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subject book bibliographic info
ascalon Bernabe et al. (2013), Redefining Dionysos, 265
Bricault et al. (2007), Orphism and Christianity in Late Antiquity, 454, 455
Champion (2022), Dorotheus of Gaza and Ascetic Education, 23, 24
Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 87
Gera (2014), Judith, 156, 196
Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 106
Katzoff(2005), Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, 36
Klein and Wienand (2022), City of Caesar, City of God: Constantinople and Jerusalem in Late Antiquity, 117, 125
Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 368
Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 85
de Ste. Croix et al. (2006), Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy, 178
van Maaren (2022), The Boundaries of Jewishness in the Southern Levant 200 BCE–132 CE, 48, 113, 169
ascalon, antiochus of Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 160, 210, 299, 387
Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 127, 145
Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 14, 15, 16, 18, 126
Cheuk-Yin Yam (2019), Trinity and Grace in Augustine, 245
Cohen (2010), The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism, 545
Corrigan and Rasimus (2013), Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World, 171, 486
Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 254
Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 6, 18, 20, 22, 23, 60, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 135
Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 59, 102, 111
Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 17, 39, 54, 64, 106
Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 131
Iricinschi et al. (2013), Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels, 112
Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 55, 62, 96, 108, 235, 287, 288, 289, 293, 294, 296, 305, 357
Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 800, 810, 815
Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 17, 29, 105, 125, 154, 155
Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 9, 10, 25, 26, 30, 31, 36, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 88, 90, 91, 92, 105, 108, 109, 110, 124, 125, 128, 136, 139, 140
Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 34, 35, 36, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100
Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 6, 52, 203
O'Daly (2020), Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn), 126, 127
Pollmann and Vessey (2007), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions, 77, 81
Woolf (2011). Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West. 70
Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 29, 50, 79, 271
d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 28, 281
ascalon, apelles of Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 296
ascalon, assyria, cyprus, cythera, aphrodite, ourania of arabia, persia, scythia Mikalson (2003), Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars, 190, 191
ascalon, eutocius of Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 177
ascalon, herod of Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 125
ascalon, poseidon, of Lupu (2005), Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents (NGSL) 58
ascalon, sosus, antiochus of Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 29
ascalon, syria, temple of urania Simon, Zeyl, and Shapiro, (2021), The Gods of the Greeks, 255, 256
ascalon, tragic apelles of actor Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 115, 124
ascalon, zosimus of Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 35

List of validated texts:
18 validated results for "ascalon"
1. Herodotus, Histories, 1.105 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aphrodite, Ourania of Arabia, Ascalon, Assyria, Cyprus, Cythera, Persia, Scythia • Ascalon (Syria), temple of Urania

 Found in books: Mikalson (2003), Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars, 190, 191; Simon, Zeyl, and Shapiro, (2021), The Gods of the Greeks, 255, 256

1.105 ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἤισαν ἐπʼ Αἴγυπτον. καὶ ἐπείτε ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ Παλαιστίνῃ Συρίῃ, Ψαμμήτιχος σφέας Αἰγύπτου βασιλεὺς ἀντιάσας δώροισί τε καὶ λιτῇσι ἀποτράπει τὸ προσωτέρω μὴ πορεύεσθαι. οἳ δὲ ἐπείτε ἀναχωρέοντες ὀπίσω ἐγένοντο τῆς Συρίης ἐν Ἀσκάλωνι πόλι, τῶν πλεόνων Σκυθέων παρεξελθόντων ἀσινέων, ὀλίγοι τινὲς αὐτῶν ὑπολειφθέντες ἐσύλησαν τῆς οὐρανίης Ἀφροδίτης τὸ ἱρόν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἱρόν, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθανόμενος εὑρίσκω, πάντων ἀρχαιότατον ἱρῶν ὅσα ταύτης τῆς θεοῦ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἱρὸν ἐνθεῦτεν ἐγένετο, ὡς αὐτοὶ Κύπριοι λέγουσι, καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυθήροισι Φοίνικές εἰσὶ οἱ ἱδρυσάμενοι ἐκ ταύτης τῆς Συρίης ἐόντες. τοῖσι δὲ τῶν Σκυθέων συλήσασι τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἐν Ἀσκάλωνι καὶ τοῖσι τούτων αἰεὶ ἐκγόνοισι ἐνέσκηψε ὁ θεὸς θήλεαν νοῦσον· ὥστε ἅμα λέγουσί τε οἱ Σκύθαι διὰ τοῦτο σφέας νοσέειν, καὶ ὁρᾶν παρʼ ἑωυτοῖσι τοὺς ἀπικνεομένους ἐς τὴν Σκυθικὴν χώρην ὡς διακέαται τοὺς καλέουσι Ἐνάρεας οἱ Σκύθαι.'' None
1.105 From there they marched against Egypt : and when they were in the part of Syria called Palestine, Psammetichus king of Egypt met them and persuaded them with gifts and prayers to come no further. ,So they turned back, and when they came on their way to the city of Ascalon in Syria, most of the Scythians passed by and did no harm, but a few remained behind and plundered the temple of Heavenly Aphrodite. ,This temple, I discover from making inquiry, is the oldest of all the temples of the goddess, for the temple in Cyprus was founded from it, as the Cyprians themselves say; and the temple on Cythera was founded by Phoenicians from this same land of Syria . ,But the Scythians who pillaged the temple, and all their descendants after them, were afflicted by the goddess with the “female” sickness: and so the Scythians say that they are afflicted as a consequence of this and also that those who visit Scythian territory see among them the condition of those whom the Scythians call “Hermaphrodites”.'' None
2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.74, 4.3, 4.8-4.9, 4.20, 4.22, 4.36, 4.43, 4.74-4.78, 5.1-5.3, 5.7-5.8, 5.13-5.14, 5.21-5.23, 5.53, 5.74, 5.87-5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon • Antiochus of Ascalon,

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 178; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 15; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 254; Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 110; Fowler (2014), Plato in the Third Sophistic, 180, 184; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 289, 305, 357; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 30, 31, 72, 124, 136; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 34, 95; Volk and Williams (2006), Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics, 159

3.74 Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me rerum me R me rerum BE rerum ANV traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum coagmentatum ed. princ. Colon. cocicmentatum A cociom tatū R coaugmentatum BEN coagumentatum V inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ut si ' aliquis apud Bentl. ' Mdv. ut non si ABERN aut non si V ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod quod BE quo moveri possit." 4.3 Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto.
Sequitur disserendi ratio cognitioque naturae; nam de summo bono mox, ut dixi, videbimus et ad id explicandum disputationem omnem conferemus. in his igitur partibus duabus nihil erat, quod Zeno commutare gestiret. res enim se praeclare habebat, habebat Bai. habeat ABERN 1 habent N 2 habet V et quidem in utraque parte. quid enim ab antiquis ex eo genere, quod ad disserendum valet, praetermissum est? qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum, ut res in partes dividatur, id et fit ab illis et quem ad modum fieri oporteat traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum venerunt. Iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt, deinde ordinem sequuntur, tum, quid verum sit in singulis, extrema conclusio est. 4.9 quanta autem ab illis varietas argumentorum ratione concludentium eorumque cum captiosis interrogationibus dissimilitudo! Quid, quod plurimis plurimis ABENV pluribus R locis quasi denuntiant, ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis sine sensibus exquiramus, add. dett. atque ut eorum alterum ab altero ne separemus? add. Lamb. Quid? ea, quae dialectici nunc tradunt et docent, nonne ab illis instituta aut aut Se. sunt ABER om. NV inventa sunt? de quibus etsi a Chrysippo maxime est elaboratum, tamen a Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis; ab hoc autem quaedam non melius quam veteres, quaedam omnino relicta.
Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri veri ( corr., ut videtur, ex vere) N vere BEV vero R investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute virtute una BE consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant.
patronusne causae in epilogo pro reo dicens negaret esse malum exilium, publicationem bonorum? haec reicienda esse, non fugienda? fugienda cod. Leidens. Madvigii ; facienda nec misericordem iudicem esse oportere? in contione autem si loqueretur, si Hannibal ad portas venisset murumque iaculo traiecisset, negaret esse in malis capi, venire, interfici, patriam amittere? an senatus, cum triumphum Africano decerneret, quod eius virtute aut felicitate posset dicere, si neque virtus in ullo ullo edit. princ. Rom. nullo nisi in in V om. BERN sapiente nec felicitas vere dici potest? quae est igitur ista philosophia, quae communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo? praesertim cum, quod illi suis suis N 2 V sui verbis significent, significant C. L. Kayser in Bai. ed. min. in eo nihil novetur, novetur P. Faber movetur de del. P. Man. ipsis rebus nihil mutetur eaedem eedem V adem B eadem ERN res maneant alio modo.

nunc de hominis summo bono quaeritur; queritur bono BE quid igitur igitur BERNV dubitamus in tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectum? cum enim constet inter omnes omne officium munusque sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii—ne me existimes contra Stoicos solum dicere—eas sententias afferunt, ut summum bonum in eo genere pot, quod sit extra nostram potestatem, tamquam de iimo aliquo iimo aliquo Mdv. in animali quo B in annali quo E animali quo R iimali quo N iimato aliquo V loquantur, alii contra, quasi corpus nullum sit hominis, ita praeter animum nihil curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non ie nescio quid sit—neque enim enim om. BER id possum intellegere—, sed in quodam genere corporis, ut ne is quidem virtute una contentus sit, sed appetat vacuitatem doloris. quam ob rem utrique idem faciunt, ut si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram dextram RN tuerentur, aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. eorum enim omnium multa praetermittentium, dum eligant aliquid, quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia; at vero illa perfecta atque plena eorum, qui cum de hominis summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi neque corporis partem vacuam tutela reliquerunt.
Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat, deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque quodcumque ( ante in) N quod cuique BEV cuique R in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. is hoc melior quam Pyrrho, quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri, quod penitus a a N 2 ( in ras. in fine versus ), om. BERV natura natura ( in marg. ad initium versus add. ) N 2 recessit. Stoici autem, quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium officii quaerunt, melius quam Pyrrho; quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea, quae que ( q B) et ad BE ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt, non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. ille enim occurrentia nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiungunt a finibus et a a ( post et) om. BE summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt, praeponunt A. (?) Man. proponunt ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quicquam ad beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt.
Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.75 —Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nisi Se. si nulla earum non ita contenta add. Se. nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. 4.76 Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil nil om. R pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne paleamne V paleam ne RN paleamve BE portet, ad bene aut ad male guberdum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in guberdo nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique qui cuique cuicumque Mdv. artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria quidem modo paria Lamb. modo paria quidem peccata sunt. 4.77 Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 4.78 maiora sint aut minora! Itaque—iam enim concludatur oratio—hoc uno vitio maxime mihi premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duas contrarias sententias optinere. quid enim est tam repugs quam eundem dicere, quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum accomodatarum N 2 V accomodarum RN 1 accommodare BE a natura profectam? ita cum add. P. Man. ea volunt retinere, quae superiori sententiae conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt, quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus. quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine nolunt, horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione et moribus.' 5.1 Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. 5.2 tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.3 Tum Quintus: Est plane, Piso, ut dicis, inquit. nam me ipsum huc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, locus lucus Valckenarius ad Callimach. p. 216 cf. Va. II p. 545 sqq. cuius incola Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis huc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine quaenam essent ipsa haec hec ipsa BE loca requirentis species quaedam commovit, iiter scilicet, sed commovit tamen. Tum Pomponius: At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, praeteribamus edd. praeteriebamus sed veteris proverbii admonitu vivorum memini, nec tamen Epicuri epicureum Non. licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis nec tamen ... anulis habent Non. p. 70 anulis anellis Non. anelis R ambus anulis V habent. habebant Non.' "
Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V" '5.8 Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. sed a te ... Peripat. sententia Non. p. 91 est sed et enim Non. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Staseam dett. stans eam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me videtur legenduim : in me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo.

namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.
praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet.
Sex igitur hae hee E, h (= haec) R summo BERNV summa dett. sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. quatuor defense quatuor BE iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus. nominavimus BER ( cf. p. 158, 30 sqq. ) nominamus NV sed quoniam quoniam q uo R non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. de vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. Quando igitur et de voluptate secl. Nissenius ( sec. Gz. ); cf. Muret. var. lect. 14, 20 cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris. 5.22 nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.23 de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium.
Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE' "

quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est?" 5.87 quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum.' "5.88 sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici." '5.89 quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo.'" None
3.74 \xa0"However I\xa0begin to perceive that I\xa0have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I\xa0set before me. The fact is that I\xa0have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. <
\xa0"My view, then, Cato," I\xa0proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master\'s predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â\x80\x94 but I\xa0should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I\xa0deal with the whole of your discourse; for I\xa0think I\xa0shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. <
\xa0"Next come Logic and Natural Science; for the problem of Ethics, as I\xa0said, we shall notice later, concentrating the whole force of the discussion upon its solution. In these two departments then, there was nothing that Zeno need have desired to alter; since all was in a most satisfactory state, and that in both departments. For in the subject of Logic, what had the ancients left undealt with? They defined a multitude of terms, and left treatises in Definition; of the kindred art of the Division of a thing into its parts they give practical examples, and lay down rules for the process; and the same with the Law of Contradictories, from which they arrived at genera and species within genera. Then, in Deductive reasoning, they start with what they term self-evident propositions; from these they proceed by rule, and finally the conclusion gives the inference valid in the particular case. < 4.9 \xa0Again, how many different forms of Deduction they distinguish, and how widely these differ from sophistical syllogisms! Think how almost solemnly they reiterate that we must not expect to find truth in sensation unaided by reason, nor in reason without sensation, and that we are not to divorce the one from the other! Was it not they who first laid down the rules that form the stock-inâ\x80\x91trade of professors of logic toâ\x80\x91day? Logic, no doubt, was very fully worked out Chrysippus, but much less was done in it by Zeno than by the older schools; and in some parts of the subject his work was no improvement on that of his predecessors, while other parts he neglected altogether. <' "
\xa0As I\xa0understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity. <" "
\xa0Could an advocate wind up his defence of a client by declaring that exile and confiscation of property are not evils? that they are 'to be rejected,' but not 'to be shunned'? that it is not a judge's duty to show mercy? Or supposing him to be addressing a meeting of the people; Hannibal is at the gates and has flung a javelin over the city walls; could he say that captivity, enslavement, death, loss of country are no evils? Could the senate, decreeing a triumph to Africanus, use the formula, 'whereas by reason of his valour,' or 'good fortune,' if no one but the Wise Man can truly be said to possess either valour or good fortune? What sort of philosophy then is this, which speaks the ordinary language in public, but in its treatises employs an idiom of its own? and that though the doctrines which the Stoics express in their own peculiar terms contain no actual novelty the ideas remain the same, though clothed in another dress. <" "

\xa0But as a matter of fact the creature whose Chief Good we are seeking is man. Surely then our course is to inquire what has been achieved in the whole of man's nature. All are agreed that the duty and function of Wisdom is entirely centred in the work of perfecting man; but then some thinkers (for you must not imagine that I\xa0am tilting at the Stoics only) produce theories which place the Chief Good in the class of things entirely outside our control, as though they were discussing some creature devoid of a mind; while others on the contrary ignore everything but mind, just as if man had no body; and that though even the mind is not an empty, impalpable something (a\xa0conception to me unintelligible), but belongs to a certain kind of material substance, and therefore even the mind is not satisfied with virtue alone, but desires freedom from pain. In fact, with each school alike it is just as if they should ignore the left side of their bodies and protect the right, or, in the mind, like Erillus, recognize cognition but leave the practical faculty out of account. They pick and choose, pass over a great deal and fasten on a single aspect; so all their systems are oneâ\x80\x91sided. The full and perfect philosophy was that which, investigating the Chief Good of man, left no part either of his mind or body uncaredâ\x80\x91for. <" 4.43 \xa0"In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the End of Goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who did not venture to leave a mere negation, but introduced as the Wise Man\'s motives of desire \'whatever chanced to enter his mind\' and \'whatever struck him.\' Aristo is better than Pyrrho in so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers already mentioned; but in trying to find a foundation for virtuous action they are an improvement upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary \'things that strike the mind\' they do better than Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as \'suitable to nature\' and \'to be adopted for their own sakes,\' and then refusing to include them in the End of Goods, they desert nature and approximate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented his vague \'things that strike the mind\'; while the Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary objects of nature, yet allow no connection between these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making the primary objects \'preferred,\' so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature. <
\xa0"The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say \'startling truths.\' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I\xa0will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I\xa0won\'t jest with you now, as I\xa0did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I\xa0defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I\xa0was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I\xa0even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I\xa0must reason more closely. < 4.75 \xa0Transgressions are equal. â\x80\x94 How so, pray? â\x80\x94 Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. â\x80\x94 Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. â\x80\x94 Suppose, says my opponent, of a\xa0number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. â\x80\x94 Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. < 4.76 \xa0Here is another of these false analogies: A\xa0skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. â\x80\x94 Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. < 4.77 \xa0"However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! < 4.78 \xa0And therefore (since my discourse must now conclude) this is the one chief defect under which your friends the Stoics seem to me to labour, â\x80\x94 they think they can maintain two contrary opinions at once. How can you have a greater inconsistency than for the same person to say both that Moral Worth is the sole good and that we have a natural instinct to seek the things conducive to life? Thus in their desire to retain ideas consot with the former doctrine they are landed in the position of Aristo; and when they try to escape from this they adopt what is in reality the position of the Peripatetics, though still clinging tooth and nail to their own terminology. Unwilling again to take the next step and weed out this terminology, they end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, full of asperities of style and even of manners. <' "
\xa0My dear Brutus, â\x80\x94 Once I\xa0had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I\xa0was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I\xa0loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a\xa0mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. <" '5.2 \xa0Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I\xa0can\'t say; but one\'s emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I\xa0am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates\' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I\xa0mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." < 5.3 \xa0"Perfectly true, Piso," rejoined Quintus. "I\xa0myself on the way here just now noticed yonder village of Colonus, and it brought to my imagination Sophocles who resided there, and who is as you know my great admiration and delight. Indeed my memory took me further back; for I\xa0had a vision of Oedipus, advancing towards this very spot and asking in those most tender verses, \'What place is this?\' â\x80\x94 a\xa0mere fancy no doubt, yet still it affected me strongly." "For my part," said Pomponius, "you are fond of attacking me as a devotee of Epicurus, and I\xa0do spend much of my time with Phaedrus, who as you know is my dearest friend, in Epicurus\'s Gardens which we passed just now; but I\xa0obey the old saw: I\xa0\'think of those that are alive.\' Still I\xa0could not forget Epicurus, even if I\xa0wanted; the members of our body not only have pictures of him, but even have his likeness on their drinking-cups and rings." <
\xa0"Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I\xa0will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I\xa0almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I\xa0beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." < 5.8 \xa0"You know that I\xa0agree with you about that, Piso," I\xa0replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I\xa0can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I\xa0should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I\xa0should not have believed it, but here I\xa0am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don\'t let me bore the rest of you while I\xa0am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said\xa0I. "Why, it is\xa0I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I\xa0will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I\xa0believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. <' "

\xa0Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. <" 5.14 \xa0"I\xa0pass over a\xa0number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I\xa0know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. <
\xa0"These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely. There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics."But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. < 5.22 \xa0Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. < 5.23 \xa0"The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. <
\xa0The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. <

\xa0Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." <
\xa0On this your cousin and\xa0I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. <' "5.88 \xa0But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I\xa0term happier, though I\xa0do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. <" "5.89 \xa0What is the difference, except that I\xa0call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I\xa0call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am\xa0I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â\x80\x94 if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â\x80\x94 let them coin new words at their pleasure. <"' None
3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6, 1.10, 1.18-1.20, 2.95, 3.92, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020), Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, 66, 75; Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 94, 108; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 288, 289, 293; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 9, 36, 110, 124, 125, 128, 136, 139, 140; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 79, 271

1.6 I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. ' "
Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so, he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. " 1.18 Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato\'s Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render \'Providence\') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19 What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; ' "1.20 but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? " "
So Aristotle says brilliantly: 'If there were beings who had always lived beneath the earth, in comfortable, well‑lit dwellings, decorated with statues and pictures and furnished with all the luxuries enjoyed by persons thought to be supremely happy, and who though they had never come forth above the ground had learnt by report and by hearsay of the existence of certain deities or divine powers; and then if at some time the jaws of the earth were opened and they were able to escape from their hidden abode and to come forth into the regions which we inhabit; when they suddenly had sight of the earth and the seas and the sky, and came to know of the vast clouds and mighty winds, and beheld the sun, and realized not only its size and beauty but also its Ptolemaic in causing the day by shedding light over all the sky, and, after night had darkened the earth, they then saw the whole sky spangled and adorned with stars, and the changing phases of the moon's light, now waxing and now waning, and the risings and settings of all these heavenly bodies and their courses fixed and changeless throughout all eternity, — when they saw these things, surely they would think that the gods exist and that these mighty marvels are their handiwork.' " "
But at all events a god could have come to the aid of those great and splendid cities and have preserved them — for you yourselves are fond of saying that there is nothing that a god cannot accomplish, and that without any toil; as man's limbs are effortlessly moved merely by his mind and will, so, as you say, the god's power can mould and move and alter all things. Nor do you say this as some superstitious fable or old wives' tale, but you give a scientific and systematic account of it: you allege that matter, which constitutes and contains all things, is in its entirety flexible and subject to change, so that there is nothing that cannot be moulded and transmuted out of it however suddenly, but the moulder and manipulator of this universal substance is divine providence, and therefore providence, whithersoever it moves, is able to perform whatever it will. Accordingly either providence does not know its own powers, or it does not regard human affairs, or it lacks power of judgement to discern what is the best. " 3.95 "I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta\'s discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth. '' None
4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6, 3.69, 4.36 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon • Antiochus of Ascalon,

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 19; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 254; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 293; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 29, 154; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 30, 109

3.69 Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis.' ' None
3.69 \xa0Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I\xa0find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â\x80\x94 although I\xa0have often made this statement, I\xa0must still repeat it again and again â\x80\x94 which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a\xa0mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I\xa0only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. <' ' None
5. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon • Antiochus of Ascalon, • Antiochus of Ascalon, Sosus • Antiochus of Ascalon, and Stoicism • Antiochus of Ascalon, and causation • Antiochus of Ascalon, and fate • Antiochus of Ascalon, and providence

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 88, 110; Del Lucchese (2019), Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture, 254; Fowler (2014), Plato in the Third Sophistic, 180; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 336; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 39; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 131; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 96, 288, 289, 293, 294; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 203; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 29

6. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon • Antiochus of Ascalon,

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 19; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 10

7. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 100, 104, 105; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 94

8. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 289; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 92

9. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 126; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 25, 57; Volk and Williams (2006), Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry and Politics, 159

10. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 43 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 160; Martens (2003), One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, 155

43 And he learnt all these things from Abraham his grandfather, who was the author of his own education, who gave to the all-wise Isaac all that he had, leaving none of his substance to bastards, or to the spurious reasonings of concubines, but he gives them small gifts, as being inconsiderable persons. For the possessions of which he is possessed, namely, the perfect virtues, belong only to the perfect and legitimate son; but those which are of an intermediate character, are suitable to and fall to the share of those who are not perfect, but who have advanced as far as the encyclical branches of elementary education, of which Agar and Cheturah partake, Agar meaning "a dwelling near," and Cheturah meaning "sacrificing." '' None
11. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 13.324, 13.326, 13.335, 13.357, 13.393, 13.397 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ascalon

 Found in books: Bar Kochba (1997), Pseudo-Hecataeus on the Jews: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora, 125, 127, 133; Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 85; van Maaren (2022), The Boundaries of Jewishness in the Southern Levant 200 BCE–132 CE, 113

13.324 Καταστησάμενος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὃν ᾤετο συμφέρειν αὐτῷ τρόπον στρατεύει ἐπὶ Πτολεμαί̈δα, τῇ δὲ μάχῃ κρατήσας ἐνέκλεισε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ περικαθίσας αὐτοὺς ἐπολιόρκει. τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ Πτολεμαὶ̈ς αὐτῷ καὶ Γάζα μόναι χειρωθῆναι ὑπελείποντο, καὶ Ζώιλος δὲ ὁ κατασχὼν τὸν Στράτωνος πύργον τύραννος καὶ Δῶρα.
ἀλλὰ πονουμένοις τῇ πολιορκίᾳ Ζώιλος ὁ τὸν Στράτωνος πύργον κατεσχηκὼς παρῆν καὶ τὰ Δῶρα σύνταγμα τρέφων στρατιωτικὸν καὶ τυραννίδι ἐπιχειρῶν διὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμιλλαν μικρὰ τοῖς Πτολεμαιεῦσι παρεβοήθει:
καὶ τετρακόσια δὲ ἀργυρίου τάλαντα δώσειν ὑπέσχετο χάριν ἀντὶ τούτων αἰτῶν Ζώιλον ἐκποδὼν ποιήσασθαι τὸν τύραννον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῖς ̓Ιουδαίοις προσνεῖμαι. τότε μὲν οὖν ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ἡδέως τὴν πρὸς ̓Αλέξανδρον ποιησάμενος φιλίαν χειροῦται τὸν Ζώιλον.' "
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐ καταπλήττει τὸν ̓Αλέξανδρον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστρατεύει τοῖς θαλαττίοις μέρεσιν, ̔Ραφείᾳ καὶ ̓Ανθηδόνι, ἣν ὕστερον βασιλεὺς ̔Ηρώδης ̓Αγριππιάδα προσηγόρευσεν, καὶ κατὰ κράτος εἷλεν καὶ ταύτην." "
̓Αλέξανδρος δ' ἐλάσας αὖθις ἐπὶ Δίαν πόλιν αἱρεῖ ταύτην, καὶ στρατεύσας ἐπὶ ̓́Εσσαν, οὗ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια Ζήνωνι συνέβαινεν εἶναι, τρισὶν μὲν περιβάλλει τείχεσιν τὸ χωρίον, ἀμαχὶ δὲ λαβὼν τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ Γαύλαναν καὶ Σελεύκειαν ἐξώρμησεν." 13.397 Μωαβίτιδας ̓Ησεβὼν Μήδαβα Λεμβὰ Ορωναιμαγελεθων Ζόαρα Κιλίκων αὐλῶνα Πέλλαν, ταύτην κατέσκαψεν ὑποσχομένων τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἐς πάτρια τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων ἔθη μεταβαλεῖσθαι, ἄλλας τε πόλεις πρωτευούσας τῆς Συρίας ἦσαν κατεστραμμένοι.'' None
13.324 2. When Alexander Janneus had settled the government in the manner that he judged best, he made an expedition against Ptolemais; and having overcome the men in battle, he shut them up in the city, and sat round about it, and besieged it; for of the maritime cities there remained only Ptolemais and Gaza to be conquered, besides Strato’s Tower and Dora, which were held by the tyrant Zoilus.
but when they were distressed with this siege, Zoilus, who possessed Strato’s Tower and Dora, and maintained a legion of soldiers, and, on occasion of the contest between the kings, affected tyranny himself, came and brought some small assistance to the people of Ptolemais;
and promising to give him four hundred talents of silver, he desired that, by way of requital, he would take off Zoilus the tyrant, and give his country to the Jews. And then indeed Ptolemy, with pleasure, made such a league of friendship with Alexander, and subdued Zoilus;
Yet did not this misfortune terrify Alexander; but he made an expedition upon the maritime parts of the country, Raphia and Anthedon, (the name of which king Herod afterwards changed to Agrippias,) and took even that by force.
3. But Alexander marched again to the city Dios, and took it; and then made an expedition against Essa, where was the best part of Zeno’s treasures, and there he encompassed the place with three walls; and when he had taken the city by fighting, he marched to Golan and Seleucia;
in the country of Moab, Heshbon, and Medaba, Lemba, and Oronas, Gelithon, Zara, the valley of the Cilices, and Pella; which last they utterly destroyed, because its inhabitants would not bear to change their religious rites for those peculiar to the Jews. The Jews also possessed others of the principal cities of Syria, which had been destroyed.'' None
12. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 1.104 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Ascalon

 Found in books: Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 85; van Maaren (2022), The Boundaries of Jewishness in the Southern Levant 200 BCE–132 CE, 113

1.104 ̓Αλέξανδρος δὲ Πέλλαν ἑλὼν ἐπὶ Γέρασαν ᾔει πάλιν τῶν Θεοδώρου κτημάτων γλιχόμενος, καὶ τρισὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς περιβόλοις ἀποτειχίσας διὰ μάχης τὸ χωρίον παραλαμβάνει.'' None
1.104 But Alexander, when he had taken Pella, marched to Gerasa again, out of the covetous desire he had of Theodorus’s possessions; and when he had built a triple wall about the garrison, he took the place by force.'' None
13. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 15; Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 95

14. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 55; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 58

15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 92; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 55, 108

16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 60; Fowler (2014), Plato in the Third Sophistic, 179

17. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 90; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 108

18. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Antiochus of Ascalon

 Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 92; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 57

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