7. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.34, 3.42, 4.45, 5.12, 5.14, 5.26, 5.37, 5.68-5.69, 5.71, 5.75, 5.81, 5.84, 5.86, 5.91-5.92 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sufficiency (of virtue for a happy life) Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 51, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181 | 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.69. "How then, you will object, can it be true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if friendships and relationships and the other external goods are not part of the Chief Good? The answer is that it is in this way: we maintain these external goods by those acts of duty which spring from the particular class of virtue connected with each. For example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents benefits the doer from the very fact that such performance of duty is a right action, and right actions take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, under nature's guidance, make right action their aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet endowed with noble characters often respond to the stimulus of honour, which has some show and semblance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection and completeness, the one thing of all others most splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would they be, if they take such a delight in the mere shadow and reputation of it! 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.81. As for external goods, you were, it is true, cautious; but since these bodily excellences are goods, you will doubtless reckon as goods the things productive of them, namely friends, children, relations, riches, rank and power. Mark that against this I say nothing; what I say is, if misfortunes which a Wise Man may encounter are as you say evils, to be wise is not enough for happiness." "Say rather," said he, "not enough for supreme happiness, but it is enough for happiness." "I noticed," I replied, "you made that distinction a little time ago, and I am aware that our master Antiochus is fond of saying the same; but what can be more unsatisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not happy enough? Any addition to what is enough makes it too much; now no one has too much happiness; therefore no one can be happier than happy." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. |
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8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.34, 3.42, 4.45, 5.12, 5.14, 5.26, 5.37, 5.68-5.69, 5.71, 5.75, 5.81, 5.84, 5.86, 5.91-5.92 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sufficiency (of virtue for a happy life) Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 51, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181| 2.34. in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, non valitudinem corporis om. E non valetudinem ( om. cor- poris) edd. summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam et iam NV etiam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante paulo ante § 33 omne enim animal ... asperneturque contraria dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * Mdv. : ' nonnulla exciderunt, quibus Cicero simili forma atque supra (Polemoni et Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt cet. ) dixerit, quae alii prima posuissent; tum rectissime (quemadmodum ante: ergo nata est cet.) subiciebatur de finibus : his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes (consentanei iis, quae posita sunt prima) sunt fines bonorum. Et fortasse etiam Carneadem et Hieronymum no- minarat, sed hic exempli causa solos Aristippum et Stoicos ponit. ' his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt fines sunt etiam A bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis Stoicis N 2 stoici consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque reficientemque A 1 BERN contraria. 3.42. An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 4.45. sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse bonum solum bonum solum BERNV honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum, quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quicquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, modo quos modo quos BERNV nominavi. mihi autem aequius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, acceperat V accederat R ac- cederet BE concederat N a communibus initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a a N 2 V om. BERN 1 natura profecta, uti isdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, isdemque sententiis. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.68. ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur. 5.69. Quo modo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amicitiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea, quae externa sunt, iis tuemur officiis, quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. nam et amici cultus et parentis ei, ei Or. et qui officio fungitur, in eo ipso prodest, quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta a virtutibus. quae add. Lamb. quidem sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes; sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes Se. sa- pientes utentes sequuntur duce natura tanquam BERV sapientes vírt tes ('rt ab alt. m. in ras. ) sequuntur duce natura tamquam N. ' Latet aliquid huiusmodi : quae quidem sapientes videntes sequuntur duce natura eam viam' Mdv. non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam. rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tantopere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur? 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.75. inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? comentatus R commentatus ( prior t in ras. paulo capaciore ) N commendatus (conm. E) BE comendatus V Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, alias N 2 alia sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto aliquando BE ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere. 5.81. iam illa externa parce tu quidem; sed haec cum corporis bona sint, eorum conficientia certe in bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquos, divitias, honores, opes. contra hoc attende me nihil dicere, illud dicere, si ista mala sunt, add. Mdv. sint Bai. in quae potest incidere sapiens, sapientem esse non esse non esse om. R ad beate vivendum satis esse ad beate vivendum BE satis. Immo vero, inquit, ad beatissime vivendum parum est, ad beate vero vero om. BE satis. Animadverti, inquam, te isto modo paulo ante paulo ante p. 191, 13-16 ponere, et scio ab Antiocho nostro dici sic solere; sed quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? quod autem satis est, eo quicquid accessit, accessit C. F. W. Mue. accesserit nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; ita ita Dav. et nemo beato beatior. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.91. At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum paulum Brem. parum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo audeo R igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt V bona appellare nec fraudare fraudari BR suo vetere vetere Wes. ad or. p. Sest. p. 7 (sec. Mdv) veteri nomine neque iam neque iam Se. quam aliquod aliquod Lamb. aliquid RV ali- quam BE potius novum exquirere, acquirere E virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. 5.92. terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at at Ascens. an hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita ait in vita om. Sacerd. risisse quem ... risisse Sacerd. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil VI 442) Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat acciderat V accideret ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, Oroete Vict. oronte BE oriente R orente V praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At At V ad R et BE multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. | 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.69. "How then, you will object, can it be true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if friendships and relationships and the other external goods are not part of the Chief Good? The answer is that it is in this way: we maintain these external goods by those acts of duty which spring from the particular class of virtue connected with each. For example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents benefits the doer from the very fact that such performance of duty is a right action, and right actions take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, under nature's guidance, make right action their aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet endowed with noble characters often respond to the stimulus of honour, which has some show and semblance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection and completeness, the one thing of all others most splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would they be, if they take such a delight in the mere shadow and reputation of it! 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.81. As for external goods, you were, it is true, cautious; but since these bodily excellences are goods, you will doubtless reckon as goods the things productive of them, namely friends, children, relations, riches, rank and power. Mark that against this I say nothing; what I say is, if misfortunes which a Wise Man may encounter are as you say evils, to be wise is not enough for happiness." "Say rather," said he, "not enough for supreme happiness, but it is enough for happiness." "I noticed," I replied, "you made that distinction a little time ago, and I am aware that our master Antiochus is fond of saying the same; but what can be more unsatisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not happy enough? Any addition to what is enough makes it too much; now no one has too much happiness; therefore no one can be happier than happy." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. |
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