| 1. Homer, Odyssey, 11.24-11.43 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 149 |
| 2. Alcaeus, Fragments, 335, 338 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 3. Alcaeus, Fragments, 335, 338 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 4. Tyrtaeus, Fragments, None (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 5. Xenophanes, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 6. Xenophanes, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
7. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 42| 31b. ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ πάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι | 31b. you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessne |
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| 8. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 97; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
9. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 11| 190d. γενόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτούς, ἔφη, διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι ἔσονται, ἅμα δὲ χρησιμώτεροι ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν γεγονέναι· καὶ βαδιοῦνται ὀρθοὶ ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκελοῖν. ἐὰν δʼ ἔτι δοκῶσιν ἀσελγαίνειν καὶ μὴ ʼθέλωσιν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, πάλιν αὖ, ἔφη, τεμῶ δίχα, ὥστʼ ἐφʼ ἑνὸς πορεύσονται σκέλους ἀσκωλιάζοντες. ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἔτεμνε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα τέμνοντες | 190d. I propose now to slice every one of them in two, so that while making them weaker we shall find them more useful by reason of their multiplication; and they shall walk erect upon two legs. If they continue turbulent and do not choose to keep quiet, I will do it again, said he; I will slice every person in two, and then they must go their ways on one leg, hopping. So saying, he sliced each human being in two, just as they slice sorb-apples to make a dry preserve, or eggs with hairs; |
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10. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 66| 247e. εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο. ΞΕ. καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις | 247e. or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power. Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this. Str. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur to them and to us. As between them |
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| 11. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 184 |
12. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 11 | 320c. do not grudge us your demonstration. |
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| 13. Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.5.25 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82, 84 |
| 14. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.13 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 40 |
| 15. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 67 |
| 16. Plato, Lysis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 78 |
| 17. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 173 |
| 18. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 118 |
19. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 107| 468b. μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, | 468b. Soc. Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so? Pol. Yes. Soc. And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not? Pol. Certainly. Soc. So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them? Pol. I agree. Soc. And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them? |
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20. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 140 | 280b. in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper. |
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| 21. Plato, Crito, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 173 |
| 22. Alcaeus Comicus, Fragments, 335, 338 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 23. Eupolis, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 24. Eupolis, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 25. Euripides, Fragments, 973 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
| 26. Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 125, 124 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 11 |
| 27. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, lucullus •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 107 |
28. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.138.4, 5.55.3 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 83, 84| 1.138.4. νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον: λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο. 5.55.3. ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς Καρύας,καὶ ὡς οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα τὰ διαβατήρια αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐπανεχώρησαν. | 1.138.4. Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises to the king. 5.55.3. The Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices again proving unfavorable, they went back again, |
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29. Herodotus, Histories, 7.22-7.24, 7.166 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 83, 84, 186, 187 | 7.22. Since those who had earlier attempted to sail around Athos had suffered shipwreck, for about three years preparations had been underway there. Triremes were anchored off Elaeus in the Chersonese; with these for their headquarters, all sorts of men in the army were compelled by whippings to dig a canal, coming by turns to the work; the inhabitants about Athos also dug. ,Bubares son of Megabazus and Artachaees son of Artaeus, both Persians, were the overseers of the workmen. Athos is a great and famous mountain, running out into the sea and inhabited by men. At the mountain's landward end it is in the form of a peninsula, and there is an isthmus about twelve stadia wide; here is a place of level ground or little hills, from the sea by Acanthus to the sea opposite Torone. ,On this isthmus which is at the end of Athos, there stands a Greek town, Sane; there are others situated seaward of Sane and landward of Athos, and the Persian now intended to make them into island and not mainland towns; they are Dion, Olophyxus, Acrothoum, Thyssus, and Cleonae. 7.23. These are the towns situated on Athos. The foreigners dug as follows, dividing up the ground by nation: they made a straight line near the town of Sane; when the channel had been dug to some depth, some men stood at the bottom of it and dug, others took the dirt as it was dug out and delivered it to yet others that stood higher on stages, and they again to others as they received it, until they came to those that were highest; these carried it out and threw it away. ,For all except the Phoenicians, the steep sides of the canal caved in, doubling their labor; since they made the span the same breadth at its mouth and at the bottom, this was bound to happen. ,But the Phoenicians showed the same skill in this as in all else they do; taking in hand the portion that fell to them, they dug by making the topmost span of the canal as wide again as the canal was to be, and narrowed it as they worked lower, until at the bottom their work was of the same span as that of the others. ,There is a meadow there, where they made a place for buying and marketing; much ground grain frequently came to them from Asia. 7.24. As far as I can judge by conjecture, Xerxes gave the command for this digging out of pride, wishing to display his power and leave a memorial; with no trouble they could have drawn their ships across the isthmus, yet he ordered them to dig a canal from sea to sea, wide enough to float two triremes rowed abreast. The same men who were assigned the digging were also assigned to join the banks of the river Strymon by a bridge. 7.166. They add this tale too—that Gelon and Theron won a victory over Amilcas the Carchedonian in Sicily on the same day that the Greeks defeated the Persian at Salamis. This Amilcas was, on his father's side, a Carchedonian, and a Syracusan on his mother's and had been made king of Carchedon for his virtue. When the armies met and he was defeated in the battle, it is said that he vanished from sight, for Gelon looked for him everywhere but was not able to find him anywhere on earth, dead or alive. |
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| 30. Theophrastus, Plant Explanations, 2.16.2-2.16.3 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 193, 194, 195 |
| 31. Aristotle, Heavens, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 89 |
| 32. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 129 |
| 33. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 122 |
| 34. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 90 |
| 35. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 114 |
| 36. Archestratus of Gela, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 37. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 136 |
| 38. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, ideal orator Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 145 |
| 39. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 99, 193 |
| 40. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 55 |
| 41. Asclepiades Tragilensis, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
| 42. Amyntas, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55 |
| 43. Dicaearchus Messenius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 145 |
| 44. Dicaearchus Messenius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 145 |
| 45. Theophrastus, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 194 |
| 46. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 58, 181 |
| 47. Asclepiades Arius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
| 48. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 49. Polemon Iliensis, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
| 50. Chrysippus, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 51. Plautus, Poenulus, 522-523, 527-528 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 147 |
| 52. Archimedes, The Sand-Reckoner, 1 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 485 |
53. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, 34, 79, 40 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 66| 40. veri similia autem partim singula movent e suo pondere, partim, etiam si videntur esse exigua per se, multum tamen cum sunt coacervata proficiunt. Atque in his veri similibus insunt non numquam etiam certae rerum et propriae notae. Maximam autem fidem facit ad similitudinem veri primum exemplum, deinde introducta rei similitudo; fabula etiam non numquam, etsi sit incredibilis, tamen homines commovet. | |
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| 54. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 2.7.4, 2.11.2, 2.12.2, 2.16.2, 2.17.6, 3.7.2, 5.12, 5.12.4, 5.12.10, 6.18.4, 7.1.5, 7.14, 9.8, 10.31.6, 13.29.4, 13.56, 13.61, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.17, 15.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 121, 122 |
| 55. Cicero, Letters, 1.9.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 8 |
| 56. Cicero, Letters, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 121, 122 |
| 57. Cicero, On Old Age, 1, 3, 78 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 40 |
58. Cicero, Republic, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 40| 6.10. Post autem apparatu regio accepti sermonem in multam noctem produximus, cum senex nihil nisi de Africano loqueretur omniaque eius non facta solum, sed etiam dicta meminisset. Deinde, ut cubitum discessimus, me et de via fessum, et qui ad multam noctem vigilassem, artior quam solebat somnus complexus est. Hic mihi (credo equidem ex hoc, quod eramus locuti; fit enim fere, ut cogitationes sermonesque nostri pariant aliquid in somno tale, quale de Homero scribit Ennius, de quo videlicet saepissime vigilans solebat cogitare et loqui) Africanus se ostendit ea forma, quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso erat notior; quem ubi agnovi, equidem cohorrui, sed ille: Ades, inquit, animo et omitte timorem, Scipio, et, quae dicam, trade memoriae. | |
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59. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.33-1.34, 1.155, 2.62-2.64, 2.153, 3.21, 3.65, 3.96, 3.126-3.143, 3.149-3.158 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 82; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 41; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82, 119, 120, 130, 131, 140, 141, 145; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118| 1.33. Quam ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat? Ut vero iam ad illa summa veniamus, quae vis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere? 1.34. Ac ne plura, quae sunt paene innumerabilia, consecter, comprehendam brevi: sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem, sed et privatorum plurimorum et universae rei publicae salutem maxime contineri. Quam ob rem pergite, ut facitis, adulescentes, atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et vobis honori et amicis utilitati et rei publicae emolumento esse possitis.' 1.155. Postea mihi placuit, eoque sum usus adulescens, ut summorum oratorum Graecas orationes explicarem, quibus lectis hoc adsequebar, ut, cum ea, quae legeram Graece, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uterer et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quaedam verba imitando, quae nova nostris essent, dum modo essent idonea. 2.62. Sed illuc redeo: videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum; neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam rhetorum praeceptis; sita sunt enim ante oculos. Nam quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid veri non audeat? Ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? Ne quae simultatis? 2.63. Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, ipsa autem exaedificatio posita est in rebus et verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem; vult etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probet et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicentur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae, sed etiam, qui fama ac nomine excellant, de cuiusque vita atque natura; 2.64. verborum autem ratio et genus orationis fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudiciali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensibus aculeis persequendum est. Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne nulla esse praecepta, quae in artibus rhetorum reperiantur? In eodem silentio multa alia oratorum officia iacuerunt, cohortationes, praecepta, consolationes, admonita, quae tractanda sunt omnia disertissime, sed locum suum in his artibus, quae traditae sunt, habent nullum. 2.153. Tum ille 'verum' inquit 'ex me audies, Catule: semper ego existimavi iucundiorem et probabiliorem huic populo oratorem fore, qui primum quam minimam artifici alicuius, deinde nullam Graecarum rerum significationem daret: atque ego idem existimavi pecudis esse, non hominis, cum tantas res Graeci susciperent, profiterentur, agerent seseque et videndi res obscurissimas et bene vivendi et copiose dicendi rationem daturos hominibus pollicerentur, non admovere aurem et, si palam audire eos non auderes, ne minueres apud tuos civis auctoritatem tuam, subauscultando tamen excipere voces eorum et procul quid narrarent attendere. Itaque feci, Catule, et istorum omnium summatim causas et genera ipsa gustavi.' 3.21. Sed si haec maior esse ratio videtur, quam ut hominum possit sensu aut cogitatione comprehendi, est etiam illa Platonis vera et tibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri; ubi enim perspecta vis est rationis eius, qua causae rerum atque exitus cognoscuntur, mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque reperitur. 3.65. Stoicos autem, quos minime improbo, dimitto tamen nec eos iratos vereor, quoniam omnino irasci nesciunt; atque hanc eis habeo gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt. Sed nimirum est in his, quod ab hoc, quem instruimus oratore, valde abhorreat; vel quod omnis, qui sapientes non sint, servos, latrones, hostis, insanos esse dicunt, neque tamen quemquam esse sapientem: valde autem est absurdum ei contionem aut senatum aut ullum coetum hominum committere, cui nemo illorum, qui adsint, sanus, nemo civis, nemo liber esse videatur. 3.96. Ornatur igitur oratio genere primum et quasi colore quodam et suco suo; nam ut gravis, ut suavis, ut erudita sit, ut liberalis, ut admirabilis, ut polita, ut sensus, ut doloris habeat quantum opus sit, non est singulorum articulorum; in toto spectantur haec corpore. Ut porro conspersa sit quasi verborum sententiarumque floribus, id non debet esse fusum aequabiliter per omnem orationem, sed ita distinctum, ut sint quasi in ornatu disposita quaedam insignia et lumina. 3.126. Hic Catulus 'di immortales,' inquit 'quantam rerum varietatem, quantam vim, quantam copiam, Crasse, complexus es quantisque ex angustiis oratorem educere ausus es et in maiorum suorum regno conlocare! Namque illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus semperque esse in omni orationis ratione versatos; 3.127. ex quibus Elius Hippias, cum Olympiam venisset maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est cuncta paene audiente Graecia nihil esse ulla in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret; nec solum has artis, quibus liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poetarum atque illa, quae de naturis rerum, quae de hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur, se tenere sed anulum, quem haberet, pallium, quo amictus, soccos, quibus indutus esset, se sua manu confecisse. 3.128. Scilicet nimis hic quidem est progressus, sed ex eo ipso est coniectura facilis, quantum sibi illi oratores de praeclarissimis artibus appetierint, qui ne sordidiores quidem repudiarint. Quid de Prodico Cio, de Thrasymacho Calchedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unus quisque plurimum ut temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit et scripsit. 3.129. Ipse ille Leontinus Gorgias, quo patrono, ut Plato voluit, philosopho succubuit orator, qui aut non est victus umquam a Socrate neque sermo ille Platonis verus est; aut, si est victus, eloquentior videlicet fuit et disertior Socrates et, ut tu appellas, copiosior et melior orator—sed hic in illo ipso Platonis libro de omni re, quaecumque in disceptationem quaestionemque vocetur, se copiosissime dicturum esse profitetur; isque princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere qua de re quisque vellet audire; cui tantus honos habitus est a Graecia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua, sed aurea statueretur. 3.130. Sed hi, quos nominavi, multique praeterea summique dicendi doctores uno tempore fuerunt; ex quibus intellegi potest ita se rem habere, ut tu, Crasse, dicis, oratorisque nomen apud antiquos in Graecia maiore quadam vel copia vel gloria floruisse. 3.131. Quo quidem magis dubito tibine plus laudis an Graecis vituperationis statuam esse tribuendum: cum tu in alia lingua ac moribus natus occupatissima in civitate vel privatorum negotiis paene omnibus vel orbis terrae procuratione ac summi imperi gubernatione destrictus tantam vim rerum cognitionemque comprehenderis eamque omnem cum eius, qui consilio et oratione in civitate valeat, scientia atque exercitatione sociaris; illi nati in litteris ardentesque his studiis, otio vero diffluentes, non modo nihil acquisierint, sed ne relictum quidem et traditum et suum conservarint.' 3.132. Tum Crassus 'non in hac' inquit 'una, Catule, re, sed in aliis etiam compluribus distributione partium ac separatione magnitudines sunt artium deminutae. An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos, qui morbis, alios, qui vulneribus, alios, qui oculis mederentur? Num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque ut alius aliam sibi partem in qua elaboraret seponeret? 3.133. Equidem saepe hoc audivi de patre et de socero meo, nostros quoque homines, qui excellere sapientiae gloria vellent, omnia, quae quidem tum haec civitas nosset, solitos esse complecti. Meminerant illi Sex. Aelium; M'. vero Manilium nos etiam vidimus transverso ambulantem foro; quod erat insigne eum, qui id faceret, facere civibus suis omnibus consili sui copiam; ad quos olim et ita ambulantis et in solio sedentis domi sic adibatur, non solum ut de iure civili ad eos, verum etiam de filia conlocanda, de fundo emendo, de agro colendo, de omni denique aut officio aut negotio referretur. 3.134. Haec fuit P. Crassi illius veteris, haec Ti. Coruncani, haec proavi generi mei Scipionis prudentissimi hominis sapientia, qui omnes pontifices maximi fuerunt, ut ad eos de omnibus divinis atque humanis rebus referretur; eidemque in senatu et apud populum et in causis amicorum et domi et militiae consilium suum fidemque praestabant. 3.135. Quid enim M. Catoni praeter hanc politissimam doctrinam transmarinam atque adventiciam defuit? Num, quia ius civile didicerat, causas non dicebat? aut quia poterat dicere, iuris scientiam neglegebat? Utroque in genere et elaboravit et praestitit. Num propter hanc ex privatorum negotiis conlectam gratiam tardior in re publica capessenda fuit? Nemo apud populum fortior, nemo melior senator; et idem facile optimus imperator; denique nihil in hac civitate temporibus illis sciri discive potuit, quod ille non cum investigarit et scierit tum etiam conscripserit. 3.136. Nunc contra plerique ad honores adipiscendos et ad rem publicam gerendam nudi veniunt atque inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla scientia ornati. Sin aliquis excellit unus e multis, effert se, si unum aliquid adfert, aut bellicam virtutem aut usum aliquem militarem; quae sane nunc quidem obsoleverunt; aut iuris scientiam, ne eius quidem universi; nam pontificium, quod est coniunctum, nemo discit; aut eloquentiam, quam in clamore et in verborum cursu positam putant; omnium vero bonarum artium, denique virtutum ipsarum societatem cognationemque non norunt. 3.137. Sed ut ad Graecos referam orationem, quibus carere hoc quidem in sermonis genere non possumus —nam ut virtutis a nostris, sic doctrinae sunt ab illis exempla petenda—septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur: hi omnes praeter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Quis doctior eisdem temporibus illis aut cuius eloquentia litteris instructior fuisse traditur quam Pisistrati? qui primus Homeri libros confusos antea sic disposuisse dicitur, ut nunc habemus. Non fuit ille quidem civibus suis utilis, sed ita eloquentia floruit, ut litteris doctrinaque praestaret. 3.138. Quid Pericles? de cuius vi dicendi sic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriae severius, tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra popularis homines diceret, populare omnibus et iucundum videretur; cuius in labris veteres comici, etiam cum illi male dicerent (quod tum Athenis fieri licebat), leporem habitasse dixerunt tantamque in eodem vim fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret. At hunc non declamator aliqui ad clepsydram latrare docuerat, sed, ut accepimus, Clazomenius ille Anaxagoras vir summus in maximarum rerum scientia: itaque hic doctrina, consilio, eloquentia excellens quadraginta annis praefuit Athenis et urbanis eodem tempore et bellicis rebus. 3.139. Quid Critias? quid Alcibiades? civitatibus quidem suis non boni, sed certe docti atque eloquentes, nonne Socraticis erant disputationibus eruditi? Quis Dionem Syracosium doctrinis omnibus expolivit? Non Plato? Atque eum idem ille non linguae solum, verum etiam animi ac virtutis magister ad liberandam patriam impulit, instruxit, armavit. Aliisne igitur artibus hunc Dionem instituit Plato, aliis Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum Cononis praestantissimi imperatoris filium, summum ipsum imperatorem hominemque doctissimum? aut aliis Pythagorius ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam, haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Graeciae? aut Xenophon Agesilaum? aut Philolaus Archytam Tarentinum? aut ipse Pythagoras totam illam veterem Italiae Graeciam, quae quondam magna vocitata est? 3.140. Equidem non arbitror; sic enim video, unam quandam omnium rerum, quae essent homine erudito dignae atque eo, qui in re publica vellet excellere, fuisse doctrinam; quam qui accepissent, si eidem ingenio ad pronuntiandum valuissent et se ad dicendum quoque non repugte natura dedissent, eloquentia praestitisse. 3.141. Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad iem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae versumque quendam Philoctetae paulo secus dixit: ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hic autem, cum Isocratem pateretur dicere; itaque ornavit et inlustravit doctrinam illam omnem rerumque cognitionem cum orationis exercitatione coniunxit. Neque vero hoc fugit sapientissimum regem Philippum, qui hunc Alexandro filio doctorem accierit, a quo eodem ille et agendi acciperet praecepta et eloquendi. 3.142. Nunc sive qui volet, eum philosophum, qui copiam nobis rerum orationisque tradat, per me appellet oratorem licet; sive hunc oratorem, quem ego dico sapientiam iunctam habere eloquentiae, philosophum appellare malet, non impediam; dum modo hoc constet, neque infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cui res non suppetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam; quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem; sin quaerimus quid unum excellat ex omnibus, docto oratori palma danda est; 3.143. quem si patiuntur eundem esse philosophum, sublata controversia est; sin eos diiungent, hoc erunt inferiores, quod in oratore perfecto inest illorum omnis scientia, in philosophorum autem cognitione non continuo inest eloquentia; quae quamvis contemnatur ab eis, necesse est tamen aliquem cumulum illorum artibus adferre videatur.' Haec cum Crassus dixisset, parumper et ipse conticuit et a ceteris silentium fuit. 3.149. Omnis igitur oratio conficitur ex verbis; quorum primum nobis ratio simpliciter videnda est, deinde coniuncte. Nam est quidam ornatus orationis, qui ex singulis verbis est; alius, qui ex continuatis coniunctis constat. Ergo utimur verbis aut eis, quae propria sunt et certa quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis; aut eis, quae transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco conlocantur; aut eis, quae novamus et facimus ipsi. 3.150. In propriis igitur est verbis illa laus oratoris, ut abiecta atque obsoleta fugiat, lectis atque inlustribus utatur, in quibus plenum quiddam et sos inesse videatur. Sed in hoc verborum genere propriorum dilectus est habendus quidam atque is aurium quodam iudicio ponderandus est; in quo consuetudo etiam bene loquendi valet plurimum. 3.151. Itaque hoc, quod vulgo de oratoribus ab imperitis dici solet "bonis hic verbis," aut "aliquis non bonis utitur," non arte aliqua perpenditur, sed quodam quasi naturali sensu iudicatur: in quo non magna laus est vitare vitium, quamquam est magnum, verum tamen hoc quasi solum quoddam atque fundamentum est, verborum usus et copia bonorum. 3.152. Sed quid ipse aedificet orator et in quo adiungat artem, id esse nobis quaerendum atque explicandum videtur. Tria sunt igitur in verbo simplici, quae orator adferat ad inlustrandam atque exordam orationem: aut inusitatum verbum aut novatum aut translatum. 3.153. Inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetustate ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt poetarum licentiae liberiora quam nostrae; sed tamen raro habet etiam in oratione poeticum aliquod verbum dignitatem. Neque enim illud fugerim dicere, ut Caelius "qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam venit," nec "prolem" aut "subolem" aut "effari" aut "nuncupare" aut, ut tu soles, Catule, "non rebar" aut "opinabar"; aut alia multa, quibus loco positis grandior atque antiquior oratio saepe videri solet. 3.154. Novantur autem verba, quae ab eo, qui dicit, ipso gignuntur ac fiunt, vel coniungendis verbis, ut haec: tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat. num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias videtis enim et "versutiloquas" et "expectorat" ex coniunctione facta esse verba, non nata; sed saepe vel sine coniunctione verba novantur ut "ille senius desertus," ut "di genitales," ut "bacarum ubertate incurvescere." 3.155. Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit. Nam ut vestis frigoris depellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, sic verbi translatio instituta est inopiae causa, frequentata delectationis. Nam gemmare vitis, luxuriem esse in herbis, laetas segetes etiam rustici dicunt. Quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio potest, id translato cum est dictum, inlustrat id, quod intellegi volumus, eius rei, quam alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo. 3.156. Ergo haec translationes quasi mutuationes sunt, cum quod non habeas aliunde sumas, illae paulo audaciores, quae non inopiam indicant, sed orationi splendoris aliquid arcessunt; quarum ego quid vobis aut inveniendi rationem aut genera ponam? 3.157. Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tamquam in suo positum si agnoscitur, delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur ; sed ea transferri oportet, quae aut clariorem faciunt rem, ut illa omnia: inhorrescit mare, tenebrae conduplicantur, noctisque et nimbum occaecat nigror, flamma inter nubis coruscat, caelum tonitru contremit, grando mixta imbri largifico subita praecipitans cadit, undique omnes venti erumpunt, saevi exsistunt turbines, fervit aestu pelagus: omnia fere, quo essent clariora, translatis per similitudinem verbis dicta sunt; 3.158. aut quo significatur magis res tota sive facti alicuius sive consili, ut ille, qui occultantem consulto, ne id, quod ageretur, intellegi posset, duobus translatis verbis similitudine ipsa indicat: quandoquidem is se circum vestit dictis, saepit se dolo. Non numquam etiam brevitas translatione conficitur, ut illud "si telum manu fugit": imprudentia teli missi brevius propriis verbis exponi non potuit, quam est uno significata translato. | |
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60. Cicero, On Duties, 1.1-1.3, 1.51-1.54, 1.54.5, 1.61, 1.77, 1.84, 1.131, 1.150-1.151, 1.156, 1.159, 2.2-2.6, 2.36, 2.60, 2.112, 3.8-3.10, 3.32-3.33, 3.51-3.53, 3.63, 3.89, 3.91, 3.108-3.109 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on appropriate actions •cicero, marcus tullius, rome imagined •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties •tullius cicero, marcus, in dio cassius •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia •tullius cicero, marcus, and fabius cunctator •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •ciceromarcus tullius cicero •cicero, marcus tullius minor (son of the orator) •cicero, marcus tullius, political career •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica •cicero, marcus tullius, education •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 1, 3, 78, 96, 101, 102, 103; Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 179; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23, 45, 117, 147; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 47, 121, 122, 186; Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 74, 191; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 25, 162| 1.1. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum et ad iudicandum. 1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.3. Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus. 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52. ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.53. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura: iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. 1.54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate; 1.61. Intelligendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor, e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri, quod animo magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in probris maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: Vós enim, iuvenes, ánimum geritis múliebrem, ílla virgo viri et si quid eius modi: Salmácida, spolia sÍne sudore et sánguine. Contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, hine noster Cocles, hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari. 1.77. Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio: Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi. Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubertibus nonne togae arma cesserunt? neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. 1.84. Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam profundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant; quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque haec quidem Lacedaemoniis plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt. Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim, qui, quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant dicere. 1.131. Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur in ingressu mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt, anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si cavebimus, ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, et si attentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus. 1.150. Iam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberales habendi, qui sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum. Illiberales autem et sordidi quaestus mercennariorum omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus, quod statim vendant; nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur; nec vero est quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantur; nec enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque artes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum: Cetárii, lanií, coqui, fartóres, piscatóres, ut ait Terentius; adde hue, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores totumque ludum talarium. 1.151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt. 1.156. Neque solum vivi atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque potissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus. 1.159. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem. 2.2. Quamquam enim libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi, sed etiam ad scribendi studium excitaverunt, tamen interdum vereor, ne quibusdam bonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum mirenturque in ea tantum me operae et temporis ponere. Ego autem, quam diu res publica per eos gerebatur, quibus se ipsa commiserat, omnis meas curas cogitationesque in eam conferebam; cum autem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset usquam consilio aut auctoritati locus, socios denique tuendae rei publicae, summos viros, amisissem, nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis restitissem, nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus. 2.3. Atque utinam res publica stetisset, quo coeperat, statu nec in homines non tam commutandarum quam evertendarum rerum cupidos incidisset! Primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus. Cum autem res publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni solebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt forenses et senatoriae. 2.4. Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae temporibus; id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium non erat. 2.5. Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nomitur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae. Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia; cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet. 2.6. Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina virtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris? Sed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accuratius disputari solent, quod alio quodam libro fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis declarandum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad hoc nos studium potissimum contulissemus. 2.36. Erat igitur ex iis tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem, sed de iis male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii, qui nec sibi nec alteri, ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. 2.60. Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et hic ipse Panaetius, quem nultum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re publica scripsi, diligenter est disputatum. Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate moderanda est. 3.8. Quod eo magis miror, quia scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse Panaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quen locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium. 3.9. Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest, quin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam; praeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum. 3.10. Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae Panaetius praetermisisset et non perfecisset propter eorum, quae perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum. 3.32. Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate extermidum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore segreganda est. Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium exquiritur. 3.33. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex quibus perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinen fugiendum, quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit. Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id, quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.53. Immo vero, inquiet ille, necesse est, siquidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille; sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ila est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed dodum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam, sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. 3.63. Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis. Huic Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec gratia est. 3.89. Plenusestsextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum: sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere. In utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate, ut putat, officium dirigit magis quam humanitate. Quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius iacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio res familiaris, alio ducit humanitas. Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebitne eam sapiens, si potuerit? Negat, quia sit iniurium. Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum? Minime, non plus quam navigantem in alto eicere de navi velit, quia sua sit. Quoad enim perventum est eo, quo sumpta navis est, non domini est navis, sed navigantium. 3.91. Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos acceperit imprudens pro bonis, cum id rescierit, soluturusne sit eos, si cui debeat, pro bonis. Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, cui potius assentior. Qui vinum fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere. Non necesse putat Diogenes, Antipater viri boni existimat. Haec sunt quasi controversa iura Stoicorum. In mancipio vendendo dicendane vitia, non ea, quae nisi dixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure civili, sed haec, mendacem esse, aleatorem, furacem, ebriosum? Alteri dicenda videntur, alteri non videntur. 3.108. Non enim falsum iurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite enim Euripides: Iurávi lingua, méntem iniuratám gero. Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles perturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos hostibus dedidisset. 3.109. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum iterum consules essent, quia, cum male pugnatum apud Caudium esset, legionibus nostris sub iugum missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt iis; iniussu enim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodemque tempore Ti. Nurnicius, Q. Maelius, qui tum tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat facta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur; atque huius deditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedebatur, suasor et auctor fuit. Quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut Numantinis, quibuscum sine senatus auctoritate foedus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit ear, quam L. Furius, Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; qua accepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius hic quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum in eadem causa esset, deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae videbatur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est. | 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.52. On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â "No less shines his" â in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. 1.53. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common â forum, temples colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many. But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now confined to a small and narrow circle. 1.54. For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; 1.61. We must realize, however, that while we have set down four cardinal virtues from which as sources moral rectitude and moral duty emanate, that achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the world which is won with a spirit great, exalted, and superior to the vicissitudes of earthly life. And so, when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to rise to our lips is, if possible, something like this: "For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden a man's;" and this: "Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood." When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or other praise in more eloquent strain the brave and noble work of some great soul. Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and countless others, and, above all, the Roman People as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory, moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in soldier's garb. 1.77. The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I am told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail: "Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises, ye laurels." Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I was at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the most desperate traitors â dropped to the ground of their own accord! What achievement in war, then, was ever so great? 1.84. Many, on the other hand, have been found who were ready to pour out not only their money but their lives for their country and yet would not consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory â even though the interests of their country demanded it. For example, when Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen to the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement with the Athenians. His answer to them was that "the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself." And yet what he did dealt only a slight blow to Sparta; there was another which proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism recklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that, the Spartan power fell. How much better was the conduct of Quintus Maximus! of him Ennius says: "One man â and he alone â restored our state by delaying. Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety; Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever brighter." This sort of offence must be avoided no less in political life. For there are men who for fear of giving offence do not dare to express their honest opinion, no matter how excellent. 1.131. We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of listless sauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal processions, or of hurrying too fast, when time presses. If we do this, it puts us out of breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted; and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But it is much more important that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony with Nature's laws. And we shall not fall in this if we guard against violent excitement or depression, and if we keep our minds intent on the observance of propriety. 1.150. Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which ones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman and which ones are vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will, as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman, too, and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their case the very wage they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must consider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail immediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of downright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than misrepresentation. And all mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for no workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least respectable of all are those trades which cater for sensual pleasures: "Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers, And fishermen," as Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the perfumers, dancers, and the whole corps de ballet. 1.151. But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived â medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching â these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point. 1.156. And not only while present in the flesh memorials of their learning they continue the same service after they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing upon laws, customs or political science; in fact, they seem to have devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public business. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation never so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred, while speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by the bonds of society. 1.159. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether this social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do any of those things. 2.2. Although my books have aroused in not a few men the desire not only to read but to write, yet I sometimes fear that what we term philosophy is distasteful to certain worthy gentlemen, and that they wonder that I devote so much time and attention to it. Now, as long as the state was administered by the men to whose care she had voluntarily entrusted herself, I devoted all my effort and thought to her. But when everything passed under the absolute control of a despot and there was no longer any room for statesmanship or authority of mine; and finally when I had lost the friends who had been associated with me in the task of serving the interests of the state, and who were men of the highest standing, I did not resign myself to grief, by which I should have been overwhelmed, had I not struggled against it; neither, on the other hand, did I surrender myself to a life of sensual pleasure unbecoming to a philosopher. 2.3. I would that the government had stood fast in the position it had begun to assume and had not fallen into the hands of men who desired not so much to reform as to abolish the constitution. For then, in the first place, I should now be devoting my energies more to public speaking than to writing as I used to do when the republic stood; and in the second place, I should be committing to written form not these present essays but my public speeches, as I often formerly did. But when the republic, to which all my care and thought and effort used to be devoted, was no more, then, of course, my voice was silenced in the forum and in the senate. 2.4. And since my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I had been well-read along these lines of thought from my early youth, that the most honourable way for me to forget my sorrows would be by turning to philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great deal of time to philosophy as a discipline; but after I began to fill the high offices of state and devoted myself heart and soul to the public service, there was only so much time for philosophical studies as was left over from the claims of my friends and of the state; all of this was spent in reading; I had no leisure for writing. 2.5. Therefore, amid all the present most awful calamities I yet flatter myself that I have won this good out of evil â that I may commit to written form matters not at all familiar to our countrymen but still very much worth their knowing. For what, in the name of heaven, is more to be desired than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better for a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will translate the word into our idiom, than "the love of wisdom." Wisdom, moreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is "the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which those things are controlled." And if the man lives who would belittle the study of philosophy, I quite fail to see what in the world he would see fit to praise. 2.6. For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively promote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of character and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no "method" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least important concerns is without its method, is the language of people who talk without due reflection and blunder in matters of the utmost importance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where shall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of learning? Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books. For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit. 2.36. The third, then, of the three conditions I name as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy, and indifferent. 2.60. Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers do not approve of them â our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am following, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius of Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The Republic." To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our ability and regulated by the golden mean. 3.8. And I wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records that Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those three books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so essentially important as this. 3.9. Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that point was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it was not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such a thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with regard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt â whether that question which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been included or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to debate â that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For, if a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third must necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close of the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper turn. 3.10. We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact. He writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also was a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that "as no painter had been found to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left unfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt adequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture to supply what he had left undone." 3.32. As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill; â nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity. of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances. 3.33. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not immoral at all. We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which is unfinished, to be sure, but still almost completed; and, as mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition, but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if Cratippus does not permit this assumption, you will still grant this at least â that what is morally right is the object most worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more probable, and, besides these, there is no other alternative that seems probable at all. 3.51. In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors â perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" 3.52. "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." 3.53. "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man." "I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away." In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. 3.63. Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor gratitude. 3.89. The sixth book of Hecaton's "Moral Duties" is full of questions like the following: "Is it consistent with a good man's duty to let his slaves go hungry when provisions are at famine price?" Hecaton gives the argument on both sides of the question; but still in the end it is by the standard of expediency, as he conceives it, rather than by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty. Then he raises this question: supposing a man had to throw part of his cargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced horse or a cheap and worthless slave? In this case regard for his property interest inclines him one way, human feeling the other."Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a plank from a sinking ship, shall a wise man wrest it away from him if he can?" "No," says Hecaton; "for that would be unjust." "But how about the owner of the ship? Shall he take the plank away because it belongs to him?""Not at all; no more than he would be willing when far out at sea to throw a passenger overboard on the ground that the ship was his. For until they reach the place for which the ship is chartered, she belongs to the passengers, not to the owner." 3.91. Again he raises the question: "If a wise man should inadvertently accept counterfeit money for good, will he offer it as genuine in payment of a debt after he discovers his mistake?" Diogenes says, "Yes"; Antipater, "No," and I agree with him. If a man knowingly offers for sale wine that is spoiling, ought he to tell his customers? Diogenes thinks that it is not required; Antipater holds that an honest man would do so. These are like so many points of the law disputed among the Stoics. "In selling a slave, should his faults be declared â not those only which he seller is bound by the civil law to declare or have the slave returned to him, but also the fact that he is untruthful, or disposed to ramble, or steal, or get drunk?" The one thinks such faults should be declared, the other does not. 3.108. For swearing to what is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to perform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says: "My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath." But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covets of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an enemy, we have our whole fetial code as well as many other laws that are binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the senate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains to the enemy. 3.109. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius in their second consulship lost the battle at the Caudine Forks, and our legions were sent under the yoke. And because they made peace with the Samnites, those generals were delivered up to them, for they had made the peace without the approval of the people and senate. And Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, tribunes of the people, were delivered up at the same time, because it was with their sanction that the peace had been concluded. This was done in order that the peace with the Samnites might be annulled. And Postumius, the very man whose delivery was in question, was the proposer and advocate of the said delivery. Many years later, Gaius Mancinus had a similar experience: he advocated the bill, introduced in accordance with a decree of the senate by Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered up to the Numantines, with whom he had made a treaty without authorization from the senate; and when the bill was passed, he was delivered up to the enemy. His action was more honourable than Quintus Pompey's. Pompey's situation was identical with his, and yet at his own entreaty the bill was rejected. In this latter case, apparent expediency prevailed over moral rectitude; in the former cases, the false semblance of expediency was overbalanced by the weight of moral rectitude. |
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61. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.1, 1.7-1.8, 1.11, 1.14, 1.24, 1.26-1.27, 1.32, 1.53-1.55, 1.62-1.63, 1.70, 1.77, 1.102-1.109, 1.111-1.112, 1.119, 2.3-2.4, 2.9-2.10, 2.13-2.15, 2.17-2.18, 2.26, 2.28-2.31, 2.40-2.41, 2.44-2.46, 2.55-2.57, 2.60-2.61, 2.66, 3.2-3.3, 3.7, 3.13, 3.29, 3.32, 3.34, 3.37, 3.41-3.42, 3.47, 3.49, 3.68, 3.76, 4.8, 4.43, 4.54, 4.58-4.59, 4.70, 5.11, 5.14-5.15, 5.17, 5.26-5.27, 5.31, 5.33-5.35, 5.37, 5.42, 5.48, 5.54-5.66, 5.73, 5.75-5.76, 5.82, 5.84, 5.88, 5.101, 5.120-5.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods •cicero, marcus tullius, and auctoritas •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical treatises of •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis •cicero, marcus tullius, personal life •cicero, marcus tullius, political career •cicero, marcus tullius, speeches •cicero, marcus tullius, view of anger •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 283; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 59, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 141; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 84, 86, 92; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 40, 168; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55, 56; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 25, 29, 33, 34, 143, 173, 193, 201| 1.1. Cum 1 et 5 extr. imit. Paschasius Radb. Expos. in ps. 44 l. I praef. in. defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli rettuli s retuli X Pasch. cf. p. 344, 24 me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis cf. Lact. inst. 3,14, 13 litteris litteris at libris V 2 inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper hoc supra semper add. V 2 iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent. 1.7. Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, scientia scientiae X -a pro -ae in r. V 2 copia, cum motus cum motus H commotus GKRV sed cũ supra com V 2 esset Isocratis isocratis V 2 s socratis X rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes docere s om. X post adulescentes add. decere V 2 et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc haen c R 1 enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, del. Mur. operam inpendimus Dav. ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus. audeamus V (a in r. c ) ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures cumplures G 1 R 1 (corr. ipsi) mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. possem V 2 g possim X ( cf. auderemus v. 20 ) ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut at id X (at id sed. ex aut id aut sed. K c ) sedens aut ambulans disputabam. 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.11. Atqui pleni libri sunt contra ista ipsa disserentium dissenentium G 1 (dissotium corr. G 1? ) RV 1 ( corr. ipse? ) diserentium K philosophorum. Inepte sane. quis enim est est om. K 1, add. c tam excors, quem ista moveant? commoveant V 2 Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli. Ita prorsus prossus G existimo. Ubi sunt Inde ab ubi - 223, 24 iam sunt multa in K madore corrupta ergo i, quos miseros dicis, aut quem locum incolunt? si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt. Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto. Igitur ne esse quidem? Prorsus isto modo, et tamen miseros miseros cf. Serv. Aen. 4, 20 ob id ipsum quidem, quidem om. K quia nulli sint. 1.14. in primis enim hoc traditur: omne pronuntiatum pronuntiatum eqs. Gell. 16, 8, 8 (Hier. adv. Rufin. 1, 486) (sic sic ex si V c enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem a)ci/wma a Il w m a R aciwML V, sed praeter 1. a omnia i. r. V c azioma K azi w ma G 1, utar post alio, si invenero alio si inv. V ( dist. 2? ) alios et inv. GKR melius) —id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. cum igitur dicis: miser M. Crassus, aut hoc dicis: miser est Crassus, ut possit iudicari, verum id falsumne sit, aut nihil dicis omnino. Age, iam concedo non eos s. non add. V 2 sunt V esse miseros, qui mortui sint, quoniam extorsisti, ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne ne s. v. K 1 miseros quidem esse posse. quid? quid ecce K ante ecce adscr. m (= magister ) K 2, post esse d ( disc. ) K ree qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? quae enim potest in vita esse iucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit iam iamque esse moriendum? Ecquid ecqui X( W ?) ergo intellegis, quantum mali de humana condicione deieceris? 1.24. nam si cor cor s. G aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; corpore V c s tempore X si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, harmonia GKR arm.V arm. H dissolvetur. quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? efficiet ... 25 dicit esse H his sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vita sensus amittitur; non sentientis autem nihil est ullam in partem quod intersit. reliquorum sententiae spem adferunt, si te hoc forte delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire. Me vero delectat, idque primum ita esse velim, deinde, etiamsi non sit, mihi persuaderi tamen velim. Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo: anima ex -o V c? amplius quod desideres nihil erit. Feci mehercule, et quidem saepius; sed nescio quo modo, dum lego, adsentior, cum posui librum et mecum ipse de inmortalitate imm. GR animorum coepi cogitare, adsensio omnis illa elabitur. Quid? 1.26. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, potest G 1 animos remanere post mortem, tum, si minus id obtinebis obtenebis GR 1 V —est enim arduum—, docebis carere omni malo mortem. ego enim istuc ipsum vereor ne ne me G malum sit non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis optineri V possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius propius opius in r. V c aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera vera ss. K c veru ( aaper- tum! ) in vera corr. R cernebant. cercebant G 1 (corr. ipse) R cernebant K cerneba t V (-bat s ) Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos cascos cassos R cassus K 1 ann. 24 appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret; 1.27. idque idquae G 1 RV 1 cum multis aliis rebus, tum e pontificio iure et e caerimoniis caer. V cer. GKR sepulcrorum intellegi licet, quas maxumis ingeniis praediti nec tanta cura coluissent nec violatas tam inexpiabili inexpiabile X -i in r. V 1? s religione sanxissent, nisi haereret in eorum mentibus mortem non interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitae, quae in claris viris et feminis dux in caelum soleret esse, in ceteris humi retineretur et permaneret tamen. 1.32. illud illũ K 1 num dubitas, quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura? quae est melior igitur in hominum genere natura quam eorum, qui se natos ad homines iuvandos tutandos conservandos arbitrantur? abiit ad deos Hercules: numquam abisset, nisi, cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam viam s. v. add. K 2 munivisset. vetera iam ista et religione omnium consecrata: quid in hac re p. tot tantosque viros ob rem p. ob rem p. b r in r. V 1 ob re p. K ob rē p. ( er. ublică) G interfectos cogitasse arbitramur? isdemne ut finibus nomen suum quibus vita terminaretur? nemo umquam sine magna spe inmortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem. 1.53. Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, nesci aet K dic quaeso, ne esse ne esse ex non esse K c quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro Phaedr. 245 c, cf. Cic. rep. 6, 27. Ciceronem sequitur Lact. inst. 7, 8, 4 et Serv. Aen. 6, 727 phedro KRV explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re p.: “Quod semper movetur, aeternum et aet. X ( sed et exp. V vet K c ) aet. Somn. Macr. est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, aliunde ( u(p' a)/llou ) H e corr. s Somn. pars Macr. alicunde X quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, quia a se s. u. add. V 2 numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc hoc o in r. R c principium est movendi. 1.54. principii autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. quod si numquam oritur, ne ne G nec s Somn. Macr. occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur nec ex ex V 2 s Somn. Macr. om. X ( ou)/te a)/llo e)c e)kei/nhs genh/setai ) se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et et Somn. Macr. (consistat et P ) om. W ( ta=sa/n te ge/nesin sumpesou=san sh=nai kai\ mh/poe au/)qis e)/xein o(/qen kinhqe/na genh/setai ) consistat necesse est nec vim ullam ciscatur, qua a a V 2 s Somn. Macr. om. X imp. GR primo inpulsa moveatur. cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? iimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur cietur s Somn. Macr. citetur X Macr. P 1 interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa semper 1.55. moveat, quae se ipsa moveat ( to\ au)to\ e(auto\ kinou=n ) Macr. quae se ipsam semper m. X sed semper del. V vet quae sese m. Somn. neque nata certe est et aeterna est.” semper enim movetur...245, 3 aeterna est ( sine 19 vel... 23 neget) H licet concurrant omnes plebei philosophi—sic enim i, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur—, non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter eliganter K el eg. R 1 explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter supt. hic GR conclusum sit intellegent. sentit igitur animus se moveri; quod cum sentit, illud ilium X, corr. K c V 2 s una sentit, se vi sua, non aliena moveri, nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur. ad R 1 ex quo efficitur aeternitas, nisi quid habes ad haec. dicere post haec add. V 2 Ego vero facile sim sim def. Plasb. ad ac. 2,147 cl. Ter. Andr. 203 sum s passus ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire; ita isti faveo sententiae. Quid? 1.62. illa vis quae tandem est quae investigat occulta, quae inventio atque excogitatio dicitur? ex hacne tibi terrena mortalique natura et caduca concreta ea concreta ea concretus esse Bentl. videtur? aut qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina? aut qui dissipatos homines congregavit et ad societatem vitae convocavit, vocum V 2 aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis litterarum notis terminavit, aut qui errantium stellarum cursus praegressiones insti tu tiones institiones Man. notavit? omnes magni; etiam superiores, qui fruges, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitae, qui praesidia contra feras invenerunt, a quibus mansuefacti et exculti a necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora eligantiora K ele g. R 1 defluximus. nam et auribus oblectatio magna parta est inventa parata ss. K 2 que post inventa add. V 2 et temperata varietate et natura sonorum, et astra suspeximus cum cum V, sed c in r. scr, V c tum X ea quae sunt infixa certis locis, tum illa non re sed vocabulo errantia, quorum conversiones omnisque motus qui animo animo Man. s animus vidit, is docuit similem animum suum eius esse, qui ea fabricatus esset in caelo. 1.63. nam cum Archimedes lunae solis quinque errantium motus in sphaeram spher. GRV sper. K inligavit, effecit efficit K 1 idem quod ille, qui in Timaeo timeo X Tim. p.39 mundum aedificavit, Platonis deus, ut tarditate et celeritate dissimillimos motus una regeret conversio. quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera spher. GRV sper. K quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine sine V divino ingenio ne V potuisset imitari. 1.70. minis utilitati agros omnis et maria parentia—: haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare quin is is H his GKRV praesit aliquis vel effector, si haec nata sunt, sînt K 1 ut Platoni videtur, vel, si semper fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? numeris K 1 sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non videas ut deum add. G 1 in mg. non vides, tamen, ut deum adgnoscis adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR a gn. V agn. H ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique omniaque GK 1 (omni atque c )R omni que V pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito. adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR In quo igitur loco est? credo equidem in capite et cur credam adferre possum. sed alias, ubi nunc ante ubi add. V rec sit animus; certe quidem in te est. quidem interest K 1 quae est eius ei' (= eius) in r. V c et X ei s V rec natura? propria, puto, et sua. sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem: spiritabilem V nihil ad id de quo agimus. illud modo videto, ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem ... 13 locum et om. H s faciem, faciem aciem in r. V 1 sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ignores et locum et formam. 1.77. catervae veniunt contra dicentium, nec solum Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio, despatio K 1 sed nescio quo modo doctissimus quisque contemnit, del. Man. acerrume accerume X ( r radd. V c ) autem deliciae meae Dicaearchus contra hanc inmortalitatem imm. GR disseruit. is enim tris libros scripsit, qui Lesbiaci lesbaici K vocantur quod Mytilenis mitilenis RV mityl, G mittil, K sermo habetur, in quibus volt efficere animos esse mortalis. Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur tamquam cornicibus: diu mansuros esse post mansuros add. V 2 aiunt animos, semper negant. num non non no V 1 ne V c N (= non) in r. G 1 ita s ista X (unde postea sint V rec ) vis igitur audire, cur, etiamsi ita sit, mors tamen non sit in malis? Ut videtur, sed me nemo de inmortalitate depellet. Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil nimis animis X ( sed a del. V 2 ) oportet confidere; 1.102. viros commemoro: qualis tandem Lacaena? quae cum filium in proelium misisset et interfectum audisset, idcirco inquit genueram, ut esset, et K 1 (ut 2 ) qui pro patria mortem non mortemon V 1 morte non V e corr. GKR dubitaret occumbere . Esto: fortes et duri Spartiatae; magnam habet vim rei p. disciplina. quid? Cyrenaeum cyreneum GKV Theodorum, philosophum non ignobilem, nonne miramur? cui cum Lysimachus rex crucem minaretur, istis, quaeso inquit ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis: Theodori quidem nihil interest, humine homine K 1 an sublime putescat. putrescat K 2? V rec (Val. Max. 6, 2 ext. 3) Cuius hoc dicto admoneor, ut aliquid etiam de humatione et sepultura dicendum existimem, rem non difficilem, di ficilem G 1 K 1 dificilem R is praesertim cognitis, quae de nihil nihili K sentiendo paulo ante dicta sunt. de qua Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparet in eo libro in quo moritur, de quo iam tam tum K 1 multa diximus. 1.103. cum enim de inmortalitate imm. R animorum disputavisset et iam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone, quem ad modum sepeliri se sepeliri V Plato Phaed. 115 c—e (libere) vellet, multam multa V 1 vero inquit operam, amici, frustra consumpsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi me hinc hic K 1 avolaturum neque mei mei Bentl. ( s ?) me quicquam relicturum. verum tamen, Crito, si me adsequi potueris aut sicubi ctus nactus KR 1 e corr. V rec n atus G 1 eris, ut tibi videbitur, videtur X videbitur s o(/pws a)/n soi fi/lon h)=| (cf. We.) sepelito. sed, mihi crede, nemo nemo vestrŭ G 1 (tum iterum scripsit nemo vestrŭ, sed ipse delevit) me vestrum, cum hinc excessero, consequetur. praeclare is is Hei. id (Socrates opponitur Diogeni) quidem, qui et amico permiserit et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare. 1.104. durior Diogenes, et is quidem eadem eadem om. X add. V 2 supra id (idem add. Wolf ) sentiens, sed ut Cynicus asperius: proici se iussit inhumatum. humatum V 1 tum amici: volucribusne et feris? minime vero inquit, sed bacillum propter me, quo quod ab K 1 R abigam, ponitote. qui poteris? enim post bac. V 2 qui p. quid p. X corr. V rec s (cf. We.) illi, non enim senties. quid igitur mihi ferarum laniatus oberit nihil sentienti? sentiendi R 1 praeclare Anaxagoras, qui cum Lampsaci lamsaci X moreretur, moretur GRV 1 (corr. 2 ) quaerentibus amicis, velletne Clazomenas in patriam, si quid accidisset, auferri, nihil necesse est inquit, undique enim ad inferos tantundem viae est. totaque de ratione humationis unum tenendum est, ad corpus illam pertinere, sive occiderit animus sive vigeat. in corpore autem perspicuum est vel extincto animo vel elapso nullum residere sensum. Sed plena errorum sunt omnia. 1.105. trahit Hectorem sqq. hęct. semper V plerumque KRG ad currum religatum Achilles: lacerari eum et sentire, credo, putat. ergo hic ulciscitur, se ante ulc. add. V 2 ut quidem sibi videtur; at illa sicut acerbissimam rem maeret: meret GKR Vidi/, videre quo/d me passa aege/rrume, Hecto/rem curru curro GK 1 ( ss. K c ) R et fort. V 1 (-u in r. ) qua/driiugo rapta/rier. Ennius Andr. 100 quem Hectorem, aut quam diu ille erit Hector? melius Accius fr. inc. 664 j et aliquando sapiens Achilles: Immo enimvero co/rpus Priamo re/ddidi, Hectora hectora Nieberding Doug. Philol. 1905 p. 153 (necess. propter v. seq.) hectorem a/bstuli. non igitur Hectora hectora sed a in r. V 1 traxisti, sed corpus quod fuerat Hectoris. 1.106. ecce alius exoritur e terra, qui matrem dormire non sinat: Mate/r, te appello, apello K 1 V 1 tu/, quae curam so/mno suspensa/m suspensam s Porph. Hor. sat. 2, 3, 60 suspense levas, Neque te/ mei miseret, su/rge et sepeli na/tum—! haec cum pressis praessisset fl. GRV (corr. rec ) pressis et K et flebilibus modis, qui totis theatris maestitiam inferant, concinuntur, difficile est non eos qui inhumati humati V (in m 2 ) sint miseros iudicare. prius qua/m ferae volucre/sque— metuit, ne laceratis membris minus bene utatur; ne combustis, non extimescit. Neu re/liquias seme/sas semiassi reis X (regis V rec s ) l semensas in mg. V 2 semiesas siris Bentl. (sireis Haupt ) semustas Va. sed cf. Apul. met. 8, 15: iacere semesa hominum corpora suisque visceribus nudatis ossibus cuncta candere sireis de/nudatis o/ssibus Per te/rram sanie de/libutas delibutam V rec foe/de divexa/rier— Pacuv. Iliona 197sqq. cf. Va. Opp. I 92 II 490 non intellego, quid metuat, cum tam bonos septenarios fundat ad tibiam. Tenendum est igitur nihil curandum esse post mortem, cum multi inimicos etiam mortuos poeniuntur. tenendum ... 16 puniuntur Non. 479,27 et ( inde a cum) 471,27 poeniuntur G 1 K 2 V 2 Non. in lemmate 479,27 paen. K 1 R pen. V 1 pun. G 1 e corr. V rec Non. praeter l. l. execr. K exsecratur luculentis sane versibus apud Ennium Enn. Thy. 362 Thyestes, primum ut naufragio pereat Atreus: durum hoc sane; talis enim interitus non est sine gravi sensu; illa iia: Ipse summis sa/xis fixus a/speris, evi/sceratus, La/tere pendens, sa/xa spargens ta/bo, sanie et sa/nguine atro— 1.107. non ipsa saxa magis sensu omni omnia X a exp. V 1 vacabunt quam ille latere pendens, cui se hic cruciatum censet optare. quae quae V 2 quam X essent dura, si sentiret, sentiret ( vel sentirentur) s sentirent X sunt om. X ante sine vel post sensu add. s sunt nulla sine sensu. illud vero perquam ie: Ne/que sepulcrum, quo/ recipiat, ha/beat, portum co/rporis, U/bi remissa huma/na vita co/rpus requiesca/t malis. vides, quanto haec in errore versentur: portum esse corporis et requiescere in sepulcro putat mortuum; magna culpa Pelopis, qui non erudierit filium nec docuerit, quatenus esset quidque curandum. 1.108. Sed quid singulorum opiniones opinionis X animadvertam, anim advertam G nationum varios errores perspicere cum liceat? condiunt Aegyptii mortuos et eos servant domi; Persae etiam cera circumlitos litos K 1 condunt, condiunt V 2 ut quam maxime permaneant diuturna corpora. Magorum mos est non humare corpora suorum, nisi a feris sint ante laniata; in Hyrcania hircania KRV plebs publicos plebs publicos V (s publi in r. V c ) plebs supplicos GKR alit canes, optumates domesticos: nobile autem genus canum illud scimus esse, sed pro sua quisque facultate parat a quibus lanietur, eamque optumam illi esse censent cessent V sepulturam. permulta alia colligit Chrysippus, crysippus X fr. eth. 322 ut est in omni historia curiosus, sed ita taetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio. totus igitur hic locus est contemnendus in nobis, in nobis V (exp. 2 ) non neglegendus in nostris, ita tamen, ut mortuorum corpora nihil sentire vivi sentiamus; ita ... 23 sentiamus del. We. non recte 1.109. quantum famaeque V (ae in r. V c ) autem consuetudini famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intellegant nihil id id ss. G 1 ad mortuos pertinere. Sed profecto mors tum aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis virtutis -utis in r. V c perfectae perfecto perfecto exp. V 2 functus est munere. multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt. quam quam Dav. quae (idem error p. 274, 16 saep.) utinam potuissem obire! nihil enim iam adquirebatur, cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortuna fortunae K 2 B bella restabant. quare si ipsa ratio minus perficiat, perficiet V 2 ut mortem neglegere possimus, at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. videamus V 1 quamquam enim en im V (si et ... 2 ) sensus abierit, tamen suis suis Lb. (cf.p.253,9) summis et propriis bonis laudis et gloriae, quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. etsi enim nihil habet habe t G( eras. n) in se gloria cur expetatur, expectatur X (c exp. in V) vir tutē V ( ss. 2? ) tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur. sequatur V 2? 1.111. 'morere, more V 1 ( add. c ) Diagora' inquit; non enim in caelum ascensurus es. magna haec, et nimium fortasse, Graeci putant vel tum potius putabant, isque, qui hoc Diagorae dixit, permagnum existimans tris tris K (r e corr 1 ) R(!)V( i ) tres G Olympionicas una e domo prodire cunctari illum diutius in vita fortunae obiectum inutile putabat ipsi. ipse K 1 Ego autem tibi quidem, quod satis esset, paucis verbis, ut mihi videbar, videbatur V 2 responderam—concesseras enim nullo in malo mortuos esse—; sed ob eam causam contendi ut plura dicerem, quod in desiderio et luctu haec est consolatio maxima. nostrum enim et nostra nostra V causa susceptum dolorem modice ferre debemus, ne nosmet ipsos amare videamur; illa suspicio suspitio K intolerabili intollerabili KRV 1 dolore cruciat, si opinamur eos quibus orbati sumus esse cum aliquo sensu in is malis quibus volgo opitur. hanc excutere opinionem mihimet post mihimet add. V 2 volui radicitus, eoque fui fortasse longior. Tu longior? 1.112. non mihi quidem. prior enim pars orationis tuae faciebat, ut mori cuperem, posterior, ut modo non nollem, modo non laborarem; omni autem oratione ratione GRV 1 ( add. 2 ) illud certe perfectum est, ut mortem non ducerem in malis. Num igitur etiam rhetorum epilogum epilogum cf. Lact. ira 22, 2 desideramus? an hanc iam iam add. G 1 artem plane relinquimus? relinqueris V ( exp. m. rec. ) Tu vero istam ne reliqueris, quam semper ornasti, et quidem iure; illa enim te, verum si loqui volumus, ornaverat. sed quinam est iste epilogus? aveo habeo X aveo s enim audire, quicquid est. 1.119. quo utinam velis passis pas is K 1 (expansis ss. 2 ) V 1 pervehi liceat! sin reflantibus sinereflantibus X sed prius e eras. in V (sine refl. dist. in G et postea in KR) ventis reiciemur, tamen eodem eodem ex eadem K 1 R 1 paulo tardius referamur necesse est. quod autem omnibus necesse est, idne miserum misterium in miserum corr. K 2 esse uni potest? Habes epilogum, ne quid praetermissum aut relictum putes. Ego vero, et quidem et qui idem GR 1 ( in hoc alterum i linea deletum, tum iterum punctis ornatum ab R 2, qui etiam supra et scripsit; voluit ut v. atqui idem) fecit etiam iste me epilogus firmiorem. Optime, inquam. sed nunc quidem valetudini valitudini KR c tribuamus aliquid, cras autem et quot quot s quos X dies erimus in Tusculano, agamus haec et ea potissimum, quae levationem habeant aegritudinum formidinum cupiditatum, qui omnis philosophiae omni philosophia X (phil ophia V 1 ) omnis philosophiae V 2 aut c ex omni ph. K 2 est fructus uberrimus. 2.3. Quamquam non sumus ignari multos studiose contra esse dicturos; quod vitare nullo modo potuimus, nisi nihil omnino scriberemus. etenim si orationes, quas nos multitudinis iudicio probari volebamus (popularis est enim illa facultas, et effectus eloquentiae est audientium adprobatio app. KV c )—sed si reperiebantur repper. K non nulli, qui nihil laudarent nisi quod se imitari posse confiderent, quemque sperandi sibi, eundem bene dicendi finem proponerent, et cum obruerentur obruerentur ru in r. G 1 obrue ntur K 1 copia sententiarum atque verborum, ieiunitatem et famem se malle quam ubertatem et copiam dicerent, unde erat exortum exortus GK exortus R 1 V 1 ˜ supra u posuit R 1? V 2 genus Atticorum is ipsis, qui id quid G 1? sequi se profitebantur, ignotum, qui iam conticuerunt paene ab ipso foro inrisi: 2.4. quid futurum putamus, cum adiutore populo, quo utebamur utebamur ex -ntur G 1 antea, nunc minime nos uti posse videamus? est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens est philosophia ... 21 fugiens Lact. inst. 3, 25,2 eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa, ut, vel si quis universam velit vituperare, secundo id populo facere possit, vel si in in V 3 in r. eam quam nos maxime sequimur conetur invadere, magna habere possit auxilia e e add. V 2 s om. X a s reliquorum philosophorum disciplinis. est itaque philosophia... 26 disciplinis H Nos autem universae philosophiae vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio, pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent, satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitramur; sed tamen tantum abest ut scribi contra nos nolimus, nolimus ex nolumus R 1 ex uolumus G 1 ut id etiam maxime optemus. in ipsa enim Graecia philosophia tanto ipsa enim Graeciae philosophia tantum Boeth. in honore numquam fuisset, nisi doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset. viguisset V ( ss. 2 ) cf. praef. crevisset Boeth. 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 2.10. Dici non potest, quam sim hesterna disputatione tua delectatus vel potius adiutus. etsi enim mihi sum conscius numquam me nimis meinimis X menimis V menimis K 2 meminus R rec vitae cupidum fuisse, tamen interdum obiciebatur animo metus quidam et dolor cogitanti cogitanti V cogitantis GKR fore aliquando finem huius lucis et amissionem omnium vitae commodorum. hoc genere molestiae sic, mihi crede, sum liberatus, ut nihil nihil V minus curandum putem. Minime mirum id quidem; 2.13. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est. nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Acci: Accius Atr. 234 Accii Probae Mur. acimprobe RK (acĭ pbe) acinprobe GV Probae falsumque ... probae om. H e/tsi in segetem su/nt deteriore/m datae Fruge/s, tamen ipsae ipse KR sua/pte natura natura alt. a in r. G 1 nature nitent K 1 e/nitent, sic animi non omnes culti fructum cultum fructi R 1 ferunt. atque, ut ut add. G 1 in eodem simili verser, ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus; ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit vitia radicitus et praeparat properat K 1 animos ad satus accipiendos eaque mandat mandat s mundat X is et, ut ita dicam, serit, quae adulta fructus uberrimos ferant. nam... 16 ferant H Agamus igitur, ut coepimus. dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis. 2.14. Dolorem existimo maxumum malorum omnium. Etiamne maius quam dedecus? decus X corr. K 2 R c V c Non audeo id dicere equidem, equidem Ha. quidem (id quidem dicere We. ) et me pudet tam cito de sententia esse deiectum. Magis esset esse X corr. K 2 R c? V c ) pudendum, si in sententia permaneres. quid enim minus est dignum minus est indignum K 1 minus te dignum V (te in r. V c ) quam tibi peius quicquam videri dedecore flagitio turpitudine? quae ut effugias, quis est non modo recusandus, sed non ultro adpetendus app. KV 2? subeundus excipiendus dolor? Ita prorsus existimo. non ultro ... 287,1 existimo Char. GL. I 211,24 (sed sub. et exc. d. est) non om. V 1 add. 2 quare ne sit sane sane om. K summum malum dolor, malum certe est. Videsne igitur, quantum breviter admonitus de doloris terrore deieceris? deiceris V 1 deieceris K sed alt. e del. 2 2.15. Video plane, sed plus desidero. Experiar equidem; sed magna res est, animoque mihi opus est non repugte. Habebis id quidem. ut enim heri feci, et heri feci Char. GL. I 200, 12 sic nunc rationem, quo ea me cumque ducet, sequar. Primum igitur de inbecillitate imb. R multorum et de variis disciplinis philosophorum loquar. quorum princeps et auctoritate et antiquitate Socraticus Aristippus aristiphus X corr. V c non dubitavit summum malum dolorem dicere. deinde ad hanc enervatam muliebremque sententiam satis docilem se Epicurus praebuit. p K ( ss. 2 ) hunc post Rhodius Hieronymus hieronimus X dolore vacare vacaredolore R 1 vacare V summum bonum dixit: tantum in dolore duxit di xit K ( man.c.? ) mali. ceteri praeter Zenonem, Aristonem, Pyrrhonem pyrronem X (phyrr. K 1 ) idem fere quod modo quod modo edd. quomodo tu: malum illud quidem, sed alia peiora. 2.17. Metrodorus Metr. fr. 5 quidem perfecte perfecit habuisse vid. V 1 eum beatum putat, cui corpus bene bene add. V 2 constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore. quis autem est iste, cui id exploratum possit esse? Epicurus Ep. fr. 601 vero ea dicit, ut mihi quidem risus captare videatur. adfirmat aff. KR 2 enim quodam loco, si uratur sapiens, si crucietur—expectas fortasse, dum dicat: patietur, perferet, non succumbet ; magna mehercule laus laus add. K 1 et eo ipso, per quem iuravi, Hercule, digna; sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis: in Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet: quam suave est, quam hoc non curo! sqq. cf. Lact. inst.3,27,5 suave suave N (= enim ) K 1 (corr. 2 ) etiam? an parum est, si non amarum? at at K 2 s ad X (atqui idem ex ad id quidem V rec ) id quidem illi ipsi, qui dolorem malum esse negant, non solent dicere, cuiquam suave esse cruciari: asperum, difficile, odiosum, contra naturam dicunt, nec tamen malum. hic, qui solum hoc malum dicit dicit add. K c et malorum omnium extremum, sapientem censet id suave dicturum. 2.18. ego ego (eras. fort. = autem; non in mg. add. 2 ) a te postulo K ate G a te non postulo, ut dolorem eisdem isdem V eisdem ex hisdem ut v. K 1 verbis adficias quibus voluptatem Epicurus, voluptatem ut Epicurus Po. Epicurus voluptatem W volup- tatem del. Bentl. homo, ut scis, sis G voluptarius. ille dixerit sane idem in Phalaridis tauro, quod, si esset in lectulo; ego tantam vim non tribuo sapientiae contra dolorem. si fortis est fortis est Ha. forte in perferendo, officio satis est; ut laetetur etiam, non postulo. tristis enim res est sine dubio, aspera, amara, inimica naturae, ad patiendum tolerandumque difficilis. Aspice Philoctetam, philotetam V cui concedendum est gementi; 2.26. interea, unde isti versus? non enim adgnosco. adgnosco KR 1 (d exp. 2 ) V 1 (d eras. ) a n. G 1 Dicam hercle; etenim recte requiris. videsne abundare me otio? Quid tum? Fuisti saepe, credo, cum Athenis esses, in scholis philosophorum. Vero, ante vero V rec ac libenter quidem. Animadvertebas igitur, etsi tum nemo erat admodum copiosus, verum tamen versus ab is admisceri orationi. Ac ac hac G dyonisio X multos quidem a Dionysio Stoico. Probe dicis. sed is quasi dictata, nullo dilectu, nulla elegantia: delectu K nulla elegantia a e in r. V c eligantia KR c Philo et †proprium nrt sic G et proprium nr t V ( exp. 1 ) et proprium noster R etpũ nr K ( add. 1 au 2, propriŭ ss. 2 ) et proprio numero Sey. et pro nuntiabat numero ( cf. div. 2, 117 ) Po. et lecta poëmata et loco adiungebat. itaque postquam adamavi hanc quasi senilem declamationem, studiose equidem utor nostris poëtis; sed sicubi illi defecerunt—verti enim enim exp. V vet etlam Ha. multa de Graecis, ne quo ornamento in hoc genere disputationis careret Latina oratio. Sed videsne, poëtae quid mali adferant? 2.28. virtutis magistri, philosophi, inventi sunt, qui summum malum dolorem dicerent. at ad in at corr. V 1 tu, adulescens, cum id tibi paulo ante dixisses videri, rogatus a me, etiamne maius quam dedecus, verbo de sententia destitisti. roga rogo X roga V 1 aut 2 cf. ac. fr. 20 hoc idem idem ex quidem R 1? Epicurum: maius dicet esse malum mediocrem dolorem quam maxumum quamaxumum X dedecus; in ipso enim dedecore mali nihil esse, nisi sequantur dolores. quis igitur Epicurum sequitur dolor, cum hoc ipsum dicit, summum malum esse dolorem? quo quo G 1 dedecus maius a philosopho nullum expecto. quare satis mihi dedisti, cum respondisti maius tibi videri malum dedecus quam dolorem. hoc ipsum enim si tenebis, intelleges quam sit obsistendum dolori; nec tam quaerendum est, dolor dolori ... est do scr. V c partim in r. partim in mg. (n&tā) malumne sit, quam firmandus animus ad dolorem ferendum. Concludunt ratiunculas Stoici, cur non sit malum; 2.29. quasi de verbo, non de re laboretur. quid me decipis, decepis GRV 1 (corr. 1 ) Zeno? nam cum nam cum bis V id, quod mihi horribile videtur, tu omnino malum negas esse, capior et scire cupio, quo modo id, quod ego miserrimum existimem, ne malum quidem sit. nihil est inquit inquld G 1 (corr. 1 ) K malum nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum viciosum ex vit- V 1 est. sqq. St. fr. 1, 185 ad ineptias redis; redis V illud enim, quod me angebat, non eximis. scio dolorem non esse nequitiam; desine id me docere: hoc hi c K doce, doleam necne doleam, nihil interesse. necne ... 2 interesse in r. G 1 numquam quicquam inquit ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in una virtute positum; sed est tamen reiciendum. cur? asperum est, contra naturam, difficile perpessu, perpe sso K (-u in r. G 1 ) triste, durum. 2.30. haec est copia verborum, quod omnes uno verbo malum appellamus, id tot modis posse dicere. definis tu mihi, non tollis dolorem, cum dicis asperum, contra naturam, vix quod ferri tolerarique tollerarique G( ) RV possit; nec mentiris; sed re succumbere non oportebat verbis gloriantem. dum du in r. V rec del. Lb. nihil bonum nisi quod honestum, nihil malum si quod ... malum add. V c nisi quod turpe— optare hoc quidem est, non docere; docere oce in r. V 1 illud et melius et verius, omnia quae natura aspernetur aspernetur V 2 aspernatur X in malis esse, quae adsciscat, in bonis. hoc posito et verborum concertatione concertatione V (m eras. ) sublata tantum tamen excellet illud quod recte rite H amplexantur isti, quod honestum, quod rectum, quod decorum appellamus, quod idem interdum virtutis nomine amplectimur, ut omnia praeterea, quae bona corporis et fortunae fortunae V c furtunae X putantur, perexigua et minuta videantur, nihil melius aut verius dici queunt quam omnia quae... 20 videantur H igitur ne malum quidem quidem V (l litt. er.) ullum, illum G 1 nec si in unum locum add. Se. (nec malum ullum, ne si in unum quidem locum Ba. ) conlata omnia sint, cum turpitudinis malo comparanda. 2.31. quare si, ut sin t s sunt si ut ex sicut G 1 K 2 ut si V (trp. m. rec.) initio concessisti, turpitudo peius est quam dolor, nihil est plane dolor. nihil...24 dolor add. G 1 nam dum tibi turpe nec dignum viro videbitur gemere, eiulare, ad eiul. add. R c (sed iterum eras.) K 2 lamentari, lamentare GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R c V rec ) frangi, debilitari dolore, dolere GKR ( ex delere) dum dum (ter) B tum X honestas, dum dignitas, dum decus aderit, tuque in ea intuens intueris X intuens V 1 e corr. R 2 (intuens te R rec ) te continebis, cedet profecto virtuti dolor et animi inductione languescet. Aut enim nulla virtus est aut contemnendus omnis dolor. dolor est H prudentiamne vis esse, sine qua ne ne om. H neç K intellegi quidem ulla virtus potest? quid ergo? ea patieturne te quicquam facere nihil proficientem et frustra add.Lb.cf.p.351,3;356,17 laborantem? an temperantia sinet sinet V (t in r. et V c ) te inmoderate inmo date V 1 imm. KRH facere quicquam? an coli iustitia poterit ab homine propter vim doloris enuntiante commissa, prodente conscios, multa officia relinquente? relinquentem K 1 R 1 V 1 H relinquente˜ (sign. interr.) G quid? fortitudini comitibusque eius, magnitudini magnitudini G animi, gravitati, gravitate X corr. K 2 R c V 1 patientiae, rerum humanarum despicientiae, quo modo respondebis? 2.40. ille vero melius, ac non paulo quidem. Sed adhuc de consuetudine exercitationis loquor, nondum de ratione exercitationis... 25 ratione in mg. add. G 1 et sapientia. aniculae saepe inediam biduum aut triduum tridium G ferunt; subduc cibum unum diem athletae: Iovem, athletae iov. hletae i in r. G 1 Iovem alt. iovem exp. R 1? V vet om. K 1 add. 2 Olympium, olimpium V (iu in r. c ) eum ipsum, cui se exercebit, exercebit V 1 inplorabit, impl. RK 2 ferre ferre ex facere(?) K 2 se post ferre add. V 1 aut c ft. recte (cf. p. 346, 7) non posse clamabit. consuetudinis magna vis est: pernoctant venatores in nive in montibus; uri se patiuntur patiuntur. Inde W corr. Dav. cf. p. 439,25 (locum fort. ante l. II scriptum. Comm. p. 26) pernoctant venatores in nive, in montibus uri se patiuntur. inde ( del. hoc Lb. vide Sey. ) pugiles eqs. alii (Se. Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 246) Indi; pugiles caestibus contusi ne ingemescunt ingemescunt alt. e in i corr. G 1 quidem. 2.41. sed quid hos, quibus quibus add. G 1 Olympiorum victoria consulatus consolatus X ( ss. R rec ) ille antiquus videtur? gladiatores, aut perditi homines aut barbari, quas plagas perferunt! quo modo illi, qui bene instituti sunt, accipere plagam plaga G malunt quam turpiter vitare! quam saepe apparet nihil eos malle quam vel domino satis facere vel populo! mittunt etiam volneribus confecti ad dominos, qui quaerant quid velint: si satis is factum sit, se velle decumbere. decŏmbere R 1 quis mediocris gladiator gradiator X ( corr. RK 1? K 2 V rec ) ingemuit, quis vultum mutavit umquam? quis non modo stetit, verum etiam decubuit turpiter? quis, cum decubuisset, decubisset R 1 ferrum recipere iussus collum contraxit? tantum exercitatio meditatio consuetudo valet. ergo hoc poterit poterit V Samnis, spurcus homo, vita illa dignus locoque Lucil. 150 ; vir natus ad gloriam ullam partem animi tam mollem habebit, quam non meditatione et ratione conroboret? crudele gladiatorum spectaculum et inhumanum non nullis videri solet, et haud haud V (ha in r. et d ex c 1 autc ) adhuc (adhoc K)X scio an ita sit, ut nunc fit; cum vero sontes ferro depugnabant, auribus fortasse multae, oculis quidem nulla poterat porter it G 1 esse fortior contra dolorem et mortem disciplina. 2.44. venit Epicurus, homo minime minime mini in r. V c malus vel potius vir optimus; tantum monet, monet et G quantum intellegit. venit... 8 intellegit Char. GL. 120, 19 Epic. fr. 446 neglege negglege G (corr. 2 ) inquit inquid G 1 (10 V 1 ) dolorem. quis hoc dicit? idem, qui dolorem summum malum? vix vix V satis constanter. constanter V audiamus. si summus dolor est inquit, inquid G 1 (10 V 1 ) brevem necesse est esse. nec. est brevem e. KR iteradum iteradum ac. 2,88. iterandum X (-d um R c ) eadem ista mihi! Iteradum ... 12 mihi Pacuv. Iliona 202 non enim satis intellego, quid quod V 1 summum dicas esse, quid breve. brevi GR 1 V summum, si ante summum add. V 2 quo nihil sit superius, breve, quo quod G 1 nihil brevius. contemno magnitudinem doloris, a qua me brevitas temporis vindicabit ante paene quam venerit. sed si est tantus dolor, quantus Philoctetae? bene plane magnus mihi quidem videtur, sed tamen non summus; summis G 1 nihil enim dolet nisi pes: possunt oculi, potest caput latera pulmones, possunt omnia; longe igitur abest a summo dolore. ergo inquit inquid G 1 (10 V 1 ) dolor diuturnus habet laetitiae plus quam molestiae. 2.45. nunc ego ego ex ergo V non possum tantum hominem nihil sapere dicere, sed nos ab eo derideri puto. ego summum dolorem—summum autem dico, etiamsi decem atomis est maior alius—non continuo esse dico brevem multosque possum bonos viros nominare, qui complures cumplures GV annos doloribus podagrae crucientur maximis. sed homo catus numquam terminat nec magnitudinis nec diuturnitatis modum, sed ... 2 modum Non. 92,20 propter catus (castus LC A D A ) catus s Non. cautus cf. Progr. 21 1 ut sciam, sciat G 1 quid summum dicat in dolore, quid breve brevem X m del. R 1 e 2 K 2 in tempore. omittamus hunc igitur nihil prorsus dicentem cogamusque confiteri non esse ab eo doloris remedia quaerenda, qui que om. G 1 dolorem malorum omnium maxumum dixerit, maxsumum duxerit G 1 quamvis idem forticulum se in torminibus et in stranguria sua praebeat. quamvis ... 8 praebeat Non. 32, 12 Epic. fr. 122 Aliunde igitur est quaerenda medicina, et maxime quidem, si, quid maxime consentaneum sit, quaerimus, ab is quibus, quod honestum sit, sit est Hei. summum bonum, quod turpe, summum videtur malum. his tu praesentibus gemere et iactare te non audebis profecto; 2.46. loquetur enim eorum voce Virtus ipsa tecum: tune, cum pueros Lacedaemone, lacedemone KV (-nę) adulescentis adulescentes V 2 Olympiae, olymphiae GKR barbaros in harena harena h exp. K 2 videris excipientis excipient es R 1 gravissimas plagas et ferentis silentio, si te forte dolor dolor add. V c aliquis pervellerit, exclamabis ut mulier, non constanter non c. nec c. Char. et sedate et sedate sed ate G 1 feres? ubi Virtus loqui desinat, C. non significat cf. ac.2, 93 al. exclamabis... 18 feres Char. GL. 1220, 17 fieri non potest; natura non patitur. audio. pueri ferunt gloria supra gloria scr. y ol et in mg. y graeculi fer . barbari fer . V c ducti, ferunt pudore alii, multi metu, et tamen veremur, ut hoc, quod a tam multis atatam multis X ( corr. K 2 RV 2 ) et quod tot locis perferatur, natura patiatur? illa vero non modo patitur, verum etiam postulat: nihil enim habet praestantius, nihil quod magis expetat expe tat V quam honestatem, honestatem quam decus. his ergo Char. quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. hisce ego pluribus nihil enim habet natura pr.... 305, 1 pluribus Char. GL. I 223, 31 nominibus unam rem declarari volo, sed utor, utor s (P sec. Doug. ) utar X (r in r. G ita V rec ) Char. ut quam maxime significem, pluribus. volo autem dicere illud homini homine X corr V 1 longe optumum esse, quod ipsum sit optandum per se, a virtute profectum pfectum G 1 vel in ipsa virtute situm, sua sponte laudabile, volo... 6 laudabile Char. GL. I 204,,10 quod idem citius dixerim solum quam non summum bonum. atque ut haec de honesto, sic de turpi contraria: nihil tam taetrum, tetrum GK nihil tam asperdum, nil tam asp. GH ( etiam nil hom.) R 1 e corr. nihil homine indignius. nihil enim ... 305, 9 indignius H 2.55. remissione remissio G 1 autem sic urgetur, ut se nequeat extollere. et si verum quaerimus, in omnibus officiis persequendis persequentis X animi est adhibenda contentio; ea est sola officii tamquam custodia. sed hoc idem in dolore maxume maximi G 1 est providendum, ne quid abiecte, ne ve ne G quid timide, ne quid ignave, ne quid serviliter muliebriterve faciamus, providendum est ne ... 13 faciamus Char. GL. 1203, 7 in primisque refutetur ac reiciatur Philocteteus ille clamor. Ingemescere ingemisc. K 1 R c non numquam viro concessum est, idque raro, eiulatus eiulatus K 1 (eiu in r. ) ne mulieri quidem; et hic nimirum est lessus lessus Mur. cf. leg. 2,59.64 fletus W l pessus in mg. V c cf. Progr. p.30 , quem duodecim tabulae in funeribus adhiberi vetuerunt. tabulae, V 2.56. nec vero umquam ne ne nec X corr. V vet ingemescit ingemisc. K 1 R c quidem vir fortis ac sapiens, nisi forte ut se intendat ad firmitatem, ut in stadio cursores exclamant quam maxime possunt. faciunt idem, cum exercentur, athletae; in stadio ... 21 athletae Char. GL. 216, 19 atlętae RV atlete K 1 adlaetae G pugiles vero, etiam cum feriunt ferunt K 1 adversarium, in iactandis caestibus ingemescunt, ingemisc. K 1 R c -scent -scunt K 2 R c V 2 non quod doleant animove succumbant, sed quia profundenda profunda G 1 voce omne cum ante omne V 2 corpus intenditur venitque plaga vehementior. quid? qui volunt exclamare maius, num satis habent latera fauces linguam intendere, e quibus elici elici cf. Pl. ad nat. deor. 2, 151 vocem et fundi videmus? toto Otto, Sprichw. 1828 corpore atque omnibus ungulis, ut dicitur, contentioni vocis adserviunt. 2.57. genu mehercule M. Antonium vidi, cum contente contente (n in r. ) K contempte pro se ipse lege le G 2 Varia diceret, terram tangere. ut enim ballistae balistae GK 2(1?) R 2(1?) lapidum et reliqua tormenta telorum eo graviores emissiones habent, quo sunt contenta atque adducta vehementius, sic vox, sic cursus, sic plaga hoc gravior, quo quo ( ante est) s cum X est missa contentius. cuius contentionis cum tanta vis sit, si gemitus in dolore ad confirmandum animum valebit, utemur; sin erit ille gemitus elamentabilis, si inbecillus, imb. R imbecill is K 1 si abiectus, si flebilis, ei qui se dederit, vix eum virum dixerim. qui quae q. X corr. K 1(?) R c V 2 quidem gemitus si levationis aliquid adferret, adferrent KR adferent G tamen videremus, quid esset fortis et animosi viri; cum vero nihil imminuat doloris, cur frustra turpes turpe X corr. K 2 V c esse volumus? quid est enim fletu muliebri viro turpius? 2.60. Dices: quid in pace, quid domi, quid in lectulo? ad philosophos me revocas, qui in aciem non saepe prodeunt. e quibus homo sane levis, Heracleotes Dionysius, St. fr. 1,432 dionisius X cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore dol ere R 1 dedoctus deductus X corr. Bentl. est. nam cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in eiulatu hei.K 2 clamitabat falsa esse illa, quae antea de dolore ipse sensisset. quem cum tum X tum R 1? Cleanthes cleantes X 1 condiscipulus rogaret, quaenam ratio eum de sententia deduxisset, respondit: quia, si, cum quicum X quia cum s si add. Mdv. ad fin. 5, 94 ( post dedissem Se. ) tantulum operae tanto opere X (operam V rec ) tantum operae s tantulum operae Po. philosophiae dedissem, dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis esset argumenti malum esse dolorem. plurimos autem annos in philosophia consumpsi nec ferre ferre non possum V possum. malum est igitur dolor. dolor or in r. V c tum tunc Cleanthem, cleantem clehantem G cum pede terram percussisset, versum ex Epigonis Tr. gr. fr. adesp. 3 epigoneis X ferunt dixisse: audi/sne haec, Amphiara/e amphiare X sub terram a/bdite? Zenonem significabat, a quo quo V illum degenerare dolebat. 2.61. at non noster Posidonius; possidon. X quem et ipse saepe vidi et id dicam, quod solebat narrare Pompeius, se, cum secum X (ipse cum R c ) Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, ex yria K audire voluisse Posidonium; possidon. X sed cum audisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum philosoph um R visere: quem ut vidisset et et add. V c salutavisset honorificisque verbis prosecutus esset molesteque se dixisset dixs. G ferre, quod eum non posset audire, at ille: tu vero inquit potes, nec committam, necomitam G ( ss. 2 ) KR (nec om. K 2 R) ne commitam V neccommittam s ut dolor corporis efficiat, ut frustra tantus vir ad me venerit. itaque narrabat eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse nihil esse nihile G 1 bonum nisi quod esset honestum, cubantem disputavisse, cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, admoverentur -rentur in r. V c saepe dixisse: dixs. G 2.66. sed cum videas eos, qui aut studio aut opinione ducantur, eos qui... ducantur quo quisque ( in ras. ) ... ducatur V 2 male in eo persequendo atque adipiscendo dolore non frangi, debes debes V vet s ( cf. Plane. 77 Lael. 6 al. ) debeas X ( quod vix defenditur locis quales sunt nat. deor. 1, 43; natum videtur esse ex videas 17) existimare aut non esse malum dolorem aut, etiamsi, etiam si c G(. 2 quicquid asperum alienumque natura natura V 1 s fort. recte cf. p. 448, 18 sit, id appellari placeat malum, tantulum tamen esse, ut a virtute ita obruatur, ut nusquam ut nusquam V u nusquam G appareat. quae meditare quaeso dies et noctes. latius enim manabit haec ratio et aliquanto maiorem locum quam de uno dolore occupabit. nam si omnia fugiendae turpitudinis adipiscendaeque honestatis causa faciemus, non modo stimulos doloris, sed etiam fulmina flumina K 1 fortunae contemnamus omnia ... 315,1 contemnamus ( sine 314, 11 Graeci... 314,15 morbo et 314, 22 quae . .. 314, 25 occupabit) H contempn mus V ( ss. rec ) licebit, praesertim cum paratum sit illud ex hesterna disputatione perfugium. 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 3.13. sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini; nos autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnis radicum fibras fybras X evellere. tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse; ita sunt altae alta GKV ( corr. 2? ) H stirpes stultitiae; sed relinquetur id solum quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, quod sine philosophia fieri non potest, finem miseriarum nullum fore. sed... 15 fore quam ob rem, quoniam coepimus, tradamus nos ei curandos: sanabimur, si volemus. et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de aegritudine solum, quamquam id quidem quidem in mg. add. R c primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Graeci volunt, explicabo. et primo, si placet, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur. 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.32. Sed est, isdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus. qui censet Epic. fr. 444 necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint. nam neque vetustate minui mala nec fieri praemeditata leviora, stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset; cum venisset ex conv. K 2 qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum; si vero ne futurum quidem sit, sit ex si V c frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam; voluntariam add. GR 1 in fine pag. ita semper angi aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. 3.34. Principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. nihil est enim quod tam optundat optundat V (at in r. ) R c optundet GR 1 obtundet HK 1 (-at 2 ) elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse quod non accidere possit, quam meditatio condicionis conditionis X humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitae varietatem, qui inbecillitatem imb. KR c H generis humani cogitat, maeret, cum haec cogitat, sed tum vel vel om. H maxime sapientiae fungitur munere: utrumque enim consequitur, ut et considerandis rebus humanis proprio ad proprio in mg. adscr. non V rec philosophiae fruatur fruatur fungatur Man. ( sed phil. off. est 'id quod homini praestare potest ac debet philo- sophia' ) officio et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur, sanentur X corr. K 2 R 2 V 2 primum quod nihil ei accidit nisi quod posse accidere diu cogitaverit, suppl. Po. cogitavit pro -erit Dav. quae cogitatio una maxime molestias omnis extenuat et diluit, deinde quod humana humane humana humane humane KV 1 (hu- mana add. 2 ) H humana G human e R ( del. c ) cf. Ps. Plut. cons. ad Ap. 118 c fe/rein ta\ a)nqrw/pina a)nqrwpi/nws ferenda intellegit, postremo quod videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam, culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit praestari, praestari vel praecaveri R vet sed cf. ( etiam ad ea quae hic antecedunt ) epist. 6,1, 4 ( et 9,16,5 ) evenerit. nihil ... 336,2 evenerit H 3.37. prudentiae vero quid quod R 1 respondebis docenti virtutem sese esse contentam, quo modo ad bene vivendum, sic etiam ad beate? quae si extrinsecus religata pendeat et non et oriatur et ante oriatur om. KR a se et rursus ad se revertatur et omnia sua complexa nihil quaerat aliunde, non intellego, cur aut verbis tam vehementer orda aut re tantopere expetenda videatur —ad haec bona me me V ( eras. si) si revocas, Epicure, pareo, sequor, utor te ipso duce, obliviscor etiam malorum, ut iubes, eoque facilius, quod ea ne in malis quidem ponenda censeo. sed traducis cogitationes meas ad voluptates. quas? corporis, credo, aut quae propter corpus vel recordatione vel spe cogitentur. num quid est aliud? rectene interpretor interprecor K 1 V sententiam tuam? solent enim isti negare nos intellegere, quid dicat Epicurus. 3.41. Quid tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem, quam tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necne? in eo quidem libro, qui continet Epic. p. te/lous fr. 67 p. 119, 16 omnem disciplinam tuam,—fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere—dicis haec: nec equidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneriis, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur venereis detrahens add. in mg. V c om. rell. cf. praef. et locos ab Usenero ad fr. 67 congestos eas quae auditu e e Sor. et ( cf. 23 ex formis) cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis detrahens eas supra oculis add. K 2 suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet quelibet V 1 quodlibet K 1 sensu. nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore forte G 1 K 1 ut natura is natura is naturalis X natura iis s potiens dolore careat. 3.42. atque haec quidem his verbis, quivis ut intellegat, quam voluptatem norit Epicurus. deinde paulo infra: saepe quaesivi inquit Epic. ib. fr. 69 ex is qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis quid in boni GV (quod V 2 ) R 1 (in exp. 1 ) quidboni K 1 quid in bonis K 2 B quod in bono Gr. relinquerent, si illa detraxissent, nisi si vellent voces iis fundere: nihil ab is potui cognoscere. qui si virtutes ebullire volent et sapientias, sapientiam V 2 nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam, vi am K viam V ( exp. 2 ) vim quae fiant ureae vol. Non. quae G qua efficiantur eae eae haec K voluptates quas supra dixi. qui si ... 7 dixi Non. 26, 19 quae secuntur, sequuntur GR in eadem sententia sunt, totusque liber, qui est alt. est om. X add. V 2 de summo bono, refertus est et verbis et sententiis talibus. 3.47. 'at at ad V idem ait non crescere voluptatem dolore fr. 419 detracto, detractos G 1 V 1 esse V c s om. X summamque esse voluptatem nihil dolere. dolore V 1 ' paucis verbis tria magna peccata: unum, quod secum ipse pugnat. modo enim ne suspicari quidem se quicquam bonum, nisi sensus quasi titillarentur titilarentur R 1 VG 2 ( ex titul.) voluptate; nunc autem summam voluptatem esse dolore carere: potestne magis secum ipse pugnare? alterum peccatum, quod, cum in natura tria sint, sunt G 1 unum gaudere, alterum dolere, tertium nec gaudere prius gaudere om. K 1 nec dolere, hic primum et tertium putat idem esse nec distinguit a non dolendo voluptatem. tertium peccatum commune cum quibusdam, quod, cum virtus maxime expetatur maxime expetatur in r. V c eiusque adipiscendae causa philosophia quaesita sit, ille a a om. G 1 virtute summum bonum separavit. 3.49. negat Epicurus sqq. Epic. fr. 506. 584. 459 iucunde posse vivi, nisi cum virtute vivatur, negat ullam in sapientem vim esse fortunae, tenuem victum antefert copioso, negat ullum esse tempus, quo sapiens non beatus sit. omnia philosopho digna, sed cum voluptate pugtia. non istam dicit voluptatem . dicat quamlibet; nempe eam dicit, in qua virtutis nulla pars insit. age, si voluptatem non intellegimus, ne dolorem quidem? nego igitur eius eius om. R 1 esse, qui quid X d del. in RV dolore dolorem X corr. s autem illi summum malum metiatur, mentionem facere virtutis. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 4.8. Non mihi videtur omni omnia X corr. K 2 R 1 V() animi perturbatione posse sapiens vacare. Aegritudine aegritudine V quidem hesterna disputatione videbatur, nisi forte temporis causa nobis nobis s novis Gr. novi X (nōvi V rec ) adsentiebare. absenti abare G ( et 2) asentiabare R 1 ( ass. 2? ) asentiabaere V 1 assentiebare KV rec Minime vero; nam mihi egregie aegregiae X (agr- V 1 -ie G) probata est oratio tua. Non igitur existumas cadere in sapientem aegritudinem? Prorsus non arbitror. Atqui, si ista perturbare animum sapientis non potest, nulla poterit. quid enim? metusne conturbet? at at s et X earum rerum est absentium metus, quarum praesentium est aegritudo; sublata et sublatus KR igitur aegritudine sublatus est metus. restant duae perturbationes, laetitia gestiens et libido; quae si non cadent in sapientem, semper semper K c ex sip mens erit tranquilla sapientis. 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 4.54. Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? colligunt G 1 ( corr. 1 ) KcV rec ( ex colig.) remove perturbationes maxumeque maxumequae G 1 RV 1 videbantur K iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra mostra R 1 nostra G dicere. nunc autem ita ita add. K c disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. St. fr. 3, 665 cf. Aug. soliloq. 1, 11, 19 at non semper. commove: senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? est igitur aliquid quod quod add. V 1 perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus moribus V c s morbus GR 1 V 1 morbis KR e corr. vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos solus V 1 morosos nominaverunt. 4.58. Sed quoniam suspicor te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso quaerere—illum enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum, te vis—, videamus, quanta sint sint V 3 s sit X quae a a B 2 M 2 s om. X philosophia remedia morbis animorum adhibeantur. est enim quaedam medicina certe, nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa atque inimica natura, ut corporibus tot res salutaris, animis nullam nulla GKR nullas V sed s fort. postea additum nullam s invenerit; de quibus hoc etiam est est om. R 1 merita melius, quod corporum adiumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in is ipsis est. sed quo maior est in eis praestantia et divinior, eo maiore indigent indigent s indiget X diligentia. itaque bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid quod K 1 optumum sit, neglecta neclecta hic X multis implicatur implicabitur K ( def. Ro b b. p. 100 ft. recte ) erroribus. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.70. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad at G 1 magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem quimorem quā orem K 1 -i amorem in r. G 2 negant stupri esse St. fr. 3, 653 Epic. 483 et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. quis est enim iste ista K 1 amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. bene ergo Ennius: Ennius sc. 395 Fla/giti flagitii X cives G(?)R rec princi/pium est nudare i/nter civis co/rpora. qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coërcent. 5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus: 5.14. cum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum ad rem veritatemque traduxeris, hoc nudum relinquitur, possitne quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur. quam ob rem hoc nunc quaeramus; virtutes autem noli vereri verereri X ne ne nec K expostulent et querantur quaerantur GVK c se a a add. G 2 beata vita esse relictas. si enim nulla virtus prudentia vacat, prudentia ipsa hoc videt, non omnis bonos esse etiam beatos, multaque de M. Atilio dematilio (ti in r. scr. et supra m add. V c io ex corr. G 2 ) Q. Caepione M'. Aquilio quinto caepionem (coep. K) aquilo (caepionemaquilo R) X aquilio e corr. V 1 aut c M'. Aquilio Fabric. recordatur, beatamque vitam, si imaginibus potius uti quam rebus ipsis placet, cotem ire in eculeum retinet ipsa prudentia ipsa prudentia del. Ern. (Dav. 1 ) negatque ei cum dolore et cruciatu quicquam esse commune. 5.15. Facile patior te isto ito G 1 modo agere, agere V c s egere GRV 1 aegere K etsi iniquum est praescribere pscribere V mihi te, quem ad modum a me disputari velis. sed quaero, utrum aliquid actum superioribus diebus an nihil arbitremur. Actum vero, et aliquantum quidem. Atqui, si ita est, profligata iam haec et paene ad exitum adducta deducta Non. quaestio questio GKV est. profligata... 10 est Non. 160, 28 Quo tandem modo? Quia motus turbulenti iactationesque animorum incitatae et impetu impetu V 1 inconsiderato elatae aelatae G ( exp. 2 ) aelate KRV rationem omnem omnem add. G 2 repellentes vitae beatae nullam partem relinquunt. quis enim potest mortem aut dolorem metuens, quorum alterum saepe adest, alterum semper impendet, esse non miser? quid, si idem, quod quod si K plerumque fit, paupertatem ignominiam infamiam infamia X ( om. G 1 add. 2 ) corr. V c timet, si si ex sed R 1 debilitatem caecitatem, si denique, quod non singulis non modo sing. V 2 Non. hominibus, sed potentibus potentissimis Non. contingit G 1 Non. B A D A populis saepe contigit, quod... 20 contigit Non. 268, 10 servitutem? 5.17. et si haec virtute efficiuntur, quid est cur virtus ipsa per se non efficiat beatos? beatus R 1 Atqui alterum dici non non add. G 1 potest, quin i, qui nihil metuant, nihil angantur, agantur KV 1 agant Non. nihil concupiscant, nulla impotenti laetitia ecferantur, qui nihil metuant ... 18 nulla inpotentia ecferantur Non. 129, 7 ecferantur V 2 s Non. ecferant X (hęc ferant K c ) beati sint, itaque id tibi concedo; alterum autem iam integrum non est. superioribus enim disputationibus effectum est vacare vacare V 2 s vacari X omni animi perturbatione perturbatione V sapientem. Nimirum igitur confecta res est; 5.26. An malumus Epicurum imitari? qui multa praeclare Epic. p. 89, 7 saepe dicit; quam enim sibi constanter convenienterque dicat, non laborat. laborant G 1 laudat tenuem lauda tenuem GRV ( corr. V c ) laudetenu ae K Ep. fr. 459 victum. philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates aut aut ex ant R ant tisthenes K 1 ( corr. c ) Antisthenes diceret, non is is his K qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse esse add. G 2 dixerit. negat quemquam iucunde i ocunde V 1 posse vivere, nisi idem honeste Epic. s. s. V sapienter iusteque que om. K vivat. nihil gravius, nihil philosophia philosophiae K dignius, nisi idem hoc ipsum honeste sapienter iuste ad voluptatem referret. Quid quid V 2 qui X melius quam: fortunam exiguam exiguam -guā in r. K c intervenire sapienti? sed hoc isne Epic. s. s.XVI isne V 2 hisne X dicit, qui, cum dolorem non modo modum V 1 maxumum malum, sed solum malum etiam dixerit, toto ut ante toto add. V 2 corpore opprimi possit doloribus doloribus bus in r. V 2 Epic. fr. 122 acerrumis tum, cum maxime contra fortunam glorietur? quod idem melioribus etiam verbis Metrodorus: 5.27. occupavi quod... 2 occupavit ( sic ) Non. 355, 5 te occupa vite K 1 inquit, Fortuna, Metr. fr. 49 atque cepi coepi GRV cé K c (cepi 1 ) omnisque que add. G 2 asp.G aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me adspirare non posses. praeclare, si Aristo Chius aristocchius KR aristho chius G aut si Stoicus sthoicus G stholchus K 1 Zenon zeno V 2 sed cf. nat. deor. 1, 70 diceret, qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret; tu vero, Metrodore, qui omne bonum in visceribus medullisque condideris et definieris summum bonum firma corporis corpori X corr. V 2 add. Lb. ( cf. off. 3,117 ) adfectione explorataque eius exspoliari potes V 2 expoliare potest X spe contineri, Fortunae aditus interclusisti? quo modo? isto enim bono iam exspoliari potes. Atqui his capiuntur imperiti, et propter huius huius eius V c? modi sententias istorum hominum est multitudo; 5.31. nunc nunc We. nec hunc et haec loqui, quae sunt magni cuiusdam et alti viri, et eadem, quae vulgus, in malis et bonis numerare concedi nullo modo potest. qua gloria commotus Epicurus exoritur; cui etiam, si dis diis V 2 placet, videtur semper semper add. G 2 sapiens beatus. hic dignitate huius sententiae capitur, sed numquam id diceret, si ipse se se om. G se audiret scr. V c in r. et in mg. audiret. quid est enim quod minus conveniat, quam ut is, qui vel summum vel solum malum dolorem esse dicat, idem idem V c (m in r. ) s id est GKR censeat quam hoc suave est! tum, cum dolore crucietur, dicturum esse sapientem? non igitur ex singulis vocibus philosophi spectandi expectandi G 1 Non. L sunt, non...419, 1 spectandi sunt Non. 402, 22 sed ex perpetuitate atque constantia. non...419, 2 constantia H 5.33. Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant: nos in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, itaque soli sumus liberi. verum tamen, quoniam de constantia paulo ante diximus, non ego hoc loco id quaerendum puto, verumne sit, verumne scit K 1 verume sit G 1 quod Zenoni placuerit quodque eius auditori audituri G Aristoni, bonum esse solum, quod honestum esset, sed si ita esset, tum tum exp. V rec (C?) fueritne consentaneum, ut totum add. Po. sed, ni ita esset, num consentaneum esset, tum ut Se. ( sed agitur de Zenonis doctrina cf .v. 29 sqq. ), alia alii ( ad tum cf. parad. 29 fin. 4,33 al. ) hoc beate vivere in una virtute poneret. 5.34. quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse ipsa X corr. V 2 viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus. Et si Zeno Citieus, ticieus R cici eus K 1 advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se se om. Non. in antiquam philosophiam videtur, advena... 3 videtur Non. 457, 25 huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum. velut velud KR in Gorgia Gorg. 470 d Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum arcelaum hic X (arcael.G) Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret, haud scio inquit; 5.35. 'numquam enim cum eo conlocutus sum.—ain tu? an aliter an tu an aliter X sed prius an in ain corr. V 2 an tu aliter s ( ti/ de/; suggeno/menos a)\n gnoi/hs, a)/llws de\ an)to/qen on) gignw/sxeis xtl .;) cf. Att. 4,5,1. ain tu? aliter Or. id id om. G scire non potes?—nullo modo.—tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege rege nego V 1 magno potes dicere, beatusne sit? beatus nescit K 1 —an ego possim, cum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—ita prorsus existimo, bonos beatos, improbos miseros.—miser ergo Archelaus?—certe, si iniustus.' 5.37. quae, quicquid genuit, non modo animal, sed etiam quod ita ortum esset e terra, ut stirpibus suis niteretur, in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit. itaque et arbores et vites et ea, quae sunt humiliora neque se tollere a terra altius possunt, alia semper virent, alia hieme nudata verno tempore tepefacta frondescunt, neque est ullum quod non ita vigeat vigeant X interiore quodam motu et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat aut bacas, ut... bacas Non.312,41 (fundant) omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis sit, nulla vi vi K vim GRV impediente perfecta sint. 5.42. qui autem illam illa maxume optatam et expetitam expetitam Man. expeditam securitatem— securitatem autem nunc appello apello RV vacuitatem aegritudinis, in qua vita in qua vita inquinata K beata posita est—habere quisquam potest, cui aut adsit aut adesse adsit ut ad.V 1 possit multitudo malorum? qui autem poterit esse celsus et erectus et ea, quae homini accidere possunt, omnia parva ducens, qualem sapientem esse volumus, nisi omnia sibi in se posita censebit? an Lacedaemonii Philippo philosopho V 1 minitante minitante Bentl. militanti X minitanti s V rec ( per anacoluthon def.Wo. ) per litteras se omnia quae conarentur prohibiturum quaesiverunt, quesierunt V num se esset etiam mori prohibiturus: vir is, quem quaerimus, queris K 1 non multo facilius tali animo reperietur repperietur GR 1 V quam civitas universa? quid? ad hanc fortitudinem, de qua loquimur, loquimur s V 3 loquitur X temperantia adiuncta, quae sit moderatrix omnium commotionum, post commotionum add. addi potest V 3 quid potest ad beate vivendum deesse ei, quem fortitudo ab aegritudine et a metu vindicet, temperantia cum cum Lb. tum a libidine avocet, tum insolenti alacritate gestire non sinat? haec efficere virtutem ostenderem, nisi superioribus diebus essent explicata. 5.48. Etenim, pro deorum atque hominum fidem! fidem s fide X parumne cognitum est superioribus nostris disputationibus, an delectationis delectacionis K dilectationis GR dilectationibus V et otii consumendi causa locuti sumus, sapientem ab omni concitatione animi, quam perturbationem voco, semper vacare, semper in animo eius esse placidissimam pacem? vir igitur temperatus, constans, sine metu, sine aegritudine, sine alacritate futtili, futili Bentl. ( cf. 379, 18 ) ulla W et Non. 457, 4 : Alacritatem in malis habendam Cicero Tusculanarum lib.V ostendit: vir igitur... sine alacritate ulla, lubidine non vexatus sine libidine nonne beatus? at a t V aut GKR semper sapiens talis; semper igitur beatus. Iam St. fr. 3,59 vero qui potest vir bonus non ad id, quod laudabile sit, omnia referre, quae agit quaeque sentit? refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum; beata igitur vita laudabilis; nec quicquam nequicquam GV sine virtute laudabile: beata igitur vita virtute conficitur. 5.54. Etenim ut stultitia, etsi adepta est quod concupivit, numquam se tamen satis consecutam putat, consecuta GRV 1 putet V 1 sic sapientia semper eo contenta contenda K 1 conta G contempta H est quod adest, neque eam umquam sui paenitet. at nos autem...14 penitet H Similemne similene X similemen s putas C. Laelii unum consulatum consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V fuisse, fuisse s V rec fuisset X et eum quidem cum repulsa (si, si sic V rec cum sapiens et bonus vir, qualis ille fuit, suffragiis praeteritur, non populus a bono consule potius quam ille a bono populo del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv del.Mue. a vano populo s a populo ( sine bono) Mdv repulsam fert post fert iterat suffragiis praeteritur X )—sed tamen utrum malles te, ma este G ( ss. 2 ) si potestas esset, semel ut Laelium consulem an ut Cinnam quater? 5.55. non dubito, tu quid responsurus sis; itaque video, cui committam. non quemvis hoc idem interrogarem; responderet enim alius fortasse se non modo quattuor consulatus consolat.GR ( in 24 corr. c ) V uni anteponere, sed unum diem Cinnae multorum et clarorum virorum totis aetatibus. Laelius si digito quem attigisset, poenas dedisset; at Cinna collegae sui consulis Cn. Octavii GN.X praecidi caput praeciditapud K iussit, iussit, iussit Sey. lussit G hic et saepius P. Crassi L. Caesaris, nobilissimorum hominum, quorum virtus fuerat domi militiaeque cognita, M. Antonii, omnium eloquentissimi quos ego audierim, C. Caesaris, G. X in quo mihi videtur specimen fuisse humanitatis salis suavitatis leporis. beatusne igitur, qui hos qui hos s V 3 quos X interfecit? interficit V 1 mihi contra non solum eo videtur miser, miser eqs. cf. Aug. civ. 5, 26 quod ea fecit, sed etiam quod ita se gessit, ut ea facere ea se f. G ( exp. 2 ) ei liceret (etsi peccare peccaret X corr. V 1 nemini licet; sed sermonis errore labimur; errore labimur add. V c labimus K id enim licere lic&re V 1 dicimus, 5.56. quod cuique conceditur). utrum tandem beatior C. Marius tum, cum Cimbricae victoriae gloriam cum collega Catulo communicavit, paene altero Laelio—nam hunc illi huic X ( unde ilium pro illi V 3 ) hunc s duco simillimum—, an cum an cum annum G 1 civili bello victor iratus necessariis Catuli deprecantibus non semel respondit, sed saepe: moriatur ? in quo beatior ille, qui huic nefariae voci paruit, par uit V quam is, qui tam scelerate imperavit. nam cum accipere quam facere praestat iniuriam, tum morti iam ipsi ipsa K adventanti paulum procedere ob viam, quod fecit Catulus, quam quod Marius, quod quam M. V 1 talis viri interitu sex interitus ex X suos obruere consulatus et contaminare extremum tempus aetatis. 5.57. Duodequadraginta Totum cap. 20 libere excerpsit Val. Max. 9, 13 ext. 4 annos tyrannus Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, dionisius KV dyonisius GR cum quinque et viginti natus annos dominatum occupavisset. qua pulchritudine urbem, quibus autem opibus praeditam servitute oppressam tenuit civitatem! atqui de hoc homine a bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus, summam fuisse eius in victu temperantiam in rebusque gerundis virum acrem et industrium, et industrium om. R 1 eundem tamen maleficum natura in rebus gerundis... 29 maleficum natura Non. 241,8 et iniustum; ex quo omnibus bene veritatem intuentibus inuentibus X corr. V 1 videri necesse est miserrimum. ea ea ecce K enim ipsa, quae concupierat, ne tum quidem, cum omnia omni G 1 se posse censebat, consequebatur. 5.58. qui cum esset bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus—etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit—abundaretque et B s ei X aequalium familiaritatibus et consuetudine propinquorum, haberet etiam more Graeciae graciae gratiae V 1 quosdam adulescentis amore more amore G 1 coniunctos, credebat eorum nemini, sed is quos quos s V 3 quod X ex familiis locupletium servos delegerat, quibus nomen servitutis ipse detraxerat, traxerat G 1 et quibusdam convenis convenis et B s convenisset X et feris barbaris corporis custodiam committebat. ita propter iniustam dominatus cupiditatem dominatus domi cup. G 1 in carcerem quodam modo ipse se incluserat. quin etiam ne tonsori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit. ita ista K 1 sordido ancillarique sordidoque ancillari X corr. V 3 B 1 ( cf. simile mendum in G 415,5 ) sordido atque ancillari alii s artificio regiae virgines ut tonstriculae tondebant barbam et capillum patris. regiae ...17 patris Prisc.GL.2, 371, 11 et tamen ab is ipsis, cum iam essent adultae, ferrum removit instituitque, ut candentibus cadentibus Non. iuglandium putaminibus barbam sibi et capillum adurerent. instituitque...20 adurerent Non. 122, 30 5.59. cumque duas uxores haberet, haberet uxores V 1 Aristomachen aristomachem X (aristhom.G) civem suam, Doridem autem Locrensem, sic noctu ad eas n otu V 1 notua deas K 1 ( corr. c ) ventitabat, ut omnia specularetur et perscrutaretur ante. et cum fossam latam cubiculari fossa lata cubicularis X corr. s lecto circumdedisset eiusque fossae transitum ponticulo ligneo coniunxisset, eum ipsum, ipsum ipse Scheibe (cum forem cubiculi extrinsecus a custodibus opertum interiore claustro ipse diligenter obserasset Val. Max. ) cum forem cubiculi clauserat, detorquebat. idemque cum in communibus suggestis consistere non auderet, contionari ex turri alta solebat. 5.60. atque is cum pila ludere vellet —studiose enim id factitabat—tunicamque poneret, adulescentulo, quem amabat, tradidisse gladium dicitur. hic cum quidam familiaris iocans dixisset: huic quidem quidam V 1 certe vitam tuam committis adrisissetque adrisisetque KR adrisissetque V 1 adulescens, utrumque iussit interfici, alterum, quia viam demonstravisset interimendi sui, alterum, quia dictum id risu adprobavisset. atque eo facto factu V 1 sic doluit, nihil ut tulerit gravius in vita; quem enim vehementer amarat, occiderat. sic distrahuntur in contrarias partis impotentium cupiditates. cum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugdum. 5.61. Quamquam hic quidem tyrannus ipse iudicavit, quam esset beatus. nam cum cum add. G 2 quidam ex eius adsentatoribus, Damocles, commemoraret in sermone sermonem K copias eius, opes, maiestatem dominatus, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam aedium regiarum negaretque umquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse, visne igitur inquit, inquid G 1 V inquit add. R 1 o Damocle, quoniam te haec vita delectat, ipse eam eam Ern. eadem ( de tota vita agitur cf. p.433, 4 ) degustare et fortunam experiri meam? cum se ille cupere dixisset, conlocari coll. KR iussit hominem in aureo lecto strato stato K 1 pulcherrimo textili stragulo, magnificis operibus picto, abacosque compluris ornavit argento auroque caelato. tum ad mensam eximia forma pueros delectos iussit consistere eosque que om. G 1 nutum illius intuentis diligenter ministrare. 5.62. aderant unguenta ungenta V coronae, incendebantur odores, mensae conquisitissimis conquisitissimis -nquisiti— V c in r. epulis aepulis GRV extruebantur. fortunatus sibi Damocles videbatur. in hoc medio apparatu fulgentem gladium e lacunari saeta equina lacunariaetaequina G 1 equi Non. aptum demitti dimitti KR Non. iussit, fulgentem... 432, 1 iussit Non.235,19 ut impenderet illius beati cervicibus. itaque nec pulchros illos ministratores aspiciebat nec plenum artis argentum nec manum porrigebat in mensam; iam ipsae ipse GKV defluebant coronae; denique exoravit tyrannum, ut abire liceret, quod iam beatus nollet esse. satisne videtur declarasse Dionysius dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) nihil esse ei beatum, cui semper cui miser semper K aliqui terror aliqui terror B s aliquid error X (aliquis error V rec ) impendeat? impend at V 1 atque ei ei add. V 1 ne integrum quidem erat, ut ad iustitiam remigraret, remigaret V 1 civibus libertatem et iura redderet; is enim se adulescens inprovida aetate inretierat erratis eaque commiserat, comiserat G 1 R ut salvus esse non posset, si sanus esse coepisset. coepisset ex coepit R 1 5.63. Quantopere vero amicitias desideraret, quarum infidelitatem extimescebat, declaravit in Pythagoriis pythagoris V duobus illis, quorum cum alterum vadem mortis vademortis X corr. G 2 V 3 accepisset, alter, alter ut s alterum X ut vadem suum liberaret, praesto fuisset ad horam oram V mortis destinatam, utinam ego inquit tertius vobis amicus adscriberer! quam huic erat miserum carere consuetudine amicorum, societate victus, sermone omnino familiari, homini praesertim docto docto dato V a puero et artibus ingenuis ingeniis K erudito, musicorum misicorum X (musicum B) vero perstudioso; perstudiosum ( propter poetam) W corr.Dav. ( qui etiam poetae...tragico...bono) poëtam etiam tragicum post tragicum add. accepimus ( ex 429,27) s non male —quam bonum, nihil ad rem; in hoc cf. Att.14, 20, 3 Atil. fr.1 enim genere nescio quo pacto magis quam in aliis suum cuique pulchrum pulcrum G est; adhuc neminem cognovi poëtam (et et om. K 1 mihi fuit cum Aquinio amicitia), qui sibi non optumus videretur; sic se res habet: te tua, me delectant mea mea ea K —sed ut ad Dionysium dyonis.X ( in 6 ex dion. K 1 ) redeamus: omni cultu et victu humano carebat; vivebat cum fugitivis, cum facinerosis, cum barbaris; neminem, qui aut libertate libertatem K dignus esset aut vellet omnino liber esse, sibi amicum arbitrabatur. arbitrabantur G 1 Non ego iam cum huius vita, qua taetrius miserius detestabilius excogitare nihil possum, Platonis aut Archytae architae vitam vitae vitam X (vitae del. s V 3 ) comparabo, doctorum hominum et plane sapientium: 5.64. ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem. cuius ego quaestor ignoratum ab Syracusanis, cum esse omnino negarent, saeptum septum X undique et vestitum vestitutum V 1 vepribus et dumetis indagavi sepulcrum. tenebam enim quosdam senariolos, quos in eius monumento esse inscriptos acceperam, qui declarabant in summo sepulcro sphaeram spheram X (18 spherae RV sphaere GK) esse positam cum cylindro. 5.65. ego autem cum omnia conlustrarem oculis—est enim ad ad a GRV 1 ( corr. V 3 ) portas Agragantinas ego ducem cum...16 portas gaianas Non.335,24 agragantinas Came rarius agragianas X gaianas (gafanas L 1 ) Non. agragentinas Sey. ( cf. Th.l.l.l.1428 ) magna frequentia sepulcrorum—, animum adverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in qua inerat sphaerae figura et cylindri. atque ego statim Syracusanis— erant autem principes mecum—dixi me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quaererem. inmissi cum inmissi cum s V 3 inmusicum X (inmuscum K) falcibus multi multi famuli Lattmann milites olim Sey. purgarunt et aperuerunt locum. 5.66. quo cum patefactus patefactum X esset aditus, ad adversam a ddit' adadv. G basim bassim X ( corr. G 1 ) accessimus. accessimus R sed -ss- e corr. ( fuit fort. accedimus) acces imus V apparebat epigramma epygramma KRV exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum dimidiatum dimidiatis X (di prius in r. R 1 ) corr. Bentl. (dimidiatus de versiculis vel de epigrammate dici poterat, de partibus non poterat cf. Gell. 3, 14 ) fere. ita nobilissima Graeciae civitas, quondam vero etiam doctissima, sui civis unius acutissimi monumentum ignorasset, nisi ab homine Arpinate Arpinati We.cl.leg.1, 4 al. didicisset. sed redeat, reddeat X ( corr. G 1 ) unde aberravit oratio: quis est omnium, qui qui quo V 1 modo cum Musis, id est cum humanitate humilitate K 1 ut v. et cum doctrina, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit quam illum tyrannum? si vitae modum actionemque quaerimus, alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur cum oblectatione sollertiae, qui est unus suavissimus pastus patus K 1 ( r ss. c ) animorum, alterius in caede et iniuriis cum et diurno et nocturno metu. age confer Democritum Pythagoram, Anaxagoram: quae regna, quas opes studiis eorum et delectationibus antepones? 5.73. An Epic.fr.604 tu me in viola putabas aut in rosa dicere? an Epicuro, qui qui G 1 quia G 2 KRV cf.438,19 tantum modo induit personam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, licebit alt. i in r. V quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit, nullum sapienti esse tempus, etiamsi uratur torqueatur secetur, quin possit exclamare: quam pro nihilo puto! cum praesertim omne malum dolore definiat defirmat ( vel defirniat) V 1 bonum voluptate, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dicatque nos in vocibus Epic.fr.511 occupatos iis sonos fundere, neque quicquam ad nos pertinere nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: huic ergo, ut dixi, non multum differenti a iudicio ferarum oblivisci licebit sui et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestate fortunae, tum dicere se se add. G 2 beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum? 5.75. mala praesentia praeteritae voluptates—sed cum is is his G 1 KV 1 dicat semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si si add. G 2 sibi constare vellet, non liceret, quidnam faciendum est is qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existumant? existumant -a- e corr. R 1 Me quidem auctore auctore ex auctoritate R c etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbuttire balbuttire GR Non. balbut ire V 1 balbutire K aliquando desit me...24 desit Non. 80, 13 aperteque et clara voce audeant dicere beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram. decen suram X ( corr. V 3 ) 5.76. sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut ut aut V iam a laqueis Stoicorum, quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo intellego, recedamus, sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et et s om. X externa iaceant humi et tantum modo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona, animi animi Jeep (cf.427,14 443,3 458,6;divini ani- mi bona divina sunt caelumque contingunt) autem illa alii K alia GRV illa add. G 2 divina longe lateque se pandant caelumque contingant; ut, ut del.Lb.sed cf.p.242,25 ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo et non beatissimum etiam dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime maxime huic G 1 sententiae repugnat. nam nam non V contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum contraque aegritudinem et reliquas animi perturbationes satis esse videmur videmus K superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati; dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis virtutis We. virtuti istis ard. G adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat, is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam se debilitaturum minatur. 5.82. Stoicorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui cum finem bonorum esse esse om. H senserint congruere congruę G 1 naturae cumque ea convenienter vivere, cum id sit in sapientis sapientis Lb. sapiente situm non officio solum, verum etiam etiam om. H potestate, sequatur necesse est, ut, cuius in potestate summum bonum, in eiusdem vita beata ita ista V 1 sit. ita fit semper vita beata sapientis. Habes, quae fortissime de beata vita dici putem et, quo modo nunc est, nisi quid tu melius attuleris, etiam verissime. Melius equidem adferre nihil possum, sed a te impetrarim lubenter, ut, nisi molestum sit, sit est Ha. quoniam te nulla vincula impediunt ullius ullius V 3 B Corr s illius X certae disciplinae libasque ex omnibus, quodcumque te maxime specie veritatis movet,—quod paulo ante paulo ante 438,22 Peripateticos veteremque Academiam hortari videbare, ut sine retractatione libere dicere dicerent G ( corr. 1 ) RV ( corr. rec ) auderent audirent K sapientis esse semper beatissimos, id velim audire, quem ad modum his putes consentaneum esse id dicere. multa multi K 1 enim a te contra istam sententiam dicta sunt et Stoicorum ratione conclusa. 5.84. tum esse sapientem—, sed quaeramus unam quamque reliquorum sententiam, si fieri potest, ut hoc praeclarum quasi decretum beatae vitae possit omnium sententiis et disciplinis convenire. Sunt autem haec de finibus, ut opinor, retentae defensaeque defensaque K 1 sententiae: primum simplices quattuor, nihil bonum nisi honestum, ut Stoici, nihil bonum nisi voluptatem, ut Epicurus, epicur ei H 1 nihil bonum nisi vacuitatem doloris, add. Bentl.cf.fin.2.16 al. ut Hieronymus, hieronimus hic, 444, 8.14; 457, 20 GV itemtque R, nisi quod 444, 14 hieronymus habet,444,8 ipse restituit. iheronimus hic K 1 in r., hyeronimus rell. loc. (ut p.457,20 F) nihil bonum nisi naturae primis bonis bonis cf. prima naturae commoda ac 2, 138 fin. 5, 58 aut omnibus aut maxumis frui, ut frui aut V Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat. 5.88. nam quae tibi Epicuri quae...Epicuri s quod...Epicurus X (epyc.G 8.13 ut saepe ) videtur, eadem erit Hieronymi et Carneadis causa et hercule omnium reliquorum. quis enim parum est contra mortem morem V 1 aut dolorem paratus? Ordiamur ordinamur X ( corr. V rec ) ab eo, si placet, quem mollem, quem voluptarium dicimus. quid? is tibi mortemne videtur aut aut s (Vind.)an X dolorem timere, qui eum diem, quo moritur, beatum appellat Epic.fr.122 maxumisque doloribus adfectus affectus KR eos ipsos inventorum suorum memoria et recordatione confutat? confutat? signum interrogandi vulgo non hic sed post timere ( v.19 ) ponunt. nec haec sic agit, ut ex tempore quasi effuttire effuttire GKR effutire V (K c in mg. ) Non. videatur. nec...videatur Non.103,21 de morte enim ita ita s ista X ( cf. 441, 19 ) Epic. sent. sel.2 sentit, ut dissoluto animante sensum extinctum putet, quod autem sensu careat, nihil ad nos id iudicet pertinere. item in in add. Se.de s om. X dolore certa habet quae sequatur, cuius cuius Bentl. (cf. fin. 1,40) quorum magnitudinem brevitate consolatur, longinquitatem levitate. levitate s lenitate (laen.KR)X 5.101. quo modo igitur iucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia, pruden tiae V 1 absit moderatio? cetera quae ... 22 moderatio H ex quo Sardanapalli, opulentissimi Syriae regis, error adgnoscitur, ad nosc. G 1 agn. R 2 qui incidi incidi in illa re, Cic. de rep., cum de Sardanapalo diceret, 'ea incidi iussit in busto' Arusian. GL. 7, 487,16 iussit in busto: busto haec. habeo X Haec Arist. fr. 90 ( cf. fin. 2, 106 ) Anth. Pal. 7,325 habeo, quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido Hausit; ausit GR 1 V 1 at illa iacent multa et praeclara relicta. quid aliud inquit Aristoteles in bovis, non in regis sepulcro inscriberes? haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur. 5.120. quorum controversiam solebat tamquam honorarius arbiter iudicare Carneades. nam cum, quaecumque nam quaecumque ..mque cum V ( initium non dispicitur ) bona Peripateticis, eadem Stoicis commoda viderentur neque tamen Peripatetici plus tribuerent divitiis bonae valetudini ceteris rebus generis eiusdem quam Stoici, cum ea re, non verbis ponderarentur, causam esse dissidendi dissidendi s desiderandi X negabat. quare hunc locum ceterarum disciplinarum philosophi quem ad modum optinere possint, ipsi viderint; mihi tamen gratum est, quod de sapientium sapientiam G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V perpetua pertua R 1 bene bene bona V vivendi facultate dignum quiddam quiddam s V b quidam X philosophorum voce profitentur. 5.121. Sed quoniam mane est eundum, has quinque dierum disputationes memoria comprehendamus. conpreh. KV equidem me etiam conscripturum arbitror—ubi enim melius uti melius uti G 1 in mg. possumus hoc, cuicuimodi cui'cui'modi R ( sed '' 2 ) est, otio?—, ad Brutumque nostrum hos libros alteros quinque libros hos K hos libros quemadmodum quinque de finibus alteros V b mittemus, a quo non modo inpulsi sumus ad philosophiae philosophiae Non. utroque loco philosophas X (philosophicas R 2 V b ) scriptiones, inpulsi 459, 1 scriptiones Non. 174,20, eadem usque ad 459,1 lacessiti 134,2 verum etiam lacessiti. in quo quantum ceteris profuturi simus, simus Beroaldus sumus non facile dixerim, dixerim GV dixeri m K dixeri- mus R ( sed us, quod fort. ab alia m. additium est, postea expunctum ) s nostris quidem acerbissimis doloribus variisque et undique circumfusis molestiis alia nulla potuit inveniri levatio. alia ... levatio Non. 336, 20 levatio. Finit K | |
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62. Polybius, Histories, 1.1.4, 2.56.11-2.56.12, 6.53 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 250; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51| 1.1.4. ὑπὲρ ὧν προῃρήμεθα γράφειν, ἱκανόν ἐστι προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμῆσαι πάντα καὶ νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὴν ἔντευξιν τῆς πραγματείας. 2.56.11. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγῳδίας οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλῆξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας, 2.56.12. ἐπειδήπερ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ᾖ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τἀληθὲς διὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν φιλομαθούντων. | 2.56.11. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, 2.56.12. since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. 6.53. 1. Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the soâcalled rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined.,2. Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead.,3. As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people.,4. Next after the interment and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine.,5. This image is a mask reproducing with remarkable fidelity both the features and complexion of the deceased.,6. On the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and carriage.,7. These representatives wear togas, with a purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar.,8. They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the offices of state held by each during his life;,9. and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue.,10. For who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this? |
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63. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.16, 1.18-1.24, 1.53, 1.82, 1.123, 2.6, 2.35, 2.62, 2.78, 2.133, 2.154, 2.158, 2.160, 3.3, 3.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, and auctoritas •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, de natura deorum •cicero, marcus tullius, and timaeus translation •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical treatises of •cicero, marcus tullius, academica •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 86; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 88, 89, 90, 96; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 252, 253, 254; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 34, 35, 70, 161, 185, 195 | 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.16. "Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine. 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? 1.21. Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? for though the world did not exist, it does not follow that ages did not exist — meaning by ages, not periods made up of a number of days and nights in annual courses, for ages in this sense I admit could not have been produced without the circular motion of the firmament; but from the infinite past there has existed an eternity not measured by limited divisions of time, but of a nature intelligible in terms of extension; since it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. 1.22. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. 1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; 1.24. for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. 1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god; 1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. 1.123. Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man's affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man's limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them. 2.6. Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. 2.35. Again, it is undeniable that every organic whole must have an ultimate ideal of perfection. As in vines or cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. Hence it follows that there must exist this fourth and highest grade, unassailable by any external force. 2.62. Those gods therefore who were the authors of various benefits owned their deification to the value of the benefits which they bestowed, and indeed the names that I just now enumerated express the various powers of the gods that bear them. "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon of distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber (I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated with Ceres and Libera, the import of which joint consecration may be gathered from the mysteries; but Liber and Libera were so named as Ceres' offspring, that being the meaning of our Latin word liberi — a use which has survived in the case of Libera but not of Liber) — and this is also the origin of Romulus, who is believed to be the same as Quirinus. And these benefactors were duly deemed divine, as being both supremely good and immortal, because their souls survived and enjoyed eternal life. 2.78. And yet from the fact of the gods' existence (assuming that they exist, as they certainly do) it necessarily follows that they are animate beings, and not only animate but possessed of reason and united together in a sort of social community or fellowship, ruling the one world as a united commonwealth or state. 2.133. "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature. 2.154. "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. 2.158. It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? 2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. 3.3. "Yes, to be sure, Velleius," replied Cotta; for "I have a very different business before me with Lucilius from what I had with you." "How so, pray?" said Velleius. "Because I think that your master Epicurus does not put up a very strong fight on the question of the immortal gods; he only does not venture to deny their existence so that he may not encounter any ill‑feeling or reproach. But when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that though they possess limbs like those of men they make no use of those limbs, he seems not to be speaking seriously, and to think it enough if he affirms the existence of blessed and everlasting beings of some sort. 3.10. Give permission therefore for my reason to join issue with yours. "You adduce all these arguments to prove that the gods exist, and by arguing you render doubtful a matter which in my opinion admits no doubt at all. For I have committed to memory not only the number but also the order of your arguments. The first was that when we look up at the sky, we at once perceive that some power exists whereby the heavenly bodies are governed. And from this you went on to quote: Behold this dazzling vault of heaven, which all mankind as Jove invoke; |
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| 64. Cicero, On Laws, 1.6, 2.2-2.4, 2.26, 2.35-2.36, 2.59, 3.36 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and historiography •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, modicum corpus •cicero marcus tullius (father) •cicero marcus tullius (son) •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 84; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225, 251, 253, 254; Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 7; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 111 |
65. Cicero, On Invention, 1.1.1-1.1.3, 1.27, 1.33, 1.69, 2.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 74, 75, 76, 83, 144; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118| 1.27. Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expo- sitio. narrationum genera tria sunt: unum genus est, in quo ipsa causa et omnis ratio controversiae con- tinetur; alterum, in quo digressio aliqua extra causam aut criminationis aut similitudinis aut delectationis non alienae ab eo negotio, quo de agitur, aut amplificationis causa interponitur. tertium genus est remotum a civi- libus causis, quod delectationis causa non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur. eius partes sunt duae, quarum altera in negotiis, altera in personis maxime versatur. ea, quae in negotiorum expositione posita est, tres habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumen- tum. fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur, cuiusmodi est: Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota; quod genus: Appius indixit Cartha- giniensibus bellum. argumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit. huiusmodi apud Terentium: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis, Sosia illa autem narratio, quae versatur in personis, eiusmodi est, ut in ea simul cum rebus ipsis personarum sermones et animi perspici possint, hoc modo: Venit ad me saepe clam it ans: Quid agis, Micio? Cur perdis adulescentem nobis? cur amat? Cur potat? cur tu his rebus sumptum suggeris, Vestitu nimio indulges? nimium ineptus es. Nimium ipse est durus praeter aequumque et bonum. hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festivitas, confecta ex rerum varietate, animorum dissimilitudine, gravitate, lenitate, spe, metu, suspicione, desiderio, dissimulatione, errore, misericordia, fortunae commu- tatione, insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, iucundo exitu rerum. verum haec ex iis, quae postea de elocu- tione praecipientur, ornamenta sumentur. 1.33. ritia. hoc igitur vitandum est, ne, cuius genus po- sueris, eius * sicuti aliquam diversam ac dissimilem partem ponas in eadem partitione. quodsi quod in genus plures incident partes, id cum in prima causae partitione erit simpliciter expositum, distribuetur tem- pore eo commodissime, cum ad ipsum ventum erit explicandum in causae dictione post partitionem. atque illud quoque pertinet ad paucitatem, ne aut plura, quam satis est, demonstraturos nos dicamus, hoc modo: ostendam adversarios, quod arguamus, et potuisse facere et voluisse et fecisse; nam fecisse satis est ostendere: aut, cum in causa partitio nulla sit, et cum simplex quiddam agatur, tamen utamur distributione, id quod perraro potest accidere. Ac sunt alia quoque praecepta partitionum, quae ad hunc usum oratorium non tanto opere pertineant, quae versantur in philosophia, ex quibus haec ipsa trans- tulimus, quae convenire viderentur, quorum nihil in ceteris artibus inveniebamus. Atque his de partitione praeceptis in omni dictione meminisse oportebit, ut et prima quaeque pars, ut expo- sita est in partitione, sic ordine transigatur et omnibus explicatis peroratum sit hoc modo, ut ne quid po- sterius praeter conclusionem inferatur. partitur apud Terentium breviter et commode senex in Andria, quae cognoscere libertum velit: Eo pacto et gnati vitam et consilium meum Cognosces et quid facere in hac re te velim. itaque quemadmodum in partitione proposuit, ita narrat, primum nati vitam: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis ; deinde suum consilium: Et nunc id operam do deinde quid Sosiam velit facere, id quod postremum posuit in partitione, postremum di- cit: Nunc tuum est officium quemadmodum igitur hic et ad primam quamque partem primum accessit et omnibus absolutis finem dicendi fecit, sic nobis pla- cet et ad singulas partes accedere et omnibus abso- lutis perorare. Nunc de confirmatione deinceps, ita ut ordo ipse postulat, praecipiendum videtur. 1.69. tae. ergo in hoc quoque iudicio desinite litteras legis perscrutari et legem, ut aequum est, ex utilitate rei publicae considerate. quid magis utile fuit Thebanis quam Lacedaemonios opprimi? cui magis Epaminon- dam, Thebanorum imperatorem, quam victoriae The- banorum consulere decuit? quid hunc tanta Thebano- rum gloria, tam claro atque exornato tropaeo carius aut antiquius habere convenit? scripto videlicet legis omisso scriptoris sententiam considerare debebat. at hoc quidem satis consideratum est, nullam esse legem nisi rei publicae causa scriptam. summam igitur amen- tiam esse existimabat, quod scriptum esset rei publicae salutis causa, id non ex rei publicae salute interpretari. quodsi leges omnes ad utilitatem rei publicae referri convenit, hic autem saluti rei publicae profuit, profecto non potest eodem facto et communibus fortunis con- suluisse et legibus non optemperasse.” 2.69. Iuridicialis est, in qua aequi et iniqui natura et praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur. huius partes sunt duae, quarum alteram absolutam, adsumptivam alteram nominamus. Absoluta est, quae ipsa in se, non ut neg- otialis implicite et abscondite, sed patentius et expedi- tius recti et non recti quaestionem continet. ea est huiuscemodi: cum Thebani Lacedaemonios bello su- peravissent et fere mos esset Graiis, cum inter se bellum gessissent, ut ii, qui vicissent, tropaeum ali- quod in finibus statuerent victoriae modo in praesen- tiam declarandae causa, non ut in perpetuum belli memoria maneret, ae+neum statuerunt tropaeum. accu- santur apud Amphictyonas id est apud commune Graeciae consilium . intentio est: | |
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66. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.1-1.10, 1.17, 1.66-1.70, 2.15, 2.21, 2.34, 2.45, 2.70, 2.106, 2.110, 2.112, 3.7-3.10, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.23, 3.26, 3.28-3.29, 3.31, 3.33, 3.41, 3.50, 3.62-3.64, 3.74, 4.3, 4.6, 4.14, 4.18, 4.21, 4.45, 4.48-4.51, 4.61, 4.64-4.68, 4.74-4.77, 5.1-5.2, 5.4, 5.6-5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.22-5.33, 5.37-5.40, 5.42-5.43, 5.45, 5.47-5.51, 5.53-5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.66-5.68, 5.71, 5.73-5.75, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86-5.89, 5.91-5.92, 5.94-5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, and academic scepticism •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, de finibus •cicero, marcus tullius, preface to •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance •cicero, marcus tullius, political career •cicero, marcus tullius, speeches •cicero, marcus tullius, letters •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, and auctoritas •cicero, marcus tullius, and antiochus •cicero, marcus tullius, lucullus Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 266; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 82, 86, 113, 141; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 44; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 186; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55, 56, 67, 69; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 88, 89, 99, 105, 107, 111, 112, 118, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 161, 164, 173, 175, 177, 181, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 201| 1.1. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 1.2. contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia philosophia a nobis BE defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, placet BEV moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum admissum dett iam missum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. 1.3. sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam sapientia om. cod. Eliens. Davisii, P. Man. est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus ullus est BE investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defatigatio defetigatio A 2 turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult 'fodere au/t arare aut a/liquid ferre de/nique'— non enim illum ab industria, sed ab inliberali labore deterret—, sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor. 1.4. Iis iis Man. sec. Bai. ; his igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina latina A 1 B E latinia R latine A 2 NV scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini nomini pene BE Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Medri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii atrilii ( ut videtur )R acilii BE mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius: Lucilius Se. lucinius A 1 ; licinius (altera parte prioris u erasa) A 2 ; licinius BER, N (litin.), V; Licinus C.F.W. Mue. 1.5. 'ferreum scriptorem', verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m an Utinam Mur (ad Phil. 14, 5), at utinam ABERN aut umnam V ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.9. quem quidem locum comit comit Se. c o N cum ABERV cf. ad p. 5,10; 23,1; 26,12; 44,8; 46,15; 160,31 multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Ponti edd. pontii (pontu BE) Tritani, Tritani Bai. tritanii A 2 RV tiranii A 1 tritanu BE centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: 'chaere,' chaere care BE inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: chorusque cohorsque 'primus quantum video Man.' Mdv. 'chaere, Tite!' hinc hic A 1 BERV mi BEV; om. in ras. A; m R; mi in fine versus N 1, add. itii ( ut sit mutii) N 2 hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius. 1.10. ego autem mirari satis mirari satis Mdv. satis mirari A. Man.; non mirari Böck. mirari (R in mg. ad aū in fine versus pos. adscriptum habet a man. rec. nō) non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic hic omnino BE docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, modo non inopem N 2 modo inopem ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam quoniam Otto con (conforensibus superscr. ab alt. man. u sup. o priore ) N c vel ī (superscr.) R cum forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor videor N 2 V videri praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, sum dett. sim debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, possum BE possim in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere tanto opere N pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, malunt BER modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 1.17. Quid igitur est? inquit; audire enim cupio, quid non probes. Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit democrite adicit A 1 RBE democrito adicit A 2, V (adijcit); adicit de- mocrite (e corr in o) N perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. ille atomos athom. (et sic semper) quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito ii, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec medium nec ultimum ultimum intimum Jonas (dissert. Berol. 1870 thes. 5) nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ferri A 2 ERN fieri BV ita ferri ut om A 1 ut concursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque certur, omnia, eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 2.21. 'Si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, voluptatem A 2 BENV liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque qui essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus quod reprehenderemus, add. Dav. cum undique complerentur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.' Hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus? quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquatum. At ille non pertimuit saneque fidenter: Istis quidem ipsis verbis, inquit; sed quid sentiat, non videtis. Si alia sentit, inquam, alia loquitur, numquam intellegam quid sentiat; sed plane dicit quod intellegit. idque si ita dicit, non esse reprehendendos luxuriosos, si sapientes sint, dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat non reprehendendos parricidas, si nec cupidi sint nec deos metuant nec mortem nec dolorem. et tamen quid attinet luxuriosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos, qui, cum luxuriose viverent, a summo philosopho non reprehenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent? 2.34. in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, non valitudinem corporis om. E non valetudinem ( om. cor- poris) edd. summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam et iam NV etiam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante paulo ante § 33 omne enim animal ... asperneturque contraria dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * Mdv. : ' nonnulla exciderunt, quibus Cicero simili forma atque supra (Polemoni et Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt cet. ) dixerit, quae alii prima posuissent; tum rectissime (quemadmodum ante: ergo nata est cet.) subiciebatur de finibus : his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes (consentanei iis, quae posita sunt prima) sunt fines bonorum. Et fortasse etiam Carneadem et Hieronymum no- minarat, sed hic exempli causa solos Aristippum et Stoicos ponit. ' his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt fines sunt etiam A bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis Stoicis N 2 stoici consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque reficientemque A 1 BERN contraria. 2.45. Honestum igitur id intellegimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se fructibusve per se A 2 fructibus vespere A 1 BER fructibus ve ( om. per se) NV ipsum possit iure laudari. quod quale sit, non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest, quamquam aliquantum potest, quam communi omnium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis, qui permulta ob eam unam causam unam causam causam unam BE causam una R faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem habent habent dett. habeant a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul simul multa BE agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. eademque ratio fecit hominem hominem fecit BE appet. BENV hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium mortalium omnium BE societate atque, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur. 2.70. At negat Epicurus Epicurus negat BE —hoc enim vestrum lumen est— quemquam, qui honeste non vivat, iucunde posse vivere. quasi ego id curem, quid quid quod Non. ille aiat aiat NV Non. alat aut neget. quasi ... neget Non. p. 70 illud quaero, quid ei, qui in voluptate summum bonum ponat, consentaneum sit dicere. quid affers, cur Thorius, cur Caius cur Caius Se. cur chius (curehius B) Postumius, cur Postumius cur postumus cur BE cur postumus V omnium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime vixerit? ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam reprehendendam, nisi plane fatui sint, id est nisi aut cupiant aut metuant. quarum ambarum rerum cum medicinam cum medicina V medicinam cum BE pollicetur, luxuriae licentiam pollicetur. his enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asotorum vita quod reprehendat. 2.106. sed vobis voluptatum perceptarum recordatio vitam beatam facit, et quidem corpore perceptarum. nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est omnis animi voluptates animi voluptates voluptas animi BE e om. A 1 BEN esse e corporis societate. corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tantopere tanto opere B tanta opere R derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur se omnis se omnis N se omnes BEV omnis A se causas R secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse. abstulisse libidinum voluptates BE Quod enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quo modo id potuit mortuo mortuo potuit BE permanere? effluit effluit Se. (cf. p. 18, 19; 79, 23; inter e et f excidit ef); fluit ARNV; in B et E pro hac voce compendium est, quod in E apud Mdv. sumitur pro etc., deinde in utroque cod. littera prima in igitur solito maior et rubro colore exarata; in E praeterea spatio relicto novus versus incipit igitur voluptas corporis et prima quaeque avolat saepiusque relinquit causam paenitendi penitendi quam recordandi. itaque beatior Africanus cum patria illo modo loquens: Desine, Roma, tuos hostes reliquaque praeclare: Nam tibi moenimenta moenimenta RKl. monimenta AERN monumenta BV mu- nimenta Mur. (Var. lect. XI 1) mei peperere peperere BE repperere A reperere NV reperire R labores. Nam E namque ( fuitne praeclare, nam Quae tibi ... labores!? in quo dubitari possit, utrum Ciceroni an Ennio tribuendum sit illud nam) Laboribus hic praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes voluptatibus, et hic se ad ea revocat, e quibus nihil umquam rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore. Illud autem ipsum qui optineri potest, quod dicitis, dicitis p. 24, 15—22 (—referri) omnis animi et voluptates et dolores ad corporis voluptates ac dolores ad corporis voluptates ac ac et R nihilne te] nichil tene BE dolores om. BE pertinere? 2.110. videmus in quodam volucrium volucrium Charis. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil I p. 146); volucrum ARNV voluerunt BE genere non nulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, in multis etiam desideria videmus. ergo in bestiis erunt secreta e voluptate humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat, praecipue praecipui P. Man. sec. Mdv. a natura nihil datum esse dicemus? esse dicemus datum BE 2.112. ut, si Xerxes, cum tantis classibus tantisque equestribus et pedestribus copiis Hellesponto iuncto Athone perfosso mari ambulavisset terra mari ... terra Bai. in ed. min.; maria ... terram navigavisset, navigasset NV si, cum tanto impetu in Graeciam venisset, causam quis ex eo quaereret tantarum copiarum tantique belli, mel se auferre ex Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa videretur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem plurimis et gravissimis artibus atque virtutibus instructum et ornatum non, ut illum, maria pedibus peragrantem, classibus montes, sed omne caelum totamque cum universo mari terram mente complexum voluptatem petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta molitum. 3.7. nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem ne re pn sionē R ne pren- sionem ABE rep hensionem N nec reprensionem V quidem vulgi iem reformidans iem non ut credo reformidans (punct. ab alt. m. pos.) N in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 3.8. quod cum accidisset ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit statim. deinde prima illa, quae in congressu solemus: Quid tu, inquit, huc? a villa enim, credo, et: Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem. Heri, inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profectus veni ad vesperum. vespm BE vesperam R causa autem fuit huc veniendi ut quosdam hinc hinc BE hīc (īc ex corr. m. alt. ) N hic A huc RV libros promerem. et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae delectari. est enim mihi magnae curae—quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est—, ut ita erudiatur, ut et patri et Caepioni scipioni BER c epioni V nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi avi avunculi Schuetz. 'cui sic assentior ut ipsum Ciceronem perturbatione quadam memoriae avi scripsisse putem' Mdv. (cf. index nom. et rer. s. v. Q. Servilius Caepio). eius memoria moveor—nec enim ignoras, quanti fecerim Caepionem, scepionem R c epionem V qui, ut opinio mea fert, fert R refert in principibus iam esset, si viveret—, et Lucullus et L. Lucullus Halm. mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum vir cum (tum E) om. V virtutibus virtutibus om. ABERN omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus. 3.9. Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum cum quod Wes. apud Mdv. et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos testamento libros suos tibi BE commendavit, et puerum diligis. quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii, sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam, sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, conbiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior. veniet paratior sit et quidem A venerit (in E incert.) paratior sit et quidem BE veniet paratior sit. Equidem R cu ul si venerit paratior sit Et quidem N 1 veniet paratior sit quidem N 2 veniet paratior sic equidem V Sic, et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus. 3.10. Tum ille: Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos quos om. BE hic hic hic ul hic N his AR hys BE om. V tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, aristotelios A aristotilis BE aristoteles R aristotili hos N 1 aristotelicos N 2 aristotilicos V quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te te om. NV rebus nomina inponere. ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. quicquid quidquid BV quitquid E Quid quod R enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum quasi virtutis lumen extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam, sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse exequant esse V, N (post t ras., es ab alt. m.); exequantes se ABE ex sequentes se R communem? 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.26. Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illa his, quae iam posui, consequentia. cum enim hoc sit extremum —sentis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod te/los te/los Graeci] greci celos BE Graeci dicant, dicant ARV dicunt BEN id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere—, cum igitur hoc sit extremum, extremum hoc sit BE congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam, de qua loquor, quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est ut, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari, sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic: 3.28. Deinde quaero, quis aut de misera vita possit gloriari aut de non de non Mdv. non de beata. de sola igitur beata. ex quo ex quo edd. (Ascens. 1511), ex qua ABERN de qua V efficitur gloriatione, ut ita dicam, dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae iure contingere. ita fit, ut honesta vita beata vita sit. Et quoniam is, cui contingit ut iure laudetur, habet insigne quiddam ad decus et ad gloriam, ut ob ea, ut ob ea edd., P. Man. ut ad ea AERN et ad ea BV quae tanta sint, beatus dici iure possit, idem de vita talis viri rectissime dicetur. ita, si beata vita honestate honestate honeste AB cernitur, quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est. Quid vero? Quid vero? negarine ullo Dav. quod vero negari nullo ARNV qui vero negari nullo BE 3.29. negarine ullo modo possit numquam add. Mdv. quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quem fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem? ut enim qui mortem in malis ponit non potest eam non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse decreverit, non curare idque contemnere. quo posito et omnium adsensu adprobato illud adsumitur, eum, qui magno sit animo atque forti, omnia, quae cadere in hominem possint, despicere ac pro nihilo putare. quae cum ita sint, effectum est nihil esse malum, quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae et actae et consequenti et bene de sese iudicare statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. ex quo intellegitur idem illud, solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere: honeste, id est cum virtute, vivere. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 3.33. Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 3.74. Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me rerum me R me rerum BE rerum ANV traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum coagmentatum ed. princ. Colon. cocicmentatum A cociom tatū R coaugmentatum BEN coagumentatum V inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ut si ' aliquis apud Bentl. ' Mdv. ut non si ABERN aut non si V ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod quod BE quo moveri possit. 4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 4.6. deinde ea, quae requirebant orationem ornatam et gravem, quam magnifice sunt dicta ab illis, quam splendide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de fortitudine, de amicitia, de aetate add. Mdv. degenda, de philosophia, de capessenda re publica, de del. Mdv. temperantia de fortitudine hominum non non Mdv. de spinas spinis RNV vellentium, ut Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, sed eorum, qui grandia ornate vellent, enucleate minora dicere. itaque quae sunt eorum consolationes, quae cohortationes, quae etiam monita et consilia scripta ad summos viros! erat enim apud eos, ut est rerum ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exercitatio duplex. nam, quicquid quaeritur, id habet aut generis ipsius sine personis temporibusque aut his adiunctis facti aut iuris aut nominis controversiam. ergo in utroque exercebantur, eaque disciplina effecit effecit edd. efficit tantam illorum utroque in genere dicendi copiam. 4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere. 4.18. Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, occultorum R quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque coniunctionum coniunctionum RNV coniunctium (coniunct iu pro coniunct iu m = coniunctionum) BE hominum ad ad R et B ac ENV societatem societatem R societatum BENV cf. III 66 inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus et p. 128, 15 sq., ubi de cognitione rerum respicit ad p. 127,23 (erat insitus menti cognitionis amor) et de coniunctione generis humani ad p. 127, 26 sq. (coniunctionum hominum ad societatem) animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut aut RN 2 ut BEN 1 V diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac ac BER et NV decore, his initiis, ut ante dixi, et et V om. BERN ( ad initiis, ut ante dixi, et seminibus cf. p. 127, 14 et 9 ) seminibus a natura datis temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est. 4.21. O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, complexus es p. 107, 17-30 omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius beatius dett. beatus vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio correctio V correptio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum nullum habere BE potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? 4.45. sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse bonum solum bonum solum BERNV honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum, quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quicquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, modo quos modo quos BERNV nominavi. mihi autem aequius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, acceperat V accederat R ac- cederet BE concederat N a communibus initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a a N 2 V om. BERN 1 natura profecta, uti isdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, isdemque sententiis. 4.48. non enim actionis aut officii ratio impellit ad ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, petenda, petenda appetenda dett. sed ab iis et appetitio et actio commovetur. Nunc venio ad tua illa tua illa BENV illa tua R cf. p. 62, 14 brevia, quae consectaria esse dicebas, dicebas p. 98, 21 et primum illud, quo nihil potest brevius: Bonum omne laudabile, laudabile autem honestum, autem honestum autem omne honestum dett. bonum igitur omne honestum. O plumbeum pugionem! quis enim tibi primum illud concesserit?—quo quidem concesso nihil opus est secundo; si enim omne bonum laudabile est, 4.49. omne honestum est—quis tibi ergo tibi ergo RNV cf. p. 31, 18; 43, 20 ; igitur tibi BE istud dabit praeter Pyrrhonem, Aristonem eorumve similes, quos tu non probas? Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia illa natura familia R non dabit, quippe qui valitudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem antepot; quid censes eos esse facturos, qui omnino virtutem a bonorum fine segregaverunt, Epicurum, Hieronymum, illos etiam, si qui Carneadeum finem tueri volunt? 4.50. iam aut Callipho aut Diodorus quo modo poterunt tibi istud concedere, qui ad honestatem aliud adiungant, adiungunt BE quod ex eodem genere non sit? placet igitur tibi, Cato, cum res sumpseris non concessas, ex illis efficere, quod velis? Iam ille sorites est, quo nihil putatis esse vitiosius: add. Kayser apud Bai. 2 quod bonum sit, id esse optabile, quod optabile, id expetendum, quod expetendum, id laudabile, deinde deinde N dein (= deinde) V dein BE reliqui gradus. sed ego in hoc resisto; eodem modo enim modo enim BNV enim modo E tibi nemo dabit, quod expetendum sit, id id laudabile ... expetendum sit id ( v. 15 ) om. R esse laudabile. Illud vero minime consectarium, sed in primis hebes, hebes RB habes ENV illorum scilicet, non tuum, non tuum Mdv. non tum BER nominum N ( ab alt. m. radendo et corrigendo effectum ), V gloriatione dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit (18 quod non possit = nec id posse cf. p. 99,5 ) sine honestate contingere, ut iure quisquam glorietur. 4.51. dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo, etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit (25 poterit, sc. non Polemo, sed qui virtute una praeditus est, caret ceteris) virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedetur, concedetur Se. concedet praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere, in quo iure possit possit iure BE gloriari, etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas. 4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes? 4.64. atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. proferebas p. 107, 23 sqq. quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam iam aquam aquam iam BE adpropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, ante quam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et, quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi dispecturi NV despecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum caecum ceco R animo ac ac RNV et BE Phalarim fuisse? 4.65. ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus quamvis multum processeris tamen illud in eadem causa est, a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris; nec enim ille respirat, ante quam emersit, et catuli aeque caeci, prius quam dispexerunt, dispexerunt Lamb. despexerunt RNV depexerunt BE ac si ita futuri semper essent. illa sunt similia: hebes hebes NV habes BER acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius senescit; senescit Mdv. nescit ERN 1 nestit B languescit N 2 V hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies, valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt. his similes sunt omnes, qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus, nisi forte censes Ti. censes Ti. censesti N consesti R censes ca (= causa) V censes ( om. ti) BE Gracchum patrem non beatiorem fuisse 'Aldus primus addidisse videtur' Mdv. quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. nec tamen ille erat sapiens— quis enim hoc aut quando aut ubi aut unde?—; sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat. 4.66. conferam avum avum BE autem avum N avū aut R avum autem V tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali? quae hic rei publicae vulnera inponebat, eadem ille sanabat. si nihil est, quod tam miseros faciat quam inpietas et scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen aeque miser, qui patriae consulit, et is, qui illam extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in in E om. BRNV iis, qui habent ad virtutem progressionis aliquantum. 4.67. vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. at quo at quo RN 2 a quo N 2 ad quod BEV utantur utantur Lamb. utuntur BENV uta|entur ( tertia litt. utrum a an u sit discerni nequit ) R homines acuti argumento ad probandum, operae pretium est considerare. quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere summa ecrescere BE summa crescere R possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summae ... contrariorum om. N contrariorum Lamb. contrariarum BEV contrarium R summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur, an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia in aliis esse maiora, illud dubium, ad id, quod summum del. Lamb. bonum dicitis, ecquaenam possit fieri fieri possit BE accessio. vos autem cum perspicuis dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicua conamini tollere. 4.68. itaque itaque atque BE rursus rursus cod. Glogav. usus BERN 1 V usi N 2 eadem ratione, qua sum paulo ante paulo ante p. 144,5-14 usus, haerebitis. si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt, quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum, quem vos facitis, quicquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud, cuius id consequens id consequens (d ex corr. alt. m. ) N inconsequens BER consequens V sit, non posse esse verum. Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? illarum BE gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valitudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae, ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est. quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. ex ea difficultate illae 'fallaciloquae', fallaciloquae P. Man. fallaci loquele BE facili loquele RN fa- cili al' fallaci loquele V fallaciloquentiae Non. p. 113 ut ait Accius, accius BRN actius E acrius V malitiae natae sunt. 4.74. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.75. —Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nisi Se. si nulla earum non ita contenta add. Se. nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. 4.76. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil nil om. R pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne paleamne V paleam ne RN paleamve BE portet, ad bene aut ad male guberdum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in guberdo nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique qui cuique cuicumque Mdv. artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria quidem modo paria Lamb. modo paria quidem peccata sunt. 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 5.1. Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. 5.2. tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.4. Hic ego: Pomponius quidem, inquam, noster iocari videtur, et fortasse suo iure. ita enim se Athenis collocavit, ut sit paene unus ex Atticis, ut id etiam cognomen videatur habiturus. Ego autem tibi, Piso, assentior usu hoc venire, ut acrius aliquanto et attentius de claris viris locorum admonitu admonitum Non. cogitemus. ut acrius...cogitemus Non. p. 190, 191 scis enim me quodam tempore Metapontum venisse tecum neque ad hospitem ante devertisse, devertisse Lambini vetus cod. in marg. ed. rep. ; divertisse quam Pythagorae ipsum illum locum, ubi vitam ediderat, sedemque viderim. hoc autem tempore, etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia summorum virorum, tamen ego illa moveor exhedra. modo enim fuit Carneadis, Carneadis Mdv. carneades quem videre videor—est enim nota imago—, a sedeque ipsa tanta tanti RN ingenii magnitudine orbata desiderari illam vocem puto. 5.6. Tum Piso: Atqui, Cicero, inquit, ista studia, si ad imitandos summos viros spectant, ingeniosorum sunt; sin tantum modo ad indicia veteris memoriae cognoscenda, curiosorum. te autem hortamur omnes, currentem quidem, ut spero, ut eos, quos novisse vis, imitari etiam velis. Hic ego: Etsi facit hic quidem, inquam, Piso, ut vides, ea, quae praecipis, tamen mihi grata hortatio tua est. Tum ille amicissime, ut solebat: Nos vero, inquit, omnes omnia ad huius adolescentiam conferamus, in primisque ut aliquid suorum studiorum philosophiae quoque impertiat, vel ut te imitetur, quem amat, vel ut illud ipsum, quod studet, facere possit ornatius. sed utrum hortandus es nobis, Luci, inquit, an etiam tua sponte propensus es? mihi quidem Antiochum, quem audis, satis belle videris attendere. Tum ille timide vel potius verecunde: Facio, inquit, equidem, sed audistine modo de Carneade? rapior illuc, revocat autem Antiochus, nec est praeterea, quem audiamus. 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.8. Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. sed a te ... Peripat. sententia Non. p. 91 est sed et enim Non. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Staseam dett. stans eam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me videtur legenduim : in me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo. 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 5.10. persecutus est est N 2 om. BERN 1 V Non. p. 232 Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab isdem non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret. exprimeret R 5.11. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab isdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, add. Ascens. 1511 pluribus praeterea conscripsisset cum scripsisset NV qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica status ... in re publica om. BER rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. vitae autem degendae elegendae E eligendae B ratio maxime quidem illis illis quidem BE placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae vite erat BE simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.27. haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt, sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. huius enim aetati haec igitur ... aetati Non. p. 15 ignoscetis cuius aetatis Non. et huic nunc haec primum haec primum R primum hoc ( ante primum ras., in qua cognosc. h) N 2 hic primum BE hoc primum V fortasse secl. Mdv. audientis audientis Mdv. audienti (audiendi E) servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam; etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur. Exposita igitur, inquit, inquit om. BE terminatione rerum expetendarum cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. quam ob rem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse reapse re ab se primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. diligere N 2 V diligi BERN 1 quod quamquam dubitationem non habet—est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur que suis add. Crat. natura ac comprehenditur suis Alanus cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur—, tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto. 5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. 5.29. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'. et qui Et qui RV Equi BE et qui (et ab alt. m. in ras. add. ) N ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus inimicus esse BE atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum. 5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. 5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? 5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. 5.33. De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, fortuitu BER videmus N 2 videamus videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando quando dett. quid BE quā R q ua NV naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia quia Dav. qui continentur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.39. Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium. itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus arboremque et novellam et vetulam vetulam dicimus BE et vigere et 'senescere'. ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, animalibus BE sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et putare et BE aptare et R amputare et NV aliena earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, circumcidat dett. circumcidet R circumdat BEN 1 circumdet N 2 V amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint possint Dav. possit ire, ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, possint A. Man. possent ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id id om. BE extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur. 5.40. at vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam moveatur, quid facturam putas? an ea, quae per vinitorem antea ante BE consequebatur, per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam curabit? sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta erit, erit ( priore loco ) C.F. W. Mue. sit vivere. ita similis erit ei ei Bentl., Gz. ; et finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. quid, si quod si R (Quod), NV non sensus modo ei modo sensus non ei BE non sensus ei modo R sit datus, datus sit BE verum etiam animus hominis? eciam animus hominis N 2 V etiam animus (animus R) est animus hominis RN 1 animus est etiam animus hominis BE etiam animus, et animus hominis Vict. non necesse est et illa pristina manere, ut Inter RN 1 ad tuendas inter BE ut tuenda Inter N 2 V tuenda sint, et ut tuenda sint, et Or. ut tuendas. haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione expletione explanatione R naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? sic, quod est sic, quod est Se. sitque BERN 1 V sicque N 2 Sic extitit Mdv. Librarius archetypi pro ē legit que extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum ductum (uc ab alt. m. in ras. ) N doctum commendatione Lamb. commutatione BE commutate V comunitate R c oi tate N a prima commendatione naturae, multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 5.45. In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem autem om. RNV est in ea, quod quidam quidem BER volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit. 5.47. Quid? in quid in RNV quod in BE motu et et etiam BE in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur ducuntur NV de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam fugienda BER putamus, cur non etiam, ac etiam ac N 2 iam et hanc BE etiam (eciam V) hac RV etiam hanc N 1 fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus fugimus P. Man. fugiamus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus corpus V opus est aut dolet aut caret viribus. 5.48. Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. inditia nature N iudicia natura BE iudicia nature RV tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi ut pulsi P. Man. aut pulsi ( etiam B) recurrant? ut aliquid recurrant ut aliquid cod. Morel. recurrentur aliquid R recurrant aliquid BEV recurrerentur aliquid ( ut vid. ) N 1 recurrerent et aliquid N 2 scire se scire se etiam R gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis ingeniis BER studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? 5.49. ut add. Se. mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur videatur BER videtur N om. V in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. finxerit RN 1 V finxerint BE finxerat N 2 neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin quin N 2 qui puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum rerum Marsus regum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse patria esse (pat a ee, 1 et in ras. a ee ab alt. m. ) N patrie V patria BER cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. 5.50. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse add. ed. princ. Roman. ( sec. Mdv. sil. ) senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito aut democrito (de mocrito V) RNV loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum magnum ac Brem. magna ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. 5.51. Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a a e RNV nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum cognitiones quem ad modum N 2 cogni- tionesque admodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, add. Se. inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. 5.53. Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE 5.54. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus phalereus R phalerius BEN phalerus V Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream alexandriam RNV contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa ipsa om. BE philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit scripsit ed. Veneta 1494 ; scribit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui qui N 2 quin etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus. soleamus valeamus R 5.55. Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia inditia N iudicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper agere semper aliquod BE neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod quod RNV qui BE in pueritia facillime se arbitrantur arbitrantur RNV arbitrentur BE naturae voluntatem voluntatem Lamb. voluptatem posse cognoscere. videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint. cum vero paulum processerunt, processerunt Non. processerint lusionibus vel laboriosis laboriosius Non. delectantur, cum ... delectantur Non. p. 211 cum hi vero Non. ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint, eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adolescit una cum aetatibus. itaque, ne si ne si edd. nisi iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus. 5.60. itaque amplius itaque BE itaque amplius RNV nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est est Thurot. ( Revue critique 1870,1. semestrep.21 ); sunt R sit NV om. BE haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, consentanee sunt BE refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae quae Matthiae ( Vermischte Schriften 1833 p. 31 sq. ); queque sint notitiae, quae quidem quae quidem Se. quaeque (queque) BENV que R significentur significent BE rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis cuiusque vis NV cuiusvis BE cuius vis R et natura sit mox mox p. 189, 20 sqq. videbimus. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.64. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum verum sed Non. etiam historiae refertae talibus exp. ... refertae Non. p. 309 sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores misimus regibus, regibus misimus BE (misimus regem municissimum menibus, rell. om., R) nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret, nostra in re publica Lucretia et quae per del. Vict. vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui interficeret filiam, filiam interficeret BE ne stupraretur. quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin quin NV qui BER intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos inmemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? Quibus rebus expositis breviter breviter expositis BE —nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus—sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur ex hijs virtutibus oritur N et in iis iis Mdv. his R hijs NV illis BE haeret, per se esse expetendum. 5.66. nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam quoddam BE ingenitum ingenitum B E innatum RN in natum V quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam quam que RN exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet fundet se BE in in N post fundet ab alt. m. superscr. est (= scilicet) usu ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti forte RNV viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus in rebus R et (ī ab alt. m. superscr. ) N 2 vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. 5.67. atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, sint ( ante ut) BE sunt ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. 5.68. ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur. 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.73. saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta dicta sunt BE ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. expetendam dett. petendam positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, adamasset BE alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. 5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est? 5.75. inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? comentatus R commentatus ( prior t in ras. paulo capaciore ) N commendatus (conm. E) BE comendatus V Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, alias N 2 alia sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto aliquando BE ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere. 5.78. Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene pene BENV porro R minima. quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. quare attende, quaeso. nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque quid ad id, quod quaerebam, quaerebam ( p. 194, 14-18 ) Mdv. et Wes. ( apud Mdv. ); queram respondeas. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.88. sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. 5.91. At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum paulum Brem. parum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo audeo R igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt V bona appellare nec fraudare fraudari BR suo vetere vetere Wes. ad or. p. Sest. p. 7 (sec. Mdv) veteri nomine neque iam neque iam Se. quam aliquod aliquod Lamb. aliquid RV ali- quam BE potius novum exquirere, acquirere E virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. 5.92. terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at at Ascens. an hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita ait in vita om. Sacerd. risisse quem ... risisse Sacerd. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil VI 442) Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat acciderat V accideret ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, Oroete Vict. oronte BE oriente R orente V praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At At V ad R et BE multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. 5.94. nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum oculorum g-|enu R (num legendum sit renum sec. Tusc. II 60 incertum est) dolorem. quasi quasi Lamb. quis vero hoc hoc vero R didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse et esse P. Man. et esset ferendum viro. viro dett. vero hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui qui BE qm (= quoniam) RV dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis. is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides charmides BE carimdes R carneades V Epicureus Epicureus Mdv. epicurus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide carmide B carnide E carimde R carneades V noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. ostendit pedes et pectus. ac tamen hic mallet non dolere. 5.95. Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et add. Gz. (e cod. Spirensi ?) summe laudabiles laudabilesque RV virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, labor possit possit molestia BE labor possit molestia R labor possit et molestia V non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes esse semper semper esse BE beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit. | 2.15. "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style â an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 2.21. 'If the things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver them from the fear of the gods and of death and pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their desires, we should have no reason to blame them, since on every hand they would be abundantly supplied with pleasures, and on no side would be exposed to any pain or grief, which are the sole evil.' " At this point Triarius could contain himself no longer. "Seriously now, Torquatus," he broke out, "does Epicurus really say that?" (For my own part, I believe that he knew it to be true, but wanted to hear Torquatus admit it.) Torquatus, nothing daunted, answered with complete assurance: "Certainly, those are his very words. But you don't perceive his meaning." "Oh," I retorted, "if he means one thing and says another, I never shall understand his meaning. But what he understands he expresses clearly enough. If what he here says is that sensualists are not to be blamed provided they are wise men, he is talking nonsense. He might as well say that parricides are not to be blamed provided they are free from avarice and from fear of the gods, of death and pain. Even so, what is the point of granting the sensual any saving clause? Why imagine certain fictitious persons who, though living sensually, would not be blamed by the wisest of philosophers for their sensuality, provided they avoided other faults? 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 2.45. "By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to carry on several operations at the same time with extreme speed, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the causes and effects of things, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. 2.70. "But Epicurus, you will tell me (for this is your strong point), denies that anyone who does not live morally can live pleasantly. As if I cared what Epicurus says or denies! What I ask is, what is it consistent for a man to say who places the Chief Good in pleasure? What reason can you give for thinking that Thorius, or Postumius of Chios, or the master of them all, Orata, did not live extremely pleasant lives? Epicurus himself says that the life of sensualists is blameless, if they are not utter fools â for that is what his proviso, 'if they are free from fear and from desire,' amounts to. And, as he offers an antidote for both desire and fear, he virtually offers free indulgence for sensuality. Eliminate those passions, he says, and he cannot find anything to blame in a life of profligacy. 2.106. But with you it is the recollection of pleasures enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be bodily pleasures, â for if it be any others, it ceases to be true that mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body. Yet if bodily pleasure even when past can give delight, I do not see why Aristotle should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus. The famous Syrian monarch boasts that he has taken with him all the sensual pleasures that he has enjoyed. How, asks Aristotle, could a dead man continue to experience a feeling which even while alive he could only be conscious of so long as he was actually enjoying it? So that bodily pleasures are transient; each in turn evaporates, leaving cause for regrets more often than for recollection. Accordingly Africanus must be counted happier than Sardanapalus, when he addresses his country with the words: Cease, Rome, thy foes â and the glorious conclusion: My toils have won thee battlements secure. His past toils are what he delights in, whereas you bid us dwell upon our past pleasures; he recalls experiences that never had any connection with bodily enjoyment, but you never rise above the body. 2.110. in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 2.112. Suppose when Xerxes led forth his huge fleets and armies of horse and foot, bridged the Hellespont, cut through Athos, marched over sea and sailed over land â suppose on his reaching Greece with his great armada some one asked him the reason for all this enormous apparatus of warfare, and he were to reply that he had wanted to procure some honey from Hymettus! surely he would be thought to have had no adequate motive for so vast an undertaking. So with our Wise Man, equipped and adorned with all the noblest accomplishments and virtues, not like Xerxes traversing the seas on foot and the mountains on shipboard, but mentally embracing sky and earth and sea in their entirety â to say that this man's aim is pleasure is to say that all his high endeavour is for the sake of a little honey. 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.23. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.26. "We may now observe how strikingly the principles I have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim â (and you have observed, no doubt, that I have all along been translating the Greek term telos either by 'final' or 'ultimate aim,' or 'chief Good,' and for 'final or ultimate aim' we may also substitute 'End') â inasmuch then as the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and destinies is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical manner, with great length and fullness and with all the resources of choice diction and impressive argument; but for my own part I like the concise and pointed 'consequences' of the Stoics. 3.28. "Next I ask, who can be proud of a life that is miserable or not happy? It follows that one can only be proud of one's lot when it is a happy one. This proves that the happy life is a thing that deserves (so to put it) that one should be proud of it; and this cannot rightly be said of any life but one morally honourable. Therefore the moral life is the happy life. And the man who deserves and wins praise has exceptional cause for pride and self-satisfaction; but these things count for so much that he can justly be pronounced happy; therefore the life of such a man can with full correctness be described as happy also. Thus if Moral Worth is the criterion of happiness, Moral Worth must be deemed the only Good. 3.29. "Once more; could it be denied that it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm and lofty mind, such a one as we call a brave man, unless it be established that pain is not an evil? For just as it is impossible for one who counts death as an evil not to fear death, so in no case can a man disregard and despise a thing that he decides to be evil. This being laid down as generally admitted, we take as our minor premise that the brave and high-minded man despises and holds of no account all the accidents to which mankind is liable. The conclusion follows that nothing is evil that is not base. Also, your lofty, distinguished, magimous and truly brave man, who thinks all human vicissitudes beneath him, I mean, the character we desire to produce, our ideal man, must unquestionably have faith in himself and in his own character both past and future, and think well of himself, holding that no ill can befall the wise man. Here then is another proof of the same position, that Moral Worth alone is good, and that to live honourably, that is virtuously, is to live happily. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.74. "However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 4.6. Then, in themes demanding ornate and dignified treatment, however imposing, how brilliant is their diction! On Justice, Temperance, Courage, Friendship, on the conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, the career of the statesman, â no hair-splitting like that of the Stoics, no niggling minutiae, but the loftier passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of their consolations, their exhortations, even their warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the highest eminence! In fact, their rhetorical exercises were twofold, like the nature of the subjects themselves. For every question for debate can be argued either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or circumstances involved, or, these also being taken into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves in both kinds; and this training produced their remarkable fluency in each class of discussion. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 4.18. Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 4.48. But what can be more inconsistent than the procedure they profess, to ascertain the Chief Good first, and then to return to Nature, and demand from her the primary motive of conduct or of duty? Considerations of conduct or duty do not supply the impulse to desire the things that are in accordance with nature; it is these things which excite desire and give motives for conduct."I now come to those concise proofs of yours which you called 'consequences.' I will start with one as concise as anything could be: 'Everything good is praiseworthy; but everything praiseworthy is morally honourable; therefore everything good is morally honourable.' What a dagger of lead! Why, who will grant you your major premise? (and if this be granted there is no need of the minor; for if everything good is praiseworthy, then everything good is honourable). 4.49. Who, I say, will grant you this, except Pyrrho, Aristo and their fellows, whose doctrines you reject? Aristotle, Xenocrates and the whole of their following will not allow it; because they call health, strength, riches, fame and many other things good, but do not call them praiseworthy. And these, though holding that the End of Goods is not limited to virtue alone, yet rate virtue higher than all other things; but what do you suppose will be the attitude of those who entirely dissociated virtue from the end of Goods, Epicurus, Hieronymus, and also of any supporters of the End of Carneades? 4.50. Or how will Callipho or Diodorus be able to grant your premise, who combine with Moral Worth another factor belonging to an entirely different category? Are you then content, Cato, to take disputed premises for granted, and draw from these any conclusion you want? And again, the following proof is a sorites, which according to you is a most fallacious form of reasoning: 'what is good is to be wished; what is to be wished is desirable; what is desirable is praiseworthy'; and so on through the remaining steps, but I call a halt at this one, for, just as before, no one will grant you that what is desirable is praiseworthy. As for your other argument, it is by no means a 'consequence,' but stupid to a degree, though, of course, the Stoic leaders and not yourself are responsible for that: 'Happiness is a thing to be proud of, whereas it cannot be the case that anyone should have good reason to be proud without Moral Worth.' 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 4.64. It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. of course everybody knows that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom. You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris! 4.65. "Really, Cato, there is no analogy between progress in virtue and cases such as you describe, in which however far one advances, the situation one wishes to escape from still remains the same until one has actually emerged from it. The man does not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the puppies are as blind before they have opened their eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good analogies would be these: one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius Gracchus was not happier than his son, when the one devoted himself to the service of the state and the other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how? Still he aspired to fame and honour, and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue. 4.66. Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The former strove to heal the wounds which the latter inflicted on the state. If there is nothing that makes men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that all who are foolish are miserable, as of course they are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not so miserable as one who longs for its ruin. Therefore those who achieve definite progress towards virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices. 4.67. Your teachers, however, while allowing progress towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is worth while to examine the argument on which these clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this: In the case of arts or sciences which admit of advancement, the opposite of those arts and sciences will also admit of advance; but virtue is absolute and incapable of increase; therefore the vices also, being the opposite of the virtues, are incapable of gradation. Pray tell me then, does a certainty explain an uncertainty, or does uncertainty disprove a certainty? Now, that some vices are worse than others is certain; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light on the uncertain, you endeavour to make the uncertain disprove the certain. 4.68. Therefore you can be checkmated by the same argument as I employed just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be worse than another depends on the fact that the End of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, since it is certain that the vices of all men are not equal. For we are bound to hold that if a conclusion is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be true."Now what has landed you in this impasse? Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's health, the management of one's estate, participation in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life; nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which according to you is the beâall and the endâall of existence; objections that were urged most earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the difficulty that gave birth to those 'base conceits deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. 4.74. "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.75. Transgressions are equal. â How so, pray? â Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. â Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. â Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. â Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. 4.76. Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. â Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. 4.77. "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." 5.4. "As for our friend Pomponius," I interposed, "I believe he is joking; and no doubt he is a licensed wit, for he has so taken root in Athens that he is almost an Athenian; in fact I expect he will get the surname of Atticus! But I, Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. You remember how I once came with you to Metapontum, and would not go to the house where we were to stay until I had seen the very place where Pythagoras breathed his last and the seat he sat in. All over Athens, I know, there are many reminders of eminent men in the actual place where they lived; but at the present moment it is that alcove over there which appeals to me, for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him now (for his portrait is familiar), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect." 5.6. "Well, Cicero," said Piso, "these enthusiasms befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy the example of the great. If they only stimulate antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. But we all of us exhort you â though I hope it is a case of spurring a willing steed â to resolve to imitate your heroes as well as to know about them." "He is practising your precepts already, Piso," said I, "as you are aware; but all the same thank you for encouraging him." "Well," said Piso, with his usual amiability, "let us all join forces to promote the lad's improvement; and especially let us try to make him spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as to follow the example of yourself for whom he has such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius," he asked, "do you need our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus's lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive pupil." "I try to be," replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; "but have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to." 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.8. "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10. Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11. The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();" affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.33. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.39. "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.45. "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâtotal of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 5.51. But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. 5.55. "Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider no better than death. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.73. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87. On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.88. But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all. 5.95. "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." |
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67. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.1-1.10, 1.17, 2.15, 2.21, 2.34, 2.45, 2.70, 2.106, 2.110, 3.7-3.10, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.23, 3.26, 3.28-3.29, 3.31, 3.33, 3.41, 3.50, 3.62-3.64, 3.74, 4.3, 4.6, 4.14, 4.18, 4.21, 4.45, 4.48-4.51, 4.61, 4.64-4.68, 4.74-4.77, 5.1-5.2, 5.4, 5.6-5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.22-5.33, 5.37-5.40, 5.42-5.43, 5.45, 5.47-5.51, 5.53-5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.66-5.68, 5.71, 5.73-5.75, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86-5.89, 5.91-5.92, 5.94-5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, and academic scepticism •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius, de finibus •cicero, marcus tullius, preface to •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance •cicero, marcus tullius, political career •cicero, marcus tullius, speeches •cicero, marcus tullius, letters •cicero, marcus tullius •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, and auctoritas •cicero, marcus tullius, and antiochus •cicero, marcus tullius, lucullus Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 82, 86, 113, 141; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 44; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55, 56, 67, 69; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 88, 89, 99, 105, 107, 111, 112, 118, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 161, 164, 173, 175, 177, 181, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 201 | 2.15. "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style â an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 2.21. 'If the things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver them from the fear of the gods and of death and pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their desires, we should have no reason to blame them, since on every hand they would be abundantly supplied with pleasures, and on no side would be exposed to any pain or grief, which are the sole evil.' " At this point Triarius could contain himself no longer. "Seriously now, Torquatus," he broke out, "does Epicurus really say that?" (For my own part, I believe that he knew it to be true, but wanted to hear Torquatus admit it.) Torquatus, nothing daunted, answered with complete assurance: "Certainly, those are his very words. But you don't perceive his meaning." "Oh," I retorted, "if he means one thing and says another, I never shall understand his meaning. But what he understands he expresses clearly enough. If what he here says is that sensualists are not to be blamed provided they are wise men, he is talking nonsense. He might as well say that parricides are not to be blamed provided they are free from avarice and from fear of the gods, of death and pain. Even so, what is the point of granting the sensual any saving clause? Why imagine certain fictitious persons who, though living sensually, would not be blamed by the wisest of philosophers for their sensuality, provided they avoided other faults? 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 2.45. "By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to carry on several operations at the same time with extreme speed, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the causes and effects of things, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. 2.70. "But Epicurus, you will tell me (for this is your strong point), denies that anyone who does not live morally can live pleasantly. As if I cared what Epicurus says or denies! What I ask is, what is it consistent for a man to say who places the Chief Good in pleasure? What reason can you give for thinking that Thorius, or Postumius of Chios, or the master of them all, Orata, did not live extremely pleasant lives? Epicurus himself says that the life of sensualists is blameless, if they are not utter fools â for that is what his proviso, 'if they are free from fear and from desire,' amounts to. And, as he offers an antidote for both desire and fear, he virtually offers free indulgence for sensuality. Eliminate those passions, he says, and he cannot find anything to blame in a life of profligacy. 2.106. But with you it is the recollection of pleasures enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be bodily pleasures, â for if it be any others, it ceases to be true that mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body. Yet if bodily pleasure even when past can give delight, I do not see why Aristotle should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus. The famous Syrian monarch boasts that he has taken with him all the sensual pleasures that he has enjoyed. How, asks Aristotle, could a dead man continue to experience a feeling which even while alive he could only be conscious of so long as he was actually enjoying it? So that bodily pleasures are transient; each in turn evaporates, leaving cause for regrets more often than for recollection. Accordingly Africanus must be counted happier than Sardanapalus, when he addresses his country with the words: Cease, Rome, thy foes â and the glorious conclusion: My toils have won thee battlements secure. His past toils are what he delights in, whereas you bid us dwell upon our past pleasures; he recalls experiences that never had any connection with bodily enjoyment, but you never rise above the body. 2.110. in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.23. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.26. "We may now observe how strikingly the principles I have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim â (and you have observed, no doubt, that I have all along been translating the Greek term telos either by 'final' or 'ultimate aim,' or 'chief Good,' and for 'final or ultimate aim' we may also substitute 'End') â inasmuch then as the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and destinies is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical manner, with great length and fullness and with all the resources of choice diction and impressive argument; but for my own part I like the concise and pointed 'consequences' of the Stoics. 3.28. "Next I ask, who can be proud of a life that is miserable or not happy? It follows that one can only be proud of one's lot when it is a happy one. This proves that the happy life is a thing that deserves (so to put it) that one should be proud of it; and this cannot rightly be said of any life but one morally honourable. Therefore the moral life is the happy life. And the man who deserves and wins praise has exceptional cause for pride and self-satisfaction; but these things count for so much that he can justly be pronounced happy; therefore the life of such a man can with full correctness be described as happy also. Thus if Moral Worth is the criterion of happiness, Moral Worth must be deemed the only Good. 3.29. "Once more; could it be denied that it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm and lofty mind, such a one as we call a brave man, unless it be established that pain is not an evil? For just as it is impossible for one who counts death as an evil not to fear death, so in no case can a man disregard and despise a thing that he decides to be evil. This being laid down as generally admitted, we take as our minor premise that the brave and high-minded man despises and holds of no account all the accidents to which mankind is liable. The conclusion follows that nothing is evil that is not base. Also, your lofty, distinguished, magimous and truly brave man, who thinks all human vicissitudes beneath him, I mean, the character we desire to produce, our ideal man, must unquestionably have faith in himself and in his own character both past and future, and think well of himself, holding that no ill can befall the wise man. Here then is another proof of the same position, that Moral Worth alone is good, and that to live honourably, that is virtuously, is to live happily. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.74. "However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 4.6. Then, in themes demanding ornate and dignified treatment, however imposing, how brilliant is their diction! On Justice, Temperance, Courage, Friendship, on the conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, the career of the statesman, â no hair-splitting like that of the Stoics, no niggling minutiae, but the loftier passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of their consolations, their exhortations, even their warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the highest eminence! In fact, their rhetorical exercises were twofold, like the nature of the subjects themselves. For every question for debate can be argued either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or circumstances involved, or, these also being taken into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves in both kinds; and this training produced their remarkable fluency in each class of discussion. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 4.18. Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 4.48. But what can be more inconsistent than the procedure they profess, to ascertain the Chief Good first, and then to return to Nature, and demand from her the primary motive of conduct or of duty? Considerations of conduct or duty do not supply the impulse to desire the things that are in accordance with nature; it is these things which excite desire and give motives for conduct."I now come to those concise proofs of yours which you called 'consequences.' I will start with one as concise as anything could be: 'Everything good is praiseworthy; but everything praiseworthy is morally honourable; therefore everything good is morally honourable.' What a dagger of lead! Why, who will grant you your major premise? (and if this be granted there is no need of the minor; for if everything good is praiseworthy, then everything good is honourable). 4.49. Who, I say, will grant you this, except Pyrrho, Aristo and their fellows, whose doctrines you reject? Aristotle, Xenocrates and the whole of their following will not allow it; because they call health, strength, riches, fame and many other things good, but do not call them praiseworthy. And these, though holding that the End of Goods is not limited to virtue alone, yet rate virtue higher than all other things; but what do you suppose will be the attitude of those who entirely dissociated virtue from the end of Goods, Epicurus, Hieronymus, and also of any supporters of the End of Carneades? 4.50. Or how will Callipho or Diodorus be able to grant your premise, who combine with Moral Worth another factor belonging to an entirely different category? Are you then content, Cato, to take disputed premises for granted, and draw from these any conclusion you want? And again, the following proof is a sorites, which according to you is a most fallacious form of reasoning: 'what is good is to be wished; what is to be wished is desirable; what is desirable is praiseworthy'; and so on through the remaining steps, but I call a halt at this one, for, just as before, no one will grant you that what is desirable is praiseworthy. As for your other argument, it is by no means a 'consequence,' but stupid to a degree, though, of course, the Stoic leaders and not yourself are responsible for that: 'Happiness is a thing to be proud of, whereas it cannot be the case that anyone should have good reason to be proud without Moral Worth.' 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 4.64. It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. of course everybody knows that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom. You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris! 4.65. "Really, Cato, there is no analogy between progress in virtue and cases such as you describe, in which however far one advances, the situation one wishes to escape from still remains the same until one has actually emerged from it. The man does not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the puppies are as blind before they have opened their eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good analogies would be these: one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius Gracchus was not happier than his son, when the one devoted himself to the service of the state and the other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how? Still he aspired to fame and honour, and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue. 4.66. Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The former strove to heal the wounds which the latter inflicted on the state. If there is nothing that makes men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that all who are foolish are miserable, as of course they are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not so miserable as one who longs for its ruin. Therefore those who achieve definite progress towards virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices. 4.67. Your teachers, however, while allowing progress towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is worth while to examine the argument on which these clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this: In the case of arts or sciences which admit of advancement, the opposite of those arts and sciences will also admit of advance; but virtue is absolute and incapable of increase; therefore the vices also, being the opposite of the virtues, are incapable of gradation. Pray tell me then, does a certainty explain an uncertainty, or does uncertainty disprove a certainty? Now, that some vices are worse than others is certain; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light on the uncertain, you endeavour to make the uncertain disprove the certain. 4.68. Therefore you can be checkmated by the same argument as I employed just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be worse than another depends on the fact that the End of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, since it is certain that the vices of all men are not equal. For we are bound to hold that if a conclusion is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be true."Now what has landed you in this impasse? Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's health, the management of one's estate, participation in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life; nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which according to you is the beâall and the endâall of existence; objections that were urged most earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the difficulty that gave birth to those 'base conceits deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. 4.74. "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.75. Transgressions are equal. â How so, pray? â Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base. â Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal. â Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal. â Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. 4.76. Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause. â Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no differences as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the other upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down. 4.77. "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." 5.4. "As for our friend Pomponius," I interposed, "I believe he is joking; and no doubt he is a licensed wit, for he has so taken root in Athens that he is almost an Athenian; in fact I expect he will get the surname of Atticus! But I, Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. You remember how I once came with you to Metapontum, and would not go to the house where we were to stay until I had seen the very place where Pythagoras breathed his last and the seat he sat in. All over Athens, I know, there are many reminders of eminent men in the actual place where they lived; but at the present moment it is that alcove over there which appeals to me, for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him now (for his portrait is familiar), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect." 5.6. "Well, Cicero," said Piso, "these enthusiasms befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy the example of the great. If they only stimulate antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. But we all of us exhort you â though I hope it is a case of spurring a willing steed â to resolve to imitate your heroes as well as to know about them." "He is practising your precepts already, Piso," said I, "as you are aware; but all the same thank you for encouraging him." "Well," said Piso, with his usual amiability, "let us all join forces to promote the lad's improvement; and especially let us try to make him spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as to follow the example of yourself for whom he has such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius," he asked, "do you need our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus's lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive pupil." "I try to be," replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; "but have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to." 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.8. "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10. Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11. The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();" affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.33. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.39. "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.45. "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâtotal of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 5.51. But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. 5.55. "Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider no better than death. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.73. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87. On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.88. But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all. 5.95. "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." |
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| 68. Cicero, Letters, 3.5.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, political career Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 1 |
69. Cicero, Topica, 58-59, 6, 60-66, 8, 90, 25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 77| 25. his igitur locis qui sunt expositi ad omne argumentum reperiendum reperiendum om. codd. O tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio ad reperiendum ad reperiendum om. O datur. Vtrum igitur hactenus satis est? Tibi quidem tam acuto et tam occupato puto. sed quoniam avidum hominem ad has discendi epulas recepi, sic accipiam, ut reliquiarum sit potius aliquid quam te hinc patiar non satiatum discedere. | |
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| 70. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, a b c d\n0 2.12(11).4 2.12(11).4 2 12(11)\n1 2.12(11).3.7-4.10 2.12(11).3.7 2 12(11)\n2 3.3.1 3.3.1 3 3 \n3 1.1.25 1.1.25 1 1 \n4 3.5.4 3.5.4 3 5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 115 |
| 71. Cicero, Hortensius, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 130 |
| 72. Cicero, Orator, 3.80 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 22; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 55 |
| 73. Cicero, Lucullus, 10, 12, 131-132, 15, 31, 38, 73, 8, 18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 21, 65 |
74. Cicero, Pro Archia, 21.3-21.5, 21.15-21.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 48, 49| 15. quaeret quispiam: 'quid? illi ipsi summi viri quorum virtutes litteris proditae sunt istane doctrina quam tu effers laudibus eruditi fuerunt?' difficile est hoc de omnibus confirmare, sed tamen est certum quid quod GEea respondeam. ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse sine doctrina, et sine doctrina et Schütz : et ( om. p : etiam b χ1 ) sine doctrina codd. naturae ipsius habitu prope divino per se ipsos et moderatos et gravis exstitisse fateor; etiam illud adiungo, saepius ad laudem atque virtutem naturam sine doctrina naturae ... doctrina om. Ee quam sine natura valuisse doctrinam. atque idem ego hoc hoc GEe : om. cett. contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam et et GEe : atque cett. inlustrem accesserit ratio quaedam conformatioque oratio ς b1gp conformatio GE : confirmatio cett. doctrinae, tum illud nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare solere exsistere. | |
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| 75. Cicero, Pro Caelio, 32, 34, 33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 127 |
| 76. Cicero, On Fate, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 149 |
| 77. Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 93 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 8 |
| 78. Cicero, Philippicae, 2.20, 2.63, 2.75, 2.84-2.87, 2.110, 3.34 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, political views •cicero, marcus tullius, speeches Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 127; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 47, 168 |
| 79. Cicero, Pro Marcello, 27, 23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 212 |
80. Cicero, Pro Murena, 61.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 39, 133| 5. fortunas quam res publica consulem ad communem salutem defendendam vocare. nam quod legem de ambitu tuli, certe ita tuli ut eam quam mihimet ipsi iam pridem tulerim tuleram Bake de civium periculis defendendis non abrogarem abrogarim Wesenberg . etenim si largitionem factam esse confiterer idque recte factum esse defenderem, facerem improbe, etiam si alius legem tulisset; cum vero nihil commissum contra legem esse defendam, quid est quod meam defensionem latio legis impediat? | |
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| 81. Cicero, Pro Plancio, 6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 82. Cicero, Pro Quinctio, 64 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 39 |
| 83. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 137, 139, 19, 47, 93, 126 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 130 |
84. Cicero, Pro Sulla, 46, 2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156| 2. et quoniam L. Torquatus, meus familiaris ac necessarius, iudices, existimavit, si nostram in accusatione sua necessitudinem necessitudinem Tek : necessitatem cett. familiaritatemque violasset, aliquid se de auctoritate meae defensionis posse detrahere, cum huius periculi propulsatione coniungam defensionem offici mei. quo quidem genere non uterer orationis orationis non uterer e π , iudices, hoc tempore, si mea solum interesset; multis enim locis mihi mihi hoc loco hab. T, post data e, ante locis cett. et data facultas est et saepe dabitur de mea laude dicendi; sed, ut ille vidit vidit Te π : iudices cett. , quantum de mea auctoritate deripuisset, tantum se de huius praesidiis deminuturum deminuturum speravit add. ς mg. : putavit (-tat σψ1 ) add. b2 ψ2ς , sic hoc ego sentio, si mei facti rationem vobis constantiamque huius offici ac defensionis probaro probavero e π , causam quoque me P. Sullae probaturum. | |
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| 85. Cicero, In Pisonem, 60, 24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 147 |
| 86. Cicero, Pro Milone, 17-18, 46-48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 121, 122 |
| 87. Cicero, In Verrem, 2.4.82, 2.4.106-2.4.109, 2.5.169, 2.5.187 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, against verres •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 126, 127; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 45, 252, 253; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 39 |
88. Cicero, De Domo Sua, 100, 102-104, 107-111, 141, 105 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 125| 105. ad Volaterras in castra L. L ucii Sullae mors Sex. Rosci quadriduo quo is occisus est Chrysogono nuntiatur. quaeritur etiam nunc quis cum nuntium miserit? nonne perspicuum est eundem qui Ameriam? curat Chrysogonus ut eius bona veneant veneant χψ : veniant cett. statim; qui non norat hominem aut rem. at qui at qui atque σχ ei venit in mentem praedia concupiscere hominis ignoti quem omnino numquam viderat? Soletis, cum aliquid huiusce modi audistis audistis ς : auditis cett. , iudices, continuo dicere: ' necesse est aliquem dixisse municipem aut vicinum; ei plerumque indicant, per eos plerique produntur.' hic nihil est quod suspicione occupetis suspicione occupetis Madvig : suspicionem hoc putetis codd. : suspicionem hanc putetis Sylvius . | |
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| 89. Cicero, On Friendship, 4, 97, 95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 133 |
| 90. Cicero, Commentariolum Petitionis, 35, 44, 17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 62 |
91. Cicero, Brutus, 287, 42-43, 46, 71, 79, 95, 41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 83| 41. sed studium eius generis maiorque vis agnoscitur in Pisistrato. Denique hunc denique hunc L : demum. Hunc Bake : demum. quem Simon proximo saeculo Themistocles insecutus est, ut apud nos, perantiquus, ut apud Atheniensis, non ita sane vetus. Fuit enim regte iam Graecia Graeca maluit Jahn , nostra autem civitate non ita pridem dominatu regio liberata. Nam bellum Volscorum illud gravissimum, cui Coriolanus exsul interfuit, eodem fere tempore quo Persarum bellum fuit, similisque fortuna clarorum virorum; | |
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92. Cicero, Brutus, 287 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 80| 287. at quid est tam fractum, tam minutum, tam in ipsa, quam tamen consequitur, concinnitate puerile? 'Atticorum similes esse volumus.' Optime; suntne igitur hi Attici oratores? 'Quis negare potest? Hos imitamur. imitamur G : imitatur H : imitantur FOBM2 ' Quo modo, qui quo quo modo BHM sunt et inter se dissimiles et aliorum? 'Thucydidem,' inquit, 'imitamur.' Optime, si historiam scribere, non si causas dicere cogitatis. Thucydides enim rerum gestarum pronuntiator sincerus et grandis etiam fuit; hoc forense concertatorium iudiciale non tractavit genus. Orationes autem quas interposuit—multae enim sunt—eas ego.laudare soleo; imitari neque possim si velim, nec velim fortasse si possim. Vt si quis Falerno vino delectetur, sed eo nec ita novo ut proximis consulibus natum velit, nec rursus ita vetere ut Opimium aut Anicium consulem quaerat—'atqui hae notae sunt optimae, optimae vulg. : optime L ' credo; sed nimia vetustas nec habet eam quam quaerimus suavitatem nec est iam sane tolerabilis— | |
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93. Cicero, Academica, 1.9, 1.21, 1.46, 1.121, 2.32, 2.62, 2.66, 2.104-2.105, 2.118-2.120 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, academica •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical treatises of •cicero, marcus tullius, plato and platonism of •cicero, marcus tullius, partitiones oratoriae •cicero, marcus tullius, and fusion of rhetorical and philosophical methods •cicero, marcus tullius, concurrence of •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance •cicero, marcus tullius, “scepticisms” of •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 59; Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 39, 40, 61, 64, 65, 87, 90, 91, 92, 96; Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 13| 1.9. Tum ego Sunt sunt uera *g . an s. vero? inquam “ista Varro. nam nos in nostra urbe peregritis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, reduxerunt s Aug. ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. tu aetatem patriae tu descriptiones discr. cod. Aug. l Mue. temporum, tu sacrorum iura tu sacerdotum, sacerdotem pm 1 nr tu domesticam tu bellicam bellicam] publicam Aug. disciplinam, tu sedum sedum vel -ium codd. Aug. plerique sedem *g*d regionum locorum tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera officia causas aperuisti; nos ... aperuisti Aug. civ. 6, 2 plurimum plurimumque s Ald. -que idem p. Gr. quidem poetis a petis *d nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis inchoasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. 1.21. ergo haec animorum; vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Iam nam Goer. virtus in in 1 et 2 om. *d animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et et om. *d in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. hominem enim enim om. *d autem Mue. esse censebant quasi partem quandam esse post quandam smn civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana hum. communi IFGronovius observ. 3, 6 quadam societate. ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut ad tenendum, aut ad agendum *dn om. s tuendum s ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam. Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum, 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? * | |
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| 94. Varro, On Agriculture, 1.2.1-1.2.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius cicero, marcus, and fabius cunctator Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 191 |
| 95. Varro, On The Latin Language, 5.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118 |
| 96. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 34.31-35.5, 35.18, 35.19, 35.20, 35.21, 35.22, 35.23, 35.24, 35.25, 35.26, 35.27, 35.28, 35.29, 35.30, 35.31, 35.32, 35.33, 35.34, 35.35, 35.36, 35.37, 35.38, 35.39, 35.40 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 216 |
97. Cicero, On Divination, 2.1, 2.12, 2.150 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and academic scepticism •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on the orator Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 30, 31, 38| 2.1. Quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti, quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla maior occurrebat, quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus; quod conpluribus iam libris me arbitror consecutum. Nam et cohortati sumus, ut maxime potuimus, ad philosophiae studium eo libro, qui est inscriptus Hortensius, et, quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus. 2.12. Quodsi nec earum rerum, quae subiectae sensibus sunt, ulla divinatio est nec earum, quae artibus continentur, nec earum, quae in philosophia disseruntur, nec earum, quae in re publica versantur, quarum rerum sit, nihil prorsus intellego; nam aut omnium debet esse, aut aliqua ei materia danda est, in qua versari possit. Sed nec omnium divinatio est, ut ratio docuit, nec locus nec materia invenitur, cui divinationem praeficere possimus. Vide igitur, ne nulla sit divinatio. Est quidam Graecus vulgaris in hanc sententiam versus: Bene quí coniciet, vátem hunc perhibebo óptumum. Num igitur aut, quae tempestas inpendeat, vates melius coniciet quam gubernator aut morbi naturam acutius quam medicus aut belli administrationem prudentius quam inperator coniectura adsequetur? 2.150. Perfugium videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurumae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugtia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. Cum quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxume contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare, quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et, quid in quamque sententiam dici possit, expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. Mihi vero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius. Quae cum essent dicta, surreximus. | 2.1. Book IIAfter serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens in the ways of the noblest learning — and this, I believe, I have already accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy. And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined. 2.12. But if there is no place for divination in things perceived by the senses, or in those included among the arts, or in those discussed by philosophers, or in those which have to do with government, I see absolutely no need for it anywhere. For either it ought to be of use in every case, or, at least, some department in which it may be employed should be found. But divination is not of use in every case, as my reasoning has shown; nor can any field or subject matter be found over which it may exercise control.[5] Therefore I am inclined to think that there is no such thing as divination. There is a much-quoted Greek verse to this effect:The best diviner I maintain to beThe man who guesses or conjectures best.Now do you think that a prophet will conjecture better whether a storm is at hand than a pilot? or that he will by conjecture make a more accurate diagnosis than a physician, or conduct a war with more skill than a general? 2.150. Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers — not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not — men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.Nothing could please me better, Quintus replied.When this was said, we arose. |
|
| 98. Asclepiades Myrleanus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
| 99. Ovid, Epistulae Ex Ponto, 1.8.36 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 146 |
| 100. Ovid, Epistulae (Heroides), 16.7 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 101. Tibullus, Elegies, 1.2.93-1.2.96, 2.3.51-2.3.52 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 148, 173 |
| 102. Antipater of Thessalonica, Epigrams, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
103. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.62-1.79, 2.1-2.13, 2.618-2.620, 2.625, 3.28-3.29, 3.74-3.77, 3.912-3.930, 3.1057-3.1067, 4.1037-4.1287, 6.575 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, rome imagined •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta (2023), Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians, 266; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 118, 148, 151, 251, 267; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67; Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 11| 1.62. Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret 1.63. in terris oppressa gravi sub religione, 1.64. quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat 1.65. horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, 1.66. primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra 1.67. est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra; 1.68. quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti 1.69. murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem 1.70. inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta 1.71. naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret. 1.72. ergo vivida vis animi pervicit et extra 1.73. processit longe flammantia moenia mundi 1.74. atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque, 1.75. unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri, 1.76. quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique 1.77. qua nam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. 1.78. quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim 1.79. opteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo. 2.1. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis 2.2. e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 2.3. non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 2.4. sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest. 2.5. per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli; 2.6. suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri 2.7. sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 2.8. edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 2.9. despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 2.10. errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 2.11. certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 2.12. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 2.13. ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 2.618. tympana tenta tot palmis et cymbala circum 2.619. concava, raucisonoque mitur cornua cantu, 2.620. et Phrygio stimulat numero cava tibia mentis, 2.625. munificat tacita mortalis muta salute, 3.28. his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas 3.29. percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 4.1037. Sollicitatur id in nobis, quod diximus ante, 4.1038. semen, adulta aetas cum primum roborat artus. 4.1039. namque alias aliud res commovet atque lacessit; 4.1040. ex homine humanum semen ciet una hominis vis. 4.1041. quod simul atque suis eiectum sedibus exit, 4.1042. per membra atque artus decedit corpore toto, 4.1043. in loca conveniens nervorum certa cietque 4.1044. continuo partis genitalis corporis ipsas. 4.1045. inritata tument loca semine fitque voluntas 4.1046. eicere id quo se contendit dira lubido, 4.1047. incitat inritans loca turgida semine multo 4.1048. idque petit corpus, mens unde est saucia amore; 4.1049. namque omnes plerumque cadunt in vulnus et illam 4.1050. emicat in partem sanguis, unde icimur ictu, 4.1051. et si comminus est, hostem ruber occupat umor. 4.1052. sic igitur Veneris qui telis accipit ictus, 4.1053. sive puer membris muliebribus hunc iaculatur 4.1054. seu mulier toto iactans e corpore amorem, 4.1055. unde feritur, eo tendit gestitque coire 4.1056. et iacere umorem in corpus de corpore ductum; 4.1057. namque voluptatem praesagit muta cupido. 4.1058. Haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen Amoris, 4.1059. hinc illaec primum Veneris dulcedinis in cor 4.1060. stillavit gutta et successit frigida cura; 4.1061. nam si abest quod ames, praesto simulacra tamen sunt 4.1062. illius et nomen dulce obversatur ad auris. 4.1063. sed fugitare decet simulacra et pabula amoris 4.1064. absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem 4.1065. et iacere umorem coniectum in corpora quaeque 4.1066. nec retinere semel conversum unius amore 4.1067. et servare sibi curam certumque dolorem; 4.1068. ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo 4.1069. inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit, 4.1070. si non prima novis conturbes volnera plagis 4.1071. volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures 4.1072. aut alio possis animi traducere motus. 4.1073. Nec Veneris fructu caret is qui vitat amorem, 4.1074. sed potius quae sunt sine poena commoda sumit; 4.1075. nam certe purast sanis magis inde voluptas 4.1076. quam miseris; etenim potiundi tempore in ipso 4.1077. fluctuat incertis erroribus ardor amantum 4.1078. nec constat quid primum oculis manibusque fruantur. 4.1079. quod petiere, premunt arte faciuntque dolorem 4.1080. corporis et dentes inlidunt saepe labellis 4.1081. osculaque adfigunt, quia non est pura voluptas 4.1082. et stimuli subsunt, qui instigant laedere id ipsum, 4.1083. quod cumque est, rabies unde illaec germina surgunt. 4.1084. sed leviter poenas frangit Venus inter amorem 4.1085. blandaque refrenat morsus admixta voluptas. 4.1086. namque in eo spes est, unde est ardoris origo, 4.1087. restingui quoque posse ab eodem corpore flammam. 4.1088. quod fieri contra totum natura repugnat; 4.1089. unaque res haec est, cuius quam plurima habemus, 4.1090. tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus. 4.1091. nam cibus atque umor membris adsumitur intus; 4.1092. quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis, 4.1093. hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido. 4.1094. ex hominis vero facie pulchroque colore 4.1095. nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra fruendum 4.1096. tenvia; quae vento spes raptast saepe misella. 4.1097. ut bibere in somnis sitiens quom quaerit et umor 4.1098. non datur, ardorem qui membris stinguere possit, 4.1099. sed laticum simulacra petit frustraque laborat 4.1100. in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans, 4.1101. sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis, 4.1102. nec satiare queunt spectando corpora coram 4.1103. nec manibus quicquam teneris abradere membris 4.1104. possunt errantes incerti corpore toto. 4.1105. denique cum membris conlatis flore fruuntur 4.1106. aetatis, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus 4.1107. atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat arva, 4.1108. adfigunt avide corpus iunguntque salivas 4.1109. oris et inspirant pressantes dentibus ora, 4.1110. ne quiquam, quoniam nihil inde abradere possunt 4.1111. nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto; 4.1112. nam facere inter dum velle et certare videntur. 4.1113. usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent, 4.1114. membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt. 4.1115. tandem ubi se erupit nervis coniecta cupido, 4.1116. parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper. 4.1117. inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit, 4.1118. cum sibi quod cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt, 4.1119. nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat. 4.1120. usque adeo incerti tabescunt volnere caeco. 4.1121. Adde quod absumunt viris pereuntque labore, 4.1122. adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas, 4.1123. languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans. 4.1124. labitur interea res et Babylonia fiunt 4.1125. unguenta et pulchra in pedibus Sicyonia rident, 4.1126. scilicet et grandes viridi cum luce zmaragdi 4.1127. auro includuntur teriturque thalassina vestis 4.1128. adsidue et Veneris sudorem exercita potat. 4.1129. et bene parta patrum fiunt anademata, mitrae, 4.1130. inter dum in pallam atque Alidensia Ciaque vertunt. 4.1131. eximia veste et victu convivia, ludi, 4.1132. pocula crebra, unguenta, coronae, serta parantur, 4.1133. ne quiquam, quoniam medio de fonte leporum 4.1134. surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat, 4.1135. aut cum conscius ipse animus se forte remordet 4.1136. desidiose agere aetatem lustrisque perire, 4.1137. aut quod in ambiguo verbum iaculata reliquit, 4.1138. quod cupido adfixum cordi vivescit ut ignis, 4.1139. aut nimium iactare oculos aliumve tueri 4.1140. quod putat in voltuque videt vestigia risus. 4.1141. Atque in amore mala haec proprio summeque secundo 4.1142. inveniuntur; in adverso vero atque inopi sunt, 4.1143. prendere quae possis oculorum lumine operto. 4.1144. innumerabilia; ut melius vigilare sit ante, 4.1145. qua docui ratione, cavereque, ne inliciaris. 4.1146. nam vitare, plagas in amoris ne iaciamur, 4.1147. non ita difficile est quam captum retibus ipsis 4.1148. exire et validos Veneris perrumpere nodos. 4.1149. et tamen implicitus quoque possis inque peditus 4.1150. effugere infestum, nisi tute tibi obvius obstes 4.1151. et praetermittas animi vitia omnia primum 4.1152. aut quae corporis sunt eius, quam praepetis ac vis. 4.1153. nam faciunt homines plerumque cupidine caeci 4.1154. et tribuunt ea quae non sunt his commoda vere. 4.1155. multimodis igitur pravas turpisque videmus 4.1156. esse in deliciis summoque in honore vigere. 4.1157. atque alios alii inrident Veneremque suadent 4.1158. ut placent, quoniam foedo adflictentur amore, 4.1159. nec sua respiciunt miseri mala maxima saepe. 4.1160. nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, 4.1161. caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, 4.1162. parvula, pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, 4.1163. magna atque inmanis cataplexis plenaque honoris. 4.1164. balba loqui non quit, traulizi, muta pudens est; 4.1165. at flagrans, odiosa, loquacula Lampadium fit. 4.1166. ischnon eromenion tum fit, cum vivere non quit 4.1167. prae macie; rhadine verost iam mortua tussi. 4.1168. at nimia et mammosa Ceres est ipsa ab Iaccho, 4.1169. simula Silena ac Saturast, labeosa philema. 4.1170. cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 4.1171. sed tamen esto iam quantovis oris honore, 4.1172. cui Veneris membris vis omnibus exoriatur; 4.1173. nempe aliae quoque sunt; nempe hac sine viximus ante; 4.1174. nempe eadem facit et scimus facere omnia turpi 4.1175. et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 4.1176. quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachint. 4.1177. at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 4.1178. floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 4.1179. unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 4.1180. quem si iam ammissum venientem offenderit aura 4.1181. una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 4.1182. et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella 4.1183. stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 4.1184. plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 4.1185. nec Veneres nostras hoc fallit; quo magis ipsae 4.1186. omnia summo opere hos vitae poscaenia celant, 4.1187. quos retinere volunt adstrictosque esse in amore, 4.1188. ne quiquam, quoniam tu animo tamen omnia possis 4.1189. protrahere in lucem atque omnis inquirere risus 4.1190. et, si bello animost et non odiosa, vicissim 4.1191. praetermittere et humanis concedere rebus. 4.1192. Nec mulier semper ficto suspirat amore, 4.1193. quae conplexa viri corpus cum corpore iungit 4.1194. et tenet adsuctis umectans oscula labris; 4.1195. nam facit ex animo saepe et communia quaerens 4.1196. gaudia sollicitat spatium decurrere amoris. 4.1197. nec ratione alia volucres armenta feraeque 4.1198. et pecudes et equae maribus subsidere possent, 4.1199. si non, ipsa quod illarum subat, ardet abundans 4.1200. natura et Venerem salientum laeta retractat. 4.1201. nonne vides etiam quos mutua saepe voluptas 4.1202. vinxit, ut in vinclis communibus excrucientur, 4.1203. in triviis cum saepe canes discedere aventis 4.1204. divorsi cupide summis ex viribus tendunt, 4.1205. quom interea validis Veneris compagibus haerent? 4.1206. quod facerent numquam, nisi mutua gaudia nossent, 4.1207. quae iacere in fraudem possent vinctosque tenere. 4.1208. quare etiam atque etiam, ut dico, est communis voluptas. 4.1209. Et commiscendo quom semine forte virilem 4.1210. femina vim vicit subita vi corripuitque, 4.1211. tum similes matrum materno semine fiunt, 4.1212. ut patribus patrio. sed quos utriusque figurae 4.1213. esse vides, iuxtim miscentes vulta parentum, 4.1214. corpore de patrio et materno sanguine crescunt, 4.1215. semina cum Veneris stimulis excita per artus 4.1216. obvia conflixit conspirans mutuus ardor, 4.1217. et neque utrum superavit eorum nec superatumst. 4.1218. fit quoque ut inter dum similes existere avorum 4.1219. possint et referant proavorum saepe figuras, 4.1220. propterea quia multa modis primordia multis 4.1221. mixta suo celant in corpore saepe parentis, 4.1222. quae patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta. 4.1223. inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras, 4.1224. maiorumque refert voltus vocesque comasque; 4.1225. quandoquidem nihilo magis haec de semine certo 4.1226. fiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis. 4.1227. et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclum 4.1228. maternoque mares existunt corpore creti; 4.1229. semper enim partus duplici de semine constat, 4.1230. atque utri similest magis id quod cumque creatur, 4.1231. eius habet plus parte aequa; quod cernere possis, 4.1232. sive virum suboles sivest muliebris origo. 4.1233. Nec divina satum genitalem numina cuiquam 4.1234. absterrent, pater a gnatis ne dulcibus umquam 4.1235. appelletur et ut sterili Venere exigat aevom; 4.1236. quod plerumque putant et multo sanguine maesti 4.1237. conspergunt aras adolentque altaria donis, 4.1238. ut gravidas reddant uxores semine largo; 4.1239. ne quiquam divom numen sortisque fatigant; 4.1240. nam steriles nimium crasso sunt semine partim, 4.1241. et liquido praeter iustum tenuique vicissim. 4.1242. tenve locis quia non potis est adfigere adhaesum, 4.1243. liquitur extemplo et revocatum cedit abortu. 4.1244. crassius hinc porro quoniam concretius aequo 4.1245. mittitur, aut non tam prolixo provolat ictu 4.1246. aut penetrare locos aeque nequit aut penetratum 4.1247. aegre admiscetur muliebri semine semen. 4.1248. nam multum harmoniae Veneris differre videntur. 4.1249. atque alias alii complent magis ex aliisque 4.1250. succipiunt aliae pondus magis inque gravescunt. 4.1251. et multae steriles Hymenaeis ante fuerunt 4.1252. pluribus et nactae post sunt tamen unde puellos 4.1253. suscipere et partu possent ditescere dulci. 4.1254. et quibus ante domi fecundae saepe nequissent 4.1255. uxoris parere, inventast illis quoque compar 4.1256. natura, ut possent gnatis munire senectam. 4.1257. usque adeo magni refert, ut semina possint 4.1258. seminibus commisceri genitaliter apta 4.1259. crassaque conveniant liquidis et liquida crassis. 4.1260. atque in eo refert quo victu vita colatur; 4.1261. namque aliis rebus concrescunt semina membris 4.1262. atque aliis extenvantur tabentque vicissim. 4.1263. et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas. 4.1264. id quoque permagni refert; nam more ferarum 4.1265. quadrupedumque magis ritu plerumque putantur 4.1266. concipere uxores, quia sic loca sumere possunt 4.1267. pectoribus positis sublatis semina lumbis. 4.1268. nec molles opus sunt motus uxoribus hilum. 4.1269. nam mulier prohibet se concipere atque repugnat, 4.1270. clunibus ipsa viri Venerem si laeta retractat 4.1271. atque exossato ciet omni pectore fluctus; 4.1272. eicit enim sulcum recta regione viaque 4.1273. vomeris atque locis avertit seminis ictum. 4.1274. idque sua causa consuerunt scorta moveri, 4.1275. ne complerentur crebro gravidaeque iacerent, 4.1276. et simul ipsa viris Venus ut concinnior esset; 4.1277. coniugibus quod nil nostris opus esse videtur. 4.1278. Nec divinitus inter dum Venerisque sagittis 4.1279. deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur; 4.1280. nam facit ipsa suis inter dum femina factis 4.1281. morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, 4.1282. ut facile insuescat secum te degere vitam. 4.1283. quod super est, consuetudo concinnat amorem; 4.1284. nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 4.1285. vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. 4.1286. nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis 4.1287. umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa? 6.575. hac igitur ratione vacillant omnia tecta, | |
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| 104. Livy, History, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 275 |
| 105. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Letter To Pompeius Geminus, 5 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and historiography •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, modicum corpus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 115 |
| 106. Sallust, Iugurtha, 4.6, 5.1-5.3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 44, 175 |
| 107. Sallust, Catiline, 3.2, 13.1-13.5, 31.1-31.3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 155; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 115, 175 |
108. Anon., Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 1.13, 2.19, 3.14 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and historiography •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 79, 174, 175 | 2.19. We shall be dealing with an Absolute Juridical Issue when, without any recourse to a defence extraneous to the cause, we contend that the act itself which we confess having committed was lawful. Herein it is proper to examine whether the act was in accord with the Law. We can discuss this question, once a cause is given, when we know the departments of which the Law is constituted. The constituent departments, then, are the following: Nature, Statute, Custom, Previous Judgements, Equity, and Agreement. To the Law of Nature belong the duties observed because of kinship or family loyalty. In accordance with this kind of Law parents are cherished by their children, and children by their parents. Statute Law is that kind of Law which is sanctioned by the will of the people; for example, you are to appear before the court when summoned to do so. Legal Custom is that which, in the absence of any statute, is by usage endowed with the force of statute law; for example, the money you have deposited with a banker you may rightly seek from his partner. It is a Previous Judgement what on the same question a sentence has been passed or a decree interposed. These are often contradictory, according as one judge, praetor, consul, or tribune of the plebs has determined differently from another; and it often happens that on the very same matter one has decree or decided differently from another. For example, Marcus Drusus, city praetor, granted an action on breach of contract against an heir, whereas Sextus Julius refused to do so. Again, Gaius Caelius, sitting in judgement, acquitted of the charge of injury the man who had by name attacked the poet Lucilius on the stage, while Publius Mucius condemned the man who had specifically named the poet Lucius Accius. 3.14. (2) Next we must pass to the Physical Advantages: if by nature he has impressiveness and beauty, these have served him to his credit, and not, as in the case of others, to his detriment and shame; if he has exceptional strength and agility, we shall point out that these were acquired by worthy and diligent exercise; if he has continual good health, that was acquired by care and by control over his passions. In censure, if the subject has this physical advantages, we shall declare that he has abused what, like the meanest gladiator, he has had by chance and nature. If he lacks them, we shall say that to his own fault and want of self-control is his lack of every physical advantage, beauty apart, attributable. (3) Then we shall return to External Circumstances and consider his virtues and defects of Character evinced with respect to these: Has he been rich or poor? What kinds of power has he wielded? What have been his titles to fame? What his friendships? Or what his private feuds, and what act of bravery has he performed in conducting these feuds? With what motive has he entered into feuds? With what loyalty, goodwill, and sense of duty has he conducted his friendships? What character of man has he been in wealth, or in poverty? What has been his attitude in the exercise of his prerogatives? If he is dead, what sort of death did he die, and what sort of consequences followed upon it? |
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| 109. Horace, Epodes, 17.21 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 110. Horace, Letters, 1.1.100, 1.4.53-1.4.62, 1.7.46-1.7.48, 1.11.27, 2.1, 2.1.139, 2.1.232-2.1.250 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, consulship •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 146, 151, 267; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 48, 109, 131, 174, 188, 189 |
| 111. Horace, Odes, 1.9, 1.11.1-1.11.2, 2.4.7, 3.29.29-3.29.32 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 150; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
112. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 6.13.1-6.13.2, 13.3 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225, 254 | 6.13.1. It is said that in this battle two men on horseback, far excelling in both beauty and stature those our human stock produces, and just growing their first beard, appeared to Postumius, the dictator, and to those arrayed about him, and charged at the head of the Roman horse, striking with their spears all the Latins they encountered and driving them headlong before them. And after the flight of the Latins and the capture of their camp, the battle having come to an end in the late afternoon, two youths are said to have appeared in the same manner in the Roman Forum attired in military garb, very tall and beautiful and of the same age, themselves retaining on their counteces as having come from a battle, the look of combatants, and the horses they led being all in a sweat. 6.13.2. And when they had each of them watered their horses and washed them at the fountain which rises near the temple of Vesta and forms a small but deep pool, and many people stood about them and inquired if they brought any news from the camp, they related how the battle had gone and that the Romans were the victors. And it is said that after they left the Forum they were not seen again by anyone, though great search was made for them by the man who had been left in command of the city. 13.3. 1. (3) This same Camillus, when conducting his campaign against Veii, made a vow to Queen Juno of the Veientes that if he should take the city he would set up her statue in Rome and establish costly rites in her honour.,2. Upon the capture of the city, accordingly, he sent the most distinguished of the knights to remove the statue from its pedestal; and when those who had been sent came into the temple and one of them, either in jest and sport or desiring an omen, asked whether the goddess wished to remove to Rome, the statue answered in a loud voice that she did. This happened twice; for the young men, doubting whether it was the statue that had spoken, asked the same question again and heard the same reply. |
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| 113. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 74, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84 |
| 114. Propertius, Elegies, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 155 |
115. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1.484 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156| 1.484. pulchra verecundo suffunditur ora rubore, | |
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| 116. Catullus, Poems, 10 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 147 |
| 117. Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 8.5 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 76; Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 154 |
| 118. Asclepiades Mendesius, Fragments, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
| 119. Plutarch, Cicero, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, education Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 101 |
| 120. Plutarch, Sulla, 26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 23, 53 |
121. Plutarch, Sertorius, 3.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius cicero, marcus, in dio cassius Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 60| 3.1. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν Κίμβρων καὶ Τευτόνων ἐμβεβληκότων εἰς Γαλατίαν στρατευόμενος ὑπὸ Καιπίωνι, κακῶς ἀγωνισαμένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τροπῆς γενομένης ἀποβεβληκὼς τὸν ἵππον καὶ κατατετρωμένος τὸ σῶμα τὸν Ῥοδανὸν διεπέρασεν, αὐτῷ τε τῷ θώρακι καὶ θυρεῷ πρὸς ἐναντίον ῥεῦμα πολὺ νηχόμενος· οὕτω τὸ σῶμα ῥωμαλέον ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ διάπονον τῇ ἀσκήσει. | 3.1. |
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| 122. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 2.152.1, 5.1.6-5.1.7, 6.198, 7.10, 7.114, 7.121, 34.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23, 251; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 44, 47, 79 |
| 123. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 95 |
| 124. Juvenal, Satires, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 67 |
| 125. Plutarch, Roman Questions, 37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 75 |
| 126. Lucan, Pharsalia, 1.119-1.120, 4.589-4.660, 5.278-5.282, 6.303-6.306, 9.227-9.236, 9.619-9.937, 10.31-10.32, 10.34 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 184; Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 13 |
127. Plutarch, Pompey, 23.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 173| 23.3. καὶ Κράσσος μὲν ὅνπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἵλετο τρόπον τοῦ βίου διεφύλαττε, Πομπήϊος δὲ τάς τε πολλὰς ἀνεδύετο συνηγορίας καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπέλειπε καὶ προῄει σπανίως εἰς τὸ δημόσιον, ἀεὶ δὲ μετὰ πλήθους, οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἔτι ῥᾴδιον ὄχλου χωρὶς ἐντυχεῖν οὐδʼ ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ἥδιστος ὁμοῦ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀθρόοις ἐφαίνετο, σεμνότητα περιβαλλόμενος ἐκ τούτου τῇ ὄψει καὶ ὄγκον, ταῖς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἐντεύξεσι καὶ συνηθείαις ἄθικτον οἰόμενος δεῖν τὸ ἀξίωμα διατηρεῖν. | 23.3. |
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128. Plutarch, Coriolanus, 3.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 254| 3.4. ἦν δὲ καὶ σιτίον ἀπʼ αὐτῆς ἡ βάλανος καὶ ποτὸν τὸ μελίτειον, ὄψον δὲ παρεῖχε τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν νεμομένων τε καὶ πτηνῶν, θήρας ὄργανον φέρουσα τὸν ἰξόν. ἐν ἐκείνῃ δὲ τῇ μάχῃ καὶ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἐπιφανῆναι λέγουσι, καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθὺς ὀφθῆναι ῥεομένοις ἱδρῶτι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐν ἀγορᾷ τὴν νίκην ἀπαγγέλλοντας, οὗ νῦν παρὰ τὴν κρήνην νεώς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἱδρυμένος, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐπινίκιον οὖσαν, ἐν τῷ Ἰουλίῳ μηνὶ τὰς εἰδούς, Διοσκούροις ἀνιερώκασι. | 3.4. In the battle of which I was speaking, it is said that Castor and Pollux appeared, and that immediately after the battle they were seen, their horses all a-drip with sweat, in the forum, announcing the victory, by the fountain where their temple now stands. Therefore the day on which this victory was won, the Ides of July, was consecrated to the Dioscuri. |
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| 129. Plutarch, Lucullus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 2 |
130. Plutarch, Fabius, 17.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 155| 17.5. ὁ γὰρ ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν ἐδόκει δεινὸν εἶναι καιροῖς εὐλαβὴς φαινόμενος καὶ δυσέλπιστος τότε πάντων καταβεβληκότων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς ἀπέραντα πένθη καὶ ταραχὰς ἀπράκτους, μόνος ἐφοίτα διὰ τῆς πόλεως πρᾴῳ βαδίσματι καὶ προσώπῳ καθεστῶτι καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ προσαγορεύσει, κοπετούς τε γυναικείους ἀφαιρῶν καὶ συστάσεις εἴργων τῶν εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἐπὶ κοινοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἐκφερομένων, βουλήν τε συνελθεῖν ἔπεισε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε τὰς ἀρχάς, αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ ῥώμη καὶ δύναμις ἀρχῆς ἁπάσης πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλεπούσης. | 17.5. For he who, in times of apparent security, appeared cautious and irresolute, then, when all were plunged in boundless grief and helpless confusion, was the only man to walk the city with calm step, composed countece, and gracious address, checking effeminate lamentation, and preventing those from assembling together who were eager to make public their common complaints. He persuaded the senate to convene, heartened up the magistrates, and was himself the strength and power of every magistracy, since all looked to him for guidance. |
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| 131. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 25 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 254 |
| 132. Martial, Epigrams, 5.22.5, 5.22.7-5.22.9, 10.2.9-10.2.12, 10.20.4-10.20.5, 10.56.1-10.56.2, 10.56.10, 12.18.1-12.18.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51, 146 |
| 133. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 72.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 187, 188 |
| 134. Martial, Epigrams, 5.22.5, 5.22.7-5.22.9, 10.2.9-10.2.12, 10.20.4-10.20.5, 10.56.1-10.56.2, 10.56.10, 12.18.1-12.18.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51, 146 |
| 135. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 95 |
| 136. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 185, 186 |
| 137. Plutarch, On The Fortune Or Virtue of Alexander The Great, 3352-3357 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 186, 187 |
138. Plutarch, Crassus, 2.4, 33.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 267; Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 294| 2.4. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρῶν τὰς συγγενεῖς καὶ συνοίκους τῆς Ῥώμης κῆρας ἐμπρησμοὺς καὶ συνιζήσεις διὰ βάρος καὶ πλῆθος οἰκοδομημάτων, ἐωνεῖτο δούλους ἀρχιτέκτονας καὶ οἰκοδόμους, εἶτʼ ἔχων τούτους ὑπὲρ πεντακοσίους ὄντας, ἐξηγόραζε τὰ καιόμενα καὶ γειτνιῶντα τοῖς καιομένοις, διὰ φόβον καὶ ἀδηλότητα τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀπʼ ὀλίγης τιμῆς προϊεμένων, ὥστε τῆς Ῥώμης τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ὑπʼ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι. 33.3. κρότῳ δὲ τῶν Πάρθων μετὰ κραυγῆς καὶ χαρᾶς ἀραμένων, τὸν μὲν Σιλλάκην κατέκλιναν οἱ ὑπηρέται βασιλέως κελεύσαντος, ὁ δʼ Ἰάσων τὰ μὲν τοῦ Πενθέως σκευοποιήματα παρέδωκέ τινι τῶν χορευτῶν, τῆς δὲ τοῦ Κράσσου κεφαλῆς λαβόμενος καὶ ἀναβακχεύσας ἐπέραινεν ἐκεῖνα τὰ μέλη μετʼ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ᾠδῆς· φέρομεν ἐξ ὄρεος ἕλικα νεότομον ἐπὶ μέλαθρα, μακαρίαν θήραν. Euripides, Bacchae, 1170-72 (Kirchhoff μακάριον ).καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντας ἔτερπεν· | 2.4. 33.3. |
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139. Plutarch, Mark Antony, 4.1-4.3, 36.7, 60.3, 60.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 167, 168| 4.1. προσῆν δὲ καὶ μορφῆς ἐλευθέριον ἀξίωμα, καὶ πώγων τις οὐκ ἀγεννὴς καὶ πλάτος μετώπου καὶ γρυπότης μυκτῆρος ἐδόκει τοῖς γραφομένοις καὶ πλαττομένοις Ἡρακλέους προσώποις ἐμφερὲς ἔχειν τὸ ἀρρενωπόν. ἦν δὲ καὶ λόγος παλαιὸς Ἡρακλείδας εἶναι τοὺς Ἀντωνίους, ἀπʼ Ἄντωνος, παιδὸς Ἡρακλέους, γεγονότας. 4.2. καὶ τοῦτον ᾤετο τὸν λόγον τῇ τε μορφῇ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τῇ στολῇ βεβαιοῦν. ἀεὶ γάρ, ὅτε μέλλοι πλείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι, χιτῶνα εἰς μηρὸν ἔζωστο, καὶ μάχαιρα μεγάλη παρήρτητο, καὶ σάγος περιέκειτο τῶν στερεῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις φορτικὰ δοκοῦντα, μεγαλαυχία καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ κώθων ἐμφανὴς καὶ καθίσαι παρὰ τὸν ἐσθίοντα καὶ φαγεῖν ἐπιστάντα τραπέζῃ στρατιωτικῇ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον εὐνοίας καὶ πόθου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνεποίει τοῖς στρατιώταις. 4.3. ἦν δέ που καὶ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν οὐκ ἀναφρόδιτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐδημαγώγει, συμπράττων τε τοῖς ἐρῶσι καὶ σκωπτόμενος οὐκ ἀηδῶς εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους ἔρωτας. ἡ δʼ ἐλευθεριότης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὀλίγῃ χειρὶ μηδὲ φειδομένῃ χαρίζεσθαι στρατιώταις καὶ φίλοις ἀρχήν τε λαμπρὰν ἐπὶ τὸ ἰσχύειν αὐτῷ παρέσχε, καὶ μεγάλου γενομένου τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐπῆρεν, ἐκ μυρίων ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων ἀνατρεπομένην. ἓν δέ τι τοῦ μεγαλοδώρου παράδειγμα διηγήσομαι. 60.3. προσῳκείου δὲ ἑαυτὸν Ἀντώνιος Ἡρακλεῖ κατὰ γένος καὶ Διονύσῳ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ βίου ζῆλον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, Διόνυσος νέος προσαγορευόμενος. ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ θύελλα καὶ τοὺς Εὐμενοῦς καὶ Ἀττάλου κολοσσοὺς ἐπιγεγραμμένους Ἀντωνείους Ἀθήνησιν ἐμπεσοῦσα μόνους ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνέτρεψε. ἡ δὲ Κλεοπάτρας ναυαρχὶς ἐκαλεῖτο μὲν Ἀντωνιάς, σημεῖον δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν δεινὸν ἐφάνη· χελιδόνες γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν πρύμναν ἐνεόττευσαν· ἕτεραι δὲ ἐπελθοῦσαι καὶ ταύτας ἐξήλασαν καὶ τὰ νεόττια διέφθειραν. | 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 60.3. |
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140. Plutarch, Brutus, 30.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 301| 30.3. καὶ πάλιν διαστάντες ἐπὶ τὰς προσηκούσας ἑκατέρῳ πράξεις, Κάσσιος μὲν ἑλὼν Ῥόδον οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἐχρῆτο τοῖς πράγμασι, Καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τὴν εἴσοδον τοῖς προσαγορεύουσιν αὐτὸν βασιλέα Καὶ κύριον ἀποκρινάμενος· οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε κύριος, τοῦ δὲ κυρίου Καὶ βασιλέως φονεὺς Καὶ κολαστής. Βροῦτος δὲ Λυκίους ᾔτει χρήματα Καὶ στρατόν. | 30.3. |
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141. Plutarch, Julius Caesar, 63.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23| 63.5. μετὰ ταῦτα κοιμώμενος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, παρὰ τῇ γυναικί, πασῶν ἅμα τῶν θυρῶν τοῦ δωματίου καὶ τῶν θυρίδων ἀναπεταννυμένων, διαταραχθεὶς ἅμα τῷ κτύπῳ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ καταλαμπούσης τῆς σελήνης, ᾔσθετο τὴν Καλπουρνίαν βαθέως μὲν καθεύδουσαν, ἀσαφεῖς δὲ φωνὰς καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἀνάρθρους ἀναπέμπουσαν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐδόκει δὲ ἄρα κλαίειν ἐκεῖνον ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἔχουσα κατεσφαγμένον. | 63.5. |
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142. Plutarch, Advice To Bride And Groom, 2, 39, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 137 | 3. In the beginning, especially, married people ought to be on their guard against disagreements and clashes, for they see that such household vessels as are made of sections joined together are at the outset easily pulled apart by any fortuitous cause, but after a time, when their joints have become set, they can hardly be separated by fire and steel. |
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143. Plutarch, Cato The Elder, 19.3-19.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 44| 19.3. φαίνεται δὲ θαυμαστῶς ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμητείαν ὁ δῆμος, ἀνδριάντα γοῦν ἀναθεὶς ἐν τῷ ναῷ τῆς Ὑγιείας ἐπέγραψεν οὐ τὰς στρατηγίας οὐδὲ τὸν θρίαμβον τὸν Κάτωνος, ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἄν τις μεταφράσειε τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ὅτι τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἐγκεκλιμένην καὶ ῥέπουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τιμητὴς γενόμενος χρησταῖς ἀγωγαῖς καὶ σώφροσιν ἐθισμοῖς καὶ διδασκαλίαις εἰς ὀρθὸν αὖθις ἀποκατέστησε 19.4. καίτοι πρότερον αὐτὸς κατεγέλα τῶν ἀγαπώντων τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ λανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἔλεγεν ἐπὶ χαλκέων καὶ ζωγράφων ἔργοις μέγα φρονοῦντας, αὐτοῦ δὲ καλλίστας εἰκόνας ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς περιφέρειν τοὺς πολίτας πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θαυμάζοντας, ὅτι πολλῶν ἀδόξων ἀνδριάντας ἐχόντων ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔχει μᾶλλον γὰρ, ἔφη, βούλομαι ζητεῖσθαι, διὰ τί μου ἀνδριὰς οὐ κεῖται ἢ διὰ τί κεῖται | 19.3. 19.4. |
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144. Plutarch, Camillus, 6.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225| 6.1. διαπορθήσας δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἔγνω τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Ἥρας μεταφέρειν εἰς Ῥώμην, ὥσπερ εὔξατο. καὶ συνελθόντων ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, ὁ μὲν ἔθυε καὶ προσεύχετο τῇ θεῷ δέχεσθαι τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν καὶ εὐμενῆ γενέσθαι σύνοικον τοῖς λαχοῦσι τὴν Ῥώμην θεοῖς, τὸ δʼ ἄγαλμά φασιν ὑποφθεγξάμενον εἰπεῖν. ὅτι καὶ βούλεται καὶ συγκαταινεῖ. | 6.1. After he had utterly sacked the city, he determined to transfer the image of Juno to Rome, in accordance with his vows. The workmen were assembled for the purpose, and Camillus was sacrificing and praying the goddess to accept of their zeal and to be a kindly co-dweller with the gods of Rome, when the image, they say, spoke in low tones and said she was ready and willing. |
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145. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 2.21.1, 2.21.7-2.21.8, 4.2.88, 5.13.39, 11.3.66, 11.3.78 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, ideal orator •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 147; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 140 | 2.21.1. As to the material of oratory, some have asserted that it is speech, as for instance Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato. If this view be accepted in the sense that the word "speech" is used of a discourse composed on any subject, then it is not the material, but the work, just as a statue is the work of the sculptor. For speeches like statues require art for their production. If on the other hand we interpret "speech" as indicating the words themselves, the can do nothing unless they are related to facts. Some again hold that the material consists of persuasive arguments. But they form part of the work, are produced by art and require material themselves. 2.21.7. But this material, as we call it, that is to say the things brought before it, has been criticised by some, at times on the ground that it is limitless, and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory, which they have therefore dubbed a discursive art, because all is grist that comes to its mill. 2.21.8. I have no serious quarrel with these critics, for they acknowledge that rhetoric is concerned with every kind of material, though they deny that it has any peculiar material just because of that material's multiplicity. But in spite of this multiplicity, rhetoric is not unlimited in scope, and there are other minor arts whose material is characterised by the same multiplicity: such for instance is architecture, which deals with everything that is useful for the purpose of building: such too is the engraver's art which works on gold, silver, bronze, iron. 5.13.39. The method of reply to our opponent's counsel should be on different lines. Sometimes however we are justified in attacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but also their character, their appearance, their gait or bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero does not confine himself to these topics, but even attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing to his heels: for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave embarrassment by his turbulent harangues. |
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| 146. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 31 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51 |
147. Tacitus, Histories, 3.84 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225 | 3.84. The greatest difficulty was met in taking the Praetorian Camp, which the bravest soldiers defended as their last hope. The resistance made the victors only the more eager, the old praetorian cohorts being especially determined. They employed at the same time every device that had ever been invented for the destruction of the strongest cities â the "tortoise," artillery, earthworks, and firebrands â shouting that all the labour and danger that they had suffered in all their battles would be crowned by this achievement. "We have given back the city to the senate and the Roman people," they cried; "we have restored the temples to the gods. The soldier's glory is in his camp: that is his native city, that his penates. If the camp is not at once recovered, we must spend the night under arms." On their side the Vitellians, unequal though they were in numbers and in fortune, by striving to spoil the victory, to delay peace, and to defile the houses and altars of the city with blood, embraced the last solace left to the conquered. Many, mortally wounded, breathed their last on the towers and battlements; when the gates were broken down, the survivors in a solid mass opposed the victors and to a man fell giving blow for blow, dying with faces to the foe; so anxious were they, even at the moment of death, to secure a glorious end. On the capture of the city Vitellius was carried on a chair through the rear of the palace to his wife's house on the Aventine, so that, in case he succeeded in remaining undiscovered during the day, he might escape to his brother and the cohorts at Tarracina. But his fickle mind and the very nature of terror, which makes the present situation always seem the worst to one who is fearful of everything, drew him back to the palace. This he found empty and deserted, for even the meanest of his slaves had slipped away or else avoided meeting him. The solitude and the silent spaces filled him with fright: he tried the rooms that were closed and shuddered to find them empty. Exhausted by wandering forlornly about, he concealed himself in an unseemly hiding-place; but Julius Placidus, tribune of a cohort, dragged him to the light. With his arms bound behind his back, his garments torn, he presented a grievous sight as he was led away. Many cried out against him, not one shed a tear; the ugliness of the last scene had banished pity. One of the soldiers from Germany met him and struck at him in rage, or else his purpose was to remove him the quicker from insult, or he may have been aiming at the tribune â no one could tell. He cut off the tribune's ear and was at once run through. |
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148. Tacitus, Annals, 4.38 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 44| 4.38. Ego me, patres conscripti, mortalem esse et hominum officia fungi satisque habere si locum principem impleam et vos testor et meminisse posteros volo; qui satis superque memoriae meae tribuent, ut maioribus meis dignum, rerum vestrarum providum, constantem in periculis, offensionum pro utilitate publica non pavidum credant. haec mihi in animis vestris templa, hae pulcherrimae effigies et mansurae. nam quae saxo struuntur, si iudicium posterorum in odium vertit, pro sepulchris spernuntur. proinde socios civis et deos ipsos precor, hos ut mihi ad finem usque vitae quietam et intellegentem humani divinique iuris mentem duint, illos ut, quandoque concessero, cum laude et bonis recordationibus facta atque famam nominis mei prosequantur.' perstititque posthac secretis etiam sermonibus aspernari talem sui cultum. quod alii modestiam, multi, quia diffideret, quidam ut degeneris animi interpretabantur. optumos quippe mortalium altissima cupere: sic Herculem et Liberum apud Graecos, Quirinum apud nos deum numero additos: melius Augustum, qui speraverit. cetera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contemptu famae contemni virtutes. | 4.38. "As for myself, Conscript Fathers, that I am mortal, that my functions are the functions of men, and that I hold it enough if I fill the foremost place among them â this I call upon you to witness, and I desire those who shall follow us to bear it in mind. For they will do justice, and more, to my memory, if they pronounce me worthy of my ancestry, provident of your interests, firm in dangers, not fearful of offences in the cause of the national welfare. These are my temples in your breasts, these my fairest and abiding effigies: for those that are reared of stone, should the judgement of the future turn to hatred, are scorned as sepulchres! And so my prayer to allies and citizens and to Heaven itself is this: to Heaven, that to the end of my life it may endow me with a quiet mind, gifted with understanding of law human and divine; and to my fellow-men, that, whenever I shall depart, their praise and kindly thoughts may still attend my deeds and the memories attached to my name." And, in fact, from now onward, even in his private conversations, he persisted in a contemptuous rejection of these divine honours to himself: an attitude by some interpreted as modesty, by many as self-distrust, by a few as degeneracy of soul:â "The best of men," they argued, "desired the greatest heights: so Hercules and Liber among the Greeks, and among ourselves Quirinus, had been added to the number of the gods. The better way had been that of Augustus â who hoped! To princes all other gratifications came instantly: for one they must toil and never know satiety â the favourable opinion of the future. For in the scorn of fame was implied the scorn of virtue!" |
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| 149. Tacitus, Agricola, 46.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 67 |
| 150. Suetonius, Tiberius, 70.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 40 |
| 151. Suetonius, Iulius, 76.1, 81.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23 |
| 152. Suetonius, Claudius, 24.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius cicero, marcus, and appius claudius pulcher Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 130 |
| 153. Suetonius, Caligula, 15.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 8 |
| 154. Suetonius, Augustus, 31.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius cicero, marcus, and development of eloquence Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 154 |
| 155. Statius, Siluae, 1.1.84-1.1.90 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 44 |
| 156. Silius Italicus, Punica, 5.151-5.152, 6.41-6.53 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus •cicero, marcus tullius, view of anger Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 275; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 155 |
| 157. Suetonius, Domitianus, 18.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 158. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 1.78, 1.237, 1.561, 1.737, 6.66, 7.229, 7.231, 8.76, 8.116, 8.515, 10.34, 10.42, 11.14, 11.347, 11.436, 14.17, 43.3-43.5, 50.5, 55.3-55.5, 87.4, 87.12, 103.1-103.2, 121.6, 121.8, 121.17, 121.20, 121.24 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 71; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 95; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 26, 155, 267; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 88, 89, 112, 191 |
| 159. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 23.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 146 |
| 160. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 11.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 267 |
| 161. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.20.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on gender roles and anger •cicero, marcus tullius, view of anger Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 136 |
| 162. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Polybium (Ad Polybium De Consolatione) (Dialogorum Liber Xi), 1.1, 18.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 45 |
| 163. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 16.2, 22.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 45, 267 |
| 164. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, 1.8.2, 1.19.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 26, 173 |
| 165. Seneca The Younger, De Brevitate Vitae (Dialogorum Liber X ), 15.4, 20.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 45 |
| 166. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 6.31, 6.34.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 173; Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 71 |
| 167. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 4.2.88, 11.3.78 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 168. Gellius, Attic Nights, 11.7.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 118 |
| 169. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 151.7-151.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 57 |
| 170. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 7.6.33 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 50, 51, 184 |
| 171. Chariton, Chaereas And Callirhoe, 6.5.8 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on gender roles and anger •cicero, marcus tullius, view of anger Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 136 |
172. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 3.11.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 74| 3.11.3. ἐπιφανέστατον δὲ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐστιν ἣν στοὰν Περσικὴν ὀνομάζουσιν ἀπὸ λαφύρων ποιηθεῖσαν τῶν Μηδικῶν· ἀνὰ χρόνον δὲ αὐτὴν ἐς μέγεθος τὸ νῦν καὶ ἐς κόσμον τὸν παρόντα μεταβεβλήκασιν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κιόνων Πέρσαι λίθου λευκοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Μαρδόνιος ὁ Γωβρύου. πεποίηται δὲ καὶ Ἀρτεμισία, θυγάτηρ μὲν Λυγδάμιδος, ἐβασίλευσε δὲ Ἁλικαρνασσοῦ· ταύτην φασὶν ἑκουσίως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα συστρατεῦσαι Ξέρξῃ καὶ ἔργα ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἀποδείξασθαι. | 3.11.3. The most striking feature in the marketplace is the portico which they call Persian because it was made from spoils taken in the Persian wars. In course of time they have altered it until it is as large and as splendid as it is now. On the pillars are white-marble figures of Persians, including Mardonius, son of Gobryas. There is also a figure of Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis and queen of Halicarnassus . It is said that this lady voluntarily joined the expedition of Xerxes against Greece and distinguished herself at the naval engagement off Salamis . |
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173. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 1.17, 9.36.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51, 151 | 1.17. To Cornelius Titianus. Faith and loyalty are not yet extinct among men 0 |
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| 174. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 80 |
| 175. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 140 |
| 176. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, lucullus •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, and antiochus Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 5, 21 |
| 177. Pliny The Younger, Panegyric, 24.2, 51.4-51.5, 83.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 26, 147 |
| 178. Lucian, Essays In Portraiture Defended, 2-3, 9 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 186, 187, 188 |
179. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 45.32.3, 46.19.8, 49.15.5, 49.20, 54.7.6, 54.9.2, 54.23.6, 54.27.3, 55.12.4, 75.2, 76.9-76.12 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 59 | 45.32.3. No, by the rods of Valerius and the law of Porcius, no, by the leg of Horatius and the hand of Mucius, no, by the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus! |
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| 180. Lucian, Nigrinus, 18, 17 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 8 |
| 181. Herodian, History of The Empire After Marcus, 3.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 353 |
| 182. Anon., Mekhilta Derabbi Shimeon Ben Yohai, None (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 151 |
| 183. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 147 |
| 184. Porphyry, On Abstinence, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 188 |
| 185. Asclepiades Cyprius, Fragments, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
186. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.6.78-1.6.79, 1.55, 4.20, 4.62, 5.22-5.27, 5.30, 5.45, 5.49, 5.81, 7.3, 7.33, 7.87-7.88, 7.125, 7.129, 7.134, 7.150, 9.36, 10.132 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •ciceromarcus tullius cicero •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, lucullus •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius, on appropriate actions •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods •cicero, marcus tullius, letters •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical stance Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 113; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 173; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 51, 53, 56, 64, 66, 68, 86, 87, 140, 142, 145, 162, 181, 185 | 1.55. So far Pisistratus. To return to Solon: one of his sayings is that 70 years are the term of man's life.He seems to have enacted some admirable laws; for instance, if any man neglects to provide for his parents, he shall be disfranchised; moreover there is a similar penalty for the spendthrift who runs through his patrimony. Again, not to have a settled occupation is made a crime for which any one may, if he pleases, impeach the offender. Lysias, however, in his speech against Nicias ascribes this law to Draco, and to Solon another depriving open profligates of the right to speak in the Assembly. He curtailed the honours of athletes who took part in the games, fixing the allowance for an Olympic victor at 500 drachmae, for an Isthmian victor at 100 drachmae, and proportionately in all other cases. It was in bad taste, he urged, to increase the rewards of these victors, and to ignore the exclusive claims of those who had fallen in battle, whose sons ought, moreover, to be maintained and educated by the State. 4.20. He loved Sophocles, particularly in those passages where it seemed as if, in the phrase of the comic poet,A stout Molossian mastiff lent him aid,and where the poet was, in the words of Phrynichus,Nor must, nor blended vintage, but true Pramnian.Thus he would call Homer the Sophocles of epic, and Sophocles the Homer of tragedyHe died at an advanced age of gradual decay, leaving behind him a considerable number of works. I have composed the following epigram upon him:Dost thou not hear? We have buried Polemo, laid here by that fatal scourge of wasted strength. Yet not Polemo, but merely his body, which on his way to the stars he left to moulder in the ground. 4.62. 9. CARNEADESCarneades, the son of Epicomus or (according to Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers) of Philocomus, was a native of Cyrene. He studied carefully the writings of the Stoics and particularly those of Chrysippus, and by combating these successfully he became so famous that he would often say:Without Chrysippus where should I have been?The man's industry was unparalleled, although in physics he was not so strong as in ethics. Hence he would let his hair and nails grow long from intense devotion to study. Such was his predomice in philosophy that even the rhetoricians would dismiss their classes and repair to him to hear him lecture. 5.22. of Justice, four books.On Poets, three books.On Philosophy, three books.of the Statesman, two books.On Rhetoric, or Grylus, one book.Nerinthus, one book.The Sophist, one book.Menexenus, one book.Concerning Love, one book.Symposium, one book.of Wealth, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.of the Soul, one book.of Prayer, one book.On Noble Birth, one book.On Pleasure, one book.Alexander, or a Plea for Colonies, one book.On Kingship, one book.On Education, one book.of the Good, three books.Extracts from Plato's Laws, three books.Extracts from the Republic, two books.of Household Management, one book.of Friendship, one book.On being or having been affected, one book.of Sciences, one book.On Controversial Questions, two books.Solutions of Controversial Questions, four books.Sophistical Divisions, four books.On Contraries, one book.On Genera and Species, one book.On Essential Attributes, one book. 5.23. Three note-books on Arguments for Purposes of Refutation.Propositions concerning Virtue, two books.Objections, one book.On the Various Meanings of Terms or Expressions where a Determit is added, one book.of Passions or of Anger, one book.Five books of Ethics.On Elements, three books.of Science, one book.of Logical Principle, one book.Logical Divisions, seventeen books.Concerning Division, one book.On Dialectical Questioning and Answering, two books.of Motion, one book.Propositions, one book.Controversial Propositions, one book.Syllogisms, one book.Eight books of Prior Analytics.Two books of Greater Posterior Analytics.of Problems, one book.Eight books of Methodics.of the Greater Good, one book.On the Idea, one book.Definitions prefixed to the Topics, seven books.Two books of Syllogisms. 5.24. Concerning Syllogism with Definitions, one book.of the Desirable and the Contingent, one book.Preface to Commonplaces, one book.Two books of Topics criticizing the Definitions.Affections or Qualities, one book.Concerning Logical Division, one book.Concerning Mathematics, one book.Definitions, thirteen books.Two books of Refutations.of Pleasure, one book.Propositions, one book.On the Voluntary, one book.On the Beautiful, one book.Theses for Refutation, twenty-five books.Theses concerning Love, four books.Theses concerning Friendship, two books.Theses concerning the Soul, one book.Politics, two books.Eight books of a course of lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus.of Just Actions, two books.A Collection of Arts [that is, Handbooks], two books.Two books of the Art of Rhetoric.Art, a Handbook, one book.Another Collection of Handbooks, two books.Concerning Method, one book.Compendium of the Art of Theodectes, one book.A Treatise on the Art of Poetry, two books.Rhetorical Enthymemes, one book.of Degree, one book.Divisions of Enthymemes, one book.On Diction, two books.of Taking Counsel, one book. 5.25. A Collection or Compendium, two books.On Nature, three books.Concerning Nature, one book.On the Philosophy of Archytas, three books.On the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates, one book.Extracts from the Timaeus and from the Works of Archytas, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Melissus, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Alcmaeon, one book.A Reply to the Pythagoreans, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Gorgias, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Xenophanes, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Zeno, one book.On the Pythagoreans, one book.On Animals, nine books.Eight books of Dissections.A selection of Dissections, one book.On Composite Animals, one book.On the Animals of Fable, one book.On Sterility, one book.On Plants, two books.Concerning Physiognomy, one book.Two books concerning Medicine.On the Unit, one book. 5.26. Prognostics of Storms, one book.Concerning Astronomy, one book.Concerning Optics, one book.On Motion, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Memory, one book.Six books of Homeric Problems.Poetics, one book.Thirty-eight books of Physics according to the lettering.Two books of Problems which have been examined.Two books of Routine Instruction.Mechanics, one book.Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.On the Magnet, one book.Analogies, one book.Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.Claims advanced, one book.Victors at Olympia, one book.Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Delphi, one book.Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.of Tragedies, one book.Dramatic Records, one book.Proverbs, one book.Laws of the Mess-table, one book.Four books of Laws.Categories, one book.De Interpretatione, one book. 5.27. Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.Letters to Philip.Letters of Selymbrians.Letters to Alexander, four books.Letters to Antipater, nine books.To Mentor, one book.To Ariston, one book.To Olympias, one book.To Hephaestion, one book.To Themistagoras, one book.To Philoxenus, one book.In reply to Democritus, one book.Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθ᾽ ἑκατηβόλε (Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting).Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ (Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring).In all 445,270 lines. 5.30. The one ethical end he held to be the exercise of virtue in a completed life. And happiness he maintained to be made up of goods of three sorts: goods of the soul, which indeed he designates as of the highest value; in the second place bodily goods, health and strength, beauty and the like; and thirdly external goods, such as wealth, good birth, reputation and the like. And he regarded virtue as not of itself sufficient to ensure happiness; bodily goods and external goods were also necessary, for the wise man would be miserable if he lived in the midst of pains, poverty, and similar circumstances. Vice, however, is sufficient in itself to secure misery, even if it be ever so abundantly furnished with corporeal and external goods. 5.45. Remarks upon Definitions, one book.On Smells, one book.On Wine and Oil.Introduction to Propositions, eighteen books.of Legislators, three books.of Politics, six books.A Political Treatise dealing with important Crises, four books.of Social Customs, four books.of the Best Constitution, one book.A Collection of Problems, five books.On Proverbs, one book.On Coagulation and Liquefaction, one book.On Fire, two books.On Winds, one book.of Paralysis, one book.of Suffocation, one book.of Mental Derangement, one book.On the Passions, one book.On Symptoms, one book.Two books of Sophisms.On the solution of Syllogisms, one book.Two books of Topics.of Punishment, two books.On Hair, one book.of Tyranny, one book.On Water, three books.On Sleep and Dreams, one book.of Friendship, three books.of Ambition, two books. 5.49. Epitomes of Aristotle's work on Animals, six books.Two books of Refutative Arguments.Theses, three books.of Kingship, two books.of Causes, one book.On Democritus, one book.[of Calumny, one book.]of Becoming, one book.of the Intelligence and Character of Animals, one book.On Motion, two books.On Vision, four books.Relating to Definitions, two books.On Data, one book.On Greater and Less, one book.On the Musicians, one book.of the Happiness of the Gods, one book.A Reply to the Academics, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.How States can best be governed, one book.Lecture-Notes, one book.On the Eruption in Sicily, one book.On Things generally admitted, one book.[On Problems in Physics, one book.]What are the methods of attaining Knowledge, one book.On the Fallacy known as the Liar, three books. 5.81. On the Iliad, two books.On the Odyssey, four books.And the following works, each in one book:Ptolemy.Concerning Love.Phaedondas.Maedon.Cleon.Socrates.Artaxerxes.Concerning Homer.Aristides.Aristomachus.An Exhortation to Philosophy.of the Constitution.On the ten years of his own Supremacy.of the Ionians.Concerning Embassies.of Belief.of Favour.of Fortune.of Magimity.of Marriage.of the Beam in the Sky.of Peace.On Laws.On Customs.of Opportunity.Dionysius.Concerning Chalcis.A Denunciation of the Athenians.On Antiphanes.Historical Introduction.Letters.A Sworn Assembly.of Old Age.Rights.Aesop's Fables.Anecdotes. 7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. 7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form. 7.150. The primary matter they make the substratum of all things: so Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno. By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes. Body according to them is substance which is finite: so Antipater in his second book On Substance, and Apollodorus in his Physics. Matter can also be acted upon, as the same author says, for if it were immutable, the things which are produced would never have been produced out of it. Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible ad infinitum. Chrysippus says that the division is not ad infinitum, but itself infinite; for there is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing. 9.36. Demetrius estimates his share at over 100 talents, the whole of which he spent. His industry, says the same author, was so great that he cut off a little room in the garden round the house and shut himself up there. One day his father brought an ox to sacrifice and tied it there, and he was not aware of it for a considerable time, until his father roused him to attend the sacrifice and told him about the ox. Demetrius goes on: It would seem that he also went to Athens and was not anxious to be recognized, because he despised fame, and that while he knew of Socrates, he was not known to Socrates, his words being, 'I came to Athens and no one knew me.' 10.132. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them. |
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| 187. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Septimus Severus, 15 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 353 |
| 188. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 12.841 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225 |
189. Ammianus Marcellinus, History, 15.9.1-15.9.12 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Woolf (2011). Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West. 108, 110 | 15.9.1. Now, since—as the lofty bard of Mantua said of old—a greater work Aen. vii. 44 f, maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo, Maius opus moveo. undertake, a greater train of events ariseth before me, I think now a suitable time to describe the regions and situation of the Gauls, for fear that amid fiery encounters and shifting fortunes of battle I may treat of matters unknown to some and seem to follow the example of slovenly sailors, who are forced amid surges and storms to mend their worn sails and rigging, which might have been put in order with less danger. 15.9.2. The ancient writers, in doubt as to the earliest origin of the Gauls, have left an incomplete account of the matter, but later Timagenes, Timagenes of Alexandria, who, according to Suidas, was brought to Rome as a prisoner of war by Pompey. He wrote a History of Alexander and a History of the Gauls. Cf. Hor., Epist. i. 19, 15; Quint., i. 10, 10; x. i. 75. a true Greek in accuracy as well as language, collected out of various books these facts that had been long forgotten; which, following his authority, and avoiding any obscurity, I shall state clearly and plainly. 15.9.3. Some asserted that the people first seen in these regions were Aborigines, called Celts from the name of a beloved king, and Galatae (for so the Greek language terms the Gauls) from the name of his mother. Others stated that the Dorians, following the earlier Hercules, Earlier seems to be contrasted with the son of Amphytrion in 9, 6, below and the Theban Hercules in 10, 9, whom Ammianus identifies with the son of Amphytrion. The story of a hero similar to Hercules is found in Greece, Italy, Egypt, the Orient, and among the Celts and Germans. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. iii. 16, 42, names six Herculeses, Serv., ad Aen. viii. 564, four: the Tirynthian, Argive, Theban, and Libyan. The Theban Hercules is generally regarded as the son of Amphitryon, but the one here referred to seems to have been the Italic hero, locally called Recaranus and Garanus, who was later identified with the Greek Heracles. settled in the lands bordering on the Ocean. 15.9.4. The Drysidae Druids say that a part of the people was in fact indigenous, but that others also poured in from the remote islands and the regions across the Rhine, driven from their homes by continual wars and by the inundation of the stormy sea. 15.9.5. Some assert that after the destruction of Troy a few of those who fled from the Greeks and were scattered everywhere occupied those regions, which were then deserted. 15.9.6. But the inhabitants of those countries affirm this beyond all else, and I have also read it inscribed upon their monuments, that Hercules, the son of Amphytrion, hastened to destroy the cruel tyrants Geryon and Tauriscus, of whom one oppressed Spain, the other, Gaul; and having overcome them both that he took to wife some high-born women and begat numerous children, who called by their own names the districts which they ruled. 15.9.7. But in fact a people of Asia from Phocaea, to avoid the severity of Harpalus, An error for Harpagus, see Index. prefect of king Cyrus, set sail for Italy. A part of them founded Velia Modern Castellamare della Bruca. in Lucania, the rest, Massilia Marseilles. in the region of Vienne. Then in subsequent ages they established no small number of towns, as their strength and resources increased. But I must not discuss varying opinions, which often causes satiety. 15.9.8. Throughout these regions men gradually grew civilised and the study of the liberal arts flourished, initiated by the Bards, the Euhages and the Druids. The three are connected also by Strabo (iv. 4. 4), who says that the bards were poets; the euhages ( οὐάτεις ), diviners and natural philosophers; while the Druids studied both natural and moral philosophy. L.C.L. ii. p. 245. Now, the Bards sang to the sweet strains of the lyre the valorous deeds of famous men composed in heroic verse, but the Euhages, Properly, Vates ( οὐάτεις ). investigating the sublime, attempted to explain the secret laws of nature. The Druids, being loftier than the rest in intellect, and bound together in fraternal organisations, as the authority of Pythagoras determined, were elevated by their investigation of obscure and profound subjects, and scorning all things human, pronounced the soul immortal. |
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| 190. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 14.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 148 |
| 191. Macrobius, Saturnalia, 3.9.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 225 |
| 192. Themistius, Orations, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 471 |
| 193. Nonnus, Dionysiaca, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82 |
| 194. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academica •cicero, marcus tullius, de divinatione •cicero, marcus tullius, de finibus •cicero, marcus tullius, de natura deorum •cicero, marcus tullius, hortensius •cicero, marcus tullius, partitiones oratoriae •cicero, marcus tullius, philonean outlook of •cicero, marcus tullius, plato and platonism of •cicero, marcus tullius, somnium scipionis •cicero, marcus tullius, topics •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, and timaeus translation •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, and fusion of rhetorical and philosophical methods •cicero, marcus tullius, concurrence of •cicero, marcus tullius, historical reach of translations •cicero, marcus tullius, language of, rhetorical •cicero, marcus tullius, on romans surpassing greeks (in tusculans) •cicero, marcus tullius, on emulating greek orators •cicero, marcus tullius, philosophical treatises of •cicero, marcus tullius, preface to •cicero, marcus tullius, sceptical terms used by •cicero, marcus tullius, speaking role in timaeus •cicero, marcus tullius, “scepticisms” of Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 167, 216 |
| 195. Cicero, Academic Books, 10-11, 13-17, 19-20, 24, 27-35, 37-39, 9, 26 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 63, 67 |
| 196. Arch., Cat., 3.26 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 44 |
| 197. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 3.7.11, 5.4-5.7 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 22; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 44 |
| 200. Calcidius, Translation of Plato, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 19 |
| 202. Florus Lucius Annaeus, Epitome Bellorum Omnium Annorum Dcc, 2.13.91 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 45 |
| 203. Arch., Att., 1.18.1, 2.3.4, 2.4.7, 2.15.3, 2.23.1, 4.10.1, 6.1.26, 13.52, 13.52.1, 14.13.1, 14.16.2, 115.17 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 51, 150, 151, 155, 173, 253, 267 |
| 205. Epicurus, Deperditorum Librorum Reliquiae, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
206. Strabo, Geography, 3.4.16, 4.1.5, 5.3.7, 13.1.54, 14.1.48, 14.5.6, 14.5.10, 14.5.14 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, political views •cicero, marcus tullius, speeches •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician •cicero, marcus tullius, son of the orator Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 127; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 149, 267; Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 317, 485; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 23, 53, 59 | 3.4.16. Iberia produces a large quantity of roots used in dyeing. In olives, vines, figs, and every kind of similar fruit trees, the Iberian coast next the Mediterranean abounds, they are likewise plentiful beyond. of the coasts next the ocean, that towards the north is destitute of them, on account of the cold, and the remaining portion generally on account of the apathy of the men, and because they do not lead a civilized life, but pass their days in poverty, only acting on the animal impulse, and living most corruptly. They do not attend to ease or luxury, unless any one considers it can add to the happiness of their lives to wash themselves and their wives in stale urine kept in tanks, and to rinse their teeth with it, which they say is the custom both with the Cantabrians and their neighbours. This practice, as well as that of sleeping on the ground, is common both among the Iberians and Kelts. Some say that the Gallicians are atheists, but that the Keltiberians, and their neighbours to the north, [sacrifice] to a nameless god, every full moon, at night, before their doors, the whole family passing the night in dancing and festival. The Vettones, the first time they came to a Roman camp, and saw certain of the officers walking up and down the roads for the mere pleasure of walking, supposed that they were mad, and offered to show them the way to their tents. For they thought, when not fighting, one should remain quietly seated at ease. 4.1.5. The Massilians live under a well-regulated aristocracy. They have a council composed of 600 persons called timouchi, who enjoy this dignity for life. Fifteen of these preside over the council, and have the management of current affairs; these fifteen are in their turn presided over by three of their number, in whom rests the principal authority; and these again by one. No one can become a timouchus who has not children, and who has not been a citizen for three generations. Their laws, which are the same as those of the Ionians, they expound in public. Their country abounds in olives and vines, but on account of its ruggedness the wheat is poor. Consequently they trust more to the resources of the sea than of the land, and avail themselves in preference of their excellent position for commerce. Nevertheless they have been enabled by the power of perseverance to take in some of the surrounding plains, and also to found cities: of this number are the cities they founded in Iberia as a rampart against the Iberians, in which they introduced the worship of Diana of Ephesus, as practised in their father-land, with the Grecian mode of sacrifice. In this number too are Rhoa [and] Agatha, [built for defence] against the barbarians dwelling around the river Rhone; also Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis and Nicaea, [built as a rampart] against the nation of the Salyes and the Ligurians who inhabit the Alps. They possess likewise dry docks and armouries. Formerly they had an abundance of vessels, arms, and machines, both for the purposes of navigation and for besieging towns; by means of which they defended themselves against the barbarians, and likewise obtained the alliance of the Romans, to whom they rendered many important services; the Romans in their turn assisting in their aggrandizement. Sextius, who defeated the Salyes, founded, not far from Marseilles, a city which was named after him and the hot waters, some of which they say have lost their heat. Here he established a Roman garrison, and drove from the sea-coast which leads from Marseilles to Italy the barbarians, whom the Massilians were not able to keep back entirely. However, all he accomplished by this was to compel the barbarians to keep at a distance of twelve stadia from those parts of the coast which possessed good harbours, and at a distance of eight stadia where it was rugged. The land which they thus abandoned, he presented to the Massilians. In their city are laid up heaps of booty taken in naval engagements against those who disputed the sea unjustly. Formerly they enjoyed singular good fortune, as well in other matters as also in their amity with the Romans. of this [amity] we find numerous signs, amongst others the statue of Diana which the Romans dedicated on the Aventine mount, of the same figure as that of the Massilians. Their prosperity has in a great measure decayed since the war of Pompey against Caesar, in which they sided with the vanquished party. Nevertheless some traces of their ancient industry may still be seen amongst the inhabitants, especially the making of engines of war and ship-building. Still as the surrounding barbarians, now that they are under the dominion of the Romans, become daily more civilized, and leave the occupation of war for the business of towns and agriculture, there is no longer the same attention paid by the inhabitants of Marseilles to these objects. The aspect of the city at the present day is a proof of this. For all those who profess to be men of taste, turn to the study of elocution and philosophy. Thus this city for some little time back has become a school for the barbarians, and has communicated to the Galatae such a taste for Greek literature, that they even draw contracts on the Grecian model. While at the present day it so entices the noblest of the Romans, that those desirous of studying resort thither in preference to Athens. These the Galatae observing, and being at leisure on account of the peace, readily devote themselves to similar pursuits, and that not merely individuals, but the public generally; professors of the arts and sciences, and likewise of medicine, being employed not only by private persons, but by towns for common instruction. of the wisdom of the Massilians and the simplicity of their life, the following will not be thought an insignificant proof. The largest dowry amongst them consists of one hundred gold pieces, with five for dress, and five more for golden ornaments. More than this is not lawful. Caesar and his successors treated with moderation the offences of which they were guilty during the war, in consideration of their former friendship; and have preserved to the state the right of governing according to its ancient laws. So that neither Marseilles nor the cities dependent on it are under submission to the governors sent [into the Narbonnaise]. So much for Marseilles. 5.3.7. In the interior, the first city above Ostia is Rome; it is the only city built on the Tiber. It has been remarked above, that its position was fixed, not by choice, but necessity; to this must be added, that those who afterwards enlarged it, were not at liberty to select a better site, being prevented by what was already built. The first [kings] fortified the Capitol, the Palatium, and the Collis Quirinalis, which was so easy of access, that when Titus Tatius came to avenge the rape of the [Sabine] virgins, he took it on the first assault. Ancus Marcius, who added Mount Caelius and the Aventine Mount with the intermediate plain, separated as these places were both from each other and from what had been formerly fortified, was compelled to do this of necessity; since he did not consider it proper to leave outside his walls, heights so well protected by nature, to whomsoever might have a mind to fortify themselves upon them, while at the same time he was not capable of enclosing the whole as far as Mount Quirinus. Servius perceived this defect, and added the Esquiline and Viminal hills. As these were both of easy access from without, a deep trench was dug outside them and the earth thrown up on the inside, thus forming a terrace of 6 stadia in length along the inner side of the trench. This terrace he surmounted with a wall flanked with towers, and extending from the Colline to the Esquiline gate. Midway along the terrace is a third gate, named after the Viminal hill. Such is the Roman rampart, which seems to stand in need of other ramparts itself. But it seems to me that the first [founders] were of opinion, both in regard to themselves and their successors, that Romans had to depend not on fortifications, but on arms and their individual valour, both for safety and for wealth, and that walls were not a defence to men, but men were a defence to walls. At the period of its commencement, when the large and fertile districts surrounding the city belonged to others, and while it lay easily open to assault, there was nothing in its position which could be looked upon as favourable; but when by valour and labour these districts became its own, there succeeded a tide of prosperity surpassing the advantages of every other place. Thus, notwithstanding the prodigious increase of the city, there has been plenty of food, and also of wood and stone for ceaseless building, rendered necessary by the falling down of houses, and on account of conflagrations, and of the sales, which seem never to cease. These sales are a kind of voluntary falling down of houses, each owner knocking down and rebuilding one part or another, according to his individual taste. For these purposes the numerous quarries, the forests, and the rivers which convey the materials, offer wonderful facilities. of these rivers, the first is the Teverone, which flows from Alba, a city of the Latins near to the country of the Marsi, and from thence through the plain below this [city], till it unites with the Tiber. After this come the Nera (Nar) and the Timia, which passing through Ombrica fall into the Tiber, and the Chiana, which flows through Tyrrhenia and the territory of Clusiumn. Augustus Caesar endeavoured to avert from the city damages of the kind alluded to, and instituted a company of freedmen, who should be ready to lend their assistance in cases of conflagration; whilst, as a preventive against the falling of houses, he decreed that all new buildings should not be carried so high as formerly, and that those erected along the public ways should not exceed seventy feet in height. But these improvements must have ceased only for the facilities afforded by the quarries, the forests, and the ease of transport. 13.1.54. From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard bow zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench. But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors. The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors. Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where Tyrannion the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts — a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men. 14.1.48. Famous men born at Nysa are: Apollonius the Stoic philosopher, best of the disciples of Panaetius; and Menecrates, pupil of Aristarchus; and Aristodemus, his son, whose entire course, in his extreme old age, I in my youth took at Nysa; and Sostratus, the brother of Aristodemus, and another Aristodemus, his cousin, who trained Pompey the Great, proved themselves notable grammarians. But my teacher also taught rhetoric and had two schools, both in Rhodes and in his native land, teaching rhetoric in the morning and grammar in the evening; at Rome, however, when he was in charge of the children of Pompey the Great, he was content with the teaching of grammar. 14.5.6. Then, after Corycus, one comes to Elaeussa, an island lying close to the mainland, which Archelaus settled, making it a royal residence, after he had received the whole of Cilicia Tracheia except Seleuceia — the same way in which it was obtained formerly by Amyntas and still earlier by Cleopatra; for since the region was naturally well adapted to the business of piracy both by land and by sea — by land, because of the height of the mountains and the large tribes that live beyond them, tribes which have plains and farm-lands that are large and easily overrun, and by sea, because of the good supply, not only of shipbuilding timber, but also of harbors and fortresses and secret recesses — with all this in view, I say, the Romans thought that it was better for the region to be ruled by kings than to be under the Roman prefects sent to administer justice, who were not likely always to be present or to have armed forces with them. Thus Archelaus received, in addition to Cappadocia, Cilicia Tracheia; and the boundary of the latter, the river Lamus and the village of the same name, lies between Soli and Elaeussa. 14.5.10. Above Anchiale lies Cyinda, a fortress, which at one time was used as a treasury by the Macedonians. But the treasures were taken away by Eumenes, when he revolted from Antigonus. And still above this and Soli is a mountainous country, in which is a city Olbe, with a sanctuary of Zeus, founded by Ajax the son of Teucer. The priest of this sanctuary became dynast of Cilicia Tracheia; and then the country was beset by numerous tyrants, and the gangs of pirates were organized. And after the overthrow of these they called this country the domain of Teucer, and called the same also the priesthood of Teucer; and most of the priests were named Teucer or Ajax. But Aba, the daughter of Xenophanes, one of the tyrants, came into this family by marriage and herself took possession of the empire, her father having previously received it in the guise of guardian. But later both Antony and Cleopatra conferred it upon her as a favor, being moved by her courteous entreaties. And then she was overthrown, but the empire remained with her descendants. After Anchiale one comes to the outlets of the Cydnus, near the Rhegma, as it is called. It is a place that forms into a lake, having also ancient arsenals; and into it empties the Cydnus River, which flows through the middle of Tarsus and has its sources in the city Taurus, which lies above Tarsus. The lake is also the naval station of Tarsus. 14.5.14. The following men were natives of Tarsus: among the Stoics, Antipater and Archedemus and Nestor; and also the two Athenodoruses, one of whom, called Cordylion, lived with Marcus Cato and died at his house; and the other, the son of Sandon, called Caites after some village, was Caesar's teacher and was greatly honored by him; and when he returned to his native land, now an old man, he broke up the government there established, which was being badly conducted by Boethus, among others, who was a bad poet and a bad citizen, having prevailed there by currying the favour of the people. He had been raised to prominence by Antony, who at the outset received favorably the poem which he had written upon the victory at Philippi, but still more by that facility prevalent among the Tarsians whereby he could instantly speak offhand and unceasingly on any given subject. Furthermore, Antony promised the Tarsians an office of gymnasiarch, but appointed Boethus instead of a gymnasiarch, and entrusted to him the expenditures. But Boethus was caught secreting, among other things, the olive-oil; and when he was being proven guilty by his accusers in the presence of Antony he deprecated Antony's wrath, saying, among other things, that Just as Homer had hymned the praises of Achilles and Agamemnon and Odysseus, so I have hymned thine. It is not right, therefore, that I should be brought before you on such slanderous charges. When, however, the accuser caught the statement, he said, Yes, but Homer did not steal Agamemnon's oil, nor yet that of Achilles, but you did; and therefore you shall be punished. However, he broke the wrath of Antony by courteous attentions, and no less than before kept on plundering the city until the overthrow of Antony. Finding the city in this plight, Athenodorus for a time tried to induce both Boethus and his partisans to change their course; but since they would abstain from no act of insolence, he used the authority given him by Caesar, condemned them to exile, and expelled them. These at first indicted him with the following inscription on the walls: Work for young men, counsels for the middle-aged, and flatulence for old men; and when he, taking the inscription as a joke, ordered the following words to be inscribed beside it, thunder for old men, someone, contemptuous of all decency and afflicted with looseness of the bowels, profusely bespattered the door and wall of Athenodorus' house as he was passing by it at night. Athenodorus, while bringing accusations in the assembly against the faction, said: One may see the sickly plight and the disaffection of the city in many ways, and in particular from its excrements. These men were Stoics; but the Nestor of my time, the teacher of Marcellus, son of Octavia the sister of Caesar, was an Academician. He too was at the head of the government of Tarsus, having succeeded Athenodorus; and he continued to be held in honor both by the prefects and in the city. |
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| 207. Priscus, Fragments, 6.13.70 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de re publica Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 186 |
| 208. Arch., Am., 16 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in puteoli Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 173 |
| 209. App., Alex., 37.3 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 39 |
| 211. Diodorus of Sicily, Fr., 11.24.1, 13.24.5-13.24.6 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 74, 75, 76, 83 |
| 212. App., Res Gestae, 1 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 76 |
| 215. Theodorus of Hierapolis, Peri Agonon, None Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 168 |
| 216. Hipp., Peri Technes, 1.3 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, ideal orator Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 144 |
| 218. Telephus, Trrf, 126 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, brutus Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 82 |
| 219. Cic., Cons., None Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, pro archia Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 47 |
| 220. Cicero, Diu., 1.49 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 181, 184 |
| 221. Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, 2.14, 2.39, 2.61, 2.81.3, 2.126 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, house in rome •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, de doma sua •cicero, marcus tullius, rome imagined Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 63; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 23, 44, 51, 118 |
| 222. Suetonius, Ben., 6.30.6 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and brutus Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 8 |
223. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.39-1.41, 1.405, 2.725, 2.730-2.731, 2.736-2.740, 2.752-2.757, 2.760, 2.768-2.771, 4.670, 5.134-5.135, 6.9-6.12, 6.42-6.51, 6.77-6.82, 6.98-6.100, 6.126, 6.128-6.129, 6.268, 6.384, 6.477, 6.539, 6.642-6.644, 6.673, 6.676, 6.688, 6.703, 7.563-7.571, 7.791, 8.276-8.277, 8.307, 8.349-8.354, 12.946-12.947 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004), Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, 275; Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 179, 182, 251; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 148, 149, 254; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 79, 175 | 1.39. its griefs and wrongs: the choice by Paris made; 1.40. her scorned and slighted beauty; a whole race 1.41. rebellious to her godhead; and Jove's smile 1.405. These words he gave, and summoned Maia's son, 2.725. when Priam was his foe. With flush of shame 2.730. the aged warrior hurled with nerveless arm 2.731. his ineffectual spear, which hoarsely rang 2.736. tell him my naughty deeds! Be sure and say 2.737. how Neoptolemus hath shamed his sires. 2.738. Now die!” With this, he trailed before the shrines 2.739. the trembling King, whose feet slipped in the stream 2.740. of his son's blood. Then Pyrrhus' left hand clutched 2.752. and dazed me utterly. A vision rose 2.753. of my own cherished father, as I saw 2.754. the King, his aged peer, sore wounded Iying 2.755. in mortal agony; a vision too 2.756. of lost Creusa at my ravaged hearth, 2.757. and young Iulus' peril. Then my eyes 2.760. from battlement or tower; some in despair 2.768. for Troy o'erthrown, and of some Greek revenge, 2.769. or her wronged husband's Iong indigt ire. 2.770. So hid she at that shrine her hateful brow, 2.771. being of Greece and Troy , full well she knew, 4.670. lifts on his shoulder the wide wheel of heaven, 5.134. the wonted way, two swine, and, sable-hued, 5.135. the yoke of bulls; from shallow bowl he poured 6.9. To find the seed-spark hidden in its veins; 6.10. One breaks the thick-branched trees, and steals away 6.11. The shelter where the woodland creatures bide; 6.12. One leads his mates where living waters flow. 6.42. 0 Icarus, in such well-graven scene 6.43. How proud thy place should be! but grief forbade: 6.44. Twice in pure gold a father's fingers strove 6.45. To shape thy fall, and twice they strove in vain. 6.46. Aeneas long the various work would scan; 6.47. But now Achates comes, and by his side 6.48. Deiphobe, the Sibyl, Glaucus' child. 6.49. Thus to the prince she spoke : 6.50. “Is this thine hour 6.51. To stand and wonder? Rather go obtain 6.77. On great Achilles! Thou hast guided me 6.78. Through many an unknown water, where the seas 6.79. Break upon kingdoms vast, and to the tribes 6.80. of the remote Massyli, whose wild land 6.81. To Syrtes spreads. But now; because at last 6.82. I touch Hesperia's ever-fleeting bound, 6.98. I there will keep, to be my people's law; 6.99. And thee, benigt Sibyl for all time 6.100. A company of chosen priests shall serve. 6.126. Through Italy ; the cause of so much ill 6.128. A marriage-chamber for an alien bride. 6.129. Oh! yield not to thy woe, but front it ever, 6.268. In silent flight, and find a wished-for rest 6.384. These were but shapes and shadows sweeping by, 6.477. For thou hast power! Or if some path there be, 6.539. Came safe across the river, and were moored 6.642. of ears and nostrils infamously shorn. 6.643. Scarce could Aeneas know the shuddering shade 6.644. That strove to hide its face and shameful scar; 6.673. In that same hour on my sad couch I lay, 6.676. But my illustrious bride from all the house 6.688. But, friend, what fortunes have thy life befallen? 6.703. To Tartarus th' accurst.” Deiphobus Deïphobus 7.563. which, while in night and slumber thou wert laid, 7.564. Saturnia 's godhead, visibly revealed, 7.565. bade me declare. Up, therefore, and array 7.566. thy warriors in arms! Swift sallying forth 7.567. from thy strong city-gates, on to the fray 7.568. exultant go! Assail the Phrygian chiefs 7.569. who tent them by thy beauteous river's marge, 7.570. and burn their painted galleys! 't is the will 7.571. of gods above that speaks. Yea, even the King 7.791. close to my journey's end, thou spoilest me 8.276. the herd of monster bulls, which pastured free 8.277. along our river-valley. Cacus gazed 8.307. gnashing his teeth. Three times his ire surveyed 8.349. burst wide the doorway of the sooty den, 8.350. and unto Heaven and all the people showed 8.351. the stolen cattle and the robber's crimes, 8.352. and dragged forth by the feet the shapeless corpse 8.353. of the foul monster slain. The people gazed 8.354. insatiate on the grewsome eyes, the breast 12.946. of Eryx , when the nodding oaks resound, 12.947. or sovereign Apennine that lifts in air |
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| 224. Papyri, Papyri Demoticae Magicae, 132 Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
225. Vergil, Georgics, 1.388-1.389, 2.66, 2.173-2.174, 2.473-2.474, 4.315-4.316 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •ciceromarcus tullius cicero •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 150, 254; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175; Walter (2020), Time in Ancient Stories of Origin, 11| 1.388. Tum cornix plena pluviam vocat inproba voce 1.389. et sola in sicca secum spatiatur harena. 2.66. fraxinus Herculeaeque arbos umbrosa coronae 2.173. Salve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus, 2.174. magna virum; tibi res antiquae laudis et artem 2.473. sacra deum sanctique patres; extrema per illos 2.474. iustitia excedens terris vestigia fecit. 4.315. Quis deus hanc, Musae, quis nobis extudit artem? 4.316. Unde nova ingressus hominum experientia cepit? | |
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| 226. Epigraphy, Cil, 6.1285 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, de oratore •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, ideal orator Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 29 |
| 227. Dion of Prusa, Or., 31.66 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, son of the orator Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 317 |
| 228. Epigraphy, Ms, None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 471 |
| 229. Aurelius Victor, Aurelius Victor, 20.14 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, orator, philosopher, and politician Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 353 |
| 230. Pseudo-Quintilian, Minor Declamations, 313.1 Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 231. Various, Ap, 7.217, 11.23.1-11.23.2, 11.38 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56, 171 |
| 232. Choerilus of Iasus, Sh, 335 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55, 56 |
| 233. Seneca The Younger, Dialogues, 10.17.2. Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 80 |
| 234. Ion of Chios, Elegies, 27 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 71 |
| 235. Aristotle, Protrepticus, None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 55, 56 |
| 236. [Alexis], Fr., 25 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 69, 71 |
| 237. Rabirius, Fr., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 71 |
| 238. Archestratus of Gela, Test., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 239. Epicurus, Letter To Menoecus, 130, 132, 131 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 240. Vergil, Eclogues, 7.61 Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 175 |
| 241. Aristippus, Ssr Iv A, 96 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 56 |
| 244. Philostratus The Athenian, De Amicitia, 83 Tagged with subjects: •tullius, marcus (client of cicero) Found in books: Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 156 |
| 250. Critolaus, Frs., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, academic books •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 63 |
| 251. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 139 |
| 252. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 47, 48 |
| 253. Dicaearchus, Frs., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 145 |
| 254. Pliny The Elder, Ep., 2.17.2-2.17.3, 2.17.8-2.17.9, 2.17.17-2.17.19, 2.17.22, 2.17.24 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Fertik (2019), The Ruler's House: Contesting Power and Privacy in Julio-Claudian Rome, 71 |
| 255. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 67 |
| 256. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 5.22-5.36, 6.17-6.20 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 164 |
| 257. Anon., Apl, 89.4 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius Found in books: Rohland (2022), Carpe Diem: The Poetics of Presence in Greek and Latin Literature, 171 |
