1. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Klazomenai • lack of respect for gods', and Anaxagoras
Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 333; Mikalson (2010) 21, 243
| 26d. Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth. Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometime''. None |
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2. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 90; Mikalson (2010) 210
885e. πλεῖστοι, δράσαντες δʼ ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα. παρὰ δὲ δὴ νομοθετῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι μὴ ἀγρίων ἀλλὰ ἡμέρων, ἀξιοῦμεν πειθοῖ πρῶτον χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ πολλῷ βελτίω τῶν ἄλλων λέγοντας περὶ θεῶν ὡς εἰσίν, ἀλλʼ οὖν βελτίω γε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τάχα πειθοίμεθʼ ἂν ἴσως ὑμῖν. ἀλλʼ ἐπιχειρεῖτε, εἴ τι μέτριον λέγομεν, εἰπεῖν ἃ προκαλούμεθα. ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί;''. None | 885e. Now from lawgivers like you, who assert that you are gentle rather than severe, we claim that you should deal with us first by way of persuasion; and if what you say about the existence of the gods is superior to the arguments of others in point of truth, even though it be but little superior in eloquence, then probably you would succeed in convincing us. Try then, if you think this reasonable, to meet our challenge. Clin. Surely it seems easy, Stranger, to assert with truth''. None |
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3. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • Anaxagoras, Mind in • Anaxagoras, and Mind
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 67, 99; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 409; Frede and Laks (2001) 41; Gee (2020) 254; Hankinson (1998) 84; Horkey (2019) 28, 248; Tor (2017) 37; Wardy and Warren (2018) 67, 68, 99; Wolfsdorf (2020) 57
89a. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον: ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ ᾽πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον. ΕΧ. πῶς δή; ΦΑΙΔ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος 96a. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη: ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις 97b. γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ’ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι’ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι’ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν’ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι. /ἀλλ’ ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου 97c. ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ: εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ 118a. ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἔφη. ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας: καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. unit="para"/ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν — ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο — ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων : ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν: ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.' '. None | 89a. than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men’s criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument. Echecrates. How did he do it? Phaedo. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool 96a. Phaedo. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty. Certainly, said Cebes, I wish to hear your experiences. Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; 97b. the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from other. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, 97c. that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to 118a. his thighs; and passing upwards in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words— Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it. That, said Crito, shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say. To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.' '. None |
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4. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae
Found in books: Horkey (2019) 271; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 70
31c. οὐ δυνατόν· δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ, τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν. ΤΙ. ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν τριῶν εἴτε ὄγκων''. None | 31c. for there must needs be some intermediary bond to connect the two. And the fairest of bonds is that which most perfectly unites into one both itself and the things which it binds together; and to effect this in the fairest manner is the natural property of proportion. Tim. For whenever the middle term of any three numbers, cubic or square,''. None |
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5. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.1, 4.7.6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • Anaxagoras, and religion
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 46; Horkey (2019) 28; Mikalson (2010) 179; Tor (2017) 43
1.1.1. πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ κατʼ αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.
4.7.6. ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δʼ ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.''. None | 1.1.1. I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of bringing in strange deities: he is also guilty of corrupting the youth.
4.7.6. In general, with regard to the phenomena of the heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He said that he who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery. ''. None |
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6. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras of Klazomenai • Anaxagoras, and religion
Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015) 333; Tor (2017) 44
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7. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • Anaxagoras on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Anaxagoras, Mind in • Anaxagoras, and mind as unmoved mover • Anaxagoras, on the unmixed nature of mind
Found in books: Carter (2019) 171, 174; Dijkstra and Raschle (2020) 81; Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 408, 409; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 214; Horkey (2019) 63, 64, 270, 271; Lloyd (1989) 113, 179; Pucci (2016) 104; Tor (2017) 22, 290; Trott (2019) 135; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 138; Álvarez (2019) 118
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8. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • Anaxagoras, Mind in
Found in books: Horkey (2019) 270; Tor (2017) 22
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9. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • happiness, in Anaxagoras
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 105, 108; Wardy and Warren (2018) 105, 108; Wolfsdorf (2020) 59
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10. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, • Anaxagoras, Mind in • Anaxagoras, and perception
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 59; Horkey (2019) 82; Long (2006) 60; Tor (2017) 38, 191
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11. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 108; Wardy and Warren (2018) 108
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12. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.25-1.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 196; Long (2006) 117; Wynne (2019) 282
| 1.25. "So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. ' "1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? " '1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. ' "1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. " '1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some \'preconception\' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus\'s Rule or Standard of Judgement. ''. None |
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13. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 67; Wardy and Warren (2018) 67
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14. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,
Found in books: Clay and Vergados (2022) 150; Del Lucchese (2019) 61; Nuno et al (2021) 62
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15. New Testament, Matthew, 19.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras (Greek philosopher)
Found in books: Mueller (2002) 143; Taylor and Hay (2020) 145
19.29. καὶ πᾶς ὅστις ἀφῆκεν οἰκίας ἢ ἀδελφοὺς ἢ ἀδελφὰς ἢ πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ἢ τέκνα ἢ ἀγροὺς ἕνεκεν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος, πολλαπλασίονα λήμψεται καὶ ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσει.''. None | 19.29. Everyone who has left houses, or brothers, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, will receive one hundred times, and will inherit eternal life. "". None |
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16. Plutarch, Pericles, 32.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, • Anaxagoras, and religion
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 297; Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 42, 59; Mikalson (2016) 129; Tor (2017) 26, 42, 43
32.2. δεχομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου καὶ προσιεμένου τὰς διαβολάς, οὕτως ἤδη ψήφισμα κυροῦται, Δρακοντίδου γράψαντος, ὅπως οἱ λόγοι τῶν χρημάτων ὑπὸ Περικλέους εἰς τοὺς Πρυτάνεις ἀποτεθεῖεν, οἱ δὲ δικασταὶ τὴν ψῆφον ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ φέροντες ἐν τῇ πόλει κρίνοιεν. Ἅγνων δὲ· τοῦτο μὲν ἀφεῖλε τοῦ ψηφίσματος, κρίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν δίκην ἔγραψεν ἐν δικασταῖς χιλίοις καὶ πεντακοσίοις, εἴτε κλοπῆς καὶ δώρων εἴτʼ ἀδικίου βούλοιτό τις ὀνομάζειν τὴν δίωξιν.' '. None | 32.2. The people accepted with delight these slanders, and so, while they were in this mood, a bill was passed, on motion of Dracontides, that Pericles should deposit his accounts of public moneys with the prytanes, and that the jurors should decide upon his case with ballots which had lain upon the altar of the goddess on the acropolis. But Hagnon amended this clause of the bill with the motion that the case be tried before fifteen hundred jurors in the ordinary way, whether one wanted to call it a prosecution for embezzlement and bribery, or malversation.' '. None |
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17. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 2.5 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras
Found in books: Demoen and Praet (2009) 58, 305; Konig (2022) 340
2.5. κορυφὴν δ' ὑπερβάλλοντες τοῦ ὄρους καὶ βαδίζοντες αὐτὴν, ἐπειδὴ ἀποτόμως εἶχεν, ἤρετο οὑτωσὶ τὸν Δάμιν: “εἰπέ μοι,” ἔφη “ποῦ χθὲς ἦμεν;” ὁ δὲ “ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ” ἔφη. “τήμερον δέ, ὦ Δάμι, ποῦ;” “ἐν τῷ Καυκάσῳ,” εἶπεν “εἰ μὴ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐκλέλησμαι.” “πότε οὖν κάτω μᾶλλον ἦσθα;” πάλιν ἤρετο, ὁ δὲ “τουτὶ μὲν” ἔφη “οὐδὲ ἐπερωτᾶν ἄξιον: χθὲς μὲν γὰρ διὰ κοίλης τῆς γῆς ἐπορευόμεθα, τήμερον δὲ πρὸς τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐσμέν.” “οἴει οὖν,” ἔφη “ὦ Δάμι, τὴν μὲν χθὲς ὁδοιπορίαν κάτω εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τήμερον ἄνω;” “νὴ Δί',” εἶπεν “εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.” “τί οὖν ἡγῇ” ἔφη “παραλλάττειν τὰς ὁδοὺς ἀλλήλων ἢ τί τήμερον πλέον εἶναί σοι τοῦ χθές;” “ὅτι χθὲς” ἔφη “ἐβάδιζον οὗπερ πολλοί, σήμερον δέ, οὗπερ ὀλίγοι.” “τί γάρ,” ἔφη “ὦ Δάμι, οὐ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἄστει λεωφόρους ἐκτρεπομένῳ βαδίζειν ἐστὶν ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων;” “οὐ τοῦτο” ἔφη “εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὅτι χθὲς μὲν διὰ κωμῶν ἐκομιζόμεθα καὶ ἀνθρώπων, σήμερον δὲ ἀστιβές τι ἀναβαίνομεν χωρίον καὶ θεῖον, ἀκούεις γὰρ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος, ὅτι οἱ βάρβαροι θεῶν αὐτὸ ποιοῦνται οἶκον” καὶ ἅμα ἀνέβλεπεν ἐς τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ ὄρους. ὁ δὲ ἐμβιβάζων αὐτὸν ἐς ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρώτα “ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Δάμι, ὅ τι ξυνῆκας τοῦ θείου βαδίζων ἀγχοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ;” “οὐδὲν” ἔφη. “καὶ μὴν ἐχρῆν γε” εἶπεν “ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τηλικαύτης καὶ θείας οὕτως ἑστηκότα περί τε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σαφεστέρας ἤδη ἐκφέρειν δόξας περί τε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῆς σελήνης, ὧν γε καὶ ῥάβδῳ ἴσως ἡγῇ ψαύσειν προσεστηκὼς τῷ οὐρανῷ τούτῳ.” “ἃ χθὲς” ἔφη “περὶ τοῦ θείου ἐγίγνωσκον, γιγνώσκω καὶ τήμερον καὶ οὔπω μοι ἑτέρα προσέπεσε περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξα.” “οὐκοῦν,” ἔφη “ὦ Δάμι, κάτω τυγχάνεις ὢν ἔτι καὶ οὐδὲν παρὰ τοῦ ὕψους εἴληφας ἀπέχεις τε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁπόσον χθές: καὶ εἰκότως σε ἠρόμην, ἃ ἐν ἀρχῇ: σὺ γὰρ ᾤου γελοίως ἐρωτᾶσθαι.” “καὶ μὴν” ἔφη “καταβήσεσθαί γε σοφώτερος ᾤμην ἀκούων, ̓Απολλώνιε, τὸν μὲν Κλαζομένιον ̓Αναξαγόραν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ ̓Ιωνίαν Μίμαντος ἐπεσκέφθαι τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, Θαλῆν τε τὸν Μιλήσιον ἀπὸ τῆς προσοίκου Μυκάλης, λέγονται δὲ καὶ τῷ Παγγαίῳ ἔνιοι φροντιστηρίῳ χρήσασθαι καὶ ἕτεροι τῷ ̓́Αθῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ μέγιστον τούτων ἀνελθὼν ὕψος οὐδὲν σοφώτερος ἑαυτοῦ καταβήσομαι.” “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι,” ἔφη “αἱ γὰρ τοιαίδε περιωπαὶ γλαυκότερον μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀποφαίνουσι καὶ μείζους τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα ἐκ νυκτός, ἃ καὶ ποιμέσιν ἤδη καὶ αἰπόλοις ἐστὶ δῆλα, ὅπη δὲ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους καὶ ὅπη χαίρει ὑπ' αὐτοῦ θεραπευόμενον, ὅ τί τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ὅ τι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη, οὔτε ̓́Αθως ἐκδείξει τοῖς ἀνελθοῦσιν οὔτε ὁ θαυμαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν ̓́Ολυμπος, εἰ μὴ διορῴη αὐτὰ ἡ ψυχή, ἥν, εἰ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκήρατος αὐτῶν ἅπτοιτο, πολλῷ μεῖζον ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην ᾅττειν τουτουὶ τοῦ Καυκάσου.”"". None | 2.5. And as they were passing over the summit of the mountain, going on foot, for it was very steep, Apollonius asked of Damis the following question. Tell me, he said, where we were yesterday. And he replied: On the plain. And today, O Damis, where are we? In the Caucasus, said he, if wholly I mistake not. Then when were you lower down than you are now? he asked again, and Damis replied: That's a question hardly worth asking. For yesterday we were traveling through the valley below, while today we are close up to heaven. Then you think, said the other, O Damis, that our road yesterday lay low down, whereas our road today lies high up? Yes, by Zeus, he replied, unless at least I'm mad. In what respect then, said Apollonius, do you suppose that our roads differ from one another, and what advantage has todays' path for you over that of yesterday? Because, said Damis, yesterday I was walking along where a great many people go, but today, where are very few. Well, said the other, O Damis, can you not also in a city turn out of the main street and walk where you will find very few people? I did not say that, replied Damis, but that yesterday we were passing through villages and populations, whereas today we are ascending through an untrodden and divine region: for you heard our guide say that the barbarians declare this tract to be the home of the gods. And with that he glanced up to the summit of the mountain. But Apollonius recalled his attention to the original question by saying: Can you tell me then, O Damis, what understanding of divine mystery you get by walking so near the heavens? None whatever, he replied. And yet you ought, said Apollonius. When your feet are placed on a platform so divine and vast as this, you ought henceforth to publish more accurate conceptions of the heaven and about the sun and moon, since you think, I suppose, that you will even lay a rod to them as you stand as close to the heavens here. Whatever, said he, I knew about God's nature yesterday, I equally know today, and so far no fresh idea has occurred to me concerning him.So then, replied the other, you are, O Damis, still below, and have won nothing from being high up, and you are as far from heaven as you were yesterday. And my question which I asked you to begin with was a fair one, although you thought that I asked it in order to make fun of you. The truth is, replied Damis, that I thought I should anyhow go down from the mountain wiser than I came up it, because I had heard, O Apollonius, that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae observed the heavenly bodies from the mountain Mimas in Ionia, and Thales of Miletus from Mycale which was close by his home; and some are said to have used as their observation mount Pangaeus and others Athos. But I have come up a greater height than any of these, and yet shall go down again no wiser than I was before. For neither did they, replied Apollonius: and such lookouts show you indeed a bluer heaven and bigger stars and the sun rising out of the night; but all these phenomena were manifest long ago to shepherds and goatherds, but neither Athos will reveal to those who climb up it, nor Olympus, so much extolled by the poets, in what way God cares for the human race and how he delights to be worshipped by them, nor reveal the nature of virtue and of justice and temperance, unless the soul scan these matters narrowly, and the soul, I should say, if it engages on the task pure and undefiled, will sour much higher than this summit of Caucasus."". None |
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18. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 303; Inwood and Warren (2020) 82
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19. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.7, 7.147, 9.34-9.35 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras • Anaxagoras of Clazomenae • happiness, in Anaxagoras
Found in books: Horkey (2019) 64; Inwood and Warren (2020) 132; Osborne (2001) 35; Taylor and Hay (2020) 148; Wolfsdorf (2020) 59
| 2.7. For, when they accused him of neglecting it, he replied, Why then do you not look after it? And at last he went into retirement and engaged in physical investigation without troubling himself about public affairs. When some one inquired, Have you no concern in your native land? Gently, he replied, I am greatly concerned with my fatherland, and pointed to the sky.He is said to have been twenty years old at the invasion of Xerxes and to have lived seventy-two years. Apollodorus in his Chronology says that he was born in the 70th Olympiad, and died in the first year of the 88th Olympiad. He began to study philosophy at Athens in the archonship of Callias when he was twenty; Demetrius of Phalerum states this in his list of archons; and at Athens they say he remained for thirty years.
7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.
9.34. 7. DEMOCRITUSDemocritus was the son of Hegesistratus, though some say of Athenocritus, and others again of Damasippus. He was a native of Abdera or, according to some, of Miletus. He was a pupil of certain Magians and Chaldaeans. For when King Xerxes was entertained by the father of Democritus he left men in charge, as, in fact, is stated by Herodotus; and from these men, while still a boy, he learned theology and astronomy. Afterwards he met Leucippus and, according to some, Anaxagoras, being forty years younger than the latter. But Favorinus in his Miscellaneous History tells us that Democritus, speaking of Anaxagoras, declared that his views on the sun and the moon were not original but of great antiquity, and that he had simply stolen them. 9.35. Democritus also pulled to pieces the views of Anaxagoras on cosmogony and on mind, having a spite against him, because Anaxagoras did not take to him. If this be so, how could he have been his pupil, as some suggest?According to Demetrius in his book on Men of the Same Name and Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers, he travelled into Egypt to learn geometry from the priests, and he also went into Persia to visit the Chaldaeans as well as to the Red Sea. Some say that he associated with the Gymnosophists in India and went to Aethiopia. Also that, being the third son, he divided the family property. Most authorities will have it that he chose the smaller portion, which was in money, because he had need of this to pay the cost of travel; besides, his brothers were crafty enough to foresee that this would be his choice.''. None |
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