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Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.



All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
chance Carter (2019) 48, 50, 52, 53, 134, 135, 136, 168, 220
Clay and Vergados (2022) 68
Del Lucchese (2019) 65, 75, 105, 106, 107, 114, 115, 123, 148, 149, 159, 214, 215, 218, 219
Faure (2022) 43, 51, 60, 61, 62, 63, 71, 84
Frede and Laks (2001) 65, 73, 74, 75, 90, 92, 106, 107
Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 53
Long (2006) 18, 26, 27, 143, 150, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 174, 176, 177, 210
Oksanish (2019) 172, 173, 181
Schibli (2002) 343, 346, 350, 351, 352, 359, 361
Versnel (2011) 182, 204, 211, 529, 530
Wynne (2019) 136, 207, 230, 257
van der EIjk (2005) 248, 249
chance, / τύχη Maso (2022) 38, 81, 82, 83
chance, and natural causal relations Carter (2019) 48, 50, 52, 53, 220
chance, as a cause of a ratio of elements Carter (2019) 135
chance, as a cause of bodily parts Carter (2019) 135
chance, as a cause of mixture Carter (2019) 134
chance, as justice Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 199
chance, casus Mueller (2002) 37, 84, 110
chance, causation Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 232
chance, defined, stoicism Williams (2012) 316
chance, empedocles Dimas Falcon and Kelsey (2022) 138, 140, 142
chance, fortuna Mueller (2002) 22, 84, 98, 102, 132, 133, 154
chance, fortune Dillon and Timotin (2015) 31, 33, 34, 35, 60, 92, 93, 139, 140, 150
chance, in delphic divination Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125
chance, love operating by Carter (2019) 136
chance, luck, tuchē fortune Wolfsdorf (2020) 145, 280, 708, 709
chance, mind not operating by Carter (2019) 168
chance, nature, and Davies (2004) 13, 170
chance, occurrence cledonomancy divination Johnston (2008) 131
chance, separation of poor-offerings by Brooks (1983) 18, 25, 83, 84, 87, 97, 134, 138, 177
chance, spartans at athens, speech of on Joho (2022) 171, 172, 173
chance, the fortuitous Schibli (2002) 344
chance, tuche Mueller (2002) 195
chance, tuchê Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 149, 161, 167, 171, 487
chance, vs. the gods Jouanna (2018) 404
chance, τυχή / ώς έτυχη Schibli (2002) 216, 227, 228, 229, 234, 236
‘chance’, τύχη ‘fortune’, and necessity in thucydides Joho (2022) 259, 260
‘chance’, τύχη ‘fortune’, and pericles Joho (2022) 285, 286, 305, 306
‘chance’, τύχη ‘fortune’, and pylos Joho (2022) 171, 172, 173, 177, 178
‘chance’, τύχη ‘fortune’, diodotus on Joho (2022) 122, 123
‘chance’, τύχη ‘fortune’, in melian dialogue Joho (2022) 138, 139, 140

List of validated texts:
15 validated results for "chance"
1. Euripides, Medea, 671 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance, in Delphic divination • tuchē (chance, luck, fortune)

 Found in books: Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 113; Wolfsdorf (2020) 145

671. ἄπαιδές ἐσμεν δαίμονός τινος τύχῃ.''. None
671. I have no child owing to the visitation of some god. Medea''. None
2. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 2.65.7, 3.45.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Spartans at Athens (Speech of), on chance • chance (τύχη) • tukhe(chance) • τύχη (‘chance’, ‘fortune’), Diodotus on • τύχη (‘chance’, ‘fortune’), and Pericles • τύχη (‘chance’, ‘fortune’), and Pylos

 Found in books: Joho (2022) 122, 123, 173, 306; Pucci (2016) 118; Spatharas (2019) 71

2.65.7. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο.
3.45.5. ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ’ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν.''. None
2.65.7. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war.
3.45.5. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. ''. None
3. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Chance • chance • chance (τύχη) • chance, as a cause of a ratio of elements • chance, as a cause of bodily parts

 Found in books: Carter (2019) 135; Faure (2022) 51, 61; Spatharas (2019) 30

4. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance • chance (τύχη)

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998) 74; Spatharas (2019) 30

5. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Empedocles, chance • chance • chance, and natural causal relations

 Found in books: Carter (2019) 220; Dimas Falcon and Kelsey (2022) 142

6. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Empedocles, chance • chance • chance, as a cause of a ratio of elements • chance, as a cause of bodily parts

 Found in books: Carter (2019) 135; Dimas Falcon and Kelsey (2022) 138, 142

7. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance • chance, and natural causal relations • luck/chance (τύχη), Aristotle on

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 4, 140; Carter (2019) 48

8. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Chance, • chance • chance, as a cause of a ratio of elements • chance, as a cause of bodily parts • luck/chance (τύχη), Aristotle on

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 4; Carter (2019) 135; Del Lucchese (2019) 106

9. Cicero, On Divination, 1.23, 2.13, 2.19, 2.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Chance / τύχη, • Chance, • chance

 Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 149; Maso (2022) 38, 81; Wynne (2019) 207, 230

1.23. Quid? quaeris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint? Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. Casu, inquis. Itane vero? quicquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? Quattuor tali iacti casu Venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum Venerios, si quadringentos talos ieceris, casu futuros putas? Aspersa temere pigmenta in tabula oris liniamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuita putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram inpresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi? Fingebat Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput extitisse Panisci; credo, aliquam non dissimilem figuram, sed certe non talem, ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim se profecto res habet, ut numquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.
2.13. Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis, quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus, quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris. Nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator?
2.19. Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est.
2.21. nulla igitur est divinatio. Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasumennum interire, num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul iis signis iisque auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, paruisset? Certe potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus, aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset; mutari enim fata non possunt. Ubi est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud, quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est. Nihil autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat.''. None
1.23. But what? You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you yourself see. Mere accidents, you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be an accident which bears upon itself every mark of truth? Four dice are cast and a Venus throw results — that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws? It is possible for paints flung at random on a canvasc to form the outlines of a face; but do you imagine that an accidental scattering of pigments could produce the beautiful portrait of Venus of Cos? Suppose that a hog should form the letter A on the ground with its snout; is that a reason for believing that it would write out Enniuss poem The Andromache?Carneades used to have a story that once in the Chian quarries when a stone was split open there appeared the head of the infant god Pan; I grant that the figure may have borne some resemblance to the god, but assuredly the resemblance was not such that you could ascribe the work to a Scopas. For it is undeniably true that no perfect imitation of a thing was ever made by chance. 14
2.13. But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of things which happen by chance. Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade?
2.13. Chrysippus, indeed, defines divination in these words: The power to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods. Its duty, he goes on to say, is to know in advance the disposition of the gods towards men, the manner in which that disposition is shown and by what means the gods may be propitiated and their threatened ills averted. And this same philosopher defines the interpretation of dreams thus: It is the power to understand and explain the visions sent by the gods to men in sleep. Then, if that be true, will just ordinary shrewdness meet these requirements, or rather is there not need of surpassing intelligence and absolutely perfect learning? But I have never seen such a man. 64
2.19. But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old womens credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary. 8
2.21. Again, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman army should perish at Lake Trasimenus in the Second Punic War, could that result have been avoided if the consul Flaminius had obeyed the signs and the auspices which forbade his joining battle? Assuredly not. Therefore, either the army did not perish by the will of Fate, or, if it did (and you are certainly bound as a Stoic to say that it did), the same result would have happened even if the auspices had been obeyed; for the decrees of Fate are unchangeable. Then what becomes of that vaunted divination of you Stoics? For if all things happen by Fate, it does us no good to be warned to be on our guard, since that which is to happen, will happen regardless of what we do. But if that which is to be can be turned aside, there is no such thing as Fate; so, too, there is no such thing as divination — since divination deals with things that are going to happen. But nothing is certain to happen which there is some means of dealing with so as to prevent its happening. 9''. None
10. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.15, 2.75, 2.82, 2.87-2.88, 2.93 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance

 Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 611; Long (2006) 157, 210; Wynne (2019) 136

2.15. And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind.
2.75. I therefore declare that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and have been governed for all time by converse providence: a thesis which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we feel at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial. ' "
2.82. Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence — for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void, and the attributes of these. When we on the other hand speak of nature as the sustaining and governing principle of the world, we do not mean that the world is like a clod of earth or lump of stone or something else of that sort, which possesses only the natural principle of cohesion, but like a tree or an animal, displaying no haphazard structure, to be order and a certain semblance of design. " '
2.87. Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things. "But if the structure of the world in all its parts is such that it could not have been better whether in point of utility or beauty, let us consider js is the result of chance, or whether on the contrary the parts of the world are in such a condition that they could not possibly have cohered together if they were not controlled by intelligence and by divine providence. If then that produces of nature are better than those of art, and if art produces nothing without reason, nature too cannot be deemed to be without reason. When you see a statue or a painting, you recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun‑dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason? 2.88. Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit.
2.93. "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! ''. None
11. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance • luck/chance (τύχη), Aristotle on

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 5; Kazantzidis (2021) 30

12. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, chance • chance • hope, and chance/fortune

 Found in books: Esler (2000) 63; Kazantzidis (2021) 30; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 20; Long (2006) 159, 163, 174, 210

13. Plutarch, Whether Land Or Sea Animals Are More Clever, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • chance

 Found in books: Kazantzidis (2021) 28; Long (2006) 164

964c. have left no path, either broad or narrow, by which any may slip in. Autobulus. This, my friend, has been spoken "from the heart." We certainly must not allow philosophers, as though they were women in difficult labour, to put about their necks a charm for speedy delivery so that they may bring justice to birth for us easily and without hard labour. For they themselves do not concede to Epicurus, for the sake of the highest considerations, a thing so small and trifling as the slightest deviation of a single atom â\x80\x94 which would permit the stars and living creatures to slip in by chance and would preserve from destruction the principle of free will. But, seeing that they bid him demonstrate whatever is not obvious or take as his starting-point something that is obvious, how are they in any position to make this statement about animals a basis of their own account of justice, when it is neither generally accepted nor otherwise demonstrated by them?''. None
14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.133 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, chance • luck/chance (τύχη), Epicurus on

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 6; Esler (2000) 63

10.133. Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.''. None
15. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • chance • luck/chance (τύχη), Epicurus on

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 174; Long (2006) 161

Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.