1. Hesiod, Works And Days, 225-237 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Maciver (2012) 58, 59; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 96
225. Οἳ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν'226. ἰθείας καὶ μή τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου, 227. τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δʼ ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ· 228. εἰρήνη δʼ ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδέ ποτʼ αὐτοῖς 229. ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς· 230. οὐδέ ποτʼ ἰθυδίκῃσι μετʼ ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ 231. οὐδʼ ἄτη, θαλίῃς δὲ μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται. 232. τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς 233. ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας· 234. εἰροπόκοι δʼ ὄιες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασιν· 235. τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν· 236. θάλλουσιν δʼ ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές· οὐδʼ ἐπὶ νηῶν 237. νίσσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα. '. None | 225. Perses – heed justice and shun haughtiness;'226. It aids no common man: nobles can’t stay 227. It easily because it will oppre 228. Us all and bring disgrace. The better way 229. Is Justice, who will outstrip Pride at last. 230. Fools learn this by experience because 231. The God of Oaths, by running very fast, 232. Keeps pace with and requites all crooked laws. 233. When men who swallow bribes and crookedly 234. Pass sentences and drag Justice away, 235. There’s great turmoil, and then, in misery 236. Weeping and covered in a misty spray, 237. She comes back to the city, carrying '. None |
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2. Hesiod, Theogony, 27 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Agri (2022) 21; Kirichenko (2022) 189
27. ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,''. None | 27. Those daughters of Lord Zeus proclaimed to me:''. None |
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3. Euripides, Orestes, 256 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, on drunkenness
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 173; Graver (2007) 240
256. τὰς αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας.''. None | 256. Mother, I implore you! Do not shake at me those maidens with their bloodshot eyes and snaky hair. Here they are, close by, to leap on me! Electra''. None |
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4. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on cannibalism
Found in books: Mikalson (2010) 150; Pinheiro et al (2015) 36
62b. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἴσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης .''. None | 62b. but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this? Yes, said Cebes,''. None |
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5. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on divination • divination, Chrysippus on
Found in books: Agri (2022) 8; Mikalson (2010) 138
244a. πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός· ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου. λεκτέος δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστʼ ἔτυμος λόγος ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῇ δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης. ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἵ τʼ ἐν''. None | 244a. that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhtown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favored, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi''. None |
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6. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On Ends
Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 52; Harte (2017) 262
90a. διὸ φυλακτέον ὅπως ἂν ἔχωσιν τὰς κινήσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους. τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπʼ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὀρθότατα λέγοντες· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν'90b. ἀνακρεμαννὺν ὀρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα. τῷ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ περὶ φιλονικίας τετευτακότι καὶ ταῦτα διαπονοῦντι σφόδρα πάντα τὰ δόγματα ἀνάγκη θνητὰ ἐγγεγονέναι, καὶ παντάπασιν καθʼ ὅσον μάλιστα δυνατὸν θνητῷ γίγνεσθαι, τούτου μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐλλείπειν, ἅτε τὸ τοιοῦτον ηὐξηκότι· τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομαθίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὑτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ 90c. φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθʼ ὅσον δʼ αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, ἅτε δὲ ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ, διαφερόντως εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δʼ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις '. None | 90a. wherefore care must be taken that they have their motions relatively to one another in due proportion. And as regards the most lordly kind of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven. And herein we speak most truly; for it is by suspending our head and root from that region whence the substance of our soul first came that the Divine Power'90b. keeps upright our whole body. 90c. must necessarily and inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine, if so be that he lays hold on truth, and in so far as it is possible for human nature to partake of immortality, he must fall short thereof in no degree; and inasmuch as he is for ever tending his divine part and duly magnifying that daemon who dwells along with him, he must be supremely blessed. And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one—namely, to supply each with its own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us the congenial motion '. None |
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7. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Akrasia • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), But Chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of emotion as well • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), False judgement distinguished from Zeno's disobedient or akratic judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Instead of being divided, it oscillates (ptoia) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Rejects Plato's tripartition of soul, in favour of unitary rational command centre • Chrysippus, on drunkenness • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Parts vs. capacities • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus
Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 46; Graver (2007) 240; Sorabji (2000) 56, 308, 310, 311, 313
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8. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Judgement distinguished from appearance as involving assent • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion
Found in books: Merz and Tieleman (2012) 169; Sorabji (2000) 41
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9. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on daimones
Found in books: Mikalson (2010) 26; Álvarez (2019) 38, 40
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10. Cicero, On Divination, 1.1, 1.6, 1.64-1.65, 1.82, 1.125, 1.127, 2.87, 2.89, 2.120, 2.124, 2.130 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus,
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 140, 262; Del Lucchese (2019) 241; Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 10; Frede and Laks (2001) 244, 249, 252, 258; Frey and Levison (2014) 55; Long (2006) 130, 131; Long (2019) 83; Luck (2006) 330; Maso (2022) 126, 143; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 9
1.1. Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci mantikh/n appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt.
1.6. Sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse dividi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur? praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius.
1.64. Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somniare, uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus ae+r sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur. Idque, ut modo dixi, facilius evenit adpropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur.
1.65. Ex quo et illud est Callani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. Neque enim illud verbum temere consuetudo adprobavisset, si ea res nulla esset omnino: Praésagibat ánimus frustra me íre, cum exirém domo. Sagire enim sentire acute est; ex quo sagae anus, quia multa scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes. Is igitur, qui ante sagit, quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire.
1.82. Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus, quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines aut, quid eventurum sit, ignorant aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire, quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus, quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt; at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea, quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt, (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus) neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscere;
1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat.
1.127. Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium.
2.87. Quis enim magistratus aut quis vir inlustrior utitur sortibus? ceteris vero in locis sortes plane refrixerunt. Quod Carneadem Clitomachus scribit dicere solitum, nusquam se fortunatiorem quam Praeneste vidisse Fortunam. Ergo hoc divinationis genus omittamus. Ad Chaldaeorum monstra veniamus; de quibus Eudoxus, Platonis auditor, in astrologia iudicio doctissimorum hominum facile princeps, sic opinatur, id quod scriptum reliquit, Chaldaeis in praedictione et in notatione cuiusque vitae ex natali die minime esse credendum.
2.89. Sed ut ratione utamur omissis testibus, sic isti disputant, qui haec Chaldaeorum natalicia praedicta defendunt: Vim quandam esse aiunt signifero in orbe, qui Graece zwdiako/s dicitur, talem, ut eius orbis una quaeque pars alia alio modo moveat inmutetque caelum, perinde ut quaeque stellae in his finitumisque partibus sint quoque tempore, eamque vim varie moveri ab iis sideribus, quae vocantur errantia; cum autem in eam ipsam partem orbis venerint, in qua sit ortus eius, qui nascatur, aut in eam, quae coniunctum aliquid habeat aut consentiens, ea triangula illi et quadrata nomit. Etenim cum †tempore anni tempestatumque caeli conversiones commutationesque tantae fiant accessu stellarum et recessu, cumque ea vi solis efficiantur, quae videmus, non veri simile solum, sed etiam verum esse censent perinde, utcumque temperatus sit ae+r, ita pueros orientis animari atque formari, ex eoque ingenia, mores, animum, corpus, actionem vitae, casus cuiusque eventusque fingi.
2.124. Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint; nunc interiora videamus. Aut enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit, aut coniectores ex quadam convenientia et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant sumpa/qeian, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt, aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. Primum igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum; nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus.' '. None | 1.1. And what do you say of the following story which we find in our annals? During the Veientian War, when Lake Albanus had overflowed its banks, a certain nobleman of Veii deserted to us and said that, according to the prophecies of the Veientian books, their city could not be taken while the lake was at flood, and that if its waters were permitted to overflow and take their own course to the sea the result would be disastrous to the Roman people; on the other hand, if the waters were drained off in such a way that they did not reach the sea the result would be to our advantage. In consequence of this announcement our forefathers dug that marvellous canal to drain off the waters from the Alban lake. Later when the Veientians had grown weary of war and had sent ambassadors to the Senate to treat for peace, one of them is reported to have said that the deserter had not dared to tell the whole of the prophecy contained in the Veientian books, for those books, he said, also foretold the early capture of Rome by the Gauls. And this, as we know, did occur six years after the fall of Veii. 45
1.1. Book I1 There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική — that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is — if only such a faculty exists — since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning gods, whereas, according to Platos interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning frenzy.
1.1. Why, my dear Quintus, said I, you are defending the very citadel of the Stoics in asserting the interdependence of these two propositions: if there is divination there are gods, and, if there are gods there is divination. But neither is granted as readily as you think. For it is possible that nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of a god, and it may be that there are gods without their having conferred any power of divination upon men.To this he replied, I, at any rate, find sufficient proof to satisfy me of the existence of the gods and of their concern in human affairs in my conviction that there are some kinds of divination which are clear and manifest. With your permission I will set forth my views on this subject, provided you are at leisure and have nothing else which you think should be preferred to such a discussion.
1.6. Ah, it is objected, but many dreams are untrustworthy. Rather, perhaps, their meaning is hidden from us. But grant that some are untrustworthy, why do we declaim against those that trustworthy? The fact is the latter would be much more frequent if we went to our rest in proper condition. But when we are burdened with food and drink our dreams are troubled and confused. Observe what Socrates says in Platos Republic:When a man goes to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul languid and inert, but having that other portion, which has in it a certain brutishness and wild savagery, immoderately gorged with drink and food, then does that latter portion leap up and hurl itself about in sleep without check. In such a case every vision presented to the mind is so devoid of thought and reason that the sleeper dreams that he is committing incest with his mother, or that he is having unlawful commerce indiscriminately with gods and men, and frequently too, with beasts; or even that he is killing someone and staining his hands with impious bloodshed; and that he is doing many vile and hideous things recklessly and without shame.
1.6. The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics — much against their will I grant you — permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school?
1.64. Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future.
1.65. This is illustrated by the story which I related about Callanus and by Homers account of Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the early death of Achilles.31 It is clear that, in our ordinary speech, we should not have made such frequent use of the word praesagire, meaning to sense in advance, or to presage, if the power of presaging had been wholly non-existent. An illustration of its use is seen in the following well-known line from Plautus:My soul presaged as I left home that my leaving was in vain.Now sagire means to have a keen perception. Accordingly certain old women are called sagae, because they are assumed to know a great deal, and dogs are said to be sagacious. And so one who has knowledge of a thing before it happens is said to presage, that is, to perceive the future in advance.
1.82. The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future;
1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.
1.127. Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena.
2.87. for no magistrate and no man of any reputation ever consults them; but in all other places lots have gone entirely out of use. And this explains the remark which, according to Clitomachus, Carneades used to make that he had at no other place seen Fortune more fortunate than at Praeneste. Then let us dismiss this branch of divination.42 Let us come to Chaldean manifestations. In discussing them Platos pupil, Eudoxus, whom the best scholars consider easily the first in astronomy, has left the following opinion in writing: No reliance whatever is to be placed in Chaldean astrologers when they profess to forecast a mans future from the position of the stars on the day of his birth.
2.89. But let us dismiss our witnesses and employ reasoning. Those men who defend the natal-day prophecies of the Chaldeans, argue in this way: In the starry belt which the Greeks call the Zodiac there is a certain force of such a nature that every part of that belt affects and changes the heavens in a different way, according to the stars that are in this or in an adjoining locality at a given time. This force is variously affected by those stars which are called planets or wandering stars. But when they have come into that sign of the Zodiac under which someone is born, or into a sign having some connexion with or accord with the natal sign, they form what is called a triangle or square. Now since, through the procession and retrogression of the stars, the great variety and change of the seasons and of temperature take place, and since the power of the sun produces such results as are before our eyes, they believe that it is not merely probable, but certain, that just as the temperature of the air is regulated by this celestial force, so also children at their birth are influenced in soul and body and by this force their minds, manners, disposition, physical condition, career in life and destinies are determined. 43
2.124. But, though the conclusion just stated is obvious, let us now look deeper into the question. Surely you must assume, either that there is a Divine Power which, in planning for our good, gives us information by means of dreams; or that, because of some natural connexion and association — the Greeks call it συμπάθεια — interpreters of dreams know what sort of a dream is required to fit any situation and what sort of a result will follow any dream; or that neither of these suppositions is true, but that the usual result or consequence of every dream is known by a consistent system of rules based on long-continued observation. In the first place, then, it must be understood that there is no divine power which creates dreams. And indeed it is perfectly clear that none of the visions seen in dreams have their origin in the will of the gods; for the gods, for our sakes, would so interpose that we might be able to foresee the future.' '. None |
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11. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.68 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Two kind of love • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Wise man will fall in love
Found in books: Long (2006) 326; Sorabji (2000) 280
| 3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <''. None |
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12. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.48, 3.62-3.63, 3.68, 3.70, 3.75, 5.25-5.26, 5.79, 5.84-5.85 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On the Fact that Zeno Used Terms in Their Proper Significations • Chrysippus, conflates pathos with nosema • Chrysippus, on equality of all mistches • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on self-sufficiency • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Ends • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Justice • Chrysippus, uses examples from literature • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Two kind of love • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Wise man will fall in love • equality of all mistakes, doctrine held by Chrysippus
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 60, 70; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 33; Graver (2007) 175, 228, 244, 250, 251; Gunderson (2022) 92; Long (2006) 326; Maso (2022) 31; Sorabji (2000) 280; Tsouni (2019) 184
3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam;
3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234
3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.
3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V
3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit;
5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV' "5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente." "
5.79. Respondebo me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo igitur, igitur ( i. e. quoniam ita quaeris, accuratius dic cur id facias ) om. BE inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est', et Quare? Post vocab. Quare in N reliqua desunt, cum sequatur pravumve quid consentiens quid et q. s. Acad. poster. I 19 sqq. inquit, respondet: add. Se. Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum. Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere." "
5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum." '5.85. Tibi hoc incredibile, quod quod Mdv. quid B quia ERV beatissimum. quid? tuum credibile? si enim ad populum me vocas, eum, qui ita sit affectus, beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute, ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint, alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugtia. Theophrasti igitur, inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita? Tamen aberramus a proposito, et, ne longius, prorsus, inquam, Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet. Nonne igitur tibi videntur, nonne inquit igitur tibi videntur BE inquit, mala?''. None | 3.48. \xa0So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I\xa0am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. <
3.62. \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63. \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '
3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <
3.70. \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <
3.75. \xa0"Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a\xa0better right to the name of \'Master of the People\' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a\xa0better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man\'s authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. <
5.25. \xa0At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. < 5.26. \xa0Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a\xa0number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. <
5.79. \xa0"My reply will be," said\xa0I, "that I\xa0am not at the present asking what result virtue can produce, but what is a consistent and what a self-contradictory account of it." "How do you mean?" said he. "Why," I\xa0said, "first Zeno enunciates the lofty and oracular utterance, \'Virtue need not look outside herself for happiness\'; \'Why?\' says some one. \'Because,\' he answers, \'nothing else is good but what is morally good.\' I\xa0am not now asking whether this is true; I\xa0merely say that Zeno\'s statements are admirably logical and consistent. <' "
5.84. \xa0Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I\xa0dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A\xa0happy man,' says Zeno. A\xa0supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I\xa0have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' <" '5.85. \xa0You draw the line at this; you can\'t believe that he is supremely happy. Well, but can one believe what you say either? Call me before a jury of ordinary people, and you will never persuade them that the man so afflicted is happy; refer the case to the learned, and it is possible that on one of the two counts you will be doubtful about their verdict, whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris: but on the other, they will find without hesitation that the Stoic doctrine is consistent and yours self-contradictory. \'Ah,\' says the Academic, \'then you agree with Theophrastus in his great work On\xa0Happiness?\' However, we are wandering from the subject; and to cut the matter short, Piso," I\xa0said, "I\xa0do fully agree with Theophrastus, if misfortunes, as you say, are evils." <''. None |
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13. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.3, 1.19, 1.22-1.24, 1.36-1.37, 1.39-1.40, 2.2, 2.13, 2.15-2.17, 2.19, 2.23, 2.32, 2.35, 2.37-2.39, 2.43, 2.45, 2.58, 2.118, 2.133, 2.153-2.154, 2.158, 2.160, 2.163-2.164, 2.167, 3.92, 7.88 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, On Ends • Chrysippus, On Nature • Chrysippus, Physical Questions • Chrysippus, location of God • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law
Found in books: Agri (2022) 17; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 609, 611, 614; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 75; Del Lucchese (2019) 194, 211, 241; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 21, 232, 235; Frede and Laks (2001) 24, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 199; Frey and Levison (2014) 42, 50, 51, 52; Graver (2007) 233; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 115, 124; Levison (2009) 147, 293; Long (2006) 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 270, 271, 346; Long (2019) 78, 79, 82; Maso (2022) 125, 126; Meister (2019) 8, 9; Moss (2012) 187; O, Brien (2015) 10; Osborne (2001) 36; Tsouni (2019) 185
| 1.3. For there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever. But if their opinion is the true one, how can piety, reverence or religion exist? For all these are tributes which it is our duty to render in purity and holiness to the divine powers solely on the assumption that they take notice of them, and that some service has been rendered by the immortal gods to the race of men. But if on the contrary the gods have neither the power nor the will to aid us, if they pay no heed to us at all and take no notice of our actions, if they can exercise no possible influence upon the life of men, what ground have we for rendering any sort of worship, honour or prayer to the immortal gods? Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion;
1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research;
1.22. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. ' "1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; " "1.24. for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. " '
1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. ' "
1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. " '
1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity.
2.2. "For my part," rejoined Balbus, "I had rather listen to Cotta again, using the same eloquence that he employed in abolishing false gods to present a picture of the true ones. A philosopher, a pontiff and a Cotta should possess not a shifting and unsettled conception of the immortal gods, like the Academics, but a firm and definite one like our school. As for refuting Epicurus, that has been accomplished and more than achieved already. But I am eager to hear what you think yourself, Cotta." "Have you forgotten," said Cotta, "what I said at the outset, that I find it more easy, especially on such subjects as these, to say what I don\'t think than what I do? ' "
2.13. As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; " '
2.15. And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind. 2.16. "Extremely acute of intellect as is Chrysippus, nevertheless his utterance here might well appear to have been learnt from the very lips of Nature, and not discovered by himself. \'If (he says) there be something in the world that man\'s mind and human reason, strength and power are incapable of producing, that which produces it must necessarily be superior to man; now the heavenly bodies and all those things that display a never-ending regularity cannot be created by man; therefore that which creates them is superior to man; yet what better name is there for this than "god"? Indeed, if gods do not exist, what can there be in the universe superior to man? for he alone possesses reason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; but for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world superior to himself would be an insane piece of arrogance; therefore there is something superior to man; therefore God does exist.\ '2.17. Again, if you see a spacious and beautiful house, you could not be induced to believe, even though you could not see its master, that it was built by mice and weasels; if then you were to imagine that this elaborate universe, with all the variety and beauty of the heavenly bodies and the vast quantity and extent of sea and land, were your abode and not that of the gods, would you not be thought absolutely insane? Again, do we not understand that everything in a higher position is of greater value, and that the lowest thing, and is enveloped by a layer of the densest kind of air? Hence for the same reason what we observe to be the case with certain districts and cities, I mean that their inhabitants are duller-witted than the average owing to the more compressed quality of the atmosphere, has also befallen the human race as a whole owing to its being located on the earth, that is, in the densest region of the world.
2.19. Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit.
2.23. "However, having begun to treat the subject in a different way from that which I proposed at the beginning (for I said that this part required no discussion, since the existence of god was manifest to everybody), in spite of this I should like to prove even this point by means of arguments drawn from Physics or Natural Philosophy. It is a law of Nature that all things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat, without which their nurture and growth would not be possible; for everything of a hot, fiery nature supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite and uniform motion; and as long as this motion remains within us, so long sensation and life remain, whereas so soon as our heat is cooled and quenched we ourselves perish and are extinguished.
2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole.
2.35. Again, it is undeniable that every organic whole must have an ultimate ideal of perfection. As in vines or cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. Hence it follows that there must exist this fourth and highest grade, unassailable by any external force.
2.37. "In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly puts it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the cornº and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he is \'a small fragment of that which is perfect.\ '2.38. The world on the contrary, since it embraces all things and since nothing exists which is not within it, is entirely perfect; how then can it fail to possess that which is the best? but there is nothing better than intelligence and reason; the world therefore cannot fail to possess them. Chrysippus therefore also well shows by the aid of illustrations that in the perfect and mature specimen of its kind everything is better than in the imperfect, for instance in a horse than in a foal, in a dog than in a puppy, in a man than in a boy; and that similarly a perfect and complete being is bound to possess that which is the best thing in all the world; 2.39. but no being is more perfect than the world, and nothing is better than virtue; therefore virtue is an essential attribute of the world. Again, man\'s nature is not perfect, yet virtue may be realized in man; how much more readily then in the world! therefore the world possesses virtue. Therefore it is wise, and consequently divine. "Having thus perceived the divinity of the world, we must also assign the same divinity to the stars, which are formed from the most mobile and the purest part of the aether, and are not compounded of any other element besides; they are of a fiery heat and translucent throughout. Hence they too have the fullest right to be pronounced to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence.
2.43. moreover the substance employed as food is also believed to have some influence on mental acuteness; it is therefore likely that the stars possess surpassing intelligence, since they inhabit the ethereal region of the world and also are nourished by the moist vapours of sea and earth, rarefied in their passage through the wide intervening space. Again, the consciousness and intelligence of the stars is most clearly evinced by their order and regularity; for regular and rhythmical motion is impossible without design, which contains no trace of casual or accidental variation; now the order and eternal regularity of the constellations indicates neither a process of nature, for it is highly rational, nor chance, for chance loves variation and abhors regularity; it follows therefore that the stars move of their own free-will and because of their intelligence and divinity.
2.45. "It remains for us to consider the qualities of the divine nature; and on this subject nothing is more difficult than to divert the eye of the mind from following the practice of bodily sight. This difficulty has caused both uneducated people generally and those philosophers who resemble the uneducated to be unable to conceive of the immortal gods without setting before themselves the form of men: a shallow mode of thought which Cotta has exposed and which therefore calls for no discussion from me. But assuming that we have a definite and preconceived idea of a deity as, first, a living being, and secondly, a being unsurpassed in excellence by anything else in the whole of nature, I can see nothing that satisfies this preconception or idea of ours more fully than, first, the judgement that this world, which must necessarily be the most excellent of all things, is itself a living being and a god. ' "
2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. " '
2.118. But the stars are of a fiery substance, and for this reason they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters, which are raised up by the sun out of the fields which it warms and out of the waters; and when nourished and renewed by these vapours the stars and the whole aether shed them back again, and then once more draw them up from the same source, with the loss of none of their matter, or only of an extremely small part which is consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the aether. As a consequence of this, so our school believe, though it used to be said that Panaetius questioned the doctrine, there will ultimately occur a conflagration of the whole while, because when the moisture has been used up neither can the earth be nourished nor will the air continue to flow, being unable to rise upward after it has drunk up all the water; thus nothing will remain but fire, by which, as a living being and a god, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before.
2.133. "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature.
2.153. "Then moreover hasn\'t man\'s reason penetrated even to the sky? We alone of living creatures know the risings and settings and the courses of the stars, the human race has set limits to the day, the month and the year, and has learnt the eclipses of the sun and moon and foretold for all future time their occurrence, their extent and their dates. And contemplating the heavenly bodies the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, with its comrades justice and the rest of the virtues, the sources of a life of happiness that vies with and resembles the divine existence and leaves us inferior to the celestial beings in nothing else save immortality, which is immaterial for happiness. I think that my exposition of these matters has been sufficient to prove how widely man\'s nature surpasses all other living creatures; and this should make it clear that neither such a conformation and arrangement of the members nor such power of mind and intellect can possibly have been created by chance.
2.154. "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. ' "
2.158. It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? " "
2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. " '
2.163. Many observations are made by those who inspect the victims at sacrifices, many events are foreseen by augurs or revealed in oracles and prophecies, dreams and portents, a knowledge of which has often led to the acquisition of many things gratifying men\'s wishes and requirements, and also to the avoidance of many dangers. This power or art or instinct therefore has clearly been bestowed by the immortal gods on man, and on no other creature, for the ascertainment of future events. "And if perchance these arguments separately fail to convince you, nevertheless in combination their collective weight will be bound to do so. 2.164. "Nor is the care and providence of the immortal gods bestowed only upon the human race in its entirety, but it is also wont to be extended to individuals. We may narrow down the entirety of the human race and bring it gradually down to smaller and smaller groups, and finally to single individuals. For if we believe, for the reasons that we have spoken of before, that the gods care for all human beings everywhere in every coast and region of the lands remote from this continent in which we dwell, then they care also for the men who inhabit with us these lands between the sunrise and the sunset. ' "
2.167. Therefore no great man ever existed who did not enjoy some portion of divine inspiration. Nor yet is this argument to be deprived by pointing to cases where a man's cornfields or vineyards have been damaged by a storm, or an accident has robbed him of some commodity of value, and inferring that the victim of one of these misfortunes is the object of god's hatred or neglect. The gods attend to great matters; they neglect small ones. Now great men always prosper in all their affairs, assuming that the teachers of our school and Socrates, the prince of philosophy, have satisfactorily discoursed upon the bounteous abundance of wealth that virtue bestows. " "
3.92. But at all events a god could have come to the aid of those great and splendid cities and have preserved them — for you yourselves are fond of saying that there is nothing that a god cannot accomplish, and that without any toil; as man's limbs are effortlessly moved merely by his mind and will, so, as you say, the god's power can mould and move and alter all things. Nor do you say this as some superstitious fable or old wives' tale, but you give a scientific and systematic account of it: you allege that matter, which constitutes and contains all things, is in its entirety flexible and subject to change, so that there is nothing that cannot be moulded and transmuted out of it however suddenly, but the moulder and manipulator of this universal substance is divine providence, and therefore providence, whithersoever it moves, is able to perform whatever it will. Accordingly either providence does not know its own powers, or it does not regard human affairs, or it lacks power of judgement to discern what is the best. " '. None |
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14. Cicero, On Duties, 1.11-1.12, 1.67, 1.69, 2.88 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius
Found in books: Agri (2022) 16; Graver (2007) 246, 247; Long (2006) 326; Maso (2022) 27; Meister (2019) 8; Sorabji (2000) 106; Wilson (2022) 31
1.67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea. quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae.
1.69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari.
2.88. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a Panaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda cum externis et externa cum corporis et ipsa inter se corporis et externa cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo comparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, cum corporis externa hoc modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus, ipsa inter se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana rusticis.' '. None | 1.67. \xa0All the glory and greatness and, I\xa0may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1)\xa0if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2)\xa0if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. <" '
1.69. \xa0Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I\xa0speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers and certain other earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their private estates. <
2.88. \xa0But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against another; â\x80\x94 for this, as I\xa0stated, is a\xa0fourth point overlooked by Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with outward advantages and outward, with physical, but physical advantages are compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical advantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as this: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than wealth; external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better to have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength; while the physical advantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is preferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages also may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be preferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived from the farm. <' ". None |
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15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, On Lives • Chrysippus, On the Principles of Syllogisms, in one book • Chrysippus, hinting at Socrates wisdom? • Chrysippus, on action • Chrysippus, on assent • Chrysippus, on fate • Chrysippus, on moral development • Cicero, on Chrysippus • fate (heimarmenē, Lat., fatum) , Chrysippus on • necessity ἀνάγκη, Chrysippus on
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 140, 143, 144; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 616; Brouwer (2013) 31, 165; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 27, 61, 89; Frede and Laks (2001) 239, 252; Frey and Levison (2014) 54; Graver (2007) 246; Hankinson (1998) 245, 255; Inwood and Warren (2020) 125, 155; Linjamaa (2019) 136; Maso (2022) 41, 85, 86, 97, 122, 127; Williams and Vol (2022) 269; Wilson (2018) 19
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16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, On Ends • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Appetite is judgement that there is future benefit and it is appropriate to reach for it • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), At least one of the two judgements false • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Cicero infers voluntariness of emotion from dispensability of second judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Concentrates therapy on second judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Distress and pleasure as involving, but not being (pace Zeno), contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), False judgement distinguished from Zeno's disobedient or akratic judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Fear is judgement that there is future harm and it is appropriate to avoid it • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Impulse is a judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), In pleasure and distress the harm or benefit is present, in appetite and fear future • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast Zeno) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Makes therapy available to non-Stoics • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Pleasure is judgement that there is present benefit and it is appropriate to feel expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Roles of the second judgement, easier to cure • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Roles of the second judgement, explains why distress is misguided even when first judgement is correct, that one's lack of virtue is an evil • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Tears, if not assented to, could illustrate idea of first movements, but Chrysippus does not make use of this • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), The second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), With two judgements • Chrysippus, conflates pathos with nosema • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, on emotions as judgments • Chrysippus, on grief and consolation • Chrysippus, on involuntary feelings • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on overwhelming emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Erotic Love • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Lives • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law • Cicero, and Chrysippus • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • First movements, Expounded by Seneca, perhaps earlier by Cicero, but examples in Aristotle and (possibly) Chrysippus not yet recognized as such • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Instead of appealing to freshness, Chrysippus could more consistently have said time removes the judgement (associated with fear) that the evil is intolerable • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius • Impulse (hormē), Impulse in adult humans is assent or judgement for Chrysippus and Seneca • Posidonius, Stoic, Zeno's and Chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Soul survives for a while • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus
Found in books: Agri (2022) 15; Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 162, 198; Brouwer (2013) 40; Gazis and Hooper (2021) 173; Graver (2007) 36, 43, 69, 79, 196, 197, 199, 200, 228, 233, 237, 252, 253, 255; Inwood and Warren (2020) 203; Linjamaa (2019) 103; Long (2019) 153; Maso (2022) 125; Sorabji (2000) 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55, 64, 70, 107, 111, 112, 136, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 237, 238, 329; Williams and Vol (2022) 270
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17. Philo of Alexandria, On The Eternity of The World, 48-51, 76 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Long (2006) 125, 257, 270; Long (2019) 153
| 48. Therefore Chrysippus, the most celebrated philosopher of that sect, in his treatise about Increase, utters some such prodigious assertions as these, and after he has prefaced his doctrines with the assertion that it is impossible for two makers of a species to exist in the same substance, he proceeds, "Let it be granted for the sake of argument and speculation that there is one person entire and sound, and another wanting one foot from his birth, and that the sound man is called Dion and the cripple Theon, and afterwards that Dion also loses one of his feet, then if the question were asked which had been spoiled, it would be more natural to say this of Theon;" but this is the assertion of one who delights in paradox rather than in truth, '49. for how could it be said that he who had suffered no mutilation whatever, namely Theon, was taken off, and that Dion, who had lost a foot, was not injured? Very appropriately, he will reply, for Dion, who had had his foot cut off, falls back upon the original imperfection of Theon, and there cannot be two specific differences in the same subject, therefore it follows of necessity that Dion must remain, and that Theon must be taken off-- "So are we slain by arrows winged With our own Feathers," as the tragic poet says. For any one, copying the form of this argument and adapting it to the entire world, may prove in the clearest manner that providence itself is liable to corruption. 50. Consider the matter thus: let the world be the subject of our argument, as Dion was just now, for it is perfect, and let the soul of the world take the place of Theon, who was imperfect, since a part is less than the whole; and as the foot was cut off from Dion, so also let everything which resembles a body be cut off from the world; 51. therefore it is necessary to say that the world has not been destroyed though its body has been taken away, just as Dion was not destroyed by having his foot cut off, but the soul of the world it is that has perished, like Theon, who suffered no artificial mutilation, for the world also receded to a lesser substance when all of it that resembled a body was taken away. And the soul was destroyed because there could not be two specific differences affecting the same and since it is imperishable it follows of necessity that the world also must be imperishable. X.
76. But some of those who used to hold a different opinion, being overpowered by truth, have changed their doctrine; for beauty has a power which is very attractive, and the truth is beyond all things beautiful, as falsehood on the contrary is enormously ugly; therefore Boethus, and Posidonius, and Panaetius, men of great learning in the Stoic doctrines, as if seized with a sudden inspiration, abandoning all the stories about conflagrations and regeneration, have come over to the more divine doctrine of the incorruptibility of the world; '. None |
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18. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 35-36 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche
Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 117
| 35. for some bodies he has endowed with habit, others with nature, others with soul, and some with rational soul; for instance, he has bound stones and beams, which are torn from their kindred materials, with the most powerful bond of habit; and this habit is the inclination of the spirit to return to itself; for it begins at the middle and proceeds onwards towards the extremities, and then when it has touched the extreme boundary, it turns back again, until it has again arrived at the same place from which it originally started. '36. This is the continued unalterable course, up and down, of habit, which runners, imitating in their triennial festivals, in those great common spectacles of all men, display as a brilliant achievement, and a worthy subject of rivalry and contention. VIII. '. None |
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19. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus of Soli • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Better kind not an emotion, but educative epibolē • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Soul survives for a while
Found in books: Maso (2022) 143; Rohland (2022) 67; Sorabji (2000) 237, 248, 283
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20. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Harte (2017) 231; Inwood and Warren (2020) 117
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21. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 1.1.10-1.1.12, 1.3, 1.14.6, 1.14.12, 2.6.9-2.6.10, 2.8.11-2.8.14, 2.18.19, 2.20.20, 3.23.37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Physical Questions • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, on moral development • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Oikeiōsis
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 54; Frey and Levison (2014) 50, 51; Gordon (2012) 180; Graver (2007) 253, 254; Inwood and Warren (2020) 125, 137; Levison (2009) 147; Linjamaa (2019) 117; Long (2006) 345, 358, 364; Sorabji (2000) 51, 52, 53, 54, 252; Wilson (2018) 37
| 1.1. of the things which are in our power, and not in our power. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please. Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero’s freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master. What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you? What then did Agrippinus say? He said, I am not a hindrance to myself. When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day —this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath— let us go and take our exercise. After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.
1.3. IF a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is quite the contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you attach yourself to this? Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous: some become like lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a maligt man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal? See then and take care that you do not become some one of these miserable things.
1.14.6. WHEN a person asked him how a man could be convinced that all his actions are under the inspection of God, he answered, Do you not think that all things are united in one? do, the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a natural agreement and union with heavenly things? I do. And how else so regularly as if by God’s command, when He bids the plants to flower, do they flower? when He bids them to send forth shoots, do they shoot? when He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them down? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves? and when He bids them to fold themselves up and to remain quiet and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest? And how else at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration and change to the contrary seen in earthly things? But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our souls much more? and our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts as being his own motion connate with himself? Now are you able to think of the divine administration, and about all things divine, and at the same time also about human affairs, and to be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things to suspend your judgment; and do you retain in your soul so many impressions from so many and various things, and being moved by them, do you fall upon notions similar to those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and the memories of ten thousand things; and is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All, and to leave so little not illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth’s shadow; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go round, being a small part of himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things? But I cannot, the man may reply, comprehend all these things at once. But who tells you that you have equal power with Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a guardian, every man’s Daemon, to whom he has committed the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. For to what better and more careful guardian could He have intrusted each of us? When then you have shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not; but God is within, and your Daemon is within, and what need have they of light to see what you are doing? To this God you ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But they who are hired for pay swear to regard the safety of Caesar before all things; and you who have received so many and such great favors, will you not swear, or when you have sworn, will you not abide by your oath? And what shall you swear? Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to find fault with any thing that he has given, and never unwillingly to do or to suffer any thing that is necessary. Is this oath like the soldier’s oath? The soldiers swear not to prefer any man to Cæsar: in this oath men swear to honour themselves before all.
2.6.9. The title of Indifference means of the indifference of things. of the things which are neither good nor bad. THE hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, I have learned them, and you have not. Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind. Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly.— But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window.—But still speak to him.—In what way? Not meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general’s command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them circumstances. What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been produced? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names. I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes: and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run? Is it not the hazard of your life? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own? how? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose? But is it as to another man’s opinion? and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opinions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome? Yes: what then if I should be sent to Gyara? If that suits you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were something great? It is not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished: never claim any thing which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison. But in our present disposition, consider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us, Would you like me to read Paeans to you?—Why do you trouble me? do you not know the evils which hold me? Can I in such circumstances (listen to paeans)?—What circumstances?—I am going to die.— And will other men be immortal?
2.8.11. GOD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial. It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God? Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in the superiority of rational over irrational animals? Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it require this use only? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over others. No; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for other wise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not then have beer subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to us and like to us. Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separated from the deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you not know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not. Mrs. Carter has a note here. See 1 Cor. vi. 19, 2 Cor. vi. 16, 2 Tim. i. 14, 1 John iii. 24, iv. 12, 13. But though the simple expression of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture. The passage in 1 Cor. vi. 19 is, What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own ? This follows v. 18, which is an exhortation to flee fornication . The passage in 2 Cor. vi. 16 is And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them, etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of these two passages. It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament; but whence did these writers learn such forms of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epictetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man. Swedenborg says, In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord’s mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him. Swedeuborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man’s, but God’s in man. I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the church of England service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken; as we see in T. Burnet’s Posthumous work (de Fide et officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the church of England, whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the Communicants, for the prayer is Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he in us. This is a different thing from Epictetus’ notion of God being in man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the truth of Christ’s natural body to be at one time in more places than one. It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines: and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted; and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have true Communion in Christ’s body and blood (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August 1874 ). What would Epictetus have thought of the subtleties of our days? Do you think that I mean some God of silver or of gold, and external? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing: but when God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make him proud? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God: he knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he says I wish I had you (God) with me. Have you not God with you? and do you seek for any other, when you have him? or will God tell you any thing else than this? If you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, an if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how you shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the artist in the other? or the work in the one case like the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory stands in that attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you dishonour him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dishonour your guardianship? But if God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, I had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself: keep him for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrifled, free from passion and perturbation. And then you do not keep him such. But some will say, whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he displays and these supercilious looks?—I have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what I have assented to: I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countece such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have: then I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious countece? Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail. —Iliad, i. 526. Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation—What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What Lerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit ( ὁρμήν ), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see.
2.18.19. EVERY habit and faculty is maintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit of walking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will know the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if you would make any thing a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it. So it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when you have been angry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced, when they did not exist before, and others not be increased and strengthened by corresponding acts. In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the mind grow up. For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. But if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is inflamed to desire quicker than before: and when this takes place continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before, unless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on it which will increase it: at first keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day; now every second day; then every third, then every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. I have not been vexed to—day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months; but I took care when some exciting things happened. Be assured that you are in a good way. To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is her husband; for he who says this says, Happy is her adulterer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind; the woman present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side. I stroke my head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is called the master sophism. And if even the woman is willing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is named the Liar, and the Quiescent. Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud; not for proposing the master sophism. How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says, Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his beauty: consider what a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself; what an Olympian victory; in what number he stood from Hercules; so that, by the Gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not these sorry boxers and pancratiasts, nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing these objects on the other side you will conquer the appearance: you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little: let me see who you are, and what you are about: let me put you to the test. And then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more. This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried way. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from perturbation. Remember God: call on him as a helper and protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscur in a storm. For what is a greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent and drive away the reason? For the storm itself, what else is it but an appearance? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm and serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true, With constant ills the dilatory strives.
2.20.20. THE propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contradict them: and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say: Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? Men, agree with us that no man agrees with another: believe us that no man believes anybody. Thus Epicurus also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational animals; believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons. —What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore. And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing; in order that all things may be secured for you? Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines? What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, and compelled him to write what he did write? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and complaining? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and invincible is man’s nature, For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man’s desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth? What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations?—I have, and I am thankful.—Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers.—Well done, philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae died from these opinions; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city? Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. of whom? of gods who do not exist: and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture. Man what are you doing? are you refuting yourself every day; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath, I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley-drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, mister: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow—slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them. Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto; not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co—operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that?— Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils. This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you? When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight. (Diog. Laert. vii. 163. Upton.)
3.23.37. FIRST say to yourself Who you wish to be: then do accordingly what you are doing; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, rubbing, and exercise: if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different; if he is a Pentathlete, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things: if a worker in metal, such things. For every thing that we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose; and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person’s mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you: take care first of all that you are not doing this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? Immediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of praise from the many? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geometrician. Do you then wish to be useful? in what? tell us that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received something useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any thing useful in the carpenter’s art, unless he is a carpenter; nor in the shoemaker’s art, unless he is a shoemaker. Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. Well; do we fulfill their promise? Tell me the truth; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs? Excellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a certain person contrary to your opinion? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons?—I hope not—Why then did you praise and flatter him? He is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses— How is this?—He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think? do not these very people secretly despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says except this, This man has some need of me? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown? Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading; has he become more modest? has he been turned to reflect on himself? has he perceived in what a bad state he is? has he cast away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him? He does. A man who will teach him to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect art, much better than Dion. This is altogether another thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations? and even if he did say it, I should say to him, Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, and then speak. You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others?—To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is nothing; suppose that there were a thousand—Dion never had so many hearers—How could he?—And they understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can move even a stone—See, these are the words of a philosopher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to others; here is a man who has listened to discourses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. I have often wondered by what arguments. Not so, but by what argument : this is more exact than that— What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending to such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words: Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me: and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best. Hence who ever heard Socrates say, I know something and I teach; but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him; and he would take them and recommend them.—Not so; but as he accompanied them he would say, Hear me to-day discoursing in the house of Quadratus. Why should I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what good will it do you?—But only praise me.—What do you mean by praising?—Say to me, admirable, wonderful.—Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name ( κατηγορία ) of good, what have I to praise in you? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.—What then? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure?— I hope not. For my part I do not listen even to a luteplayer without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear what Socrates says, Nor would it be seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you. Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or to speak, and while he is reading to say, There are not many who can do these things, I swear by all that you value. Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit? What physician invites a man to be treated by him? Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. I invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of invitation: and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say: If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose. Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man’s faults. The philosopher’s school, ye men, is a surgery: you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter: one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a head ache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their parents and their friends and kinsmen and property, that they may say to you, Wonderful! when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or Cleanthes? What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who denies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display? What is the hortatory style? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation that when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reaching or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well: I must no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person? He spoke finely about Xerxes; and another says, No, but about the battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher?''. None |
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22. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 10.14-10.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 93; Wilson (2022) 171
10.14. Διόπερ, ἀγαπητοί μου, φεύγετε ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας. 10.15. ὡς φρονίμοις λέγω· κρίνατε ὑμεῖς ὅ φημι. 10.16. Τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ χριστοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ ἐστίν; 10.17. ὅτι εἷς ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· 10.18. οὐχ οἱ ἐσθίοντες τὰς θυσίας κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εἰσίν; 10.19. τί οὖν φημί; ὅτι εἰδωλόθυτόν τί ἐστιν, ἢ ὅτι εἴδωλόν τί ἐστιν; 10.20. ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἃ θύουσιν τὰ ἔθνη,δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ θύουσιν,οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κοινωνοὺς τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι.''. None | 10.14. Therefore, my beloved, flee fromidolatry. 10.15. I speak as to wise men. Judge what I say.' "10.16. Thecup of blessing which we bless, isn't it a communion of the blood ofChrist? The bread which we break, isn't it a communion of the body ofChrist?" '10.17. Because we, who are many, are one bread, one body; forwe all partake of the one bread.' "10.18. Consider Israel after theflesh. Don't those who eat the sacrifices have communion with the altar?" '10.19. What am I saying then? That a thing sacrificed to idols isanything, or that an idol is anything?' "10.20. But I say that thethings which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and notto God, and I don't desire that you would have communion with demons."'. None |
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23. New Testament, 1 Timothy, 6.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 509; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 171
6.10. ῥίζα γὰρ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ φιλαργυρία, ἧς τινὲς ὀρεγόμενοι ἀπεπλανήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἑαυτοὺς περιέπειραν ὀδύναις πολλαῖς.''. None | 6.10. For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil. Some have been led astray from the faith in their greed, and have pierced themselves through with many sorrows. ''. None |
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24. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.16, 41.2, 42.1, 78.16, 87.31, 94.48, 115.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, Eur. Medea • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Not suited to children • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on the rarity of the sage • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Ends • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Justice • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Oikeiōsis • related fabulously about, Chrysippus on the
Found in books: Agri (2022) 9, 21; Brouwer (2013) 164; Del Lucchese (2019) 208; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 21, 221; Frey and Levison (2014) 51; Graver (2007) 246, 247, 250; Gunderson (2022) 3; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 217; Linjamaa (2019) 103; Long (2006) 270, 358; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 169; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 98; Sorabji (2000) 52, 107, 153, 252; Álvarez (2019) 41
| 9.16. People may say: "But what sort of existence will the wise man have, if he be left friendless when thrown into prison, or when stranded in some foreign nation, or when delayed on a long voyage, or when cast upon a lonely shore?" His life will be like that of Jupiter, who, amid the dissolution of the world, when the gods are confounded together and Nature rests for a space from her work, can retire into himself and give himself over to his own thoughts.10 In some such way as this the sage will act; he will retreat into himself, and live with himself.
41.2. This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God. Can one rise superior to fortune unless God helps him to rise? He it is that gives noble and upright counsel. In each good man A god doth dwell, but what god know we not.1
42.1. Has that friend of yours already made you believe that he is a good man? And yet it is impossible in so short a time for one either to become good or be known as such.1 Do you know what kind of man I now mean when I speak of "a good man"? I mean one of the second grade, like your friend. For one of the first class perhaps springs into existence, like the phoenix, only once in five hundred years. And it is not surprising, either, that greatness develops only at long intervals; Fortune often brings into being commonplace powers, which are born to please the mob; but she holds up for our approval that which is extraordinary by the very fact that she makes it rare.
87.31. I think that the reasoning of Posidonius is better: he holds that riches are a cause of evil, not because, of themselves, they do any evil, but because they goad men on so that they are ready to do evil. For the efficient cause, which necessarily produces harm at once, is one thing, and the antecedent cause is another. It is this antecedent cause which inheres in riches; they puff up the spirit and beget pride, they bring on unpopularity and unsettle the mind to such an extent that the mere reputation of having wealth, though it is bound to harm us, nevertheless affords delight.
94.48. Although a man hear what limit he should observe in sacrifice, and how far he should recoil from burdensome superstitions, he will never make sufficient progress until he has conceived a right idea of God, – regarding Him as one who possesses all things, and allots all things, and bestows them without price. '
94.48. It is said: "Philosophy is divided into knowledge and state of mind. For one who has learned and understood what he should do and avoid,23 is not a wise man until his mind is metamorphosed into the shape of that which he has learned. This third department – that of precept – is compounded from both the others, from dogmas of philosophy and state of mind. Hence it is superfluous as far as the perfecting of virtue is concerned; the other two parts are enough for the purpose." '. None |
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25. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, on moral development • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus
Found in books: Graver (2007) 253; Sorabji (2000) 53
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26. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus
Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 103; Sorabji (2000) 52
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27. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Judgement distinguished from appearance as involving assent • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, on involuntary feelings • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Third movements accommodate Zeno's disobedience to reason as a stage in anger distinct from Chrysippus' mistaken judgement of reason • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus
Found in books: Graver (2007) 233, 237; Linjamaa (2019) 63; Sorabji (2000) 41, 45, 50, 63
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28. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 100; Inwood and Warren (2020) 122; Long (2006) 123, 267, 269; Long (2019) 78, 79, 80
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29. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On Gods • Chrysippus, On Lives • Chrysippus, On Nature • Chrysippus, On the Principles of Syllogisms, in one book • Chrysippus, On the Use of Reason • Chrysippus, Physical Theses • Chrysippus, on fate • Chrysippus, on initiation • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on the order of the parts of philosophy • Chrysippus, sagehood of • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Ends • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Justice • Posidonius preferred image, according to Chrysippus • fate (heimarmenē, Lat., fatum) , Chrysippus on • related fabulously about, of Chrysippus
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 24, 31, 65, 130, 134; Frede and Laks (2001) 106, 109, 120, 202; Graver (2007) 250; Harte (2017) 227; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 122; Joosse (2021) 61; Long (2006) 115, 123, 268; Long (2019) 77, 78, 80; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 176; Osborne (2001) 36; Tsouni (2019) 82, 185; Álvarez (2019) 37, 38
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30. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus,
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 207; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 149; Álvarez (2019) 41
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31. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Harte (2017) 231; Inwood and Warren (2020) 115, 117, 126; Vazques and Ross (2022) 10
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32. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on drunkenness • Chrysippus, on the order of the parts of philosophy • Posidonius preferred image, according to Chrysippus
Found in books: Bett (2019) 60; Brouwer (2013) 23; Graver (2007) 240; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91
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33. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on complex mental processes • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, on impressions • Chrysippus, on parts of psyche • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Inconsistency • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche • Chrysippus, uses examples from literature
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 77, 78, 79; Graver (2007) 25, 226, 234
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34. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Physical Questions
Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 50; Inwood and Warren (2020) 137
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35. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Gunderson (2022) 3; Linjamaa (2019) 134, 135
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36. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On Tenors • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Akrasia • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Appetite is judgement that there is future benefit and it is appropriate to reach for it • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), But Chrysippus taken to favour akratic account of emotion as well • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Concentrates therapy on second judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Distress and pleasure as involving, but not being (pace Zeno), contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Even disowned tears correspond to one of two conflicting appearances • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), False judgement distinguished from Zeno's disobedient or akratic judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Fear is judgement that there is future harm and it is appropriate to avoid it • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Impulse is a judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), In pleasure and distress the harm or benefit is present, in appetite and fear future • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Instead of being divided, it oscillates (ptoia) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast Zeno) • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Natural tendency to virtue overlooks irrational tendencies in soul • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Not suited to children • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Pleasure is judgement that there is present benefit and it is appropriate to feel expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Rejects Plato's tripartition of soul, in favour of unitary rational command centre • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Roles of the second judgement, easier to cure • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Roles of the second judgement, explains why distress is misguided even when first judgement is correct, that one's lack of virtue is an evil • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Second judgement is impulse (hormē) construed as a judgement about how it is appropriate (kathēkein) to react • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Tears, if not assented to, could illustrate idea of first movements, but Chrysippus does not make use of this • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), The second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Though some inconsistency alleged re division • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Will is here frustrated • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), With two judgements • Chrysippus, conflates pathos with nosema • Chrysippus, on complex mental processes • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, on drunkenness • Chrysippus, on insanity • Chrysippus, on involuntary feelings • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on overwhelming emotions • Chrysippus, on parts of psyche • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Erotic Love • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Inconsistency • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Lives • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche • Chrysippus, uses examples from literature • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Eupatheiai, equanimous states, Not yet introduced by Chrysippus? • First movements, Expounded by Seneca, perhaps earlier by Cicero, but examples in Aristotle and (possibly) Chrysippus not yet recognized as such • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Complains of contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Instead of appealing to freshness, Chrysippus could more consistently have said time removes the judgement (associated with fear) that the evil is intolerable • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius • Impulse (hormē), Impulse in adult humans is assent or judgement for Chrysippus and Seneca • Posidonius, Stoic, Contradictions in Chrysippus' account of emotion • Posidonius, Stoic, The lower capacities of soul, wrongly ignored in Chrysippus' unitary conception of soul, explain why philosophy and good example do not on their own produce good character • Posidonius, Stoic, Zeno's and Chrysippus' call for freshness of judgement does not explain fading of emotion • Seneca, the Younger, Stoic, Third movements accommodate Zeno's disobedience to reason as a stage in anger distinct from Chrysippus' mistaken judgement of reason • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Parts vs. capacities • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus
Found in books: Agri (2022) 15, 176; Brouwer (2013) 75; Frey and Levison (2014) 46, 54; Graver (2007) 67, 68, 119, 154, 155, 226, 228, 233, 234, 235, 237, 240, 241, 247, 252, 253; Inwood and Warren (2020) 49, 50, 54, 56, 115, 154, 158, 159, 162, 163, 166; Levison (2009) 293; Sorabji (2000) 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 106, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 121, 122, 128, 136, 175, 257, 258
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37. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Hence emotion voluntary • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius
Found in books: Agri (2022) 16; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 61; Del Lucchese (2019) 193, 216; Graver (2007) 233; Howley (2018) 41; Inwood and Warren (2020) 131; Linjamaa (2019) 136; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 175; Osborne (2001) 36; Sorabji (2000) 45, 107; Williams and Vol (2022) 269
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38. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Oikeiōsis
Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 42; Graver (2007) 23, 226; Sorabji (2000) 251
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39. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, Physical Questions
Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014) 50; Álvarez (2019) 41
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40. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.120, 4.26, 4.61, 5.2, 5.31, 6.46, 7.1-7.34, 7.36, 7.38-7.41, 7.63, 7.66, 7.68, 7.71, 7.75, 7.83, 7.85, 7.87-7.89, 7.92, 7.96, 7.98, 7.101, 7.103, 7.110-7.111, 7.113, 7.116, 7.119-7.123, 7.127-7.129, 7.134-7.140, 7.142-7.144, 7.147-7.157, 7.160-7.167, 7.174, 7.180, 7.183-7.184, 7.187, 7.195, 10.6-10.7, 10.119 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Antipater of Tarsus, On the Differences Between Cleanthes and Chrysippus • Chrysippus • Chrysippus of Soli • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, Demonstrations for the doctrine that the Sage Will not Hold Opinions • Chrysippus, Eur. Medea • Chrysippus, On Emotions • Chrysippus, On Ends • Chrysippus, On Ends (Peri Telōn) • Chrysippus, On Fate • Chrysippus, On Gods • Chrysippus, On Law • Chrysippus, On Lives • Chrysippus, On Nature • Chrysippus, On Tenors • Chrysippus, On the Fact that Zeno Used Terms in Their Proper Significations • Chrysippus, On the Principles of Syllogisms, in one book • Chrysippus, Stoic • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Distress and pleasure as involving, but not being (pace Zeno), contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Four generic emotions, pleasure, distress, appetite, fear • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Impulse is a judgement • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), In pleasure and distress the harm or benefit is present, in appetite and fear future • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Not suited to children • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction • Chrysippus, conflates pathos with nosema • Chrysippus, on Zenos non-Greek background • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, on emotions as judgments • Chrysippus, on equality of all mistches • Chrysippus, on expertise • Chrysippus, on human and divine matters • Chrysippus, on initiation • Chrysippus, on loss of virtue • Chrysippus, on moral development • Chrysippus, on philosophy • Chrysippus, on self-sufficiency • Chrysippus, on the end • Chrysippus, on the etymology of moira • Chrysippus, on the order of the parts of philosophy • Chrysippus, on traits of character • Chrysippus, sagehood of • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Emotions • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Ends • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Erotic Love • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Justice • Chrysippus, treatises of, On Lives • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Law • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche • Chrysippus, uses examples from literature • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Galen, Platonizing ecletic doctor, Reliability as source for Chrysippus and Posidonius • Impulse (hormē), Impulse in adult humans is assent or judgement for Chrysippus and Seneca • Musonius some level of equality required, Communal partners in Plato, Zeno, Chrysippus • Posidonius preferred image, according to Chrysippus • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Better kind not an emotion, but educative epibolē • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Marriage and procreation advocated • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Wise man will fall in love • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • end (telos), Chrysippus on • equality of all mistakes, doctrine held by Chrysippus • expertise (technē), Chrysippus on • human and divine matters, Chrysippus on • philosophy (philosophia), Chrysippus on • portion (moira), Chrysippus on the etymology of • related fabulously about, of Chrysippus • wisdom (sophia), Chrysippus on
Found in books: Agri (2022) 9, 16, 17, 114; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 609, 611, 613; Brouwer (2013) 13, 23, 27, 28, 31, 40, 42, 46, 60, 61, 65, 70, 75, 134, 140, 141, 161, 162; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 33, 52, 75; Bryan (2018) 243, 247, 251; Del Lucchese (2019) 207; Erler et al (2021) 48, 156; Esler (2000) 64; Farrell (2021) 78; Frede and Laks (2001) 120, 121; Gazis and Hooper (2021) 173; Geljon and Runia (2013) 156, 228, 229; Geljon and Runia (2019) 256, 263, 291, 296; Gordon (2012) 35; Graver (2007) 39, 115, 141, 154, 225, 226, 233, 244, 246, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254; Harte (2017) 229; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 137, 152, 157, 159, 192; James (2021) 31, 33, 80; König (2012) 239; Levison (2009) 138, 139, 140, 147; Long (2006) 10, 97, 106, 126, 260, 268, 346, 352; Long (2019) 78, 82, 83, 153; Malherbe et al (2014) 619, 621; Martens (2003) 19; Maso (2022) 116, 142; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 14, 91, 98, 100, 149; Rohland (2022) 66; Sorabji (2000) 34, 35, 44, 48, 49, 51, 64, 97, 107, 136, 274, 281, 283; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231; Tsouni (2019) 80, 82, 185; Wardy and Warren (2018) 243, 247, 250, 251, 303; Wilson (2022) 31, 45; Yona (2018) 87; Zanker (1996) 127; Álvarez (2019) 40
| 2.120. Nine dialogues of his are extant written in frigid style, Moschus, Aristippus or Callias, Ptolemy, Chaerecrates, Metrocles, Anaximenes, Epigenes, To his Daughter, Aristotle. Heraclides relates that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, was one of Stilpo's pupils; Hermippus that Stilpo died at a great age after taking wine to hasten his end.I have written an epitaph on him also:Surely you know Stilpo the Megarian; old age and then disease laid him low, a formidable pair. But he found in wine a charioteer too strong for that evil team; he quaffed it eagerly and was borne along.He was also ridiculed by Sophilus the Comic poet in his drama The Wedding:What Charinus says is just Stilpo's stoppers." '
4.26. Crantor admired Homer and Euripides above all other poets; it is hard, he said, at once to write tragedy and to stir the emotions in the language of everyday life. And he would quote the line from the story of Bellerophon:Alas! But why Alas? We have suffered the lot of mortals.And it is said that there are extant these lines of the poet Antagoras, spoken by Crantor on Love:My mind is in doubt, since thy birth is disputed, whether I am to call thee, Love, the first of the immortal gods, the eldest of all the children whom old Erebus and queenly Night brought to birth in the depths beneath wide Ocean;
4.61. He assumed the headship of the school in the fourth year of the 134th Olympiad, and at his death he had been head for twenty-six years. His end was a palsy brought on by drinking too freely. And here is a quip of my own upon the fact:of thee too, O Lacydes, I have heard a tale, that Bacchus seized thee and dragged thee on tip-toe to the underworld. Nay, was it not clear that when the wine-god comes in force into the frame, he loosens our limbs? Perhaps this is why he gets his name of the Loosener.
5.2. He seceded from the Academy while Plato was still alive. Hence the remark attributed to the latter: Aristotle spurns me, as colts kick out at the mother who bore them. Hermippus in his Lives mentions that he was absent as Athenian envoy at the court of Philip when Xenocrates became head of the Academy, and that on his return, when he saw the school under a new head, he made choice of a public walk in the Lyceum where he would walk up and down discussing philosophy with his pupils until it was time to rub themselves with oil. Hence the name Peripatetic. But others say that it was given to him because, when Alexander was recovering from an illness and taking daily walks, Aristotle joined him and talked with him on certain matters.' "
5.31. He held that the virtues are not mutually interdependent. For a man might be prudent, or again just, and at the same time profligate and unable to control his passions. He said too that the wise man was not exempt from all passions, but indulged them in moderation.He defined friendship as an equality of reciprocal good-will, including under the term as one species the friendship of kinsmen, as another that of lovers, and as a third that of host and guest. The end of love was not merely intercourse but also philosophy. According to him the wise man would fall in love and take part in politics; furthermore he would marry and reside at a king's court. of three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the pleasure-loving life, he gave the preference to the contemplative. He held that the studies which make up the ordinary education are of service for the attainment of virtue." "
6.46. Being short of money, he told his friends that he applied to them not for alms, but for repayment of his due. When behaving indecently in the marketplace, he wished it were as easy to relieve hunger by rubbing an empty stomach. Seeing a youth starting off to dine with satraps, he dragged him off, took him to his friends and bade them keep strict watch over him. When a youth effeminately attired put a question to him, he declined to answer unless he pulled up his robe and showed whether he was man or woman. A youth was playing cottabos in the baths. Diogenes said to him, The better you play, the worse it is for you. At a feast certain people kept throwing all the bones to him as they would have done to a dog. Thereupon he played a dog's trick and drenched them." '
7.1. BOOK 7: 1. ZENOZeno, the son of Mnaseas (or Demeas), was a native of Citium in Cyprus, a Greek city which had received Phoenician settlers. He had a wry neck, says Timotheus of Athens in his book On Lives. Moreover, Apollonius of Tyre says he was lean, fairly tall, and swarthy – hence some one called him an Egyptian vine-branch, according to Chrysippus in the first book of his Proverbs. He had thick legs; he was flabby and delicate. Hence Persaeus in his Convivial Reminiscences relates that he declined most invitations to dinner. They say he was fond of eating green figs and of basking in the sun.' "7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty." "7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you." "7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates." '7.5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the Stoa Poikile, which is also called the stoa or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy, the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous. 7.6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city, and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms:' "7.7. King Antigonus to Zeno the philosopher, greeting.While in fortune and fame I deem myself your superior, in reason and education I own myself inferior, as well as in the perfect happiness which you have attained. Wherefore I have decided to ask you to pay me a visit, being persuaded that you will not refuse the request. By all means, then, do your best to hold conference with me, understanding clearly that you will not be the instructor of myself alone but of all the Macedonians taken together. For it is obvious that whoever instructs the ruler of Macedonia and guides him in the paths of virtue will also be training his subjects to be good men. As is the ruler, such for the most part it may be expected that his subjects will become.And Zeno's reply is as follows:" '7.8. Zeno to King Antigonus, greeting.I welcome your love of learning in so far as you cleave to that true education which tends to advantage and not to that popular counterfeit of it which serves only to corrupt morals. But if anyone has yearned for philosophy, turning away from much-vaunted pleasure which renders effeminate the souls of some of the young, it is evident that not by nature only, but also by the bent of his will he is inclined to nobility of character. But if a noble nature be aided by moderate exercise and further receive ungrudging instruction, it easily comes to acquire virtue in perfection. 7.9. But I am constrained by bodily weakness, due to old age, for I am eighty years old; and for that reason I am unable to join you. But I send you certain companions of my studies whose mental powers are not inferior to mine, while their bodily strength is far greater, and if you associate with these you will in no way fall short of the conditions necessary to perfect happiness.So he sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; and Epicurus in his letter to his brother Aristobulus mentions them both as living with Antigonus. I have thought it well to append the decree also which the Athenians passed concerning him. It reads as follows:
7.10. In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth prytany of the tribe Acamantis on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, at the twenty-third plenary assembly of the prytany, one of the presidents, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the deme Xypetaeon, and his co-presidents put the question to the vote; Thraso, the son of Thraso of the deme Anacaea, moved:Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in all other respects, exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth who come to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching, it has seemed good to the people –
7.11. and may it turn out well – to bestow praise upon Zeno of Citium, the son of Mnaseas, and to crown him with a golden crown according to the law, for his goodness and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus at the public cost. And that for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb, the people shall now elect five commissioners from all Athenians, and the Secretary of State shall inscribe this decree on two stone pillars and it shall be lawful for him to set up one in the Academy and the other in the Lyceum. And that the magistrate presiding over the administration shall apportion the expense incurred upon the pillars, that all may know that the Athenian people honour the good both in their life and after their death.
7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates.
7.13. It is said that he had more than a thousand talents when he came to Greece, and that he lent this money on bottomry. He used to eat little loaves and honey and to drink a little wine of good bouquet. He rarely employed men-servants; once or twice indeed he might have a young girl to wait on him in order not to seem a misogynist. He shared the same house with Persaeus, and when the latter brought in a little flute-player he lost no time in leading her straight to Persaeus. They tell us he readily adapted himself to circumstances, so much so that King Antigonus often broke in on him with a noisy party, and once took him along with other revellers to Aristocles the musician; Zeno, however, in a little while gave them the slip.
7.14. He disliked, they say, to be brought too near to people, so that he would take the end seat of a couch, thus saving himself at any rate from one half of such inconvenience. Nor indeed would he walk about with more than two or three. He would occasionally ask the bystanders for coppers, in order that, for fear of being asked to give, people might desist from mobbing him, as Cleanthes says in his work On Bronze. When several persons stood about him in the Colonnade he pointed to the wooden railing at the top round the altar and said, This was once open to all, but because it was found to be a hindrance it was railed off. If you then will take yourselves off out of the way you will be the less annoyance to us.When Demochares, the son of Laches, greeted him and told him he had only to speak or write for anything he wanted to Antigonus, who would be sure to grant all his requests, Zeno after hearing this would have nothing more to do with him.' "
7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo." "
7.16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countece. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off." "
7.17. When he was slowly picking his way across a watercourse, With good reason, quoth Zeno, he looks askance at the mud, for he can't see his face in it. When a certain Cynic declared he had no oil in his flask and begged some of him, Zeno refused to give him any. However, as the man went away, Zeno bade him consider which of the two was the more impudent. Being enamoured of Chremonides, as he and Cleanthes were sitting beside the youth, he got up, and upon Cleanthes expressing surprise, Good physicians tell us, said he, that the best cure for inflammation is repose. When of two reclining next to each other over the wine, the one who was neighbour to Zeno kicked the guest below him, Zeno himself nudged the man with his knee, and upon the man turning round, inquired, How do you think your neighbour liked what you did to him?" '
7.18. To a lover of boys he remarked, Just as schoolmasters lose their common-sense by spending all their time with boys, so it is with people like you. He used to say that the very exact expressions used by those who avoided solecisms were like the coins struck by Alexander: they were beautiful in appearance and well-rounded like the coins, but none the better on that account. Words of the opposite kind he would compare to the Attic tetradrachms, which, though struck carelessly and inartistically, nevertheless outweighed the ornate phrases. When his pupil Ariston discoursed at length in an uninspired manner, sometimes in a headstrong and over-confident way. Your father, said he, must have been drunk when he begat you. Hence he would call him a chatterbox, being himself concise in speech.' "
7.19. There was a gourmand so greedy that he left nothing for his table companions. A large fish having been served, Zeno took it up as if he were about to eat the whole. When the other looked at him, What do you suppose, said he, those who live with you feel every day, if you cannot put up with my gourmandise in this single instance? A youth was putting a question with more curiosity than became his years, whereupon Zeno led him to a mirror, and bade him look in it; after which he inquired if he thought it became anyone who looked like that to ask such questions. Some one said that he did not in general agree with Antisthenes, whereupon Zeno produced that author's essay on Sophocles, and asked him if he thought it had any excellence; to which the reply was that he did not know. Then are you not ashamed, quoth he, to pick out and mention anything wrong said by Antisthenes, while you suppress his good things without giving them a thought?" '7.20. Some one having said that he thought the chain-arguments of the philosophers seemed brief and curt, Zeno replied, You are quite right; indeed, the very syllables ought, if possible, to be clipped. Some one remarked to him about Polemo, that his discourse was different from the subject he announced. He replied with a frown, Well, what value would you have set upon what was given out? He said that when conversing we ought to be earnest and, like actors, we should have a loud voice and great strength; but we ought not to open the mouth too wide, which is what your senseless chatterbox does. Telling periods, he said, unlike the works of good craftsmen, should need no pause for the contemplation of their excellences; on the contrary, the hearer should be so absorbed in the discourse itself as to have no leisure even to take notes. 7.21. Once when a young man was talking a good deal, he said, Your ears have slid down and merged in your tongue. To the fair youth, who gave it as his opinion that the wise man would not fall in love, his reply was: Then who can be more hapless than you fair youths? He used to say that even of philosophers the greater number were in most things unwise, while about small and casual things they were quite ignorant. And he used to cite the saying of Caphisius, who, when one of his pupils was endeavouring to blow the flute lustily, gave him a slap and told him that to play well does not depend on loudness, though playing loudly may follow upon playing well. And to a youth who was talking somewhat saucily his rejoinder was, I would rather not tell you what I am thinking, my lad. 7.22. A Rhodian, who was handsome and rich, but nothing more, insisted on joining his class; but so unwelcome was this pupil, that first of all Zeno made him sit on the benches that were dusty, that he might soil his cloak, and then he consigned him to the place where the beggars sat, that he might rub shoulders with their rags; so at last the young man went away. Nothing, he declared, was more unbecoming than arrogance, especially in the young. He used also to say that it was not the words and expressions that we ought to remember, but we should exercise our mind in disposing to advantage of what we hear, instead of, as it were, tasting a well-cooked dish or well-dressed meal. The young, he thought, should behave with perfect propriety in walk, gait and dress, and he used continually to quote the lines of Euripides about Capaneus:Large means had he, yet not the haughtinessThat springs from wealth, nor cherished prouder thoughtsof vain ambition than the poorest man. 7.23. Again he would say that if we want to master the sciences there is nothing so fatal as conceit, and again there is nothing we stand so much in need of as time. To the question Who is a friend? his answer was, A second self (alter ego). We are told that he was once chastising a slave for stealing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, Yes, and to be beaten too, said Zeno. Beauty he called the flower of chastity, while according to others it was chastity which he called the flower of beauty. Once when he saw the slave of one of his acquaintance marked with weals, I see, said he, the imprints of your anger. To one who had been drenched with unguent, Who is this, quoth he, who smells of woman? When Dionysius the Renegade asked, Why am I the only pupil you do not correct? the reply was, Because I mistrust you. To a stripling who was talking nonsense his words were, The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more and talk the less. 7.24. One day at a banquet he was reclining in silence and was asked the reason: whereupon he bade his critic carry word to the king that there was one present who knew how to hold his tongue. Now those who inquired of him were ambassadors from King Ptolemy, and they wanted to know what message they should take back from him to the king. On being asked how he felt about abuse, he replied, As an envoy feels who is dismissed without an answer. Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said, The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo.' "7.25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up. A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as The Reaper, and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod's lines thus:He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself." '7.26. The reason he gave for this was that the man capable of giving a proper hearing to what is said and profiting by it was superior to him who discovers everything himself. For the one had merely a right apprehension, the other in obeying good counsel superadded conduct.When he was asked why he, though so austere, relaxed at a drinking-party, he said, Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked become sweet. Hecato too in the second book of his Anecdotes says that he indulged freely at such gatherings. And he would say, Better to trip with the feet than with the tongue. Well-being is attained by little and little, and nevertheless it is no little thing itself. Others attribute this to Socrates.' "7.27. He showed the utmost endurance, and the greatest frugality; the food he used required no fire to dress, and the cloak he wore was thin. Hence it was said of him:The cold of winter and the ceaseless rainCome powerless against him: weak the dartof the fierce summer sun or racking painTo bend that iron frame. He stands apartUnspoiled by public feast and jollity:Patient, unwearied night and day doth heCling to his studies of philosophy.Nay more: the comic poets by their very jests at his expense praised him without intending it. Thus Philemon says in a play, Philosophers:This man adopts a new philosophy.He teaches to go hungry: yet he getsDisciples. One sole loaf of bread his food;His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.Others attribute these lines to Poseidippus.By this time he had almost become a proverb. At all events, More temperate than Zeno the philosopher was a current saying about him. Poseidippus also writes in his Men Transported:So that for ten whole daysMore temperate than Zeno's self he seemed." '7.28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?and died on the spot through holding his breath. 7.29. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus and honoured him in the decrees already cited above, adding their testimony of his goodness. Here is the epitaph composed for him by Antipater of Sidon:Here lies great Zeno, dear to Citium, who scaled high Olympus, though he piled not Pelion on Ossa, nor toiled at the labours of Heracles, but this was the path he found out to the stars – the way of temperance alone.' "7.30. Here too is another by Zenodotus the Stoic, a pupil of Diogenes:Thou madest self-sufficiency thy rule,Eschewing haughty wealth, O godlike Zeno,With aspect grave and hoary brow serene.A manly doctrine thine: and by thy prudenceWith much toil thou didst found a great new school,Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.And if thy native country was Phoenicia,What need to slight thee? came not Cadmus thence,Who gave to Greece her books and art of writing?And Athenaeus the epigrammatist speaks of all the Stoics in common as follows:O ye who've learnt the doctrines of the StoaAnd have committed to your books divineThe best of human learning, teaching menThat the mind's virtue is the only good!She only it is who keeps the lives of menAnd cities, – safer than high gates and walls.But those who place their happiness in pleasureAre led by the least worthy of the Muses." "7.31. We have ourselves mentioned the manner of Zeno's death in the Pammetros (a collection of poems in various metres):The story goes that Zeno of Citium after enduring many hardships by reason of old age was set free, some say by ceasing to take food; others say that once when he had tripped he beat with his hand upon the earth and cried, I come of my own accord; why then call me?For there are some who hold this to have been the manner of his death.So much then concerning his death.Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on Men of the Same Name, says of him: his father, Mnaseas, being a merchant often went to Athens and brought away many books about Socrates for Zeno while still a boy." '7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.34. That the Republic is the work of Zeno is attested by Chrysippus in his De Republica. And he discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled The Art of Love. Moreover, he writes much the same in his Interludes. So much for the criticisms to be found not only in Cassius but in Isidorus of Pergamum, the rhetorician. Isidorus likewise affirms that the passages disapproved by the school were expunged from his works by Athenodorus the Stoic, who was in charge of the Pergamene library; and that afterwards, when Athenodorus was detected and compromised, they were replaced. So much concerning the passages in his writings which are regarded as spurious.' "
7.36. of the many disciples of Zeno the following are the most famous: Persaeus, son of Demetrius, of Citium, whom some call a pupil and others one of the household, one of those sent him by Antigonus to act as secretary; he had been tutor to Antigonus's son Halcyoneus. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy, and as his countece fell, Do you see, said he, that wealth is not a matter of indifference?The following works are by Persaeus:of Kingship.The Spartan Constitution.of Marriage.of Impiety.Thyestes.of Love.Exhortations.Interludes.Four books of Anecdotes.Memorabilia.A Reply to Plato's Laws in seven books." '
7.38. And furthermore the following according to Hippobotus were pupils of Zeno: Philonides of Thebes; Callippus of Corinth; Posidonius of Alexandria; Athenodorus of Soli; and Zeno of Sidon.I have decided to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zeno because he was the founder of the School. I have already given a list of his numerous writings, in which he has spoken as has no other of the Stoics. And his tenets in general are as follows. In accordance with my usual practice a summary statement must suffice. 7.39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.
7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.
7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place.
7.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as It is day. Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions.
7.71. of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction If. Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, If it is day, it is light. An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction Since and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, Since it is day-time, it is light. This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact.' "
7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking." '
7.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic.' "
7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it." '
7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse.
7.92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom.Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice . . .;
7.96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy.Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high-spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends.' "
7.98. of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one's children or in one's old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise." '
7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent).
7.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.
7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.' "
7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." '
7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty.
7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.
7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.
7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct.
7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same;' "
7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified." "
7.123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon's mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action." '
7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
7.128. For if magimity by itself alone can raise us far above everything, and if magimity is but a part of virtue, then too virtue as a whole will be sufficient in itself for well-being – despising all things that seem troublesome. Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.Another tenet of theirs is the perpetual exercise of virtue, as held by Cleanthes and his followers. For virtue can never be lost, and the good man is always exercising his mind, which is perfect. Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by convention: so Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful.
7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics.
7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form.
7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names.
7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.
7.137. The four elements together constitute unqualified substance or matter. Fire is the hot element, water the moist, air the cold, earth the dry. Not but what the quality of dryness is also found in the air. Fire has the uppermost place; it is also called aether, and in it the sphere of the fixed stars is first created; then comes the sphere of the planets, next to that the air, then the water, and lowest of all the earth, which is at the centre of all things.The term universe or cosmos is used by them in three senses: (1) of God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement, who at stated periods of time absorbs into himself the whole of substance and again creates it from himself. (2)
7.138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena, a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods, book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less.
7.139. For through some parts it passes as a hold or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion.
7.140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii. But these, it is added i.e. sympathy and tension, are likewise bodies.
7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius.
7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite.
7.144. of the stars some are fixed, and are carried round with the whole heaven; others, the wandering stars or planets, have their special motions. The sun travels in an oblique path through the zodiac. Similarly the moon travels in a spiral path. The sun is pure fire: so Posidonius in the seventh book of his Celestial Phenomena. And it is larger than the earth, as the same author says in the sixth book of his Physical Discourse. Moreover it is spherical in shape like the world itself according to this same author and his school. That it is fire is proved by its producing all the effects of fire; that it is larger than the earth by the fact that all the earth is illuminated by it; nay more, the heaven beside. The fact too that the earth casts a conical shadow proves that the sun is greater than it. And it is because of its great size that it is seen from every part of the earth.
7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.
7.148. The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in his first book of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title. Again, Antipater in the seventh book of his work On the Cosmos says that the substance of God is akin to air, while Boethus in his work On Nature speaks of the sphere of the fixed stars as the substance of God. Now the term Nature is used by them to mean sometimes that which holds the world together, sometimes that which causes terrestrial things to spring up. Nature is defined as a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in accordance with seminal principles within definite periods, and effecting results homogeneous with their sources.
7.149. Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione, Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione. But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence.
7.150. The primary matter they make the substratum of all things: so Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno. By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes. Body according to them is substance which is finite: so Antipater in his second book On Substance, and Apollodorus in his Physics. Matter can also be acted upon, as the same author says, for if it were immutable, the things which are produced would never have been produced out of it. Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible ad infinitum. Chrysippus says that the division is not ad infinitum, but itself infinite; for there is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing.' "
7.151. Hence, again, their explanation of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in the third book of his Physics, that they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not merely surround those of the other or lie beside them. Thus, if a little drop of wine be thrown into the sea, it will be equally diffused over the whole sea for a while and then will be blended with it.Also they hold that there are daemons (δαίμονες) who are in sympathy with mankind and watch over human affairs. They believe too in heroes, that is, the souls of the righteous that have survived their bodies.of the changes which go on in the air, they describe winter as the cooling of the air above the earth due to the sun's departure to a distance from the earth; spring as the right temperature of the air consequent upon his approach to us;" "
7.152. ummer as the heating of the air above the earth when he travels to the north; while autumn they attribute to the receding of the sun from us. As for the winds, they are streams of air, differently named according to the localities from which they blow. And the cause of their production is the sun through the evaporation of the clouds. The rainbow is explained as the reflection of the sun's rays from watery clouds or, as Posidonius says in his Meteorology, an image of a segment of the sun or moon in a cloud suffused with dew, which is hollow and visible without intermission, the image showing itself as if in a mirror in the form of a circular arch. Comets, bearded stars, and meteors are fires which arise when dense air is carried up to the region of aether." '
7.153. A shooting star is the sudden kindling of a mass of fire in rapid motion through the air, which leaves a trail behind it presenting an appearance of length. Rain is the transformation of cloud into water, when moisture drawn up by the sun from land or sea has been only partially evaporated. If this is cooled down, it is called hoar-frost. Hail is frozen cloud, crumbled by a wind; while snow is moist matter from a cloud which has congealed: so Posidonius in the eighth book of his Physical Discourse. Lightning is a kindling of clouds from being rubbed together or being rent by wind, as Zeno says in his treatise On the Whole; thunder the noise these clouds make when they rub against each other or burst.
7.154. Thunderbolt is the term used when the fire is violently kindled and hurled to the ground with great force as the clouds grind against each other or are torn by the wind. Others say that it is a compression of fiery air descending with great force. A typhoon is a great and violent thunderstorm whirlwind-like, or a whirlwind of smoke from a cloud that has burst. A prester is a cloud rent all round by the force of fire and wind. Earthquakes, say they, happen when the wind finds its way into, or is imprisoned in, the hollow parts of the earth: so Posidonius in his eighth book; and some of them are tremblings, others openings of the earth, others again lateral displacements, and yet others vertical displacements.
7.155. They maintain that the parts of the world are arranged thus. The earth is in the middle answering to a centre; next comes the water, which is shaped like a sphere all round it, concentric with the earth, so that the earth is in water. After the water comes a spherical layer of air. There are five celestial circles: first, the arctic circle, which is always visible; second, the summer tropic; third, the circle of the equinox; fourth, the winter tropic; and fifth, the antarctic, which is invisible to us. They are called parallel, because they do not incline towards one another; yet they are described round the same centre. The zodiac is an oblique circle, as it crosses the parallel circles.
7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible.
7.157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.
7.160. 2. ARISTONAriston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics.' "
7.161. Dialectical reasonings, he said, are like spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet of no use. He would not admit a plurality of virtues with Zeno, nor again with the Megarians one single virtue called by many names; but he treated virtue in accordance with the category of relative modes. Teaching this sort of philosophy, and lecturing in the Cynosarges, he acquired such influence as to be called the founder of a sect. At any rate Miltiades and Diphilus were denominated Aristoneans. He was a plausible speaker and suited the taste of the general public. Hence Timon's verse about him:One who from wily Ariston's line boasts his descent." "
7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses." "
7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic." '
7.164. The story goes that being bald he had a sunstroke and so came to his end. I have composed a trifling poem upon him in limping iambics as follows:Wherefore, Ariston, when old and bald did you let the sun roast your forehead? Thus seeking warmth more than was reasonable, you lit unwillingly upon the chill reality of Death.There was also another Ariston, a native of Iulis; a third, a musician of Athens; a fourth, a tragic poet; a fifth, of Halae, author of treatises on rhetoric; a sixth, a Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria.
7.165. 3. HERILLUSHerillus of Carthage declared the end of action to be Knowledge, that is, so to live always as to make the scientific life the standard in all things and not to be misled by ignorance. Knowledge he defined as a habit of mind, not to be upset by argument, in the acceptance of presentations. Sometimes he used to say there was no single end of action, but it shifted according to varying circumstances and objects, as the same bronze might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. He made a distinction between end-in-chief and subordinate end: even the unwise may aim at the latter, but only the wise seek the true end of life. Everything that lies between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent. His writings, though they do not occupy much space, are full of vigour and contain some controversial passages in reply to Zeno.
7.166. He is said to have had many admirers when a boy; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he compelled Herillus to have his head shaved, which disgusted them.His books are the following:of Training.of the Passions.Concerning Opinion or Belief.The Legislator.The Obstetrician.The Challenger.The Teacher.The Reviser.The Controller.Hermes.Medea.Dialogues.Ethical Themes.
7.167. 4. DIONYSIUSDionysiusDionysius, the Renegade, declared that pleasure was the end of action; this under the trying circumstance of an attack of ophthalmia. For so violent was his suffering that he could not bring himself to call pain a thing indifferent.He was the son of Theophantus and a native of Heraclea. At first, as Diocles relates, he was a pupil of his fellow-townsman, Heraclides, next of Alexinus and Menedemus, and lastly of Zeno. At the outset of his career he was fond of literature and tried his hand at all kinds of poetry; afterwards he took Aratus for his model, whom he strove to imitate. When he fell away from Zeno, he went over to the Cyrenaics, and used to frequent houses of ill fame and indulge in all other excesses without disguise. After living till he was nearly eighty years of age, he committed suicide by starving himself.The following works are attributed to him:of Apathy, two booksOn Training, two books.of Pleasure, four books.of Wealth, Popularity and RevengeHow to live amongst Men.of Prosperity.of Ancient Kings.of those who are Praised.of the Customs of Barbarians.These three, then, are the heterodox Stoics. The legitimate successor to Zeno, however, was Cleanthes: of whom we have now to speak.' "
7.174. To the solitary man who talked to himself he remarked, You are not talking to a bad man. When some one twitted him on his old age, his reply was, I too am ready to depart; but when again I consider that I am in all points in good health and that I can still write and read, I am content to wait. We are told that he wrote down Zeno's lectures on oyster-shells and the blade-bones of oxen through lack of money to buy paper. Such was he; and yet, although Zeno had many other eminent disciples, he was able to succeed him in the headship of the school.He has left some very fine writings, which are as follows:of Time.of Zeno's Natural Philosophy, two books.Interpretations of Heraclitus, four books.De Sensu.of Art.A Reply to Democritus.A Reply to Aristarchus.A Reply to Herillus.of Impulse, two books." "
7.180. So renowned was he for dialectic that most people thought, if the gods took to dialectic, they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus. He had abundance of matter, but in style he was not successful. In industry he surpassed every one, as the list of his writings shows; for there are more than 705 of them. He increased their number by arguing repeatedly on the same subject, setting down anything that occurred to him, making many corrections and citing numerous authorities. So much so that in one of his treatises he copied out nearly the whole of Euripides' Medea, and some one who had taken up the volume, being asked what he was reading, replied, The Medea of Chrysippus." '
7.183. At wine-parties he used to behave quietly, though he was unsteady on his legs; which caused the woman-slave to say, As for Chrysippus, only his legs get tipsy. His opinion of himself was so high that when some one inquired, To whom shall I entrust my son? he replied, To me: for, if I had dreamt of there being anyone better than myself, I should myself be studying with him. Hence, it is said, the application to him of the line:He alone has understanding; the others flit shadow-like around;andBut for Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa.
7.184. At last, however, – so we are told by Sotion in his eighth book, – he joined Arcesilaus and Lacydes and studied philosophy under them in the Academy. And this explains his arguing at one time against, and at another in support of, ordinary experience, and his use of the method of the Academy when treating of magnitudes and numbers.On one occasion, as Hermippus relates, when he had his school in the Odeum, he was invited by his pupils to a sacrificial feast. There after he had taken a draught of sweet wine unmixed with water, he was seized with di7iness and departed this life five days afterwards, having reached the age of seventy-three years, in the 143rd Olympiad. This is the date given by Apollodorus in his Chronology. I have toyed with the subject in the following verses:Chrysippus turned giddy after gulping down a draught of Bacchus; he spared not the Stoa nor his country nor his own life, but fared straight to the house of Hades.
7.187. Again: If anyone is in Megara, he is not in Athens: now there is a man in Megara, therefore there is not a man in Athens. Again: If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say wagon, consequently a wagon passes through your lips. And further: If you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns, ergo you have horns. Others attribute this to Eubulides.There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written much in a tone that is gross and indecent. For in his work On the ancient Natural Philosophers at line 600 or thereabouts he interprets the story of Hera and Zeus coarsely, with details which no one would soil his lips by repeating.
7.195. Second series:On Conclusive Arguments, addressed to Zeno, one book.On the Primary Indemonstrable Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno, one book.On the Analysis of Syllogisms, one book.of Redundant Arguments, addressed to Pasylus, two books.of the Rules for Syllogisms, one book.of Introductory or Elementary Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno, one book.of the Introductory Moods, addressed to Zeno, three books.of the Syllogisms under False Figures, five books.Syllogistic Arguments by Resolution in Indemonstrable Arguments, one book.Inquiries into the Moods: addressed to Zeno and Philomathes, one book. (This appears to be spurious.)Third series:On Variable Arguments, addressed to Athenades, one book. (This also is spurious.)
10.6. It is added that he corresponded with many courtesans, and especially with Leontion, of whom Metrodorus also was enamoured. It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms: I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form. And in his letter to Pythocles: Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture. Epictetus calls him preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him.Again there was Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who was his disciple and then left the school. He in the book entitled Merriment asserts that Epicurus vomited twice a day from over-indulgence, and goes on to say that he himself had much ado to escape from those notorious midnight philosophizings and the confraternity with all its secrets;' "10.7. further, that Epicurus's acquaintance with philosophy was small and his acquaintance with life even smaller; that his bodily health was pitiful, so much so that for many years he was unable to rise from his chair; and that he spent a whole mina daily on his table, as he himself says in his letter to Leontion and in that to the philosophers at Mitylene. Also that among other courtesans who consorted with him and Metrodorus were Mammarion and Hedia and Erotion and Nikidion. He alleges too that in his thirty-seven books On Nature Epicurus uses much repetition and writes largely in sheer opposition to others, especially to Nausiphanes, and here are his own words: Nay, let them go hang: for, when labouring with an idea, he too had the sophist's off-hand boastfulness like many another servile soul;" '
10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.'". None |
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41. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche
Found in books: Graver (2007) 22, 226; Inwood and Warren (2020) 115, 140
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42. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, on directive faculty • Chrysippus, treatises of, On the Psyche • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Eternal recurrence • Stoics, see under individual Stoics, esp. Chrysippus, whose views came to be seen already in antiquity as Stoic orthodoxy, so that, conversely, views seen as orthodox tended to be ascribed to him, Soul survives for a while
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 74; Gazis and Hooper (2021) 176; Graver (2007) 225, 226; Inwood and Warren (2020) 122; Long (2019) 82, 153; Sorabji (2000) 242
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43. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, on involuntary feelings • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of
Found in books: Graver (2007) 237; Sorabji (2000) 35, 382, 383
| 9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call &". None |
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44. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On the Fact that Zeno Used Terms in Their Proper Significations
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 60; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 33
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45. None, None, nan (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 180; Wardy and Warren (2018) 180
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46. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 247; Wardy and Warren (2018) 247
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47. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, On Ends • Chrysippus, On Fate • Chrysippus, On Gods • Chrysippus, On Lives • Chrysippus, On Tenors • Chrysippus, On the Fact that Zeno Used Terms in Their Proper Significations • Chrysippus, On the Principles of Syllogisms, in one book • Chrysippus, On the Use of Reason • Chrysippus, Physical Questions • Chrysippus, Physical Theses • Chrysippus, hinting at Socrates wisdom? • Chrysippus, on action • Chrysippus, on equality of all mistches • Chrysippus, on fate • Chrysippus, on initiation • Chrysippus, on the end • Chrysippus, on the etymology of moira • Chrysippus, on the order of the parts of philosophy • Cicero, on Chrysippus • Posidonius preferred image, according to Chrysippus • end (telos), Chrysippus on • equality of all mistakes, doctrine held by Chrysippus • fate (heimarmenē, Lat., fatum) , Chrysippus on • necessity ἀνάγκη, Chrysippus on • portion (moira), Chrysippus on the etymology of
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 40, 60, 65, 70, 75, 161, 162, 165; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 33, 75, 89; Bryan (2018) 243, 247; Del Lucchese (2019) 173, 181, 193, 195, 206, 207, 208, 211, 216; Frede and Laks (2001) 24, 120, 202, 252; Frey and Levison (2014) 42, 45, 50, 52; Hankinson (1998) 245; Harte (2017) 229; Linjamaa (2019) 117; Long (2006) 123, 130; Long (2019) 77, 80, 82, 153; Maso (2022) 86, 125, 143, 144; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 175, 176; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 98, 149; Wardy and Warren (2018) 243, 247; Wilson (2012) 414
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48. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, On Law • Chrysippus, on human and divine matters • human and divine matters, Chrysippus on
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 13; Long (2006) 347
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49. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus
Found in books: Long (2006) 10; Long (2019) 77
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50. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus • Chrysippus, • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Contraction/expansion • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Judgement distinguished from appearance as involving assent • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Tears, if not assented to, could illustrate idea of first movements, but Chrysippus does not make use of this • Emotions, Identified with judgements by Chrysippus • First movements, Expounded by Seneca, perhaps earlier by Cicero, but examples in Aristotle and (possibly) Chrysippus not yet recognized as such • Posidonius, Stoic, Reply to Chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 166; Long (2019) 80; Sorabji (2000) 41, 71; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 127
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