγον οὐ πολλοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπικνέονται· πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ τὸν ἐς νοῦσον πίπτοντα πάντα κτείνουσι. 3.100. ἑτέρων δὲ ἐστὶ Ἰνδῶν ὅδε ἄλλος τρόπος· οὔτε κτείνουσι οὐδὲν ἔμψυχον οὔτε τι σπείρουσι οὔτε οἰκίας νομίζουσι ἐκτῆσθαι ποιηφαγέουσί τε· καὶ αὐτοῖσι ἐστὶ ὅσον κέγχρος τὸ μέγαθος ἐν κάλυκι, αὐτόματον ἐκ τῆς γῆς γινόμενον, τὸ συλλέγοντες αὐτῇ τῇ κάλυκι ἕψουσί τε καὶ σιτέονται. ὃς δʼ ἂν ἐς νοῦσον αὐτῶν πέσῃ, ἐλθὼν ἐς τὴν ἔρημον κεῖται· φροντίζει δὲ οὐδεὶς οὔτε ἀποθανόντος οὔτε κάμνοντος.
3.106. αἱ δʼ ἐσχατιαί κως τῆς οἰκεομένης τὰ κάλλιστα ἔλαχον, κατά περ ἡ Ἑλλὰς τὰς ὥρας πολλόν τι κάλλιστα κεκρημένας ἔλαχε. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἠῶ ἐσχάτη τῶν οἰκεομενέων ἡ Ἰνδική ἐστι, ὥσπερ ὀλίγῳ πρότερον εἴρηκα· ἐν ταύτῃ τοῦτο μὲν τὰ ἔμψυχα, τετράποδά τε καὶ τὰ πετεινά, πολλῷ μέζω ἢ ἐν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι χωρίοισι ἐστί, πάρεξ τῶν ἵππων ʽοὗτοι δὲ ἑσσοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, Νησαίων δὲ καλευμένων ἵππων̓, τοῦτο δὲ χρυσὸς ἄπλετος αὐτόθι ἐστί, ὃ μὲν ὀρυσσόμενος, ὁ δὲ καταφορεύμενος ὑπὸ ποταμῶν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐσήμηνα ἁρπαζόμενος. τὰ δὲ δένδρεα τὰ ἄγρια αὐτόθι φέρει καρπὸν εἴρια καλλονῇ τε προφέροντα καὶ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀίων· καὶ ἐσθῆτι Ἰνδοὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν δενδρέων χρέωνται.
5.3. Θρηίκων δὲ ἔθνος μέγιστον ἐστὶ μετά γε Ἰνδοὺς πάντων ἀνθρώπων· εἰ δὲ ὑπʼ ἑνὸς ἄρχοιτο ἢ φρονέοι κατὰ τὠυτό, ἄμαχόν τʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ πολλῷ κράτιστον πάντων ἐθνέων κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄπορόν σφι καὶ ἀμήχανον μή κοτε ἐγγένηται, εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀσθενέες. οὐνόματα δʼ ἔχουσι πολλὰ κατὰ χώρας ἕκαστοι, νόμοισι δὲ οὗτοι παραπλησίοισι πάντες χρέωνται κατὰ πάντα, πλὴν Γετέων καὶ Τραυσῶν καὶ τῶν κατύπερθε Κρηστωναίων οἰκεόντων.
9.78. ἐν δὲ Πλαταιῇσι ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Αἰγινητέων ἦν Λάμπων Πυθέω, Αἰγινητέων ἐὼν τὰ πρῶτα· ὃς ἀνοσιώτατον ἔχων λόγον ἵετο πρὸς Παυσανίην, ἀπικόμενος δὲ σπουδῇ ἔλεγε τάδε. “ὦ παῖ Κλεομβρότου, ἔργον ἔργασταί τοι ὑπερφυὲς μέγαθός τε καὶ κάλλος, καί τοι θεὸς παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι μέγιστον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν. σὺ δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοισι ποίησον, ὅκως λόγος τε σὲ ἔχῃ ἔτι μέζων καί τις ὕστερον φυλάσσηται τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἔργα ἀτάσθαλα ποιέων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Λεωνίδεω γὰρ ἀποθανόντος ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι Μαρδόνιός τε καὶ Ξέρξης ἀποταμόντες τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀνεσταύρωσαν· τῷ σὺ τὴν ὁμοίην ἀποδιδοὺς ἔπαινον ἕξεις πρῶτα μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων Σπαρτιητέων, αὖτις δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων· Μαρδόνιον γὰρ ἀνασκολοπίσας τετιμωρήσεαι ἐς πάτρων τὸν σὸν Λεωνίδην.” 9.79. ὃ μὲν δοκέων χαρίζεσθαι ἔλεγε τάδε, ὃ δʼ ἀνταμείβετο τοῖσιδε. “ὦ ξεῖνε Αἰγινῆτα, τὸ μὲν εὐνοέειν τε καὶ προορᾶν ἄγαμαί σευ, γνώμης μέντοι ἡμάρτηκας χρηστῆς· ἐξαείρας γάρ με ὑψοῦ καὶ τὴν πάτρην καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἐς τὸ μηδὲν κατέβαλες παραινέων νεκρῷ λυμαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἢν ταῦτα ποιέω, φὰς ἄμεινόν με ἀκούσεσθαι· τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροισι ποιέειν ἤ περ Ἕλλησι· καὶ ἐκείνοισι δὲ ἐπιφθονέομεν. ἐγὼ δʼ ὦν τούτου εἵνεκα μήτε Αἰγινήτῃσι ἅδοιμι μήτε τοῖσι ταῦτα ἀρέσκεται, ἀποχρᾷ δέ μοι Σπαρτιήτῃσι ἀρεσκόμενον ὅσια μὲν ποιέειν, ὅσια δὲ καὶ λέγειν. Λεωνίδῃ δέ, τῷ με κελεύεις τιμωρῆσαι, φημὶ μεγάλως τετιμωρῆσθαι, ψυχῇσί τε τῇσι τῶνδε ἀναριθμήτοισι τετίμηται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι τελευτήσαντες. σὺ μέντοι ἔτι ἔχων λόγον τοιόνδε μήτε προσέλθῃς ἔμοιγε μήτε συμβουλεύσῃς, χάριν τε ἴσθι ἐὼν ἀπαθής.”''. None
3.98. All this abundance of gold, from which the Indians send the aforementioned gold-dust to the king, they obtain in the following way. ,To the east of the Indian country is sand. of all the people of Asia whom we know - even those about whom something is said with precision - the Indians dwell nearest to the dawn and the rising sun; for on the eastern side of India all is desolate because of the sand. ,There are many Indian nations, none speaking the same language; some of them are nomads, some not; some dwell in the river marshes and live on raw fish, which they catch from reed boats. Each boat is made of one joint of reed. ,These Indians wear clothes of bullrushes; they mow and cut these from the river, then weave them crosswise like a mat, and wear them like a breastplate. ' "3.99. Other Indians, to the east of these, are nomads and eat raw flesh; they are called Padaei. It is said to be their custom that when anyone of their fellows, whether man or woman, is sick, a man's closest friends kill him, saying that if wasted by disease he will be lost to them as meat; though he denies that he is sick, they will not believe him, but kill and eat him. ,When a woman is sick, she is put to death like the men by the women who are her close acquaintances. As for one that has come to old age, they sacrifice him and feast on his flesh; but not many reach this reckoning, for before that everyone who falls ill they kill. " '3.100. There are other Indians, again, who kill no living creature, nor plant anything, nor are accustomed to have houses; they eat grass, and they have a grain growing naturally from the earth in its husk, about the size of a millet-seed, which they gather with the husk and boil and eat. When any one of them falls sick, he goes into the desert and lies there, and no one notices whether he is sick or dies. ' "
3.106. The most outlying nations of the world have somehow drawn the finest things as their lot, exactly as Greece has drawn the possession of far the best seasons. ,As I have lately said, India lies at the world's most distant eastern limit; and in India all living creatures four-footed and flying are much bigger than those of other lands, except the horses, which are smaller than the Median horses called Nesaean; moreover, the gold there, whether dug from the earth or brought down by rivers or got as I have described, is very abundant. ,There, too, wool more beautiful and excellent than the wool of sheep grows on wild trees; these trees supply the Indians with clothing. " '
5.3. The Thracians are the biggest nation in the world, next to the Indians. If they were under one ruler, or united, they would, in my judgment, be invincible and the strongest nation on earth. Since, however, there is no way or means to bring this about, they are weak. ,The Thracians have many names, each tribe according to its region, but they are very similar in all their customs, save the Getae, the Trausi, and those who dwell above the Crestonaeans. ' "
9.78. There was at Plataea in the army of the Aeginetans one Lampon, son of Pytheas, a leading man of Aegina. He hastened to Pausanias with really outrageous counsel and coming upon him, said to him: ,“son of Cleombrotus, you have done a deed of surpassing greatness and glory; the god has granted to you in saving Hellas to have won greater renown than any Greek whom we know. But now you must finish what remains for the rest, so that your fame may be greater still and so that no barbarian will hereafter begin doing reckless deeds against the Greeks. ,When Leonidas was killed at Thermopylae, Mardonius and Xerxes cut off his head and set it on a pole; make them a like return, and you will win praise from all Spartans and the rest of Hellas besides. For if you impale Mardonius, you will be avenged for your father's brother Leonidas.” " '9.79. This is what Lampon, thinking to please, said. Pausanias, however, answered him as follows: “Aeginetan, I thank you for your goodwill and forethought, but you have missed the mark of right judgment. First you exalt me and my fatherland and my deeds, yet next you cast me down to mere nothingness when you advise me to insult the dead, and say that I shall win more praise if I do so. That would be an act more proper for barbarians than for Greeks and one that we consider worthy of censure even in barbarians. ,No, as for myself, I would prefer to find no favor either with the people of Aegina or anyone else who is pleased by such acts. It is enough for me if I please the Spartans by righteous deeds and speech. As for Leonidas, whom you would have me avenge, I think that he has received a full measure of vengeance; the uncounted souls of these that you see have done honor to him and the rest of those who died at Thermopylae. But to you this is my warning: do not come again to me with words like these nor give me such counsel. Be thankful now that you go unpunished.” ''. None
7. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Hippocrates (Ps.), Airs, Waters, Places, and environmental determinism • environmental determinism

 Found in books: Isaac (2004) 65; Konig (2022) 196

8. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • indeterminism/antideterminism

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 140, 141, 143; Maso (2022) 84

9. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • indeterminism/antideterminism

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 146, 159, 170; Linjamaa (2019) 136

10. Anon., 1 Enoch, 85-90 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Periodization of history, defined • determinism

 Found in books: Collins (2016) 81; Crabb (2020) 59

85. And after this I saw another dream, and I will show the whole dream to thee, my son. And Enoch lifted up (his voice) and spake to his son Methuselah: ' To thee, my son, will I speak: hear my words-incline thine ear to the dream-vision of thy father. Before I took thy mother Edna, I saw in a vision on my bed, and behold a bull came forth from the earth, and that bull was white; and after it came forth a heifer, and along with this (latter) came forth two bulls, one of them black and,the other red. And that black bull gored the red one and pursued him over the earth, and thereupon,I could no longer see that red bull. But that black bull grew and that heifer went with him, and,I saw that many oxen proceeded from him which resembled and followed him. And that cow, that first one, went from the presence of that first bull in order to seek that red one, but found him,not, and lamented with a great lamentation over him and sought him. And I looked till that first,bull came to her and quieted her, and from that time onward she cried no more. And after that she bore another white bull, and after him she bore many bulls and black cows.,And I saw in my sleep that white bull likewise grow and become a great white bull, and from Him proceeded many white bulls, and they resembled him. And they began to beget many white bulls, which resembled them, one following the other, (even) many."86. And again I saw with mine eyes as I slept, and I saw the heaven above, and behold a star fell,from heaven, and it arose and eat and pastured amongst those oxen. And after that I saw the large and the black oxen, and behold they all changed their stalls and pastures and their cattle, and began,to live with each other. And again I saw in the vision, and looked towards the heaven, and behold I saw many stars descend and cast themselves down from heaven to that first star, and they became,bulls amongst those cattle and pastured with them amongst them. And I looked at them and saw, and behold they all let out their privy members, like horses, and began to cover the cows of the oxen,,and they all became pregt and bare elephants, camels, and asses. And all the oxen feared them and were affrighted at them, and began to bite with their teeth and to devour, and to gore with their,horns. And they began, moreover, to devour those oxen; and behold all the children of the earth began to tremble and quake before them and to flee from them.' "87. And again I saw how they began to gore each other and to devour each other, and the earth,began to cry aloud. And I raised mine eyes again to heaven, and I saw in the vision, and behold there came forth from heaven beings who were like white men: and four went forth from that place,and three with them. And those three that had last come forth grasped me by my hand and took me up, away from the generations of the earth, and raised me up to a lofty place, and showed me,a tower raised high above the earth, and all the hills were lower. And one said unto me: ' Remain here till thou seest everything that befalls those elephants, camels, and asses, and the stars and the oxen, and all of them.'" '88. And I saw one of those four who had come forth first, and he seized that first star which had fallen from the heaven, and bound it hand and foot and cast it into an abyss: now that abyss was,narrow and deep, and horrible and dark. And one of them drew a sword, and gave it to those elephants and camels and asses: then they began to smite each other, and the whole earth quaked,because of them. And as I was beholding in the vision, lo, one of those four who had come forth stoned (them) from heaven, and gathered and took all the great stars whose privy members were like those of horses, and bound them all hand and foot, and cast them in an abyss of the earth. 89. And one of those four went to that white bull and instructed him in a secret, without his being terrified: he was born a bull and became a man, and built for himself a great vessel and dwelt thereon;,and three bulls dwelt with him in that vessel and they were covered in. And again I raised mine eyes towards heaven and saw a lofty roof, with seven water torrents thereon, and those torrents,flowed with much water into an enclosure. And I saw again, and behold fountains were opened on the surface of that great enclosure, and that water began to swell and rise upon the surface,,and I saw that enclosure till all its surface was covered with water. And the water, the darkness, and mist increased upon it; and as I looked at the height of that water, that water had risen above the height of that enclosure, and was streaming over that enclosure, and it stood upon the earth.,And all the cattle of that enclosure were gathered together until I saw how they sank and were",swallowed up and perished in that water. But that vessel floated on the water, while all the oxen and elephants and camels and asses sank to the bottom with all the animals, so that I could no longer see them, and they were not able to escape, (but) perished and sank into the depths. And again I saw in the vision till those water torrents were removed from that high roof, and the chasms,of the earth were leveled up and other abysses were opened. Then the water began to run down into these, till the earth became visible; but that vessel settled on the earth, and the darkness,retired and light appeared. But that white bull which had become a man came out of that vessel, and the three bulls with him, and one of those three was white like that bull, and one of them was red as blood, and one black: and that white bull departed from them.,And they began to bring forth beasts of the field and birds, so that there arose different genera: lions, tigers, wolves, dogs, hyenas, wild boars, foxes, squirrels, swine, falcons, vultures, kites, eagles, and ravens; and among them was born a white bull. And they began to bite one another; but that white bull which was born amongst them begat a wild ass and a white bull with it, and the,wild asses multiplied. But that bull which was born from him begat a black wild boar and a white",sheep; and the former begat many boars, but that sheep begat twelve sheep. And when those twelve sheep had grown, they gave up one of them to the asses, and those asses again gave up that sheep to the wolves, and that sheep grew up among the wolves. And the Lord brought the eleven sheep to live with it and to pasture with it among the wolves: and they multiplied and became many flocks of sheep. And the wolves began to fear them, and they oppressed them until they destroyed their little ones, and they cast their young into a river of much water: but those sheep began to,cry aloud on account of their little ones, and to complain unto their Lord. And a sheep which had been saved from the wolves fled and escaped to the wild asses; and I saw the sheep how they lamented and cried, and besought their Lord with all their might, till that Lord of the sheep descended at the voice of the sheep from a lofty abode, and came to them and pastured them. And He called that sheep which had escaped the wolves, and spake with it concerning the wolves that it should,admonish them not to touch the sheep. And the sheep went to the wolves according to the word of the Lord, and another sheep met it and went with it, and the two went and entered together into the assembly of those wolves, and spake with them and admonished them not to touch the,sheep from henceforth. And thereupon I saw the wolves, and how they oppressed the sheep,exceedingly with all their power; and the sheep cried aloud. And the Lord came to the sheep and they began to smite those wolves: and the wolves began to make lamentation; but the sheep became",quiet and forthwith ceased to cry out. And I saw the sheep till they departed from amongst the wolves; but the eyes of the wolves were blinded, and those wolves departed in pursuit of the sheep,with all their power. And the Lord of the sheep went with them, as their leader, and all His sheep,followed Him: and his face was dazzling and glorious and terrible to behold. But the wolves",began to pursue those sheep till they reached a sea of water. And that sea was divided, and the water stood on this side and on that before their face, and their Lord led them and placed Himself between,them and the wolves. And as those wolves did not yet see the sheep, they proceeded into the midst of that sea, and the wolves followed the sheep, and those wolves ran after them into that sea.,And when they saw the Lord of the sheep, they turned to flee before His face, but that sea gathered itself together, and became as it had been created, and the water swelled and rose till it covered,those wolves. And I saw till all the wolves who pursued those sheep perished and were drowned.",But the sheep escaped from that water and went forth into a wilderness, where there was no water and no grass; and they began to open their eyes and to see; and I saw the Lord of the sheep,pasturing them and giving them water and grass, and that sheep going and leading them. And that,sheep ascended to the summit of that lofty rock, and the Lord of the sheep sent it to them. And after that I saw the Lord of the sheep who stood before them, and His appearance was great and,terrible and majestic, and all those sheep saw Him and were afraid before His face. And they all feared and trembled because of Him, and they cried to that sheep with them which was amongst,them: \' We are not able to stand before our Lord or to behold Him.\' And that sheep which led them again ascended to the summit of that rock, but the sheep began to be blinded and to wander,from the way which he had showed them, but that sheep wot not thereof. And the Lord of the sheep was wrathful exceedingly against them, and that sheep discovered it, and went down from the summit of the rock, and came to the sheep, and found the greatest part of them blinded and fallen,away. And when they saw it they feared and trembled at its presence, and desired to return to their,folds. And that sheep took other sheep with it, and came to those sheep which had fallen away, and began to slay them; and the sheep feared its presence, and thus that sheep brought back those,sheep that had fallen away, and they returned to their folds. And I saw in this vision till that sheep became a man and built a house for the Lord of the sheep, and placed all the sheep in that house.,And I saw till this sheep which had met that sheep which led them fell asleep: and I saw till all the great sheep perished and little ones arose in their place, and they came to a pasture, and,approached a stream of water. Then that sheep, their leader which had become a man, withdrew,from them and fell asleep, and all the sheep sought it and cried over it with a great crying. And I saw till they left off crying for that sheep and crossed that stream of water, and there arose the two sheep as leaders in the place of those which had led them and fallen asleep (lit. \' had fallen asleep and led,them \'). And I saw till the sheep came to a goodly place, and a pleasant and glorious land, and I saw till those sheep were satisfied; and that house stood amongst them in the pleasant land.,And sometimes their eyes were opened, and sometimes blinded, till another sheep arose and led them and brought them all back, and their eyes were opened.,And the dogs and the foxes and the wild boars began to devour those sheep till the Lord of the sheep raised up another sheep a ram from their",midst, which led them. And that ram began to butt on either side those dogs, foxes, and wild,boars till he had destroyed them all. And that sheep whose eyes were opened saw that ram, which was amongst the sheep, till it forsook its glory and began to butt those sheep, and trampled upon them, and behaved itself,unseemly. And the Lord of the sheep sent the lamb to another lamb and raised it to being a ram and leader of the sheep instead of that",ram which had forsaken its glory. And it went to it and spake to it alone, and raised it to being a ram, and made it the prince and leader of the sheep; but during all these things those dogs,oppressed the sheep. And the first ram pursued that second ram, and that second ram arose and fled before it; and I saw till those dogs pulled,down the first ram. And that second ram arose",and led the little sheep. And those sheep grew and multiplied; but all the dogs, and foxes, and wild boars feared and fled before it, and that ram butted and killed the wild beasts, and those wild beasts had no longer any power among the,sheep and robbed them no more of ought. And that ram begat many sheep and fell asleep; and a little sheep became ram in its stead, and became prince and leader of those sheep.,And that house became great and broad, and it was built for those sheep: (and) a tower lofty and great was built on the house for the Lord of the sheep, and that house was low, but the tower was elevated and lofty, and the Lord of the sheep stood on that tower and they offered a full table before Him.,And again I saw those sheep that they again erred and went many ways, and forsook that their house, and the Lord of the sheep called some from amongst the sheep and sent them to the sheep,,but the sheep began to slay them. And one of them was saved and was not slain, and it sped away and cried aloud over the sheep; and they sought to slay it, but the Lord of the sheep saved it from,the sheep, and brought it up to me, and caused it to dwell there. And many other sheep He sent to those sheep to testify unto them and lament over them. And after that I saw that when they forsook the house of the Lord and His tower they fell away entirely, and their eyes were blinded; and I saw the Lord of the sheep how He wrought much slaughter amongst them in their herds until,those sheep invited that slaughter and betrayed His place. And He gave them over into the hands of the lions and tigers, and wolves and hyenas, and into the hand of the foxes, and to all the wild,beasts, and those wild beasts began to tear in pieces those sheep. And I saw that He forsook that their house and their tower and gave them all into the hand of the lions, to tear and devour them,,into the hand of all the wild beasts. And I began to cry aloud with all my power, and to appeal to the Lord of the sheep, and to represent to Him in regard to the sheep that they were devoured,by all the wild beasts. But He remained unmoved, though He saw it, and rejoiced that they were devoured and swallowed and robbed, and left them to be devoured in the hand of all the beasts.,And He called seventy shepherds, and cast those sheep to them that they might pasture them, and He spake to the shepherds and their companions: \' Let each individual of you pasture the sheep,henceforward, and everything that I shall command you that do ye. And I will deliver them over unto you duly numbered, and tell you which of them are to be destroyed-and them destroy ye.\' And,He gave over unto them those sheep. And He called another and spake unto him: \' Observe and mark everything that the shepherds will do to those sheep; for they will destroy more of them than",I have commanded them. And every excess and the destruction which will be wrought through the shepherds, record (namely) how many they destroy according to my command, and how many according to their own caprice: record against every individual shepherd all the destruction he,effects. And read out before me by number how many they destroy, and how many they deliver over for destruction, that I may have this as a testimony against them, and know every deed of the shepherds, that I may comprehend and see what they do, whether or not they abide by my,command which I have commanded them. But they shall not know it, and thou shalt not declare it to them, nor admonish them, but only record against each individual all the destruction which,the shepherds effect each in his time and lay it all before me.\' And I saw till those shepherds pastured in their season, and they began to slay and to destroy more than they were bidden, and they delivered,those sheep into the hand of the lions. And the lions and tigers eat and devoured the greater part of those sheep, and the wild boars eat along with them; and they burnt that tower and demolished,that house. And I became exceedingly sorrowful over that tower because that house of the sheep was demolished, and afterwards I was unable to see if those sheep entered that house.,And the shepherds and their associates delivered over those sheep to all the wild beasts, to devour them, and each one of them received in his time a definite number: it was written by the other,in a book how many each one of them destroyed of them. And each one slew and destroyed many",more than was prescribed; and I began to weep and lament on account of those sheep. And thus in the vision I saw that one who wrote, how he wrote down every one that was destroyed by those shepherds, day by day, and carried up and laid down and showed actually the whole book to the Lord of the sheep-(even) everything that they had done, and all that each one of them had made,away with, and all that they had given over to destruction. And the book was read before the Lord of the sheep, and He took the book from his hand and read it and sealed it and laid it down.,And forthwith I saw how the shepherds pastured for twelve hours, and behold three of those sheep turned back and came and entered and began to build up all that had fallen down of that,house; but the wild boars tried to hinder them, but they were not able. And they began again to build as before, and they reared up that tower, and it was named the high tower; and they began again to place a table before the tower, but all the bread on it was polluted and not pure.,And as touching all this the eyes of those sheep were blinded so that they saw not, and (the eyes of) their shepherds likewise; and they delivered them in large numbers to their shepherds for,destruction, and they trampled the sheep with their feet and devoured them. And the Lord of the sheep remained unmoved till all the sheep were dispersed over the field and mingled with them (i.e. the,beasts), and they (i.e. the shepherds) did not save them out of the hand of the beasts. And this one who wrote the book carried it up, and showed it and read it before the Lord of the sheep, and implored Him on their account, and besought Him on their account as he showed Him all the doings,of the shepherds, and gave testimony before Him against all the shepherds. And he took the actual book and laid it down beside Him and departed. 90. And I saw till that in this manner thirty-five shepherds undertook the pasturing (of the sheep), and they severally completed their periods as did the first; and others received them into their,hands, to pasture them for their period, each shepherd in his own period. And after that I saw in my vision all the birds of heaven coming, the eagles, the vultures, the kites, the ravens; but the eagles led all the birds; and they began to devour those sheep, and to pick out their eyes and to,devour their flesh. And the sheep cried out because their flesh was being devoured by the birds,,and as for me I looked and lamented in my sleep over that shepherd who pastured the sheep. And I saw until those sheep were devoured by the dogs and eagles and kites, and they left neither flesh nor skin nor sinew remaining on them till only their bones stood there: and their bones too fell,to the earth and the sheep became few. And I saw until that twenty-three had undertaken the pasturing and completed in their several periods fifty-eight times.",But behold lambs were borne by those white sheep, and they began to open their eyes and to see,,and to cry to the sheep. Yea, they cried to them, but they did not hearken to what they said to,them, but were exceedingly deaf, and their eyes were very exceedingly blinded. And I saw in the vision how the ravens flew upon those lambs and took one of those lambs, and dashed the sheep,in pieces and devoured them. And I saw till horns grew upon those lambs, and the ravens cast down their horns; and I saw till there sprouted a great horn of one of those sheep, and their eyes,were opened. And it looked at them and their eyes opened, and it cried to the sheep, and the,rams saw it and all ran to it. And notwithstanding all this those eagles and vultures and ravens and kites still kept tearing the sheep and swooping down upon them and devouring them: still the sheep remained silent, but the rams lamented and cried out. And those ravens fought and battled with it and sought to lay low its horn, but they had no power over it. All the eagles and vultures and ravens and kites were gathered together, and there came with them all the sheep of the field, yea, they all came together, and helped each other to break that horn of the ram.,And I saw till a great sword was given to the sheep, and the sheep proceeded against all the beasts of the field to slay them, and all the beasts and the birds of the heaven fled before their face. And I saw that man, who wrote the book according to the command of the Lord, till he opened that book concerning the destruction which those twelve last shepherds had wrought, and showed that they had destroyed much more than their predecessors, before the Lord of the sheep. And I saw till the Lord of the sheep came unto them and took in His hand the staff of His wrath, and smote the earth, and the earth clave asunder, and all the beasts and all the birds of the heaven fell from among those sheep, and were swallowed up in the earth and it covered them.,And I saw till a throne was erected in the pleasant land, and the Lord of the sheep sat Himself thereon, and the other took the sealed books and opened those books before the Lord of the sheep.,And the Lord called those men the seven first white ones, and commanded that they should bring before Him, beginning with the first star which led the way, all the stars whose privy members,were like those of horses, and they brought them all before Him. And He said to that man who wrote before Him, being one of those seven white ones, and said unto him: \' Take those seventy shepherds to whom I delivered the sheep, and who taking them on their own authority slew more,than I commanded them.\' And behold they were all bound, I saw, and they all stood before Him.,And the judgement was held first over the stars, and they were judged and found guilty, and went to the place of condemnation, and they were cast into an abyss, full of fire and flaming, and full,of pillars of fire. And those seventy shepherds were judged and found guilty, and they were cast,into that fiery abyss. And I saw at that time how a like abyss was opened in the midst of the earth, full of fire, and they brought those blinded sheep, and they were all judged and found guilty and,cast into this fiery abyss, and they burned; now this abyss was to the right of that house. And I saw those sheep burning and their bones burning.,And I stood up to see till they folded up that old house; and carried off all the pillars, and all the beams and ornaments of the house were at the same time folded up with it, and they carried,it off and laid it in a place in the south of the land. And I saw till the Lord of the sheep brought a new house greater and loftier than that first, and set it up in the place of the first which had beer folded up: all its pillars were new, and its ornaments were new and larger than those of the first, the old one which He had taken away, and all the sheep were within it.,And I saw all the sheep which had been left, and all the beasts on the earth, and all the birds of the heaven, falling down and doing homage to those sheep and making petition to and obeying,them in every thing. And thereafter those three who were clothed in white and had seized me by my hand who had taken me up before, and the hand of that ram also seizing hold of me, they,took me up and set me down in the midst of those sheep before the judgement took place. And those",sheep were all white, and their wool was abundant and clean. And all that had been destroyed and dispersed, and all the beasts of the field, and all the birds of the heaven, assembled in that house, and the Lord of the sheep rejoiced with great joy because they were all good and had returned to,His house. And I saw till they laid down that sword, which had been given to the sheep, and they brought it back into the house, and it was sealed before the presence of the Lord, and all the sheep,were invited into that house, but it held them not. And the eyes of them all were opened, and they,saw the good, and there was not one among them that did not see. And I saw that that house was large and broad and very full.,And I saw that a white bull was born, with large horns and all the beasts of the field and all the,birds of the air feared him and made petition to him all the time. And I saw till all their generations were transformed, and they all became white bulls; and the first among them became a lamb, and that lamb became a great animal and had great black horns on its head; and the Lord of the sheep,rejoiced over it and over all the oxen. And I slept in their midst: and I awoke and saw everything.",This is the vision which I saw while I slept, and I awoke and blessed the Lord of righteousness and,gave Him glory. Then I wept with a great weeping and my tears stayed not till I could no longer endure it: when I saw, they flowed on account of what I had seen; for everything shall come and,be fulfilled, and all the deeds of men in their order were shown to me. On that night I remembered the first dream, and because of it I wept and was troubled-because I had seen that vision.Section V. XCI-CIV (i.e. XCII, XCI.,XCIII.",XCI.",XCIV-CIV.). A Book of Exhortation and Promised Blessing for the Righteous and of Malediction and Woe for the Sinners."' "'. None
11. Cicero, On Divination, 1.1, 1.125, 1.127-1.128, 2.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Christians, on environmental determinism • Determination / apprehension / cognitio / ἐπιβολή • Galen, on environmental determinism • Ptolemy of Alexandria (Claudius Ptolemaeus), on astrological determinism • Socrates (church historian), on environmental determinism • astrometeorology, hard / strongly deterministic form of • cosmos, as deterministic • determinism,

 Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 140, 262; Green (2014) 84, 86; Isaac (2004) 87, 88, 99; Maso (2022) 83, 145; Struck (2016) 195, 203

1.1. Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci mantikh/n appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt.

1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat.

1.127. Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium.
1.128. Non est igitur, ut mirandum sit ea praesentiri a divitibus, quae nusquam sint; sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. Atque ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iis progignuntur, sic in causis conditae sunt res futurae, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit. Atque ut ii, qui solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus motusque cognorunt, quo quidque tempore eorum futurum sit, multo ante praedicunt, sic, qui cursum rerum eventorumque consequentiam diuturnitate pertractata notaverunt, aut semper aut, si id difficile est, plerumque, quodsi ne id quidem conceditur, non numquam certe, quid futurum sit, intellegunt. Atque haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio, ducuntur a fato.
2.96. Quid? illudne dubium est, quin multi, cum ita nati essent, ut quaedam contra naturam depravata haberent, restituerentur et corrigerentur ab natura, cum se ipsa revocasset, aut arte atque medicina? ut, quorum linguae sic inhaererent, ut loqui non possent, eae scalpello resectae liberarentur. Multi etiam naturae vitium meditatione atque exercitatione sustulerunt, ut Demosthenem scribit Phalereus, cum rho dicere nequiret, exercitatione fecisse, ut planissume diceret. Quodsi haec astro ingenerata et tradita essent, nulla res ea mutare posset. Quid? dissimilitudo locorum nonne dissimilis hominum procreationes habet? quas quidem percurrere oratione facile est, quid inter Indos et Persas, Aethiopas et Syros differat corporibus, animis, ut incredibilis varietas dissimilitudoque sit.' '. None
1.1. And what do you say of the following story which we find in our annals? During the Veientian War, when Lake Albanus had overflowed its banks, a certain nobleman of Veii deserted to us and said that, according to the prophecies of the Veientian books, their city could not be taken while the lake was at flood, and that if its waters were permitted to overflow and take their own course to the sea the result would be disastrous to the Roman people; on the other hand, if the waters were drained off in such a way that they did not reach the sea the result would be to our advantage. In consequence of this announcement our forefathers dug that marvellous canal to drain off the waters from the Alban lake. Later when the Veientians had grown weary of war and had sent ambassadors to the Senate to treat for peace, one of them is reported to have said that the deserter had not dared to tell the whole of the prophecy contained in the Veientian books, for those books, he said, also foretold the early capture of Rome by the Gauls. And this, as we know, did occur six years after the fall of Veii. 45
1.1. Book I1 There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική — that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is — if only such a faculty exists — since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning gods, whereas, according to Platos interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning frenzy.
1.1. Why, my dear Quintus, said I, you are defending the very citadel of the Stoics in asserting the interdependence of these two propositions: if there is divination there are gods, and, if there are gods there is divination. But neither is granted as readily as you think. For it is possible that nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of a god, and it may be that there are gods without their having conferred any power of divination upon men.To this he replied, I, at any rate, find sufficient proof to satisfy me of the existence of the gods and of their concern in human affairs in my conviction that there are some kinds of divination which are clear and manifest. With your permission I will set forth my views on this subject, provided you are at leisure and have nothing else which you think should be preferred to such a discussion.

1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.

1.127. Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena.
1.128. Therefore it is not strange that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all things are, though, from the standpoint of time, they are not present. As in seeds there inheres the germ of those things which the seeds produce, so in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture, or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy, or when it is set free by sleep. Persons familiar with the rising, setting, and revolutions of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies, can tell long in advance where any one of these bodies will be at a given time. And the same thing may be said of men who, for a long period of time, have studied and noted the course of facts and the connexion of events, for they always know what the future will be; or, if that is putting it too strongly, they know in a majority of cases; or, if that will not be conceded either, then, surely, they sometimes know what the future will be. These and a few other arguments of the same kind for the existence of divination are derived from Fate. 57
2.96. Furthermore, is it not a well-known and undoubted fact that many persons who were born with certain natural defects have been restored completely by Nature herself, after she had resumed her sway, or by surgery or by medicine? For example, some, who were so tongue-tied that they could not speak, have had their tongues set free by a cut from the surgeons knife. Many more have corrected a natural defect by intelligent exertion. Demosthenes is an instance: according to the account given by Phalereus, he was unable to pronounce the Greek letter rho, but by repeated effort learned to articulate it perfectly. But if such defects had been engendered and implanted by a star nothing could have changed them. Do not unlike places produce unlike men? It would be an easy matter to sketch rapidly in passing the differences in mind and body which distinguish the Indians from the Persians and the Ethiopians from the Syrians — differences so striking and so pronounced as to be incredible.''. None
12. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.18, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determination / apprehension / cognitio / ἐπιβολή • Determinism • cosmos, as deterministic • determinism • determinism, • determinism,dialectic • self-determination,

 Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 141; Frede and Laks (2001) 96; Long (2006) 293; Maso (2022) 124, 127, 145, 148; Struck (2016) 195; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 125

1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so, he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. " '
1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato\'s Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render \'Providence\') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. ' "
2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. "". None
13. Polybius, Histories, 2.56, 3.9.8, 4.21, 4.21.3-4.21.4, 9.9.9-9.9.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Polybius, on environmental determinism • determinism • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, rarely suggested by Polybius • mousike, music, environmental determinism in

 Found in books: Gruen (2020) 59; Isaac (2004) 82; Konig and Wiater (2022) 267, 269, 271; Kowalzig (2007) 4, 290; König and Wiater (2022) 267, 269, 271

3.9.8. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ξένους ἐγένετο κίνημα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἂν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο καὶ παρασκευὴν πραγμάτων, ὅσον ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ.

4.21.3. βουλόμενοι δὲ μαλάττειν καὶ κιρνᾶν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὔθαδες καὶ σκληρόν, τά τε προειρημένα πάντα παρεισήγαγον, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις συνόδους κοινὰς καὶ θυσίας πλείστας ὁμοίως ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξὶ κατείθισαν, ἔτι δὲ χοροὺς παρθένων ὁμοῦ καὶ παίδων,
9.9.9. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐχ οὕτως τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἢ Καρχηδονίων ἐγκωμίου χάριν εἴρηταί μοι — τούτους μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις ἐπεσημηνάμην — τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἡγουμένων παρʼ ἀμφοτέροις καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων χειρίζειν παρʼ ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, 9.9.10. ἵνα τῶν μὲν ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, τὰ δʼ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται παράβολον ἔχειν τι καὶ κινδυνῶδες, τοὐναντίον ἀσφαλῆ μὲν τὴν τόλμαν, θαυμασίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀείμνηστον δὲ καὶ καλὴν ἔχει τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ κατορθωθέντα καὶ διαψευσθέντα παραπλησίως, ἐὰν μόνον σὺν νῷ γένηται τὰ πραττόμενα. Ἄτελλα,' '. None
2.56. 1. \xa0Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy,,2. \xa0it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I\xa0have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority.,3. \xa0In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements;,4. \xa0but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I\xa0must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I\xa0am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war.,5. \xa0This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work.,6. \xa0Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks.,7. \xa0In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery.,8. \xa0This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes.,9. \xa0Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history.,10. \xa0A\xa0historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace.,11. \xa0For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates,,12. \xa0since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners.,13. \xa0Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger.,14. \xa0Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise.,15. \xa0Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction.,16. \xa0So in every such case the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer. " '
3.9.8. \xa0Had not the mutinous outbreak among the mercenaries occurred, he would very soon, as far as it lay in his power, have created some other means and other resources for resuming the contest, <' "

4.21.3. \xa0The primitive Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I\xa0mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the natural character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I\xa0may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald, <' "
4.21. 1. \xa0Now all these practices I\xa0believe to have been introduced by the men of old time, not as luxuries and superfluities but because they had before their eyes the universal practice of personal manual labour in Arcadia, and in general the toilsomeness and hardship of the men's lives, as well as the harshness of character resulting from the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions usually prevailing in these parts â\x80\x94 conditions to which all men by their very nature must perforce assimilate themselves;,2. \xa0there being no other cause than this why separate nations and peoples dwelling widely apart differ so much from each other in character, feature, and colour as well as in the most of their pursuits.,3. \xa0The primitive Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I\xa0mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the natural character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I\xa0may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald,,9. \xa0but the Mantineans after their departure even made a solemn purification by offering piacular sacrifices and carrying them round their city and all their territory.,10. \xa0I\xa0have said so much on this subject firstly in order that the character of the Arcadian nation should not suffer for the crimes of one city, secondly to deter any other Arcadians from beginning to neglect music under the impression that its extensive practice in Arcadia serves no necessary purpose. I also spoke for the sake of the Cynaetheans themselves, in order that, if Heaven ever grant them better fortune, they may humanize themselves by turning their attention to education and especially to music; for by no other means can they hope to free themselves from that savagery which overtook them at this time.,12. \xa0Having now said all that occurred to me on the subject of this people I\xa0return to the point whence I\xa0digressed. " '
9.9.9. \xa0It is not for the purpose of extolling the Romans or the Carthaginians that I\xa0have offered these remarks â\x80\x94 I\xa0have often had occasion to bestow praise on both peoples â\x80\x94 but rather for the sake of the leaders of both these states, and of all, no matter where, who shall be charged with the conduct of public affairs, <' "9.9.10. \xa0so that by memory or actual sight of such actions as these, they be moved to emulation, and not shrink from undertaking designs, which may seem indeed to be fraught with risk and peril, but on the contrary are courageous without being hazardous, are admirable in their conception, and their excellence, whether the result be success or failure alike, will deserve to live in men's memories for ever, always provided that all that is done is the result of sound reasoning.\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. Tarentum <"". None
14. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 15.11-15.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • self-determination

 Found in books: Garcia (2021) 66; Wilson (2018) 22

15.11. And the inheritance of sinners is destruction and darkness, And their iniquities shall pursue them unto Sheol beneath.
15.11. because he failed to know the one who formed him and inspired him with an active soul and breathed into him a living spirit." 15.12. Their inheritance shall not be found of their children, 15.12. But he considered our existence an idle game,and life a festival held for profit,for he says one must get money however one can, even by base means. 15.13. For sins shall lay waste the houses of sinners. And sinners shall perish for ever in the day of the Lord’s judgement, 15.13. For this man, more than all others, knows that he sins when he makes from earthy matter fragile vessels and graven images.''. None
15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Galen, accuses Stoics of indeterminism • Indeterminism • Judaea, region of,and determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • Stoics, and determinism • astrometeorology, hard / strongly deterministic form of • astrometeorology, soft / non-deterministic form of • causes, causal determinism • determinism • determinism, • determinism, and fatalism • determinism, and predictability • determinism, hard • determinism, logical • determinism, soft • freedom, and determinism • indeterminism/antideterminism

 Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 84, 138, 140, 143, 144, 146, 262; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 7, 145, 147; Graver (2007) 232; Green (2014) 86, 89; Hankinson (1998) 223, 224, 225, 255, 258, 259, 261; Linjamaa (2019) 136; Maso (2022) 41, 84, 85, 86, 127; Taylor (2012) 88, 89; Wilson (2018) 19

16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determination / apprehension / cognitio / ἐπιβολή • determinism,

 Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 84; Maso (2022) 124

17. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 183; Wilson (2018) 24

18. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • deterministic

 Found in books: Garcia (2021) 50, 54; Wilson (2018) 23; deSilva (2022) 60

19. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Garcia (2021) 264; Wilson (2018) 23

20. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Periodization of history, defined • theme, defined

 Found in books: Collins (2016) 81; Trudinger (2004) 208

21. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 5.313, 5.584, 5.605-5.606, 5.621-5.625, 5.635-5.638 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus), defines Egypt and the Nile • virginity or chastity, as self determination or rebellion

 Found in books: Johnson (2008) 69, 70, 71; Manolaraki (2012) 152, 214

5.313. vel nos Emathiis ad Paeonas usque nivosos
5.584. corporis erubui, crimenque placere putavi.
5.605. ut fugere accipitrem penna trepidante columbae, 5.606. ut solet accipiter trepidas urgere columbas.
5.621. Mota dea est spissisque ferens e nubibus unam 5.622. me super iniecit. Lustrat caligine tectam 5.623. amnis et ignarus circum cava nubila quaerit. 5.625. et bis “io Arethusa io Arethusa!” vocavit.
5.635. ros cadit, et citius, quam nunc tibi facta renarro, 5.636. in latices mutor. Sed enim cognoscit amatas 5.637. amnis aquas, positoque viri, quod sumpserat, ore 5.638. vertitur in proprias, ut se mihi misceat, undas.' '. None
5.313. he could not speak; he stood, complete with arms,
5.584. may be enlarged according to great need.
5.605. a fringe of trees, encircling as a wreath 5.606. its compassed waters, with a leafy veil
5.621. fell from her loosened tunic.—This mishap, 5.622. o perfect was her childish innocence, 5.623. increased her virgin grief.— 5.625. urged on his chariot, and inspired his steeds;
5.635. and Arethusa lies a moon-like pool, 5.636. of silvered narrow horns. There stood the Nymph, 5.637. revered above all others in that land, 5.638. whose name was Cyane. From her that pond' '. None
22. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 47-48 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, determinism • Stoicism, determinism • determinism • freedom, and determinism

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998) 345; Malherbe et al (2014) 302; Wilson (2018) 28, 29

47. for that is the only quality in us which the Father, who created us, thought deserving of freedom; and, unloosing the bonds of necessity, he let it go unrestrained, bestowing on it that most admirable gift and most connected with himself, the power, namely, of spontaneous will, as far as he was able to receive it; for the irrational animals, in whose soul there is not that especial gift tending to freedom, namely, mind, are put under the yoke and have bridles put in their mouths, and so are given unto men to be their slaves, as servants are given to their masters. But man, who has had bestowed on him a voluntary and self-impelling intellect, and who for the most part puts forth his energies in accordance with deliberate purpose, very properly receives blame for the offences which he designedly commits, and praise for the good actions which he intentionally performs. '48. For, in the case of other plants and other animals, we cannot call either the good that is caused by them deserving of praise, nor the evil that they do deserving of blame; for all their motions in either direction, and, all their changes, have no design about them, but are involuntary. But the soul of man, being the only one which has received from God the power of voluntary motion, and which in this respect has been made to resemble God, and being as far as possible emancipated from the authority of that grievous and severe mistress, necessity, may rightly be visited with reproach if she does not pay due honour to the being who has emancipated her. And therefore, in such a case, she will most deservedly suffer the implacable punishment denounced against slavish and ungrateful minds. '. None
23. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • humanity, justice defining

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 180; Wilson (2018) 28

24. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.4.18, 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • Stoics/Stoicism, as determinists • determinism • self-determination,

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 103; Linjamaa (2019) 136; Wilson (2018) 17; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 122, 128

4.18. HE who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take the treatise on the active powers ( ὁρμή ), and see how I have studied it. I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making progress: but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will ( προαίρεσις ) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed abort with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles τὰ προηγούμενα ) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus say this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the perturbations ( πάθη ) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish. What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! 0 the great benefactor who points out the way! To Triptolemus all men have erectedtemples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?
4.1. HE is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ( ὁρμαί ) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ( ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι ). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free. If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις ) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugt to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume ( ὑποτάσσομεν ) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. —No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance? Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action ( ὁρμήν ) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements ( ὁρμάς , the acts) of God Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will ( τὰ προαιρετικὰ ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? He could not, and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole ( τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ( πανήγυρις ); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go. But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countece; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom ( καρπιοτήν ), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:— For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .) Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία ), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.''. None
25. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 10.277, 13.172-13.173, 18.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Judaea, region of,and determinism • determinism

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 221; Taylor (2012) 88, 89; Wilson (2018) 27, 30

10.277. ταῦτα πάντα ἐκεῖνος θεοῦ δείξαντος αὐτῷ συγγράψας κατέλειψεν: ὥστε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα σκοποῦντας θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ τῇ παρὰ θεοῦ τιμῇ τὸν Δανίηλον καὶ τοὺς ̓Επικουρείους ἐκ τούτων εὑρίσκειν πεπλανημένους,' "
13.172. οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἔργον εἶναι λέγουσιν, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνειν τε καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν ̓Εσσηνῶν γένος πάντων τὴν εἱμαρμένην κυρίαν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ μηδὲν ὃ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾶν." "13.173. Σαδδουκαῖοι δὲ τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς γινομένους καὶ τὰ χείρω παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀκριβεστέραν πεποίημαι δήλωσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βίβλῳ τῆς ̓Ιουδαϊκῆς πραγματείας." '
18.18. ̓Εσσηνοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν θεῷ καταλείπειν φιλεῖ τὰ πάντα ὁ λόγος, ἀθανατίζουσιν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς περιμάχητον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ δικαίου τὴν πρόσοδον.
18.18. τιμία δὲ ἦν ̓Αντωνία Τιβερίῳ εἰς τὰ πάντα συγγενείας τε ἀξιώματι, Δρούσου γὰρ ἦν ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ γυνή, καὶ ἀρετῇ τοῦ σώφρονος: νέα γὰρ χηρεύειν παρέμεινεν γάμῳ τε ἀπεῖπεν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον καίπερ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ κελεύοντός τινι γαμεῖσθαι, καὶ λοιδοριῶν ἀπηλλαγμένον διεσώσατο αὐτῆς τὸν βίον.''. None
10.277. All these things did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him, insomuch that such as read his prophecies, and see how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honor wherewith God honored Daniel; and may thence discover how the Epicureans are in an error,
13.172. Now for the Pharisees, they say that some actions, but not all, are the work of fate, and some of them are in our own power, and that they are liable to fate, but are not caused by fate. But the sect of the Essenes affirm, that fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination. 13.173. And for the Sadducees, they take away fate, and say there is no such thing, and that the events of human affairs are not at its disposal; but they suppose that all our actions are in our own power, so that we are ourselves the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from our own folly. However, I have given a more exact account of these opinions in the second book of the Jewish War.
18.18. 5. The doctrine of the Essenes is this: That all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for;
18.18. Now Antonia was greatly esteemed by Tiberius on all accounts, from the dignity of her relation to him, who had been his brother Drusus’s wife, and from her eminent chastity; for though she was still a young woman, she continued in her widowhood, and refused all other matches, although Augustus had enjoined her to be married to somebody else; yet did she all along preserve her reputation free from reproach.''. None
26. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 2.119-2.129, 2.131-2.139, 2.141-2.149, 2.151-2.159, 2.161-2.166 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, determinism • Stoicism, determinism • determinism • determinism/fate • deterministic

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 205, 211; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 102; Garcia (2021) 213, 216; Malherbe et al (2014) 311; Wilson (2018) 26, 27, 30

2.119. Τρία γὰρ παρὰ ̓Ιουδαίοις εἴδη φιλοσοφεῖται, καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἱρετισταὶ Φαρισαῖοι, τοῦ δὲ Σαδδουκαῖοι, τρίτον δέ, ὃ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σεμνότητα ἀσκεῖν, ̓Εσσηνοὶ καλοῦνται, ̓Ιουδαῖοι μὲν γένος ὄντες, φιλάλληλοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλέον. 2.121. τὸν μὲν γάμον καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ διαδοχὴν οὐκ ἀναιροῦντες, τὰς δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀσελγείας φυλαττόμενοι καὶ μηδεμίαν τηρεῖν πεπεισμένοι τὴν πρὸς ἕνα πίστιν.' "2.122. Καταφρονηταὶ δὲ πλούτου, καὶ θαυμάσιον αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινωνικόν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν κτήσει τινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπερέχοντα: νόμος γὰρ τοὺς εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν εἰσιόντας δημεύειν τῷ τάγματι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥστε ἐν ἅπασιν μήτε πενίας ταπεινότητα φαίνεσθαι μήθ' ὑπεροχὴν πλούτου, τῶν δ' ἑκάστου κτημάτων ἀναμεμιγμένων μίαν ὥσπερ ἀδελφοῖς ἅπασιν οὐσίαν εἶναι." "2.123. κηλῖδα δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸ ἔλαιον, κἂν ἀλειφθῇ τις ἄκων, σμήχεται τὸ σῶμα: τὸ γὰρ αὐχμεῖν ἐν καλῷ τίθενται λευχειμονεῖν τε διαπαντός. χειροτονητοὶ δ' οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμεληταὶ καὶ ἀδιαίρετοι πρὸς ἁπάντων εἰς τὰς χρείας ἕκαστοι." "2.124. Μία δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν πόλις ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστῃ μετοικοῦσιν πολλοί. καὶ τοῖς ἑτέρωθεν ἥκουσιν αἱρετισταῖς πάντ' ἀναπέπταται τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἴδια, καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὐ πρότερον εἶδον εἰσίασιν ὡς συνηθεστάτους:" "2.125. διὸ καὶ ποιοῦνται τὰς ἀποδημίας οὐδὲν μὲν ὅλως ἐπικομιζόμενοι, διὰ δὲ τοὺς λῃστὰς ἔνοπλοι. κηδεμὼν δ' ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τοῦ τάγματος ἐξαιρέτως τῶν ξένων ἀποδείκνυται ταμιεύων ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια." '2.126. καταστολὴ δὲ καὶ σχῆμα σώματος ὅμοιον τοῖς μετὰ φόβου παιδαγωγουμένοις παισίν. οὔτε δὲ ἐσθῆτας οὔτε ὑποδήματα ἀμείβουσι πρὶν διαρραγῆναι τὸ πρότερον παντάπασιν ἢ δαπανηθῆναι τῷ χρόνῳ.' "2.127. οὐδὲν δ' ἐν ἀλλήλοις οὔτ' ἀγοράζουσιν οὔτε πωλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ χρῄζοντι διδοὺς ἕκαστος τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ παρ' ἐκείνου χρήσιμον ἀντικομίζεται: καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως ἀκώλυτος ἡ μετάληψις αὐτοῖς παρ' ὧν ἂν θέλωσιν." '2.128. Πρός γε μὴν τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβεῖς ἰδίως: πρὶν γὰρ ἀνασχεῖν τὸν ἥλιον οὐδὲν φθέγγονται τῶν βεβήλων, πατρίους δέ τινας εἰς αὐτὸν εὐχὰς ὥσπερ ἱκετεύοντες ἀνατεῖλαι. 2.129. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἃς ἕκαστοι τέχνας ἴσασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν διαφίενται, καὶ μέχρι πέμπτης ὥρας ἐργασάμενοι συντόνως πάλιν εἰς ἓν συναθροίζονται χωρίον, ζωσάμενοί τε σκεπάσμασιν λινοῖς οὕτως ἀπολούονται τὸ σῶμα ψυχροῖς ὕδασιν, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁγνείαν εἰς ἴδιον οἴκημα συνίασιν, ἔνθα μηδενὶ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἐπιτέτραπται παρελθεῖν: αὐτοί τε καθαροὶ καθάπερ εἰς ἅγιόν τι τέμενος παραγίνονται τὸ δειπνητήριον.' "
2.131. προκατεύχεται δ' ὁ ἱερεὺς τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ γεύσασθαί τινα πρὶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἀθέμιτον: ἀριστοποιησάμενος δ' ἐπεύχεται πάλιν: ἀρχόμενοί τε καὶ παυόμενοι γεραίρουσι θεὸν ὡς χορηγὸν τῆς ζωῆς. ἔπειθ' ὡς ἱερὰς καταθέμενοι τὰς ἐσθῆτας πάλιν ἐπ' ἔργα μέχρι δείλης τρέπονται." "2.132. δειπνοῦσι δ' ὁμοίως ὑποστρέψαντες συγκαθεζομένων τῶν ξένων, εἰ τύχοιεν αὐτοῖς παρόντες. οὔτε δὲ κραυγή ποτε τὸν οἶκον οὔτε θόρυβος μιαίνει, τὰς δὲ λαλιὰς ἐν τάξει παραχωροῦσιν ἀλλήλοις." "2.133. καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ὡς μυστήριόν τι φρικτὸν ἡ τῶν ἔνδον σιωπὴ καταφαίνεται, τούτου δ' αἴτιον ἡ διηνεκὴς νῆψις καὶ τὸ μετρεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς τροφὴν καὶ ποτὸν μέχρι κόρου." "2.134. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι μὴ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν προσταξάντων ἐνεργοῦσι, δύο δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτοῖς αὐτεξούσια, ἐπικουρία καὶ ἔλεος: βοηθεῖν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἀξίοις, ὁπόταν δέωνται, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐφίεται καὶ τροφὰς ἀπορουμένοις ὀρέγειν. τὰς δὲ εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς μεταδόσεις οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιεῖσθαι δίχα τῶν ἐπιτρόπων." "2.135. ὀργῆς ταμίαι δίκαιοι, θυμοῦ καθεκτικοί, πίστεως προστάται, εἰρήνης ὑπουργοί. καὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἰσχυρότερον ὅρκου, τὸ δὲ ὀμνύειν αὐτοῖς περιίσταται χεῖρον τῆς ἐπιορκίας ὑπολαμβάνοντες: ἤδη γὰρ κατεγνῶσθαί φασιν τὸν ἀπιστούμενον δίχα θεοῦ." "2.136. σπουδάζουσι δ' ἐκτόπως περὶ τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν συντάγματα μάλιστα τὰ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐκλέγοντες: ἔνθεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς θεραπείαν παθῶν ῥίζαι τε ἀλεξητήριον καὶ λίθων ἰδιότητες ἀνερευνῶνται." "2.137. Τοῖς δὲ ζηλοῦσιν τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἡ πάροδος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔξω μένοντι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποτίθενται δίαιταν ἀξινάριόν τε καὶ τὸ προειρημένον περίζωμα καὶ λευκὴν ἐσθῆτα δόντες." '2.138. ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πεῖραν ἐγκρατείας δῷ, πρόσεισιν μὲν ἔγγιον τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ καθαρωτέρων τῶν πρὸς ἁγνείαν ὑδάτων μεταλαμβάνει, παραλαμβάνεται δὲ εἰς τὰς συμβιώσεις οὐδέπω. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τῆς καρτερίας ἐπίδειξιν δυσὶν ἄλλοις ἔτεσιν τὸ ἦθος δοκιμάζεται καὶ φανεὶς ἄξιος οὕτως εἰς τὸν ὅμιλον ἐγκρίνεται.' "2.139. πρὶν δὲ τῆς κοινῆς ἅψασθαι τροφῆς ὅρκους αὐτοῖς ὄμνυσι φρικώδεις, πρῶτον μὲν εὐσεβήσειν τὸ θεῖον, ἔπειτα τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια φυλάξειν καὶ μήτε κατὰ γνώμην βλάψειν τινὰ μήτε ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος, μισήσειν δ' ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀδίκους καὶ συναγωνιεῖσθαι τοῖς δικαίοις:" "
2.141. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀγαπᾶν ἀεὶ καὶ τοὺς ψευδομένους προβάλλεσθαι: χεῖρας κλοπῆς καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνοσίου κέρδους καθαρὰν φυλάξειν καὶ μήτε κρύψειν τι τοὺς αἱρετιστὰς μήθ' ἑτέροις αὐτῶν τι μηνύσειν, κἂν μέχρι θανάτου τις βιάζηται." '2.142. πρὸς τούτοις ὄμνυσιν μηδενὶ μὲν μεταδοῦναι τῶν δογμάτων ἑτέρως ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς μετέλαβεν, ἀφέξεσθαι δὲ λῃστείας καὶ συντηρήσειν ὁμοίως τά τε τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν βιβλία καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα. τοιούτοις μὲν ὅρκοις τοὺς προσιόντας ἐξασφαλίζονται.' "2.143. Τοὺς δ' ἐπ' ἀξιοχρέοις ἁμαρτήμασιν ἁλόντας ἐκβάλλουσι τοῦ τάγματος. ὁ δ' ἐκκριθεὶς οἰκτίστῳ πολλάκις μόρῳ διαφθείρεται: τοῖς γὰρ ὅρκοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐνδεδεμένος οὐδὲ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις τροφῆς δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν, ποηφαγῶν δὲ καὶ λιμῷ τὸ σῶμα τηκόμενος διαφθείρεται." '2.144. διὸ δὴ πολλοὺς ἐλεήσαντες ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἀναπνοαῖς ἀνέλαβον, ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν τὴν μέχρι θανάτου βάσανον ἡγούμενοι.' "2.145. Περὶ δὲ τὰς κρίσεις ἀκριβέστατοι καὶ δίκαιοι, καὶ δικάζουσι μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν ἑκατὸν συνελθόντες, τὸ δ' ὁρισθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀκίνητον. σέβας δὲ μέγα παρ' αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὸν θεὸν τοὔνομα τοῦ νομοθέτου, κἂν βλασφημήσῃ τις εἰς τοῦτον κολάζεται θανάτῳ." '2.146. τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις ὑπακούουσιν καὶ τοῖς πλείοσιν ἐν καλῷ: δέκα γοῦν συγκαθεζομένων οὐκ ἂν λαλήσειέν τις ἀκόντων τῶν ἐννέα.' "2.147. καὶ τὸ πτύσαι δὲ εἰς μέσους ἢ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος φυλάσσονται καὶ ταῖς ἑβδομάσιν ἔργων ἐφάπτεσθαι διαφορώτατα ̓Ιουδαίων ἁπάντων: οὐ μόνον γὰρ τροφὰς ἑαυτοῖς πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμέρας παρασκευάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ πῦρ ἐναύοιεν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σκεῦός τι μετακινῆσαι θαρροῦσιν οὐδὲ ἀποπατεῖν." "2.148. ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις ἡμέραις βόθρον ὀρύσσοντες βάθος ποδιαῖον τῇ σκαλίδι, τοιοῦτον γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διδόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀξινίδιον τοῖς νεοσυστάτοις, καὶ περικαλύψαντες θοιμάτιον, ὡς μὴ τὰς αὐγὰς ὑβρίζοιεν τοῦ θεοῦ, θακεύουσιν εἰς αὐτόν." "2.149. ἔπειτα τὴν ἀνορυχθεῖσαν γῆν ἐφέλκουσιν εἰς τὸν βόθρον: καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι τοὺς ἐρημοτέρους τόπους ἐκλεγόμενοι. καίπερ δὴ φυσικῆς οὔσης τῆς τῶν λυμάτων ἐκκρίσεως ἀπολούεσθαι μετ' αὐτὴν καθάπερ μεμιασμένοις ἔθιμον." "
2.151. καὶ μακρόβιοι μέν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑκατὸν παρατείνειν ἔτη, διὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς διαίτης ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν καὶ τὴν εὐταξίαν, καταφρονηταὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀλγηδόνας νικῶντες τοῖς φρονήμασιν, τὸν δὲ θάνατον, εἰ μετ' εὐκλείας πρόσεισι, νομίζοντες ἀθανασίας ἀμείνονα." "2.152. διήλεγξεν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἅπασιν τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ πρὸς ̔Ρωμαίους πόλεμος, ἐν ᾧ στρεβλούμενοί τε καὶ λυγιζόμενοι καιόμενοί τε καὶ κλώμενοι καὶ διὰ πάντων ὁδεύοντες τῶν βασανιστηρίων ὀργάνων, ἵν' ἢ βλασφημήσωσιν τὸν νομοθέτην ἢ φάγωσίν τι τῶν ἀσυνήθων, οὐδέτερον ὑπέμειναν παθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κολακεῦσαί ποτε τοὺς αἰκιζομένους ἢ δακρῦσαι." '2.153. μειδιῶντες δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ κατειρωνευόμενοι τῶν τὰς βασάνους προσφερόντων εὔθυμοι τὰς ψυχὰς ἠφίεσαν ὡς πάλιν κομιούμενοι.' "2.154. Καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν, καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος ὥσπερ εἱρκταῖς τοῖς σώμασιν ἴυγγί τινι φυσικῇ κατασπωμένας," "2.155. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμῶν, οἷα δὴ μακρᾶς δουλείας ἀπηλλαγμένας τότε χαίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέρεσθαι. καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοδοξοῦντες παισὶν ̔Ελλήνων ἀποφαίνονται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὠκεανὸν δίαιταν ἀποκεῖσθαι καὶ χῶρον οὔτε ὄμβροις οὔτε νιφετοῖς οὔτε καύμασι βαρυνόμενον, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ πραὺ̈ς ἀεὶ ζέφυρος ἐπιπνέων ἀναψύχει: ταῖς δὲ φαύλαις ζοφώδη καὶ χειμέριον ἀφορίζονται μυχὸν γέμοντα τιμωριῶν ἀδιαλείπτων." "2.156. δοκοῦσι δέ μοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ̔́Ελληνες τοῖς τε ἀνδρείοις αὐτῶν, οὓς ἥρωας καὶ ἡμιθέους καλοῦσιν, τὰς μακάρων νήσους ἀνατεθεικέναι, ταῖς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ψυχαῖς καθ' ᾅδου τὸν ἀσεβῶν χῶρον, ἔνθα καὶ κολαζομένους τινὰς μυθολογοῦσιν, Σισύφους καὶ Ταντάλους ̓Ιξίονάς τε καὶ Τιτυούς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀιδίους ὑφιστάμενοι τὰς ψυχάς, ἔπειτα εἰς προτροπὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀποτροπήν." '2.157. τούς τε γὰρ ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμείνους ἐλπίδι τιμῆς καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν, τῶν τε κακῶν ἐμποδίζεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς δέει προσδοκώντων, εἰ καὶ λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν ἀθάνατον τιμωρίαν ὑφέξειν. 2.158. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ̓Εσσηνοὶ περὶ ψυχῆς θεολογοῦσιν ἄφυκτον δέλεαρ τοῖς ἅπαξ γευσαμένοις τῆς σοφίας αὐτῶν καθιέντες.' "2.159. Εἰσὶν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς οἳ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προγινώσκειν ὑπισχνοῦνται, βίβλοις ἱεραῖς καὶ διαφόροις ἁγνείαις καὶ προφητῶν ἀποφθέγμασιν ἐμπαιδοτριβούμενοι: σπάνιον δ' εἴ ποτε ἐν ταῖς προαγορεύσεσιν ἀστοχοῦσιν." "
2.161. δοκιμάζοντες μέντοι τριετίᾳ τὰς γαμετάς, ἐπειδὰν τρὶς καθαρθῶσιν εἰς πεῖραν τοῦ δύνασθαι τίκτειν, οὕτως ἄγονται. ταῖς δ' ἐγκύμοσιν οὐχ ὁμιλοῦσιν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὸ μὴ δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ τέκνων χρείαν γαμεῖν. λουτρὰ δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἀμπεχομέναις ἐνδύματα, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν περιζώματι. τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔθη τοῦδε τοῦ τάγματος." '2.162. Δύο δὲ τῶν προτέρων Φαρισαῖοι μὲν οἱ μετὰ ἀκριβείας δοκοῦντες ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὴν πρώτην ἀπάγοντες αἵρεσιν εἱμαρμένῃ τε καὶ θεῷ προσάπτουσι πάντα, 2.163. καὶ τὸ μὲν πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κεῖσθαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ εἰς ἕκαστον καὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην: ψυχήν τε πᾶσαν μὲν ἄφθαρτον, μεταβαίνειν δὲ εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μόνην, τὰς δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἀιδίῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι. 2.164. Σαδδουκαῖοι δέ, τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα, τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην παντάπασιν ἀναιροῦσιν καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔξω τοῦ δρᾶν τι κακὸν ἢ ἐφορᾶν τίθενται:' "2.165. φασὶν δ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκλογῇ τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν προκεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ γνώμην ἑκάστου τούτων ἑκατέρῳ προσιέναι. ψυχῆς τε τὴν διαμονὴν καὶ τὰς καθ' ᾅδου τιμωρίας καὶ τιμὰς ἀναιροῦσιν." '2.166. καὶ Φαρισαῖοι μὲν φιλάλληλοί τε καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὁμόνοιαν ἀσκοῦντες, Σαδδουκαίων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ ἦθος ἀγριώτερον αἵ τε ἐπιμιξίαι πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπηνεῖς ὡς πρὸς ἀλλοτρίους. τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν ἐν ̓Ιουδαίοις φιλοσοφούντων εἶχον εἰπεῖν.' '. None
2.119. 2. For there are three philosophical sects among the Jews. The followers of the first of which are the Pharisees; of the second, the Sadducees; and the third sect, which pretends to a severer discipline, are called Essenes. These last are Jews by birth, and seem to have a greater affection for one another than the other sects have. 2.121. They do not absolutely deny the fitness of marriage, and the succession of mankind thereby continued; but they guard against the lascivious behavior of women, and are persuaded that none of them preserve their fidelity to one man. 2.122. 3. These men are despisers of riches, and so very communicative as raises our admiration. Nor is there anyone to be found among them who hath more than another; for it is a law among them, that those who come to them must let what they have be common to the whole order,—insomuch that among them all there is no appearance of poverty, or excess of riches, but every one’s possessions are intermingled with every other’s possessions; and so there is, as it were, one patrimony among all the brethren. 2.123. They think that oil is a defilement; and if anyone of them be anointed without his own approbation, it is wiped off his body; for they think to be sweaty is a good thing, as they do also to be clothed in white garments. They also have stewards appointed to take care of their common affairs, who every one of them have no separate business for any, but what is for the use of them all. 2.124. 4. They have no one certain city, but many of them dwell in every city; and if any of their sect come from other places, what they have lies open for them, just as if it were their own; and they go in to such as they never knew before, as if they had been ever so long acquainted with them. 2.125. For which reason they carry nothing at all with them when they travel into remote parts, though still they take their weapons with them, for fear of thieves. Accordingly, there is, in every city where they live, one appointed particularly to take care of strangers, and to provide garments and other necessaries for them. 2.126. But the habit and management of their bodies is such as children use who are in fear of their masters. Nor do they allow of the change of garments, or of shoes, till they be first entirely torn to pieces or worn out by time. 2.127. Nor do they either buy or sell anything to one another; but every one of them gives what he hath to him that wanteth it, and receives from him again in lieu of it what may be convenient for himself; and although there be no requital made, they are fully allowed to take what they want of whomsoever they please. 2.128. 5. And as for their piety towards God, it is very extraordinary; for before sunrising they speak not a word about profane matters, but put up certain prayers which they have received from their forefathers, as if they made a supplication for its rising. 2.129. After this every one of them are sent away by their curators, to exercise some of those arts wherein they are skilled, in which they labor with great diligence till the fifth hour. After which they assemble themselves together again into one place; and when they have clothed themselves in white veils, they then bathe their bodies in cold water. And after this purification is over, they every one meet together in an apartment of their own, into which it is not permitted to any of another sect to enter; while they go, after a pure manner, into the dining-room, as into a certain holy temple,
2.131. but a priest says grace before meat; and it is unlawful for anyone to taste of the food before grace be said. The same priest, when he hath dined, says grace again after meat; and when they begin, and when they end, they praise God, as he that bestows their food upon them; after which they lay aside their white garments, and betake themselves to their labors again till the evening; 2.132. then they return home to supper, after the same manner; and if there be any strangers there, they sit down with them. Nor is there ever any clamor or disturbance to pollute their house, but they give every one leave to speak in their turn; 2.133. which silence thus kept in their house appears to foreigners like some tremendous mystery; the cause of which is that perpetual sobriety they exercise, and the same settled measure of meat and drink that is allotted to them, and that such as is abundantly sufficient for them. 2.134. 6. And truly, as for other things, they do nothing but according to the injunctions of their curators; only these two things are done among them at everyone’s own free will, which are to assist those that want it, and to show mercy; for they are permitted of their own accord to afford succor to such as deserve it, when they stand in need of it, and to bestow food on those that are in distress; but they cannot give any thing to their kindred without the curators. 2.135. They dispense their anger after a just manner, and restrain their passion. They are eminent for fidelity, and are the ministers of peace; whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury for they say that he who cannot be believed without swearing by God is already condemned. 2.136. They also take great pains in studying the writings of the ancients, and choose out of them what is most for the advantage of their soul and body; and they inquire after such roots and medicinal stones as may cure their distempers. 2.137. 7. But now, if anyone hath a mind to come over to their sect, he is not immediately admitted, but he is prescribed the same method of living which they use, for a year, while he continues excluded; and they give him also a small hatchet, and the fore-mentioned girdle, and the white garment. 2.138. And when he hath given evidence, during that time, that he can observe their continence, he approaches nearer to their way of living, and is made a partaker of the waters of purification; yet is he not even now admitted to live with them; for after this demonstration of his fortitude, his temper is tried two more years; and if he appear to be worthy, they then admit him into their society. 2.139. And before he is allowed to touch their common food, he is obliged to take tremendous oaths, that, in the first place, he will exercise piety towards God, and then that he will observe justice towards men, and that he will do no harm to any one, either of his own accord, or by the command of others; that he will always hate the wicked, and be assistant to the righteous;
2.141. that he will be perpetually a lover of truth, and propose to himself to reprove those that tell lies; that he will keep his hands clear from theft, and his soul from unlawful gains; and that he will neither conceal anything from those of his own sect, nor discover any of their doctrines to others, no, not though anyone should compel him so to do at the hazard of his life. 2.142. Moreover, he swears to communicate their doctrines to no one any otherwise than as he received them himself; that he will abstain from robbery, and will equally preserve the books belonging to their sect, and the names of the angels or messengers. These are the oaths by which they secure their proselytes to themselves. 2.143. 8. But for those that are caught in any heinous sins, they cast them out of their society; and he who is thus separated from them does often die after a miserable manner; for as he is bound by the oath he hath taken, and by the customs he hath been engaged in, he is not at liberty to partake of that food that he meets with elsewhere, but is forced to eat grass, and to famish his body with hunger, till he perish; 2.144. for which reason they receive many of them again when they are at their last gasp, out of compassion to them, as thinking the miseries they have endured till they came to the very brink of death to be a sufficient punishment for the sins they had been guilty of. 2.145. 9. But in the judgments they exercise they are most accurate and just, nor do they pass sentence by the votes of a court that is fewer than a hundred. And as to what is once determined by that number, it is unalterable. What they most of all honor, after God himself, is the name of their legislator Moses, whom, if anyone blaspheme, he is punished capitally. 2.146. They also think it a good thing to obey their elders, and the major part. Accordingly, if ten of them be sitting together, no one of them will speak while the other nine are against it. 2.147. They also avoid spitting in the midst of them, or on the right side. Moreover, they are stricter than any other of the Jews in resting from their labors on the seventh day; for they not only get their food ready the day before, that they may not be obliged to kindle a fire on that day, but they will not remove any vessel out of its place, nor go to stool thereon. 2.148. Nay, on theother days they dig a small pit, a foot deep, with a paddle (which kind of hatchet is given them when they are first admitted among them); and covering themselves round with their garment, that they may not affront the Divine rays of light, they ease themselves into that pit, 2.149. after which they put the earth that was dug out again into the pit; and even this they do only in the more lonely places, which they choose out for this purpose; and although this easement of the body be natural, yet it is a rule with them to wash themselves after it, as if it were a defilement to them.
2.151. They are long-lived also, insomuch that many of them live above a hundred years, by means of the simplicity of their diet; nay, as I think, by means of the regular course of life they observe also. They condemn the miseries of life, and are above pain, by the generosity of their mind. And as for death, if it will be for their glory, they esteem it better than living always; 2.152. and indeed our war with the Romans gave abundant evidence what great souls they had in their trials, wherein, although they were tortured and distorted, burnt and torn to pieces, and went through all kinds of instruments of torment, that they might be forced either to blaspheme their legislator, or to eat what was forbidden them, yet could they not be made to do either of them, no, nor once to flatter their tormentors, or to shed a tear; 2.153. but they smiled in their very pains, and laughed those to scorn who inflicted the torments upon them, and resigned up their souls with great alacrity, as expecting to receive them again. 2.154. 11. For their doctrine is this: That bodies are corruptible, and that the matter they are made of is not permanent; but that the souls are immortal, and continue forever; and that they come out of the most subtile air, and are united to their bodies as to prisons, into which they are drawn by a certain natural enticement; 2.155. but that when they are set free from the bonds of the flesh, they then, as released from a long bondage, rejoice and mount upward. And this is like the opinions of the Greeks, that good souls have their habitations beyond the ocean, in a region that is neither oppressed with storms of rain or snow, or with intense heat, but that this place is such as is refreshed by the gentle breathing of a west wind, that is perpetually blowing from the ocean; while they allot to bad souls a dark and tempestuous den, full of never-ceasing punishments. 2.156. And indeed the Greeks seem to me to have followed the same notion, when they allot the islands of the blessed to their brave men, whom they call heroes and demigods; and to the souls of the wicked, the region of the ungodly, in Hades, where their fables relate that certain persons, such as Sisyphus, and Tantalus, and Ixion, and Tityus, are punished; which is built on this first supposition, that souls are immortal; and thence are those exhortations to virtue, and dehortations from wickedness collected; 2.157. whereby good men are bettered in the conduct of their life by the hope they have of reward after their death; and whereby the vehement inclinations of bad men to vice are restrained, by the fear and expectation they are in, that although they should lie concealed in this life, they should suffer immortal punishment after their death. 2.158. These are the Divine doctrines of the Essenes about the soul, which lay an unavoidable bait for such as have once had a taste of their philosophy. 2.159. 12. There are also those among them who undertake to foretell things to come, by reading the holy books, and using several sorts of purifications, and being perpetually conversant in the discourses of the prophets; and it is but seldom that they miss in their predictions.
2.161. However, they try their spouses for three years; and if they find that they have their natural purgations thrice, as trials that they are likely to be fruitful, they then actually marry them. But they do not use to accompany with their wives when they are with child, as a demonstration that they do not marry out of regard to pleasure, but for the sake of posterity. Now the women go into the baths with some of their garments on, as the men do with somewhat girded about them. And these are the customs of this order of Essenes. 2.162. 14. But then as to the two other orders at first mentioned: the Pharisees are those who are esteemed most skillful in the exact explication of their laws, and introduce the first sect. These ascribe all to fate or providence, and to God, 2.163. and yet allow, that to act what is right, or the contrary, is principally in the power of men, although fate does cooperate in every action. They say that all souls are incorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies,—but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment. 2.164. But the Sadducees are those that compose the second order, and take away fate entirely, and suppose that God is not concerned in our doing or not doing what is evil; 2.165. and they say, that to act what is good, or what is evil, is at men’s own choice, and that the one or the other belongs so to every one, that they may act as they please. They also take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul, and the punishments and rewards in Hades. 2.166. Moreover, the Pharisees are friendly to one another, and are for the exercise of concord, and regard for the public; but the behavior of the Sadducees one towards another is in some degree wild, and their conversation with those that are of their own party is as barbarous as if they were strangers to them. And this is what I had to say concerning the philosophic sects among the Jews.' '. None
27. New Testament, Acts, 2.37-2.39, 24.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • determinism/fate

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 149, 196; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 428; Wilson (2018) 283

2.37. Ἀκούσαντες δὲ κατενύγησαν τὴν καρδίαν, εἶπάν τε πρὸς τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀποστόλους Τί ποιήσωμεν, 2.38. ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί; Πέτρος δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς Μετανοήσατε, καὶ βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν, καὶ λήμψεσθε τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος· 2.39. ὑμῖν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπαγγελία καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰς μακρὰν ὅσους ἂν προσκαλέσηται Κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν.
24.2. κληθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἤρξατο κατηγορεῖν ὁ Τέρτυλλος λέγων Πολλῆς εἰρήνης τυγχάνοντες διὰ σοῦ καὶ διορθωμάτων γινομένων τῷ ἔθνει τούτῳ διὰ τῆς σῆς προνοίας''. None
2.37. Now when they heard this, they were cut to the heart, and said to Peter and the rest of the apostles, "Brothers, what shall we do?" 2.38. Peter said to them, "Repent, and be baptized, everyone of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. 2.39. For to you is the promise, and to your children, and to all who are far off, even as many as the Lord our God will call to himself."
24.2. When he was called, Tertullus began to accuse him, saying, "Seeing that by you we enjoy much peace, and that excellent measures are coming to this nation, ''. None
28. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.3-1.11, 2.1-2.3, 2.8-2.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Wilson (2018) 100, 273, 293; deSilva (2022) 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 269

1.3. Εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ εὐλογήσας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ, 1.4. καθὼς ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, 1.5. προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἱοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, 1.6. εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἧς ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ, 1.7. ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων, 1.8. κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1.9. ἧς ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει γνωρίσας ἡμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ ἣν προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ 1.10. εἰς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ χριστῷ, τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· ἐν αὐτῷ, 1.11. ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκληρώθημεν προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ,
2.1. καὶ ὑμᾶς ὄντας νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν, 2.2. ἐν αἷς ποτὲ περιεπατήσατε κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, κατὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ νῦν ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθίας· 2.3. ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημέν ποτε ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν, καὶ ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί·—
2.8. καὶ τοῦτο 2.9. οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον· οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μή τις καυχήσηται.''. None
1.3. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ; 1.4. even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and without blemish before him in love; 1.5. having predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his desire, 1.6. to the praise of the glory of his grace, by which he freely bestowed favor on us in the Beloved, 1.7. in whom we have our redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace, 1.8. which he made to abound toward us in all wisdom and prudence, 1.9. making known to us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him 1.10. to an administration of the fullness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things on the earth, in him; 1.11. in whom also we were assigned an inheritance, having been foreordained according to the purpose of him who works all things after the counsel of his will;
2.1. You were made alive when you were dead in transgressions and sins, 2.2. in which you once walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the powers of the air, the spirit who now works in the sons of disobedience; 2.3. among whom we also all once lived in the lust of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.
2.8. for by grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, 2.9. not of works, that no one would boast. ''. None
29. New Testament, Galatians, 1.13-1.17, 2.12-2.14, 3.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, determinism • Stoicism, determinism • determinism • determinism/fate • genuine humanness, defined by Epictetus • gospel, defining the • human beings, defined by Epictetus • human vocation, defined by Epictetus • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, avoided by Paul

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 26, 428; Dürr (2022) 145; Gruen (2020) 190; Malherbe et al (2014) 296, 300; Pierce et al. (2022) 30; deSilva (2022) 60

1.13. Ἠκούσατε γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφήν ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, ὅτι καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ἐδίωκον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπόρθουν αὐτήν, 1.14. καὶ προέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει μου, περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων. 1.15. Ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἀφορίσας μεἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μουκαὶκαλέσαςδιὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1.16. ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εὐθέως οὐ προσανεθέμην σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι, 1.17. οὐδὲ ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀποστόλους, ἀλλὰ ἀπῆλθον εἰς Ἀραβίαν, καὶ πάλιν ὑπέστρεψα εἰς Δαμασκόν.
2.12. πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἐλθεῖν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν· ὅτε δὲ ἦλθον, ὑπέστελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς. 2.13. καὶ συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὥστε καὶ Βαρνάβας συναπήχθη αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποκρίσει. 2.14. ἀλλʼ ὅτε εἶδον ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, εἶπον τῷ Κηφᾷ ἔμπροσθεν πάντων Εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων ἐθνικῶς καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαΐζειν;
3.8. προϊδοῦσα δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῖ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ θεὸς προευηγγελίσατο τῷ Ἀβραὰμ ὅτιἘνευλογηθήσονται ἐν σοὶ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.''. None
1.13. For you have heard of my way ofliving in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure Ipersecuted the assembly of God, and ravaged it. " "1.14. I advanced inthe Jews' religion beyond many of my own age among my countrymen, beingmore exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers. " "1.15. Butwhen it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me from my mother'swomb, and called me through his grace, " "1.16. to reveal his Son in me,that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I didn't immediately conferwith flesh and blood, " '1.17. nor did I go up to Jerusalem to those whowere apostles before me, but I went away into Arabia. Then I returnedto Damascus.
2.12. For before some people came fromJames, he ate with the Gentiles. But when they came, he drew back andseparated himself, fearing those who were of the circumcision. 2.13. And the rest of the Jews joined him in his hypocrisy; so that evenBarnabas was carried away with their hypocrisy. 2.14. But when I sawthat they didn\'t walk uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, Isaid to Peter before them all, "If you, being a Jew, live as theGentiles do, and not as the Jews do, why do you compel the Gentiles tolive as the Jews do?
3.8. The Scripture,foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached thegospel beforehand to Abraham, saying, "In you all the nations will beblessed." '". None
30. New Testament, Philippians, 2.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • determinism

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 123; Wilson (2018) 69, 293

2.13. θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας·''. None
2.13. For it is God who works in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure. ''. None
31. New Testament, Romans, 8.28-8.29, 9.13, 9.16-9.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Paul, determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • Stoicism, determinism • determinism • determinism, philosophical • gospel, defining the

 Found in books: Garcia (2021) 50; Linjamaa (2019) 149, 150; Malherbe et al (2014) 310; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 238; Pierce et al. (2022) 30; Wilson (2018) 68, 69, 276, 293; deSilva (2022) 65

8.28. οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν θεὸν πάντα συνεργεῖ ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς οὖσιν. 8.29. ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς·
9.13. καθάπερ γέγραπταιΤὸν Ἰακὼβ ἠγάπησα, τὸν δὲ Ἠσαῦ ἐμίσησα.
9.16. ἄρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ θέλοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐλεῶντος θεοῦ. 9.17. λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφὴ τῷ Φαραὼ ὅτι Εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε ὅπως ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν δύναμίν μου, καὶ ὅπως διαγγελῇ τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ. 9.18. ἄρα οὖν ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλεισκληρύνει. 9.19. Ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν Τί ἔτι μέμφεται; 9.20. τῷ γὰρ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ τίς ἀνθέστηκεν; ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μενοῦνγε σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ;μὴ ἐρεῖ τὸ πλάσμα τῷ πλάσαντιΤί με ἐποίησας οὕτως; 9.21. ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίανὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν; 9.22. εἰ δὲ θέλων ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦἤνεγκενἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳσκεύη ὀργῆςκατηρτισμέναεἰς ἀπώλειαν, 9.23. ἵνα γνωρίσῃ τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ σκεύη ἐλέους, ἃ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν,''. None
8.28. We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose. 8.29. For whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers.
9.13. Even as it is written, "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated."
9.16. So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy. 9.17. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, "For this very purpose I caused you to be raised up, that I might show in you my power, and that my name might be published abroad in all the earth." 9.18. So then, he has mercy on whom he desires, and he hardens whom he desires. 9.19. You will say then to me, "Why does he still find fault? For who withstands his will?" 9.20. But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed ask him who formed it, "Why did you make me like this?"' "9.21. Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? " '9.22. What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath made for destruction, 9.23. and that he might make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he prepared beforehand for glory, ''. None
32. New Testament, John, 1.9-1.13, 8.44 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • determinism • determinism/fate • self-determination, αὐτεξούσιον

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 331, 428; Linjamaa (2019) 151; Wilson (2018) 14, 66, 225

1.9. Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον. 1.10. ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω. 1.11. Εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον. 1.12. ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, 1.13. οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.
8.44. ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν. ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἔστηκεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ. ὅταν λαλῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ, ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ.''. None
1.9. The true light that enlightens everyone was coming into the world. ' "1.10. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world didn't recognize him. " "1.11. He came to his own, and those who were his own didn't receive him. " "1.12. But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become God's children, to those who believe in his name: " '1.13. who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. ' "
8.44. You are of your Father, the devil, and you want to do the desires of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning, and doesn't stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks on his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it. "'. None
33. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 45.5, 62.1-62.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 257, 262; König and Wiater (2022) 257, 262

62.1. τοὺς μέντοι Μακεδόνας ὁ πρὸς Πῶρον ἀγὼν ἀμβλυτέρους ἐποίησε καὶ τοῦ πρόσω τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἔτι προελθεῖν ἐπέσχε. μόλις γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ὠσάμενοι δισμυρίοις πεζοῖς καὶ δισχιλίοις ἱππεῦσι παραταξάμενον, ἀντέστησαν ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βιαζομένῳ καὶ τὸν Γάγγην περᾶσαι ποταμόν, εὖρος μὲν αὐτοῦ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα σταδίων εἶναι πυνθανόμενοι καὶ βάθος ὀργυιὰς ἑκατόν, ἀντιπέρας δὲ τὰς ὄχθας ἀποκεκρύφθαι πλήθεσιν ὅπλων καὶ ἵππων καὶ ἐλεφάντων. 62.2. ἐλέγοντο γὰρ ὀκτὼ μὲν μυριάδας ἱπποτῶν, εἴκοσι δὲ πεζῶν, ἅρματα δὲ ὀκτακισχίλια καὶ μαχίμους ἐλέφαντας ἑξακισχιλίους ἔχοντες οἱ Γανδαριτῶν καὶ Πραισίων βασιλεῖς ὑπομένειν. καὶ κόμπος οὐκ ἦν περὶ ταῦτα. Ἀνδρόκοττος γὰρ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ βασιλεύσας Σελεύκῳ πεντακοσίους ἐλέφαντας ἐδωρήσατο, καὶ στρατοῦ μυριάσιν ἑξήκοντα τὴν Ἰνδικὴν ἐπῆλθεν ἅπασαν καταστρεφόμενος. 62.3. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ὑπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ ὀργῆς αὐτόν εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν καθείρξας ἔκειτο, χάριν οὐδεμίαν εἰδὼς τοῖς διαπεπραγμένοις εἰ μὴ περάσειε τὸν Γάγγην, ἀλλʼ ἐξομολόγησιν ἥττης τιθέμενος τὴν ἀναχώρησιν. ὡς δὲ οἵ τε φίλοι τὰ εἰκότα παρηγοροῦντες αὐτόν οἵ τε στρατιῶται κλαυθμῷ καὶ βοῇ προσιστάμενοι ταῖς θύραις ἱκέτευον, ἐπικλασθεὶς ἀνεζεύγνυε, πολλὰ πρὸς δόξαν ἀπατηλὰ καὶ σοφιστικὰ μηχανώμενος. 62.4. καὶ γὰρ ὅπλα μείζονα καὶ φάτνας ἵππων καὶ χαλινοὺς βαρυτέρους κατασκευάσας ἀπέλιπέ τε καὶ διέρριψεν ἱδρύσατο δὲ βωμοὺς θεῶν, οὓς μέχρι νῦν οἱ Πραισίων βασιλεῖς διαβαίνοντες σέβονται καὶ θύουσιν Ἑλληνικὰς θυσίας. Ἀνδρόκοττος δὲ μειράκιον ὢν αὐτόν Ἀλέξανδρον εἶδε, καὶ λέγεται πολλάκις εἰπεῖν ὕστερον ὡς παρʼ οὐδὲν ἦλθε τὰ πράγματα λαβεῖν Ἀλέξανδρος, μισουμένου τε καὶ καταφρονουμένου τοῦ βασιλέως διὰ μοχθηρίαν καὶ δυσγένειαν.' '. None
62.1. As for the Macedonians, however, their struggle with Porus blunted their courage and stayed their further advance into India. Alexander carried his conquests from the Indus to the Hyphasis ( Arrian, Anab. v. 25 ), subduing the Punjab. It was now September, 326 B.C. For having had all they could do to repulse an enemy who mustered only twenty thousand infantry and two thousand horse, they violently opposed Alexander when he insisted on crossing the river Ganges also, the width of which, as they learned, was thirty-two furlongs, its depth a hundred fathoms, while its banks on the further side were covered with multitudes of men-at-arms and horsemen and elephants. 62.2. For they were told that the kings of the Ganderites and Praesii were awaiting them with eighty thousand horsemen, two hundred thousand footmen, eight thousand chariots, and six thousand fighting elephants. And there was no boasting in these reports. For Androcottus, who reigned there not long afterwards, made a present to Seleucus of five hundred elephants, and with an army of six hundred thousand men overran and subdued all India. 62.3. At first, then, Alexander shut himself up in his tent from displeasure and wrath and lay there, feeling no gratitude for what he had already achieved unless he should cross the Ganges, nay, counting a retreat a confession of defeat. But his friends gave him fitting consolation, and his soldiers crowded about his door and besought him with loud cries and wailing, until at last he relented and began to break camp, resorting to many deceitful and fallacious devices for the enhancement of his fame. 62.4. For instance, he had armour prepared that was larger than usual, and mangers for horses that were higher, and bits that were heavier than those in common use, and left them scattered up and down. Moreover, he erected altars for the gods, which down to the present time are revered by the kings of the Praesii when they cross the river, and on them they offer sacrifices in the Hellenic manner. Androcottus, when he was a stripling, saw Alexander himself, and we are told that he often said in later times that Alexander narrowly missed making himself master of the country, since its king was hated and despised on account of his baseness and low birth. ' '. None
34. Plutarch, Mark Antony, 33.2-33.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 260; König and Wiater (2022) 260

33.2. ἦν γάρ τις ἀνὴρ σὺν αὐτῷ μαντικὸς ἀπʼ Αἰγύπτου τῶν τὰς γενέσεις ἐπισκοπούντων, ὃς εἴτε Κλεοπάτρᾳ χαριζόμενος εἴτε χρώμενος ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἐπαρρησιάζετο, λέγων τὴν τύχην αὐτοῦ λαμπροτάτην οὖσαν καὶ μεγίστην ὑπὸ τῆς Καίσαρος ἀμαυροῦσθαι, καὶ συνεβούλευε πορρωτάτω τοῦ νεανίσκου ποιεῖν ἑαυτόν. ὁ γὰρ σός, ἔφη, δαίμων τὸν τούτου φοβεῖται· καὶ γαῦρος ὢν καὶ ὑψηλὸς ὅταν ᾖ καθʼ ἑαυτόν, ὑπʼ ἐκείνου γίνεται ταπεινότερος ἐγγίσαντος καὶ ἀγεννέστερος. 33.3. καὶ μέντοι τὰ γινόμενα τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ μαρτυρεῖν ἐδόκει. λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι κληρουμένων μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἐφʼ ὅτῳ τύχοιεν ἑκάστοτε καὶ κυβευόντων ἔλαττον ἔχων ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἀπῄει. πολλάκις δὲ συμβαλόντων ἀλεκτρυόνας, πολλάκις δὲ μαχίμους ὄρτυγας, ἐνίκων οἱ Καίσαρος. ἐφʼ οἷς ἀνιώμενος ἀδήλως ὁ Ἀντώνιος καὶ μᾶλλόν τι τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ προσέχων, ἀπῆρεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἐγχειρίσας Καίσαρι τὰ οἰκεῖα· τὴν δὲ Ὀκταουίαν ἄχρι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπήγετο θυγατρίου γεγονότος αὐτοῖς.''. None
33.2. 33.3. ''. None
35. Plutarch, On Chance, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 269; König and Wiater (2022) 269

336d. tanding at Delphi, he cried out that it stood there as a monument to Greek licentiousness; and thus if one examine either the life or the tomb of Sardanapalus (for Ithink there is no difference between them), one would say that they are a monument to the bounty of Fortune. But if this be so, shall we allow Fortune to lay hold upon Alexander after Sardanapalus, and to lay claim to Alexander's greatness and power? For what greater gift did she bestow on him than those which other monarchs received at her hands: arms, horses, missiles, money, guardsmen? Let Fortune endeavour to make an Aridaeus great by these, if she can, or an Ochus or Oarse" ". None
36. Plutarch, Fabius, 2.4-2.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 263; König and Wiater (2022) 263

2.4. τὸν μὲν ὕπατον Γάιον Φλαμίνιον οὐδὲν ἤμβλυνε τούτων, ἄνδρα πρὸς τῷ φύσει θυμοειδεῖ καὶ φιλοτίμῳ μεγάλαις ἐπαιρόμενον εὐτυχίαις, ἃς πρόσθεν εὐτύχησε παραλόγως, τῆς τε βουλῆς ἀπᾳδούσης ἀπᾳδούσης with CS: ἀποκαλούσης . καὶ τοῦ συνάρχοντος ἐνισταμένου βίᾳ συμβαλὼν τοῖς Γαλάταις καὶ κρατήσας, Φάβιον δὲ τὰ μὲν σημεῖα, καίπερ ἁπτόμενα πολλῶν, ἧττον ὑπέθραττε διὰ τὴν ἀλογίαν· 2.5. τὴν δʼ ὀλιγότητα τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τὴν ἀχρηματίαν πυνθανόμενος καρτερεῖν παρεκάλει τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ μὴ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τούτῳ διὰ πολλῶν ἀγώνων ἠσκημένῃ στρατιᾷ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἐπιπέμποντας βοηθείας καὶ τὰς πόλεις διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντας αὐτὴν ἐᾶν περὶ αὑτῇ μαραίνεσθαι τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ Ἀννίβου, καθάπερ φλόγα λάμψασαν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς καὶ κούφης δυνάμεως.' '. None
2.4. The consul, Gaius Flaminius, was daunted by none of these things, for he was a man of a fiery and ambitious nature, and besides, he was elated by great successes which he had won before this, in a manner contrary to all expectation. He had, namely, although the senate dissented from his plan, and his colleague violently opposed it, joined battle with the Gauls and defeated them. Fabius also was less disturbed by the signs and portents, because he thought it would be absurd, although they had great effect upon many.
2.4. The consul, Gaius Flaminius, was daunted by none of these things, for he was a man of a fiery and ambitious nature, and besides, he was elated by great successes which he had won before this, in a manner contrary to all expectation. He had, namely, although the senate dissented from his plan, and his colleague violently opposed it, joined battle with the Gauls and defeated them. Fabius also was less disturbed by the signs and portents, because he thought it would be absurd, although they had great effect upon many. 2.5. But when he learned how few in number the enemy were, and how great was their lack of resources, he exhorted the Romans to bide their time, and not to give battle to a man who wielded an army trained by many contests for this very issue, but to send aid to their allies, to keep their subject cities well in hand, and to suffer the culminating vigour of Hannibal to sink and expire of itself, like a flame that flares up from scant and slight material.' '. None
37. Plutarch, Coriolanus, 1.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 261; König and Wiater (2022) 261

1.2. Γάϊος δὲ Μάρκιος, ὑπὲρ οὗ τάδε γέγραπται, τραφεὶς ὑπὸ μητρὶ χήρᾳ πατρὸς ὀρφανός, ἀπέδειξε τὴν ὀρφανίαν ἄλλα μὲν ἔχουσαν κακά, πρὸς δὲ τὸ γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν οὖσαν, ἄλλως δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ ψέγειν παρέχουσαν αὑτὴν ὡς ἀμελείᾳ διαφθείρουσαν. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ ἐμαρτύρησε καὶ τοῖς τὴν φύσιν ἡγουμένοις, ἐὰν οὖσα γενναία καὶ ἀγαθὴ παιδείας ἐνδεὴς γένηται, πολλὰ τοῖς χρηστοῖς ὁμοῦ φαῦλα συναποτίκτειν, ὥσπερ εὐγενῆ χώραν ἐν γεωργίᾳ θεραπείας μὴ τυχοῦσαν.''. None
1.2. ''. None
38. Plutarch, Pericles, 18.1, 22.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 263; König and Wiater (2022) 263

18.1. ἐν δὲ ταῖς στρατηγίαις εὐδοκίμει μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, οὔτε μάχης ἐχούσης πολλὴν ἀδηλότητα καὶ κίνδυνον ἑκουσίως ἁπτόμενος, οὔτε τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ παραβάλλεσθαι χρησαμένους τύχῃ λαμπρᾷ καὶ θαυμασθέντας ὡς μεγάλους ζηλῶν καὶ μιμούμενος στρατηγούς, ἀεί τε λέγων πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ὡς ὅσον ἐπʼ αὐτῷ μενοῦσιν ἀθάνατοι πάντα τὸν χρόνον.
22.1. ὅτι δʼ ὀρθῶς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων συνεῖχεν, ἐμαρτύρησεν αὐτῷ τὰ γενόμενα. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ Εὐβοεῖς ἀπέστησαν, ἐφʼ οὓς διέβη μετὰ δυνάμεως. εἶτʼ εὐθὺς ἀπηγγέλλοντο Μεγαρεῖς ἐκπεπολεμωμένοι καὶ στρατιὰ πολεμίων ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅροις τῆς Ἀττικῆς οὖσα, Πλειστώνακτος ἡγουμένου, βασιλέως Λακεδαιμονίων.''. None
18.1. In his capacity as general, he was famous above all things for his saving caution; he neither undertook of his own accord a battle involving much uncertainty and peril, nor did he envy and imitate those who took great risks, enjoyed brilliant good-fortune, and so were admired as great generals; and he was for ever saying to his fellow-citizens that, so far as lay in his power, they would remain alive forever and be immortals.
22.1. That he was right in seeking to confine the power of the Athenians within lesser Greece, was amply proved by what came to pass. To begin with, the Euboeans revolted, 446. B.C. and he crossed over to the island with a hostile force. Then straightway word was brought to him that the Megarians had gone over to the enemy, and that an army of the enemy was on the confines of Attica under the leadership of Pleistoanax, the king of the Lacedaemonians.''. None
39. Plutarch, Pompey, 1.1-1.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 261; König and Wiater (2022) 261

1.1. πρὸς Πομπήϊον ἔοικε τοῦτο παθεῖν ὁ Ῥωμαίων δῆμος εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ ὁ Αἰσχύλου Προμηθεὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἡρακλέα σωθεὶς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγων ἐχθροῦ πατρός μοι τοῦτο φίλτατον τέκνον . οὔτε γὰρ μῖσος οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν καὶ ἄγριον ἐπεδείξαντο Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ἕτερον στρατηγὸν ὡς τὸν Πομπηΐου πατέρα Στράβωνα, ζῶντος μὲν αὐτοῦ φοβούμενοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις δύναμιν (ἦν γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολεμικώτατος), 1.2. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπέθανε κεραυνωθείς, ἐκκομιζόμενον τὸ σῶμα κατασπάσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λέχους καὶ καθυβρίσαντες, οὔτε μὴν εὔνοιαν αὖ πάλιν σφοδροτέραν ἢ θᾶσσον ἀρξαμένην ἢ μᾶλλον εὐτυχοῦντι συνακμάσασαν ἢ πταίσαντι παραμείνασαν βεβαιότερον ἄλλος ἔσχε Ῥωμαίων ἢ Πομπήϊος.''. None
1.1. 1.2. ''. None
40. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • self-determination

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 224; Wilson (2018) 22

41. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism

 Found in books: Konig and Wiater (2022) 257, 262; König and Wiater (2022) 257, 262

42. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Firmicus Maternus, on environmental determinism of • Ptolemy of Alexandria (Claudius Ptolemaeus), on astrological determinism • astrology, and determinism

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998) 371; Isaac (2004) 100, 101

43. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.7.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • determinism/fate

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 430; Wilson (2018) 14

1.7.5. They conceive, then, of three kinds of men, spiritual, material, and animal, represented by Cain, Abel, and Seth. These three natures are no longer found in one person, but constitute various kinds of men. The material goes, as a matter of course, into corruption. The animal, if it make choice of the better part, finds repose in the intermediate place; but if the worse, it too shall pass into destruction. But they assert that the spiritual principles which have been sown by Achamoth, being disciplined and nourished here from that time until now in righteous souls (because when given forth by her they were yet but weak), at last attaining to perfection, shall be given as brides to the angels of the Saviour, while their animal souls of necessity rest for ever with the Demiurge in the intermediate place. And again subdividing the animal souls themselves, they say that some are by nature good, and others by nature evil. The good are those who become capable of receiving the spiritual seed; the evil by nature are those who are never able to receive that seed.''. None
44. Justin, First Apology, 43-44 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Zeno; defined God as logos • determinism

 Found in books: Sider (2001) 42; Wilson (2018) 46

43. But lest some suppose, from what has been said by us, that we say that whatever happens, happens by a fatal necessity, because it is foretold as known beforehand, this too we explain. We have learned from the prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments, and chastisements, and good rewards, are rendered according to the merit of each man's actions. Since if it be not so, but all things happen by fate, neither is anything at all in our own power. For if it be fated that this man, e.g., be good, and this other evil, neither is the former meritorious nor the latter to be blamed. And again, unless the human race have the power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not accountable for their actions, of whatever kind they be. But that it is by free choice they both walk uprightly and stumble, we thus demonstrate. We see the same man making a transition to opposite things. Now, if it had been fated that he were to be either good or bad, he could never have been capable of both the opposites, nor of so many transitions. But not even would some be good and others bad, since we thus make fate the cause of evil, and exhibit her as acting in opposition to herself; or that which has been already stated would seem to be true, that neither virtue nor vice is anything, but that things are only reckoned good or evil by opinion; which, as the true word shows, is the greatest impiety and wickedness. But this we assert is inevitable fate, that they who choose the good have worthy rewards, and they who choose the opposite have their merited awards. For not like other things, as trees and quadrupeds, which cannot act by choice, did God make man: for neither would he be worthy of reward or praise did he not of himself choose the good, but were created for this end; nor, if he were evil, would he be worthy of punishment, not being evil of himself, but being able to be nothing else than what he was made. "44. And the holy Spirit of prophecy taught us this, telling us by Moses that God spoke thus to the man first created: Behold, before your face are good and evil: choose the good. And again, by the other prophet Isaiah, that the following utterance was made as if from God the Father and Lord of all: Wash you, make you clean; put away evils from your souls; learn to do well; judge the orphan, and plead for the widow: and come and let us reason together, says the Lord: And if your sins be as scarlet, I will make them white as wool; and if they be red like as crimson, I will make them white as snow. And if you be willing and obey Me, you shall eat the good of the land; but if you do not obey Me, the sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. Isaiah 1:16, etc. And that expression, The sword shall devour you, does not mean that the disobedient shall be slain by the sword, but the sword of God is fire, of which they who choose to do wickedly become the fuel. Wherefore He says, The sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. And if He had spoken concerning a sword that cuts and at once dispatches, He would not have said, shall devour. And so, too, Plato, when he says, The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless, took this from the prophet Moses and uttered it. For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding the truth when they assert contradictories. So that what we say about future events being foretold, we do not say it as if they came about by a fatal necessity; but God foreknowing all that shall be done by all men, and it being His decree that the future actions of men shall all be recompensed according to their several value, He foretells by the Spirit of prophecy that He will bestow meet rewards according to the merit of the actions done, always urging the human race to effort and recollection, showing that He cares and provides for men. But by the agency of the devils death has been decreed against those who read the books of Hystaspes, or of the Sibyl, or of the prophets, that through fear they may prevent men who read them from receiving the knowledge of the good, and may retain them in slavery to themselves; which, however, they could not always effect. For not only do we fearlessly read them, but, as you see, bring them for your inspection, knowing that their contents will be pleasing to all. And if we persuade even a few, our gain will be very great; for, as good husbandmen, we shall receive the reward from the Master. ' "'. None
45. Justin, Second Apology, 7.5-7.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • determinism

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 123, 131; Wilson (2018) 46

7.5. Wherefore God delays causing the confusion and destruction of the whole world, by which the wicked angels and demons and men shall cease to exist, because of the seed of the Christians, who know that they are the cause of preservation in nature. Since, if it were not so, it would not have been possible for you to do these things, and to be impelled by evil spirits; but the fire of judgment would descend and utterly dissolve all things, even as formerly the flood left no one but him only with his family who is by us called Noah, and by you Deucalion, from whom again such vast numbers have sprung, some of them evil and others good. For so we say that there will be the conflagration, but not as the Stoics, according to their doctrine of all things being changed into one another, which seems most degrading. But neither do we affirm that it is by fate that men do what they do, or suffer what they suffer, but that each man by free choice acts rightly or sins; and that it is by the influence of the wicked demons that earnest men, such as Socrates and the like, suffer persecution and are in bonds, while Sardanapalus, Epicurus, and the like, seem to be blessed in abundance and glory. The Stoics, not observing this, maintained that all things take place according to the necessity of fate. But since God in the beginning made the race of angels and men with free-will, they will justly suffer in eternal fire the punishment of whatever sins they have committed. And this is the nature of all that is made, to be capable of vice and virtue. For neither would any of them be praiseworthy unless there were power to turn to both virtue and vice. And this also is shown by those men everywhere who have made laws and philosophized according to right reason, by their prescribing to do some things and refrain from others. Even the Stoic philosophers, in their doctrine of morals, steadily honour the same things, so that it is evident that they are not very felicitous in what they say about principles and incorporeal things. For if they say that human actions come to pass by fate, they will maintain either that God is nothing else than the things which are ever turning, and altering, and dissolving into the same things, and will appear to have had a comprehension only of things that are destructible, and to have looked on God Himself as emerging both in part and in whole in every wickedness; or that neither vice nor virtue is anything; which is contrary to every sound idea, reason, and sense. 7.6. Wherefore God delays causing the confusion and destruction of the whole world, by which the wicked angels and demons and men shall cease to exist, because of the seed of the Christians, who know that they are the cause of preservation in nature. Since, if it were not so, it would not have been possible for you to do these things, and to be impelled by evil spirits; but the fire of judgment would descend and utterly dissolve all things, even as formerly the flood left no one but him only with his family who is by us called Noah, and by you Deucalion, from whom again such vast numbers have sprung, some of them evil and others good. For so we say that there will be the conflagration, but not as the Stoics, according to their doctrine of all things being changed into one another, which seems most degrading. But neither do we affirm that it is by fate that men do what they do, or suffer what they suffer, but that each man by free choice acts rightly or sins; and that it is by the influence of the wicked demons that earnest men, such as Socrates and the like, suffer persecution and are in bonds, while Sardanapalus, Epicurus, and the like, seem to be blessed in abundance and glory. The Stoics, not observing this, maintained that all things take place according to the necessity of fate. But since God in the beginning made the race of angels and men with free-will, they will justly suffer in eternal fire the punishment of whatever sins they have committed. And this is the nature of all that is made, to be capable of vice and virtue. For neither would any of them be praiseworthy unless there were power to turn to both virtue and vice. And this also is shown by those men everywhere who have made laws and philosophized according to right reason, by their prescribing to do some things and refrain from others. Even the Stoic philosophers, in their doctrine of morals, steadily honour the same things, so that it is evident that they are not very felicitous in what they say about principles and incorporeal things. For if they say that human actions come to pass by fate, they will maintain either that God is nothing else than the things which are ever turning, and altering, and dissolving into the same things, and will appear to have had a comprehension only of things that are destructible, and to have looked on God Himself as emerging both in part and in whole in every wickedness; or that neither vice nor virtue is anything; which is contrary to every sound idea, reason, and sense. ''. None
46. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • birth (γένɛσις), determined • demons, defined • life, determined

 Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 150; Schibli (2002) 342

47. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • determinism • indeterminism/antideterminism • self-determination,

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 142, 143, 144, 153, 154, 156; Wilson (2018) 12; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 126

48. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • astrology, as a means of determining God’s will • rabbinic movement, use of term defined

 Found in books: Kalmin (1998) 118; Kalmin (2014) 192

98a. מבושם אני מוכר לך חייב להעמיד לו עד העצרת וישן משל אשתקד ומיושן משל ג\' שנים:,
98a. that is spiced, which is preserved and of lasting quality, that I am selling to you, then he bears ficial responsibility to provide him with wine that will keep until the festival of Shavuot. And if the seller said: I am selling you old wine, he is responsible to provide wine from the previous year. And if he said: I am selling you aged wine, he is responsible to provide wine that is from three years earlier.,Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: When they taught that the seller does not bear responsibility if the wine sours, that was only if it soured while in the jugs of the buyer; but if it soured in the jugs of the seller, then the buyer could say to him: This is your wine and this is your jug; take it and reimburse me. Since it soured while still in the original jugs, it was clearly flawed from the outset.,The Gemara asks: But even if the wine soured while in the jugs of the seller, what of it? Let the seller say to the buyer: You should not have left it for so long after purchasing it; I should not be responsible just because you chose to do so. The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary in a case where the buyer had said to him that he was purchasing the wine for cooking, in which case it is understood that he needs it to maintain its quality over a longer period of time, as only a small amount is used each time.,The Gemara asks: And what impelled Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, to interpret the mishna as referring to a case where the wine soured while in the jugs of the buyer, and where he had said to him that he wanted the wine for cooking? Instead, let him interpret it as referring to a case where the wine soured while in the jugs of the seller, and to where he had not said to him that he wanted the wine for cooking.,In explanation, Rava said: The mishna was difficult for him, as it teaches in the following clause: But if it is known of this seller that his wine always sours, then this sale is a mistaken transaction. With regard to this clause one could ask: Why is that so? Let the seller say to him: You should not have left it for so long after purchasing it. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from that clause that the mishna is referring to a case where the buyer had said to him that he wants the wine for cooking? The Gemara concludes: Yes, one can conclude from it that this is so.,And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef, as Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: With regard to wine, it is the owner’s poor fortune that causes the wine to go sour, as it is stated: “And moreover, wine is a treacherous dealer; the haughty man abides not” (Habakkuk 2:5), which is interpreted to mean that the wine of a haughty man will betray him, as it will sour as a punishment for his arrogance. Accordingly, since the wine soured after the buyer purchased it, he cannot place the blame upon the seller.,The Gemara offers additional homiletic interpretations of the verse just cited. Rav Mari said: One who is haughty is not accepted even by the members of his household, as it is stated: “The haughty man abides not” (Habakkuk 2:5). What does the phrase “abides yinveh not” mean? It means that even in his abode naveh, he is not accepted.,Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to anyone who glorifies himself by wearing a garment of the style worn by a Torah scholar, but in reality he is not a Torah scholar, he will not be brought within the boundary of the Holy One, Blessed be He, in the World-to-Come. This is alluded to by the fact that it is written in the verse here: “Abides yinveh not,” and the meaning of the word yinveh may be derived from that which is written in a verse there: “To Your holy habitation neveh (Exodus 15:13).,Rava says: In the case of one who sells a barrel of wine to a shopkeeper with the understanding that the wine will be for serving to the shopkeeper’s customers and that he will be liable to pay the seller only once the barrel is finished, and the wine spoiled when one-half or one-third of the wine still remained, the halakha is that the seller must accept back the remaining wine from the shopkeeper, as the shopkeeper is liable to pay only for the wine that he sells. And we stated this halakha only in a case where the shopkeeper had not switched the tap of the barrel; but if he had switched the tap, the seller does not have to take the wine back and the shopkeeper must pay for it all. And furthermore, we stated this halakha only where the wine soured before the market day arrived and the shopkeeper did not have the opportunity to sell the entire barrel; but if the wine was still of good quality when the market day arrived, then the seller does not have to take the wine back.,And Rava says: In the case of a vintner who enters a business venture with another person who will sell the wine for him and afterward they will split the profits, then if this middleman who receives the wine to sell does so with the understanding that he will bring it to the port of the city of Vol Shefat and sell it only there, and before he arrives there the price of the wine drops, the halakha is that the vintner must accept the loss.,With regard to the previous case, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the wine becomes vinegar before he reaches Vol Shefat, what is the halakha? Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: When we were in the study hall of Rav Kahana, he said to us: If the wine becomes vinegar, the vintner does not have to accept the loss; and this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who holds that as long as the wine is in the jug of the seller he is able to return it to the seller. The reason for this is that it is possible that the poor fortune of the middleman caused it to sour.,And there are those who say that even if the wine turns into vinegar, the vintner must also accept the loss. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.,The mishna teaches: If the seller said: I am selling you old wine, he is responsible to provide wine from the previous year. And if he said: I am selling you aged wine, he is responsible to provide wine that is from three years earlier.''. None
49. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46, 7.75, 10.34 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aspasius, Aristotelian, Emotion defined as the irrational part of the soul being moved by the pleasant or distressing • Determination / apprehension / cognitio / ἐπιβολή • Galen, accuses Stoics of indeterminism • Stoics, and determinism • causes, causal determinism • determinism • determinism,dialectic • freedom, and determinism

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 232; Hankinson (1998) 253; Long (2006) 237, 246; Maso (2022) 145; Sorabji (2000) 134

7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions." "
7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking." '
10.34. Opinion they also call conception or assumption, and declare it to be true and false; for it is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by evidence. Hence the introduction of the phrase, that which awaits confirmation, e.g. to wait and get close to the tower and then learn what it looks like at close quarters.They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined; and that there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words. So much, then, for his division and criterion in their main outline.But we must return to the letter.Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.'". None
50. Origen, On First Principles, 1.4.1, 2.9.5-2.9.6, 3.1, 3.1.4-3.1.6, 3.1.8, 3.1.14, 3.1.18, 3.1.21 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Self-determination [ Free will ] • determinism • determinism/fate • self-determination, • self-determination, human versus animal abilities for • self-determination, αὐτεξούσιον

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 431; Linjamaa (2019) 112, 122, 123, 124, 133, 146, 147, 148, 149; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 193; Wilson (2018) 15, 65, 66, 68, 69, 258; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 124, 125, 135

1.4.1. To exhibit the nature of defection or falling away, on the part of those who conduct themselves carelessly, it will not appear out of place to employ a similitude by way of illustration. Suppose, then, the case of one who had become gradually acquainted with the art or science, say of geometry or medicine, until he had reached perfection, having trained himself for a lengthened time in its principles and practice, so as to attain a complete mastery over the art: to such an one it could never happen, that, when he lay down to sleep in the possession of his skill, he should awake in a state of ignorance. It is not our purpose to adduce or to notice here those accidents which are occasioned by any injury or weakness, for they do not apply to our present illustration. According to our point of view, then, so long as that geometer or physician continues to exercise himself in the study of his art and in the practice of its principles, the knowledge of his profession abides with him; but if he withdraw from its practice, and lay aside his habits of industry, then, by his neglect, at first a few things will gradually escape him, then by and by more and more, until in course of time everything will be forgotten, and be completely effaced from the memory. It is possible, indeed, that when he has first begun to fall away, and to yield to the corrupting influence of a negligence which is small as yet, he may, if he be aroused and return speedily to his senses, repair those losses which up to that time are only recent, and recover that knowledge which hitherto had been only slightly obliterated from his mind. Let us apply this now to the case of those who have devoted themselves to the knowledge and wisdom of God, whose learning and diligence incomparably surpass all other training; and let us contemplate, according to the form of the similitude employed, what is the acquisition of knowledge, or what is its disappearance, especially when we hear from the apostle what is said of those who are perfect, that they shall behold face to face the glory of the Lord in the revelation of His mysteries.
2.9.5. Now, when we say that this world was established in the variety in which we have above explained that it was created by God, and when we say that this God is good, and righteous, and most just, there are numerous individuals, especially those who, coming from the school of Marcion, and Valentinus, and Basilides, have heard that there are souls of different natures, who object to us, that it cannot consist with the justice of God in creating the world to assign to some of His creatures an abode in the heavens, and not only to give such a better habitation, but also to grant them a higher and more honourable position; to favour others with the grant of principalities; to bestow powers upon some, dominions on others; to confer upon some the most honourable seats in the celestial tribunals; to enable some to shine with more resplendent glory, and to glitter with a starry splendour; to give to some the glory of the sun, to others the glory of the moon, to others the glory of the stars; to cause one star to differ from another star in glory. And, to speak once for all, and briefly, if the Creator God wants neither the will to undertake nor the power to complete a good and perfect work, what reason can there be that, in the creation of rational natures, i.e., of beings of whose existence He Himself is the cause, He should make some of higher rank, and others of second, or third, or of many lower and inferior degrees? In the next place, they object to us, with regard to terrestrial beings, that a happier lot by birth is the case with some rather than with others; as one man, e.g., is begotten of Abraham, and born of the promise; another, too, of Isaac and Rebekah, and who, while still in the womb, supplants his brother, and is said to be loved by God before he is born. Nay, this very circumstance — especially that one man is born among the Hebrews, with whom he finds instruction in the divine law; another among the Greeks, themselves also wise, and men of no small learning; and then another among the Ethiopians, who are accustomed to feed on human flesh; or among the Scythians, with whom parricide is an act sanctioned by law; or among the people of Taurus, where strangers are offered in sacrifice — is a ground of strong objection. Their argument accordingly is this: If there be this great diversity of circumstances, and this diverse and varying condition by birth, in which the faculty of free-will has no scope (for no one chooses for himself either where, or with whom, or in what condition he is born); if, then, this is not caused by the difference in the nature of souls, i.e., that a soul of an evil nature is destined for a wicked nation, and a good soul for a righteous nation, what other conclusion remains than that these things must be supposed to be regulated by accident and chance? And if that be admitted, then it will be no longer believed that the world was made by God, or administered by His providence; and as a consequence, a judgment of God upon the deeds of each individual will appear a thing not to be looked for. In which matter, indeed, what is clearly the truth of things is the privilege of Him alone to know who searches all things, even the deep things of God.' "2.9.6. We, however, although but men, not to nourish the insolence of the heretics by our silence, will return to their objections such answers as occur to us, so far as our abilities enable us. We have frequently shown, by those declarations which we were able to produce from the holy Scriptures, that God, the Creator of all things, is good, and just, and all-powerful. When He in the beginning created those beings which He desired to create, i.e., rational natures, He had no other reason for creating them than on account of Himself, i.e., His own goodness. As He Himself, then, was the cause of the existence of those things which were to be created, in whom there was neither any variation nor change, nor want of power, He created all whom He made equal and alike, because there was in Himself no reason for producing variety and diversity. But since those rational creatures themselves, as we have frequently shown, and will yet show in the proper place, were endowed with the power of free-will, this freedom of will incited each one either to progress by imitation of God, or reduced him to failure through negligence. And this, as we have already stated, is the cause of the diversity among rational creatures, deriving its origin not from the will or judgment of the Creator, but from the freedom of the individual will. Now God, who deemed it just to arrange His creatures according to their merit, brought down these different understandings into the harmony of one world, that He might adorn, as it were, one dwelling, in which there ought to be not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay (and some indeed to honour, and others to dishonour), with those different vessels, or souls, or understandings. And these are the causes, in my opinion, why that world presents the aspect of diversity, while Divine Providence continues to regulate each individual according to the variety of his movements, or of his feelings and purpose. On which account the Creator will neither appear to be unjust in distributing (for the causes already mentioned) to every one according to his merits; nor will the happiness or unhappiness of each one's birth, or whatever be the condition that falls to his lot, be deemed accidental; nor will different creators, or souls of different natures, be believed to exist." '

3.1.4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect cause of annulling his determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined himself ), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire.

3.1.4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an external cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is impossible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or evil, let the holder of this opinion turn his attention for a little upon himself, and carefully inspect the movements of his own mind, unless he has discovered already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that, after the statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the judgment of reason. For, to take an illustration: if, to a man who has determined to live continently and chastely, and to keep himself free from all pollution with women, a woman should happen to present herself, inciting and alluring him to act contrary to his purpose, that woman is not a complete and absolute cause or necessity of his transgressing, since it is in his power, by remembering his resolution, to bridle the incitements to lust, and by the stern admonitions of virtue to restrain the pleasure of the allurement that solicits him; so that, all feeling of indulgence being driven away, his determination may remain firm and enduring. Finally, if to any men of learning, strengthened by divine training, allurements of that kind present themselves, remembering immediately what they are, and calling to mind what has long been the subject of their meditation and instruction, and fortifying themselves by the support of a holier doctrine, they reject and repel all incitement to pleasure, and drive away opposing lusts by the interposition of the reason implanted within them.
3.1.5. Seeing, then, that these positions are thus established by a sort of natural evidence, is it not superfluous to throw back the causes of our actions on those things which happen to us from without, and thus transfer the blame from ourselves, on whom it wholly lies? For this is to say that we are like pieces of wood, or stones, which have no motion in themselves, but receive the causes of their motion from without. Now such an assertion is neither true nor becoming, and is invented only that the freedom of the will may be denied; unless, indeed, we are to suppose that the freedom of the will consists in this, that nothing which happens to us from without can incite us to good or evil. And if any one were to refer the causes of our faults to the natural disorder of the body, such a theory is proved to be contrary to the reason of all teaching. For, as we see in very many individuals, that after living unchastely and intemperately, and after being the captives of luxury and lust, if they should happen to be aroused by the word of teaching and instruction to enter upon a better course of life, there takes place so great a change, that from being luxurious and wicked men, they are converted into those who are sober, and most chaste and gentle; so, again, we see in the case of those who are quiet and honest, that after associating with restless and shameless individuals, their good morals are corrupted by evil conversation, and they become like those whose wickedness is complete. And this is the case sometimes with men of mature age, so that such have lived more chastely in youth than when more advanced years have enabled them to indulge in a freer mode of life. The result of our reasoning, therefore, is to show that those things which happen to us from without are not in our own power; but that to make a good or bad use of those things which do so happen, by help of that reason which is within us, and which distinguishes and determines how these things ought to be used, is within our power.
3.1.5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy the conception of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere constitution of the body, is absurd; for the disciplinary reason, taking hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for the better is most extensive — the most licentious men frequently becoming better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the most savage men passing into such a state of mildness, that those persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed, which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without.
3.1.6. And now, to confirm the deductions of reason by the authority of Scripture — viz., that it is our own doing whether we live rightly or not, and that we are not compelled, either by those causes which come to us from without, or, as some think, by the presence of fate— we adduce the testimony of the prophet Micah, in these words: If it has been announced to you, O man, what is good, or what the Lord requires of you, except that you should do justice, and love mercy, and be ready to walk with the Lord your God. Moses also speaks as follows: I have placed before your face the way of life and the way of death: choose what is good, and walk in it. Isaiah, moreover, makes this declaration: If you are willing, and hear me, you shall eat the good of the land. But if you be unwilling, and will not hear me, the sword shall consume you; for the mouth of the Lord has spoken this. In the Psalm, too, it is written: If My people had heard Me, if Israel had walked in My ways, I would have humbled her enemies to nothing; by which he shows that it was in the power of the people to hear, and to walk in the ways of God. The Saviour also saying, I say unto you, Resist not evil; and, Whoever shall be angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment; and, Whosoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart; and in issuing certain other commands — conveys no other meaning than this, that it is in our own power to observe what is commanded. And therefore we are rightly rendered liable to condemnation if we transgress those commandments which we are able to keep. And hence He Himself also declares: Every one who hears my words, and does them, I will show to whom he is like: he is like a wise man who built his house upon a rock, etc. So also the declaration: Whoever hears these things, and does them not, is like a foolish man, who built his house upon the sand, etc. Even the words addressed to those who are on His right hand, Come unto Me, all you blessed of My Father, etc.; for I was an hungered, and you gave Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave Me drink, manifestly show that it depended upon themselves, that either these should be deserving of praise for doing what was commanded and receiving what was promised, or those deserving of censure who either heard or received the contrary, and to whom it was said, Depart, you cursed, into everlasting fire. Let us observe also, that the Apostle Paul addresses us as having power over our own will, and as possessing in ourselves the causes either of our salvation or of our ruin: Do you despise the riches of His goodness, and of His patience, and of His long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But, according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you are treasuring up for yourself wrath on the day of judgment and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every one according to his work: to those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and immortality, eternal life; while to those who are contentious, and believe not the truth, but who believe iniquity, anger, indignation, tribulation, and distress, on every soul of man that works evil, on the Jew first, and (afterwards) on the Greek; but glory, and honour, and peace to every one that does good, to the Jew first, and (afterwards) to the Greek. You will find also innumerable other passages in holy Scripture, which manifestly show that we possess freedom of will. Otherwise there would be a contrariety in commandments being given us, by observing which we may be saved, or by transgressing which we may be condemned, if the power of keeping them were not implanted in us.
3.1.6. Now, that it is our business to live virtuously, and that God asks this of us, as not being dependent on Him nor on any other, nor, as some think, upon fate, but as being our own doing, the prophet Micah will prove when he says: If it has been announced to you, O man, what is good, or what does the Lord require of you, except to do justice and to love mercy? Moses also: I have placed before your face the way of life, and the way of death: choose what is good, and walk in it. Isaiah too: If you are willing, and hear me, you shall eat the good of the land; but if you be unwilling, and will not hear me, the sword will consume you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. And in the Psalms: If My people had heard Me, and Israel had walked in My ways, I would have humbled their enemies to nothing, and laid My hand upon those that afflicted them; showing that it was in the power of His people to hear and to walk in the ways of God. And the Saviour also, when He commands, But I say unto you, Resist not evil; and, Whosoever shall be angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment; and, Whosoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart; and by any other commandment which He gives, declares that it lies with ourselves to keep what is enjoined, and that we shall reasonably be liable to condemnation if we transgress. And therefore He says in addition: He that hears My words, and does them, shall be likened to a prudent man, who built his house upon a rock, etc., etc.; while he that hears them, but does them not, is like a foolish man, who built his house upon the sand, etc. And when He says to those on His right hand, Come, you blessed of My Father, etc.; for I was an hungered, and you gave Me to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave Me to drink, it is exceedingly manifest that He gives the promises to these as being deserving of praise. But, on the contrary, to the others, as being censurable in comparison with them, He says, Depart, you cursed, into everlasting fire! And let us observe how Paul also converses with us as having freedom of will, and as being ourselves the cause of ruin or salvation, when he says, Do you despise the riches of His goodness, and of His patience, and of His long-suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But, according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you are treasuring up for yourself wrath on the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every one according to his works: to those who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and immortality, eternal life; while to those who are contentious, and believe not the truth, but who believe iniquity, anger, wrath, tribulation, and distress, on every soul of man that works evil; on the Jew first, and on the Greek: but glory, and honour, and peace to every one that works good; to the Jew first, and to the Greek. There are, indeed, innumerable passages in the Scriptures which establish with exceeding clearness the existence of freedom of will.' "

3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost." '

3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons.' "

3.1.14. But let us take from the Gospels also the similitudes of those things which we have mentioned, in which is described a certain rock, having on it a little superficial earth, on which, when a seed falls, it is said quickly to spring up; but when sprung up, it withers as the sun ascends in the heavens, and dies away, because it did not cast its root deeply into the ground. Now this rock undoubtedly represents the human soul, hardened on account of its own negligence, and converted into stone because of its wickedness. For God gave no one a stony heart by a creative act; but each individual's heart is said to become stony through his own wickedness and disobedience. As, therefore, if one were to blame a husbandman for not casting his seed more quickly upon rocky ground, because seed cast upon other rocky soil was seen to spring up speedily, the husbandman would certainly say in reply: I sow this soil more slowly, for this reason, that it may retain the seed which it has received; for it suits this ground to be sown somewhat slowly, lest perhaps the crop, having sprouted too rapidly, and coming forth from the mere surface of a shallow soil, should be unable to withstand the rays of the sun. Would not he who formerly found fault acquiesce in the reasons and superior knowledge of the husbandman, and approve as done on rational grounds what formerly appeared to him as founded on no reason? And in the same way, God, the thoroughly skilled husbandman of all His creation, undoubtedly conceals and delays to another time those things which we think ought to have obtained health sooner, in order that not the outside of things, rather than the inside, may be cured. But if any one now were to object to us that certain seeds do even fall upon rocky ground, i.e., on a hard and stony heart, we should answer that even this does not happen without the arrangement of Divine Providence; inasmuch as, but for this, it would not be known what condemnation was incurred by rashness in hearing and indifference in investigation, nor, certainly, what benefit was derived from being trained in an orderly manner. And hence it happens that the soul comes to know its defects, and to cast the blame upon itself, and, consistently with this, to reserve and submit itself to training, i.e., in order that it may see that its faults must first be removed, and that then it must come to receive the instruction of wisdom. As, therefore, souls are innumerable, so also are their manners, and purposes, and movements, and appetencies, and incitements different, the variety of which can by no means be grasped by the human mind; and therefore to God alone must be left the art, and the knowledge, and the power of an arrangement of this kind, as He alone can know both the remedies for each individual soul, and measure out the time of its cure. It is He alone then who, as we said, recognises the ways of individual men, and determines by what way He ought to lead Pharaoh, that through him His name might be named in all the earth, having previously chastised him by many blows, and finally drowning him in the sea. By this drowning, however, it is not to be supposed that God's providence as regards Pharaoh was terminated; for we must not imagine, because he was drowned, that therefore he had immediately completely perished: for in the hand of God are both we and our words; all wisdom, also, and knowledge of workmanship, as Scripture declares. But these points we have discussed according to our ability, treating of that chapter of Scripture in which it is said that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and agreeably to the statement, He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens." "

3.1.14. Come now, and let us use the following image from the Gospel. There is a certain rock, with a little surface-soil, on which, if seeds fall, they quickly spring up; but when sprung up, as not having root, they are burned and withered when the sun has arisen. Now this rock is a human soul, hardened on account of its negligence, and converted to stone because of its wickedness; for no one receives from God a heart created of stone, but it becomes such in consequence of wickedness. If one, then, were to find fault with the husbandman for not sowing his seed sooner upon the rocky soil, when he saw other rocky ground which had received seed flourishing, the husbandman would reply, I shall sow this ground more slowly, casting in seeds that will be able to retain their hold, this slower method being better for the ground, and more secure than that which receives the seed in a more rapid manner, and more upon the surface. (The person finding fault) would yield his assent to the husbandman, as one who spoke with sound reason, and who acted with skill: so also the great Husbandman of all nature postpones that benefit which might be deemed premature, that it may not prove superficial. But it is probable that here some one may object to us with reference to this: Why do some of the seeds fall upon the earth that has superficial soil, the soul being, as it were, a rock? Now we must say, in answer to this, that it was better for this soul, which desired better things precipitately, and not by a way which led to them, to obtain its desire, in order that, condemning itself on this account, it may, after a long time, endure to receive the husbandry which is according to nature. For souls are, as one may say, innumerable; and their habits are innumerable, and their movements, and their purposes, and their assaults, and their efforts, of which there is only one admirable administrator, who knows both the season, and the fitting helps, and the avenues, and the ways, viz., the God and Father of all things, who knows how He conducts even Pharaoh by so great events, and by drowning in the sea, with which latter occurrence His superintendence of Pharaoh does not cease. For he was not annihilated when drowned: For in the hand of God are both we and our words; all wisdom also, and knowledge of workmanship. And such is a moderate defense with regard to the statement that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and that God has mercy upon whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens." '

3.1.18. Let us look next at the passage: So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For they who find fault say: If it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement made by Him who has formed us such as we are, or on the purpose of Him who shows mercy when he pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer; since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things; for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give (perhaps) a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent, and neither beautiful nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz., to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defense which I think we can offer to the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the Song of Degrees is his, from which we shall quote the words): Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman wakes in vain: not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong, it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the (mere) human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus — for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God — it is well said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters; but God that gives the increase. Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing; for it is not completed by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds, and the mildness of the air, and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour? — since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the Churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also (to attempt) to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage.

3.1.18. Let us now look to the expression, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For our opponents assert, that if it does not depend upon him that wills, nor on him that runs, but on God that shows mercy, that a man be saved, our salvation is not in our own power. For our nature is such as to admit of our either being saved or not, or else our salvation rests solely on the will of Him who, if He wills it, shows mercy, and confers salvation. Now let us inquire, in the first place, of such persons, whether to desire blessings be a good or evil act; and whether to hasten after good as a final aim be worthy of praise. If they were to answer that such a procedure was deserving of censure, they would evidently be mad; for all holy men both desire blessings and run after them, and certainly are not blameworthy. How, then, is it that he who is not saved, if he be of an evil nature, desires blessing, and runs after them, but does not find them? For they say that a bad tree does not bring forth good fruits, whereas it is a good fruit to desire blessings. And how is the fruit of a bad tree good? And if they assert that to desire blessings, and to run after them, is an act of indifference, i.e., neither good nor bad, we shall reply, that if it be an indifferent act to desire blessings, and to run after them, then the opposite of that will also be an indifferent act, viz., to desire evils, and to run after them; whereas it is certain that it is not an indifferent act to desire evils, and to run after them, but one that is manifestly wicked. It is established, then, that to desire and follow after blessings is not an indifferent, but a virtuous proceeding.

3.1.21. And at the same time, it is clearly shown that, as far as regards the underlying nature, as there is one (piece of) clay which is under the hands of the potter, from which piece vessels are formed unto honour and dishonour; so the one nature of every soul being in the hands of God, and, so to speak, there being (only) one lump of reasonable beings, certain causes of more ancient date led to some being created vessels unto honour, and others vessels unto dishonour. But if the language of the apostle convey a censure when he says, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? it teaches us that he who has confidence before God, and is faithful, and has lived virtuously, would not hear the words, Who are you that replies against God? Such an one, e.g., as Moses was, For Moses spoke, and God answered him with a voice; and as God answers Moses, so does a saint also answer God. But he who does not possess this confidence, manifestly, either because he has lost it, or because he investigates these matters not from a love of knowledge, but from a desire to find fault, and who therefore says, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? would merit the language of censure, which says, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God?' '. None
51. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 2.16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Apollo of Delphi on, determining elements of cult • indetermined

 Found in books: Mikalson (2010) 135, 165; Álvarez (2019) 138

2.16. 16.Theopompus likewise narrates things similar to these, viz. that a certain Magnesian came from Asia to Delphi; a man very rich, and abounding in cattle, and that he was accustomed every year to make many and magnificent sacrifices to the Gods, partly through the abundance of his possessions, and partly through piety and wishing to please the Gods. But being thus disposed, he came to the divinity at Delphi, bringing with him a hecatomb for the God, and magnificently honouring Apollo, he consulted his oracle. Conceiving also that he worshipped the Gods in a manner more beautiful than that of all other men, he asked the Pythian deity who the man was that, with the greatest promptitude, and in the best manner, venerated divinity, and |53 made the most acceptable sacrifices, conceiving that on this occasion the God would deem him to be pre-eminent. The Pythian deity however answered, that Clearchus, who dwelt in Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, worshipped the Gods in a way surpassing that of all other men. But the Magnesian being astonished, was desirous of seeing Clearchus, and of learning from him the manner in which he performed his sacrifices. Swiftly, therefore, betaking himself to Methydrium, in the first place, indeed, he despised the smallness and vileness of the town, conceiving that neither any private person, nor even the whole city, could honour the Gods more magnificently and more beautifully than he did. Meeting, however, with the man, he thought fit to ask him after what manner he reverenced the Gods. But Clearchus answered him, that he diligently sacrificed to them at proper times in every month at the new moon, crowning and adorning the statues of Hermes and Hecate, and the other sacred images which were left to us by our ancestors, and that he also honoured the Gods with frankincense, and sacred wafers and cakes. He likewise said, that he performed public sacrifices annually, omitting no festive day; and that in these festivals he worshipped the Gods, not by slaying oxen, nor by cutting victims into fragments, but that he sacrificed whatever he might casually meet with, sedulously offering the first-fruits to the Gods of all the vegetable productions of the seasons, and of all the fruits with which he was supplied. He added, that some of these he placed before the statues of the Gods,6 but that he burnt others on their altars; and that, being studious of frugality, he avoided the sacrificing of oxen.
52. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Determinism • Freedom, Autexousion, self-determination • determinism • determinism, causal • life, determined • self-determination, αὐτεξούσιον

 Found in books: Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 408; Linjamaa (2019) 118; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 156, 187; Schibli (2002) 343; Sorabji (2000) 324, 334; Wilson (2018) 33, 34

53. Augustine, The City of God, 5.2-5.6 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • astrometeorology, hard / strongly deterministic form of • determinism,dialectic

 Found in books: Green (2014) 84; Long (2006) 151

5.2. Cicero says that the famous physician Hippocrates has left in writing that he had suspected that a certain pair of brothers were twins, from the fact that they both took ill at once, and their disease advanced to its crisis and subsided in the same time in each of them. Posidonius the Stoic, who was much given to astrology, used to explain the fact by supposing that they had been born and conceived under the same constellation. In this question the conjecture of the physician is by far more worthy to be accepted, and approaches much nearer to credibility, since, according as the parents were affected in body at the time of copulation, so might the first elements of the fœtuses have been affected, so that all that was necessary for their growth and development up till birth having been supplied from the body of the same mother, they might be born with like constitutions. Thereafter, nourished in the same house, on the same kinds of food, where they would have also the same kinds of air, the same locality, the same quality of water - which, according to the testimony of medical science, have a very great influence, good or bad, on the condition of bodily health - and where they would also be accustomed to the same kinds of exercise, they would have bodily constitutions so similar that they would be similarly affected with sickness at the same time and by the same causes. But, to wish to adduce that particular position of the stars which existed at the time when they were born or conceived as the cause of their being simultaneously affected with sickness, manifests the greatest arrogance, when so many beings of most diverse kinds, in the most diverse conditions, and subject to the most diverse events, may have been conceived and born at the same time, and in the same district, lying under the same sky. But we know that twins do not only act differently, and travel to very different places, but that they also suffer from different kinds of sickness; for which Hippocrates would give what is in my opinion the simplest reason, namely, that, through diversity of food and exercise, which arises not from the constitution of the body, but from the inclination of the mind, they may have come to be different from each other in respect of health. Moreover, Posidonius, or any other asserter of the fatal influence of the stars, will have enough to do to find anything to say to this, if he be unwilling to im pose upon the minds of the uninstructed in things of which they are ignorant. But, as to what they attempt to make out from that very small interval of time elapsing between the births of twins, on account of that point in the heavens where the mark of the natal hour is placed, and which they call the horoscope, it is either disproportionately small to the diversity which is found in the dispositions, actions, habits, and fortunes of twins, or it is disproportionately great when compared with the estate of twins, whether low or high, which is the same for both of them, the cause for whose greatest difference they place, in every case, in the hour on which one is born; and, for this reason, if the one is born so immediately after the other that there is no change in the horoscope, I demand an entire similarity in all that respects them both, which can never be found in the case of any twins. But if the slowness of the birth of the second give time for a change in the horoscope, I demand different parents, which twins can never have. ' "5.3. It is to no purpose, therefore, that that famous fiction about the potter's wheel is brought forward, which tells of the answer which Nigidius is said to have given when he was perplexed with this question, and on account of which he was called Figulus. For, having whirled round the potter's wheel with all his strength he marked it with ink, striking it twice with the utmost rapidity, so that the strokes seemed to fall on the very same part of it. Then, when the rotation had ceased, the marks which he had made were found upon the rim of the wheel at no small distance apart. Thus, said he, considering the great rapidity with which the celestial sphere revolves, even though twins were born with as short an interval between their births as there was between the strokes which I gave this wheel, that brief interval of time is equivalent to a very great distance in the celestial sphere. Hence, said he, come whatever dissimilitudes may be remarked in the habits and fortunes of twins. This argument is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned by the rotation of that wheel. For if there is so much significance in the heavens which cannot be comprehended by observation of the constellations, that, in the case of twins, an inheritance may fall to the one and not to the other, why, in the case of others who are not twins, do they dare, having examined their constellations, to declare such things as pertain to that secret which no one can comprehend, and to attribute them to the precise moment of the birth of each individual? Now, if such predictions in connection with the natal hours of others who are not twins are to be vindicated on the ground that they are founded on the observation of more extended spaces in the heavens, while those very small moments of time which separated the births of twins, and correspond to minute portions of celestial space, are to be connected with trifling things about which the mathematicians are not wont to be consulted - for who would consult them as to when he is to sit, when to walk abroad, when and on what he is to dine? - how can we be justified in so speaking, when we can point out such manifold diversity both in the habits, doings, and destinies of twins? " "5.4. In the time of the ancient fathers, to speak concerning illustrious persons, there were born two twin brothers, the one so immediately after the other, that the first took hold of the heel of the second. So great a difference existed in their lives and manners, so great a dissimilarity in their actions, so great a difference in their parents' love for them respectively, that the very contrast between them produced even a mutual hostile antipathy. Do we mean, when we say that they were so unlike each other, that when the one was walking the other was sitting, when the one was sleeping the other was waking - which differences are such as are attributed to those minute portions of space which cannot be appreciated by those who note down the position of the stars which exists at the moment of one's birth, in order that the mathematicians may be consulted concerning it? One of these twins was for a long time a hired servant; the other never served. One of them was beloved by his mother; the other was not so. One of them lost that honor which was so much valued among their people; the other obtained it. And what shall we say of their wives, their children, and their possessions? How different they were in respect to all these! If, therefore, such things as these are connected with those minute intervals of time which elapse between the births of twins, and are not to be attributed to the constellations, wherefore are they predicted in the case of others from the examination of their constellations? And if, on the other hand, these things are said to be predicted, because they are connected, not with minute and inappreciable moments, but with intervals of time which can be observed and noted down, what purpose is that potter's wheel to serve in this matter, except it be to whirl round men who have hearts of clay, in order that they may be prevented from detecting the emptiness of the talk of the mathematicians? " '5.5. Do not those very persons whom the medical sagacity of Hippocrates led him to suspect to be twins, because their disease was observed by him to develop to its crisis and to subside again in the same time in each of them - do not these, I say, serve as a sufficient refutation of those who wish to attribute to the influence of the stars that which was owing to a similarity of bodily constitution? For wherefore were they both sick of the same disease, and at the same time, and not the one after the other in the order of their birth? (for certainly they could not both be born at the same time.) Or, if the fact of their having been born at different times by no means necessarily implies that they must be sick at different times, why do they contend that the difference in the time of their births was the cause of their difference in other things? Why could they travel in foreign parts at different times, marry at different times, beget children at different times, and do many other things at different times, by reason of their having been born at different times, and yet could not, for the same reason, also be sick at different times? For if a difference in the moment of birth changed the horoscope, and occasioned dissimilarity in all other things, why has that simultaneousness which belonged to their conception remained in their attacks of sickness? Or, if the destinies of health are involved in the time of conception, but those of other things be said to be attached to the time of birth, they ought not to predict anything concerning health from examination of the constellations of birth, when the hour of conception is not also given, that its constellations may be inspected. But if they say that they predict attacks of sickness without examining the horoscope of conception, because these are indicated by the moments of birth, how could they inform either of these twins when he would be sick, from the horoscope of his birth, when the other also, who had not the same horoscope of birth, must of necessity fall sick at the same time? Again, I ask, if the distance of time between the births of twins is so great as to occasion a difference of their constellations on account of the difference of their horoscopes, and therefore of all the cardinal points to which so much influence is attributed, that even from such change there comes a difference of destiny, how is it possible that this should be so, since they cannot have been conceived at different times? Or, if two conceived at the same moment of time could have different destinies with respect to their births, why may not also two born at the same moment of time have different destinies for life and for death? For if the one moment in which both were conceived did not hinder that the one should be born before the other, why, if two are born at the same moment, should anything hinder them from dying at the same moment? If a simultaneous conception allows of twins being differently affected in the womb, why should not simultaneousness of birth allow of any two individuals having different fortunes in the world? And thus would all the fictions of this art, or rather delusion, be swept away. What strange circumstance is this, that two children conceived at the same time, nay, at the same moment, under the same position of the stars, have different fates which bring them to different hours of birth, while two children, born of two different mothers, at the same moment of time, under one and the same position of the stars, cannot have different fates which shall conduct them by necessity to diverse manners of life and of death? Are they at conception as yet without destinies, because they can only have them if they be born? What, therefore, do they mean when they say that, if the hour of the conception be found, many things can be predicted by these astrologers? From which also arose that story which is reiterated by some, that a certain sage chose an hour in which to lie with his wife, in order to secure his begetting an illustrious son. From this opinion also came that answer of Posidonius, the great astrologer and also philosopher, concerning those twins who were attacked with sickness at the same time, namely, That this had happened to them because they were conceived at the same time, and born at the same time. For certainly he added conception, lest it should be said to him that they could not both be born at the same time, knowing that at any rate they must both have been conceived at the same time; wishing thus to show that he did not attribute the fact of their being similarly and simultaneously affected with sickness to the similarity of their bodily constitutions as its proximate cause, but that he held that even in respect of the similarity of their health, they were bound together by a sidereal connection. If, therefore, the time of conception has so much to do with the similarity of destinies, these same destinies ought not to be changed by the circumstances of birth; or, if the destinies of twins be said to be changed because they are born at different times, why should we not rather understand that they had been already changed in order that they might be born at different times? Does not, then, the will of men living in the world change the destinies of birth, when the order of birth can change the destinies they had at conception? ' "5.6. But even in the very conception of twins, which certainly occurs at the same moment in the case of both, it often happens that the one is conceived a male, and the other a female. I know two of different sexes who are twins. Both of them are alive, and in the flower of their age; and though they resemble each other in body, as far as difference of sex will permit, still they are very different in the whole scope and purpose of their lives (consideration being had of those differences which necessarily exist between the lives of males and females) - the one holding the office of a count, and being almost constantly away from home with the army in foreign service, the other never leaving her country's soil, or her native district. Still more - and this is more incredible, if the destinies of the stars are to be believed in, though it is not wonderful if we consider the wills of men, and the free gifts of God - he is married; she is a sacred virgin: he has begotten a numerous offspring; she has never even married. But is not the virtue of the horoscope very great? I think I have said enough to show the absurdity of that. But, say those astrologers, whatever be the virtue of the horoscope in other respects, it is certainly of significance with respect to birth. But why not also with respect to conception, which takes place undoubtedly with one act of copulation? And, indeed, so great is the force of nature, that after a woman has once conceived, she ceases to be liable to conception. Or were they, perhaps, changed at birth, either he into a male, or she into a female, because of the difference in their horoscopes? But, while it is not altogether absurd to say that certain sidereal influences have some power to cause differences in bodies alone - as, for instance, we see that the seasons of the year come round by the approaching and receding of the sun, and that certain kinds of things are increased in size or diminished by the waxings and wanings of the moon, such as sea-urchins, oysters, and the wonderful tides of the ocean - it does not follow that the wills of men are to be made subject to the position of the stars. The astrologers, however, when they wish to bind our actions also to the constellations, only set us on investigating whether, even in these bodies, the changes may not be attributable to some other than a sidereal cause. For what is there which more intimately concerns a body than its sex? And yet, under the same position of the stars, twins of different sexes may be conceived. Wherefore, what greater absurdity can be affirmed or believed than that the position of the stars, which was the same for both of them at the time of conception, could not cause that the one child should not have been of a different sex from her brother, with whom she had a common constellation, while the position of the stars which existed at the hour of their birth could cause that she should be separated from him by the great distance between marriage and holy virginity? "'. None
54. Strabo, Geography, 2.3.7, 3.4.5
 Tagged with subjects: • Posidonius, on the Cimbri, on environmental determinism • Strabo, on Aristotle’s advice to Alexander, on environmental determinism • innate capacity as determining ethnicity, not advocated by Strabo

 Found in books: Gruen (2020) 28; Isaac (2004) 91, 92

2.3.7. Next he undertakes to find fault with those who gave to the continents their present division, instead of marking them out by lines drawn parallel to the equator, by which means the different animals, plants, and temperatures would have been distinguished, according as they approached the frigid or the torrid zones; so that each continent would have formed a kind of zone. Afterwards, however, he overturns and gives up altogether this view, bestowing every commendation on the existing system, and thus making his argument altogether worthless and of no avail. In fact, the various arrangements of a country are not the result of premeditation, any more than the diversities of nations or languages; they all depend on circumstances and chance. Arts, forms of government, and modes of life, arising from certain internal springs, flourish under whatever climate they may be situated; climate, however, has its influence, and therefore while some peculiarites are due to the nature of the country, others are the result of institutions and education. It is not owing to the nature of the country, but rather to their education, that the Athenians cultivate eloquence, while the Lacedemonians do not; nor yet the Thebans, who are nearer still. Neither are the Babylonians and Egyptians philosophers by nature, but by reason of their institutions and education. In like manner the excellence of horses, oxen, and other animals, results not alone from the places where they dwell, but also, from their breeding. Posidonius confounds all these distinctions. In praising the division of the continents as it now stands, he advances as an argument the difference between the Indians and the Ethiopians of Libya, the former being more robust, and less dried by the heat of the climate. It is on this account that Homer, who includes them all under the title of Ethiopians, describes them as being separated into two divisions, These eastward situate, those toward the west. Od. i, 23. Crates, to support his hypothesis, supposes another inhabited earth, of which Homer certainly knew nothing; and says that the passage ought to be read thus, towards the descending sun, viz. when having passed the meridian, it begins to decline.
3.4.5. The settlement of the Grecians amongst these barbarous nations may be regarded as the result of the division of these latter into small tribes and sovereignties, having on account of their moroseness no union amongst themselves, and therefore powerless against attacks from without. This moroseness is remarkably prevalent amongst the Iberians, who are besides crafty in their manner, devoid of sincerity, insidious, and predatory in their mode of life; they are bold in little adventures, but never undertake any thing of magnitude, inasmuch as they have never formed any extended power or confederacy. If they had had but the will to assist each other, neither could the Carthaginians by making an incursion have so easily deprived them of the greater part of their country, nor before them the Tyrians, then the Kelts, now called the Keltiberians and Berones, nor after these the brigand Viriathus, and Sertorius, nor any others who desired power. On this account the Romans, having carried the war into Iberia, lost much time by reason of the number of different sovereignties, having to conquer first one, then another; in fact, it occupied nearly two centuries, or even longer, before they had subdued the whole. — I return to my description.''. None
55. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.278-1.279, 8.688-8.713
 Tagged with subjects: • Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus), defines Egypt and the Nile • determinism • performative ekphrasis,, defined and described • self-definition, perfect law as defining chosenness

 Found in books: Crabb (2020) 171; Hayes (2022) 344, 345; Johnson (2008) 28, 29; Manolaraki (2012) 31, 200

1.279. imperium sine fine dedi. Quin aspera Iuno,
8.688. Bactra vehit, sequiturque (nefas) Aegyptia coniunx. 8.689. Una omnes ruere, ac totum spumare reductis 8.690. convolsum remis rostrisque tridentibus aequor. 8.691. alta petunt: pelago credas innare revolsas 8.692. Cycladas aut montis concurrere montibus altos, 8.693. tanta mole viri turritis puppibus instant. 8.694. stuppea flamma manu telisque volatile ferrum 8.695. spargitur, arva nova Neptunia caede rubescunt. 8.696. Regina in mediis patrio vocat agmina sistro 8.697. necdum etiam geminos a tergo respicit anguis. 8.698. omnigenumque deum monstra et latrator Anubis 8.699. contra Neptunum et Venerem contraque Minervam 8.700. tela tenent. Saevit medio in certamine Mavors 8.701. caelatus ferro tristesque ex aethere Dirae, 8.702. et scissa gaudens vadit Discordia palla, 8.703. quam cum sanguineo sequitur Bellona flagello. 8.704. Actius haec cernens arcum tendebat Apollo 8.705. desuper: omnis eo terrore Aegyptus et Indi, 8.706. omnis Arabs, omnes vertebant terga Sabaei. 8.707. Ipsa videbatur ventis regina vocatis 8.708. vela dare et laxos iam iamque inmittere funis. 8.709. Illam inter caedes pallentem morte futura 8.710. fecerat Ignipotens undis et Iapyge ferri, 8.711. contra autem magno maerentem corpore Nilum 8.712. pandentemque sinus et tota veste vocantem 8.713. caeruleum in gremium latebrosaque flumina victos.' '. None
1.279. Such was his word, but vexed with grief and care,
8.688. pallas, my son, and bid him find in thee 8.689. a master and example, while he learns ' "8.690. the soldier's arduous toil. With thy brave deeds " '8.691. let him familiar grow, and reverence thee 8.692. with youthful love and honor. In his train 8.693. two hundred horsemen of Arcadia, 8.694. our choicest men-at-arms, shall ride; and he 8.695. in his own name an equal band shall bring 8.696. to follow only thee.” Such the discourse. 8.697. With meditative brows and downcast eyes 8.698. Aeneas and Achates, sad at heart, 8.699. mused on unnumbered perils yet to come. ' "8.700. But out of cloudless sky Cythera's Queen " "8.701. gave sudden signal: from th' ethereal dome " '8.702. a thunder-peal and flash of quivering fire 8.703. tumultuous broke, as if the world would fall, 8.704. and bellowing Tuscan trumpets shook the air. 8.705. All eyes look up. Again and yet again 8.706. crashed the terrible din, and where the sky 8.707. looked clearest hung a visionary cloud, 8.708. whence through the brightness blazed resounding arms. ' "8.709. All hearts stood still. But Troy 's heroic son " '8.710. knew that his mother in the skies redeemed 8.711. her pledge in sound of thunder: so he cried, 8.712. “Seek not, my friend, seek not thyself to read ' "8.713. the meaning of the omen. 'T is to me " '. None
56. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Seneca, on environmental determinism, on Germans (and Scythians) • astrological determinism, cosmogonical structure and

 Found in books: Isaac (2004) 205, 430; Scopello (2008) 302

57. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Stoics, and determinism • determinism • determinism, and fatalism • determinism, hard • freedom, and determinism • self-determination,

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998) 258; Wilson (2018) 293; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 127, 128

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