| 1. Empedocles, Fragments, d75, r70 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Del Lucchese, Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture (2019) 141 |
2. Lycophron, Alexandra, 1464-1465 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Pillinger, Cassandra and the Poetics of Prophecy in Greek and Latin Literature (2019) 139| 1465. Νησοῦς θυγατρός, ἤ τι Φίκιον τέρας, | |
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| 3. Tibullus, Elegies, 2.5 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, jan hendrik Found in books: Pillinger, Cassandra and the Poetics of Prophecy in Greek and Latin Literature (2019) 172 |
4. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.102, 1.331, 1.1116, 3.9, 3.207, 4.24-4.25, 5.82, 6.58 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j.f. Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 214| 1.102. Tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum 1.331. quod tibi cognosse in multis erit utile rebus 1.1116. nox iter eripiet, quin ultima naturai 3.9. tu, pater, es rerum inventor, tu patria nobis 3.207. utilis invenietur et opportuna cluebit. 4.24. versibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem 4.25. naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem. 5.82. nam bene qui didicere deos securum agere aevom, 6.58. ignorantia causarum conferre deorum | 1.102. And there shall come the time when even thou, Forced by the soothsayer's terror-tales, shalt seek To break from us. Ah, many a dream even now Can they concoct to rout thy plans of life, And trouble all thy fortunes with base fears. I own with reason: for, if men but knew Some fixed end to ills, they would be strong By some device unconquered to withstand Religions and the menacings of seers. But now nor skill nor instrument is theirs, Since men must dread eternal pains in death. For what the soul may be they do not know, Whether 'tis born, or enter in at birth, And whether, snatched by death, it die with us, Or visit the shadows and the vasty caves of Orcus, or by some divine decree Enter the brute herds, as our Ennius sang, Who first from lovely Helicon brought down A laurel wreath of bright perennial leaves, Renowned forever among the Italian clans. Yet Ennius too in everlasting verse Proclaims those vaults of Acheron to be, Though thence, he said, nor souls nor bodies fare, But only phantom figures, strangely wan, And tells how once from out those regions rose Old Homer's ghost to him and shed salt tears And with his words unfolded Nature's source. Then be it ours with steady mind to clasp The purport of the skies- the law behind The wandering courses of the sun and moon; To scan the powers that speed all life below; But most to see with reasonable eyes of what the mind, of what the soul is made, And what it is so terrible that breaks On us asleep, or waking in disease, Until we seem to mark and hear at hand Dead men whose bones earth bosomed long ago. |
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5. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 3.6.6, 7.5-7.9, 7.6.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. h. Found in books: Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 92 | 7.6. Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention of the law, in fact a large proportion of legal disputes turn on these points. We need not therefore be surprised that such questions occur in the schools as well, where they are often invented with this special purpose. One form of this kind of question is found in cases where the enquiry turns both on the letter and the spirit of a law., Such questions arise when the law presents some obscurity. Under these circumstances both parties will seek to establish their own interpretation of the passage and to overthrow that advanced by their opponent. Take for example the following case. "A thief shall refund four times the amount of his theft. Two thieves have jointly stolen 10,000 sesterces. 40,000 are claimed from each. They claim that they are liable only to pay 20,000 each." The accuser will urge that the sum which he claims is fourfold the amount stolen; the accused will urge that the sum which they offer to pay is fourfold. The intention of the law will be pleaded by both parties., On the other hand, the dispute may turn on a passage of the law which is clear in one sense and doubtful in another. "The son of a harlot shall not address the people. A woman who had a son became a prostitute. The youth is forbidden to address the people." Here there is no doubt about the son of one who was a prostitute before his birth, but it is doubtful whether the law applies to the case of one born before his mother became a prostitute., Another question which is not infrequently raised is as to the interpretation of the law forbidding an action to be brought twice on the same dispute, the problem being whether the word twice refers to the prosecutor or the prosecution. Such are the points raising out of the obscurity of the law. A second form of question turns on some passage where the meaning is clear. Those who have given exclusive attention to this class of question call it the basis concerned with the obvious expression of the law and its intention. In such circumstances one party will rest their case on the letter, the other on the intention of the law., There are three different methods in which we may combat the letter. The first comes into play where it is clear that it is impossible always to observe the letter of the law. "Children shall support their parents under penalty of imprisonment." It is clear, in the first place, that this cannot apply to an infant. At this point we shall turn to other possible exceptions and distinguish as follows. "Does this apply to everyone who refuses to support his parent? Has this particular individual incurred the penalty by this particular act?", The second arises in scholastic themes where no argument can be drawn from the particular law, but the question is concerned solely with the subject of the dispute. "A foreigner who goes up on to the wall should be liable to capital punishment. The enemy had scaled the wall and were driven back by a foreigner. His punishment is demanded.", In this case we shall not have two separate questions, namely, whether every foreigner who goes up on the wall is liable to the penalty, and whether this particular foreigner is liable, since no more forcible argument can be brought against the application of the letter of the law than the fact in dispute, but the only question to be raised will be whether a foreigner may not go on to the wall even for the purpose of saving the city. Therefore we shall rest our case on equity and the intention of the law. It is, however, sometimes possible to draw examples from other laws to show that we cannot always stand by the letter, as Cicero did in his defence of Caecina., The third method becomes operative when we find something in the actual words of the law which enables us to prove that the intention of the legislator was different. The following theme will provide an example. "Anyone who is caught at night with steel in his hands shall be thrown into prison. A man is found wearing a steel ring, and is imprisoned by the magistrate." In this case the use of the word caught is sufficient proof that the word steel was only intended by the law in the sense of a weapon of offence., But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola., A second heir had been appointed in the event of a posthumous son dying while a minor. No posthumous son was born. The next of kin claimed the property. Who could doubt that the intention of the testator was that the same man should inherit in the event of the son not being born who would have inherited in the event of his death? But he had not written this in his will., Again, the opposite case, that is to say, when what is written is obviously contrary to the intention of the writer, occurred quite recently. A man who had made a bequest of 5000 sesterces, on altering his will erased the word sesterces and inserted pounds of silver. But it was clear that he had meant not 5000 but 5 pounds of silver, because the weight of silver mentioned in the bequest was unparalleled and incredible., The same basis includes such general questions as to whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the document, and what was the purpose of the writer, while for the treatment of such questions we must have recourse to quality or conjecture, with which I think I have dealt in sufficient detail. 7.6.9. But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola. 7.7. The next subject which comes up for discussion is that of contrary laws. For all writers of text-books are agreed that in such cases there are two bases involving the letter and the intention of the law respectively. This view is justified by the fact that, when one law contradicts another, both parties attack the letter and raise the question of intention, while the point in dispute, as regards each law, is whether we should be guided by it at all., But it is clear to everybody that one law cannot contradict another in principle (since if there were two different principles, one law would cancel the other), and that the laws in question are brought into collision purely by the accidents of chance. When two laws clash, they may be of a similar nature, as for instance if we have to compare two cases in which a tyrannicide and a brave man are given the choice of their reward, both being granted the privilege of choosing whatever they desire. In such a case we compare the deserts of the claimants, the occasions of the respective acts and the nature of the rewards claimed., Or the same law may be in conflict with itself, as in the case where we have two brave men, two tyrannicides or two ravished women, when the question must turn either on time (that is, whose claim has priority) or on quality (that is, whose claim is the more just). Again, we may have a conflict between diverse, similar or dissimilar laws., Diverse laws are those against which arguments may be brought without reference to any contradictory law. The following theme will provide an example. "A magistrate shall not quit the citadel. One who has rendered heroic service to his country may choose what reward he pleases. A magistrate who left his post and saved his country, demands an amnesty for his conduct." In this case, even though there be no other law covering the case, we may raise the question whether a hero ought to be granted anything he chooses to claim. Again, many conclusive arguments may be brought against the letter of the law restricting the movements of the magistrate: for example, a fire may have broken out in the citadel, or a sally against the enemy may have been necessary., Laws are styled similar when nothing can be opposed to one except the other. "Tyrannicides shall have their statues set up in the gymnasium. A statue of a woman shall not be set up in the gymnasium. A woman killed a tyrant." Here are two conflicting laws: for a woman's statue cannot under any other circumstances be erected in the gymnasium, while there is no other circumstance which can bar the erection of the statue of a tyrannicide in the gymnasium., Laws are styled dissimilar when many arguments can be urged against one, while the only point which can be urged against the other is the actual subject of the dispute. An example is provided by the case in which a brave man demands the pardon of a deserter as his reward. For there are many arguments, as I have shown above, which can be urged against the law permitting a hero to choose whatever reward he will, but the letter of the law dealing with the crime of desertion cannot be overthrown under any circumstances save the choice of rewards to which I have just referred., Again, the point of law is either admitted by both parties or disputed. If it be admitted, the questions which are raised will as a rule be such as the following. Which of the two laws is the most stringent? Does it concern gods or men, the state or private individuals, reward or punishment, great things or small? Does it permit, forbid or command?, Another common question is which of the two laws is the oldest; but the most important question is which of the two laws will suffer less by its contravention, as for example in the case of the hero and the deserter just mentioned, in which case, if the deserter is not put to death, the whole law is ignored, whereas, if he be put to death, the hero will still have another choice left open to him. It is, however, of the utmost importance to consider which course is best from the point of view of morality and justice, a problem for the solution of which no general rules can be laid down, as it will depend on the special circumstances of the case., If, on the other hand, the point of law is disputed, either one party or both in turn will argue the point. Take the following case as an example. "A father shall be empowered to arrest his son, and a patron to arrest his freedman. Freedmen shall be transferred to their patron's heir. A certain man appointed the son of a freedman as his heir. The son of the freedman and the freedman himself both claim the right to arrest the other." Here the father claims his right over the son, while the son, in virtue of his new position as patron, denies that his father possessed the rights of a father, because he was in the power of his patron., Laws containing two provisions may conflict with themselves in exactly the same way as two laws may conflict. The following will serve as an illustration. "The bastard born before a legitimate son shall rank as legitimate, the bastard born after the legitimate son shall only rank as a citizen." All that I have said about laws will also apply to decrees of the senate. If decrees of the senate conflict with one another or with the laws, the basis will be the same as if laws only were concerned. 7.8. The syllogistic basis has some resemblance to the basis concerned with the letter and intention of the law, since whenever it comes into play, one party rests his case on the letter: there is, however, this difference between the two bases, that in the latter we argue against the letter, in the present beyond the letter, while in the latter the party defending the letter aims at securing that in any case the letter may be carried into effect, whereas in the present his aim will be to prevent anything except the letter being carried into effect. The syllogism is sometimes employed in conjunction with definition: for often if the definition be weak it takes refuge in the syllogism., Assume a law to run as follows: "A woman who is a poisoner shall be liable to capital punishment. A wife gave her husband a love-potion to cure him of his habit of beating her. She also divorced him. On being asked by her relatives to return to him, she refused. The husband hung himself. The woman is accused of poisoning." The strongest line for the accuser to take will be to assert that the love-potion was a poison. This involves definition. If it proves weak, we shall have recourse to the syllogism, to which we shall proceed after virtually dropping our previous argument, and which we shall employ to decide the question whether she does not deserve to be punished for administering the love-potion no less than if she had caused her husband's death by poison., The syllogistic basis, then, deduces from the letter of the law that which is uncertain; and since this conclusion is arrived at by reason, the basis is called ratiocinative. It may be subdivided into the following species of question. If it is right to do a thing once, is it right to do it often? Example: "A priestess found guilty of unchastity is thrown from the Tarpeian rock and survives. It is demanded that she shall be thrown down again." If the law grants a privilege with reference to one thing, does it grant it with reference to a number? Example: "A man kills two tyrants together and claims two rewards.", If a thing is legal before a certain occurrence, is it legal after it? Example: "The ravisher took refuge in flight. His victim married. The ravisher returned and the woman demands to be allowed her choice." Is that which is lawful with regard to the whole, lawful with regard to a part? Example: "It is forbidden to accept a plough as security. He accepted a ploughshare." Is that which is lawful with regard to a part, lawful with regard to the whole? Example: "It is forbidden to export wool from Tarentum: he exported sheep.", In all these cases the syllogism rests on the letter of the law as well: for the accuser urges that the provisions of the law are precise. He will say, "I demand that the priestess who has broken her vows be cast down: it is the law," or "The ravished woman demands the exercise of the choice permitted her by law," or "Wool grows on sheep," and so on., But to this we may reply, "The law does not prescribe that the condemned woman should be thrown down twice, that the ravished woman should exercise her choice under all circumstances, that the tyrannicide should receive two rewards, while it makes no mention of ploughshares or of sheep." Thus we infer what is doubtful from what is certain. It is a more difficult task to deduce from the letter of the law that which is not actually prescribed by the letter, and to argue because that is the case, so also is this. Take the following problems. "The man who kills his father shall be sewn up in a sack. He killed his mother," or "It is illegal to drag a man from his own house into the court. He dragged him from his tent.", Under this heading come questions such as the following: if there is not a special law applicable to the case, ought we to have recourse to an analogous law? is the point in question similar to what is contained in the letter of the law? Now it should be noted that what is similar may be greater, equal or less. In the first case we enquire whether the provisions of the law are sufficient, or, if they are insufficient, whether we should have recourse to this other law. In both cases it is a question of the intention of the legislator. But the most effective form of treatment in such cases will be to appeal to equity. 7.9. I turn to the discussion of ambiguity, which will be found to have countless species: indeed, in the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which has not a diversity of meanings. There are, however, very few genera, since ambiguity must occur either in a single word or in a group of words., Single words give rise to error, when the same noun applies to a number of things or persons (the Greeks call this homonymy): for example, it is uncertain with regard to the word gallus whether it means a cock or a Gaul or a proper name or an emasculated priest of Cybele; while Ajax may refer either to the son of Telamon or the son of Oileus. Again, verbs likewise may have different meanings, as, for example, cerno., This ambiguity crops up in many ways, and gives rise to disputes, more especially in connexion with wills, when two men of the same name claim their freedom or, it may be, an inheritance, or again, when the enquiry turns on the precise nature of the bequest., There is another form of ambiguity where a word has one meaning when entire and another when divided, as, for example, ingenua, armamentum or Corvinum. The disputes arising from such ambiguities are no more than childish quibbles, but nevertheless the Greeks are in the habit of making them the subject for controversial themes, as, for example, in the notorious case of the αá½Î»Î·ÏÏίÏ, when the question is whether it is a hall which has fallen down three times (αá½Î»Î· ÏÏίÏ) or a flute-player who fell down that is to be sold., A third form of ambiguity is caused by the use of compound words; for example, if a man orders his body to be buried in a cultivated spot, and should direct, as is often done, a considerable space of land surrounding his tomb to be taken from the land left to his heirs with a view to preserving his ashes from outrage, an occasion for dispute may be afforded by the question whether the words mean "in a cultivated place" (in culto loco) or "in an uncultivated place" (inculto loco)., Thus arises the Greek theme about Leon and Pantaleon, who go to law because the handwriting of a will makes it uncertain whether the testator has left all his property to Leon or his property to Pantaleon. Groups of words give rise to more serious ambiguity. Such ambiguity may arise from doubt as to a case, as in the following passage: â "I say that you, O prince of Aeacus' line, Rome can o'erthrow.", Or it may arise from the arrangement of the words, which makes it doubtful what the exact reference of some word or words may be, more especially when there is a word in the middle of the sentence which may be referred either to what precedes or what follows, as in the line of Virgil which describes Troilus as lora tenens tamen, where it may be disputed whether the poet means that he is still holding the reins, or that, although he holds the reins, he is still dragged along., The controversial theme, "A certain man in his will ordered his heirs to erect 'statuam auream hastam tenentem,' " turns on a similar ambiguity; for it raises the question whether it is the statue holding the spear which is to be of gold, or whether the spear should be of gold and the statue of some other material. The same result is even more frequently produced by a mistaken inflexion of the voice, as in the line: quinquaginta ubi erant centum inde occidit Achilles., It is also often doubtful to which of two antecedents a phrase is to be referred. Here we get such controversial themes as, "My heir shall be bound to give my wife a hundred pounds of silver according to choice," where it is left uncertain which of the two is to make the choice. But in these examples of ambiguity, the first may be remedied by a change of case, the second by separating the words or altering their position, the third by some addition., Ambiguity resulting from the use of two accusatives may be removed by the substitution of the ablative: for example, Lachetem audivi percussisse Demeam (I heard that Demea struck Laches, or that L. struck D.) may be rendered clear by writing a Lachete percussum demeam (that D. was struck by L.). There is, however, a natural ambiguity in the ablative case itself, as I pointed out in the first book. For example, caelo decurrit aperto leaves it doubtful whether the poet means he hastened down "through the open sky," or "when the sky was opened for him to pass.", Words may be separated by a breathing space or pause. We may, for instance, say statuam, and then, after a slight pause, add auream hastam, or the pause may come between statuam auream and hastam. The addition referred to above would take the form quod elegerit ipse, where ipse will show that the reference to the heir, or quod elegerit ipsa, making the reference to the wife. In cases where the ambiguity is caused by the addition of a word, the difficulty may be eliminated by the removal of a word, as in the sentence nos flentes illos deprehendimus., Where it is doubtful to what a word or phrase refers, and the word or phrase itself is ambiguous, we shall have to alter several words, as, for example, in the sentence, "My heir shall be bound to give him all his own property," where "his own" is ambiguous. Cicero commits the same fault when he says of Gaius Fannius, "He following the instructions of his father-inâlaw, for whom, because he had not been elected to the college of augurs, he had no great affection, especially as he had given Quintus Scaevola, the younger of his sons-inâlaw, the preference over himself . . ." For over himself may refer either to his father-inâlaw or to Fannius., Again, another source of ambiguity arises from leaving it doubtful in a written document whether a syllable is long or short. Cato, for example, means one thing in the nominative when its second syllable is short, and another in the dative or ablative when the same syllable is long. There are also a number of other forms of ambiguity which it is unnecessary for me to describe at length., Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises or how it is remedied. For it is clear in all cases that two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity., In cases of ambiguity the only questions which confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or uttered the words. I have, however, given sufficient instructions in the course of my remarks on conjecture and quality, as to the method of treating such questions, whether by the prosecution or the defence. |
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6. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 3.6.6, 7.5-7.9, 7.6.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. h. Found in books: Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 92 | 7.6. Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention of the law, in fact a large proportion of legal disputes turn on these points. We need not therefore be surprised that such questions occur in the schools as well, where they are often invented with this special purpose. One form of this kind of question is found in cases where the enquiry turns both on the letter and the spirit of a law., Such questions arise when the law presents some obscurity. Under these circumstances both parties will seek to establish their own interpretation of the passage and to overthrow that advanced by their opponent. Take for example the following case. "A thief shall refund four times the amount of his theft. Two thieves have jointly stolen 10,000 sesterces. 40,000 are claimed from each. They claim that they are liable only to pay 20,000 each." The accuser will urge that the sum which he claims is fourfold the amount stolen; the accused will urge that the sum which they offer to pay is fourfold. The intention of the law will be pleaded by both parties., On the other hand, the dispute may turn on a passage of the law which is clear in one sense and doubtful in another. "The son of a harlot shall not address the people. A woman who had a son became a prostitute. The youth is forbidden to address the people." Here there is no doubt about the son of one who was a prostitute before his birth, but it is doubtful whether the law applies to the case of one born before his mother became a prostitute., Another question which is not infrequently raised is as to the interpretation of the law forbidding an action to be brought twice on the same dispute, the problem being whether the word twice refers to the prosecutor or the prosecution. Such are the points raising out of the obscurity of the law. A second form of question turns on some passage where the meaning is clear. Those who have given exclusive attention to this class of question call it the basis concerned with the obvious expression of the law and its intention. In such circumstances one party will rest their case on the letter, the other on the intention of the law., There are three different methods in which we may combat the letter. The first comes into play where it is clear that it is impossible always to observe the letter of the law. "Children shall support their parents under penalty of imprisonment." It is clear, in the first place, that this cannot apply to an infant. At this point we shall turn to other possible exceptions and distinguish as follows. "Does this apply to everyone who refuses to support his parent? Has this particular individual incurred the penalty by this particular act?", The second arises in scholastic themes where no argument can be drawn from the particular law, but the question is concerned solely with the subject of the dispute. "A foreigner who goes up on to the wall should be liable to capital punishment. The enemy had scaled the wall and were driven back by a foreigner. His punishment is demanded.", In this case we shall not have two separate questions, namely, whether every foreigner who goes up on the wall is liable to the penalty, and whether this particular foreigner is liable, since no more forcible argument can be brought against the application of the letter of the law than the fact in dispute, but the only question to be raised will be whether a foreigner may not go on to the wall even for the purpose of saving the city. Therefore we shall rest our case on equity and the intention of the law. It is, however, sometimes possible to draw examples from other laws to show that we cannot always stand by the letter, as Cicero did in his defence of Caecina., The third method becomes operative when we find something in the actual words of the law which enables us to prove that the intention of the legislator was different. The following theme will provide an example. "Anyone who is caught at night with steel in his hands shall be thrown into prison. A man is found wearing a steel ring, and is imprisoned by the magistrate." In this case the use of the word caught is sufficient proof that the word steel was only intended by the law in the sense of a weapon of offence., But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola., A second heir had been appointed in the event of a posthumous son dying while a minor. No posthumous son was born. The next of kin claimed the property. Who could doubt that the intention of the testator was that the same man should inherit in the event of the son not being born who would have inherited in the event of his death? But he had not written this in his will., Again, the opposite case, that is to say, when what is written is obviously contrary to the intention of the writer, occurred quite recently. A man who had made a bequest of 5000 sesterces, on altering his will erased the word sesterces and inserted pounds of silver. But it was clear that he had meant not 5000 but 5 pounds of silver, because the weight of silver mentioned in the bequest was unparalleled and incredible., The same basis includes such general questions as to whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the document, and what was the purpose of the writer, while for the treatment of such questions we must have recourse to quality or conjecture, with which I think I have dealt in sufficient detail. 7.7. The next subject which comes up for discussion is that of contrary laws. For all writers of text-books are agreed that in such cases there are two bases involving the letter and the intention of the law respectively. This view is justified by the fact that, when one law contradicts another, both parties attack the letter and raise the question of intention, while the point in dispute, as regards each law, is whether we should be guided by it at all., But it is clear to everybody that one law cannot contradict another in principle (since if there were two different principles, one law would cancel the other), and that the laws in question are brought into collision purely by the accidents of chance. When two laws clash, they may be of a similar nature, as for instance if we have to compare two cases in which a tyrannicide and a brave man are given the choice of their reward, both being granted the privilege of choosing whatever they desire. In such a case we compare the deserts of the claimants, the occasions of the respective acts and the nature of the rewards claimed., Or the same law may be in conflict with itself, as in the case where we have two brave men, two tyrannicides or two ravished women, when the question must turn either on time (that is, whose claim has priority) or on quality (that is, whose claim is the more just). Again, we may have a conflict between diverse, similar or dissimilar laws., Diverse laws are those against which arguments may be brought without reference to any contradictory law. The following theme will provide an example. "A magistrate shall not quit the citadel. One who has rendered heroic service to his country may choose what reward he pleases. A magistrate who left his post and saved his country, demands an amnesty for his conduct." In this case, even though there be no other law covering the case, we may raise the question whether a hero ought to be granted anything he chooses to claim. Again, many conclusive arguments may be brought against the letter of the law restricting the movements of the magistrate: for example, a fire may have broken out in the citadel, or a sally against the enemy may have been necessary., Laws are styled similar when nothing can be opposed to one except the other. "Tyrannicides shall have their statues set up in the gymnasium. A statue of a woman shall not be set up in the gymnasium. A woman killed a tyrant." Here are two conflicting laws: for a woman's statue cannot under any other circumstances be erected in the gymnasium, while there is no other circumstance which can bar the erection of the statue of a tyrannicide in the gymnasium., Laws are styled dissimilar when many arguments can be urged against one, while the only point which can be urged against the other is the actual subject of the dispute. An example is provided by the case in which a brave man demands the pardon of a deserter as his reward. For there are many arguments, as I have shown above, which can be urged against the law permitting a hero to choose whatever reward he will, but the letter of the law dealing with the crime of desertion cannot be overthrown under any circumstances save the choice of rewards to which I have just referred., Again, the point of law is either admitted by both parties or disputed. If it be admitted, the questions which are raised will as a rule be such as the following. Which of the two laws is the most stringent? Does it concern gods or men, the state or private individuals, reward or punishment, great things or small? Does it permit, forbid or command?, Another common question is which of the two laws is the oldest; but the most important question is which of the two laws will suffer less by its contravention, as for example in the case of the hero and the deserter just mentioned, in which case, if the deserter is not put to death, the whole law is ignored, whereas, if he be put to death, the hero will still have another choice left open to him. It is, however, of the utmost importance to consider which course is best from the point of view of morality and justice, a problem for the solution of which no general rules can be laid down, as it will depend on the special circumstances of the case., If, on the other hand, the point of law is disputed, either one party or both in turn will argue the point. Take the following case as an example. "A father shall be empowered to arrest his son, and a patron to arrest his freedman. Freedmen shall be transferred to their patron's heir. A certain man appointed the son of a freedman as his heir. The son of the freedman and the freedman himself both claim the right to arrest the other." Here the father claims his right over the son, while the son, in virtue of his new position as patron, denies that his father possessed the rights of a father, because he was in the power of his patron., Laws containing two provisions may conflict with themselves in exactly the same way as two laws may conflict. The following will serve as an illustration. "The bastard born before a legitimate son shall rank as legitimate, the bastard born after the legitimate son shall only rank as a citizen." All that I have said about laws will also apply to decrees of the senate. If decrees of the senate conflict with one another or with the laws, the basis will be the same as if laws only were concerned. 7.8. The syllogistic basis has some resemblance to the basis concerned with the letter and intention of the law, since whenever it comes into play, one party rests his case on the letter: there is, however, this difference between the two bases, that in the latter we argue against the letter, in the present beyond the letter, while in the latter the party defending the letter aims at securing that in any case the letter may be carried into effect, whereas in the present his aim will be to prevent anything except the letter being carried into effect. The syllogism is sometimes employed in conjunction with definition: for often if the definition be weak it takes refuge in the syllogism., Assume a law to run as follows: "A woman who is a poisoner shall be liable to capital punishment. A wife gave her husband a love-potion to cure him of his habit of beating her. She also divorced him. On being asked by her relatives to return to him, she refused. The husband hung himself. The woman is accused of poisoning." The strongest line for the accuser to take will be to assert that the love-potion was a poison. This involves definition. If it proves weak, we shall have recourse to the syllogism, to which we shall proceed after virtually dropping our previous argument, and which we shall employ to decide the question whether she does not deserve to be punished for administering the love-potion no less than if she had caused her husband's death by poison., The syllogistic basis, then, deduces from the letter of the law that which is uncertain; and since this conclusion is arrived at by reason, the basis is called ratiocinative. It may be subdivided into the following species of question. If it is right to do a thing once, is it right to do it often? Example: "A priestess found guilty of unchastity is thrown from the Tarpeian rock and survives. It is demanded that she shall be thrown down again." If the law grants a privilege with reference to one thing, does it grant it with reference to a number? Example: "A man kills two tyrants together and claims two rewards.", If a thing is legal before a certain occurrence, is it legal after it? Example: "The ravisher took refuge in flight. His victim married. The ravisher returned and the woman demands to be allowed her choice." Is that which is lawful with regard to the whole, lawful with regard to a part? Example: "It is forbidden to accept a plough as security. He accepted a ploughshare." Is that which is lawful with regard to a part, lawful with regard to the whole? Example: "It is forbidden to export wool from Tarentum: he exported sheep.", In all these cases the syllogism rests on the letter of the law as well: for the accuser urges that the provisions of the law are precise. He will say, "I demand that the priestess who has broken her vows be cast down: it is the law," or "The ravished woman demands the exercise of the choice permitted her by law," or "Wool grows on sheep," and so on., But to this we may reply, "The law does not prescribe that the condemned woman should be thrown down twice, that the ravished woman should exercise her choice under all circumstances, that the tyrannicide should receive two rewards, while it makes no mention of ploughshares or of sheep." Thus we infer what is doubtful from what is certain. It is a more difficult task to deduce from the letter of the law that which is not actually prescribed by the letter, and to argue because that is the case, so also is this. Take the following problems. "The man who kills his father shall be sewn up in a sack. He killed his mother," or "It is illegal to drag a man from his own house into the court. He dragged him from his tent.", Under this heading come questions such as the following: if there is not a special law applicable to the case, ought we to have recourse to an analogous law? is the point in question similar to what is contained in the letter of the law? Now it should be noted that what is similar may be greater, equal or less. In the first case we enquire whether the provisions of the law are sufficient, or, if they are insufficient, whether we should have recourse to this other law. In both cases it is a question of the intention of the legislator. But the most effective form of treatment in such cases will be to appeal to equity. 7.9. I turn to the discussion of ambiguity, which will be found to have countless species: indeed, in the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which has not a diversity of meanings. There are, however, very few genera, since ambiguity must occur either in a single word or in a group of words., Single words give rise to error, when the same noun applies to a number of things or persons (the Greeks call this homonymy): for example, it is uncertain with regard to the word gallus whether it means a cock or a Gaul or a proper name or an emasculated priest of Cybele; while Ajax may refer either to the son of Telamon or the son of Oileus. Again, verbs likewise may have different meanings, as, for example, cerno., This ambiguity crops up in many ways, and gives rise to disputes, more especially in connexion with wills, when two men of the same name claim their freedom or, it may be, an inheritance, or again, when the enquiry turns on the precise nature of the bequest., There is another form of ambiguity where a word has one meaning when entire and another when divided, as, for example, ingenua, armamentum or Corvinum. The disputes arising from such ambiguities are no more than childish quibbles, but nevertheless the Greeks are in the habit of making them the subject for controversial themes, as, for example, in the notorious case of the αá½Î»Î·ÏÏίÏ, when the question is whether it is a hall which has fallen down three times (αá½Î»Î· ÏÏίÏ) or a flute-player who fell down that is to be sold., A third form of ambiguity is caused by the use of compound words; for example, if a man orders his body to be buried in a cultivated spot, and should direct, as is often done, a considerable space of land surrounding his tomb to be taken from the land left to his heirs with a view to preserving his ashes from outrage, an occasion for dispute may be afforded by the question whether the words mean "in a cultivated place" (in culto loco) or "in an uncultivated place" (inculto loco)., Thus arises the Greek theme about Leon and Pantaleon, who go to law because the handwriting of a will makes it uncertain whether the testator has left all his property to Leon or his property to Pantaleon. Groups of words give rise to more serious ambiguity. Such ambiguity may arise from doubt as to a case, as in the following passage: â "I say that you, O prince of Aeacus' line, Rome can o'erthrow.", Or it may arise from the arrangement of the words, which makes it doubtful what the exact reference of some word or words may be, more especially when there is a word in the middle of the sentence which may be referred either to what precedes or what follows, as in the line of Virgil which describes Troilus as lora tenens tamen, where it may be disputed whether the poet means that he is still holding the reins, or that, although he holds the reins, he is still dragged along., The controversial theme, "A certain man in his will ordered his heirs to erect 'statuam auream hastam tenentem,' " turns on a similar ambiguity; for it raises the question whether it is the statue holding the spear which is to be of gold, or whether the spear should be of gold and the statue of some other material. The same result is even more frequently produced by a mistaken inflexion of the voice, as in the line: quinquaginta ubi erant centum inde occidit Achilles., It is also often doubtful to which of two antecedents a phrase is to be referred. Here we get such controversial themes as, "My heir shall be bound to give my wife a hundred pounds of silver according to choice," where it is left uncertain which of the two is to make the choice. But in these examples of ambiguity, the first may be remedied by a change of case, the second by separating the words or altering their position, the third by some addition., Ambiguity resulting from the use of two accusatives may be removed by the substitution of the ablative: for example, Lachetem audivi percussisse Demeam (I heard that Demea struck Laches, or that L. struck D.) may be rendered clear by writing a Lachete percussum demeam (that D. was struck by L.). There is, however, a natural ambiguity in the ablative case itself, as I pointed out in the first book. For example, caelo decurrit aperto leaves it doubtful whether the poet means he hastened down "through the open sky," or "when the sky was opened for him to pass.", Words may be separated by a breathing space or pause. We may, for instance, say statuam, and then, after a slight pause, add auream hastam, or the pause may come between statuam auream and hastam. The addition referred to above would take the form quod elegerit ipse, where ipse will show that the reference to the heir, or quod elegerit ipsa, making the reference to the wife. In cases where the ambiguity is caused by the addition of a word, the difficulty may be eliminated by the removal of a word, as in the sentence nos flentes illos deprehendimus., Where it is doubtful to what a word or phrase refers, and the word or phrase itself is ambiguous, we shall have to alter several words, as, for example, in the sentence, "My heir shall be bound to give him all his own property," where "his own" is ambiguous. Cicero commits the same fault when he says of Gaius Fannius, "He following the instructions of his father-inâlaw, for whom, because he had not been elected to the college of augurs, he had no great affection, especially as he had given Quintus Scaevola, the younger of his sons-inâlaw, the preference over himself . . ." For over himself may refer either to his father-inâlaw or to Fannius., Again, another source of ambiguity arises from leaving it doubtful in a written document whether a syllable is long or short. Cato, for example, means one thing in the nominative when its second syllable is short, and another in the dative or ablative when the same syllable is long. There are also a number of other forms of ambiguity which it is unnecessary for me to describe at length., Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises or how it is remedied. For it is clear in all cases that two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity., In cases of ambiguity the only questions which confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or uttered the words. I have, however, given sufficient instructions in the course of my remarks on conjecture and quality, as to the method of treating such questions, whether by the prosecution or the defence. |
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| 7. Tertullian, On The Soul, 11.2, 24.2, 43.10 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mcglothlin, Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism (2018) 100, 112, 115; Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 162 |
| 8. Tertullian, Prescription Against Heretics, 33, 7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mcglothlin, Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism (2018) 100 |
| 9. Tertullian, On The Resurrection of The Flesh, 20.1-20.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. h. Found in books: Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 92 |
10. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 1.2, 2.5-2.8, 2.9.2, 2.9.4-2.9.5, 3.5.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. •waszink, j. h. Found in books: Mcglothlin, Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism (2018) 100, 112, 115; Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 92 | 1.2. The heretic of Pontus introduces two Gods, like the twin Symplegades of his own shipwreck: One whom it was impossible to deny, i.e. our Creator; and one whom he will never be able to prove, i.e. his own god. The unhappy man gained the first idea of his conceit from the simple passage of our Lord's saying, which has reference to human beings and not divine ones, wherein He disposes of those examples of a good tree and a corrupt one; how that the good tree brings not forth corrupt fruit, neither the corrupt tree good fruit. Which means, that an honest mind and good faith cannot produce evil deeds, any more than an evil disposition can produce good deeds. Now (like many other persons now-a-days, especially those who have an heretical proclivity), while morbidly brooding over the question of the origin of evil, his perception became blunted by the very irregularity of his researches; and when he found the Creator declaring, I am He that creates evil, Isaiah 45:7 inasmuch as he had already concluded from other arguments, which are satisfactory to every perverted mind, that God is the author of evil, so he now applied to the Creator the figure of the corrupt tree bringing forth evil fruit, that is, moral evil, and then presumed that there ought to be another god, after the analogy of the good tree producing its good fruit. Accordingly, finding in Christ a different disposition, as it were - one of a simple and pure benevolence - differing from the Creator, he readily argued that in his Christ had been revealed a new and strange divinity; and then with a little leaven he leavened the whole lump of the faith, flavouring it with the acidity of his own heresy. He had, moreover, in one Cerdon an abettor of this blasphemy - a circumstance which made them the more readily think that they saw most clearly their two gods, blind though they were; for, in truth, they had not seen the one God with soundness of faith. To men of diseased vision even one lamp looks like many. One of his gods, therefore, whom he was obliged to acknowledge, he destroyed by defaming his attributes in the matter of evil; the other, whom he laboured so hard to devise, he constructed, laying his foundation in the principle of good. In what articles he arranged these natures, we show by our own refutations of them. 2.5. Now then, you dogs, whom the apostle puts outside, Revelation 22:15 and who yelp at the God of truth, let us come to your various questions. These are the bones of contention, which you are perpetually gnawing! If God is good, and prescient of the future, and able to avert evil, why did He permit man, the very image and likeness of Himself, and, by the origin of his soul, His own substance too, to be deceived by the devil, and fall from obedience of the law into death? For if He had been good, and so unwilling that such a catastrophe should happen, and prescient, so as not to be ignorant of what was to come to pass, and powerful enough to hinder its occurrence, that issue would never have come about, which should be impossible under these three conditions of the divine greatness. Since, however, it has occurred, the contrary proposition is most certainly true, that God must be deemed neither good, nor prescient, nor powerful. For as no such issue could have happened had God been such as He is reputed - good, and prescient, and mighty - so has this issue actually happened, because He is not such a God. In reply, we must first vindicate those attributes in the Creator which are called in question - namely, His goodness and foreknowledge, and power. But I shall not linger long over this point for Christ's own definition John 10:25 comes to our aid at once. From works must proofs be obtained. The Creator's works testify at once to His goodness, since they are good, as we have shown, and to His power, since they are mighty, and spring indeed out of nothing. And even if they were made out of some (previous) matter, as some will have it, they are even thus out of nothing, because they were not what they are. In short, both they are great because they are good; and God is likewise mighty, because all things are His own, whence He is almighty. But what shall I say of His prescience, which has for its witnesses as many prophets as it inspired? After all, what title to prescience do we look for in the Author of the universe, since it was by this very attribute that He foreknew all things when He appointed them their places, and appointed them their places when He foreknew them? There is sin itself. If He had not foreknown this, He would not have proclaimed a caution against it under the penalty of death. Now if there were in God such attributes as must have rendered it both impossible and improper for any evil to have happened to man, and yet evil did occur, let us consider man's condition also - whether it were not, in fact, rather the cause why that came to pass which could not have happened through God. I find, then, that man was by God constituted free, master of his own will and power; indicating the presence of God's image and likeness in him by nothing so well as by this constitution of his nature. For it was not by his face, and by the lineaments of his body, though they were so varied in his human nature, that he expressed his likeness to the form of God; but he showed his stamp in that essence which he derived from God Himself (that is, the spiritual, which answered to the form of God), and in the freedom and power of his will. This his state was confirmed even by the very law which God then imposed upon him. For a law would not be imposed upon one who had it not in his power to render that obedience which is due to law; nor again, would the penalty of death be threatened against sin, if a contempt of the law were impossible to man in the liberty of his will. So in the Creator's subsequent laws also you will find, when He sets before man good and evil, life and death, that the entire course of discipline is arranged in precepts by God's calling men from sin, and threatening and exhorting them; and this on no other ground than that man is free, with a will either for obedience or resistance. |
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| 11. Pseudo-Cyprian, De Laude Martyrii, 14-15, 18, 29, 28 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 162 |
| 12. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 1.6.14 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, jan hendrik Found in books: Pillinger, Cassandra and the Poetics of Prophecy in Greek and Latin Literature (2019) 139 |
| 13. Papyri, Papyri Graecae Magicae, 4.436-4.461, 4.1957-4.1989 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. h. Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt, The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion (2015) 141 |
| 14. Pseudo-Cyprian, De Montibus Sina Et Sion, Adversus Judaeos., 9, 4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yates and Dupont, The Bible in Christian North Africa: Part I: Commencement to the Confessiones of Augustine (ca. 180 to 400 CE) (2020) 162 |
| 15. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 6.321 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, jan hendrik Found in books: Pillinger, Cassandra and the Poetics of Prophecy in Greek and Latin Literature (2019) 139 |
| 16. [Pseudo-Aristotle], De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus, 838a5, 95 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 17. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis De Caelo Libros Commentaria, 528.30 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •waszink, j. h., Found in books: Del Lucchese, Monstrosity and Philosophy: Radical Otherness in Greek and Latin Culture (2019) 141 |
