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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.


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All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
desire Balberg (2017) 36, 83, 84
Despotis and Lohr (2022) 148, 156, 159, 180, 189, 192, 207, 208, 222, 224, 231, 276, 287, 290, 292, 293, 294, 328, 351, 355, 421, 428
Dilley (2019) 196, 197
Dillon and Timotin (2015) 29, 32, 35, 37, 63, 65, 66, 68, 74, 85, 113, 138, 139, 143, 155, 156, 159, 161, 181
Geljon and Runia (2013) 111, 126, 130, 168, 170, 177, 179, 201, 202, 224
Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 27, 32, 33, 44, 58, 64, 92, 100, 104, 127, 128, 196, 230, 231, 239, 244, 247, 296, 315, 316, 333, 348, 357, 367, 368, 371, 373, 405
Graver (2007) 227
Harkins and Maier (2022) 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 50, 52, 58, 60, 64, 67, 70, 79, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 122, 123, 160
Harte (2017) 83, 206, 217, 251
Hirshman (2009) 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 136
Huffman (2019) 113, 193, 195, 198, 199, 205, 207, 208, 209, 364, 365, 366, 368, 369, 414, 415, 416, 473
Joosse (2021) 59, 62, 63, 64, 70, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 118, 119, 158
Jouanna (2012) 240
Karfíková (2012) 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31, 32, 35, 39, 46, 47, 51, 55, 90, 91, 92, 93, 98, 99, 114, 122, 149, 183, 187, 194, 233, 254, 255, 257, 275, 276, 283, 286, 287, 301, 309, 315, 317, 329, 334, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 348, 349
King (2006) 107, 128, 142, 156, 170, 171, 203, 243, 250
Long (2006) 4, 8, 13, 27, 33, 38, 61, 81, 179, 185, 187, 192, 196, 197, 199, 202, 375, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388
Nasrallah (2019) 164, 165
O, Daly (2020) 187
Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 133, 134, 185, 190, 291
Pinheiro et al (2012a) 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 43, 60, 62, 67, 95, 109, 113, 115, 116, 118, 123, 131, 132, 171, 172, 175, 181, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 194, 219, 225, 236, 242, 244
Sorabji (2000) 135
Taylor and Hay (2020) 113, 158, 205, 253, 304, 305
Wilson (2010) 94, 95, 97, 106, 109, 110, 132, 133, 138, 251, 270, 271
Wolfsdorf (2020) 128, 227, 708
d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 14, 254
desire, / tendency / adpetitio Maso (2022) 9, 19, 24, 29, 30, 35, 95, 97, 104, 105, 120, 122, 123, 124, 128, 135
desire, alcibiades, and Joho (2022) 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207, 222, 223, 224, 225
desire, alciphron, letters, representation of disappointed König (2012) 253
desire, alexander the great of to go beyond the limits of human knowledge Kalmin (2014) 212, 213, 232
desire, and epicureanism, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 423, 424, 425
desire, and erotic love Graver (2007) 185, 186, 187, 188, 251
desire, and heat metaphors, sexual Braund and Most (2004) 82
desire, and human nature Joho (2022) 189, 196, 266, 295, 296, 297
desire, and intention Wolfsdorf (2020) 140, 141, 142
desire, and pollution Fabian Meinel (2015) 37
desire, and procession d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 246, 248
desire, and procreation, music, and pythagorean precepts on Wolfsdorf (2020) 707, 708
desire, and reversion d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 99
desire, and stoicism, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 420, 421, 422, 423
desire, and sycophancy, sexual Braund and Most (2004) 89, 91, 92, 93
desire, and, body Pinheiro et al (2012a) 15, 16, 19, 20, 62, 67, 109, 115, 118, 123, 190, 191, 192
desire, aristotle, on Huffman (2019) 193, 198, 207
desire, as divine will Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 145
desire, as genus emotion Graver (2007) 53, 54, 57, 204
desire, as physical change in psyche Graver (2007) 30
desire, as source of sin Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 241
desire, aspasius, aristotelian, emotions classified under pleasure and distress, not aristotle's Sorabji (2000) 134, 135
desire, associated with summer Lieber (2014) 302
desire, athenian…, mostly for sicily Joho (2022) 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198, 266
desire, being-life-intellect as object of d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 105
desire, belief, and Harte (2017) 243, 245, 254
desire, between humans and animals, sexual Kneebone (2020) 325, 326
desire, but plato says the same of pleasure Sorabji (2000) 201
desire, concept of van der EIjk (2005) 148
desire, condemnation of eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 543
desire, cupido and cupiditas Oksanish (2019) 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161
desire, day of initiation, indicated by will of goddess, day of constant Griffiths (1975) 281
desire, eco, curiosity/sexual Mheallaigh (2014) 131
desire, emotions, but aspasius ignores Sorabji (2000) 134, 135
desire, emotions, passion and Champion (2022) 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 160, 162, 186, 187
desire, epithumia Blidstein (2017) 35, 49, 84, 85, 86, 89, 108, 124, 130, 133, 146, 147, 151, 155, 156, 157, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 174, 177, 178, 179, 190, 192, 193, 195, 216, 219
Gunderson (2022) 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 87, 99, 196, 197, 220
desire, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 217, 218, 265, 266, 268, 269, 290
desire, erotic Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 217, 251, 314
Wolfsdorf (2020) 331
desire, fairness, slaves, onstage Richlin (2018) 86, 97, 219, 221, 267, 429
desire, fear, and Agri (2022) 21, 23, 113, 114, 115, 165, 166
desire, female Faraone (1999) 19, 20, 160, 163, 164
desire, first one, the, object of d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 79, 81
desire, for - cause of injustice, pleasure Joosse (2021) 175
desire, for beauty d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 284, 286
desire, for death, orestes, and Shilo (2022) 94
desire, for gain cupido Agri (2022) 160
desire, for glory, medical ethics Wolfsdorf (2020) 531
desire, for god eliminates satiety, origen, church father, ever increasing Sorabji (2000) 388
desire, for good or apparent good?, will Sorabji (2000) 306, 307, 308, 322, 323, 329, 330
desire, for intellect d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 105
desire, for one, intellect Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 104, 127, 128
desire, for privacy in sex universal?, julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine, is Sorabji (2000) 411, 412
desire, for second-level lives Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 198
desire, for the good d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 77, 79, 81, 99
desire, for the good, soul Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 196, 244, 255
desire, for the nile and egypt, cupido Manolaraki (2012) 37, 48, 80, 81, 195, 215, 219, 249, 267, 306, 310, 311
desire, for, death Jouanna (2018) 759
desire, for, domination, human O, Daly (2020) 72, 73, 74, 182, 187, 188, 191, 276, 277
desire, for, glory, physicians’ Wolfsdorf (2020) 531
desire, for, grandchildren Brule (2003) 155
desire, for, immortality Long (2019) 37, 131, 132, 142
desire, for, money, doctors Jouanna (2012) 271
desire, for, peace, universal O, Daly (2020) 212, 213, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 263, 301
desire, for, revenge, achilles’ Braund and Most (2004) 79, 186
desire, god, as object of Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 132
desire, homoerotic/homosexual Faraone (1999) 140, 147
desire, imagery of eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 340, 341, 342
desire, in athens, social norms of Steiner (2001) 208, 209, 210, 211
desire, in letters, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473
desire, in plato, sexual Braund and Most (2004) 95, 96
desire, in remedia amoris, ovid, therapy of Williams and Vol (2022) 129
desire, in shivata shir ha-shirim Lieber (2014) 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 207
desire, in song of songs piyyutim Lieber (2014) 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62
desire, in sphere-souls, soul, appetition Frede and Laks (2001) 4, 15
desire, in the shivata for dew Lieber (2014) 302, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315
desire, incestuous Repath and Whitmarsh (2022) 23, 24, 25, 26
desire, intention, and Wolfsdorf (2020) 140, 141, 142
desire, involves a lack, desire, distinguished p leasure and love Sorabji (2000) 388, 389
desire, judgement is upto epictetus, stoic, only will, proairesis, us, not anything bodily Sorabji (2000) 215, 332
desire, law of nature, vs. irrational Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377
desire, love, amor, dilectio, caritas, opposite to evil Nisula (2012) 45, 49, 149, 284
desire, love, involves no lack, unlike Sorabji (2000) 388
desire, males, slaves, onstage, male Richlin (2018) 281, 293
desire, manumission, slaves, onstage Richlin (2018) 23, 42, 73, 95, 96, 107, 169, 184, 186, 187, 211, 219, 257, 321, 348, 400, 414, 417, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 432, 433
desire, marriage, slaves, onstage Richlin (2018) 241, 242, 243, 244, 421, 433
desire, martyrdom, martyr Maier and Waldner (2022) 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 131, 132, 133, 141, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 182
desire, natural and/or necessary, desires, Sorabji (2000) 26, 201, 283
desire, natural, necessary Sorabji (2000) 26, 201, 283, 388
desire, non-rational Wolfsdorf (2020) 451
desire, not stoics' fear, aristotle, emotions classified under distress, pleasure, and Sorabji (2000) 22, 135
desire, object of Harte (2017) 66, 67, 68, 75, 114, 118
desire, object, of Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 137
desire, of barbarians, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 403, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 410, 411
desire, of curbed for ten days, foods, unhallowed and unlawful, abstention from Griffiths (1975) 290
desire, of god Hirshman (2009) 144
desire, of gods, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 219, 220
desire, of humans for divinities Steiner (2001) 191, 192
desire, of the good Joosse (2021) 99, 100
desire, of the substrate d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 251
desire, one, the, as object of Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 136
desire, onos, curiosity/sexual Mheallaigh (2014) 131, 132, 133
desire, or emotion, passion Gray (2021) 45, 49, 87, 88, 89, 95, 108, 133, 161, 162, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 208
desire, plato, on Huffman (2019) 193, 198
desire, plato, philosopher, aetiological myth of Brule (2003) 79, 93, 94, 95
desire, plotinus on d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 246
desire, poetry, and Kirichenko (2022) 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200
desire, pollution, and Fabian Meinel (2015) 37
desire, production, without Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 53
desire, psychological mode Mackey (2022) 69, 72, 73, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 212, 213, 214, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 245, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301
desire, rational versus non-rational Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 157
desire, reciprocity of eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 480
desire, related to reason, will, distinct functions Sorabji (2000) 321, 335
desire, resurrection and Lieber (2014) 141, 313, 314, 330
desire, royal, cupido and cupiditas Oksanish (2019) 159, 160
desire, satisfaction of Harte (2017) 65, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76
desire, second-order Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 203
desire, see also prayer for dew dialogue, prayer as Lieber (2014) 22, 58
desire, seeing god, human Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 632
desire, sexual Braund and Most (2004) 88
Grypeou and Spurling (2009) 78, 89
Kneebone (2020) 180, 182, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 306
O, Daly (2020) 187, 188
van , t Westeinde (2021) 91, 92, 94, 121, 129, 141, 194
desire, soul, seat of Gray (2021) 124, 175, 176
desire, species of Graver (2007) 56
desire, symbol of torah Lieber (2014) 315
desire, texts, as object of Steiner (2001) 287, 288
desire, to approaching food, epictetus, stoic, do not project your Sorabji (2000) 216
desire, to conquer greece, persian Papadodima (2022) 132
desire, to see god, moses O, Brien (2015) 61
desire, tombs of Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 95, 96, 98, 99, 104, 107, 113
desire, truth, alētheia, and Wolfsdorf (2020) 128
desire, with customers, prostitutes, onstage, identify their Richlin (2018) 235, 280, 430
desire, with judgement controversial, desire, stoic identification of Sorabji (2000) 42, 43, 44
desire, women as objects of Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 30, 33
desire, women, slaves, onstage, male Richlin (2018) 111, 373
desire, womens, eros, sexual Hubbard (2014) 318, 319, 324, 325, 336, 337, 338, 359, 360, 361, 363, 374, 375, 468, 470, 471, 489, 536, 537, 577
desire, όρεξις Schibli (2002) 231
desire, ‘for more’, πλεονεξία Joho (2022) 22, 58, 63, 105, 106, 125, 127, 128, 160, 175, 185, 279
desired, by epigoni in suppliant women revenge Pucci (2016) 138, 140, 141
desired, by epigoni in suppliant women, revenge Pucci (2016) 138, 140, 141
desired, by, justinian, conversion of all synagogues to churches Kraemer (2020) 294, 295, 296, 298
desires Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 6, 59, 69, 160, 187, 208
Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 16, 21, 40, 63, 68, 69, 73, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 141, 143, 145, 153, 159, 165, 173, 176, 177, 179, 180
Wilson (2012) 48, 59, 80, 92, 96, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 116, 124, 125, 136, 138, 146, 158, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 185, 192, 198, 224, 236, 249, 269, 270, 275, 277, 280, 282, 308, 310, 344, 378, 381, 396, 397, 407, 412, 413, 418, 422
Černušková (2016) 8, 122, 169, 171, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 305, 319, 331, 332
desires, abandonment of Černušková (2016) 218, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 237
desires, and pleasures necessary, plato, some Sorabji (2000) 201, 386
desires, epicurus, natural and/or necessary Sorabji (2000) 201, 283
desires, for, conversion, christian Kraemer (2020) 44, 62, 64, 75, 125, 155, 294, 295, 296, 310
desires, homosexual Nisula (2012) 123, 330
desires, metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of emotion, natural and/or necessary Sorabji (2000) 26, 201, 283, 388
desires, of flesh Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 230
desires, of slave-women, onstage Richlin (2018) 237, 280
desires, of women Rosen-Zvi (2012) 33
desires, έπι - / προθυµία Schibli (2002) 210, 253, 264, 292
desiring, subjects Faraone (1999) 160, 163, 164
desirous, gaze Steiner (2001) 205, 208, 209, 210, 211
‘desire’, and epithumia epithumêtikon Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 20, 23, 27

List of validated texts:
64 validated results for "desire"
1. Hebrew Bible, Song of Songs, 5.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire, in Shivata Shir ha-Shirim • desires

 Found in books: Lieber (2014) 206; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 59


5.2. אֲנִי יְשֵׁנָה וְלִבִּי עֵר קוֹל דּוֹדִי דוֹפֵק פִּתְחִי־לִי אֲחֹתִי רַעְיָתִי יוֹנָתִי תַמָּתִי שֶׁרֹּאשִׁי נִמְלָא־טָל קְוֻּצּוֹתַי רְסִיסֵי לָיְלָה׃''. None
5.2. I sleep, but my heart waketh; Hark! my beloved knocketh: ‘Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undefiled; For my head is filled with dew, My locks with the drops of the night.’''. None
2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 31.13, 33.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Soul, seat of desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, in the Shivata for Dew • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Gray (2021) 124; Gunderson (2022) 196; Lieber (2014) 310; Maier and Waldner (2022) 30


31.13. וְאַתָּה דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר אַךְ אֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ כִּי אוֹת הִוא בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם לָדַעַת כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה מְקַדִּשְׁכֶם׃
33.18. וַיֹּאמַר הַרְאֵנִי נָא אֶת־כְּבֹדֶךָ׃''. None
31.13. ’Speak thou also unto the children of Israel, saying: Verily ye shall keep My sabbaths, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout your generations, that ye may know that I am the LORD who sanctify you.
33.18. And he said: ‘Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory.’''. None
3. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.27, 2.2, 2.7, 3.5, 4.6-4.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Passion, desire or emotion • Plato, on God as desires to create the best possible world • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, as source of sin • domination, human desire for • eros (sexual desire), womens

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 294; Gray (2021) 108; Gunderson (2022) 9, 197; Hubbard (2014) 536, 537; Karfíková (2012) 26, 122; Kosman (2012) 190; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 241; O, Daly (2020) 182, 191


1.27. וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃
2.2. וַיְכַל אֱלֹהִים בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מְלַאכְתּוֹ אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וַיִּשְׁבֹּת בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִכָּל־מְלַאכְתּוֹ אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה׃
2.2. וַיִּקְרָא הָאָדָם שֵׁמוֹת לְכָל־הַבְּהֵמָה וּלְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה וּלְאָדָם לֹא־מָצָא עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ׃
2.7. וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃
3.5. כִּי יֹדֵעַ אֱלֹהִים כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְכֶם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנִפְקְחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם וִהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע׃
4.6. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־קָיִן לָמָּה חָרָה לָךְ וְלָמָּה נָפְלוּ פָנֶיךָ׃ 4.7. הֲלוֹא אִם־תֵּיטִיב שְׂאֵת וְאִם לֹא תֵיטִיב לַפֶּתַח חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ וְאֵלֶיךָ תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ וְאַתָּה תִּמְשָׁל־בּוֹ׃''. None
1.27. And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.
2.2. And on the seventh day God finished His work which He had made; and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had made.
2.7. Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.
3.5. for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.’
4.6. And the LORD said unto Cain: ‘Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countece fallen? 4.7. If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up? and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it.’''. None
4. Hebrew Bible, Joel, 1.13, 2.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 276; Maier and Waldner (2022) 32


1.13. חִגְרוּ וְסִפְדוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים הֵילִילוּ מְשָׁרְתֵי מִזְבֵּחַ בֹּאוּ לִינוּ בַשַּׂקִּים מְשָׁרְתֵי אֱלֹהָי כִּי נִמְנַע מִבֵּית אֱלֹהֵיכֶם מִנְחָה וָנָסֶךְ׃
2.17. בֵּין הָאוּלָם וְלַמִּזְבֵּחַ יִבְכּוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים מְשָׁרְתֵי יְהוָה וְיֹאמְרוּ חוּסָה יְהוָה עַל־עַמֶּךָ וְאַל־תִּתֵּן נַחֲלָתְךָ לְחֶרְפָּה לִמְשָׁל־בָּם גּוֹיִם לָמָּה יֹאמְרוּ בָעַמִּים אַיֵּה אֱלֹהֵיהֶם׃''. None
1.13. Gird yourselves, and lament, ye priests, Wail, ye ministers of the altar; Come, lie all night in sackcloth, Ye ministers of my God; For the meal-offering and the drink-offering is withholden From the house of your God.
2.17. Let the priests, the ministers of the LORD, Weep between the porch and the altar, And let them say: ‘Spare thy people, O LORD, And give not Thy heritage to reproach, That the nations should make them a byword: Wherefore should they say among the peoples: Where is their God?’''. None
5. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.18, 21.14-21.15 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desires • eros (sexual desire), womens • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Hubbard (2014) 537; Maier and Waldner (2022) 20, 30; Wilson (2012) 125; Černušková (2016) 221


19.18. לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃
21.14. אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה אֶת־אֵלֶּה לֹא יִקָּח כִּי אִם־בְּתוּלָה מֵעַמָּיו יִקַּח אִשָּׁה׃ 21.15. וְלֹא־יְחַלֵּל זַרְעוֹ בְּעַמָּיו כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה מְקַדְּשׁוֹ׃''. None
19.18. Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
21.14. A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife. 21.15. And he shall not profane his seed among his people; for I am the LORD who sanctify him.''. None
6. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 25.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desire, • desires

 Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 111, 113; Wilson (2010) 138


25.1. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר׃
25.1. וַיֵּשֶׁב יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּשִּׁטִּים וַיָּחֶל הָעָם לִזְנוֹת אֶל־בְּנוֹת מוֹאָב׃''. None
25.1. And Israel abode in Shittim, and the people began to commit harlotry with the daughters of Moab.''. None
7. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 13.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires • desires, abandonment of

 Found in books: Hirshman (2009) 69; Černušková (2016) 224


13.11. הוֹן מֵהֶבֶל יִמְעָט וְקֹבֵץ עַל־יָד יַרְבֶּה׃''. None
13.11. Wealth gotten by vanity shall be diminished; But he that gathereth little by little shall increase. .''. None
8. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 26.2, 51.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 130, 133; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 40; Wilson (2018) 160


26.2. בְּחָנֵנִי יְהוָה וְנַסֵּנִי צרופה צָרְפָה כִלְיוֹתַי וְלִבִּי׃
51.5. כִּי־פְשָׁעַי אֲנִי אֵדָע וְחַטָּאתִי נֶגְדִּי תָמִיד׃''. None
26.2. Examine me, O LORD, and try me; test my reins and my heart.
51.5. For I know my transgressions; And my sin is ever before me.''. None
9. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desiring subjects • female desire • truth (alētheia), and desire

 Found in books: Faraone (1999) 160; Wolfsdorf (2020) 128


10. None, None, nan (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • body, desire, and • desire • desire, • desire, and erotic love

 Found in books: Bowie (2021) 64, 477, 478, 724; Graver (2007) 185, 251; Pinheiro et al (2012a) 190


11. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire, • eros (sexual desire), imagery of

 Found in books: Bowie (2021) 211, 266; Hubbard (2014) 340


12. Euripides, Hippolytus, 29-32, 34-37 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire, and pollution • eros (sexual desire), womens • pollution, and desire

 Found in books: Fabian Meinel (2015) 37; Hubbard (2014) 359


29. καὶ πρὶν μὲν ἐλθεῖν τήνδε γῆν Τροζηνίαν,'30. πέτραν παρ' αὐτὴν Παλλάδος, κατόψιον" '31. γῆς τῆσδε ναὸν Κύπριδος ἐγκαθίσατο,' "32. ἐρῶς' ἔρωτ' ἔκδημον, ̔Ιππολύτῳ δ' ἔπι" '
34. ἐπεὶ δὲ Θησεὺς Κεκροπίαν λείπει χθόνα 35. μίασμα φεύγων αἵματος Παλλαντιδῶν 36. καὶ τήνδε σὺν δάμαρτι ναυστολεῖ χθόνα, 37. ἐνιαυσίαν ἔκδημον αἰνέσας φυγήν, ". None
29. to witness the solemn mystic rites and be initiated therein in Pandion’s land, i.e. Attica. Phaedra, his father’s noble wife, caught sight of him, and by my designs she found her heart was seized with wild desire.'30. a temple did she rear to Cypris hard by the rock of Pallas where it o’erlooks this country, for love of the youth in another land; and to win his love in days to come she called after his name the temple she had founded for the goddess. 35. flying the pollution of the blood of Pallas’ Descendants of Pandion, king of Cecropia, slain by Theseus to obtain the kingdom. sons, and with his wife sailed to this shore, content to suffer exile for a year, then began the wretched wife to pine away in silence, moaning ’neath love’s cruel scourge, '. None
13. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on desire • Plato, on desire • desire • desires

 Found in books: Huffman (2019) 198; Wilson (2012) 282


558d. γένοιτʼ ἂν οἶμαι ὑὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσι;''. None
558d. would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary,''. None
14. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Athens, social norms of desire in • desire • desire, object of • erotic desire • gaze, desirous • immortality, desire for

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 287; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 251; Harte (2017) 118; Huffman (2019) 208; Long (2019) 37; Steiner (2001) 211


182a. ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ ἐρᾶν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὸ ὄνειδος πεποιηκότες, ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς· λέγουσι δὲ εἰς τούτους ἀποβλέποντες, ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀκαιρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δήπου κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα πραττόμενον ψόγον ἂν δικαίως φέροι.'204a. ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδʼ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδʼ αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν. οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι. 206a. ἐρῶσιν ἅνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν; 212a. γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ; '. None
182a. just as we force them, so far as we can, to refrain from loving our freeborn women. These are the persons responsible for the scandal which prompts some to say it is a shame to gratify one’s lover: such are the cases they have in view, for they observe all their reckless and wrongful doings; and surely, whatsoever is done in an orderly and lawful manner can never justly bring reproach.'204a. uch they are already; nor does anyone else that is wise ensue it. Neither do the ignorant ensue wisdom, nor desire to be made wise: in this very point is ignorance distressing, when a person who is not comely or worthy or intelligent is satisfied with himself. The man who does not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof he feels no defect. 206a. ince what men love is simply and solely the good. Or is your view otherwise? 212a. Do you call it a pitiful life for a man to lead—looking that way, observing that vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him? Do but consider, she said, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal. '. None
15. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire for beauty • god, as object of desire

 Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 132; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 284


28a. ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δʼ αὖ δόξῃ μετʼ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπʼ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης''. None
28a. and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. Again, everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity''. None
16. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 6.13.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alcibiades, and desire • Athens, social norms of desire in • Desire, Athenian…(mostly for Sicily) • Desire, and human nature • gaze, desirous

 Found in books: Joho (2022) 187, 197, 296; Steiner (2001) 209


6.13.1. ‘οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῴ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ᾽, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης ἀντιχειροτονεῖν, καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἷσπερ νῦν ὅροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ παρὰ γῆν ἤν τις πλέῃ, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὑτῶν νεμομένους καθ’ αὑτοὺς καὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι:''. None
6.13.1. When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; ''. None
17. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • sexual desire, and sycophancy • slaves, onstage, desire marriage

 Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 89; Richlin (2018) 241


18. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • sexual desire • texts, as object of desire

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 35; Steiner (2001) 287


19. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire, Stoic identification of desire with judgement controversial • desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?

 Found in books: Hockey (2019) 65; Sorabji (2000) 43, 322


20. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?

 Found in books: Harte (2017) 217; Karfíková (2012) 348, 349; Maso (2022) 120; Sorabji (2000) 308


21. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, on desire (ὄρεξις) • Aristotle, on desire • Desire • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Plato, on desire • desire • desire (ὄρεξις) • desire, second-order • sexual desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 170; Fortenbaugh (2006) 171; Harte (2017) 217; Huffman (2019) 198, 415; Joosse (2021) 59; Karfíková (2012) 348, 349; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 203; Sorabji (2000) 201, 283, 308, 323


22. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • First One, the, object of desire • desire • desire for the Good • god, as object of desire

 Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 138; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 132; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 81


23. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?

 Found in books: Karfíková (2012) 348, 349; Sorabji (2000) 322, 323


24. Anon., 1 Enoch, 24-36 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • eros (sexual desire), womens

 Found in books: Harkins and Maier (2022) 93; Hubbard (2014) 537


24. And from thence I went to another place of the earth, and he showed me a mountain range of,fire which burnt day and night. And I went beyond it and saw seven magnificent mountains all differing each from the other, and the stones (thereof) were magnificent and beautiful, magnificent as a whole, of glorious appearance and fair exterior: three towards the east, one founded on the other, and three towards the south, one upon the other, and deep rough ravines, no one of which,joined with any other. And the seventh mountain was in the midst of these, and it excelled them,in height, resembling the seat of a throne: and fragrant trees encircled the throne. And amongst them was a tree such as I had never yet smelt, neither was any amongst them nor were others like it: it had a fragrance beyond all fragrance, and its leaves and blooms and wood wither not for ever:,and its fruit is beautiful, and its fruit n resembles the dates of a palm. Then I said: 'How beautiful is this tree, and fragrant, and its leaves are fair, and its blooms very delightful in appearance.',Then answered Michael, one of the holy and honoured angels who was with me, and was their leader."25. And he said unto me: \'Enoch, why dost thou ask me regarding the fragrance of the tree,,and why dost thou wish to learn the truth\' Then I answered him saying: \'I wish to",know about everything, but especially about this tree.\' And he answered saying: \'This high mountain which thou hast seen, whose summit is like the throne of God, is His throne, where the Holy Great One, the Lord of Glory, the Eternal King, will sit, when He shall come down to visit,the earth with goodness. And as for this fragrant tree no mortal is permitted to touch it till the great judgement, when He shall take vengeance on all and bring (everything) to its consummation,for ever. It shall then be given to the righteous and holy. Its fruit shall be for food to the elect: it shall be transplanted to the holy place, to the temple of the Lord, the Eternal King.,Then shall they rejoice with joy and be glad, And into the holy place shall they enter; And its fragrance shall be in their bones, And they shall live a long life on earth, Such as thy fathers lived:And in their days shall no sorrow or plague Or torment or calamity touch them.\',Then blessed I the God of Glory, the Eternal King, who hath prepared such things for the righteous, and hath created them and promised to give to them. 26. And I went from thence to the middle of the earth, and I saw a blessed place in which there were,trees with branches abiding and blooming of a dismembered tree. And there I saw a holy mountain,,and underneath the mountain to the east there was a stream and it flowed towards the south. And I saw towards the east another mountain higher than this, and between them a deep and narrow,ravine: in it also ran a stream underneath the mountain. And to the west thereof there was another mountain, lower than the former and of small elevation, and a ravine deep and dry between them: and another deep and dry ravine was at the extremities of the three mountains. And all the ravines were deep rand narrow, (being formed) of hard rock, and trees were not planted upon,them. And I marveled at the rocks, and I marveled at the ravine, yea, I marveled very much. 27. Then said I: \'For what object is this blessed land, which is entirely filled with trees, and this,accursed valley between\' Then Uriel, one of the holy angels who was with me, answered and said: \'This accursed valley is for those who are accursed for ever: Here shall all the accursed be gathered together who utter with their lips against the Lord unseemly words and of His glory speak hard things. Here shall they be gathered together, and here,shall be their place of judgement. In the last days there shall be upon them the spectacle of righteous judgement in the presence of the righteous for ever: here shall the merciful bless the Lord of glory, the Eternal King.,In the days of judgement over the former, they shall bless Him for the mercy in accordance with,which He has assigned them (their lot).\' Then I blessed the Lord of Glory and set forth His glory and lauded Him gloriously." 28. And thence I went towards the east, into the midst of the mountain range of the desert, and,I saw a wilderness and it was solitary, full of trees and plants. And water gushed forth from,above. Rushing like a copious watercourse which flowed towards the north-west it caused clouds and dew to ascend on every side." 29. And thence I went to another place in the desert, and approached to the east of this mountain,range. And there I saw aromatic trees exhaling the fragrance of frankincense and myrrh, and the trees also were similar to the almond tree. 30. And beyond these, I went afar to the east, and I saw another place, a valley (full) of water. And,therein there was a tree, the colour () of fragrant trees such as the mastic. And on the sides of those valleys I saw fragrant cinnamon. And beyond these I proceeded to the east. 31. And I saw other mountains, and amongst them were groves of trees, and there flowed forth from,them nectar, which is named sarara and galbanum. And beyond these mountains I saw another mountain to the east of the ends of the earth, whereon were aloe-trees, and all the trees were full,of stacte, being like almond-trees. And when one burnt it, it smelt sweeter than any fragrant odour.' "32. And after these fragrant odours, as I looked towards the north over the mountains I saw seven mountains full of choice nard and fragrant trees and cinnamon and pepper.,And thence I went over the summits of all these mountains, far towards the east of the earth, and passed above the Erythraean sea and went far from it, and passed over the angel Zotiel. And I came to the Garden of Righteousness,,I and from afar off trees more numerous than I these trees and great-two trees there, very great, beautiful, and glorious, and magnificent, and the tree of knowledge, whose holy fruit they eat and know great wisdom.,That tree is in height like the fir, and its leaves are like (those of) the Carob tree: and its fruit,is like the clusters of the vine, very beautiful: and the fragrance of the tree penetrates afar. Then,I said: 'How beautiful is the tree, and how attractive is its look!' Then Raphael the holy angel, who was with me, answered me and said: 'This is the tree of wisdom, of which thy father old (in years) and thy aged mother, who were before thee, have eaten, and they learnt wisdom and their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked and they were driven out of the garden.'" '33. And from thence I went to the ends of the earth and saw there great beasts, and each differed from the other; and (I saw) birds also differing in appearance and beauty and voice, the one differing from the other. And to the east of those beasts I saw the ends of the earth whereon the heaven,rests, and the portals of the heaven open. And I saw how the stars of heaven come forth, and,I counted the portals out of which they proceed, and wrote down all their outlets, of each individual star by itself, according to their number and their names, their courses and their positions, and their,times and their months, as Uriel the holy angel who was with me showed me. He showed all things to me and wrote them down for me: also their names he wrote for me, and their laws and their companies. 34. And from thence I went towards the north to the ends of the earth, and there I saw a great and,glorious device at the ends of the whole earth. And here I saw three portals of heaven open in the heaven: through each of them proceed north winds: when they blow there is cold, hail, frost,,snow, dew, and rain. And out of one portal they blow for good: but when they blow through the other two portals, it is with violence and affliction on the earth, and they blow with violence. 35. And from thence I went towards the west to the ends of the earth, and saw there three portals of the heaven open such as I had seen in the east, the same number of portals, and the same number of outlets. 36. And from thence I went to the south to the ends of the earth, and saw there three open portals,of the heaven: and thence there come dew, rain, and wind. And from thence I went to the east to the ends of the heaven, and saw here the three eastern portals of heaven open and small portals,above them. Through each of these small portals pass the stars of heaven and run their course to the west on the path which is shown to them. And as often as I saw I blessed always the Lord of Glory, and I continued to bless the Lord of Glory who has wrought great and glorious wonders, to show the greatness of His work to the angels and to spirits and to men, that they might praise His work and all His creation: that they might see the work of His might and praise the great work of His hands and bless Him for ever.' "'. None
25. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire, • sexual desire

 Found in books: Bowie (2021) 263; Kneebone (2020) 196, 198


26. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • eros (sexual desire), womens • slaves, onstage, desire marriage

 Found in books: Hubbard (2014) 375; Richlin (2018) 241


27. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29, 2.9-2.10, 3.55, 3.58-3.59, 3.68, 3.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, and erotic love

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 89; Graver (2007) 251; Long (2006) 187; Maso (2022) 29, 30, 95; Sorabji (2000) 201


2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 ) difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem?" '2.10. Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere?
3.55. Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv.
3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus.
3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.
3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V' ". None
2.9. \xa0"He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I\xa0have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I\xa0said, "as for the formula \'freedom from pain,\' I\xa0will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that \'freedom from pain\' does not mean the same as \'pleasure.\'\xa0" "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said\xa0I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst is a \'static\' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a \'kinetic\' pleasure." "Why then," I\xa0asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" < 2.10. \xa0"Do you not remember," he replied, "what I\xa0said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I\xa0remember," said\xa0I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. \'Variation\' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a\xa0number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a\xa0number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I\xa0could understand the term, just as I\xa0understand it without your speaking of it. But I\xa0cannot quite grasp what you mean by \'variation\' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or \'kinetic\' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain â\x80\x94 although why you should call this \'pleasure\' I\xa0cannot\xa0make out." <
3.55. \xa0"Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are \'constituents\' of the final end (for so I\xa0represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are \'productive\' of the End, the Greek poiÄ\x93tika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the \'constituent\' class are moral action; the only instance of a \'productive\' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I\xa0called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. <
3.58. \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59. \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <
3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <
3.70. \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <' '. None
28. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.58, 1.92, 1.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • desire, and erotic love • desires

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 251; Maso (2022) 35; Wilson (2012) 106, 185


1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours Lucius Crassus declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. ' "
1.92. Did you think they were all out of their minds because they pronounced that god can exist without hands or feet? Does not even a consideration of the adaptation of man's limbs to their functions convince you that the gods do not require human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if nothing has to be grasped, or for the rest of the list of the various parts of the body, in which nothing is useless, nothing without a reason, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork? It seems then that god will have a tongue, and will not speak; teeth, a palate, a throat, for no use; the organs that nature has attached to the body for the purpose of procreation — these god will possess, but to no purpose; and not only the external but also the internal organs, the heart, lungs, liver and the rest, which if they are not useful are assuredly not beautiful — since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. " '
1.121. for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. ''. None
29. Cicero, On Duties, 3.43, 3.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • psychological mode, desire

 Found in books: Mackey (2022) 301; Maso (2022) 29, 30, 95


3.43. Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.
3.58. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur.''. None
3.43. \xa0It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is short and easy to master: apparent advantages â\x80\x94 political preferment, riches, sensual pleasures, and the like â\x80\x94 should never be preferred to the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit his friend's convenience. <" '
3.58. \xa0If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. <'". None
30. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • action, and desire

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998) 255; Maso (2022) 97


31. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire

 Found in books: Long (2006) 187; Sorabji (2000) 201


32. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • Desire, distinguished p leasure and love, desire involves a lack • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, as genus emotion • desires • eros (sexual desire), and Stoicism • will, desire for good or apparent good?

 Found in books: Graver (2007) 57, 204, 227; Gunderson (2022) 99; Hubbard (2014) 420; Maso (2022) 105, 124; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 159; Sorabji (2000) 329, 389


33. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Seeing God, Human desire • desire, resurrection and

 Found in books: Lieber (2014) 141; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 632


34. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 10.248-10.249 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire, of Pygmalion for statue • desire, of humans for divinities • naturalism, and desire

 Found in books: Elsner (2007) 123, 124, 125; Steiner (2001) 191


10.248. sculpsit ebur formamque dedit, qua femina nasci 10.249. nulla potest: operisque sui concepit amorem.''. None
10.248. You also, Hyacinthus, would have been 10.249. et in the sky! if Phoebus had been given''. None
35. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 128, 179 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desires

 Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 104, 105; Wilson (2012) 269, 413


128. And this is the end which is celebrated among those who study philosophy in the best manner, namely, to live in accordance with nature. And this takes place when the mind, entering into the path of virtue, treads in the steps of right reason, and follows God, remembering his commandments, and at all times and in all places confirming them both by word and deed;" '
179. These men, then, imagined that this world which we behold was the only world in the existing universe, and was either God himself, or else that it contained within itself God, that is, the soul of the universe. Then, having erected fate and necessity into gods, they filled human life with excessive impiety, teaching men that with the exception of those things which are apparent there is no other cause whatever of anything, but that it is the periodical revolutions of the sun, and moon, and other stars, which distribute good and evil to all existing beings. '. None
36. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.103, 1.277, 4.100-4.131 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 49; Gunderson (2022) 196; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 107, 108, 109, 114; Sorabji (2000) 386; Wilson (2010) 106


1.103. For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers become united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts. For the scars and impressions of their old offences remain not the less in the souls of those who repent.
1.277. And this command is a symbol of nothing else but of the fact that in the eyes of God it is not the number of things sacrificed that is accounted valuable, but the purity of the rational spirit of the sacrificer. Unless, indeed, one can suppose that a judge who is anxious to pronounce a holy judgment will never receive gifts from any of those whose conduct comes before his tribunal, or that, if he does receive such presents, he will be liable to an accusation of corruption; and that a good man will not receive gifts from a wicked person, not even though he may be poor and the other rich, and he himself perhaps in actual want of what he would so receive; and yet that God can be corrupted by bribes, who is most all-sufficient for himself and who has no need of any thing created; who, being himself the first and most perfect good thing, the everlasting fountain of wisdom, and justice, and of every virtue, rejects the gifts of the wicked.
4.100. Moreover, Moses has not granted an unlimited possession and use of all other animals to those who partake in his sacred constitution, but he has forbidden with all his might all animals, whether of the land, or of the water, or that fly through the air, which are most fleshy and fat, and calculated to excite treacherous pleasure, well knowing that such, attracting as with a bait that most slavish of all the outward senses, namely, taste, produce insatiability, an incurable evil to both souls and bodies, for insatiability produces indigestion, which is the origin and source of all diseases and weaknesses. 4.101. Now of land animals, the swine is confessed to be the nicest of all meats by those who eat it, and of all aquatic animals the most delicate are the fish which have no scales; and Moses is above all other men skilful in training and inuring persons of a good natural disposition to the practice of virtue by frugality and abstinence, endeavouring to remove costly luxury from their characters, 4.102. at the same time not approving of unnecessary rigour, like the lawgiver of Lacedaemon, nor undue effeminacy, like the man who taught the Ionians and the Sybarites lessons of luxury and license, but keeping a middle path between the two courses, so that he has relaxed what was over strict, and tightened what was too loose, mingling the excesses which are found at each extremity with moderation, which lies between the two, so as to produce an irreproachable harmony and consistency of life, on which account he has laid down not carelessly, but with minute particularity, what we are to use and what to avoid. 4.103. One might very likely suppose it to be just that those beasts which feed upon human flesh should receive at the hands of men similar treatment to that which they inflict on men, but Moses has ordained that we should abstain from the enjoyment of all such things, and with a due consideration of what is becoming to the gentle soul, he proposes a most gentle and most pleasant banquet; for though it is proper that those who inflict evils should suffer similar calamities themselves, yet it may not be becoming to those whom they ill treated to retaliate, lest without being aware of it they become brutalized by anger, which is a savage passion; 4.104. and he takes such care to guard against this, that being desirous to banish as far as possible all desire for those animals abovementioned, he forbids with all his energy the eating of any carnivorous animal at all, selecting the herbivorous animals out of those kinds which are domesticated, since they are tame by nature, feeding on that gentle food which is supplied by the earth, and having no disposition to plot evil against anything.WHAT QUADRUPEDS ARE CLEANXVIII. 4.105. The animals which are clean and lawful to be used as food are ten in number; the heifer, the lamb, the goat, the stag, the antelope, the buffalo, the roebuck, the pygarga, the wildox, and the chamois, {19}{4.106. And he gives two tests and criteria of the ten animals thus Enumerated{20}{4.107. for as the animal which chews the cud, while it is masticating its food draws it down its throat, and then by slow degrees kneads and softens it, and then after this process again sends it down into the belly, in the same manner the man who is being instructed, having received the doctrines and speculations of wisdom in at his ears from his instructor, derives a considerable amount of learning from him, but still is not able to hold it firmly and to embrace it all at once, until he has resolved over in his mind everything which he has heard by the continued exercise of his memory (and this exercise of memory is the cement which connects idea 4.108. But as it seems the firm conception of such ideas is of no advantage to him unless he is able to discriminate between and to distinguish which of contrary things it is right to choose and which to avoid, of which the parting of the hoof is the symbol; since the course of life is twofold, the one road leading to wickedness and the other to virtue, and since we ought to renounce the one and never to forsake the other.WHAT BEASTS ARE NOT CLEANXIX. 4.109. For this reason all animals with solid hoofs, and all with many toes are spoken of by implication as unclean; the one because, being so, they imply that the nature of good and evil is one and the same; which is just as if one were to say that the nature of a concave and a convex surface, or of a road up hill and down hill, was the same. And the other, because it shows that there are many roads, though, indeed, they have no right to be called roads at all, which lead the life of man to deceit; for it is not easy among a variety of paths to choose that which is the most desirable and the most excellent.WHAT AQUATIC ANIMALS ARE CLEANXX. 4.110. Having laid down these definitions with respect to land animals, he proceeds to describe what aquatic creatures are clean and lawful to be used for food; distinguishing them also by two characteristics as having fins or Scales.{21}{4.111. for all those creatures which are destitute of both, or even of one of the two, are sucked down by the current, not being able to resist the force of the stream; but those which have both these characteristics can stem the water, and oppose it in front, and strive against it as against an adversary, and struggle with invincible good will and courage, so that if they are pushed they push in their turn; and if they are pursued they turn upon their foe and pursue it in their turn, making themselves broad roads in a pathless district, so as to have an easy passage to and fro. 4.112. Now both these things are symbols; the former of a soul devoted to pleasure, and the latter of one which loves perseverance and temperance. For the road which leads to pleasure is a down-hill one and very easy, being rather an absorbing gulf than a path. But the path which leads to temperance is up hill and laborious, but above all other roads advantageous. And the one leads men downwards, and prevents those who travel by it from retracing their steps until they have arrived at the very lowest bottom, but the other leads to heaven; making those who do not weary before they reach it immortal, if they are only able to endure its rugged and difficult ascent.ABOUT Reptile 4.113. And adhering to the same general idea the lawgiver asserts that those reptiles which have no feet, and which crawl onwards, dragging themselves along the ground on their bellies, or those which have four legs, or many feet, are all unclean as far as regards their being eaten. And here, again, when he mentions reptiles he intimates under a figurative form of expression those who are devoted to their bellies, gorging themselves like cormorants, and who are continually offering up tribute to their miserable belly, tribute, that is, of strong wine, and confections, and fish, and, in short, all the superfluous delicacies which the skill and labour of bakers and confectioners are able to devise, inventing all sorts of rare viands, to stimulate and set on fire the insatiable and unappeasable appetites of man. And when he speaks of animals with four legs and many feet, he intends to designate the miserable slaves not of one single passion, appetite, but of all the passions; the genera of which were four in number; but in their subordinate species they are innumerable. Therefore, the despotism of one is very grievous, but that of many is most terrible, and as it seems intolerable. 4.114. Again, in the case of those reptiles who have legs above their feet, so that they are able to take leaps from the ground, those Moses speaks of as clean; as, for instance, the different kinds of locusts, and that animal called the serpentfighter, here again intimating by figurative expressions the manners and habits of the rational soul. For the weight of the body being naturally heavy, drags down with it those who are but of small wisdom, strangling it and pressing it down by the weight of the flesh. 4.115. But blessed are they to whose lot it has fallen, inasmuch as they have been well and solidly instructed in the rules of sound education, to resist successfully the power of mere strength, so as to be able, by reason of what they have learnt, to spring up from the earth and all low things, to the air and the periodical revolutions of the heaven, the very sight of which is to be admired and earnestly striven for by those who come to it of their own accord with no indolence or indifference.CONCERNING FLYING Creature 4.116. Having, therefore, in his ordices already gone through all the different kinds of land animals and of those who live in the water, and having distinguished them in his code of laws as accurately as it was possible, Moses begins to investigate the remaining class of animals in the air; the innumerable kinds of flying creatures, rejecting all those which prey upon one another or upon man, all carnivorous birds, in short, all animals which are venomous, and all which have any power of plotting against others. 4.117. But doves, and pigeons, and turtle-doves, and all the flocks of cranes, and geese, and birds of that kind, he numbers in the class of domestic, and tame, and eatable creatures, allowing every one who chooses to partake of them with impunity. ' "4.118. Thus, in each of the parts of the universe, earth, water, and air, he refuses some kinds of each description of animal, whether terrestrial, or aquatic, or a'rial, to our use; and thus, taking as it were fuel from the fire, he causes the extinction of appetite.CONCERNING CARCASSES AND BODIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TORN BY WILDBEASTSXXIII. " '4.119. Moreover, Moses Commands{25}{4.120. Now many of the lawgivers both among the Greeks and barbarians, praise those who are skilful in hunting, and who seldom fail in their pursuit or miss their aim, and who pride themselves on their successful hunts, especially when they divide the limbs of the animals which they have caught with the huntsmen and the hounds, as being not only brave hunters but men of very sociable dispositions. But any one who was a sound interpreter of the sacred constitution and code of laws would very naturally blame them, since the lawgiver of that code has expressly forbidden any enjoyment of carcasses or of bodies torn by beasts for the reasons before mentioned. 4.121. But if any one of those persons who devote themselves wholly to meditations on and to the practice of virtue were suddenly to become fond of gymnastic exercises and of hunting, looking upon hunting as a sort of prelude to and representation of the wars and dangers that have to be encountered against the enemy, then, whenever such a man is successful in his sport, he ought to give the beasts which he has slain to his dogs as a feast for them, and as a reward or wages for their successful boldness and their irreproachable alliance. But he ought not himself to touch them, inasmuch as he has been previously taught in the case of irrational animals, what sentiments he ought to entertain, respecting his enemies. For he ought to carry on war against them, not for the sake of unrighteous gain like those who make a dishonest traffic of all their actions, but either in revenge for some calamities which he has previously suffered at their hands, or with a view toward some which he expects to suffer. 4.122. But some men, with open mouths, carry even the excessive luxury and boundless intemperance of Sardanapalus to such an indefinite and unlimited extent, being wholly absorbed in the invention of senseless pleasures, that they prepare sacrifices which ought never be offered, strangling their victims, and stifling the essence of life, {26}{4.123. On which account Moses, in another passage, establishes a law concerning blood, that one may not eat the blood nor the Fat.{27}{4.124. But Moses commanded men to abstain from eating fat, because it is gross. And again, he gave us this injunction, in order to inculcate temperance and a zeal for an austere life: for some things we easily abandon, and without any hesitation; though we do not willingly encounter any anxieties or labours for the sake of the acquisition of virtue. 4.125. For which reason these two parts are to be taken out of every victim and burnt with fire, as a kind of first fruits, namely, the fat and the blood; the one being poured upon the altar as a libation; and the other as a fuel to the flame, being applied instead of oil, by reason of its fatness, to the consecrated and holy flame. 4.126. The lawgiver blames some persons of his time as gluttons, and as believing that the mere indulgence of luxury is the happiest of all possible conditions, not being content to live in this manner only in cities in which there were abundant supplies and stores of all kinds of necessary things, but carrying their effeminacy even into pathless and untrodden deserts, and choosing in them also to have markets for fish and meat, and all things which can contribute to an easy life: 4.127. then, when a scarcity arose, they assembled together and raised an outcry, and looked miserable, and with shameless audacity impeached their ruler, and did not desist from creating disturbances till they obtained what they desired; and they obtained it to their destruction, for two reasons: first of all, that it might be shown that all things are possible to God, who can find a way in the most difficult and apparently hopeless circumstances; and secondly, that punishment might fall on those who were intemperate in their gluttonous appetites, and obstinate resisters of holiness. ' "4.128. For a vast cloud being Raised{28}{4.129. It would have been natural therefore for them, being amazed at the marvellous nature of the prodigy which they beheld, to be satisfied with the sight, and being filled with piety to nourish their souls on that, and to abstain from eating flesh; but these men, on the contrary, stirred up their desires even more than before, and pursued these birds as the greatest good imaginable, and catching hold of them with both their hands filled their bosoms; then, having stored them up in their tents, they sallied forth to catch others, for immoderate covetousness has no limit. And when they had collected every description of food they devoured it insatiably, being about, vain-minded generation that they were, to perish by their own fulness; 4.130. and indeed at no distant time they did perish by the purging of their bile, {30}{4.131. For which reason Moses says with great beauty in his recommendations, "Let not every man do that which seemeth good to his own Eyes,"{32}{'. None
37. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Eclogues,, and theme of desire • Epicureanism, on erotic desire • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Venus, and sexual desire / intercourse • eros (sexual desire), and Epicureanism • furor, and erotic / sexual desire

 Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 213, 214; Hubbard (2014) 424; Kazantzidis (2021) 21, 22, 23, 52, 54, 56, 59, 124, 145; Sorabji (2000) 283


38. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire • terminology of desire

 Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 111, 177, 201; Nisula (2012) 205; Sorabji (2000) 386


39. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.17.21-1.17.28, 2.2.3-2.2.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epictetus, Stoic, Only will (proairesis), desire, judgement is upto us, not anything bodily • desire • desires

 Found in books: Harte (2017) 251; Long (2006) 388; Sorabji (2000) 332; Wilson (2012) 282


1.17.21. SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
2.2.3. CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will determine against you something that appears formidable; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life. But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is. For what do you think? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said: Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges ( δικασταῖς ) that his case was just, said when he had come to the peroration of his speech, I will neither intreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you father than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business. What need was there of this? Only do not intreat; but do not also say, I do not intreat. unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to trial? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come: but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper character). For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me (tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what will you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid. 2.2.4. CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will determine against you something that appears formidable; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life. But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is. For what do you think? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said: Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges ( δικασταῖς ) that his case was just, said when he had come to the peroration of his speech, I will neither intreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you father than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business. What need was there of this? Only do not intreat; but do not also say, I do not intreat. unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to trial? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come: but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper character). For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me (tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what will you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid.''. None
40. Ignatius, To The Romans, 4.2, 7.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 193; Maier and Waldner (2022) 133, 165, 167; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 134


4.2. Rather entice the wild beasts, that they may become my sepulchre and may leave no part of my body behind, so that I may not, when I am fallen asleep, be burdensome to any one. Then shall I be truly a disciple of Jesus Christ, when the world shall not so much as see my body. Supplicate the Lord for me, that through these instruments I may be found a sacrifice to God.
7.2. Let not envy have a home in you. Even though I myself, when I am with you, should beseech you, obey me not; but rather give credence to these things which I write to you. For I write to you in the midst of life, yet lusting after death. My lust hath been crucified, and there is no fire of material longing in me, but only water living +and speaking+ in me, saying within me, Come to the Father. ''. None
41. New Testament, 1 John, 5.16-5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 195; Černušková (2016) 305, 319


5.16. Ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον, αἰτήσει, καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωήν, τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον. ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον· οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ. 5.17. πᾶσα ἀδικία ἁμαρτία ἐστίν, καὶ ἔστιν ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον.''. None
5.16. If anyone sees his brother sinning a sin not leading to death, he shall ask, and God will give him life for those who sin not leading to death. There is a sin leading to death. I don't say that he should make a request concerning this. " '5.17. All unrighteousness is sin, and there is a sin not leading to death. '". None
42. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 4.7, 6.18-6.19, 7.5, 8.7, 9.25, 10.3, 10.5, 10.17-10.18, 12.12-12.13, 15.28 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • domination, human desire for • sexual desire • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 151; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 328; Gunderson (2022) 5, 15, 87; Karfíková (2012) 46, 122, 287; Nasrallah (2019) 164; O, Daly (2020) 182, 187, 188; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 208; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 109, 110, 112, 159; Wilson (2018) 160, 252, 253, 259; Černušková (2016) 231, 331, 332


4.7. τίς γάρ σε διακρίνει; τί δὲ ἔχεις ὃ οὐκ ἔλαβες; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλαβες, τί καυχᾶσαι ὡς μὴ λαβών;
6.18. φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν· πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ὃ ἐὰν ποιήσῃ ἄνθρωπος ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ πορνεύων εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἁμαρτάνει. 6.19. ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν, οὗ ἔχετε ἀπὸ θεοῦ;
7.5. μὴ ἀποστερεῖτε ἀλλήλους, εἰ μήτι ἂν ἐκ συμφώνου πρὸς καιρὸν ἵνα σχολάσητε τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦτε, ἵνα μὴ πειράζῃ ὑμᾶς ὁ Σατανᾶς διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ὑμῶν.
8.7. τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον ἐσθίουσιν, καὶ ἡ συνείδησις αὐτῶν ἀσθενὴς οὖσα μολύνεται.
9.25. πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄφθαρτον.
10.3. καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον
10.5. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν ηὐδόκησεν ὁ θεός,κατεστρώθησανγὰρἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ.
10.17. ὅτι εἷς ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· 10.18. οὐχ οἱ ἐσθίοντες τὰς θυσίας κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εἰσίν;
12.12. Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χριστός· 12.13. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες, εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν.
15.28. ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν.' '. None
4.7. For who makes you different? And what doyou have that you didn't receive? But if you did receive it, why do youboast as if you had not received it?" '
6.18. Flee sexual immorality! "Every sin that a man doesis outside the body," but he who commits sexual immorality sins againsthis own body.' "6.19. Or don't you know that your body is a temple ofthe Holy Spirit which is in you, which you have from God? You are notyour own," "
7.5. Don't deprive one another, unless it is by consent for aseason, that you may give yourselves to fasting and prayer, and may betogether again, that Satan doesn't tempt you because of your lack ofself-control." "
8.7. However, that knowledgeisn't in all men. But some, with consciousness of the idol until now,eat as of a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience, beingweak, is defiled." '
9.25. Every man who strives in thegames exercises self-control in all things. Now they do it to receive acorruptible crown, but we an incorruptible.
10.3. andall ate the same spiritual food;
10.5. However with most of them, God was notwell pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness.
10.17. Because we, who are many, are one bread, one body; forwe all partake of the one bread.' "10.18. Consider Israel after theflesh. Don't those who eat the sacrifices have communion with the altar?" '
12.12. For as the body is one, and has many members, and all themembers of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. 12.13. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whetherJews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all given to drink intoone Spirit.
15.28. When all things have been subjected to him, then theSon will also himself be subjected to him who subjected all things tohim, that God may be all in all.' ". None
43. New Testament, 1 Timothy, 4.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022) 23; Černušková (2016) 332


4.3. κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν εἰς μετάλημψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.''. None
4.3. forbidding marriage and commanding to abstain from foods which God created to be received with thanksgiving by those who believe and know the truth. ''. None
44. New Testament, James, 4.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires • domination, human desire for

 Found in books: Karfíková (2012) 90; O, Daly (2020) 72, 73, 74; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 69


4.6. μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν· διὸ λέγει Ὁ θεὸς ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν.''. None
4.6. But he gives more grace. Therefore it says, "God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble."''. None
45. New Testament, Colossians, 1.18, 2.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 86; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 207; Maier and Waldner (2022) 23; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 208


1.18. καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος, τῆς ἐκκλησίας· ὅς ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχή, πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων,
2.16. Μὴ οὖν τις ὑμᾶς κρινέτω ἐν βρώσει καὶ ἐν πόσει ἢ ἐν μέρει ἑορτῆς ἢ νεομηνίας ἢ σαββάτων,''. None
1.18. He is the head of the body, the assembly, who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead; that in all things he might have the preeminence.
2.16. Let no man therefore judge you in eating, or in drinking, or with respect to a feast day or a new moon or a Sabbath day, ''. None
46. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.5, 2.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty

 Found in books: Karfíková (2012) 47, 329; Wilson (2018) 160; Černušková (2016) 331


1.5. προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἱοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ,
2.3. ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημέν ποτε ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν, καὶ ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί·—''. None
1.5. having predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his desire,
2.3. among whom we also all once lived in the lust of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. ''. None
47. New Testament, Galatians, 4.19, 5.4, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 85; Gunderson (2022) 9, 10; Karfíková (2012) 55, 255; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 187; Černušková (2016) 332


4.19. τεκνία μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν·
5.4. κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε.
5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε.''. None
4.19. My little children, of whom I am again in travail untilChrist is formed in you--
5.4. You are alienated from Christ, you who desire to be justified by thelaw. You have fallen away from grace.
5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. ''. None
48. New Testament, Hebrews, 9.11-9.15, 12.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Seeing God, Human desire • desire (epithumia) • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 193; Maier and Waldner (2022) 23, 26, 28, 30, 32; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 632


9.11. Χριστὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν διὰ τῆς μείζονος καὶ τελειοτέρας σκηνῆς οὐ χειροποιήτου, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως, 9.12. οὐδὲ διʼ αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια, αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος. 9.13. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἷμα τράγων καὶ ταύρων καὶ σποδὸς δαμάλεως ῥαντίζουσα τοὺς κεκοινωμένους ἁγιάζει πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα, 9.14. πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ αἷμα τοῦ χριστοῦ, ὃς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἄμωμον τῷ θεῷ, καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ἡμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι. 9.15. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης ἐστίν, ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν λάβωσιν οἱ κεκλημένοι τῆς αἰωνίου κληρονομίας.
12.18. Οὐ γὰρ προσεληλύθατε ψηλαφωμένῳ καὶκεκαυμένῳ πυρὶκαὶγνόφῳκαὶ ζόφῳ καὶ θυέλλῃ''. None
9.11. But Christ having come as a high priest of the coming good things, through the greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this creation, 9.12. nor yet through the blood of goats and calves, but through his own blood, entered in once for all into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption. 9.13. For if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling those who have been defiled, sanctify to the cleanness of the flesh: 9.14. how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? 9.15. For this reason he is the mediator of a new covet, since a death has occurred for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covet, that those who have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance.
12.18. For you have not come to a mountain that might be touched, and that burned with fire, and to blackness, darkness, tempest, ''. None
49. New Testament, Romans, 5.5, 6.4, 7.15-7.16, 7.18-7.19, 7.23, 7.25, 8.17, 9.3, 9.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • conversion, Christian desires for • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • domination, human desire for • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 193; Gunderson (2022) 6, 9, 10, 73, 87, 99; Karfíková (2012) 35, 47, 93, 122, 233, 287, 317, 334, 340, 344; Kraemer (2020) 75; Nasrallah (2019) 164; O, Daly (2020) 191; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 159; Wilson (2012) 277; Wilson (2018) 254; Černušková (2016) 8, 236, 331, 332


5.5. ἡ δὲἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει.ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν·
6.4. συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν.
7.15. ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλʼ ὃ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ. 7.16. εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύνφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός.
7.18. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειταί μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὔ· 7.19. οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω.
7.23. βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου.
7.25. χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας.
8.17. εἰ δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι· κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, συνκληρονόμοι δὲ Χριστοῦ, εἴπερ συνπάσχομεν ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν.
9.3. ηὐχόμην γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου τῶν συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα, οἵτινές εἰσιν Ἰσραηλεῖται,
9.21. ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίανὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν;' '. None
5.5. and hope doesn't disappoint us, because God's love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us. " '
6.4. We were buried therefore with him through baptism to death, that just like Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. ' "
7.15. For I don't know what I am doing. For I don't practice what I desire to do; but what I hate, that I do. " "7.16. But if what I don't desire, that I do, I consent to the law that it is good. " "
7.18. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing. For desire is present with me, but I don't find it doing that which is good. " "7.19. For the good which I desire, I don't do; but the evil which I don't desire, that I practice. " '
7.23. but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. ' "
7.25. I thank God through Jesus Christ, our Lord! So then with the mind, I myself serve God's law, but with the flesh, the sin's law. " '
8.17. and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if indeed we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him. ' "
9.3. For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my brothers' sake, my relatives according to the flesh, " "
9.21. Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? " ". None
50. New Testament, Mark, 14.35-14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires

 Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 63; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 165


14.35. καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπιπτεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ προσηύχετο ἵνα εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν παρέλθῃ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὥρα, 14.36. καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ.''. None
14.35. He went forward a little, and fell on the ground, and prayed that, if it were possible, the hour might pass away from him. 14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire."''. None
51. New Testament, Matthew, 5.3, 5.5-5.6, 5.8-5.9, 5.12, 5.23-5.24, 5.26, 5.28-5.30, 5.41, 5.44-5.46, 5.48, 19.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires • desires, abandonment of

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 287, 290, 292, 293, 294; Wilson (2012) 269; Černušková (2016) 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 237, 238


5.3. ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΙ οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.
5.5. μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν. 5.6. μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται.
5.8. μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. 5.9. μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται.
5.12. χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.
5.23. ἐὰν οὖν προσφέρῃς τὸ δῶρόν σου ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον κἀκεῖ μνησθῇς ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἔχει τι κατὰ σοῦ, 5.24. ἄφες ἐκεῖ τὸ δῶρόν σου ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, καὶ ὕπαγε πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, καὶ τότε ἐλθὼν πρόσφερε τὸ δῶρόν σου.
5.26. ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως ἂν ἀποδῷς τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην.
5.28. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. 5.29. εἰ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτὸν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν·
5.30. καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιά σου χεὶρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου εἰς γέενναν ἀπέλθῃ.
5.41. καὶ ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει μίλιον ἕν, ὕπαγε μετʼ αὐτοῦ δύο.
5.44. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν διωκόντων ὑμᾶς· 5.45. ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους. 5.46. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀγαπήσητε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς, τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε; οὐχὶ καὶ οἱ τελῶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν;
5.48. Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν.
19.21. ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Εἰ θέλεις τέλειος εἶναι, ὕπαγε πώλησόν σου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ δὸς τοῖς πτωχοῖς, καὶ ἕξεις θησαυρὸν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολούθει μοι.''. None
5.3. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
5.5. Blessed are the gentle, For they shall inherit the earth. 5.6. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, For they shall be filled.
5.8. Blessed are the pure in heart, For they shall see God. 5.9. Blessed are the peacemakers, For they shall be called sons of God.
5.12. Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you.
5.23. "If therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has anything against you, 5.24. leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift.
5.26. Most assuredly I tell you, you shall by no means get out of there, until you have paid the last penny.
5.28. but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. 5.29. If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and throw it away from you. For it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, than for your whole body to be cast into Gehenna.
5.30. If your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off, and throw it away from you: for it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, and not your whole body be thrown into Gehenna.
5.41. Whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him two.
5.44. But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 5.45. that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust. ' "5.46. For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Don't even the tax collectors do the same? " '
5.48. Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect.
19.21. Jesus said to him, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."''. None
52. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 85; Gunderson (2022) 6, 87; Wilson (2012) 422


53. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire, of humans for divinities

 Found in books: Pinheiro et al (2012a) 244; Steiner (2001) 191


54. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire, women as objects of

 Found in books: Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 30; Pinheiro et al (2012a) 24


55. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 86, 89; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 96; Černušková (2016) 319


56. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Sexual desire • desire (epithumia)

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 166; Grypeou and Spurling (2009) 78


57. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 34 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire

 Found in books: Huffman (2019) 366; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013) 291


34. Since, however, we have thus generally, and with arrangement, discussed what pertains to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans; let us after this 171narrate such scattered particulars relative to this subject, as do not fall under the above-mentioned order. It is said, therefore, that each of the Greeks who joined himself to this community of the Pythagoreans, was ordered to use his native language. For they did not approve of the use of a foreign tongue. Foreigners also united themselves to the Pythagoric sect, viz. the Messenians, the Lucani, Picentini, and the Romans. And Metrodorus the son of Thyrsus who was the father of Epicharmus,48 and who transferred the greater part of his doctrine to medicine, says in explaining the writings of his father to his brother, that Epicharmus, and prior to him Pythagoras, conceived that the best dialect, as well as the best harmony of music, is the Doric; that the Ionic and the Æolic participate of the chromatic harmony; but that the Attic dialect is replete with this in a still greater degree. They were also of opinion, that the Doric dialect, which consists of vocal letters, is enharmonic.Fables likewise bear testimony to the antiquity of this dialect. For in these it is said that Nereus married Doris the daughter of Ocean; by whom he had fifty daughters, one of which was the mother of Achilles. Metrodorus also says, that according to 172some, Hellen was the offspring of Deucalion, who was the son of Prometheus and Pyrrha the daughter of Epimetheus; and that from him came Dorus, and Æolus. He farther observes, that he learnt from the sacred rites of the Babylonians, that Hellen was the offspring of Jupiter, and that the sons of Hellen were Dorus, Xuthus, and Æolus; with which narrations Herodotus also accords. It is difficult, however, for those in more recent times to know accurately, in particulars so ancient, which of these narrations is to be preferred. But it may be collected from each of these histories, that the Doric dialect is acknowledged to be the most ancient; that the Æolic is next to this, which received its name from Æolus; and that the Ionic ranks as the third, which derived its appellation from Ion the son of Xuthus. The Attic is the fourth, which was denominated from Creusa, the daughter of Erectheus, and is posterior to the former dialects by three generations, as it existed about the time of the Thracians, and the rape of Orithyia, as is evident from the testimony of most histories. Orpheus also, who is the most ancient of the poets, used the Doric dialect.of medicine, however, they especially embraced the diætetic species, and in the exercise of this were most accurate. And in the first place, indeed, they endeavoured to learn the indications of symmetry, of labor, food, and repose. In the next place, 173with respect to the preparation of food, they were nearly the first who attempted to employ themselves in it, and to define the mode in which it should be performed. The Pythagoreans likewise employed cataplasms, more frequently than their predecessors; but they in a less degree approved of medicated ointments. These, however, they principally used in the cure of ulcerations. But incisions and burnings they admitted the least of all things. Some diseases also they cured by incantations. But they are said to have objected to those who expose disciplines to sale; who open their souls like the gates of an inn to every man that approaches to them; and who, if they do not thus find buyers, diffuse themselves through cities, and, in short, hire gymnasia and require a reward from young men for those things which are without price. Pythagoras, however, concealed the meaning of much that was said by him, in order that those who were genuinely instructed might clearly be partakers of it; but that others, as Homer says of Tantalus, might be pained in the midst of what they heard, in consequence of receiving no delight from thence.I think also, it was said by the Pythagoreans, respecting those who teach for the sake of reward, that they show themselves to be worse than statuaries, or those artists who perform their work sitting. For these, when some one orders them to make a 174statue of Hermes, search for wood adapted to the reception of the proper form; but those pretend that they can readily produce the works of virtue from every nature.49 The Pythagoreans likewise said, that it is more necessary to pay attention to philosophy, than to parents and agriculture; for it is owing to the latter, indeed, that we live; but philosophers and preceptors are the causes of our living well, and becoming wise, in consequence of having discovered the right mode of discipline and instruction. Nor did they think fit either to speak or write in such a way, that their conceptions might be obvious to any casual persons; but Pythagoras is said to have taught this in the first place to those that came to him, that, being purified from all incontinence, they should preserve in silence the doctrines they had heard. It is said, therefore, that he who first divulged the theory of commensurable and incommensurable quantities, to those who were unworthy to receive it, was so hated by the Pythagoreans that they not only expelled him from their 175common association, and from living with them, but also constructed a tomb for him, as one who had migrated from the human and passed into a another life. Others also say, that the Divine Power was indigt with those who divulged the dogmas of Pythagoras: for that he perished in the sea, as an impious person, who rendered manifest the composition of the icostagonus; viz. who delivered the method of inscribing in a sphere the dodecaedron, which is one of what are called the five solid figures. But according to others, this happened to him who unfolded the doctrine of irrational and incommensurable quantities.50 Moreover, all the Pythagoric discipline was symbolic, and resembled enigmas and riddles, consisting of apothegms, in consequence of imitating antiquity in its character; just as the truly divine and Pythian oracles appear to be in a certain respect difficult to be understood and explained, to those who carelessly receive the answers which they give. Such therefore, and so many are the indications respecting Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, which may be collected from what is disseminated about them.''. None
58. Origen, Against Celsus, 7.48 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 216; Wilson (2012) 108


7.48. But those who are despised for their ignorance, and set down as fools and abject slaves, no sooner commit themselves to God's guidance by accepting the teaching of Jesus, than, so far from defiling themselves by licentious indulgence or the gratification of shameless passion, they in many cases, like perfect priests, for whom such pleasures have no charm, keep themselves in act and in thought in a state of virgin purity. The Athenians have one hierophant, who, not having confidence in his power to restrain his passions within the limits he prescribed for himself, determined to check them at their seat by the application of hemlock; and thus he was accounted pure, and fit for the celebration of religious worship among the Athenians. But among Christians may be found men who have no need of hemlock to fit them for the pure service of God, and for whom the Word in place of hemlock is able to drive all evil desires from their thoughts, so that they may present their prayers to the Divine Being. And attached to the other so-called gods are a select number of virgins, who are guarded by men, or it may be not guarded (for that is not the point in question at present), and who are supposed to live in purity for the honour of the god they serve. But among Christians, those who maintain a perpetual virginity do so for no human honours, for no fee or reward, from no motive of vainglory; but as they choose to retain God in their knowledge, they are preserved by God in a spirit well-pleasing to Him, and in the discharge of every duty, being filled with all righteousness and goodness. "". None
59. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.7-1.12, 4.20 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia)

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 35, 177; King (2006) 170; Long (2006) 196


1.7. 7.The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordice, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. 4.20. 20.For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not being mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence, they thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not from dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which is animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But they conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, and the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living; and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once sensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living being. Hence, universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in rejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are appropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are attended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of the female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and causing her to be pregt, defiles the soul, through its association with the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in consequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with males defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery, and emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes mingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of the soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a certain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things of an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this mixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are produced through mixture, one species being complicated with another, this mixture is denominated a defilement. As when some woman with a lively red Stains the pure iv'ry --- says Homer 22. And again painters call the mixtures of colours, |134 corruptions. It is usual, likewise to denominate that which is unmingled and pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted. For water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. But water, which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves behind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream. When from a limpid and perennial fount It defluous runs --- as Hesiod says 23. For such water is salubrious, because it is uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive into herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that the mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture of dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once living and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be reasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature; just, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body; and he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different and foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, it is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoetic, therefore, or discursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes dianoetically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a separation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper nutriment likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves it. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its composition. It is one thing, however, |135 to nourish, and another to fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various also is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly endeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of the rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron, though most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather, by contracting hat is necessary to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, he himself nourished, by adhering to God more closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homer 24 says, we were not in want either of meat or drink, that we might be truly immortal! --- the poet in thus speaking beautifully signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of death. If therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant that, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it. 25 Hence, it is much |136 to be wished that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which hunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the everyway-flowing river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him who truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call on them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, dismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to what remains to be discussed?
60. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Desire • One, the, as object of desire • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, rational versus non-rational

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 35; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 27, 239, 367; Joosse (2021) 63; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 136, 157


61. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Julian of Eclanum, bishop, Pelagian opponent of Augustine, Is desire for privacy in sex universal? • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty

 Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 411; Wilson (2018) 252


62. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 1.34
 Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire

 Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 49; Maier and Waldner (2022) 26; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 96


1.34. Therefore when we crave seafood and fowl and animals and all sorts of foods that are forbidden to us by the law, we abstain because of domination by reason.''. None
63. Vergil, Aeneis, 6.847-6.853
 Tagged with subjects: • Aeneas, personal desires • domination, human desire for

 Found in books: Farrell (2021) 282; O, Daly (2020) 74, 276, 277


6.847. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, 6.848. credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus, 6.849. orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus 6.850. describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent: 6.851. tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento; 6.852. hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem, 6.853. parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos.''. None
6.847. Lo! on the left and right at feast reclined 6.848. Are other blessed souls, whose chorus sings 6.849. Victorious paeans on the fragrant air 6.850. of laurel groves; and hence to earth outpours 6.851. Eridanus, through forests rolling free. 6.852. Here dwell the brave who for their native land 6.853. Fell wounded on the field; here holy priests ''. None
64. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on desire • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Plato, on desire • desire • immortality, desire for • psychological mode, desire

 Found in books: Huffman (2019) 198, 415; Long (2006) 179, 187; Long (2019) 131; Mackey (2022) 214, 240, 241; Sorabji (2000) 201





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