1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 23.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 345| 23.3. "וַיָּקָם אַבְרָהָם מֵעַל פְּנֵי מֵתוֹ וַיְדַבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי־חֵת לֵאמֹר׃", | 23.3. "And Abraham rose up from before his dead, and spoke unto the children of Heth, saying:", |
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| 2. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 185 |
| 3. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 185 |
| 4. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 307, 320, 322 |
5. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on moral end Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 | 280e. Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them? Soc. |
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| 6. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 307 |
| 7. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 64 |
| 8. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 64 |
| 9. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 10. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 11. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 309, 316, 383 |
| 12. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 290 |
| 13. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 14. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 309 |
| 15. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 188 |
| 16. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 136 |
| 17. Euripides, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197 |
| 18. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 136 |
| 19. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 20. Xenophon, Symposium, 8.9-8.13 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 278 |
21. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252| 127d. ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν ποτε λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν περὶ ἧς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὔθʼ ἥτις οὔτʼ ἐν οἷστισιν· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδʼ αὐτὸς οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἴσχιστα ἔχων. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ᾔσθου πεπονθὼς | 127d. about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account. Alc. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition. Soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight |
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| 22. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 64 |
| 23. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 194, 241, 308, 327 |
| 24. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 56 |
| 25. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 291 |
| 26. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224, 277, 289, 292, 320, 322 |
| 27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 135, 233, 237, 241, 290, 298, 322, 323 |
| 28. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 255, 258, 264 |
| 29. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 30. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320, 322 |
| 31. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 2.3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 32. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 117, 133, 254, 261, 263, 264, 293, 313, 320, 322 |
| 33. Aristotle, Categories, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 304 |
| 34. Aristotle, History of Animals, 1.8-1.10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 255 |
| 35. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 304 |
| 36. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221 |
| 37. Timocles Comicus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224, 292 |
| 38. Timocles Comicus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224, 292 |
| 39. Democritus Ephesius, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
40. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 | 2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. |
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| 41. Cicero, On Fate, 9.20, 11.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, on physiognomics Found in books: Graver (2007) 171; Sorabji (2000) 320, 329, 333 |
42. Cicero, De Finibus, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 165, 233 | 2.96. "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.' |
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| 43. Philodemus, De Libertate Dicendi, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 44. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 45. Philodemus of Gadara, De Morte \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 46. Philodemus of Gadara, De Musica \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 234 |
47. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 181| 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V | 3.70. "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. |
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| 48. Cicero, Academica, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 65 |
49. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 79; Sorabji (2000) 111, 112, 241| 3.55. hoc enim fere tum habemus in promptu, promtu GR nihil oportere inopinatum videri. aut aut R, sed u del. R c qui sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) tolerabilius feret incommodum, qui cognoverit cognoverint X corr. R 2 V c necesse esse homini tale aliquid accidere? haec enim oratio de ipsa summa mali nihil detrahit, tantum modo adfert, nihil evenisse quod non opidum fuisset. neque tamen genus id orationis in consolando non valet, sed id haud sciam an plurimum. * ergo ista necopinata non habent tantam vim, ut aegritudo ex is omnis oriatur; feriunt enim fortasse gravius, non id efficiunt, ut ea, quae accidant maiora videantur: sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur, non quia repentina. Ergo... 18 repentina verba ipsa sana sunt ( cf. Herm. XLI p. 324 ), sed non suo loco posita. a Cicerone ipso, ut argumentationem §§ 52–54 concluderent, in chiro- grapho postea adscripta, ab Attici librariis autem falso loco inserta esse videntur. (nam id efficiunt ... videantur, sed maiora videntur, quia recentia sunt, non quia repentina We. ut ea quae accidant, mala videantur ... non quia repentina, mala Se, Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 244 ) | |
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| 50. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 51. Cicero, Letters, 12.14-12.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 177 |
| 52. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.58.236 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 290 |
53. Cicero, On Duties, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233| 1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. | 1.136. But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly â never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done. |
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| 54. Cicero, On Laws, 1.12.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 184 |
| 55. Cicero, Hortensius, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188 |
| 56. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 34, 111 |
| 57. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 10.5.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 |
58. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.44-1.49, 2.1-2.13, 2.251-2.293, 2.646-2.651, 3.31-3.93, 3.288-3.315, 3.830-3.1094, 4.886-4.887, 4.1058-4.1072, 4.1084-4.1120, 4.1160-4.1170, 4.1175-4.1184, 4.1190-4.1191, 4.1209-4.1287, 5.1218-5.1240, 6.379-6.422 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 222, 224, 228, 229, 235, 236, 237, 241, 243, 248, 264, 265, 267, 275, 283, 320, 333, 334| 1.44. omnis enim per se divum natura necessest 1.45. immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 1.46. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 1.47. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 1.48. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 1.49. nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira. 2.1. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis 2.2. e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 2.3. non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 2.4. sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest. 2.5. per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli; 2.6. suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri 2.7. sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 2.8. edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 2.9. despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 2.10. errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 2.11. certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 2.12. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 2.13. ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 2.251. Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis 2.252. et vetere exoritur motus novus ordine certo 2.253. nec declido faciunt primordia motus 2.254. principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, 2.255. ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 2.256. libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, 2.257. unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, 2.258. per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas, 2.259. declinamus item motus nec tempore certo 2.260. nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 2.261. nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 2.262. principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur. 2.263. nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore puncto 2.264. carceribus non posse tamen prorumpere equorum 2.265. vim cupidam tam de subito quam mens avet ipsa? 2.266. omnis enim totum per corpus materiai 2.267. copia conciri debet, concita per artus 2.268. omnis ut studium mentis conixa sequatur; 2.269. ut videas initum motus a corde creari 2.270. ex animique voluntate id procedere primum, 2.271. inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus. 2.272. nec similest ut cum inpulsi procedimus ictu 2.273. viribus alterius magnis magnoque coactu; 2.274. nam tum materiem totius corporis omnem 2.275. perspicuumst nobis invitis ire rapique, 2.276. donec eam refrenavit per membra voluntas. 2.277. iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multos 2.278. pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe 2.279. praecipitesque rapi, tamen esse in pectore nostro 2.280. quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit? 2.281. cuius ad arbitrium quoque copia materiai 2.282. cogitur inter dum flecti per membra per artus 2.283. et proiecta refrenatur retroque residit. 2.284. quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest, 2.285. esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam 2.286. motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas, 2.287. de nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. 2.288. pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant 2.289. externa quasi vi; sed ne res ipsa necessum 2.290. intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis 2.291. et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique, 2.292. id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum 2.293. nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 2.646. omnis enim per se divom natura necessest 2.647. inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 2.648. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 2.649. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 2.650. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 2.651. nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira. 3.31. Et quoniam docui, cunctarum exordia rerum 3.32. qualia sint et quam variis distantia formis 3.33. sponte sua volitent aeterno percita motu, 3.34. quove modo possint res ex his quaeque creari, 3.35. hasce secundum res animi natura videtur 3.36. atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse 3.37. et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, 3.38. funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo 3.39. omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam 3.40. esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit. 3.41. nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos 3.42. infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti 3.43. et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse, 3.44. aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, 3.45. nec prosum quicquam nostrae rationis egere, 3.46. hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis 3.47. iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur. 3.48. extorres idem patria longeque fugati 3.49. conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 3.50. omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt, 3.51. et quo cumque tamen miseri venere parentant 3.52. et nigras mactant pecudes et manibus divis 3.53. inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 3.54. acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 3.55. quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 3.56. convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit; 3.57. nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo 3.58. eliciuntur et eripitur persona amanare. 3.59. denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido, 3.60. quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 3.61. iuris et inter dum socios scelerum atque ministros 3.62. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 3.63. ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 3.64. non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 3.65. turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 3.66. semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 3.67. et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante; 3.68. unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 3.69. effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 3.70. sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 3.71. conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 3.72. crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 3.73. et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.78. intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo. 3.79. et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae 3.80. percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 3.81. ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum 3.82. obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem: 3.83. hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai 3.84. rumpere et in summa pietate evertere suadet: 3.85. nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 3.86. prodiderunt vitare Acherusia templa petentes. 3.87. nam vel uti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 3.88. in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 3.89. inter dum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 3.90. quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 3.91. hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 3.92. non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 3.93. discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 3.288. est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira 3.289. cum fervescit et ex oculis micat acrius ardor; 3.290. est et frigida multa, comes formidinis, aura, 3.291. quae ciet horrorem membris et concitat artus; 3.292. est etiam quoque pacati status aeris aëris ille, 3.293. pectore tranquillo fit qui voltuque sereno. 3.294. sed calidi plus est illis quibus acria corda 3.295. iracundaque mens facile effervescit in ira, 3.296. quo genere in primis vis est violenta leonum, 3.297. pectora qui fremitu rumpunt plerumque gementes 3.298. nec capere irarum fluctus in pectore possunt. 3.299. at ventosa magis cervorum frigida mens est 3.300. et gelidas citius per viscera concitat auras, 3.301. quae tremulum faciunt membris existere motum. 3.302. at natura boum placido magis aere aëre vivit 3.303. nec nimis irai fax umquam subdita percit 3.304. fumida, suffundens caecae caliginis umbra, 3.305. nec gelidis torpet telis perfixa pavoris; 3.306. interutrasque sitast cervos saevosque leones. 3.307. sic hominum genus est: quamvis doctrina politos 3.308. constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit 3.309. naturae cuiusque animi vestigia prima. 3.310. nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst, 3.311. quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acris, 3.312. ille metu citius paulo temptetur, at ille 3.313. tertius accipiat quaedam clementius aequo. 3.314. inque aliis rebus multis differre necessest 3.315. naturas hominum varias moresque sequacis; 3.830. Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 3.831. quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur. 3.832. et vel ut ante acto nihil tempore sensimus aegri, 3.833. ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, 3.834. omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu 3.835. horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, 3.836. in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum 3.837. omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, 3.838. sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 3.839. discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, 3.840. scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 3.841. accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.842. non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo. 3.843. et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 3.844. distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, 3.845. nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 3.846. corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 3.847. nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 3.848. post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, 3.849. atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, 3.850. pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 3.851. interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. 3.852. et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante 3.853. qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor. 3.854. nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne 3.855. praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 3.856. multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis, 3.857. semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta 3.858. haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. 3.859. nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente; 3.860. inter enim iectast vitai pausa vageque 3.861. deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. 3.862. debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst; 3.863. ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit 3.864. accidere. id quoniam mors eximit, esseque prohibet 3.865. illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 3.866. scire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum 3.867. nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum 3.868. differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, 3.869. mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit. 3.870. Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 3.871. post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto 3.872. aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum, 3.873. scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse 3.874. caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse 3.875. credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum; 3.876. non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde 3.877. nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, 3.878. sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. 3.879. vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, 3.880. corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 3.881. ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim 3.882. nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum 3.883. se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans. 3.884. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum 3.885. nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 3.886. qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum 3.887. stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. 3.888. nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum 3.889. tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum 3.890. ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis 3.891. aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere 3.892. frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi, 3.893. urgerive superne obrutum pondere terrae. 3.894. 'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor 3.895. optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 3.896. praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 3.897. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 3.898. praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 3.899. una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.' 3.900. illud in his rebus non addunt 'nec tibi earum 3.901. iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.' 3.902. quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, 3.903. dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. 3.904. 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 3.905. quod super est cunctis privatus doloribus aegris; 3.906. at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 3.907. insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 3.908. nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.' 3.909. illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari 3.910. tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem, 3.911. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 3.950. quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 3.951. naturam et veram verbis exponere causam? 3.952. grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur 3.953. atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo, 3.954. non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri: 3.955. 'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas. 3.956. omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 3.957. sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 3.958. inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 3.959. et nec opiti mors ad caput adstitit ante 3.960. quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 3.961. nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte 3.962. aequo animoque, age dum, magnis concede necessis?' 3.963. iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque; 3.964. cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas 3.965. semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. 3.966. Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra; 3.967. materies opus est, ut crescant postera saecla; 3.968. quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; 3.969. nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere cadentque. 3.970. sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri 3.971. vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 3.972. respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas 3.973. temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. 3.974. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 3.975. temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 3.976. numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 3.977. quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? 3.978. Atque ea ni mirum quae cumque Acherunte profundo 3.979. prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. 3.980. nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere aëre saxum 3.981. Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; 3.982. sed magis in vita divom metus urget iis 3.983. mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors. 3.984. nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem 3.985. nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 3.986. perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto. 3.987. quam libet immani proiectu corporis exstet, 3.988. qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris 3.989. optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem, 3.990. non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 3.991. nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper. 3.992. sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem 3.993. quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 3.994. aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.995. Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 3.996. qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 3.997. imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 3.998. nam petere imperium, quod iest nec datur umquam, 3.999. atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 3.1000. hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 3.1001. saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rusum 3.1002. volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 3.1003. deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 3.1004. atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam, 3.1005. quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 3.1006. cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 3.1007. nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam, 3.1008. hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas 3.1009. quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 3.1010. quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 3.1011. Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas, 3.1012. Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus! 3.1013. qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto; 3.1014. sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 3.1015. est insignibus insignis scelerisque luela, 3.1016. carcer et horribilis de saxo iactus deorsum, 3.1017. verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 3.1018. quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 3.1019. praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 3.1020. nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 3.1021. possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 3.1022. atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 3.1023. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. 3.1024. Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis. 3.1025. 'lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit, 3.1026. qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. 3.1027. inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes 3.1028. occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt. 3.1029. ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum 3.1030. stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 3.1031. ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas 3.1032. et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti, 3.1033. lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit. 3.1034. Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, 3.1035. ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 3.1036. adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum, 3.1037. adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus 3.1038. sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitus quietest. 3.1039. denique Democritum post quam matura vetustas 3.1040. admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 3.1041. sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse. 3.1042. ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 3.1043. qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 3.1044. restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. 3.1045. tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 3.1046. mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti, 3.1047. qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi, 3.1048. et viligans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 3.1049. sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 3.1050. nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 3.1051. ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 3.1052. atque animo incerto fluitans errore vagaris.' 3.1053. Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 3.1054. pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget, 3.1055. e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 3.1056. tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet, 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1068. hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, 3.1069. effugere haut potis est: ingratius haeret et odit 3.1070. propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 3.1071. quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis 3.1072. naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum, 3.1073. temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 3.1074. ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis 3.1075. aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manendo. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 4.886. ergo animus cum sese ita commovet ut velit ire 4.887. inque gredi, ferit extemplo quae in corpore toto 4.1058. Haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen Amoris, 4.1059. hinc illaec primum Veneris dulcedinis in cor 4.1060. stillavit gutta et successit frigida cura; 4.1061. nam si abest quod ames, praesto simulacra tamen sunt 4.1062. illius et nomen dulce obversatur ad auris. 4.1063. sed fugitare decet simulacra et pabula amoris 4.1064. absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem 4.1065. et iacere umorem coniectum in corpora quaeque 4.1066. nec retinere semel conversum unius amore 4.1067. et servare sibi curam certumque dolorem; 4.1068. ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo 4.1069. inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit, 4.1070. si non prima novis conturbes volnera plagis 4.1071. volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures 4.1072. aut alio possis animi traducere motus. 4.1084. sed leviter poenas frangit Venus inter amorem 4.1085. blandaque refrenat morsus admixta voluptas. 4.1086. namque in eo spes est, unde est ardoris origo, 4.1087. restingui quoque posse ab eodem corpore flammam. 4.1088. quod fieri contra totum natura repugnat; 4.1089. unaque res haec est, cuius quam plurima habemus, 4.1090. tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus. 4.1091. nam cibus atque umor membris adsumitur intus; 4.1092. quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis, 4.1093. hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido. 4.1094. ex hominis vero facie pulchroque colore 4.1095. nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra fruendum 4.1096. tenvia; quae vento spes raptast saepe misella. 4.1097. ut bibere in somnis sitiens quom quaerit et umor 4.1098. non datur, ardorem qui membris stinguere possit, 4.1099. sed laticum simulacra petit frustraque laborat 4.1100. in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans, 4.1101. sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis, 4.1102. nec satiare queunt spectando corpora coram 4.1103. nec manibus quicquam teneris abradere membris 4.1104. possunt errantes incerti corpore toto. 4.1105. denique cum membris conlatis flore fruuntur 4.1106. aetatis, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus 4.1107. atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat arva, 4.1108. adfigunt avide corpus iunguntque salivas 4.1109. oris et inspirant pressantes dentibus ora, 4.1110. ne quiquam, quoniam nihil inde abradere possunt 4.1111. nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto; 4.1112. nam facere inter dum velle et certare videntur. 4.1113. usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent, 4.1114. membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt. 4.1115. tandem ubi se erupit nervis coniecta cupido, 4.1116. parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper. 4.1117. inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit, 4.1118. cum sibi quod cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt, 4.1119. nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat. 4.1120. usque adeo incerti tabescunt volnere caeco. 4.1160. nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, 4.1161. caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, 4.1162. parvula, pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, 4.1163. magna atque inmanis cataplexis plenaque honoris. 4.1164. balba loqui non quit, traulizi, muta pudens est; 4.1165. at flagrans, odiosa, loquacula Lampadium fit. 4.1166. ischnon eromenion tum fit, cum vivere non quit 4.1167. prae macie; rhadine verost iam mortua tussi. 4.1168. at nimia et mammosa Ceres est ipsa ab Iaccho, 4.1169. simula Silena ac Saturast, labeosa philema. 4.1170. cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 4.1175. et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 4.1176. quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachint. 4.1177. at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 4.1178. floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 4.1179. unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 4.1180. quem si iam ammissum venientem offenderit aura 4.1181. una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 4.1182. et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella 4.1183. stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 4.1184. plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 4.1190. et, si bello animost et non odiosa, vicissim 4.1191. praetermittere et humanis concedere rebus. 4.1209. Et commiscendo quom semine forte virilem 4.1210. femina vim vicit subita vi corripuitque, 4.1211. tum similes matrum materno semine fiunt, 4.1212. ut patribus patrio. sed quos utriusque figurae 4.1213. esse vides, iuxtim miscentes vulta parentum, 4.1214. corpore de patrio et materno sanguine crescunt, 4.1215. semina cum Veneris stimulis excita per artus 4.1216. obvia conflixit conspirans mutuus ardor, 4.1217. et neque utrum superavit eorum nec superatumst. 4.1218. fit quoque ut inter dum similes existere avorum 4.1219. possint et referant proavorum saepe figuras, 4.1220. propterea quia multa modis primordia multis 4.1221. mixta suo celant in corpore saepe parentis, 4.1222. quae patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta. 4.1223. inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras, 4.1224. maiorumque refert voltus vocesque comasque; 4.1225. quandoquidem nihilo magis haec de semine certo 4.1226. fiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis. 4.1227. et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclum 4.1228. maternoque mares existunt corpore creti; 4.1229. semper enim partus duplici de semine constat, 4.1230. atque utri similest magis id quod cumque creatur, 4.1231. eius habet plus parte aequa; quod cernere possis, 4.1232. sive virum suboles sivest muliebris origo. 4.1233. Nec divina satum genitalem numina cuiquam 4.1234. absterrent, pater a gnatis ne dulcibus umquam 4.1235. appelletur et ut sterili Venere exigat aevom; 4.1236. quod plerumque putant et multo sanguine maesti 4.1237. conspergunt aras adolentque altaria donis, 4.1238. ut gravidas reddant uxores semine largo; 4.1239. ne quiquam divom numen sortisque fatigant; 4.1240. nam steriles nimium crasso sunt semine partim, 4.1241. et liquido praeter iustum tenuique vicissim. 4.1242. tenve locis quia non potis est adfigere adhaesum, 4.1243. liquitur extemplo et revocatum cedit abortu. 4.1244. crassius hinc porro quoniam concretius aequo 4.1245. mittitur, aut non tam prolixo provolat ictu 4.1246. aut penetrare locos aeque nequit aut penetratum 4.1247. aegre admiscetur muliebri semine semen. 4.1248. nam multum harmoniae Veneris differre videntur. 4.1249. atque alias alii complent magis ex aliisque 4.1250. succipiunt aliae pondus magis inque gravescunt. 4.1251. et multae steriles Hymenaeis ante fuerunt 4.1252. pluribus et nactae post sunt tamen unde puellos 4.1253. suscipere et partu possent ditescere dulci. 4.1254. et quibus ante domi fecundae saepe nequissent 4.1255. uxoris parere, inventast illis quoque compar 4.1256. natura, ut possent gnatis munire senectam. 4.1257. usque adeo magni refert, ut semina possint 4.1258. seminibus commisceri genitaliter apta 4.1259. crassaque conveniant liquidis et liquida crassis. 4.1260. atque in eo refert quo victu vita colatur; 4.1261. namque aliis rebus concrescunt semina membris 4.1262. atque aliis extenvantur tabentque vicissim. 4.1263. et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas. 4.1264. id quoque permagni refert; nam more ferarum 4.1265. quadrupedumque magis ritu plerumque putantur 4.1266. concipere uxores, quia sic loca sumere possunt 4.1267. pectoribus positis sublatis semina lumbis. 4.1268. nec molles opus sunt motus uxoribus hilum. 4.1269. nam mulier prohibet se concipere atque repugnat, 4.1270. clunibus ipsa viri Venerem si laeta retractat 4.1271. atque exossato ciet omni pectore fluctus; 4.1272. eicit enim sulcum recta regione viaque 4.1273. vomeris atque locis avertit seminis ictum. 4.1274. idque sua causa consuerunt scorta moveri, 4.1275. ne complerentur crebro gravidaeque iacerent, 4.1276. et simul ipsa viris Venus ut concinnior esset; 4.1277. coniugibus quod nil nostris opus esse videtur. 4.1278. Nec divinitus inter dum Venerisque sagittis 4.1279. deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur; 4.1280. nam facit ipsa suis inter dum femina factis 4.1281. morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, 4.1282. ut facile insuescat secum te degere vitam. 4.1283. quod super est, consuetudo concinnat amorem; 4.1284. nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 4.1285. vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. 4.1286. nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis 4.1287. umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa? 5.1218. praeterea cui non animus formidine divum 5.1219. contrahitur, cui non correpunt membra pavore, 5.1220. fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus 5.1221. contremit et magnum percurrunt murmura caelum? 5.1222. non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi 5.1223. corripiunt divum percussi membra timore, 5.1224. ne quod ob admissum foede dictumve superbe 5.1225. poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adauctum? 5.1226. summa etiam cum vis violenti per mare venti 5.1227. induperatorem classis super aequora verrit 5.1228. cum validis pariter legionibus atque elephantis, 5.1229. non divom pacem votis adit ac prece quaesit 5.1230. ventorum pavidus paces animasque secundas? 5.1231. ne quiquam, quoniam violento turbine saepe 5.1232. correptus nihilo fertur minus ad vada leti. 5.1233. usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam 5.1234. opterit et pulchros fascis saevasque secures 5.1235. proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur. 5.1236. denique sub pedibus tellus cum tota vacillat 5.1237. concussaeque cadunt urbes dubiaeque mitur, 5.1238. quid mirum si se temnunt mortalia saecla 5.1239. atque potestatis magnas mirasque relinquunt 5.1240. in rebus viris divum, quae cuncta gubernent? 6.379. Hoc est igniferi naturam fulminis ipsam 6.380. perspicere et qua vi faciat rem quamque videre, 6.381. non Tyrrhena retro volventem carmina frustra 6.382. indicia occultae divum perquirere mentis, 6.383. unde volans ignis pervenerit aut in utram se 6.384. verterit hinc partim, quo pacto per loca saepta 6.385. insinuarit, et hinc dominatus ut extulerit se, 6.386. quidve nocere queat de caelo fulminis ictus. 6.387. quod si Iuppiter atque alii fulgentia divi 6.388. terrifico quatiunt sonitu caelestia templa 6.389. et iaciunt ignem quo cuiquest cumque voluntas, 6.390. cur quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumquest 6.391. non faciunt icti flammas ut fulguris halent 6.392. pectore perfixo, documen mortalibus acre, 6.393. et potius nulla sibi turpi conscius in re 6.394. volvitur in flammis innoxius inque peditur 6.395. turbine caelesti subito correptus et igni? 6.396. cur etiam loca sola petunt frustraque laborant? 6.397. an tum bracchia consuescunt firmantque lacertos? 6.398. in terraque patris cur telum perpetiuntur 6.399. optundi? cur ipse sinit neque parcit in hostis? 6.400. denique cur numquam caelo iacit undique puro 6.401. Iuppiter in terras fulmen sonitusque profundit? 6.402. an simul ac nubes successere, ipse in eas tum 6.403. descendit, prope ut hinc teli determinet ictus? 6.404. in mare qua porro mittit ratione? quid undas 6.405. arguit et liquidam molem camposque natantis? 6.406. praeterea si vult caveamus fulminis ictum, 6.407. cur dubitat facere ut possimus cernere missum? 6.408. si nec opitis autem volt opprimere igni, 6.409. cur tonat ex illa parte, ut vitare queamus, 6.410. cur tenebras ante et fremitus et murmura concit? 6.411. et simul in multas partis qui credere possis 6.412. mittere? an hoc ausis numquam contendere factum, 6.413. ut fierent ictus uno sub tempore plures? 6.414. at saepest numero factum fierique necessest, 6.415. ut pluere in multis regionibus et cadere imbris, 6.416. fulmina sic uno fieri sub tempore multa. 6.417. postremo cur sancta deum delubra suasque 6.418. discutit infesto praeclaras fulmine sedes 6.419. et bene facta deum frangit simulacra suisque 6.420. demit imaginibus violento volnere honorem? 6.421. altaque cur plerumque petit loca plurimaque eius 6.422. montibus in summis vestigia cernimus ignis? | |
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| 59. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 1.29, 2.4, 2.57, 4.74, 4.177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Sorabji (2000) 345, 346, 385 |
| 60. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 345, 385 |
| 61. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 17.109 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246 |
62. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 144, 177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 177. For absolutely never to do anything wrong at all is a peculiar attribute of God, and perhaps one may also say of a God-like man. But when one has erred, then to change so as to adopt a blameless course of life for the future is the part of a wise man, and of one who is not altogether ignorant of what is expedient. |
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63. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.103, 2.115, 2.138, 3.113 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 276, 386 | 1.103. For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers become united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts. For the scars and impressions of their old offences remain not the less in the souls of those who repent. 2.115. And at the same time it sympathises with the man who is in too great a state of indigence to do so, and bestows its compassion on him, giving him back his former property with the exception of any fields which have been consecrated by a vow, and are so placed in the class of offerings to God. And it is contrary to divine law that any thing which has been offered to God should ever by lapse of time become profane. On which account it is commanded that the accurate value of those fields shall be fully exacted, without showing any favour to the man who dedicated the offering.XXIII. 2.138. Secondly, it shows mercy and compassion on those who have been treated unjustly, whose burden of distress it lightens by giving them a share in grace and gift; for the double portion of the inheriting son was no less likely to please the mother, who will be encouraged by the kindness of the law, which did not permit her and her offspring to be totally overcome by their enemies. 3.113. for those men are devoted to pleasure who are not influenced by the wish of propagating children, and of perpetuating their race, when they have connection with women, but who are only like boars or he-goats seeking the enjoyment that arises from such a connection. Again, who can be greater haters of their species than those who are the implacable and ferocious enemies of their own children? Unless, indeed, any one is so foolish as to imagine that these men can be humane to strangers who act in a barbarous manner to those who are united to them by ties of blood. |
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64. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.91 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 1.91. Why so? Because, even if the mind, fancying that though it does wrong it can escape the notice of the Deity as not being able to see everything, should sin secretly and in dark places, and should after that, either by reason of its own notions or through the suggestions of some one else, conceive that it is impossible that anything should be otherwise than clear to God, and should disclose itself and all its actions, and should bring them forward, as it were, out of the light of the sun, and display them to the governor of the universe, saying, that it repents of the perverse conduct which it formerly exhibited when under the influence of foolish opinion (for that nothing is indistinct before God, but all things are known and clear to him, not merely such as have been done, but even such are merely hoped or designed, by reason of the boundless character of his wisdom), it then is purified and benefited, and it propitiates the chastiser who was ready to punish it, namely, conscience, who was previously filled with just anger towards it, and who now admits repentance as the younger brother of perfect innocence and freedom from sin. XVI. |
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65. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 121 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 | 121. These then, to speak with strict propriety are the prices to be paid for the preserving and ransoming of the soul which is desirous of freedom. And may we not say that in this way a very necessary doctrine is brought forward? Namely that every wise man is a ransom for a worthless one, who would not be able to last for even a short time, if the wise man by the exertion of mercy and prudence did not take thought for his lasting; as a physician opposing himself to the infirmities of an invalid, and either rendering them slighter, or altogether removing them unless the disease comes on with irresistible violence, and surmounts all the ingenuity of medical skill. |
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66. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 67, 137 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 | 137. Come, and at once abandoning all other things, learn to know yourselves, and tell us plainly what ye yourselves are in respect of your bodies, in respect of your souls, in respect of your external senses, and in respect of your reason. Tell us now with respect to one, and that the smallest, perhaps, of the senses, what sight is, and how it is that you see; tell us what hearing is, and how it is that you hear; tell us what taste is, what touch is, what smell is, and how it is that you exercise the energies of each of these faculties; and what the sources of them are from which they originate. |
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| 67. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Joseph, 82 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 68. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
69. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 256-257, 26 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 233, 386 | 26. But we must not be ignorant that repentance occupies the second place only, next after perfection, just as the change from sickness to convalescence is inferior to perfect uninterrupted health. Therefore, that which is continuous and perfect in virtues is very near divine power, but that condition which is improvement advancing in process of time is the peculiar blessing of a welldisposed soul, which does not continue in its childish pursuits, but by more vigorous thoughts and inclinations, such as really become a man, seeks a tranquil steadiness of soul, and which attains to it by its conception of what is good. V. |
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70. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 1.35-1.40, 2.657-2.662 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 222, 279| 1.35. Principio, quod amare velis, reperire labora, 1.36. rend= 1.37. Proximus huic labor est placitam exorare puellam: 1.38. rend= 1.39. Hic modus, haec nostro signabitur area curru: 1.40. rend= 2.657. Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur, 2.658. rend= 2.659. Si straba, sit Veneri similis: si rava, Minervae: 2.660. rend= 2.661. Dic habilem, quaecumque brevis, quae turgida, plenam, 2.662. rend= | |
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| 71. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 2.8, 3.128-3.134, 3.140-3.147 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385, 386 |
72. New Testament, Galatians, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315| 5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε. | 5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. |
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| 73. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 197, 235, 236 |
| 74. Plutarch, Consolation To His Wife, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
75. New Testament, Matthew, 4.1-4.11, 5.7, 5.28, 13.24, 15.19, 26.37, 26.39, 26.41 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 219, 317, 320, 346, 349, 351, 353, 354, 372, 391, 397| 4.1. Τότε [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς ἀνήχθη εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. 4.2. καὶ νηστεύσας ἡμέρας τεσσεράκοντα καὶ νύκτας τεσσεράκοντα ὕστερον ἐπείνασεν. 4.3. Καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ πειράζων εἶπεν αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὸν ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται. 4.4. ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν Γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ. 4.5. Τότε παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν, καὶ ἔστησεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ, 4.6. καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν κάτω· γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι Τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε, μή ποτε προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου. 4.7. ἔφη αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Πάλιν γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου. 4.8. Πάλιν παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν λίαν, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ πάσας τὰς βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, 4.9. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ταῦτά σοι πάντα δώσω ἐὰν πεσὼν προσκυνήσῃς μοι. 4.10. τότε λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ὕπαγε, Σατανᾶ· γέγραπται γάρ Κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις. 4.11. Τότε ἀφίησιν αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄγγελοι προσῆλθον καὶ διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 5.7. μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. 5.28. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι [αὐτὴν] ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. 13.24. Ἄλλην παραβολὴν παρέθηκεν αὐτοῖς λέγων Ὡμοιώθη ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀνθρώπῳ σπείραντι καλὸν σπέρμα ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ αὐτοῦ. 15.19. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς καρδίας ἐξέρχονται διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί, φόνοι, μοιχεῖαι, πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, ψευδομαρτυρίαι, βλασφημίαι. 26.37. καὶ παραλαβὼν τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς δύο υἱοὺς Ζεβεδαίου ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν. 26.39. καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλʼ ὡς σύ. 26.41. γρηγορεῖτε καὶ προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς πειρασμόν· τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής. | 4.1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil. 4.2. When he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was hungry afterward. 4.3. The tempter came and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread." 4.4. But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God.'" 4.5. Then the devil took him into the holy city. He set him on the pinnacle of the temple, 4.6. and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge concerning you.' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, So that you don't dash your foot against a stone.'" 4.7. Jesus said to him, "Again, it is written, 'You shall not test the Lord, your God.'" 4.8. Again, the devil took him to an exceedingly high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and their glory. 4.9. He said to him, "I will give you all of these things, if you will fall down and worship me." 4.10. Then Jesus said to him, "Get behind me, Satan! For it is written, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.'" 4.11. Then the devil left him, and behold, angels came and ministered to him. 5.7. Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy. 5.28. but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. 13.24. He set another parable before them, saying, "The Kingdom of Heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field, 15.19. For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, sexual sins, thefts, false testimony, and blasphemies. 26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled. 26.39. He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire." 26.41. Watch and pray, that you don't enter into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." |
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76. New Testament, Mark, 1.12-1.13, 7.21-7.22, 14.33, 14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320, 346, 350, 353, 369| 1.12. Καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν ἐκβάλλει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον. 1.13. καὶ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρας πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ, καὶ ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων, καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι διηκόνουν αὐτῷ. 7.21. ἔσωθεν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ διαλογισμοὶ οἱ κακοὶ ἐκπορεύονται, πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, φόνοι, 7.22. μοιχεῖαι, πλεονεξίαι, πονηρίαι, δόλος, ἀσέλγεια, ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός, βλασφημία, ὑπερηφανία, ἀφροσύνη· 14.33. καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τὸν Ἰάκωβον καὶ τὸν Ἰωάνην μετʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἤρξατο ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν, 14.36. καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ. | 1.12. Immediately the Spirit drove him out into the wilderness. 1.13. He was there in the wilderness forty days tempted by Satan. He was with the wild animals; and the angels ministered to him. 7.21. For from within, out of the hearts of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, sexual sins, murders, thefts, 7.22. covetings, wickedness, deceit, lustful desires, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, and foolishness. 14.33. He took with him Peter, James, and John, and began to be greatly troubled and distressed. 14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire." |
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77. New Testament, Luke, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353| 4.4. καὶ ἀπεκρίθη πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Ἰησοῦς Γέγραπται ὅτι Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. | 4.4. Jesus answered him, saying, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God.'" |
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| 78. Epictetus, Discourses, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 79. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 2.2, 19.2, 31.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 184, 214, 216, 236 |
| 80. Epictetus, Fragments, 9.85-9.86 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 81. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 82. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
83. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.26, 6.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349| 4.26. ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε· ὁ ἥλιος μὴ ἐπιδυέτω ἐπὶ παροργισμῷ ὑμῶν, 6.12. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. | 4.26. "Be angry, and don't sin." Don't let the sun go down on your wrath, 6.12. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world's rulers of the darkness of this age, and against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places. |
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84. New Testament, Romans, 6.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 350| 6.10. ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ· | 6.10. For the death that he died, he died to sin one time; but the life that he lives, he lives to God. |
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85. New Testament, Hebrews, 2.13-2.14, 4.15, 5.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349, 351, 352| 2.13. καὶ πάλιν 2.14. ἐπεὶ οὖντὰ παιδίακεκοινώνηκεν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός, καὶ αὐτὸς παραπλησίως μετέσχεν τῶν αὐτῶν, ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸν διάβολον, 4.15. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἀρχιερέα μὴ δυνάμενον συνπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν, πεπειρασμένον δὲ κατὰ πάντα καθʼ ὁμοιότητα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. 5.7. ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, δεήσεις τε καὶ ἱκετηρίας πρὸς τὸν δυνάμενον σώζειν αὐτὸν ἐκ θανάτου μετὰ κραυγῆς ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ δακρύων προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας, | 2.13. Again, "I will put my trust in him." Again, "Behold, here am I and the children whom God has given me." 2.14. Since then the children have shared in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death he might bring to nothing him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, 4.15. For we don't have a high priest who can't be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one who has been in all points tempted like we are, yet without sin. 5.7. He, in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and petitions with strong crying and tears to him who was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear, |
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| 86. Plutarch, How To Profit By One'S Enemies, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 87. Cebes of Thebes, Cebetis Tabula, 18.4-18.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 88. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.3.7-6.3.8, 6.3.82 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 290, 291 |
| 89. Aspasius, Nicomachian Ethics, 42.27-47.2, 42.31-43.2, 42.33-44.8, 43.30, 43.31, 44.21, 44.22, 44.33-45.10, 45.31-46.3, 46.4, 46.5, 46.10, 46.11, 46.12, 46.27, 46.28, 46.29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 136 |
| 90. Seneca The Younger, De Providentia (Dialogorum Liber I), 6.6-6.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214 |
| 91. Plutarch, On The Sign of Socrates, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 |
| 92. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 93. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 94. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Polybium (Ad Polybium De Consolatione) (Dialogorum Liber Xi), 18.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 95. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.6, 5.16, 6.1, 9, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 10, 11, 11.1, 12.4, 12.5-16.4, 12.5, 19.1, 20.2, 20.3, 23, 24, 24.5-25.3, 26, 26.6, 26.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 96. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 192, 390 |
| 97. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 4.39, 7.2.4-7.2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 219, 235 |
| 98. Seneca The Younger, Apocolocyntosis, 8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 99. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 230 |
| 100. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 101. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 1.2, 1.5, 2.3, 13.2-13.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 182, 218, 219 |
| 102. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 103. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 4.2.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 |
| 104. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 105. Plutarch, How To Tell A Flatterer From A Friend, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 218 |
| 106. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 107. Plutarch, Table Talk, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 295 |
| 108. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 2.59.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 379 |
| 109. Plutarch, On Being A Busybody, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 |
| 110. Seneca The Younger, Letters, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 111. Plutarch, On The E At Delphi, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 162, 245, 247, 248 |
| 112. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 6.3.7-6.3.8, 6.3.82 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 290, 291 |
| 113. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 114. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 16.3, 22.1, 22.4, 23.5, 24.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170, 171, 172, 184 |
| 115. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 |
| 116. Galen, On Affected Parts, 6.15 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 117. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.25-1.30, 2.31, 3.235-3.237 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 182, 198, 199, 200, 254, 271 |
| 118. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 119. Apuleius, On Plato, 2.20.247 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 196 |
| 120. Apuleius, Apology, 15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 175, 214 |
| 121. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.228-7.231, 7.234, 9.71-9.72, 9.110 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on impressions •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 25, 225 |
| 122. Gellius, Attic Nights, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 65, 233 |
| 123. Galen, That The Qualities of The Mind Depend On The Temperament of The Body, 36.12, 36.13, 36.14, 36.15, 36.16, 39, 41, 42.11-43.19, 44.7, 44.8, 44.12, 44.13, 44.14, 44.15, 44.16, 44.17, 44.18, 44.19, 44.20, 45, 47, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64.19, 64.19-65.1, 64.20, 64.21, 64.22, 64.23, 64.24, 64.25, 64.26, 64.27, 64.28, 64.29, 64.30, 64.31, 64.32, 64.33, 64.34, 64.35, 64.36, 64.37, 64.38, 64.39, 64.40, 64.41, 64.42, 64.43, 64.44, 64.45, 64.46, 64.47, 64.48, 64.49, 64.50, 64.51, 64.52, 64.53, 64.54, 64.55, 64.56, 64.57, 64.58, 64.59, 64.60, 64.61, 64.62, 64.63, 64.64, 64.65, 67.2, 67.3, 67.4, 67.5, 67.6, 67.7, 67.8, 67.9, 67.10, 67.11, 67.12, 67.13, 67.14, 67.15, 67.16, 70.11, 70.12, 70.13, 70.14, 71.19-72.18, 73.3, 73.6, 73.7, 73.8, 73.9, 73.10, 73.11, 73.12, 73.13-74.21, 74.21-75.1, 74.21-77.1, 75.1, 76.1-77.1, 77.17-79.2, 78.2, 78.3, 78.4, 78.5, 78.6, 78.7, 78.8, 78.9, 78.10, 78.11, 78.12, 78.13, 78.14, 78.15, 78.16, 78.17, 78.18, 78.19, 79, 79.4, 79.5, 79.6, 79.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 255 |
| 124. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 56, 60 |
| 125. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, None (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
| 126. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary On Aristotle'S Prior Analytics I, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 243 |
| 127. Tertullian, On Patience, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 128. Hierocles Stoicus, , 4.38-4.53 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007) 24 |
| 129. Hippolytus, Apostolic Tradition, 15-16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 401 |
| 130. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.2.2, 1.5.5, 1.29.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315, 334 |
| 131. Justin, First Apology, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 132. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 23.185.32-23.185.35, 26.179.10-26.179.11, 30.184.20-30.184.36, 31.184.37-31.184.40, 32.185.37, 32.186.15-32.186.24 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 122, 134, 162, 191, 196, 279, 324 |
| 133. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1, 2.1.13, 2.10.90-2.10.102 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 216, 276, 284, 389 |
| 134. Clement of Alexandria, A Discourse Concerning The Salvation of Rich Men, 12.1, 21.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 135. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 136. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 10.14, 10.15, 10.16, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19, 10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 10.25, 10.26, 12.16, 12.17, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 24.4, 24.5, 24.18-25.9, 24.18, 24.19, 24.20, 24.21, 24.22, 24.23, 25.2, 25.3, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 25.7, 25.8, 25.9, 26.7, 26.8, 26.9, 26.10, 26.11, 26.12, 26.13, 26.14, 26.15, 26.16, 26.17, 26.18, 26.19, 26.20, 26.21, 26.22, 26.23, 26.24, 26.25, 26.26, 26.27, 26.28, 26.29, 26.30, 72.26-73.2, 76.14-77.8 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 261 |
| 137. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 138. Aelian, Varia Historia, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197, 235 |
| 139. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 3.216, 10.224 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 140. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 2.1, 2.5, 2.14, 3.12, 4.50, 6.32, 7.29, 7.69, 8.36, 9.6, 11.26, 12.1, 12.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214, 220, 235, 239, 240, 241 |
| 141. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 13, 33, 182.8-20, 199.19, 199.20, 205.15-22 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333 |
| 142. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 27.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 196 |
| 143. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries On Eight Books of Aristotle'S Topics, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 281 |
| 144. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 188, 252 |
| 145. Tertullian, On The Soul, 20.5, 21.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 146. Origen, Homilies On Luke, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 365 |
| 147. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
148. Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 40 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213 | 40. He advised special regard to two times; that when we go to sleep, and that when we awake. At each of these we should consider our past actions, and those that are to come. We ought to require of ourselves an account of our past deeds, while of the future we should have a providential care. Therefore he advised everybody to repeat to himself the following verses before he fell asleep: "Nor suffer sleep to close thine eyes Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast run o'er;How slipt? What deeds? What duty left undone?" On rising: "As soon as ere thou wakest, in order lay The actions to be done that following day" SPAN |
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| 149. Origen, Commentary On Matthew, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
150. Origen, Against Celsus, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 | 4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits. |
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| 151. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 285 |
| 152. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 3.13, 9.47, 15.64-15.66, 16.68-16.70, 24.106, 25.110, 30.186, 31.187, 31.196-31.197, 31.217 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 213, 235, 241, 271, 277, 285, 297 |
| 153. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
154. Origen, On First Principles, 1.3.8, 3.1.4, 3.1.8, 3.1.18, 3.1.20, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 3.4.1-3.4.5, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315, 320, 343, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 359, 388, 397, 398 | 1.3.8. Having made these declarations regarding the Unity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, let us return to the order in which we began the discussion. God the Father bestows upon all, existence; and participation in Christ, in respect of His being the word of reason, renders them rational beings. From which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because capable of virtue and vice. On this account, therefore, is the grace of the Holy Ghost present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be rendered holy by participating in it. Seeing, then, that firstly, they derive their existence from God the Father; secondly, their rational nature from the Word; thirdly, their holiness from the Holy Spirit — those who have been previously sanctified by the Holy Spirit are again made capable of receiving Christ, in respect that He is the righteousness of God; and those who have earned advancement to this grade by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, will nevertheless obtain the gift of wisdom according to the power and working of the Spirit of God. And this I consider is Paul's meaning, when he says that to some is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit. And while pointing out the individual distinction of gifts, he refers the whole of them to the source of all things, in the words, There are diversities of operations, but one God who works all in all. Whence also the working of the Father, which confers existence upon all things, is found to be more glorious and magnificent, while each one, by participation in Christ, as being wisdom, and knowledge, and sanctification, makes progress, and advances to higher degrees of perfection; and seeing it is by partaking of the Holy Spirit that any one is made purer and holier, he obtains, when he is made worthy, the grace of wisdom and knowledge, in order that, after all stains of pollution and ignorance are cleansed and taken away, he may make so great an advance in holiness and purity, that the nature which he received from God may become such as is worthy of Him who gave it to be pure and perfect, so that the being which exists may be as worthy as He who called it into existence. For, in this way, he who is such as his Creator wished him to be, will receive from God power always to exist, and to abide forever. That this may be the case, and that those whom He has created may be unceasingly and inseparably present with Him, Who IS, it is the business of wisdom to instruct and train them, and to bring them to perfection by confirmation of His Holy Spirit and unceasing sanctification, by which alone are they capable of receiving God. In this way, then, by the renewal of the ceaseless working of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in us, in its various stages of progress, shall we be able at some future time perhaps, although with difficulty, to behold the holy and the blessed life, in which (as it is only after many struggles that we are able to reach it) we ought so to continue, that no satiety of that blessedness should ever seize us; but the more we perceive its blessedness, the more should be increased and intensified within us the longing for the same, while we ever more eagerly and freely receive and hold fast the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But if satiety should ever take hold of any one of those who stand on the highest and perfect summit of attainment, I do not think that such an one would suddenly be deposed from his position and fall away, but that he must decline gradually and little by little, so that it may sometimes happen that if a brief lapsus take place, and the individual quickly repent and return to himself, he may not utterly fall away, but may retrace his steps, and return to his former place, and again make good that which had been lost by his negligence. 3.1.4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an external cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is impossible to resist them, whether they incite us to good or evil, let the holder of this opinion turn his attention for a little upon himself, and carefully inspect the movements of his own mind, unless he has discovered already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a judge residing within the tribunals of our heart, in order that, after the statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the judgment of reason. For, to take an illustration: if, to a man who has determined to live continently and chastely, and to keep himself free from all pollution with women, a woman should happen to present herself, inciting and alluring him to act contrary to his purpose, that woman is not a complete and absolute cause or necessity of his transgressing, since it is in his power, by remembering his resolution, to bridle the incitements to lust, and by the stern admonitions of virtue to restrain the pleasure of the allurement that solicits him; so that, all feeling of indulgence being driven away, his determination may remain firm and enduring. Finally, if to any men of learning, strengthened by divine training, allurements of that kind present themselves, remembering immediately what they are, and calling to mind what has long been the subject of their meditation and instruction, and fortifying themselves by the support of a holier doctrine, they reject and repel all incitement to pleasure, and drive away opposing lusts by the interposition of the reason implanted within them. 3.1.4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect cause of annulling his determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined himself ), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons. 3.1.18. Let us now look to the expression, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For our opponents assert, that if it does not depend upon him that wills, nor on him that runs, but on God that shows mercy, that a man be saved, our salvation is not in our own power. For our nature is such as to admit of our either being saved or not, or else our salvation rests solely on the will of Him who, if He wills it, shows mercy, and confers salvation. Now let us inquire, in the first place, of such persons, whether to desire blessings be a good or evil act; and whether to hasten after good as a final aim be worthy of praise. If they were to answer that such a procedure was deserving of censure, they would evidently be mad; for all holy men both desire blessings and run after them, and certainly are not blameworthy. How, then, is it that he who is not saved, if he be of an evil nature, desires blessing, and runs after them, but does not find them? For they say that a bad tree does not bring forth good fruits, whereas it is a good fruit to desire blessings. And how is the fruit of a bad tree good? And if they assert that to desire blessings, and to run after them, is an act of indifference, i.e., neither good nor bad, we shall reply, that if it be an indifferent act to desire blessings, and to run after them, then the opposite of that will also be an indifferent act, viz., to desire evils, and to run after them; whereas it is certain that it is not an indifferent act to desire evils, and to run after them, but one that is manifestly wicked. It is established, then, that to desire and follow after blessings is not an indifferent, but a virtuous proceeding. 3.1.18. Let us look next at the passage: So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For they who find fault say: If it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement made by Him who has formed us such as we are, or on the purpose of Him who shows mercy when he pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer; since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things; for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give (perhaps) a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent, and neither beautiful nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz., to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defense which I think we can offer to the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the Song of Degrees is his, from which we shall quote the words): Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman wakes in vain: not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong, it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the (mere) human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus — for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God — it is well said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters; but God that gives the increase. Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing; for it is not completed by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds, and the mildness of the air, and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour? — since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the Churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also (to attempt) to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage. 3.1.20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad, since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz., that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but (He makes) those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes (which operated) in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes (at work) in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and (in supposing) that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca? 3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance. 3.2.4. With respect to the thoughts which proceed from our heart, or the recollection of things which we have done, or the contemplation of any things or causes whatever, we find that they sometimes proceed from ourselves, and sometimes are originated by the opposing powers; not seldom also are they suggested by God, or by the holy angels. Now such a statement will perhaps appear incredible, unless it be confirmed by the testimony of holy Scripture. That, then, thoughts arise within ourselves, David testifies in the Psalms, saying, The thought of a man will make confession to You, and the rest of the thought shall observe to You a festival day. That this, however, is also brought about by the opposing powers, is shown by Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes in the following manner: If the spirit of the ruler rise up against you, leave not your place; for soundness restrains great offenses. The Apostle Paul also will bear testimony to the same point in the words: Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalted itself against the knowledge of Christ. That it is an effect due to God, nevertheless, is declared by David, when he says in the Psalms, Blessed is the man whose help is in You, O Lord, Your ascents (are) in his heart. And the apostle says that God put it into the heart of Titus. That certain thoughts are suggested to men's hearts either by good or evil angels, is shown both by the angel that accompanied Tobias, and by the language of the prophet, where he says, And the angel who spoke in me answered. The book of the Shepherd declares the same, saying that each individual is attended by two angels; that whenever good thoughts arise in our hearts, they are suggested by the good angel; but when of a contrary kind, they are the instigation of the evil angel. The same is declared by Barnabas in his Epistle, where he says there are two ways, one of light and one of darkness, over which he asserts that certain angels are placed — the angels of God over the way of light, the angels of Satan over the way of darkness. We are not, however, to imagine that any other result follows from what is suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, save a (mental) commotion only, and an incitement instigating us either to good or evil. For it is quite within our reach, when a maligt power has begun to incite us to evil, to cast away from us the wicked suggestions, and to resist the vile inducements, and to do nothing that is at all deserving of blame. And, on the other hand, it is possible, when a divine power calls us to better things, not to obey the call; our freedom of will being preserved to us in either case. We said, indeed, in the foregoing pages, that certain recollections of good or evil actions were suggested to us either by the act of divine providence or by the opposing powers, as is shown in the book of Esther, when Artaxerxes had not remembered the services of that just man Mordecai, but, when wearied out with his nightly vigils, had it put into his mind by God to require that the annals of his great deeds should be read to him; whereon, being reminded of the benefits received from Mordecai, he ordered his enemy Haman to be hanged, but splendid honours to be conferred on him, and impunity from the threatened danger to be granted to the whole of the holy nation. On the other hand, however, we must suppose that it was through the hostile influence of the devil that the suggestion was introduced into the minds of the high priests and the scribes which they made to Pilate, when they came and said, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again. The design of Judas, also, respecting the betrayal of our Lord and Saviour, did not originate in the wickedness of his mind alone. For Scripture testifies that the devil had already put it into his heart to betray Him. And therefore Solomon rightly commanded, saying, Keep your heart with all diligence. And the Apostle Paul warns us: Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest perhaps we should let them slip. And when he says, Neither give place to the devil, he shows by that injunction that it is through certain acts, or a kind of mental slothfulness, that room is made for the devil, so that, if he once enter our heart, he will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not obtained the entire mastery over it, by casting on us his fiery darts; and by these we are sometimes deeply wounded, and sometimes only set on fire. Seldom indeed, and only in a few instances, are these fiery darts quenched, so as not to find a place where they may wound, i.e., when one is covered by the strong and mighty shield of faith. The declaration, indeed, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places, must be so understood as if we meant, I Paul, and you Ephesians, and all who have not to wrestle against flesh and blood: for such have to struggle against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, not like the Corinthians, whose struggle was as yet against flesh and blood, and who had been overtaken by no temptation but such as is common to man. 3.4.1. And now the subject of human temptations must not, in my opinion, be passed over in silence, which take their rise sometimes from flesh and blood, or from the wisdom of flesh and blood, which is said to be hostile to God. And whether the statement be true which certain allege, viz., that each individual has as it were two souls, we shall determine after we have explained the nature of those temptations, which are said to be more powerful than any of human origin, i.e., which we sustain from principalities and powers, and from the rulers of the darkness of this world, and from spiritual wickedness in high places, or to which we are subjected from wicked spirits and unclean demons. Now, in the investigation of this subject, we must, I think, inquire according to a logical method whether there be in us human beings, who are composed of soul and body and vital spirit, some other element, possessing an incitement of its own, and evoking a movement towards evil. For a question of this kind is wont to be discussed by some in this way: whether, viz., as two souls are said to co-exist within us, the one is more divine and heavenly and the other inferior; or whether, from the very fact that we inhere in bodily structures which according to their own proper nature are dead, and altogether devoid of life (seeing it is from us, i.e., from our souls, that the material body derives its life, it being contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn on and enticed to the practice of those evils which are agreeable to the body; or whether, thirdly (which was the opinion of some of the Greek philosophers), although our soul is one in substance, it nevertheless consists of several elements, and one portion of it is called rational and another irrational, and that which is termed the irrational part is again separated into two affections — those of covetousness and passion. These three opinions, then, regarding the soul, which we have stated above, we have found to be entertained by some, but that one of them, which we have mentioned as being adopted by certain Grecian philosophers, viz., that the soul is tripartite, I do not observe to be greatly confirmed by the authority of holy Scripture; while with respect to the remaining two there is found a considerable number of passages in the holy Scriptures which seem capable of application to them. 3.4.2. Now, of these opinions, let us first discuss that which is maintained by some, that there is in us a good and heavenly soul, and another earthly and inferior; and that the better soul is implanted within us from heaven, such as was that which, while Jacob was still in the womb, gave him the prize of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in the case of Jeremiah was sanctified from his birth, and in that of John was filled by the Holy Spirit from the womb. Now, that which they term the inferior soul is produced, they allege, along with the body itself out of the seed of the body, whence they say it cannot live or subsist beyond the body, on which account also they say it is frequently termed flesh. For the expression, The flesh lusts against the Spirit, they take to be applicable not to the flesh, but to this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words, moreover, they endeavour notwithstanding to make good the declaration in Leviticus: The life of all flesh is the blood thereof. For, from the circumstance that it is the diffusion of the blood throughout the whole flesh which produces life in the flesh, they assert that this soul, which is said to be the life of all flesh, is contained in the blood. This statement, moreover, that the flesh struggles against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the further statement, that the life of all flesh is the blood thereof, is, according to these writers, simply calling the wisdom of the flesh by another name, because it is a kind of material spirit, which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires. And it is with respect to this that they think the apostle uttered the words: I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. And if one were to object to them that these words were spoken of the nature of the body, which indeed, agreeably to the peculiarity of its nature, is dead, but is said to have sensibility, or wisdom which is hostile to God, or which struggles against the spirit; or if one were to say that, in a certain degree, the flesh itself was possessed of a voice, which should cry out against the endurance of hunger, or thirst, or cold, or of any discomfort arising either from abundance or poverty, — they would endeavour to weaken and impair the force of such (arguments), by showing that there were many other mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul, as it were, of which we have spoken above, and which is generated from the seed by a process of traducianism. They are accustomed also to adduce, in support of their assertion, the declaration of the apostle, Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, poisonings, hatred, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrelling, dissensions, heresies, sects, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and the like; asserting that all these do not derive their origin from the habits or pleasures of the flesh, so that all such movements are to be regarded as inherent in that substance which has not a soul, i.e., the flesh. The declaration, moreover, For you see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men among you according to the flesh are called, would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom, carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: Since the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the things that we would. What are these things now respecting which he says, that we cannot do the things that we would? It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be intended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant, because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains, then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself with the spirit, it produces men of the Spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual. And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, But you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit. 3.4.3. But since the subject of discussion on which we have entered is one of great profundity, which it is necessary to consider in all its bearings, let us see whether some such point as this may not be determined: that as it is better for the soul to follow the spirit when the latter has overcome the flesh, so also, if it seem to be a worse course for the former to follow the flesh in its struggles against the spirit, when the latter would recall the soul to its influence, it may nevertheless appear a more advantageous procedure for the soul to be under the mastery of the flesh than to remain under the power of its own will. For, since it is said to be neither hot nor cold, but to continue in a sort of tepid condition, it will find conversion a slow and somewhat difficult undertaking. If indeed it clung to the flesh, then, satiated at length, and filled with those very evils which it suffers from the vices of the flesh, and wearied as it were by the heavy burdens of luxury and lust, it may sometimes be converted with greater ease and rapidity from the filthiness of matter to a desire for heavenly things, and (to a taste for) spiritual graces. And the apostle must be supposed to have said, that the Spirit contends against the flesh, and the flesh against the Spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would (those things, undoubtedly, which are designated as being beyond the will of the spirit, and the will of the flesh), meaning (as if we were to express it in other words) that it is better for a man to be either in a state of virtue or in one of wickedness, than in neither of these; but that the soul, before its conversion to the spirit, and its union with it, appears during its adherence to the body, and its meditation of carnal things, to be neither in a good condition nor in a manifestly bad one, but resembles, so to speak, an animal. It is better, however, for it, if possible, to be rendered spiritual through adherence to the spirit; but if that cannot be done, it is more expedient for it to follow even the wickedness of the flesh, than, placed under the influence of its own will, to retain the position of an irrational animal. 3.4.4. Let us now see what answer is usually returned to these statements by those who maintain that there is in us one movement, and one life, proceeding from one and the same soul, both the salvation and the destruction of which are ascribed to itself as a result of its own actions. And, in the first place, let us notice of what nature those commotions of the soul are which we suffer, when we feel ourselves inwardly drawn in different directions; when there arises a kind of contest of thoughts in our hearts, and certain probabilities are suggested us, agreeably to which we lean now to this side, now to that, and by which we are sometimes convicted of error, and sometimes approve of our acts. It is nothing remarkable, however, to say of wicked spirits, that they have a varying and conflicting judgment, and one out of harmony with itself, since such is found to be the case in all men, whenever, in deliberating upon an uncertain event, council is taken, and men consider and consult what is to be chosen as the better and more useful course. It is not therefore surprising that, if two probabilities meet, and suggest opposite views, they should drag the mind in contrary directions. For example, if a man be led by reflection to believe and to fear God, it cannot then be said that the flesh contends against the Spirit; but, amidst the uncertainty of what may be true and advantageous, the mind is drawn in opposite directions. So, also, when it is supposed that the flesh provokes to the indulgence of lust, but better counsels oppose allurements of that kind, we are not to suppose that it is one life which is resisting another, but that it is the tendency of the nature of the body, which is eager to empty out and cleanse the places filled with seminal moisture; as, in like manner, it is not to be supposed that it is any opposing power, or the life of another soul, which excites within us the appetite of thirst, and impels us to drink, or which causes us to feel hunger, and drives us to satisfy it. But as it is by the natural movements of the body that food and drink are either desired or rejected, so also the natural seed, collected together in course of time in the various vessels, has an eager desire to be expelled and thrown away, and is so far from never being removed, save by the impulse of some exciting cause, that it is even sometimes spontaneously emitted. When, therefore, it is said that the flesh struggles against the Spirit, these persons understand the expression to mean that habit or necessity, or the delights of the flesh, arouse a man, and withdraw him from divine and spiritual things. For, owing to the necessity of the body being drawn away, we are not allowed to have leisure for divine things, which are to be eternally advantageous. So again, the soul, devoting itself to divine and spiritual pursuits, and being united to the spirit, is said to fight against the flesh, by not permitting it to be relaxed by indulgence, and to become unsteady through the influence of those pleasures for which it feels a natural delight. In this way, also, they claim to understand the words, The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God, not that the flesh really has a soul, or a wisdom of its own. But as we are accustomed to say, by an abuse of language, that the earth is thirsty, and wishes to drink in water, this use of the word wishes is not proper, but catachrestic — as if we were to say again, that this house wants to be rebuilt, and many other similar expressions; so also is the wisdom of the flesh to be understood, or the expression, that the flesh lusts against the Spirit. They generally connect with these the expression, The voice of your brother's blood cries unto Me from the ground. For what cries unto the Lord is not properly the blood which was shed; but the blood is said improperly to cry out, vengeance being demanded upon him who had shed it. The declaration also of the apostle, I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, they so understand as if he had said, That he who wishes to devote himself to the word of God is, on account of his bodily necessities and habits, which like a sort of law are ingrained in the body, distracted, and divided, and impeded, lest, by devoting himself vigorously to the study of wisdom, he should be enabled to behold the divine mysteries. 3.4.5. With respect, however, to the following being ranked among the works of the flesh, viz., heresies, and envyings, and contentions, or other (vices), they so understand the passage, that the mind, being rendered grosser in feeling, from its yielding itself to the passions of the body, and being oppressed by the mass of its vices, and having no refined or spiritual feelings, is said to be made flesh, and derives its name from that in which it exhibits more vigour and force of will. They also make this further inquiry, Who will be found, or who will be said to be, the creator of this evil sense, called the sense of the flesh? Because they defend the opinion that there is no other creator of soul and flesh than God. And if we were to assert that the good God created anything in His own creation that was hostile to Himself, it would appear to be a manifest absurdity. If, then, it is written, that carnal wisdom is enmity against God, and if this be declared to be a result of creation, God Himself will appear to have formed a nature hostile to Himself, which cannot be subject to Him nor to His law, as if it were (supposed to be) an animal of which such qualities are predicated. And if this view be admitted, in what respect will it appear to differ from that of those who maintain that souls of different natures are created, which, according to their natures, are destined either to be lost or saved? But this is an opinion of the heretics alone, who, not being able to maintain the justice of God on grounds of piety, compose impious inventions of this kind. And now we have brought forward to the best of our ability, in the person of each of the parties, what might be advanced by way of argument regarding the several views, and let the reader choose out of them for himself that which he thinks ought to be preferred. |
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| 155. Origen, Commentary On The Song of Songs, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 346 |
156. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 | 7.13. I have made it evident, as I think, that the soul is not subject to dissolution. It remains that I bring forward witnesses by whose authority my arguments may be confirmed. And I will not now allege the testimony of the prophets, whose system and divination consist in this alone, the teaching that man was created for the worship of God, and for receiving immortality from Him; but I will rather bring forward those whom they who reject the truth cannot but believe. Hermes, describing the nature of man, that he might show how he was made by God, introduced this statement: And the same out of two natures- the immortal and the mortal - made one nature, that of man, making the same partly immortal, and partly mortal; and bringing this, he placed it in the midst, between that nature which was divine and immortal, and that which was mortal and changeable, that seeing all things, he may admire all things. But some one may perhaps reckon him in the number of the philosophers, although he has been placed among the gods, and honoured by the Egyptians under the name of Mercury, and may give no more authority to him than to Plato or Pythagoras. Let us therefore seek for greater testimony. A certain Polites asked Apollo of Miletus whether the soul remains after death or goes to dissolution; and he replied in these verses:- As long as the soul is bound by fetters to the body, perceiving corruptible sufferings, it yields to mortal pains; but when, after the wasting of the body, it has found a very swift dissolution of mortality, it is altogether borne into the air, never growing old, and it remains always uninjured; for the first-born providence of God made this disposition.What do the Sibylline poems say? Do they not declare that this is so, when they say that the time will come when God will judge the living and the dead?- whose authority we will hereafter bring forward. Therefore the opinion entertained by Democritus, and Epicurus, and Dic archus concerning the dissolution of the soul is false; and they would not venture to speak concerning the destruction of souls, in the presence of any magician, who knew that souls are called forth from the lower regions by certain incantations, and that they are at hand, and afford themselves to be seen by human eyes, and speak, and foretell future events; and if they should thus venture, they would be overpowered by the fact itself, and by proofs presented to them. But because they did not comprehend the nature of the soul, which is so subtle that it escapes the eyes of the human mind, they said that it perishes. What of Aristoxenus, who denied that there is any soul at all, even while it lives in the body? But as on the lyre harmonious sound, and the strain which musicians call harmony, is produced by the tightening of the strings, so he thought that the power of perception existed in bodies from the joining together of the vitals, and from the vigour of the limbs; than which nothing can be said more senseless. Truly he had his eyes uninjured, but his heart was blind, with which he did not see that he lived, and had the mind by which he had conceived that very thought. But this has happened to many philosophers, that they did not believe in the existence of any object which is not apparent to the eyes; whereas the sight of the mind ought to be much clearer than that of the body, for perceiving those things the force and nature of which are rather felt than seen. |
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| 157. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 158. Papyri, Papyri Graecae Magicae, 4.538 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
| 159. Origen, Commentary On John, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 160. Origen, Fragments On Psalms 1-150, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 350, 351 |
| 161. Origen, Commentary On Romans, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 387 |
| 162. Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, 16 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254 |
163. Porphyry, On Abstinence, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271, 284, 287 | 1.32. 32.But this departure [from sense, imagination, and irrationality,] may be effected by violence, and also by persuasion and by reason, through the wasting away, and, as it may be said, oblivion and death of the passions; which, indeed, is the best kind of departure, since it is accomplished without oppressing that from which we are divulsed. For, in sensibles, a divulsion by force is not effected without either a laceration of a part, or a vestige of avulsion. But this separation is introduced by a continual negligence of the passions. And this negligence is produced by an abstinence from those sensible perceptions which excite the passions, and by a persevering attention to intelligibles. And among these passions or perturbations, those which arise from food are to be enumerated. SPAN |
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164. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 251 | 7.1. BOOK 7: 1. ZENOZeno, the son of Mnaseas (or Demeas), was a native of Citium in Cyprus, a Greek city which had received Phoenician settlers. He had a wry neck, says Timotheus of Athens in his book On Lives. Moreover, Apollonius of Tyre says he was lean, fairly tall, and swarthy – hence some one called him an Egyptian vine-branch, according to Chrysippus in the first book of his Proverbs. He had thick legs; he was flabby and delicate. Hence Persaeus in his Convivial Reminiscences relates that he declined most invitations to dinner. They say he was fond of eating green figs and of basking in the sun. |
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| 165. Porphyry, Aids To The Study of The Intelligibles, 32 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197, 285, 414 |
| 166. Athanasius, Life of Anthony, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220, 348, 361 |
| 167. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.1.6, 1.1.5(17-21), 1.1.7(16-24), 1.1.10, 1.1.11(1-8), 1.1.11(7), 1.1.11(5-8), 1.2.2(14-18), 1.2.3(20), 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.6(25-7), 1.2.5(5-24), 1.2.2(13-18), 1.4.10, 1.5.7(10-23), 1.5.7(23-5), 1.5.8, 1.5.9, 1.6.7(17), 1.6.7(12-28), 1.8.4, 2.2.2(4-18), 2.3.9, 2.9.2(4-18), 3.6.4, 3.6.5, 3.7.11(15-16), 3.8.8(32-6), 4.3.32, 4.4.1, 4.4.5(23-7), 4.4.5(22-3), 4.4.5(11-31), 4.4.2(1-3), 4.4.1(1-14), 4.8.1(1-11), 5.1.1(1-22), 5.1.1, 5.3.14(1-3), 5.3.13(36), 5.3.10(28-51), 5.3.3(34-9), 5.5.12(35-6), 5.5.12(16), 5.8.11(4), 5.8.10(31-43), 6.1.20(8-9), 6.4.15(37), 6.5.7(3-6), 6.5.12(15-26), 6.7.41(38), 6.7.40(1), 6.7.39(17-20), 6.7.35(43-5), 6.7.35(29-30), 6.7.35(24-6), 6.7.35, 6.7.34, 6.7.35(26), 6.7.6(15-18), 6.7.33(23), 6.7.6(18), 6.8.1, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4, 6.8.5, 6.8.6, 6.8.5(30-2), 6.8, 6.9.11(11), 6.9.10(7-21), 6.9.4(1-6), 6.9.4(16-23), 6.9.7 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 203 |
168. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 24, 28, 33, 35 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 241, 276, 284 | 35. Try not to wrong thy slaves nor to correct them when thou art angry. And before correcting them, prove to them that thou dost this for their good, and give them an opportunity for excuse. When purchasing slaves, avoid the stubborn ones. Practise doing many things thyself, for our own labour is simple and easy. And men should use each limb for the purpose for which nature intended it to be used, for nature needs no more. They who do not use their own bodies, but make excessive use of others, commit a twofold wrong, and are ungrateful to nature that has given them these parts. Never use thy bodily parts merely for the sake of pleasure, for it is far better to die than to obscure thy soul by intemperance . . . . correct the vice of thy nature. . . . If thou give aught to thy slaves, distinguish the better ones by a share of honour . . . . for it is impossible that he who does wrong to man should honour God. But look on the love of mankind as the foundation of thy piety. And . . . . |
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| 169. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Sorabji (2000) 242 |
| 170. Augustine, On Genesis Against The Manichaeans, 2.21.32 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 406 |
| 171. Augustine, De Nuptiis Et Concupiscentia, 1.13.12, 2.30.15, 2.37.22 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276, 416 |
| 172. Augustine, De Sermone Domini In Monte Secundum Matthaeum, 1.9, 1.12, 1.12.33-1.12.34, 1.34.12, 2.7.25 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 346, 372, 373, 374, 414 |
| 173. Hermeias of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia,, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283 |
| 174. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 10.10.14-10.10.16, 11.2.2, 11.2.5, 11.3.1, 11.3.6, 11.10.17, 12.12-12.13, 14.9.2, 14.10.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 242, 270, 337, 348, 356, 373, 374, 375, 382, 414 |
| 175. Augustine, Enchiridion, 28.105 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 407 |
| 176. Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, 32.22-32.31, 37.21 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 254, 303 |
| 177. Augustine, Questions On The Heptateuch, 1.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 355, 379, 380, 385 |
| 178. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 179. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 180. Julian (Emperor), Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 223 |
| 181. Augustine, Retractiones, 1.7.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 398 |
| 182. Augustine, Sermons, 43.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 337 |
| 183. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 140, 2, 261, 269, 28, 300-302, 6, 62, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236, 391, 393, 394, 395 |
| 184. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 140, 2, 261, 269, 28, 300-302, 6, 62, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236, 391, 393, 394, 395 |
| 185. Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae In Hexaemeron, 3.5-3.6 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 186. Augustine, On Care To Be Had For The Dead, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
187. Augustine, The City of God, 2.4-2.6, 2.26, 4.15, 5.11, 6.10, 9.4-9.6, 10.23, 12.14, 14.6, 14.8-14.10, 14.13, 14.16-14.24 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 252; Sorabji (2000) 109, 112, 165, 191, 206, 207, 243, 274, 287, 316, 334, 335, 336, 337, 344, 349, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 394, 398, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 411, 413 | 2.4. First of all, we would ask why their gods took no steps to improve the morals of their worshippers. That the true God should neglect those who did not seek His help, that was but justice; but why did those gods, from whose worship ungrateful men are now complaining that they are prohibited, issue no laws which might have guided their devotees to a virtuous life? Surely it was but just, that such care as men showed to the worship of the gods, the gods on their part should have to the conduct of men. But, it is replied, it is by his own will a man goes astray. Who denies it? But none the less was it incumbent on these gods, who were men's guardians, to publish in plain terms the laws of a good life, and not to conceal them from their worshippers. It was their part to send prophets to reach and convict such as broke these laws, and publicly to proclaim the punishments which await evil-doers, and the rewards which may be looked for by those that do well. Did ever the walls of any of their temples echo to any such warning voice? I myself, when I was a young man, used sometimes to go to the sacrilegious entertainments and spectacles; I saw the priests raving in religious excitement, and heard the choristers; I took pleasure in the shameful games which were celebrated in honor of gods and goddesses, of the virgin Cœlestis, and Berecynthia, the mother of all the gods. And on the holy day consecrated to her purification, there were sung before her couch productions so obscene and filthy for the ear - I do not say of the mother of the gods, but of the mother of any senator or honest man - nay, so impure, that not even the mother of the foul-mouthed players themselves could have formed one of the audience. For natural reverence for parents is a bond which the most abandoned cannot ignore. And, accordingly, the lewd actions and filthy words with which these players honored the mother of the gods, in presence of a vast assemblage and audience of both sexes, they could not for very shame have rehearsed at home in presence of their own mothers. And the crowds that were gathered from all quarters by curiosity, offended modesty must, I should suppose, have scattered in the confusion of shame. If these are sacred rites, what is sacrilege? If this is purification, what is pollution? This festivity was called the Tables, as if a banquet were being given at which unclean devils might find suitable refreshment. For it is not difficult to see what kind of spirits they must be who are delighted with such obscenities, unless, indeed, a man be blinded by these evil spirits passing themselves off under the name of gods, and either disbelieves in their existence, or leads such a life as prompts him rather to propitiate and fear them than the true God. 2.5. In this matter I would prefer to have as my assessors in judgment, not those men who rather take pleasure in these infamous customs than take pains to put an end to them, but that same Scipio Nasica who was chosen by the senate as the citizen most worthy to receive in his hands the image of that demon Cybele, and convey it into the city. He would tell us whether he would be proud to see his own mother so highly esteemed by the state as to have divine honors adjudged to her; as the Greeks and Romans and other nations have decreed divine honors to men who had been of material service to them, and have believed that their mortal benefactors were thus made immortal, and enrolled among the gods. Surely he would desire that his mother should enjoy such felicity were it possible. But if we proceeded to ask him whether, among the honors paid to her, he would wish such shameful rites as these to be celebrated, would he not at once exclaim that he would rather his mother lay stone-dead, than survive as a goddess to lend her ear to these obscenities? Is it possible that he who was of so severe a morality, that he used his influence as a Roman senator to prevent the building of a theatre in that city dedicated to the manly virtues, would wish his mother to be propitiated as a goddess with words which would have brought the blush to her cheek when a Roman matron? Could he possibly believe that the modesty of an estimable woman would be so transformed by her promotion to divinity, that she would suffer herself to be invoked and celebrated in terms so gross and immodest, that if she had heard the like while alive upon earth, and had listened without stopping her ears and hurrying from the spot, her relatives, her husband, and her children would have blushed for her? Therefore, the mother of the gods being such a character as the most profligate man would be ashamed to have for his mother, and meaning to enthral the minds of the Romans, demanded for her service their best citizen, not to ripen him still more in virtue by her helpful counsel, but to entangle him by her deceit, like her of whom it is written, The adulteress will hunt for the precious soul. Proverbs 6:26 Her intent was to puff up this high-souled man by an apparently divine testimony to his excellence, in order that he might rely upon his own eminence in virtue, and make no further efforts after true piety and religion, without which natural genius, however brilliant, vapors into pride and comes to nothing. For what but a guileful purpose could that goddess demand the best man seeing that in her own sacred festivals she requires such obscenities as the best men would be covered with shame to hear at their own tables? 2.6. This is the reason why those divinities quite neglected the lives and morals of the cities and nations who worshipped them, and threw no dreadful prohibition in their way to hinder them from becoming utterly corrupt, and to preserve them from those terrible and detestable evils which visit not harvests and vintages, not house and possessions, not the body which is subject to the soul, but the soul itself, the spirit that rules the whole man. If there was any such prohibition, let it be produced, let it be proved. They will tell us that purity and probity were inculcated upon those who were initiated in the mysteries of religion, and that secret incitements to virtue were whispered in the ear of the élite; but this is an idle boast. Let them show or name to us the places which were at any time consecrated to assemblages in which, instead of the obscene songs and licentious acting of players, instead of the celebration of those most filthy and shameless Fugalia (well called Fugalia, since they banish modesty and right feeling), the people were commanded in the name of the gods to restrain avarice, bridle impurity, and conquer ambition; where, in short, they might learn in that school which Persius vehemently lashes them to, when he says: Be taught, you abandoned creatures, and ascertain the causes of things; what we are, and for what end we are born; what is the law of our success in life; and by what art we may turn the goal without making shipwreck; what limit we should put to our wealth, what we may lawfully desire, and what uses filthy lucre serves; how much we should bestow upon our country and our family; learn, in short, what God meant you to be, and what place He has ordered you to fill. Let them name to us the places where such instructions were wont to be communicated from the gods, and where the people who worshipped them were accustomed to resort to hear them, as we can point to our churches built for this purpose in every land where the Christian religion is received. 2.26. Seeing that this is so - seeing that the filthy and cruel deeds, the disgraceful and criminal actions of the gods, whether real or feigned, were at their own request published, and were consecrated, and dedicated in their honor as sacred and stated solemnities; seeing they vowed vengeance on those who refused to exhibit them to the eyes of all, that they might be proposed as deeds worthy of imitation, why is it that these same demons, who by taking pleasure in such obscenities, acknowledge themselves to be unclean spirits, and by delighting in their own villanies and iniquities, real or imaginary, and by requesting from the immodest, and extorting from the modest, the celebration of these licentious acts, proclaim themselves instigators to a criminal and lewd life - why, I ask, are they represented as giving some good moral precepts to a few of their own elect, initiated in the secrecy of their shrines? If it be so, this very thing only serves further to demonstrate the malicious craft of these pestilent spirits. For so great is the influence of probity and chastity, that all men, or almost all men, are moved by the praise of these virtues; nor is any man so depraved by vice, but he has some feeling of honor left in him. So that, unless the devil sometimes transformed himself, as Scripture says, into an angel of light, 2 Corinthians 11:14 he could not compass his deceitful purpose. Accordingly, in public, a bold impurity fills the ear of the people with noisy clamor; in private, a feigned chastity speaks in scarce audible whispers to a few: an open stage is provided for shameful things, but on the praiseworthy the curtain falls: grace hides disgrace flaunts: a wicked deed draws an overflowing house, a virtuous speech finds scarce a hearer, as though purity were to be blushed at, impurity boasted of. Where else can such confusion reign, but in devils' temples? Where, but in the haunts of deceit? For the secret precepts are given as a sop to the virtuous, who are few in number; the wicked examples are exhibited to encourage the vicious, who are countless. Where and when those initiated in the mysteries of Cœlestis received any good instructions, we know not. What we do know is, that before her shrine, in which her image is set, and amidst a vast crowd gathering from all quarters, and standing closely packed together, we were intensely interested spectators of the games which were going on, and saw, as we pleased to turn the eye, on this side a grand display of harlots, on the other the virgin goddess; we saw this virgin worshipped with prayer and with obscene rites. There we saw no shame-faced mimes, no actress over-burdened with modesty; all that the obscene rites demanded was fully complied with. We were plainly shown what was pleasing to the virgin deity, and the matron who witnessed the spectacle returned home from the temple a wiser woman. Some, indeed, of the more prudent women turned their faces from the immodest movements of the players, and learned the art of wickedness by a furtive regard. For they were restrained, by the modest demeanor due to men, from looking boldly at the immodest gestures; but much more were they restrained from condemning with chaste heart the sacred rites of her whom they adored. And yet this licentiousness - which, if practised in one's home, could only be done there in secret - was practised as a public lesson in the temple; and if any modesty remained in men, it was occupied in marvelling that wickedness which men could not unrestrainedly commit should be part of the religious teaching of the gods, and that to omit its exhibition should incur the anger of the gods. What spirit can that be, which by a hidden inspiration stirs men's corruption, and goads them to adultery, and feeds on the full-fledged iniquity, unless it be the same that finds pleasure in such religious ceremonies, sets in the temples images of devils, and loves to see in play the images of vices; that whispers in secret some righteous sayings to deceive the few who are good, and scatters in public invitations to profligacy, to gain possession of the millions who are wicked? 4.15. Let them ask, then, whether it is quite fitting for good men to rejoice in extended empire. For the iniquity of those with whom just wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom, which would certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being thus more happy, all kingdoms would have been small, rejoicing in neighborly concord; and thus there would have been very many kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are very many houses of citizens in a city. Therefore, to carry on war and extend a kingdom over wholly subdued nations seems to bad men to be felicity, to good men necessity. But because it would be worse that the injurious should rule over those who are more righteous, therefore even that is not unsuitably called felicity. But beyond doubt it is greater felicity to have a good neighbor at peace, than to conquer a bad one by making war. Your wishes are bad, when you desire that one whom you hate or fear should be in such a condition that you can conquer him. If, therefore, by carrying on wars that were just, not impious or unrighteous, the Romans could have acquired so great an empire, ought they not to worship as a goddess even the injustice of foreigners? For we see that this has cooperated much in extending the empire, by making foreigners so unjust that they became people with whom just wars might be carried on, and the empire increased. And why may not injustice, at least that of foreign nations, also be a goddess, if Fear and Dread and Ague have deserved to be Roman gods? By these two, therefore - that is, by foreign injustice, and the goddess Victoria, for injustice stirs up causes of wars, and Victoria brings these same wars to a happy termination - the empire has increased, even although Jove has been idle. For what part could Jove have here, when those things which might be thought to be his benefits are held to be gods, called gods, worshipped as gods, and are themselves invoked for their own parts? He also might have some part here, if he himself might be called Empire, just as she is called Victory. Or if empire is the gift of Jove, why may not victory also be held to be his gift? And it certainly would have been held to be so, had he been recognized and worshipped, not as a stone in the Capitol, but as the true King of kings and Lord of lords. 5.11. Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one), one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy through verity and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting of soul and body, who, when he sinned, neither permitted him to go unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value; from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the irrational soul has given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to these, has given intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts - that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence. 6.10. That liberty, in truth, which this man wanted, so that he did not dare to censure that theology of the city, which is very similar to the theatrical, so openly as he did the theatrical itself, was, though not fully, yet in part possessed by Ann us Seneca, whom we have some evidence to show to have flourished in the times of our apostles. It was in part possessed by him, I say, for he possessed it in writing, but not in living. For in that book which he wrote against superstition, he more copiously and vehemently censured that civil and urban theology than Varro the theatrical and fabulous. For, when speaking concerning images, he says, They dedicate images of the sacred and inviolable immortals in most worthless and motionless matter. They give them the appearance of man, beasts, and fishes, and some make them of mixed sex, and heterogeneous bodies. They call them deities, when they are such that if they should get breath and should suddenly meet them, they would be held to be monsters. Then, a while afterwards, when extolling the natural theology, he had expounded the sentiments of certain philosophers, he opposes to himself a question, and says, Here some one says, Shall I believe that the heavens and the earth are gods, and that some are above the moon and some below it? Shall I bring forward either Plato or the peripatetic Strato, one of whom made God to be without a body, the other without a mind? In answer to which he says, And, really, what truer do the dreams of Titus Tatius, or Romulus, or Tullus Hostilius appear to you? Tatius declared the divinity of the goddess Cloacina; Romulus that of Picus and Tiberinus; Tullus Hostilius that of Pavor and Pallor, the most disagreeable affections of men, the one of which is the agitation of the mind under fright, the other that of the body, not a disease, indeed, but a change of color. Will you rather believe that these are deities, and receive them into heaven? But with what freedom he has written concerning the rites themselves, cruel and shameful! One, he says, castrates himself, another cuts his arms. Where will they find room for the fear of these gods when angry, who use such means of gaining their favor when propitious? But gods who wish to be worshipped in this fashion should be worshipped in none. So great is the frenzy of the mind when perturbed and driven from its seat, that the gods are propitiated by men in a manner in which not even men of the greatest ferocity and fable-renowned cruelty vent their rage. Tyrants have lacerated the limbs of some; they never ordered any one to lacerate his own. For the gratification of royal lust, some have been castrated; but no one ever, by the command of his lord, laid violent hands on himself to emasculate himself. They kill themselves in the temples. They supplicate with their wounds and with their blood. If any one has time to see the things they do and the things they suffer, he will find so many things unseemly for men of respectability, so unworthy of freemen, so unlike the doings of sane men, that no one would doubt that they are mad, had they been mad with the minority; but now the multitude of the insane is the defense of their sanity. He next relates those things which are wont to be done in the Capitol, and with the utmost intrepidity insists that they are such things as one could only believe to be done by men making sport, or by madmen. For having spoken with derision of this, that in the Egyptian sacred rites Osiris, being lost, is lamented for, but straightway, when found, is the occasion of great joy by his reappearance, because both the losing and the finding of him are feigned; and yet that grief and that joy which are elicited thereby from those who have lost nothing and found nothing are real - having I say, so spoken of this, he says, Still there is a fixed time for this frenzy. It is tolerable to go mad once in the year. Go into the Capitol. One is suggesting divine commands to a god; another is telling the hours to Jupiter; one is a lictor; another is an anointer, who with the mere movement of his arms imitates one anointing. There are women who arrange the hair of Juno and Minerva, standing far away not only from her image, but even from her temple. These move their fingers in the manner of hairdressers. There are some women who hold a mirror. There are some who are calling the gods to assist them in court. There are some who are holding up documents to them, and are explaining to them their cases. A learned and distinguished comedian, now old and decrepit, was daily playing the mimic in the Capitol, as though the gods would gladly be spectators of that which men had ceased to care about. Every kind of artificers working for the immortal gods is dwelling there in idleness. And a little after he says, Nevertheless these, though they give themselves up to the gods for purposes superflous enough, do not do so for any abominable or infamous purpose. There sit certain women in the Capitol who think they are beloved by Jupiter; nor are they frightened even by the look of the, if you will believe the poets, most wrathful Juno. This liberty Varro did not enjoy. It was only the poetical theology he seemed to censure. The civil, which this man cuts to pieces, he was not bold enough to impugn. But if we attend to the truth, the temples where these things are performed are far worse than the theatres where they are represented. Whence, with respect to these sacred rites of the civil theology, Seneca preferred, as the best course to be followed by a wise man, to feign respect for them in act, but to have no real regard for them at heart. All which things, he says, a wise man will observe as being commanded by the laws, but not as being pleasing to the gods. And a little after he says, And what of this, that we unite the gods in marriage, and that not even naturally, for we join brothers and sisters? We marry Bellona to Mars, Venus to Vulcan, Salacia to Neptune. Some of them we leave unmarried, as though there were no match for them, which is surely needless, especially when there are certain unmarried goddesses, as Populonia, or Fulgora, or the goddess Rumina, for whom I am not astonished that suitors have been awanting. All this ignoble crowd of gods, which the superstition of ages has amassed, we ought, he says, to adore in such a way as to remember all the while that its worship belongs rather to custom than to reality. Wherefore, neither those laws nor customs instituted in the civil theology that which was pleasing to the gods, or which pertained to reality. But this man, whom philosophy had made, as it were, free, nevertheless, because he was an illustrious senator of the Roman people, worshipped what he censured, did what he condemned, adored what he reproached, because, forsooth, philosophy had taught him something great - namely, not to be superstitious in the world, but, on account of the laws of cities and the customs of men, to be an actor, not on the stage, but in the temples, - conduct the more to be condemned, that those things which he was deceitfully acting he so acted that the people thought he was acting sincerely. But a stage-actor would rather delight people by acting plays than take them in by false pretences. 9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi , and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears. 9.5. We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consot with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of C sar, when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. 9.6. Deferring for the present the question about the holy angels, let us examine the opinion of the Platonists, that the demons who mediate between gods and men are agitated by passions. For if their mind, though exposed to their incursion, still remained free and superior to them, Apuleius could not have said that their hearts are tossed with passions as the sea by stormy winds. Their mind, then - that superior part of their soul whereby they are rational beings, and which, if it actually exists in them, should rule and bridle the turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul - this mind of theirs, I say, is, according to the Platonist referred to, tossed with a hurricane of passions. The mind of the demons, therefore, is subject to the emotions of fear, anger, lust, and all similar affections. What part of them, then, is free, and endued with wisdom, so that they are pleasing to the gods, and the fit guides of men into purity of life, since their very highest part, being the slave of passion and subject to vice, only makes them more intent on deceiving and seducing, in proportion to the mental force and energy of desire they possess? 10.23. Even Porphyry asserts that it was revealed by divine oracles that we are not purified by any sacrifices to sun or moon, meaning it to be inferred that we are not purified by sacrificing to any gods. For what mysteries can purify, if those of the sun and moon, which are esteemed the chief of the celestial gods, do not purify? He says, too, in the same place, that principles can purify, lest it should be supposed, from his saying that sacrificing to the sun and moon cannot purify, that sacrificing to some other of the host of gods might do so. And what he as a Platonist means by principles, we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak as they have a mind to, and in the most difficult matters do not scruple to offend religious ears; but we are bound to speak according to a certain rule, lest freedom of speech beget impiety of opinion about the matters themselves of which we speak. 12.14. What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will, created man, who had never before been, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, You shall keep us, O Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation for ever, and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness adds immediately, The wicked walk in a circle. Then, as if it were said to him, What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity -God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness? the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, According to the depth of Your wisdom You have multiplied the children of men. Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but You have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will. 14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord; Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them? Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added good things, to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you. For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications - luxurious banquets, for example - on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, good does not occur, but only, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them, and, as I believe, because good is already included in the word would; for He does not say desire. Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord. And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, Be unwilling to make any manner of lie, Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, Peace on earth, of good will to men. Luke 2:14 For good is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that it rejoices not in iniquity, unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful. And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said I will rather than I desire, because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, I will nothing else than Philumena. That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more! And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations - Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are content The same author had also used the expression, the evil contentments of the mind. So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you! 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible. 14.10. But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness. Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman: Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart. Matthew 5:28 As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, Increase and multiply, Genesis 1:28 the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels - a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things. 14.13. Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of sin. Sirach 10:13 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then - that is to say, the trangression of eating the forbidden fruit - was committed by persons who were already wicked. That evil fruit Matthew 7:18 could be brought forth only by a corrupt tree. But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: You cast them down when they lifted up themselves. For he does not say, when they had been lifted up, as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but when they lifted up themselves even then they were cast down - that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God. The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, You shall be as gods, Genesis 3:5 which they would much more readily have accomplished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light - this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, Pride goes before destruction, and before honor is humility; Proverbs 18:12 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God's prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Your name, O Lord; that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with You in seeking Your glory. 14.16. Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible , to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved. 14.17. Justly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called shameful. Their condition was different before sin. For as it is written, They were naked and were not ashamed, Genesis 2:25 - not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those members without the will's consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man. For they were not created blind, as the unenlightened vulgar fancy; for Adam saw the animals to whom he gave names, and of Eve we read, The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes. Genesis 3:6 Their eyes, therefore were open, but were not open to this, that is to say, were not observant so as to recognize what was conferred upon them by the garment of grace, for they had no consciousness of their members warring against their will. But when they were stripped of this grace, that their disobedience might be punished by fit retribution, there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them ashamed. And therefore, after they violated God's command by open transgression, it is written: And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. Genesis 3:7 The eyes of them both were opened, not to see, for already they saw, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. And therefore also the tree itself which they were forbidden to touch was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from this circumstance, that if they ate of it it would impart to them this knowledge. For the discomfort of sickness reveals the pleasure of health. They knew, therefore, that they were naked,- naked of that grace which prevented them from being ashamed of bodily nakedness while the law of sin offered no resistance to their mind. And thus they obtained a knowledge which they would have lived in blissful ignorance of, had they, in trustful obedience to God, declined to commit that offense which involved them in the experience of the hurtful effects of unfaithfulness and disobedience. And therefore, being ashamed of the disobedience of their own flesh, which witnessed to their disobedience while it punished it, they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons, that is, cinctures for their privy parts; for some interpreters have rendered the word by succinctoria. Campestria is, indeed, a Latin word, but it is used of the drawers or aprons used for a similar purpose by the young men who stripped for exercise in the campus; hence those who were so girt were commonly called campestrati. Shame modestly covered that which lust disobediently moved in opposition to the will, which was thus punished for its own disobedience. Consequently all nations, being propagated from that one stock, have so strong an instinct to cover the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not uncover them even in the bath, but wash with their drawers on. In the dark solitudes of India also, though some philosophers go naked, and are therefore called gymnosophists, yet they make an exception in the case of these members and cover them. 14.18. Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! Does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin? 14.19. Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions - that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring - these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife. 14.20. It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin - that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice. 14.21. Far be it, then, from us to suppose that our first parents in Paradise felt that lust which caused them afterwards to blush and hide their nakedness, or that by its means they should have fulfilled the benediction of God, Increase and multiply and replenish the earth; Genesis 1:28 for it was after sin that lust began. It was after sin that our nature, having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it. But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the procreation of children might be recognized as part of the glory of marriage, and not of the punishment of sin. But now, men being ignorant of the blessedness of Paradise, suppose that children could not have been begotten there in any other way than they know them to be begotten now, i.e., by lust, at which even honorable marriage blushes; some not simply rejecting, but sceptically deriding the divine Scriptures, in which we read that our first parents, after they sinned, were ashamed of their nakedness, and covered it; while others, though they accept and honor Scripture, yet conceive that this expression, Increase and multiply, refers not to carnal fecundity, because a similar expression is used of the soul in the words, You will multiply me with strength in my soul; and so, too, in the words which follow in Genesis, And replenish the earth, and subdue it, they understand by the earth the body which the soul fills with its presence, and which it rules over when it is multiplied in strength. And they hold that children could no more then than now be begotten without lust, which, after sin, was kindled, observed, blushed for, and covered; and even that children would not have been born in Paradise, but only outside of it, as in fact it turned out. For it was after they were expelled from it that they came together to beget children, and begot them. 14.22. But we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before man sinned, when He created them male and female - in other words, two sexes manifestly distinct. And it was this work of God on which His blessing was pronounced. For no sooner had Scripture said, Male and female created He them, Genesis 1:27-28 than it immediately continues, And God blessed them, and God said to them, Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, etc. And though all these things may not unsuitably be interpreted in a spiritual sense, yet male and female cannot be understood of two things in one man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact. It was not of the spirit which commands and the body which obeys, nor of the rational soul which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor of the contemplative virtue which is supreme and the active which is subject, nor of the understanding of the mind and the sense of the body, but plainly of the matrimonial union by which the sexes are mutually bound together, that our Lord, when asked whether it were lawful for any cause to put away one's wife (for on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given), answered and said, Have you not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more two, but one flesh. What, therefore, God has joined together, let not man put asunder. Matthew 19:4-5 It is certain, then, that from the first men were created, as we see and know them to be now, of two sexes, male and female, and that they are called one, either on account of the matrimonial union, or on account of the origin of the woman, who was created from the side of the man. And it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to love their own wives in particular. Ephesians 5:25 14.23. But he who says that there should have been neither copulation nor generation but for sin, virtually says that man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints. For if these two by not sinning should have continued to live alone, because, as is supposed, they could not have begotten children had they not sinned, then certainly sin was necessary in order that there might be not only two but many righteous men. And if this cannot be maintained without absurdity, we must rather believe that the number of the saints fit to complete this most blessed city would have been as great though no one had sinned, as it is now that the grace of God gathers its citizens out of the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated. Luke 20:34 And therefore that marriage, worthy of the happiness of Paradise, should have had desirable fruit without the shame of lust, had there been no sin. But how that could be, there is now no example to teach us. Nevertheless, it ought not to seem incredible that one member might serve the will without lust then, since so many serve it now. Do we now move our feet and hands when we will to do the things we would by means of these members? Do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants of the will, both in our own case and in that of others, and especially of artisans employed in mechanical operations, by which the weakness and clumsiness of nature become, through industrious exercise, wonderfully dexterous? And shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will, so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award of disobedience, had been awanting? Did not Cicero, in discussing the difference of governments in his De Republica, adopt a simile from human nature, and say that we command our bodily members as children, they are so obedient; but that the vicious parts of the soul must be treated as slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority? And no doubt, in the order of nature, the soul is more excellent than the body; and yet the soul commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless this lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the members under the control of the will; for if they were thus ruled, there should be no shame. But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should resist its authority. For in the resistance experienced by the soul in the other emotions there is less shame, because the resistance is from itself, and thus, when it is conquered by itself, itself is the conqueror, although the conquest is inordinate and vicious, because accomplished by those parts of the soul which ought to be subject to reason, yet, being accomplished by its own parts and energies, the conquest is, as I say, its own. For when the soul conquers itself to a due subordination, so that its unreasonable motions are controlled by reason, while it again is subject to God, this is a conquest virtuous and praiseworthy. Yet there is less shame when the soul is resisted by its own vicious parts than when its will and order are resisted by the body, which is distinct from and inferior to it, and dependent on it for life itself. But so long as the will retains under its authority the other members, without which the members excited by lust to resist the will cannot accomplish what they seek, chastity is preserved, and the delight of sin foregone. And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will. The field of generation should have been sown by the organ created for this purpose, as the earth is sown by the hand. And whereas now, as we essay to investigate this subject more exactly, modesty hinders us, and compels us to ask pardon of chaste ears, there would have been no cause to do so, but we could have discoursed freely, and without fear of seeming obscene, upon all those points which occur to one who meditates on the subject. There would not have been even words which could be called obscene, but all that might be said of these members would have been as pure as what is said of the other parts of the body. Whoever, then, comes to the perusal of these pages with unchaste mind, let him blame his disposition, not his nature; let him brand the actings of his own impurity, not the words which necessity forces us to use, and for which every pure and pious reader or hearer will very readily pardon me, while I expose the folly of that scepticism which argues solely on the ground of its own experience, and has no faith in anything beyond. He who is not scandalized at the apostle's censure of the horrible wickedness of the women who changed the natural use into that which is against nature, Romans 1:26 will read all this without being shocked, especially as we are not, like Paul, citing and censuring a damnable uncleanness, but are explaining, so far as we can, human generation, while with Paul we avoid all obscenity of language. 14.24. The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we move at will not only those members which are furnished with joints of solid bone, as the hands, feet, and fingers, but we move also at will those which are composed of slack and soft nerves: we can put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist them, or contract and stiffen them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face. The lungs, which are the very tenderest of the viscera except the brain, and are therefore carefully sheltered in the cavity of the chest, yet for all purposes of inhaling and exhaling the breath, and of uttering and modulating the voice, are obedient to the will when we breathe, exhale, speak, shout, or sing, just as the bellows obey the smith or the organist. I will not press the fact that some animals have a natural power to move a single spot of the skin with which their whole body is covered, if they have felt on it anything they wish to drive off - a power so great, that by this shivering tremor of the skin they can not only shake off flies that have settled on them, but even spears that have fixed in their flesh. Man, it is true, has not this power; but is this any reason for supposing that God could not give it to such creatures as He wished to possess it? And therefore man himself also might very well have enjoyed absolute power over his members had he not forfeited it by his disobedience; for it was not difficult for God to form him so that what is now moved in his body only by lust should have been moved only at will. We know, too, that some men are differently constituted from others, and have some rare and remarkable faculty of doing with their body what other men can by no effort do, and, indeed, scarcely believe when they hear of others doing. There are persons who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are some who, without moving the head, can bring the hair down upon the forehead, and move the whole scalp backwards and forwards at pleasure. Some, by lightly pressing their stomach, bring up an incredible quantity and variety of things they have swallowed, and produce whatever they please, quite whole, as if out of a bag. Some so accurately mimic the voices of birds and beasts and other men, that, unless they are seen, the difference cannot be told. Some have such command of their bowels, that they can break wind continuously at pleasure, so as to produce the effect of singing. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is well known that some weep when they please, and shed a flood of tears. But far more incredible is that which some of our brethren saw quite recently. There was a presbyter called Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian Church, who, as often as he pleased (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), on some one imitating the wailings of mourners, became so insensible, and lay in a state so like death, that not only had he no feeling when they pinched and pricked him, but even when fire was applied to him, and he was burned by it, he had no sense of pain except afterwards from the wound. And that his body remained motionless, not by reason of his self-command, but because he was insensible, was proved by the fact that he breathed no more than a dead man; and yet he said that, when any one spoke with more than ordinary distinctness, he heard the voice, but as if it were a long way off. Seeing, then, that even in this mortal and miserable life the body serves some men by many remarkable movements and moods beyond the ordinary course of nature, what reason is there for doubting that, before man was involved by his sin in this weak and corruptible condition, his members might have served his will for the propagation of offspring without lust? Man has been given over to himself because he abandoned God, while he sought to be self-satisfying; and disobeying God, he could not obey even himself. Hence it is that he is involved in the obvious misery of being unable to live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself blessed; but he could not be so if he lived wickedly. |
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| 188. Augustine, Commentary On Genesis, 6.25.36, 9.4.8, 9.10.16, 9.10.18-9.10.19, 9.14.25, 10.25, 11.41.56, 12.15.31, 12.17.34, 13.21.33 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 381, 414, 415 |
| 189. Augustine, Against Julian, 1.68, 1.70, 2.5.13, 2.7.20, 2.8.23, 2.56, 2.83, 2.85, 2.88, 2.122, 2.179, 3.1.2, 3.13.27, 3.14.28, 3.20.38, 3.21.43, 3.21.49, 4.1.29, 4.3.29, 4.4.34, 4.5.35, 4.8.52, 4.11.57, 4.13.62, 4.14.67, 4.14.69, 4.14.72, 4.19, 4.24, 4.41, 4.43-4.44, 4.43.8, 4.79, 4.104, 5.5.20-5.5.23, 5.10.42, 5.14, 5.16, 6.22, 6.24.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 274, 276, 277, 335, 353, 373, 399, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 413, 415, 416 |
| 190. Themistius, Orations, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197 |
191. Cassian, Institutiones, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220, 348, 371 | 5.32. of the letters which were burnt without being read. Nor do I think it less needful to relate this act of a brother who was intent on purity of heart, and extremely anxious with regard to the contemplation of things divine. When after an interval of fifteen years a large number of letters had been brought to him from his father and mother and many friends in the province of Pontus, he received the huge packet of letters, and turning over the matter in his own mind for some time, What thoughts, said he, will the reading of these suggest to me, which will incite me either to senseless joy or to useless sadness! For how many days will they draw off the attention of my heart from the contemplation I have set before me, by the recollection of those who wrote them! How long will it take for the disturbance of mind thus created to be calmed, and what an effort will it cost for that former state of peacefulness to be restored, if the mind is once moved by the sympathy of the letters, and by recalling the words and looks of those whom it has left for so long begins once more in thought and spirit to revisit them, to dwell among them and to be with them. And it will be of no use to have forsaken them in the body, if one begins to look on them with the heart, and readmits and revives that memory which on renouncing this world every one gave up, as if he were dead. Turning this over in his mind, he determined not only not to read a single letter, but not even to open the packet, for fear lest, at the sight of the names of the writers, or on recalling their appearance, the purpose of his spirit might give way. And so he threw it into the fire to be burnt, all tied up just as he had received it, crying, Away, O you thoughts of my home, be burnt up, and try no further to recall me to those things from which I have fled. 12.7. That the evil of pride is so great that it rightly has even God Himself as its adversary. How great is the evil of pride, that it rightly has no angel, nor other virtues opposed to it, but God Himself as its adversary! Since it should be noted that it is never said of those who are entangled in other sins that they have God resisting them; I mean it is not said that God is opposed to the gluttonous, fornicators, passionate, or covetous, but only to the proud. For those sins react only on those who commit them, or seem to be committed against those who share in them, i.e., against other men; but this one has more properly to do with God, and therefore it is especially right that it should have Him opposed to it. |
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| 192. John Chrysostom, Homilies On Hebrews, 2.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 193. Augustine, On The Good of Marriage, 2.2, 5.5 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 402, 403, 406 |
| 194. Evagrius, On Discrimination In Respect of Passions And Thoughts, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 365 |
| 195. Anon., Alphabetical Collection, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 370 |
| 196. Paulinus of Nola, Letters, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 197. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum (Homiliae 15), None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 393 |
| 198. Cassian, Conferences, 5.3, 5.6, 5.16 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 369, 386 |
| 199. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 165, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246, 392 |
| 200. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 165, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 163, 246, 392 |
| 201. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 10-17, 19-25, 27-28, 30-31, 35-38, 40, 43-45, 47, 50-51, 56-59, 6, 60, 71, 74-75, 80-81, 84, 86-87, 89, 91, 49 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 411 |
| 202. Augustine, Reply To Faustus, 22.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277, 400 |
| 203. Evagrius Ponticus, On Evil Thoughts, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 411 |
| 204. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, 1.17.35 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 408 |
205. Augustine, Confessions, 1.6-1.7, 3.1, 3.6-3.7, 4.2.2, 4.4, 4.6.12, 4.8.13, 4.15-4.16, 6.11.20, 6.13.23, 6.14.24, 6.15.25, 7.1, 7.3, 7.3.5, 7.7.11, 7.17, 8.5-8.6, 8.9-8.10, 8.9.21, 8.11.26-8.11.27, 8.12, 9.2-9.3, 9.6, 9.10, 10.14, 10.21.30, 10.30, 10.33, 10.35.55, 11.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 205 | 11.9. 11. In this Beginning, O God, have You made heaven and earth - in Your Word, in Your Son, in Your Power, in Your Wisdom, in Your Truth, wondrously speaking and wondrously making. Who shall comprehend? Who shall relate it? What is that which shines through me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn? I shudder inasmuch as I am unlike it; and I burn inasmuch as I am like it. It is Wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness, which again overwhelms me, fainting from it, in the darkness and amount of my punishment. For my strength is brought down in need, so that I cannot endure my blessings, until Thou, O Lord, who hast been gracious to all mine iniquities, heal also all mine infirmities; because You shall also redeem my life from corruption, and crown me with Your loving-kindness and mercy, and shall satisfy my desire with good things, because my youth shall be renewed like the eagle's. For by hope we are saved; and through patience we await Your promises. Romans 8:24-25 Let him that is able hear You discoursing within. I will with confidence cry out from Your oracle, How wonderful are Your works, O Lord, in Wisdom have You made them all. And this Wisdom is the Beginning, and in that Beginning have You made heaven and earth. |
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| 206. Gregory of Nyssa, Dialogus De Anima Et Resurrectione, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389, 393 |
| 207. Philoponus John, In Aristotelis Libros De Generatione Et Corruptione Commentaria, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 267, 269 |
| 208. Philoponus John, In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 267 |
| 209. Jerome, Commentaria In Epistolam Ad Ephesios, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 353, 355 |
| 210. Jerome, Commentaria In Jeremiam, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 397 |
| 211. Jerome, Commentaria In Matthaeum (Commentaria In Evangelium S. Matthaei), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 349, 352, 353, 354, 396 |
| 212. Jerome, Dialogi Contra Pelagianos (Dialogus Adversus Pelagianos.), None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 213. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 214. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 215. John Philoponus, In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria, 51.13-52.1, 51.13-52.12, 141.22, 141.23, 141.24, 141.25, 141.26, 141.27, 141.28, 141.29, 439.35-440.3 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 269 |
| 216. Jerome, Commentary On Ezekiel, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 352, 353, 354 |
| 217. Jerome, Letters, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 343, 346, 348, 353, 354, 355 |
| 218. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 303, 315 |
| 219. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 133.18, 226.12-227.2 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 279 |
| 220. Damaskios, In Philebum, 13.5-13.12, 87.1-87.4 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 205 |
| 221. Damaskios, In Parmenidem, 252.11, 252.12, 252.13, 252.27-253.11, 253.23, 253.24, 253.25, 253.26, 266.25, 266.26, 266.27, 266.28 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206 |
| 222. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.212.22, 2.72.14, 3.334.3-3.334.15, 3.335.10-3.335.14, 3.338.6-3.338.13, 3.340.14-3.340.17 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206, 266 |
| 223. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 196 |
| 224. Boethius, De Consolatione, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 167 |
| 225. David, Prolegomena Philosophiae, 14.15-15.22 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 226. Maximus The Confessor, Quaestiones Ad Thalassium , None (6th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 348 |
| 227. Augustine, Letters, None (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 405, 407, 412 |
| 229. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Monks, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389, 395 |
| 230. Philodemus, On Envy, Ed.Guerra, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 231. Philodemus, On Arrogance, Ed.Jensen, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 202 |
| 234. Antiphon, On Emotions, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 235. Basil of Caesarea, On The Eucharist, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 391 |
| 237. Basil of Caesarea, Ascetic Sermons, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214 |
| 239. Paulinus of Nola, Epithalamium Carmen, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 240. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Virgins, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 365, 370 |
| 241. Gregory The Great, Pope, Moralia, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 370 |
| 242. Plutarch, Erotikos, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277 |
| 243. Philodemus, On Conversation (Cronache Ercolanesi 5), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 218 |
| 245. Augustine, Expositions of The Psalms, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 246. John Chrysostom, Pseudo‐Augustine, De Consolatione Mortuorum, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 247. Isaiah The Solitary, Logoi, 2.1-2.2 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 249. Maimonides, Commentary On The Misnah, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385 |
| 250. Maimonides, Guide For The Perplexed, 1.54 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 251. Maimonides, Hilkhot De'Ot, 1.4-1.5, 2.3 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 385, 386 |
| 253. Palladius of Aspuna, Lausiac History, 25.5 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 361, 371 |
| 254. Pseudo‐Ocellus, Commentary On Plato'S Phaedo, Ed.Westerink, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172, 226 |
| 255. Posidonius, Ed.Edelstein–Kidd (See Also Galen, Php, Books 4–5), Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 106 |
| 256. Augustine, On The Catholic And Manichaean Ways of Life, 1.27.53-1.27.54, 2.17, 18.15, 18.65 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 277, 397, 400 |
| 257. John Climacus, Ladder, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 259. Libanius, Preliminary Exercises, 3.4.1-3.4.3 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 279 |
| 260. Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 317 |
| 261. Sextus, The Sentences of Sextus, 116, 13, 70, 87, 97, 232 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 262. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 243 |
| 263. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 214, 233, 297 |
| 264. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, 241.7 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 206 |
| 265. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 197, 235 |
| 266. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 382, 410, 415 |
| 267. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 268. Isaiah The Solitary, On Guarding The Intellect, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 386 |
| 269. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 18, 2, 29, 3, 1 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 236 |
| 270. Photius, Bibliotheca (Library, Bibl.), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 271 |
| 271. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 28 |
| 272. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 273. Origen, Commentary On Joshua, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 346, 387 |
| 274. Anon., Pachomius, Vita Graecae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 220 |
| 275. Ambrose, On The Death of His Brother (Csel 73, Pp.207–325), 1.70-1.71, 2.11 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 394 |
| 276. Epicurus, On Nature, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 327 |
| 277. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 35-36 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 217 |
| 278. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 14 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 279. Iamblichus, Letters, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 303 |
| 281. Pseudo‐Plutarch, Is The Emotional Element In Humans A Part Or A Capacity of The Soul?, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 120 |
| 282. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209, 311 |
| 285. Porphyry, On The Faculties of The Soul, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 315 |
| 286. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Creation of Man, 16.11, 16.14 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 324 |
| 287. Athenaeus, Sophists At Dinner, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209, 279 |
| 289. Epiphanius, On Faith, 9.46 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 107 |
| 290. Musonius Rufus, Ed.Hense, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 215 |
| 291. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 126-127, 131-132, 135-136, 133 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 324, 333 |
| 293. Augustine, New Sermon, Mainz, Ed.Dolbeau, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 294. Pseudo‐Maximus, Centuries, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 348 |
| 295. Basil of Caesarea, Constitutiones Monasticae, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 369 |
| 296. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Rerum Monachalium Rationes, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 369 |
| 298. Seneca The Younger, On The Shortness of Life, 10 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 231 |
| 299. Barlaam of Seminaria, Ethics According To The Stoics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 209 |
| 300. Maximus The Confessor, Letter To Marinus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 338, 339 |
| 301. Pseudo‐Diogenes (The Cynic), Letters, Ed.Malherbe, 44 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 302. Stephanus, In Artem Rhetoricam, 325.15 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 169 |
| 304. Aristo of Ceos, On Freeing From Pride, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221 |
| 305. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, 4-5 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 241 |
| 306. Porphyry, On What Is Up To Us, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320 |
| 307. Pseudo‐Makarios, Logia, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 308. Lactantius, Ep.Ad Pentad., None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 389 |
| 309. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Life of Moses (Pg 44), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 240 |
| 310. Pseudo‐Crates (The Cynic), Letters, Ed.Malherbe, 28 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 274 |
| 311. Pseudo‐Elias (Pseudo‐David), Lectures On Porphyry'S Isagoge, Ed.Westerink, 13.1-13.17 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 312. David, Prolegomena (Cag 18.2), 32.11-33.26 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 172 |
| 313. Pseudo‐Ocellus, On The Nature of The Universe, 4 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 314. Valerius Pinianus, Life of Saint Melania, Ed.Gorce, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 276 |
| 316. Pseudo‐Iamblichus (Nicomachus of Gerasa), Theologoumena Arithmeticae, Ed.De Falco, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334 |
| 317. Jerome, On Guarding The Intellect, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 224 |
| 318. Bible.O.T., Wisdom, 8.21 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 383 |
| 319. Augustine, Exposition of 84 Propositions In The Epistle To The Romans, 61, 60 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 337 |
| 322. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, To Anatolius, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 396 |
| 323. Pseudo‐Aristotle, Problems, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 242 |
| 324. Pseudo-Plato, 'Axiochus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 228 |
| 326. Augustine, On Free Choice of The Will, 2.1.1 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 321 |
| 328. Anon., Scholium On Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283, 410 |
| 332. Council of Constantinople, Second, Anathemas, 10 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 333. Mark The Ascetic, On The Spiritual Law, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 368 |
| 336. Gregory of Nyssa, On Placilla, Ed.Jaeger Et Al., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 392 |
| 340. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 341. Aristotle, Protrepticus, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 188, 250 |
| 343. Galen, Commentary On Hippocrates, Epidemics, Ed.Kühn, 3.1.4 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 284 |
| 344. Anon., Epicurea, Ed.Usener, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 283, 410 |
| 345. Philodemus, On Choices And Avoidances, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201, 284 |
| 346. Pseudo‐Ocellus, In Alcibiadem I, 6.6-7.8, 54.15-55.11, 145.12-146.11 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 221, 299 |
| 347. Justinian, Letter To Menna, Ed Mansi, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 189 |
| 350. Photius, Epitome, None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 190 |
| 352. Clement, Pedagogue, 3.11.74 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on erotic love Found in books: Graver (2007) 252 |
| 354. Origen, Pg, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 355. Galen, Medical Introduction, 14.726 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on pneuma •zeno of citium, treatise on the universe Found in books: Graver (2007) 225 |
| 358. Cicero, Posterior Academics, 1.38 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on causes of emotion •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 62, 233 |
| 359. Anon., Herculaneum Papyrus, 1577 / 1579 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, on mental conflict Found in books: Graver (2007) 233 |
| 360. Pseudo‐Nilus, Handbook (Edition of Epictetus), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 390 |
| 361. Evagrius, 'Frag.From Sayings of The Fathers (Apophthegmata Patrum), None Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 390 |
| 363. Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary On The Song of Songs (Pg 44), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 240, 388 |
| 365. Proclus, Psalms, 2.2, 4.4, 34.17 Tagged with subjects: •zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 344, 349, 352, 354 |
| 367. Pseudo‐John of Damascus, On The Virtues And The Vices, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 368 |
