1. Hebrew Bible, Song of Songs, 5.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, in Shivata Shir ha-Shirim • desires
Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 206; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 59
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5.2 אֲנִי יְשֵׁנָה וְלִבִּי עֵר קוֹל דּוֹדִי דוֹפֵק פִּתְחִי־לִי אֲחֹתִי רַעְיָתִי יוֹנָתִי תַמָּתִי שֶׁרֹּאשִׁי נִמְלָא־טָל קְוֻּצּוֹתַי רְסִיסֵי לָיְלָה׃'' None | sup>
5.2 I sleep, but my heart waketh; Hark! my beloved knocketh: ‘Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undefiled; For my head is filled with dew, My locks with the drops of the night.’'' None |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 31.13, 33.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Soul, seat of desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, in the Shivata for Dew • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 124; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 196; Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 310; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 30
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31.13 וְאַתָּה דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר אַךְ אֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ כִּי אוֹת הִוא בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם לָדַעַת כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה מְקַדִּשְׁכֶם׃
33.18 וַיֹּאמַר הַרְאֵנִי נָא אֶת־כְּבֹדֶךָ׃'' None | sup>
31.13 ’Speak thou also unto the children of Israel, saying: Verily ye shall keep My sabbaths, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout your generations, that ye may know that I am the LORD who sanctify you.
33.18 And he said: ‘Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory.’'' None |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.27, 2.2, 2.7, 3.5, 3.16, 4.6-4.8, 4.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cain, Desire of • Passion, desire or emotion • Plato, on God as desires to create the best possible world • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, as source of sin • desires • domination, human desire for • eros (sexual desire), womens • women, desires of
Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 294; Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 108; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 9, 197; Herman, Rubenstein (2018), The Aggada of the Bavli and Its Cultural World. 300; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 536, 537; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 26, 122; Kosman (2012), Gender and Dialogue in the Rabbinic Prism, 190; Levison (2023), The Greek Life of Adam and Eve. 227, 981; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 241; O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 182, 191; Rosen-Zvi (2012), The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash, 33; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 176
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1.27 וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃
2.2 וַיְכַל אֱלֹהִים בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מְלַאכְתּוֹ אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וַיִּשְׁבֹּת בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִכָּל־מְלַאכְתּוֹ אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה׃
2.2 וַיִּקְרָא הָאָדָם שֵׁמוֹת לְכָל־הַבְּהֵמָה וּלְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה וּלְאָדָם לֹא־מָצָא עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ׃
2.7 וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃
3.5 כִּי יֹדֵעַ אֱלֹהִים כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְכֶם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנִפְקְחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם וִהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע׃
3.16 אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אָמַר הַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה עִצְּבוֹנֵךְ וְהֵרֹנֵךְ בְּעֶצֶב תֵּלְדִי בָנִים וְאֶל־אִישֵׁךְ תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ וְהוּא יִמְשָׁל־בָּךְ׃
4.6 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־קָיִן לָמָּה חָרָה לָךְ וְלָמָּה נָפְלוּ פָנֶיךָ׃ 4.7 הֲלוֹא אִם־תֵּיטִיב שְׂאֵת וְאִם לֹא תֵיטִיב לַפֶּתַח חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ וְאֵלֶיךָ תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ וְאַתָּה תִּמְשָׁל־בּוֹ׃ 4.8 וַיֹּאמֶר קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיְהִי בִּהְיוֹתָם בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיָּקָם קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיַּהַרְגֵהוּ׃
4.14 הֵן גֵּרַשְׁתָּ אֹתִי הַיּוֹם מֵעַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה וּמִפָּנֶיךָ אֶסָּתֵר וְהָיִיתִי נָע וָנָד בָּאָרֶץ וְהָיָה כָל־מֹצְאִי יַהַרְגֵנִי׃'' None | sup>
1.27 And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.
2.2 And on the seventh day God finished His work which He had made; and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had made.
2.7 Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.
3.5 for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.’
3.16 Unto the woman He said: ‘I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.’
4.6 And the LORD said unto Cain: ‘Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countece fallen? 4.7 If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up? and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it.’ 4.8 And Cain spoke unto Abel his brother. And it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him.
4.14 Behold, Thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the land; and from Thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer in the earth; and it will come to pass, that whosoever findeth me will slay me.’'' None |
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4. Hebrew Bible, Joel, 1.13, 2.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 276; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 32
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1.13 חִגְרוּ וְסִפְדוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים הֵילִילוּ מְשָׁרְתֵי מִזְבֵּחַ בֹּאוּ לִינוּ בַשַּׂקִּים מְשָׁרְתֵי אֱלֹהָי כִּי נִמְנַע מִבֵּית אֱלֹהֵיכֶם מִנְחָה וָנָסֶךְ׃
2.17 בֵּין הָאוּלָם וְלַמִּזְבֵּחַ יִבְכּוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים מְשָׁרְתֵי יְהוָה וְיֹאמְרוּ חוּסָה יְהוָה עַל־עַמֶּךָ וְאַל־תִּתֵּן נַחֲלָתְךָ לְחֶרְפָּה לִמְשָׁל־בָּם גּוֹיִם לָמָּה יֹאמְרוּ בָעַמִּים אַיֵּה אֱלֹהֵיהֶם׃'' None | sup>
1.13 Gird yourselves, and lament, ye priests, Wail, ye ministers of the altar; Come, lie all night in sackcloth, Ye ministers of my God; For the meal-offering and the drink-offering is withholden From the house of your God.
2.17 Let the priests, the ministers of the LORD, Weep between the porch and the altar, And let them say: ‘Spare thy people, O LORD, And give not Thy heritage to reproach, That the nations should make them a byword: Wherefore should they say among the peoples: Where is their God?’'' None |
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5. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.18, 21.14-21.15 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desires • eros (sexual desire), womens • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 537; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 20, 30; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 125; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 221
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19.18 לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃
21.14 אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה אֶת־אֵלֶּה לֹא יִקָּח כִּי אִם־בְּתוּלָה מֵעַמָּיו יִקַּח אִשָּׁה׃ 21.15 וְלֹא־יְחַלֵּל זַרְעוֹ בְּעַמָּיו כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה מְקַדְּשׁוֹ׃'' None | sup>
19.18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
21.14 A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife. 21.15 And he shall not profane his seed among his people; for I am the LORD who sanctify him.'' None |
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6. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 25.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desire, • desires
Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 111, 113; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 138
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25.1 וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר׃
25.1 וַיֵּשֶׁב יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּשִּׁטִּים וַיָּחֶל הָעָם לִזְנוֹת אֶל־בְּנוֹת מוֹאָב׃'' None | sup>
25.1 And Israel abode in Shittim, and the people began to commit harlotry with the daughters of Moab.'' None |
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7. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 13.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires • desires, abandonment of
Found in books: Hirshman (2009), The Stabilization of Rabbinic Culture, 100 C, 69; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 224
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13.11 הוֹן מֵהֶבֶל יִמְעָט וְקֹבֵץ עַל־יָד יַרְבֶּה׃'' None | sup>
13.11 Wealth gotten by vanity shall be diminished; But he that gathereth little by little shall increase. .'' None |
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8. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 26.2, 26.4, 51.5, 112.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Evil desire • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 130, 133; Hirshman (2009), The Stabilization of Rabbinic Culture, 100 C, 66, 67, 68; Ployd (2023), Augustine, Martyrdom, and Classical Rhetoric, 74, 75; Rosen-Zvi (2011), Demonic Desires: Yetzer Hara and the Problem of Evil in Late Antiquity. 121; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 40, 89; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 160
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26.2 בְּחָנֵנִי יְהוָה וְנַסֵּנִי צרופה צָרְפָה כִלְיוֹתַי וְלִבִּי׃
51.5 כִּי־פְשָׁעַי אֲנִי אֵדָע וְחַטָּאתִי נֶגְדִּי תָמִיד׃
112.1 הַלְלוּ יָהּ אַשְׁרֵי־אִישׁ יָרֵא אֶת־יְהוָה בְּמִצְוֺתָיו חָפֵץ מְאֹד׃'
112.1 רָשָׁע יִרְאֶה וְכָעָס שִׁנָּיו יַחֲרֹק וְנָמָס תַּאֲוַת רְשָׁעִים תֹּאבֵד׃ ' None | sup>
26.2 Examine me, O LORD, and try me; test my reins and my heart.
51.5 For I know my transgressions; And my sin is ever before me.
112.1 Hallelujah. Happy is the man that feareth the LORD, That delighteth greatly in His commandments.' ' None |
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9. Homer, Iliad, 3.139, 6.358, 10.94 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • death and temporality, human desire for glory (kleos) in Greco-Roman literature • desires (έπι - / προθυµία) • eros (sexual desire), womens • immortality, human desire for glory (kleos) and
Found in books: Goldhill (2022), The Christian Invention of Time: Temporality and the Literature of Late Antiquity, 49; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 319; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 253; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 55, 136
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3.139 ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ γλυκὺν ἵμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ
6.358 ἀνθρώποισι πελώμεθʼ ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισι.
10.94 ἔμπεδον, ἀλλʼ ἀλαλύκτημαι, κραδίη δέ μοι ἔξω'' None | sup>
3.139 and they lean upon their shields, and beside them their long spears are fixed. But Alexander and Menelaus, dear to Ares, will do battle with their long spears for thee; and whoso shall conquer, his dear wife shalt thou be called. So spake the goddess, and put into her heart sweet longing
6.358 my brother, since above all others has trouble encompassed thy heart because of shameless me, and the folly of Alexander; on whom Zeus hath brought an evil doom, that even in days to come we may be a song for men that are yet to be. Then made answer to her great Hector of the flashing helm:
10.94 o long as the breath abideth in my breast and my knees are quick. I wander thus, because sweet sleep settleth not upon mine eyes, but war is a trouble to me and the woes of the Achaeans. Wondrously do I fear for the Danaans, nor is my mind firm, but I am tossed to and fro, and my heart '' None |
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10. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire / lust • desire,
Found in books: Bowie (2021), Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 170, 612; Gazzarri and Weiner (2023), Searching for the Cinaedus in Ancient Rome. 30
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11. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • desires
Found in books: Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 187; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 192
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12. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desiring subjects • female desire • truth (alētheia), and desire
Found in books: Faraone (1999), Ancient Greek Love Magic, 160; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 128
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13. None, None, nan (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • body, desire, and • desire • desire, • desire, and erotic love
Found in books: Bowie (2021), Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture, 64, 477, 478, 724; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 185, 251; Pinheiro et al. (2012a), Narrating Desire: Eros, Sex, and Gender in the Ancient Novel, 190
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14. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, • eros (sexual desire), imagery of • poetry, and desire • see also landscapes, sexualized, of desire
Found in books: Bowie (2021), Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture, 211, 263, 266, 573; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 340; Kirichenko (2022), Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age, 195; Skempis and Ziogas (2014), Geography, Topography, Landscape: Configurations of Space in Greek and Roman Epic 140, 141, 146
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15. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, supposedly a motive for love • eros (sexual desire), womens
Found in books: Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 360; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 71
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16. Euripides, Alcestis, 354 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • desire, of humans for divinities
Found in books: Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 168; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 191
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354 How many a wrong against a wife wouldst thou prefer thy daughter to have found to suffering what I now describe? We ought not on trifling grounds to promote serious mischief; nor should men, if we women are so deadly a curse, bring their nature down to our level.'' None |
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17. Euripides, Hippolytus, 29-32, 34-37, 525-534 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, and pollution • desire, erotic • desire, supposedly a motive for love • eros (sexual desire), womens • pollution, and desire
Found in books: Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 359, 361; Meinel (2015), Pollution and Crisis in Greek Tragedy, 37; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 71; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 234
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29 καὶ πρὶν μὲν ἐλθεῖν τήνδε γῆν Τροζηνίαν,'30 πέτραν παρ' αὐτὴν Παλλάδος, κατόψιον" '31 γῆς τῆσδε ναὸν Κύπριδος ἐγκαθίσατο,' "32 ἐρῶς' ἔρωτ' ἔκδημον, ̔Ιππολύτῳ δ' ἔπι" 34 ἐπεὶ δὲ Θησεὺς Κεκροπίαν λείπει χθόνα 35 μίασμα φεύγων αἵματος Παλλαντιδῶν 36 καὶ τήνδε σὺν δάμαρτι ναυστολεῖ χθόνα, 37 ἐνιαυσίαν ἔκδημον αἰνέσας φυγήν,' "
525 ̓́Ερως ̓́Ερως, ὁ κατ' ὀμμάτων" '526 στάζων πόθον, εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν 527 ψυχᾷ χάριν οὓς ἐπιστρατεύσῃ, 528 μή μοί ποτε σὺν κακῷ φανείης' "5
29 μηδ' ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις." "530 οὔτε γὰρ πυρὸς οὔτ' ἄστρων ὑπέρτερον βέλος," '531 οἷον τὸ τᾶς ̓Αφροδίτας ἵησιν ἐκ χερῶν 532 ̓́Ερως ὁ Διὸς παῖς.' '" None | sup>
29 to witness the solemn mystic rites and be initiated therein in Pandion’s land, i.e. Attica. Phaedra, his father’s noble wife, caught sight of him, and by my designs she found her heart was seized with wild desire.'30 a temple did she rear to Cypris hard by the rock of Pallas where it o’erlooks this country, for love of the youth in another land; and to win his love in days to come she called after his name the temple she had founded for the goddess. 35 flying the pollution of the blood of Pallas’ Descendants of Pandion, king of Cecropia, slain by Theseus to obtain the kingdom. sons, and with his wife sailed to this shore, content to suffer exile for a year, then began the wretched wife to pine away in silence, moaning ’neath love’s cruel scourge,
525 O Love, Love, that from the eyes diffusest soft desire, bringing on the souls of those, whom thou dost camp against, sweet grace, O never in evil mood appear to me, nor out of time and tune approach! 530 Nor fire nor meteor hurls a mightier bolt than Aphrodite’s shaft shot by the hands of Love, the child of Zeus. Choru ' None |
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18. Herodotus, Histories, 1.135 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • eros (sexual desire), of barbarians
Found in books: Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 405, 406; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 360
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1.135 ξεινικὰ δὲ νόμαια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐσθῆτα νομίσαντες τῆς ἑωυτῶν εἶναι καλλίω φορέουσι, καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους θώρηκας· καὶ εὐπαθείας τε παντοδαπὰς πυνθανόμενοι ἐπιτηδεύουσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀπʼ Ἑλλήνων μαθόντες παισὶ μίσγονται. γαμέουσι δὲ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν πολλὰς μὲν κουριδίας γυναῖκας, πολλῷ δʼ ἔτι πλεῦνας παλλακὰς κτῶνται.'' None | sup>
1.135 But the Persians more than all men welcome foreign customs. They wear the Median dress, thinking it more beautiful than their own, and the Egyptian cuirass in war. Their luxurious practices are of all kinds, and all borrowed: the Greeks taught them pederasty. Every Persian marries many lawful wives, and keeps still more concubines. '' None |
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19. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on desire • Desire • Plato, on desire • desire • desires
Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 198; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 107; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 274; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 282
| 558d γένοιτʼ ἂν οἶμαι ὑὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσι;' ' None | 558d would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary,' ' None |
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20. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Athens, social norms of desire in • desire • desire for wisdom • desire, object of • erotic desire • gaze, desirous • immortality, desire for • lack, in the desire for wisdom
Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 287; Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 251; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 118; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 208; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 37; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 94; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 211
| 182a ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ ἐρᾶν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὸ ὄνειδος πεποιηκότες, ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς· λέγουσι δὲ εἰς τούτους ἀποβλέποντες, ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀκαιρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δήπου κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα πραττόμενον ψόγον ἂν δικαίως φέροι.'204a ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδʼ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδʼ αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν. οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι. 206a ἐρῶσιν ἅνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν; 212a γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ; ' None | 182a just as we force them, so far as we can, to refrain from loving our freeborn women. These are the persons responsible for the scandal which prompts some to say it is a shame to gratify one’s lover: such are the cases they have in view, for they observe all their reckless and wrongful doings; and surely, whatsoever is done in an orderly and lawful manner can never justly bring reproach.'204a uch they are already; nor does anyone else that is wise ensue it. Neither do the ignorant ensue wisdom, nor desire to be made wise: in this very point is ignorance distressing, when a person who is not comely or worthy or intelligent is satisfied with himself. The man who does not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof he feels no defect. 206a ince what men love is simply and solely the good. Or is your view otherwise? 212a Do you call it a pitiful life for a man to lead—looking that way, observing that vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him? Do but consider, she said, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal. ' None |
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21. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire for beauty • god, as object of desire
Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 132; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 284
| 28a ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δʼ αὖ δόξῃ μετʼ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπʼ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης'' None | 28a and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. Again, everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity'' None |
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22. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 6.13.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Alcibiades, and desire • Athens, social norms of desire in • Desire, Athenian…(mostly for Sicily) • Desire, and human nature • gaze, desirous
Found in books: Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 187, 197, 296; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 209
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6.13.1 ‘οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῴ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ᾽, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης ἀντιχειροτονεῖν, καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἷσπερ νῦν ὅροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ παρὰ γῆν ἤν τις πλέῃ, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὑτῶν νεμομένους καθ’ αὑτοὺς καὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι:'' None | sup>
6.13.1 When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; '' None |
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23. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • sexual desire, and sycophancy • slaves, onstage, desire marriage
Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 89; Richlin (2018), Slave Theater in the Roman Republic: Plautus and Popular Comedy, 241
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24. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • sexual desire • texts, as object of desire
Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 35; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 287
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25. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • desire,
Found in books: Bowie (2021), Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture, 586; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 504
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26. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire, Stoic identification of desire with judgement controversial • desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?
Found in books: Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 65; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 55, 63; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 43, 322
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27. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 217; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 348, 349; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 120; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 308
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28. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, on desire (ὄρεξις) • Aristotle, on desire • Desire • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Plato, on desire • desire • desire (ὄρεξις) • desire, second-order • sexual desire • will, desire for good or apparent good?
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 170; Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 171; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 217; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 198, 415; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 59; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 348, 349; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 203; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 55, 61; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201, 283, 308, 322, 323
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29. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Being-Life-Intellect as object of desire • First One, the, object of desire • desire • desire for Intellect • desire for the Good • god, as object of desire
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 138; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 132; Zachhuber (2022), Time and Soul: From Aristotle to St. Augustine. 40; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 81, 105
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30. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • desire • revenge, Achilles’ desire for • will, desire for good or apparent good?
Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 79; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 348, 349; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 322, 323; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 637
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31. Anon., 1 Enoch, 24-36 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • eros (sexual desire), womens
Found in books: Harkins and Maier (2022), Experiencing the Shepherd of Hermas, 93; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 537
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24 And from thence I went to another place of the earth, and he showed me a mountain range of,fire which burnt day and night. And I went beyond it and saw seven magnificent mountains all differing each from the other, and the stones (thereof) were magnificent and beautiful, magnificent as a whole, of glorious appearance and fair exterior: three towards the east, one founded on the other, and three towards the south, one upon the other, and deep rough ravines, no one of which,joined with any other. And the seventh mountain was in the midst of these, and it excelled them,in height, resembling the seat of a throne: and fragrant trees encircled the throne. And amongst them was a tree such as I had never yet smelt, neither was any amongst them nor were others like it: it had a fragrance beyond all fragrance, and its leaves and blooms and wood wither not for ever:,and its fruit is beautiful, and its fruit n resembles the dates of a palm. Then I said: 'How beautiful is this tree, and fragrant, and its leaves are fair, and its blooms very delightful in appearance.',Then answered Michael, one of the holy and honoured angels who was with me, and was their leader."25 And he said unto me: \'Enoch, why dost thou ask me regarding the fragrance of the tree,,and why dost thou wish to learn the truth\' Then I answered him saying: \'I wish to",know about everything, but especially about this tree.\' And he answered saying: \'This high mountain which thou hast seen, whose summit is like the throne of God, is His throne, where the Holy Great One, the Lord of Glory, the Eternal King, will sit, when He shall come down to visit,the earth with goodness. And as for this fragrant tree no mortal is permitted to touch it till the great judgement, when He shall take vengeance on all and bring (everything) to its consummation,for ever. It shall then be given to the righteous and holy. Its fruit shall be for food to the elect: it shall be transplanted to the holy place, to the temple of the Lord, the Eternal King.,Then shall they rejoice with joy and be glad, And into the holy place shall they enter; And its fragrance shall be in their bones, And they shall live a long life on earth, Such as thy fathers lived:And in their days shall no sorrow or plague Or torment or calamity touch them.\',Then blessed I the God of Glory, the Eternal King, who hath prepared such things for the righteous, and hath created them and promised to give to them. 26 And I went from thence to the middle of the earth, and I saw a blessed place in which there were,trees with branches abiding and blooming of a dismembered tree. And there I saw a holy mountain,,and underneath the mountain to the east there was a stream and it flowed towards the south. And I saw towards the east another mountain higher than this, and between them a deep and narrow,ravine: in it also ran a stream underneath the mountain. And to the west thereof there was another mountain, lower than the former and of small elevation, and a ravine deep and dry between them: and another deep and dry ravine was at the extremities of the three mountains. And all the ravines were deep rand narrow, (being formed) of hard rock, and trees were not planted upon,them. And I marveled at the rocks, and I marveled at the ravine, yea, I marveled very much. 27 Then said I: \'For what object is this blessed land, which is entirely filled with trees, and this,accursed valley between\' Then Uriel, one of the holy angels who was with me, answered and said: \'This accursed valley is for those who are accursed for ever: Here shall all the accursed be gathered together who utter with their lips against the Lord unseemly words and of His glory speak hard things. Here shall they be gathered together, and here,shall be their place of judgement. In the last days there shall be upon them the spectacle of righteous judgement in the presence of the righteous for ever: here shall the merciful bless the Lord of glory, the Eternal King.,In the days of judgement over the former, they shall bless Him for the mercy in accordance with,which He has assigned them (their lot).\' Then I blessed the Lord of Glory and set forth His glory and lauded Him gloriously." 28 And thence I went towards the east, into the midst of the mountain range of the desert, and,I saw a wilderness and it was solitary, full of trees and plants. And water gushed forth from,above. Rushing like a copious watercourse which flowed towards the north-west it caused clouds and dew to ascend on every side." 29 And thence I went to another place in the desert, and approached to the east of this mountain,range. And there I saw aromatic trees exhaling the fragrance of frankincense and myrrh, and the trees also were similar to the almond tree. 30 And beyond these, I went afar to the east, and I saw another place, a valley (full) of water. And,therein there was a tree, the colour () of fragrant trees such as the mastic. And on the sides of those valleys I saw fragrant cinnamon. And beyond these I proceeded to the east. 31 And I saw other mountains, and amongst them were groves of trees, and there flowed forth from,them nectar, which is named sarara and galbanum. And beyond these mountains I saw another mountain to the east of the ends of the earth, whereon were aloe-trees, and all the trees were full,of stacte, being like almond-trees. And when one burnt it, it smelt sweeter than any fragrant odour.' "32 And after these fragrant odours, as I looked towards the north over the mountains I saw seven mountains full of choice nard and fragrant trees and cinnamon and pepper.,And thence I went over the summits of all these mountains, far towards the east of the earth, and passed above the Erythraean sea and went far from it, and passed over the angel Zotiel. And I came to the Garden of Righteousness,,I and from afar off trees more numerous than I these trees and great-two trees there, very great, beautiful, and glorious, and magnificent, and the tree of knowledge, whose holy fruit they eat and know great wisdom.,That tree is in height like the fir, and its leaves are like (those of) the Carob tree: and its fruit,is like the clusters of the vine, very beautiful: and the fragrance of the tree penetrates afar. Then,I said: 'How beautiful is the tree, and how attractive is its look!' Then Raphael the holy angel, who was with me, answered me and said: 'This is the tree of wisdom, of which thy father old (in years) and thy aged mother, who were before thee, have eaten, and they learnt wisdom and their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked and they were driven out of the garden.'" '33 And from thence I went to the ends of the earth and saw there great beasts, and each differed from the other; and (I saw) birds also differing in appearance and beauty and voice, the one differing from the other. And to the east of those beasts I saw the ends of the earth whereon the heaven,rests, and the portals of the heaven open. And I saw how the stars of heaven come forth, and,I counted the portals out of which they proceed, and wrote down all their outlets, of each individual star by itself, according to their number and their names, their courses and their positions, and their,times and their months, as Uriel the holy angel who was with me showed me. He showed all things to me and wrote them down for me: also their names he wrote for me, and their laws and their companies. 34 And from thence I went towards the north to the ends of the earth, and there I saw a great and,glorious device at the ends of the whole earth. And here I saw three portals of heaven open in the heaven: through each of them proceed north winds: when they blow there is cold, hail, frost,,snow, dew, and rain. And out of one portal they blow for good: but when they blow through the other two portals, it is with violence and affliction on the earth, and they blow with violence. 35 And from thence I went towards the west to the ends of the earth, and saw there three portals of the heaven open such as I had seen in the east, the same number of portals, and the same number of outlets. 36 And from thence I went to the south to the ends of the earth, and saw there three open portals,of the heaven: and thence there come dew, rain, and wind. And from thence I went to the east to the ends of the heaven, and saw here the three eastern portals of heaven open and small portals,above them. Through each of these small portals pass the stars of heaven and run their course to the west on the path which is shown to them. And as often as I saw I blessed always the Lord of Glory, and I continued to bless the Lord of Glory who has wrought great and glorious wonders, to show the greatness of His work to the angels and to spirits and to men, that they might praise His work and all His creation: that they might see the work of His might and praise the great work of His hands and bless Him for ever.' "' None |
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32. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, • sexual desire
Found in books: Bowie (2021), Essays on Ancient Greek Literature and Culture, 263; Kneebone (2020), Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, 196, 198
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33. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • eros (sexual desire), womens • slaves, onstage, desire marriage
Found in books: Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 375; Richlin (2018), Slave Theater in the Roman Republic: Plautus and Popular Comedy, 241
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34. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29, 2.9-2.10, 2.87, 3.55, 3.58-3.59, 3.68, 3.70, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, and erotic love
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 89; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 29, 30, 95; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 268; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 95; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201
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2.9 Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 ) difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem?" '2.10 Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc tu quidem istuc V dixti dixisti RNV bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis dissimilis dissimiliter RNV efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui qui Dav. quae (que); in BE compend. incert. faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, ille inquit BE quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere?
3.55 Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv.
3.58 Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59 Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus.
3.68 Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.
3.70 Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V
4.7 Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt aut non potuerunt tueri aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. add. Cobet Mnemosyn. nov. ser. III p. 99 quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides, quo modo loquantur. nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta cotur! mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum! incendi incendi ABERN 1 incendit N 2 V igitur igitur ergo BE eos, qui audiunt, vides. quantam rem agas, quantam rem agas = quid efficere quis possit, quod (ut illi Stoicorum conatus) tantum sit, ut Circeiis qui habitet cet. agat (t ab alt. m. in ras. ) N ut Circeiis qui habitet totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet? Quid? ille incendat? restinguet citius, si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa, ista ipsa p. 118, 29 sqq. quae tu breviter: regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volunt esse, ut beatum per se efficere possit. pungunt quasi pungunt enim quasi BE aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et idem abeunt, qui venerant. res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur, ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius.' " None | sup>
2.9 \xa0"He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I\xa0have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I\xa0said, "as for the formula \'freedom from pain,\' I\xa0will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that \'freedom from pain\' does not mean the same as \'pleasure.\'\xa0" "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said\xa0I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one\'s thirst is a \'static\' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a \'kinetic\' pleasure." "Why then," I\xa0asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" < 2.10 \xa0"Do you not remember," he replied, "what I\xa0said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?" "Oh, yes, I\xa0remember," said\xa0I; "but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. \'Variation\' is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a\xa0number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a\xa0number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I\xa0could understand the term, just as I\xa0understand it without your speaking of it. But I\xa0cannot quite grasp what you mean by \'variation\' when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or \'kinetic\' pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain â\x80\x94 although why you should call this \'pleasure\' I\xa0cannot\xa0make out." <
3.55 \xa0"Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are \'constituents\' of the final end (for so I\xa0represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are \'productive\' of the End, the Greek poiÄ\x93tika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the \'constituent\' class are moral action; the only instance of a \'productive\' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I\xa0called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. <
3.58 \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59 \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <
3.68 \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <
3.70 \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <' "
4.7 \xa0This whole field Zeno and his successors were either unable or unwilling to discover; at all events they left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, but what are they like? why, they furnish a complete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold his tongue; you can judge then of their style, coining new words, discarding those approved by use. 'But,' you will say, 'think how vast are the themes that they essay! for example, that this entire universe is our own town.' You see the magnitude of a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii that the whole vast world is his own borough! 'If so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.' What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student may have had to begin with. Even those brief maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man alone is king, dictator, millionaire, â\x80\x94 neatly rounded off no doubt as you put them: of course, for you learnt them from professors of rhetoric; â\x80\x94 but how bald those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, when they talk about the potency of virtue, â\x80\x94 virtue which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllogisms are mere pinâ\x80\x91pricks; they may convince the intellect, but they cannot convert the heart, and the hearer goes away no better than he came. What they say is possibly true, and certainly important; but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far too petty. <" ' None |
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35. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.58, 1.92, 1.118-1.119, 1.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • desire, and erotic love • desires
Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 35; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 45; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 106, 185
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1.58 I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours Lucius Crassus declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. ' "
1.92 Did you think they were all out of their minds because they pronounced that god can exist without hands or feet? Does not even a consideration of the adaptation of man's limbs to their functions convince you that the gods do not require human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if nothing has to be grasped, or for the rest of the list of the various parts of the body, in which nothing is useless, nothing without a reason, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork? It seems then that god will have a tongue, and will not speak; teeth, a palate, a throat, for no use; the organs that nature has attached to the body for the purpose of procreation — these god will possess, but to no purpose; and not only the external but also the internal organs, the heart, lungs, liver and the rest, which if they are not useful are assuredly not beautiful — since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. " 1.118 Take again those who have asserted that the entire notion of the immortal gods is a fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state, to the end that those whom reason was powerless to control might be led in the path of duty by religion; surely this view was absolutely and entirely destructive of religion. Or Prodicus of Ceos,\',WIDTH,)" onmouseout="nd();"º who said that the gods were personifications of things beneficial to the life of man — pray what religion was left by his theory? ' "1.119 Or those who teach that brave or famous or powerful men have been deified after death, and that it is these who are the real objects of the worship, prayers and adoration which we are accustomed to offer — are not they entirely devoid of all sense of religion? This theory was chiefly developed by Euhemerus, who was translated and imitated especially by our poet Ennius. Yet Euhemerus describes the death and burial of certain gods; are we then to think of him as upholding religion, or rather as utterly and entirely destroying it? I say nothing of the holy and awe‑inspiring sanctuary of Eleusis, Where tribes from earth's remotest confines seek Initiation, and I pass over Samothrace and those occult mysteries Which throngs of worshippers at dead of night In forest coverts deep do celebrate at Lemnos, since such mysteries when interpreted and rationalized prove to have more to do with natural science than with theology. " 1.121 for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. '' None |
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36. Cicero, On Duties, 3.38, 3.43, 3.58, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • psychological mode, desire
Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 301; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 29, 30, 95; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 268, 272
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3.43 Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.
3.58 Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur.' ' None | sup>
3.43 \xa0It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is short and easy to master: apparent advantages â\x80\x94 political preferment, riches, sensual pleasures, and the like â\x80\x94 should never be preferred to the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit his friend's convenience. <" 3.58 \xa0If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. <' " None |
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37. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • action, and desire
Found in books: Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 255; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 97
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38. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire
Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201
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39. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • Desire, distinguished p leasure and love, desire involves a lack • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, as genus emotion • desires • eros (sexual desire), and Stoicism • will, desire for good or apparent good?
Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 57, 204, 227; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 99; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 420; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 105, 124; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 159; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 329, 389
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40. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Seeing God, Human desire • desire, resurrection and
Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 141; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 632
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41. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 10.248-10.249 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire, of Pygmalion for statue • desire, of humans for divinities • naturalism, and desire
Found in books: Elsner (2007), Roman Eyes: Visuality and Subjectivity in Art and Text, 123, 124, 125; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 191
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10.248 sculpsit ebur formamque dedit, qua femina nasci 10.249 nulla potest: operisque sui concepit amorem.'' None | sup>
10.248 You also, Hyacinthus, would have been 10.249 et in the sky! if Phoebus had been given'' None |
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42. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 128, 179 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desires
Found in books: Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 104, 105; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 269, 413
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128 And this is the end which is celebrated among those who study philosophy in the best manner, namely, to live in accordance with nature. And this takes place when the mind, entering into the path of virtue, treads in the steps of right reason, and follows God, remembering his commandments, and at all times and in all places confirming them both by word and deed;" 179 These men, then, imagined that this world which we behold was the only world in the existing universe, and was either God himself, or else that it contained within itself God, that is, the soul of the universe. Then, having erected fate and necessity into gods, they filled human life with excessive impiety, teaching men that with the exception of those things which are apparent there is no other cause whatever of anything, but that it is the periodical revolutions of the sun, and moon, and other stars, which distribute good and evil to all existing beings. ' None |
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43. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.103, 1.277, 4.100-4.131 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, • desires
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 49; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 196; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 169; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 107, 108, 109, 114; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 386; Wilson (2010), Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 106
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1.103 For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers become united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts. For the scars and impressions of their old offences remain not the less in the souls of those who repent.
1.277 And this command is a symbol of nothing else but of the fact that in the eyes of God it is not the number of things sacrificed that is accounted valuable, but the purity of the rational spirit of the sacrificer. Unless, indeed, one can suppose that a judge who is anxious to pronounce a holy judgment will never receive gifts from any of those whose conduct comes before his tribunal, or that, if he does receive such presents, he will be liable to an accusation of corruption; and that a good man will not receive gifts from a wicked person, not even though he may be poor and the other rich, and he himself perhaps in actual want of what he would so receive; and yet that God can be corrupted by bribes, who is most all-sufficient for himself and who has no need of any thing created; who, being himself the first and most perfect good thing, the everlasting fountain of wisdom, and justice, and of every virtue, rejects the gifts of the wicked.
4.100 Moreover, Moses has not granted an unlimited possession and use of all other animals to those who partake in his sacred constitution, but he has forbidden with all his might all animals, whether of the land, or of the water, or that fly through the air, which are most fleshy and fat, and calculated to excite treacherous pleasure, well knowing that such, attracting as with a bait that most slavish of all the outward senses, namely, taste, produce insatiability, an incurable evil to both souls and bodies, for insatiability produces indigestion, which is the origin and source of all diseases and weaknesses. 4.101 Now of land animals, the swine is confessed to be the nicest of all meats by those who eat it, and of all aquatic animals the most delicate are the fish which have no scales; and Moses is above all other men skilful in training and inuring persons of a good natural disposition to the practice of virtue by frugality and abstinence, endeavouring to remove costly luxury from their characters, 4.102 at the same time not approving of unnecessary rigour, like the lawgiver of Lacedaemon, nor undue effeminacy, like the man who taught the Ionians and the Sybarites lessons of luxury and license, but keeping a middle path between the two courses, so that he has relaxed what was over strict, and tightened what was too loose, mingling the excesses which are found at each extremity with moderation, which lies between the two, so as to produce an irreproachable harmony and consistency of life, on which account he has laid down not carelessly, but with minute particularity, what we are to use and what to avoid. 4.103 One might very likely suppose it to be just that those beasts which feed upon human flesh should receive at the hands of men similar treatment to that which they inflict on men, but Moses has ordained that we should abstain from the enjoyment of all such things, and with a due consideration of what is becoming to the gentle soul, he proposes a most gentle and most pleasant banquet; for though it is proper that those who inflict evils should suffer similar calamities themselves, yet it may not be becoming to those whom they ill treated to retaliate, lest without being aware of it they become brutalized by anger, which is a savage passion; 4.104 and he takes such care to guard against this, that being desirous to banish as far as possible all desire for those animals abovementioned, he forbids with all his energy the eating of any carnivorous animal at all, selecting the herbivorous animals out of those kinds which are domesticated, since they are tame by nature, feeding on that gentle food which is supplied by the earth, and having no disposition to plot evil against anything.WHAT QUADRUPEDS ARE CLEANXVIII. 4.105 The animals which are clean and lawful to be used as food are ten in number; the heifer, the lamb, the goat, the stag, the antelope, the buffalo, the roebuck, the pygarga, the wildox, and the chamois, {19}{4.106 And he gives two tests and criteria of the ten animals thus Enumerated{20}{4.107 for as the animal which chews the cud, while it is masticating its food draws it down its throat, and then by slow degrees kneads and softens it, and then after this process again sends it down into the belly, in the same manner the man who is being instructed, having received the doctrines and speculations of wisdom in at his ears from his instructor, derives a considerable amount of learning from him, but still is not able to hold it firmly and to embrace it all at once, until he has resolved over in his mind everything which he has heard by the continued exercise of his memory (and this exercise of memory is the cement which connects idea 4.108 But as it seems the firm conception of such ideas is of no advantage to him unless he is able to discriminate between and to distinguish which of contrary things it is right to choose and which to avoid, of which the parting of the hoof is the symbol; since the course of life is twofold, the one road leading to wickedness and the other to virtue, and since we ought to renounce the one and never to forsake the other.WHAT BEASTS ARE NOT CLEANXIX. 4.109 For this reason all animals with solid hoofs, and all with many toes are spoken of by implication as unclean; the one because, being so, they imply that the nature of good and evil is one and the same; which is just as if one were to say that the nature of a concave and a convex surface, or of a road up hill and down hill, was the same. And the other, because it shows that there are many roads, though, indeed, they have no right to be called roads at all, which lead the life of man to deceit; for it is not easy among a variety of paths to choose that which is the most desirable and the most excellent.WHAT AQUATIC ANIMALS ARE CLEANXX. 4.110 Having laid down these definitions with respect to land animals, he proceeds to describe what aquatic creatures are clean and lawful to be used for food; distinguishing them also by two characteristics as having fins or Scales.{21}{4.111 for all those creatures which are destitute of both, or even of one of the two, are sucked down by the current, not being able to resist the force of the stream; but those which have both these characteristics can stem the water, and oppose it in front, and strive against it as against an adversary, and struggle with invincible good will and courage, so that if they are pushed they push in their turn; and if they are pursued they turn upon their foe and pursue it in their turn, making themselves broad roads in a pathless district, so as to have an easy passage to and fro. 4.112 Now both these things are symbols; the former of a soul devoted to pleasure, and the latter of one which loves perseverance and temperance. For the road which leads to pleasure is a down-hill one and very easy, being rather an absorbing gulf than a path. But the path which leads to temperance is up hill and laborious, but above all other roads advantageous. And the one leads men downwards, and prevents those who travel by it from retracing their steps until they have arrived at the very lowest bottom, but the other leads to heaven; making those who do not weary before they reach it immortal, if they are only able to endure its rugged and difficult ascent.ABOUT Reptile 4.113 And adhering to the same general idea the lawgiver asserts that those reptiles which have no feet, and which crawl onwards, dragging themselves along the ground on their bellies, or those which have four legs, or many feet, are all unclean as far as regards their being eaten. And here, again, when he mentions reptiles he intimates under a figurative form of expression those who are devoted to their bellies, gorging themselves like cormorants, and who are continually offering up tribute to their miserable belly, tribute, that is, of strong wine, and confections, and fish, and, in short, all the superfluous delicacies which the skill and labour of bakers and confectioners are able to devise, inventing all sorts of rare viands, to stimulate and set on fire the insatiable and unappeasable appetites of man. And when he speaks of animals with four legs and many feet, he intends to designate the miserable slaves not of one single passion, appetite, but of all the passions; the genera of which were four in number; but in their subordinate species they are innumerable. Therefore, the despotism of one is very grievous, but that of many is most terrible, and as it seems intolerable. 4.114 Again, in the case of those reptiles who have legs above their feet, so that they are able to take leaps from the ground, those Moses speaks of as clean; as, for instance, the different kinds of locusts, and that animal called the serpentfighter, here again intimating by figurative expressions the manners and habits of the rational soul. For the weight of the body being naturally heavy, drags down with it those who are but of small wisdom, strangling it and pressing it down by the weight of the flesh. 4.115 But blessed are they to whose lot it has fallen, inasmuch as they have been well and solidly instructed in the rules of sound education, to resist successfully the power of mere strength, so as to be able, by reason of what they have learnt, to spring up from the earth and all low things, to the air and the periodical revolutions of the heaven, the very sight of which is to be admired and earnestly striven for by those who come to it of their own accord with no indolence or indifference.CONCERNING FLYING Creature 4.116 Having, therefore, in his ordices already gone through all the different kinds of land animals and of those who live in the water, and having distinguished them in his code of laws as accurately as it was possible, Moses begins to investigate the remaining class of animals in the air; the innumerable kinds of flying creatures, rejecting all those which prey upon one another or upon man, all carnivorous birds, in short, all animals which are venomous, and all which have any power of plotting against others. 4.117 But doves, and pigeons, and turtle-doves, and all the flocks of cranes, and geese, and birds of that kind, he numbers in the class of domestic, and tame, and eatable creatures, allowing every one who chooses to partake of them with impunity. ' "4.118 Thus, in each of the parts of the universe, earth, water, and air, he refuses some kinds of each description of animal, whether terrestrial, or aquatic, or a'rial, to our use; and thus, taking as it were fuel from the fire, he causes the extinction of appetite.CONCERNING CARCASSES AND BODIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TORN BY WILDBEASTSXXIII. " '4.119 Moreover, Moses Commands{25}{4.120 Now many of the lawgivers both among the Greeks and barbarians, praise those who are skilful in hunting, and who seldom fail in their pursuit or miss their aim, and who pride themselves on their successful hunts, especially when they divide the limbs of the animals which they have caught with the huntsmen and the hounds, as being not only brave hunters but men of very sociable dispositions. But any one who was a sound interpreter of the sacred constitution and code of laws would very naturally blame them, since the lawgiver of that code has expressly forbidden any enjoyment of carcasses or of bodies torn by beasts for the reasons before mentioned. 4.121 But if any one of those persons who devote themselves wholly to meditations on and to the practice of virtue were suddenly to become fond of gymnastic exercises and of hunting, looking upon hunting as a sort of prelude to and representation of the wars and dangers that have to be encountered against the enemy, then, whenever such a man is successful in his sport, he ought to give the beasts which he has slain to his dogs as a feast for them, and as a reward or wages for their successful boldness and their irreproachable alliance. But he ought not himself to touch them, inasmuch as he has been previously taught in the case of irrational animals, what sentiments he ought to entertain, respecting his enemies. For he ought to carry on war against them, not for the sake of unrighteous gain like those who make a dishonest traffic of all their actions, but either in revenge for some calamities which he has previously suffered at their hands, or with a view toward some which he expects to suffer. 4.122 But some men, with open mouths, carry even the excessive luxury and boundless intemperance of Sardanapalus to such an indefinite and unlimited extent, being wholly absorbed in the invention of senseless pleasures, that they prepare sacrifices which ought never be offered, strangling their victims, and stifling the essence of life, {26}{4.123 On which account Moses, in another passage, establishes a law concerning blood, that one may not eat the blood nor the Fat.{27}{4.124 But Moses commanded men to abstain from eating fat, because it is gross. And again, he gave us this injunction, in order to inculcate temperance and a zeal for an austere life: for some things we easily abandon, and without any hesitation; though we do not willingly encounter any anxieties or labours for the sake of the acquisition of virtue. 4.125 For which reason these two parts are to be taken out of every victim and burnt with fire, as a kind of first fruits, namely, the fat and the blood; the one being poured upon the altar as a libation; and the other as a fuel to the flame, being applied instead of oil, by reason of its fatness, to the consecrated and holy flame. 4.126 The lawgiver blames some persons of his time as gluttons, and as believing that the mere indulgence of luxury is the happiest of all possible conditions, not being content to live in this manner only in cities in which there were abundant supplies and stores of all kinds of necessary things, but carrying their effeminacy even into pathless and untrodden deserts, and choosing in them also to have markets for fish and meat, and all things which can contribute to an easy life: 4.127 then, when a scarcity arose, they assembled together and raised an outcry, and looked miserable, and with shameless audacity impeached their ruler, and did not desist from creating disturbances till they obtained what they desired; and they obtained it to their destruction, for two reasons: first of all, that it might be shown that all things are possible to God, who can find a way in the most difficult and apparently hopeless circumstances; and secondly, that punishment might fall on those who were intemperate in their gluttonous appetites, and obstinate resisters of holiness. ' "4.128 For a vast cloud being Raised{28}{4.129 It would have been natural therefore for them, being amazed at the marvellous nature of the prodigy which they beheld, to be satisfied with the sight, and being filled with piety to nourish their souls on that, and to abstain from eating flesh; but these men, on the contrary, stirred up their desires even more than before, and pursued these birds as the greatest good imaginable, and catching hold of them with both their hands filled their bosoms; then, having stored them up in their tents, they sallied forth to catch others, for immoderate covetousness has no limit. And when they had collected every description of food they devoured it insatiably, being about, vain-minded generation that they were, to perish by their own fulness; 4.130 and indeed at no distant time they did perish by the purging of their bile, {30}{4.131 For which reason Moses says with great beauty in his recommendations, "Let not every man do that which seemeth good to his own Eyes,"{32}{' None |
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44. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Eclogues,, and theme of desire • Epicureanism, on erotic desire • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Erotic desire • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Venus, and sexual desire / intercourse • desire • eros (sexual desire), and Epicureanism • furor, and erotic / sexual desire
Found in books: Bowditch (2001), Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination, 213, 214; Hubbard (2014), A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, 424; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 21, 22, 23, 52, 54, 56, 59, 124, 145; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 122; Nijs (2023), The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus. 74; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 53, 56; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 283
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45. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire • terminology of desire
Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 111, 177, 201; Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 205; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 386
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46. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.23, 1.17.21-1.17.28, 2.2.3-2.2.4, 4.1.86-4.1.87, 4.4.1-4.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epictetus, Stoic, Only will (proairesis), desire, judgement is upto us, not anything bodily • desire • desires
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 251; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 388; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 50; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 332; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 282
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1.1.23 of the things which are in our power, and not in our power. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please. Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero’s freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master. What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you? What then did Agrippinus say? He said, I am not a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day —this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath— let us go and take our exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.
1.17.21 SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
2.2.3 CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will determine against you something that appears formidable; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life. But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is. For what do you think? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said: Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges ( δικασταῖς ) that his case was just, said when he had come to the peroration of his speech, I will neither intreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you father than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business. What need was there of this? Only do not intreat; but do not also say, I do not intreat. unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to trial? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come: but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper character). For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me (tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what will you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid.
4.1.86 HE is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ( ὁρμαί ) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ( ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι ). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free. If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις ) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugt to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume ( ὑποτάσσομεν ) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. —No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance? Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action ( ὁρμήν ) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements ( ὁρμάς , the acts) of God Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will ( τὰ προαιρετικὰ ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? He could not, and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole ( τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ( πανήγυρις ); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go. But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countece; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom ( καρπιοτήν ), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:— For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .) Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία ), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.
4.4.1 REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the difference between desiring power or being content with a private station; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labour. But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ( εὔσοια )? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.—And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar’s friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something: I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external; and then that I may attend to men, what they say, how they are moved; and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not: thanks to God. Come, when you have done these things and have attended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading? are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why then do you not act consistently in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach any person? If you maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady; if you look rather at the things which are done and happen than are looked at yourself; if you do not envy those who are I referred before you; if surrounding circumstances ( ὕλαι ) do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want? Books? How or for what purpose? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise; for this purpose were used the halteres (weights), the dust, the young men as antagonists; and do you seek for those things now when it is the time of action? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about comprehension ( κατάληψις ). What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in away conformable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action (efforts, ὁρμή ), not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well: if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read so many verses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have not employed my desire; I have used avoidance ( ἐκκλίσει ) only with respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we do not know that we also in another way are like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have power: you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates did, If so it pleases God, so let it be? Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served in military expeditions so often as he did; and would he not have lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am; I must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum? Why, was this your business, to sun yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be free from hindrance, free from impediment? And could he still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way: how would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison? In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition: not only occupation (business), but also leisure.—Now then must I live in this tumult?—Why do you say tumult?—I mean among many men.—Well what is the hardship? Suppose that you are at Olympia: imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, another is doing another thing, and a third is pushing another person: in the baths there is a crowd: and who of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens.—Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure it is a desert: I do not like a crowd; it is confusion.— But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought: talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival: try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen: we are delighted when we see many ships: who is pained when he sees many men?—But they deafen me with their cries.—Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered? And who prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it; and movement towards a thing and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this? Do you only bear in mind the general rules: what is mine, what is not mine; what is given (permitted) to me; what does God will that I should do now? what does he not will? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says to you: Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators.—But my wish is to live quietly.—Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things?—And how shall I release myself?—Have you not often heard, that you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turning away) to those things only which are within your power, that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private station? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity. Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. To Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhappy; and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things.— Athens is a good place.—But happiness is much better; and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation. But happiness is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick? But if you do not so, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius. There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl; nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning, But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power ( ἡγεμονικόν ), that he may keep it in a state conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); fur these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. If you see any thing which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province? These things come to you from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on? 4.4.2 REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the difference between desiring power or being content with a private station; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labour. But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ( εὔσοια )? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.—And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar’s friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something: I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external; and then that I may attend to men, what they say, how they are moved; and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not: thanks to God. Come, when you have done these things and have attended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading? are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why then do you not act consistently in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach any person? If you maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady; if you look rather at the things which are done and happen than are looked at yourself; if you do not envy those who are I referred before you; if surrounding circumstances ( ὕλαι ) do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want? Books? How or for what purpose? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise; for this purpose were used the halteres (weights), the dust, the young men as antagonists; and do you seek for those things now when it is the time of action? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about comprehension ( κατάληψις ). What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in away conformable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action (efforts, ὁρμή ), not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well: if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read so many verses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have not employed my desire; I have used avoidance ( ἐκκλίσει ) only with respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we do not know that we also in another way are like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have power: you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates did, If so it pleases God, so let it be? Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served in military expeditions so often as he did; and would he not have lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am; I must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum? Why, was this your business, to sun yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be free from hindrance, free from impediment? And could he still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way: how would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison? In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition: not only occupation (business), but also leisure.—Now then must I live in this tumult?—Why do you say tumult?—I mean among many men.—Well what is the hardship? Suppose that you are at Olympia: imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, another is doing another thing, and a third is pushing another person: in the baths there is a crowd: and who of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens.—Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure it is a desert: I do not like a crowd; it is confusion.— But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought: talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival: try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen: we are delighted when we see many ships: who is pained when he sees many men?—But they deafen me with their cries.—Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered? And who prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it; and movement towards a thing and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this? Do you only bear in mind the general rules: what is mine, what is not mine; what is given (permitted) to me; what does God will that I should do now? what does he not will? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says to you: Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators.—But my wish is to live quietly.—Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things?—And how shall I release myself?—Have you not often heard, that you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turning away) to those things only which are within your power, that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private station? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity. Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. To Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhappy; and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things.— Athens is a good place.—But happiness is much better; and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation. But happiness is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick? But if you do not so, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius. There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl; nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning, But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power ( ἡγεμονικόν ), that he may keep it in a state conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); fur these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. If you see any thing which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province? These things come to you from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on?'' None |
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47. Ignatius, To The Romans, 4.2, 7.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 193; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 133, 165, 167; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 73; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013), Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel, 134
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4.2 Rather entice the wild beasts, that they may become my sepulchre and may leave no part of my body behind, so that I may not, when I am fallen asleep, be burdensome to any one. Then shall I be truly a disciple of Jesus Christ, when the world shall not so much as see my body. Supplicate the Lord for me, that through these instruments I may be found a sacrifice to God.
7.2 Let not envy have a home in you. Even though I myself, when I am with you, should beseech you, obey me not; but rather give credence to these things which I write to you. For I write to you in the midst of life, yet lusting after death. My lust hath been crucified, and there is no fire of material longing in me, but only water living +and speaking+ in me, saying within me, Come to the Father. '' None |
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48. New Testament, 1 John, 5.16-5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 195; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 305, 319
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5.16 Ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον, αἰτήσει, καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωήν, τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον. ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον· οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ. 5.17 πᾶσα ἀδικία ἁμαρτία ἐστίν, καὶ ἔστιν ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον.'' None | sup>
5.16 If anyone sees his brother sinning a sin not leading to death, he shall ask, and God will give him life for those who sin not leading to death. There is a sin leading to death. I don't say that he should make a request concerning this. " '5.17 All unrighteousness is sin, and there is a sin not leading to death. '" None |
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49. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 4.7, 6.15-6.16, 6.18-6.19, 7.5, 7.23, 8.7, 9.25, 10.3, 10.5, 10.17-10.18, 12.12-12.13, 15.28 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Sexual desire • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • domination, human desire for • sexual desire • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 151; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 328; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 5, 15, 87; Herman, Rubenstein (2018), The Aggada of the Bavli and Its Cultural World. 224; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 46, 122, 287; Nasrallah (2019), Archaeology and the Letters of Paul, 164; O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 182, 187, 188; Pevarello (2013), The Sentences of Sextus and the Origins of Christian Ascetiscism. 85; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 208; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 109, 110, 112, 159; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 160, 252, 253, 259; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 231, 331, 332
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4.7 τίς γάρ σε διακρίνει; τί δὲ ἔχεις ὃ οὐκ ἔλαβες; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλαβες, τί καυχᾶσαι ὡς μὴ λαβών;
6.15 οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν μέλη Χριστοῦ ἐστίν; ἄρας οὖν τὰ μέλη τοῦ χριστοῦ ποιήσω πόρνης μέλη; μὴ γένοιτο. 6.16 ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ὁ κολλώμενος τῇ πόρνῃ ἓν σῶμά ἐστιν;Ἔσονταιγάρ, φησίν,οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν.
6.18 φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν· πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ὃ ἐὰν ποιήσῃ ἄνθρωπος ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ πορνεύων εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἁμαρτάνει. 6.19 ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν, οὗ ἔχετε ἀπὸ θεοῦ;
7.5 μὴ ἀποστερεῖτε ἀλλήλους, εἰ μήτι ἂν ἐκ συμφώνου πρὸς καιρὸν ἵνα σχολάσητε τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦτε, ἵνα μὴ πειράζῃ ὑμᾶς ὁ Σατανᾶς διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ὑμῶν.
7.23 τιμῆς ἠγοράσθητε· μὴ γίνεσθε δοῦλοι ἀνθρώπων.
8.7 τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον ἐσθίουσιν, καὶ ἡ συνείδησις αὐτῶν ἀσθενὴς οὖσα μολύνεται.
9.25 πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄφθαρτον.
10.3 καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον
10.5 ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν ηὐδόκησεν ὁ θεός,κατεστρώθησανγὰρἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ.
10.17 ὅτι εἷς ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· 10.18 οὐχ οἱ ἐσθίοντες τὰς θυσίας κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εἰσίν;
12.12 Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χριστός· 12.13 καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες, εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν.
15.28 ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν.' ' None | sup>
4.7 For who makes you different? And what doyou have that you didn't receive? But if you did receive it, why do youboast as if you had not received it?" "
6.15 Don't you know that your bodies aremembers of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ, and makethem members of a prostitute? May it never be!" '6.16 Or don\'t you knowthat he who is joined to a prostitute is one body? For, "The two," sayshe, "will become one flesh."
6.18 Flee sexual immorality! "Every sin that a man doesis outside the body," but he who commits sexual immorality sins againsthis own body.' "6.19 Or don't you know that your body is a temple ofthe Holy Spirit which is in you, which you have from God? You are notyour own," "
7.5 Don't deprive one another, unless it is by consent for aseason, that you may give yourselves to fasting and prayer, and may betogether again, that Satan doesn't tempt you because of your lack ofself-control." "
7.23 You were bought witha price. Don't become bondservants of men." "
8.7 However, that knowledgeisn't in all men. But some, with consciousness of the idol until now,eat as of a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience, beingweak, is defiled." 9.25 Every man who strives in thegames exercises self-control in all things. Now they do it to receive acorruptible crown, but we an incorruptible.
10.3 andall ate the same spiritual food;
10.5 However with most of them, God was notwell pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness.
10.17 Because we, who are many, are one bread, one body; forwe all partake of the one bread.' "10.18 Consider Israel after theflesh. Don't those who eat the sacrifices have communion with the altar?" 12.12 For as the body is one, and has many members, and all themembers of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. 12.13 For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whetherJews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all given to drink intoone Spirit.
15.28 When all things have been subjected to him, then theSon will also himself be subjected to him who subjected all things tohim, that God may be all in all.' " None |
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50. New Testament, 1 Timothy, 4.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 23; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 332
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4.3 κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν εἰς μετάλημψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.'' None | sup>
4.3 forbidding marriage and commanding to abstain from foods which God created to be received with thanksgiving by those who believe and know the truth. '' None |
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51. New Testament, James, 1.12-1.15, 4.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • desire • desires • domination, human desire for
Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 90; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 161, 162; O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 72, 73, 74; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 40, 63, 68, 69, 73, 141, 159
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1.12 Μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν, ὅτι δόκιμος γενόμενος λήμψεται τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν. 1.13 μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος λεγέτω ὅτι Ἀπὸ θεοῦ πειράζομαι· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπείραστός ἐστιν κακῶν, πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα. 1.14 ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος· 1.15 εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν, ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκυεῖ θάνατον.
4.6 μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν· διὸ λέγει Ὁ θεὸς ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν.'' None | sup>
1.12 Blessed is the man who endures temptation, for when he has been approved, he will receive the crown of life, which the Lord promised to those who love him. 1.13 Let no man say when he is tempted, "I am tempted by God," for God can\'t be tempted by evil, and he himself tempts no one. 1.14 But each one is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed. 1.15 Then the lust, when it has conceived, bears sin; and the sin, when it is full grown, brings forth death.
4.6 But he gives more grace. Therefore it says, "God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble."'' None |
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52. New Testament, Colossians, 1.18, 2.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 86; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 207; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 23; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 208
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1.18 καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος, τῆς ἐκκλησίας· ὅς ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχή, πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων,
2.16 Μὴ οὖν τις ὑμᾶς κρινέτω ἐν βρώσει καὶ ἐν πόσει ἢ ἐν μέρει ἑορτῆς ἢ νεομηνίας ἢ σαββάτων,'' None | sup>
1.18 He is the head of the body, the assembly, who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead; that in all things he might have the preeminence.
2.16 Let no man therefore judge you in eating, or in drinking, or with respect to a feast day or a new moon or a Sabbath day, '' None |
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53. New Testament, Ephesians, 1.5, 2.3, 6.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • desire • desires • sexual desire • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty
Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 47, 329; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 90, 106; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 160; van 't Westeinde (2021), Roman Nobilitas in Jerome's Letters: Roman Values and Christian Asceticism for Socialites, 92; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 331
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1.5 προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἱοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ,
2.3 ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημέν ποτε ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν, καὶ ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί·—
6.16 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀναλαβόντες τὸν θυρεὸν τῆς πίστεως, ἐν ᾧ δυνήσεσθε πάντα τὰ βέλη τοῦ πονηροῦ τὰ πεπυρωμένα σβέσαι·'' None | sup>
1.5 having predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his desire,
2.3 among whom we also all once lived in the lust of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.
6.16 above all, taking up the shield of faith, with which you will be able to quench all the fiery darts of the evil one. '' None |
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54. New Testament, Galatians, 1.16, 2.20, 4.19, 5.4, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, identified with love • desires
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 85; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 428; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 9, 10, 14; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 55, 255; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 194; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 187; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 68; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 332
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1.16 ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εὐθέως οὐ προσανεθέμην σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι,
2.20 ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.
4.19 τεκνία μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν·
5.4 κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε.
5.17 ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε.'' None | sup>
1.16 to reveal his Son in me,that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I didn't immediately conferwith flesh and blood, " 2.20 I have been crucified with Christ, andit is no longer I that live, but Christ living in me. That life which Inow live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me,and gave himself up for me.
4.19 My little children, of whom I am again in travail untilChrist is formed in you--
5.4 You are alienated from Christ, you who desire to be justified by thelaw. You have fallen away from grace.
5.17 For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. '" None |
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55. New Testament, Hebrews, 9.11-9.15, 12.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Seeing God, Human desire • desire (epithumia) • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 193; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 632
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9.11 Χριστὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν διὰ τῆς μείζονος καὶ τελειοτέρας σκηνῆς οὐ χειροποιήτου, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως, 9.12 οὐδὲ διʼ αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια, αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος. 9.13 εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἷμα τράγων καὶ ταύρων καὶ σποδὸς δαμάλεως ῥαντίζουσα τοὺς κεκοινωμένους ἁγιάζει πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα, 9.14 πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ αἷμα τοῦ χριστοῦ, ὃς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἄμωμον τῷ θεῷ, καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ἡμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι. 9.15 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης ἐστίν, ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν λάβωσιν οἱ κεκλημένοι τῆς αἰωνίου κληρονομίας.
12.18 Οὐ γὰρ προσεληλύθατε ψηλαφωμένῳ καὶκεκαυμένῳ πυρὶκαὶγνόφῳκαὶ ζόφῳ καὶ θυέλλῃ'' None | sup>
9.11 But Christ having come as a high priest of the coming good things, through the greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this creation, 9.12 nor yet through the blood of goats and calves, but through his own blood, entered in once for all into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption. 9.13 For if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling those who have been defiled, sanctify to the cleanness of the flesh: 9.14 how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? 9.15 For this reason he is the mediator of a new covet, since a death has occurred for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covet, that those who have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance.
12.18 For you have not come to a mountain that might be touched, and that burned with fire, and to blackness, darkness, tempest, '' None |
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56. New Testament, Romans, 1.17, 1.26-1.27, 3.5, 3.26, 5.5, 6.4, 7.15-7.16, 7.18-7.19, 7.23, 7.25, 8.17, 9.3, 9.21, 12.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • conversion, Christian desires for • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, between men and women, female same-sex • desire, between men and women, male same-sex • desire, between men and women, pederastic • desires • domination, human desire for • emotions, passion and desire • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 193; Champion (2022), Dorotheus of Gaza and Ascetic Education, 187; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 355; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 6, 9, 10, 73, 87, 99; Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 35, 47, 93, 122, 233, 287, 317, 334, 340, 344; Kraemer (2020), The Mediterranean Diaspora in Late Antiquity: What Christianity Cost the Jews, 75; Masterson (2016), Man to Man: Desire, Homosociality, and Authority in Late-Roman Manhood. 93, 133, 134; Nasrallah (2019), Archaeology and the Letters of Paul, 164; O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 191; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 71; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 159; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 277; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 254; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 8, 236, 331, 332
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1.17 δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπταιὉ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.
1.26 Διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας· αἵ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν μετήλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, 1.27 ὁμοίως τε καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσιν, τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες.
3.5 εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην συνίστησιν, τί ἐροῦμεν; μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν; κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω.
3.26 ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ.
5.5 ἡ δὲἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει.ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν·
6.4 συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν.
7.15 ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλʼ ὃ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ. 7.16 εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύνφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός.
7.18 οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειταί μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὔ· 7.19 οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω.
7.23 βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου.
7.25 χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας.
8.17 εἰ δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι· κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, συνκληρονόμοι δὲ Χριστοῦ, εἴπερ συνπάσχομεν ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν.
9.3 ηὐχόμην γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου τῶν συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα, οἵτινές εἰσιν Ἰσραηλεῖται,
9.21 ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίανὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν;
12.2 καὶ μὴ συνσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον.' ' None | sup>
1.17 For in it is revealed God\'s righteousness from faith to faith. As it is written, "But the righteous shall live by faith."
1.26 For this reason, God gave them up to vile passions. For their women changed the natural function into that which is against nature. 1.27 Likewise also the men, leaving the natural function of the woman, burned in their lust toward one another, men doing what is inappropriate with men, and receiving in themselves the due penalty of their error.
3.5 But if our unrighteousness commends the righteousness of God, what will we say? Is God unrighteous who inflicts wrath? I speak like men do.
3.26 to demonstrate his righteousness at this present time; that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him who has faith in Jesus. ' "
5.5 and hope doesn't disappoint us, because God's love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us. " 6.4 We were buried therefore with him through baptism to death, that just like Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. ' "
7.15 For I don't know what I am doing. For I don't practice what I desire to do; but what I hate, that I do. " "7.16 But if what I don't desire, that I do, I consent to the law that it is good. " "
7.18 For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing. For desire is present with me, but I don't find it doing that which is good. " "7.19 For the good which I desire, I don't do; but the evil which I don't desire, that I practice. " 7.23 but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. ' "
7.25 I thank God through Jesus Christ, our Lord! So then with the mind, I myself serve God's law, but with the flesh, the sin's law. " 8.17 and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if indeed we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him. ' "
9.3 For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my brothers' sake, my relatives according to the flesh, " "
9.21 Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? " "
12.2 Don't be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, so that you may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God. " ' None |
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57. New Testament, Mark, 14.35-14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desires
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 63; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 165
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14.35 καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπιπτεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ προσηύχετο ἵνα εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν παρέλθῃ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὥρα, 14.36 καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ.'' None | sup>
14.35 He went forward a little, and fell on the ground, and prayed that, if it were possible, the hour might pass away from him. 14.36 He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire."'' None |
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58. New Testament, Matthew, 5.3, 5.5-5.6, 5.8-5.9, 5.12, 5.23-5.26, 5.28-5.30, 5.41, 5.44-5.46, 5.48, 6.16, 19.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • Sexual desire • Sexual desire, and overeating • desire • desire, between men and women • desires • desires, abandonment of
Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 287, 290, 292, 293, 294; Masterson (2016), Man to Man: Desire, Homosociality, and Authority in Late-Roman Manhood. 99; Pevarello (2013), The Sentences of Sextus and the Origins of Christian Ascetiscism. 91; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 68; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 269; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 237, 238
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5.3 ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΙ οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.
5.5 μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν. 5.6 μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται.
5.8 μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. 5.9 μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται.
5.12 χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.
5.23 ἐὰν οὖν προσφέρῃς τὸ δῶρόν σου ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον κἀκεῖ μνησθῇς ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἔχει τι κατὰ σοῦ, 5.24 ἄφες ἐκεῖ τὸ δῶρόν σου ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, καὶ ὕπαγε πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, καὶ τότε ἐλθὼν πρόσφερε τὸ δῶρόν σου. 5.25 ἴσθι εὐνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου ταχὺ ἕως ὅτου εἶ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, μή ποτέ σε παραδῷ ὁ ἀντίδικος τῷ κριτῇ, καὶ ὁ κριτὴς τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ, καὶ εἰς φυλακὴν βληθήσῃ· 5.26 ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως ἂν ἀποδῷς τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην.
5.28 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. 5.29 εἰ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτὸν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν·
5.30 καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιά σου χεὶρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου εἰς γέενναν ἀπέλθῃ.
5.41 καὶ ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει μίλιον ἕν, ὕπαγε μετʼ αὐτοῦ δύο.
5.44 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν διωκόντων ὑμᾶς· 5.45 ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους. 5.46 ἐὰν γὰρ ἀγαπήσητε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς, τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε; οὐχὶ καὶ οἱ τελῶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν;
5.48 Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν.
6.16 Ὅταν δὲ νηστεύητε, μὴ γίνεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταὶ σκυθρωποί, ἀφανίζουσιν γὰρ τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν ὅπως φανῶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νηστεύοντες· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν.
19.21 ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Εἰ θέλεις τέλειος εἶναι, ὕπαγε πώλησόν σου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ δὸς τοῖς πτωχοῖς, καὶ ἕξεις θησαυρὸν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολούθει μοι.'' None | sup>
5.3 "Blessed are the poor in spirit, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
5.5 Blessed are the gentle, For they shall inherit the earth. 5.6 Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, For they shall be filled.
5.8 Blessed are the pure in heart, For they shall see God. 5.9 Blessed are the peacemakers, For they shall be called sons of God.
5.12 Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you.
5.23 "If therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has anything against you, 5.24 leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift. 5.25 Agree with your adversary quickly, while you are with him in the way; lest perhaps the prosecutor deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be cast into prison. 5.26 Most assuredly I tell you, you shall by no means get out of there, until you have paid the last penny.
5.28 but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. 5.29 If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and throw it away from you. For it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, than for your whole body to be cast into Gehenna.
5.30 If your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off, and throw it away from you: for it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, and not your whole body be thrown into Gehenna.
5.41 Whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him two.
5.44 But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 5.45 that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust. ' "5.46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Don't even the tax collectors do the same? " 5.48 Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect.
6.16 "Moreover when you fast, don\'t be like the hypocrites, with sad faces. For they disfigure their faces, that they may be seen by men to be fasting. Most assuredly I tell you, they have received their reward.
19.21 Jesus said to him, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."'' None |
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59. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 5.8, 113.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire / tendency / adpetitio • desires, attitude towards • hope, and desire (epithumia/ cupiditas)
Found in books: Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018), Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art, 11; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 128; Rüpke and Woolf (2013), Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE. 24, 230
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5.8 I am not surprised that they proceed in this way; each alike belongs to a mind that is in suspense, a mind that is fretted by looking forward to the future. But the chief cause of both these ills is that we do not adapt ourselves to the present, but send our thoughts a long way ahead. And so foresight, the noblest blessing of the human race, becomes perverted.
113.18 Every living thing possessed of reason is inactive if it is not first stirred by some external impression; then the impulse comes, and finally assent confirms the impulse.8 Now what assent is, I shall explain. Suppose that I ought to take a walk: I do walk, but only after uttering the command to myself and approving this opinion of mine. Or suppose that I ought to seat myself; I do seat myself, but only after the same process. This assent is not a part of virtue. '' None |
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60. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire
Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 251; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 50
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61. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Sexual desire • desire (epithumia) • desires
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 85; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 6, 87; Pevarello (2013), The Sentences of Sextus and the Origins of Christian Ascetiscism. 198; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 422
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62. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • Eco, curiosity/sexual desire • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • Onos, curiosity/sexual desire • body, desire, and • desire • desire / lust • desire, of humans for divinities • sexual desire
Found in books: Gazzarri and Weiner (2023), Searching for the Cinaedus in Ancient Rome. 71, 205, 216, 221; Mheallaigh (2014), Reading Fiction with Lucian: Fakes, Freaks and Hyperreality, 131; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 168; Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 27; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013), Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel, 190; Pinheiro et al. (2012a), Narrating Desire: Eros, Sex, and Gender in the Ancient Novel, 67, 244; Rothschold, Blanton and Calhoun (2014), The History of Religions School Today : Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts 288, 290; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 191
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63. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • desire • desire, women as objects of
Found in books: Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013), Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel, 30; Pinheiro et al. (2012a), Narrating Desire: Eros, Sex, and Gender in the Ancient Novel, 24, 95; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 635, 646
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64. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires, attitude towards
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 86; Rüpke and Woolf (2013), Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE. 84
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65. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire, distinguished p leasure and love, desire involves a lack • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • desires, attitude towards
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 86, 89; Rüpke and Woolf (2013), Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE. 78; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 96; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 319
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66. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • body, desire, and • desire • tears, erotic desire
Found in books: Alexiou and Cairns (2017), Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After. 308; Pinheiro et al. (2012a), Narrating Desire: Eros, Sex, and Gender in the Ancient Novel, 15, 109, 116, 123; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 636
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67. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Natural dreaming, circumstances and desires • desires
Found in books: Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 168; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 6
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68. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Sexual desire • desire (epithumia)
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 166; Grypeou and Spurling (2009), The Exegetical Encounter between Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity, 78
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69. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.111, 7.113, 10.118 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Desire, distinguished p leasure and love, desire involves a lack • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Erotic desire • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire (epithumia) • desire, and erotic love
Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251; Gunderson (2022), The Social Worlds of Ancient Jews and Christians: Essays in Honor of L. Michael White, 68, 99; Nijs (2023), The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus. 74; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201, 389
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7.111 They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." 7.113 panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty.' "
10.118 When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse."" None |
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70. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 34 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire
Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 366; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013), Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel, 291
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34 Since, however, we have thus generally, and with arrangement, discussed what pertains to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans; let us after this 171narrate such scattered particulars relative to this subject, as do not fall under the above-mentioned order. It is said, therefore, that each of the Greeks who joined himself to this community of the Pythagoreans, was ordered to use his native language. For they did not approve of the use of a foreign tongue. Foreigners also united themselves to the Pythagoric sect, viz. the Messenians, the Lucani, Picentini, and the Romans. And Metrodorus the son of Thyrsus who was the father of Epicharmus,48 and who transferred the greater part of his doctrine to medicine, says in explaining the writings of his father to his brother, that Epicharmus, and prior to him Pythagoras, conceived that the best dialect, as well as the best harmony of music, is the Doric; that the Ionic and the Æolic participate of the chromatic harmony; but that the Attic dialect is replete with this in a still greater degree. They were also of opinion, that the Doric dialect, which consists of vocal letters, is enharmonic.Fables likewise bear testimony to the antiquity of this dialect. For in these it is said that Nereus married Doris the daughter of Ocean; by whom he had fifty daughters, one of which was the mother of Achilles. Metrodorus also says, that according to 172some, Hellen was the offspring of Deucalion, who was the son of Prometheus and Pyrrha the daughter of Epimetheus; and that from him came Dorus, and Æolus. He farther observes, that he learnt from the sacred rites of the Babylonians, that Hellen was the offspring of Jupiter, and that the sons of Hellen were Dorus, Xuthus, and Æolus; with which narrations Herodotus also accords. It is difficult, however, for those in more recent times to know accurately, in particulars so ancient, which of these narrations is to be preferred. But it may be collected from each of these histories, that the Doric dialect is acknowledged to be the most ancient; that the Æolic is next to this, which received its name from Æolus; and that the Ionic ranks as the third, which derived its appellation from Ion the son of Xuthus. The Attic is the fourth, which was denominated from Creusa, the daughter of Erectheus, and is posterior to the former dialects by three generations, as it existed about the time of the Thracians, and the rape of Orithyia, as is evident from the testimony of most histories. Orpheus also, who is the most ancient of the poets, used the Doric dialect.of medicine, however, they especially embraced the diætetic species, and in the exercise of this were most accurate. And in the first place, indeed, they endeavoured to learn the indications of symmetry, of labor, food, and repose. In the next place, 173with respect to the preparation of food, they were nearly the first who attempted to employ themselves in it, and to define the mode in which it should be performed. The Pythagoreans likewise employed cataplasms, more frequently than their predecessors; but they in a less degree approved of medicated ointments. These, however, they principally used in the cure of ulcerations. But incisions and burnings they admitted the least of all things. Some diseases also they cured by incantations. But they are said to have objected to those who expose disciplines to sale; who open their souls like the gates of an inn to every man that approaches to them; and who, if they do not thus find buyers, diffuse themselves through cities, and, in short, hire gymnasia and require a reward from young men for those things which are without price. Pythagoras, however, concealed the meaning of much that was said by him, in order that those who were genuinely instructed might clearly be partakers of it; but that others, as Homer says of Tantalus, might be pained in the midst of what they heard, in consequence of receiving no delight from thence.I think also, it was said by the Pythagoreans, respecting those who teach for the sake of reward, that they show themselves to be worse than statuaries, or those artists who perform their work sitting. For these, when some one orders them to make a 174statue of Hermes, search for wood adapted to the reception of the proper form; but those pretend that they can readily produce the works of virtue from every nature.49 The Pythagoreans likewise said, that it is more necessary to pay attention to philosophy, than to parents and agriculture; for it is owing to the latter, indeed, that we live; but philosophers and preceptors are the causes of our living well, and becoming wise, in consequence of having discovered the right mode of discipline and instruction. Nor did they think fit either to speak or write in such a way, that their conceptions might be obvious to any casual persons; but Pythagoras is said to have taught this in the first place to those that came to him, that, being purified from all incontinence, they should preserve in silence the doctrines they had heard. It is said, therefore, that he who first divulged the theory of commensurable and incommensurable quantities, to those who were unworthy to receive it, was so hated by the Pythagoreans that they not only expelled him from their 175common association, and from living with them, but also constructed a tomb for him, as one who had migrated from the human and passed into a another life. Others also say, that the Divine Power was indigt with those who divulged the dogmas of Pythagoras: for that he perished in the sea, as an impious person, who rendered manifest the composition of the icostagonus; viz. who delivered the method of inscribing in a sphere the dodecaedron, which is one of what are called the five solid figures. But according to others, this happened to him who unfolded the doctrine of irrational and incommensurable quantities.50 Moreover, all the Pythagoric discipline was symbolic, and resembled enigmas and riddles, consisting of apothegms, in consequence of imitating antiquity in its character; just as the truly divine and Pythian oracles appear to be in a certain respect difficult to be understood and explained, to those who carelessly receive the answers which they give. Such therefore, and so many are the indications respecting Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, which may be collected from what is disseminated about them.'' None |
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71. Origen, Against Celsus, 7.48 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire (epithumia) • desires
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 216; Wilson (2012), The Sentences of Sextus, 108
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7.48 But those who are despised for their ignorance, and set down as fools and abject slaves, no sooner commit themselves to God's guidance by accepting the teaching of Jesus, than, so far from defiling themselves by licentious indulgence or the gratification of shameless passion, they in many cases, like perfect priests, for whom such pleasures have no charm, keep themselves in act and in thought in a state of virgin purity. The Athenians have one hierophant, who, not having confidence in his power to restrain his passions within the limits he prescribed for himself, determined to check them at their seat by the application of hemlock; and thus he was accounted pure, and fit for the celebration of religious worship among the Athenians. But among Christians may be found men who have no need of hemlock to fit them for the pure service of God, and for whom the Word in place of hemlock is able to drive all evil desires from their thoughts, so that they may present their prayers to the Divine Being. And attached to the other so-called gods are a select number of virgins, who are guarded by men, or it may be not guarded (for that is not the point in question at present), and who are supposed to live in purity for the honour of the god they serve. But among Christians, those who maintain a perpetual virginity do so for no human honours, for no fee or reward, from no motive of vainglory; but as they choose to retain God in their knowledge, they are preserved by God in a spirit well-pleasing to Him, and in the discharge of every duty, being filled with all righteousness and goodness. "" None |
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72. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.7-1.12, 4.20 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • desire (epithumia)
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 35, 177; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 170; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 196
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1.7 7.The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordice, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. 1.8 8.For none of those legal institutes which were established from the |15 first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, from one generation to another became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial to the community. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right. 1.9 9.Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes, by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the |16 vulgar everywhere require something which may impede them from promptly performing what is not advantageous to the community. Hence those who first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, though proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other without discrimination. 1.10 10.Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but also for defence against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did not alone recall this to their memory in an irrational manner. 1.11 11.Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past |17 transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way injurious to our life. For as I may say, no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use. 1.12 12.On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities of |18 life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which are unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other animals, than from iimate natures. But we can alone obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death. And such are the arguments of the Epicureans. The Arguments of Claudius the Neapolitan who published a Treatise against Abstinence from Animal Food.
4.20 20.For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not being mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence, they thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not from dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which is animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But they conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, and the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living; and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once sensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living being. Hence, universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in rejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are appropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are attended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of the female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and causing her to be pregt, defiles the soul, through its association with the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in consequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with males defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery, and emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes mingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of the soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a certain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things of an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this mixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are produced through mixture, one species being complicated with another, this mixture is denominated a defilement. As when some woman with a lively red Stains the pure iv'ry --- says Homer 22. And again painters call the mixtures of colours, |134 corruptions. It is usual, likewise to denominate that which is unmingled and pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted. For water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. But water, which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves behind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream. When from a limpid and perennial fount It defluous runs --- as Hesiod says 23. For such water is salubrious, because it is uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive into herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that the mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture of dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once living and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be reasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature; just, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body; and he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different and foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, it is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoetic, therefore, or discursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes dianoetically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a separation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper nutriment likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves it. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its composition. It is one thing, however, |135 to nourish, and another to fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various also is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly endeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of the rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron, though most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather, by contracting hat is necessary to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, he himself nourished, by adhering to God more closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homer 24 says, we were not in want either of meat or drink, that we might be truly immortal! --- the poet in thus speaking beautifully signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of death. If therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant that, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it. 25 Hence, it is much |136 to be wished that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which hunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the everyway-flowing river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him who truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call on them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, dismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to what remains to be discussed? |
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73. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Desire • One, the, as object of desire • desire • desire (epithumia) • desire, object, of • desire, or innate • desire, rational versus non-rational
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 35; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 27, 239, 357, 367, 405; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 63; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 136, 157; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 113, 114, 166; Pinheiro Bierl and Beck (2013), Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel, 137; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 57
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74. Augustine, The City of God, 14.6, 14.20 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Julian of Eclanum, bishop, Pelagian opponent of Augustine, Is desire for privacy in sex universal? • Will, Distinct functions, desire related to reason • reason, opposed to desire • sexual desire
Found in books: Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 104, 245; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 335, 411
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14.6 But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. " "
14.20 It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin - that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice. "" None |
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75. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Julian of Eclanum, bishop, Pelagian opponent of Augustine, Is desire for privacy in sex universal? • desire • homosexual desires • ‘evil will’, desiring-faculty
Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 329; Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 123, 330; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 411; Wilson (2018), Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology, 251, 252
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76. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire • reason, opposed to desire
Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 26; Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 209
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77. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • desire
Found in books: Karfíková (2012), Grace and the Will According to Augustine, 114; Ployd (2023), Augustine, Martyrdom, and Classical Rhetoric, 75
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78. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Justinian, conversion of all synagogues to churches desired by • conversion, Christian desires for • desire, between men and women, male same-sex • desires
Found in books: Kraemer (2020), The Mediterranean Diaspora in Late Antiquity: What Christianity Cost the Jews, 155, 294; Masterson (2016), Man to Man: Desire, Homosociality, and Authority in Late-Roman Manhood. 28, 34, 139; Roskovec and Hušek (2021), Interactions in Interpretation: The Pilgrimage of Meaning through Biblical Texts and Contexts, 160
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79. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 1.34
Tagged with subjects: • Tombs of Desire • desire (epithumia) • desires • martyrdom, martyr, desire
Found in books: Blidstein (2017), Purity Community and Ritual in Early Christian Literature, 49; Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 26; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020), Testing and Temptation in Second Temple Jewish and Early Christian Texts, 96
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1.34 Therefore when we crave seafood and fowl and animals and all sorts of foods that are forbidden to us by the law, we abstain because of domination by reason.'' None |
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80. Vergil, Aeneis, 6.847-6.853
Tagged with subjects: • Aeneas, personal desires • domination, human desire for
Found in books: Farrell (2021), Juno's Aeneid: A Battle for Heroic Identity, 282; O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 74, 276, 277
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6.847 Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, 6.848 credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus, 6.849 orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus 6.850 describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent: 6.851 tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento; 6.852 hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem, 6.853 parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos.'' None | sup>
6.847 Lo! on the left and right at feast reclined 6.848 Are other blessed souls, whose chorus sings 6.849 Victorious paeans on the fragrant air 6.850 of laurel groves; and hence to earth outpours 6.851 Eridanus, through forests rolling free. 6.852 Here dwell the brave who for their native land 6.853 Fell wounded on the field; here holy priests '' None |
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81. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • desire • immortality, desire for • psychological mode, desire
Found in books: Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 132; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 241; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 81; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 26, 201
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82. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on desire • Desire, But Plato says the same of pleasure • Desire, Natural and/or necessary desires • Epicurus, Natural and/or necessary desires • Metriopatheia, Moderate, moderation of, emotion; Natural and/or necessary desires • Natural, necessary, Desire • Plato, Some desires and pleasures necessary • Plato, on desire • desire • immortality, desire for • psychological mode, desire
Found in books: Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 198, 415; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 179, 187; Long (2019), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, 131; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 214, 240, 241; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 81; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 201
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83. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Emotions, Desire • body, desire, and • desire
Found in books: Pinheiro et al. (2012a), Narrating Desire: Eros, Sex, and Gender in the Ancient Novel, 115; de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 636
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84. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Athens, social norms of desire in • desire • gaze, desirous • sexual desire
Found in books: Chaniotis (2012), Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World vol, 160; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 210
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