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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.


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All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
consent Brodd and Reed, Rome and Religion: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on the Imperial Cult (2011) 231
Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 167, 179, 181
Liddel, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (2007) 143
Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 123, 194, 196, 209, 212, 213, 216, 229, 235, 241, 245, 254, 255, 256, 262, 274, 275, 277, 298, 299, 301, 305, 315, 316, 319, 321, 329, 336, 344, 348
Pandey, The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome (2018) 2, 4, 20, 97, 105, 124, 128, 199, 221, 241, 243
Westwood, Moses among the Greek Lawgivers: Reading Josephus’ Antiquities through Plutarch’s Lives (2023) 103, 159, 162, 165, 178
van 't Westeinde, Roman Nobilitas in Jerome's Letters: Roman Values and Christian Asceticism for Socialites (2021) 179
consent, and compliance, medical ethics Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 539, 540, 541
consent, augustine, marriage without sex praised if by mutual Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 276
consent, coercion, ending in Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 105
consent, conventions, solidification of Pandey, The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome (2018) 118, 207, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 236
consent, divinity Hickson, Roman prayer language: Livy and the Aneid of Vergil (1993) 54
consent, is something that will subsequently bypass the will, augustine, in sexual dreams Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 415
consent, julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine, neither sleep nor lust need oppose will, if they have Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 409, 410
consent, marriage, and Kanarek, Biblical narrative and formation rabbinic law (2014) 69, 70, 81, 82, 83, 102
consent, matrimony Monnickendam, Jewish Law and Early Christian Identity: Betrothal, Marriage, and Infidelity in the Writings of Ephrem the Syrian (2020) 116, 129, 131, 133, 162
consent, of will is source of sin augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 372, 414
consent, of will, augustine, sexual dreams involve Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 115, 381, 382, 413, 414, 415
consent, of will, so lust no different from decision to eat or drink, salivation, julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine, male member has digestion, sleep Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 381, 409, 412
consent, rule of the master, on parental Dilley, Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline (2019) 50
consent, second marriage, former husbands Monnickendam, Jewish Law and Early Christian Identity: Betrothal, Marriage, and Infidelity in the Writings of Ephrem the Syrian (2020) 31
consent, sexual relations Monnickendam, Jewish Law and Early Christian Identity: Betrothal, Marriage, and Infidelity in the Writings of Ephrem the Syrian (2020) 120, 122, 144
consent, to act in waking life, augustine, but not Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 414
consent, to marriage, female Faraone, Ancient Greek Love Magic (1999) 77, 79
consent, to sex in dreams not sufficiently distinguished from nocturnal emissions, augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 381, 382, 415
consent, universal Tuori, The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication< (2016) 97, 98
consent, vs. command of will, julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine, crucial reply to augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 409, 412
consentes, , dei Bodel and Kajava, Dediche sacre nel mondo greco-romano: diffusione, funzioni, tipologie = Religious dedications in the Greco-Roman world: distribution, typology, use: Institutum Romanum Finlandiae, American Academy in Rome, 19-20 aprile, 2006 (2009) 248, 346
consentes, di Jenkyns, God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination (2013) 215, 216
consentes, dii Gorain, Language in the Confessions of Augustine (2019) 94
consentes, sanctissimi, dei Bodel and Kajava, Dediche sacre nel mondo greco-romano: diffusione, funzioni, tipologie = Religious dedications in the Greco-Roman world: distribution, typology, use: Institutum Romanum Finlandiae, American Academy in Rome, 19-20 aprile, 2006 (2009) 248

List of validated texts:
5 validated results for "consent"
1. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.43-1.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • consensus • consensus, arguments from

 Found in books: Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 218; Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 86

1.43 With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some preconception of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicuruss Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.44 Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question. For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.
2. Cicero, Republic, 1.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • consensus • consensus, • consent,

 Found in books: Atkins, The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy (2021) 222, 224; Mackey, Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion (2022) 199

1.39 Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tia
1.39 Scipio. Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The hist cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man . For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men . .
3. Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 34 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • consensus • consent

 Found in books: Brodd and Reed, Rome and Religion: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on the Imperial Cult (2011) 231; Pandey, The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome (2018) 2, 88, 97

34 In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished civil wars, and at a time when with universal consent I was in complete control of affairs, I transferred the republic from my power to the dominion of the senate and people of Rome. 2 For this service of mine I was named Augustus by decree of the senate, and the door-posts of my house were publicly wreathed with bay leaves and a civic crown was fixed over my door and a golden shield was set in the Curia Julia, which, as attested by the inscription thereon, was given me by the senate and people of Rome on account of my courage, clemency, justice and piety. 3 After this time I excelled all in influence auctoritas, although I possessed no more official power potestas than others who were my colleagues in the several magistracies.
4. Mishnah, Qiddushin, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • consent • matrimony, consent

 Found in books: Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 167; Monnickendam, Jewish Law and Early Christian Identity: Betrothal, Marriage, and Infidelity in the Writings of Ephrem the Syrian (2020) 116

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5. Augustine, The City of God, 14.6, 14.16, 14.19 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Augustine, Consent to sex in dreams not sufficiently distinguished from nocturnal emissions • Augustine, Sexual dreams involve consent of will • consent

 Found in books: Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 241, 245; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 382, 413

"
14.6
But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a mans will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain.",
14.16
Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved. "
14.19
Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, mans righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions - that anger, e.g. may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring - these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife."



Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.