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44 results for "wisdom"
1. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
2. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 184
87b. εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθʼ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν 87b. in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not. In the same way with regard to our question about virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be, we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not? In the first place, if it is something dissimilar or similar to knowledge, is it taught or not—or, as we were saying just now, remembered? Let us have no disputing about the choice of a name:
3. Xenophon, Apology, 14 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 139
4. Xenophon, Memoirs, 3.9.1-3.9.5, 4.6.7-4.6.9 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 184
3.9.1. πάλιν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ἡ ἀνδρεία πότερον εἴη διδακτὸν ἢ φυσικόν, οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον πρὸς τοὺς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν ψυχῆς ἐρρωμενεστέραν πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ φύσει γίγνεσθαι· ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσι τρεφομένους πολὺ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τόλμῃ. 3.9.2. νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αὔξεσθαι· δῆλον μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα λαβόντες Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμάχεσθαι· φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτʼ ἂν Θρᾳξὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις οὔτε Σκύθαις τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι. 3.9.3. ὁρῶ δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καὶ φύσει διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ πολὺ ἐπιδιδόντας. ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πάντας χρὴ καὶ τοὺς εὐφυεστέρους καὶ τοὺς ἀμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν. 3.9.4. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε κἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία σοφούς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι, οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ οἴονται συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν· νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. 3.9.5. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλά τε κἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν· οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα καλά τε κἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί. 4.6.7. σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαιμεν εἶναι; εἰπέ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι, ἢ εἰσί τινες ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται σοφοί; ἃ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις, ἅ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμῃ σοφοί εἰσι; τίνι γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ; ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἴει εἶναι ἢ ᾧ σοφοί εἰσιν; οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; οὐδὲ μὰ Δίʼ ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἶναι; μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 4.6.8. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, καὶ τἀγαθὸν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί; πῶς; ἔφη. δοκεῖ σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔμοιγε. τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλῳ ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίοτε ἄλλῳ βλαβερὸν εἶναι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἄλλο δʼ ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. 4.6.9. τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχοιμεν ἄν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν; ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ὀνομάζεις καλὸν ἢ σῶμα ἢ σκεῦος ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν, ὃ οἶσθα πρὸς πάντα καλὸν ὄν; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. καλὸν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο, ἔφη. τὸ χρήσιμον ἄρα καλόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. 3.9.1. When asked again whether Courage could be taught or came by nature, he replied: I think that just as one man’s body is naturally stronger than another’s for labour, so one man’s soul is naturally braver than another’s in danger. For I notice that men brought up under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring. 3.9.2. Nevertheless, I think that every man’s nature acquires more courage by learning and practice. of course Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bronze shield and spear and fight Lacedaemonians; and of course Lacedaemonians would not be willing to face Thracians with leather shields and javelins, nor Scythians with bows for weapons. 3.9.3. And similarly in all other points, I find that human beings naturally differ one from another and greatly improve by application. Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practise what they want to excel in. 3.9.4. Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, The Greek text is corrupt, but the sense is clear. that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent. 3.9.5. He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. 4.6.7. How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know? About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn’t know? The wise, then, are wise by knowledge? How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge? Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise? No. It follows that Wisdom is Knowledge? I think so. Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things? of course not — nor even a fraction of them. So an all-wise man is an impossibility? of course, of course. Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as he knows? I think so. 4.6.8. Now to seek the Good, Euthydemus: is this the way? What do you mean? Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone? No. In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don’t you think? Assuredly. Should you call anything good except what is useful? No. Consequently what is useful is good for him to whom it is useful? I think so. 4.6.9. Consider the Beautiful: can we define it in any other way? Or is it possible to name a beautiful body, for instance, or vessel, or anything else that you know to be beautiful for all purposes? of course not. Then does the beauty in using anything consist in using it for just that purpose for which that particular thing is useful? Certainly. And is a thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use that particular thing? For no other purpose whatever. The useful, then, is beautiful for any purpose for which it is useful? I think so. Next comes Courage, Euthydemus.
5. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 184
278e. to listen to your wisdom I shall venture to improvise in your presence. So both you and your disciples must restrain yourselves and listen without laughing; and you, son of Axiochus, answer me this:
6. Plato, Crito, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 139
46b. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὴ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, 46b. Socrates. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. Aud I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever,
7. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 139
28e. Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον 28e. if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium , I remained where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others,
8. Euripides, Alcestis, 619 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
9. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
10. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
11. Numenius Heracleensis, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 141
12. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), on the order of the parts of philosophy Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23
13. Cicero, Lucullus, 145, 144 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 126
14. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.80 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 184
4.80. Et si fidentia, id est firma animi confisio, scientia quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis, metus quoque est diffidentia loco desperato sententia tole- rabilis efficiatur, si scribas : metus quoque qui est diffidentia inbecilla est adsensio ( cf. p. 368, 26 ) expectati et impendentis mali. propter haec ultima autem verba proximum enuntiatum et si spes — metum ante et si fidentia — imp. mali ponen- dum videtur. ut igitur metus — in malo = w(/ste e)n tw=| fau/lw| ( gen. masc. cf. St. fr. 3, 548 p. 147, 9 to\n sofo\n ou)k a)pistei=n th\n ga\r a)pisti/an ei/(nai Yeu/dous u(po/lhYin, th\n de/ pi/stin a)stei=on u(pa/rxein, ei/)nai ga\r kata/lhWin i)sxura/n ktl. ) ei/)nai to\n fo/bon, a(sau/tws de\ kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/qh pa/nta ? sed quid Cicero peccauerit quid librarii, incertum. difidentia KV 3 (itiae V 1 ) defidentia GR expectati et impendentis inp. V mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. ut igitur metus, metum mecum G 1 V 1 sic reliquae reliqui K 1 perturbationes sunt in malo. ergo ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem natura dicuntur iracundi aut misericordes aut invidi aut tale quid, ei sunt constituti quasi mala valetudine valitudini V animi, sanabiles sanabiles s sanabile est tamen, ut Socrates dicitur: cum multa in conventu vitia conlegisset in eum Zopyrus, zopirus GK qui se naturam cuiusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent, ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi sic nata, sic nata Po signa (insita vel innata Bentl. Dav. quod potius de eis rebus dicitur quas etiamnunc habe- mus ) cf. fin. 2, 33 ut bacillum aliud est inflexum de industria, aliud ita natum fat. 9 al. sed ratione a se adse R 1 deiecta deiec ta di ceret K valitudine R diceret.
15. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 142
16. Plutarch, On The Fortune Or Virtue of Alexander The Great, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 143
17. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 89.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 11
18. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.20.15-1.20.16, 3.21.19 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), on the end •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 26, 139
19. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.24.1-2.24.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 11
20. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), on the order of the parts of philosophy Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23
21. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), on the order of the parts of philosophy Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23
22. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 141
23. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 141
24. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.106, 2.111, 2.114, 3.66, 7.2, 7.4, 7.6, 7.16, 7.24-7.25, 7.39-7.40, 7.87, 7.89, 7.161 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul •wisdom (sophia), ambiguous relation with the academy •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle •wisdom (sophia), on the order of the parts of philosophy •wisdom (sophia), on the nature of man •wisdom (sophia), on the end Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23, 25, 27, 139, 141, 142; Wolfsdorf (2020) 184
2.106. 10. EUCLIDEuclides was a native of Megara on the Isthmus, or according to some of Gela, as Alexander states in his Successions of Philosophers. He applied himself to the writings of Parmenides, and his followers were called Megarians after him, then Eristics, and at a later date Dialecticians, that name having first been given to them by Dionysius of Chalcedon because they put their arguments into the form of question and answer. Hermodorus tells us that, after the death of Socrates, Plato and the rest of the philosophers came to him, being alarmed at the cruelty of the tyrants. He held the supreme good to be really one, though called by many names, sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and again Mind, and so forth. But all that is contradictory of the good he used to reject, declaring that it had no existence. 2.111. There are also other pupils of Eubulides, amongst them Apollonius surnamed Cronus. He had a pupil Diodorus, the son of Ameinias of Iasus, who was also nicknamed Cronus. Callimachus in his Epigrams says of him:Momus himself chalked up on the walls Cronus is wise.He too was a dialectician and was supposed to have been the first who discovered the arguments known as the Veiled Figure and the Horned One. When he was staying with Ptolemy Soter, he had certain dialectical questions addressed to him by Stilpo, and, not being able to solve them on the spot, he was reproached by the king and, among other slights, the nickname Cronus was applied to him by way of derision. 2.114. And besides these he won over Phrasidemus the Peripatetic, an accomplished physicist, and Alcimus the rhetorician, the first orator in all Greece; Crates, too, and many others he got into his toils, and, what is more, along with these, he carried off Zeno the Phoenician.He was also an authority on politics.He married a wife, and had a mistress named Nicarete, as Onetor has somewhere stated. He had a profligate daughter, who was married to his friend Simmias of Syracuse. And, as she would not live by rule, some one told Stilpo that she was a disgrace to him. To this he replied, Not so, any more than I am an honour to her. 3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them. 7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty. 7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates. 7.6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city, and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms: 7.16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countece. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off. 7.24. One day at a banquet he was reclining in silence and was asked the reason: whereupon he bade his critic carry word to the king that there was one present who knew how to hold his tongue. Now those who inquired of him were ambassadors from King Ptolemy, and they wanted to know what message they should take back from him to the king. On being asked how he felt about abuse, he replied, As an envoy feels who is dismissed without an answer. Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said, The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo. 7.25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up. A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as The Reaper, and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod's lines thus:He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself. 7.39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.161. Dialectical reasonings, he said, are like spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet of no use. He would not admit a plurality of virtues with Zeno, nor again with the Megarians one single virtue called by many names; but he treated virtue in accordance with the category of relative modes. Teaching this sort of philosophy, and lecturing in the Cynosarges, he acquired such influence as to be called the founder of a sect. At any rate Miltiades and Diphilus were denominated Aristoneans. He was a plausible speaker and suited the taste of the general public. Hence Timon's verse about him:One who from wily Ariston's line boasts his descent.
25. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.5.11 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 141
26. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 7.19, 7.432-7.435, 9.108 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), on the order of the parts of philosophy •wisdom (sophia), reputation among the stoics as great, but not wise •wisdom (sophia), on the end Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 23, 27, 126
27. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.31.68 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
28. Jerome, Ecclesiasticus, 34.8 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 11
29. Strabo, Geography, 16.2.24  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 139
16.2.24. The Sidonians are said by historians to excel in various kinds of art, as the words of Homer also imply. Besides, they cultivate science and study astronomy and arithmetic, to which they were led by the application of numbers (in accounts) and night sailing, each of which (branches of knowledge) concerns the merchant and seaman; in the same manner the Egyptians were led to the invention of geometry by the mensuration of ground, which was required in consequence of the Nile confounding, by its overflow, the respective boundaries of the country. It is thought that geometry was introduced into Greece from Egypt, and astronomy and arithmetic from Phoenicia. At present the best opportunities are afforded in these cities of acquiring a knowledge of these, and of all other branches of philosophy.If we are to believe Poseidonius, the ancient opinion about atoms originated with Mochus, a native of Sidon, who lived before the Trojan times. Let us, however, dismiss subjects relating to antiquity. In my time there were distinguished philosophers, natives of Sidon, as Boethus, with whom I studied the philosophy of Aristotle, and Diodotus his brother. Antipater was of Tyre, and a little before my time Apollonius, who published a table of the philosophers of the school of Zeno, and of their writings.Tyre is distant from Sidon not more than 200 stadia. Between the two is situated a small town, called Ornithopolis, (the city of birds); next a river which empties itself near Tyre into the sea. Next after Tyre is Palae-tyrus (ancient Tyre), at the distance of 30 stadia.
30. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, None (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan
31. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 25
32. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 25, 27
33. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 38-39  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 27
34. Hecato, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), consulting the oracle Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 139
35. Epiphanius, Abbreviated True Creed, 9.30  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
37. Antiphon, Tetralogies,  Tagged with subjects: •sophia (wisdom), as condition of the soul Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020) 183
38. Hippobotus, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), ambiguous relation with the academy Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 142
40. Stilpo, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan
41. Diodorus Cronus, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan
42. Antigonus of Carystus, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), studying together with diodorus cronus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 141
43. Fds, Fds, 1, 107-108, 110, 17, 20, 24, 369, 99, 2  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 11
44. Theophrastus, On The Stoics, 13.3, 14.19-14.22  Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), ambiguous relation with the academy •wisdom (sophia), reputation among the stoics as great, but not wise Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 126, 143