1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.1-1.3, 1.7, 2.7, 6.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and body Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 20, 281, 282, 283| 1.1. "וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהִים לַיַּבָּשָׁה אֶרֶץ וּלְמִקְוֵה הַמַּיִם קָרָא יַמִּים וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים כִּי־טוֹב׃", 1.1. "בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ׃", 1.2. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יִשְׁרְצוּ הַמַּיִם שֶׁרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה וְעוֹף יְעוֹפֵף עַל־הָאָרֶץ עַל־פְּנֵי רְקִיעַ הַשָּׁמָיִם׃", 1.2. "וְהָאָרֶץ הָיְתָה תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ וְחֹשֶׁךְ עַל־פְּנֵי תְהוֹם וְרוּחַ אֱלֹהִים מְרַחֶפֶת עַל־פְּנֵי הַמָּיִם׃", 1.3. "וּלְכָל־חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ וּלְכָל־עוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל רוֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה אֶת־כָּל־יֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב לְאָכְלָה וַיְהִי־כֵן׃", 1.3. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר וַיְהִי־אוֹר׃", 1.7. "וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָרָקִיעַ וַיַּבְדֵּל בֵּין הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר מִתַּחַת לָרָקִיעַ וּבֵין הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר מֵעַל לָרָקִיעַ וַיְהִי־כֵן׃", 2.7. "וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃", 6.14. "עֲשֵׂה לְךָ תֵּבַת עֲצֵי־גֹפֶר קִנִּים תַּעֲשֶׂה אֶת־הַתֵּבָה וְכָפַרְתָּ אֹתָהּ מִבַּיִת וּמִחוּץ בַּכֹּפֶר׃", | 1.1. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.", 1.2. "Now the earth was unformed and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters.", 1.3. "And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there was light.", 1.7. "And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament; and it was so.", 2.7. "Then the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.", 6.14. "Make thee an ark of gopher wood; with rooms shalt thou make the ark, and shalt pitch it within and without with pitch.", |
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2. Hesiod, Works And Days, 106-126, 128-201, 127 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 401 | 127. With all the gods. But when this progeny |
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| 3. Homer, Odyssey, 9.219, 10.509-10.515, 11.21-11.22 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (tripartite soul, psyche) •death and the afterlife, soul (psyche) Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 398; Pinheiro et al. (2018), Cultural Crossroads in the Ancient Novel, 223 |
4. Homer, Iliad, 1.3, 1.474-1.476 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •death and the afterlife, soul (psyche) •soul (psyche) Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 398; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 66 | 1.3. / The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus' son, Achilles, that destructive wrath which brought countless woes upon the Achaeans, and sent forth to Hades many valiant souls of heroes, and made them themselves spoil for dogs and every bird; thus the plan of Zeus came to fulfillment, 1.474. / and served out to all, first pouring drops for libation into the cups. So the whole day long they sought to appease the god with song, singing the beautiful paean, the sons of the Achaeans, hymning the god who works from afar; and his heart was glad, as he heard.But when the sun set and darkness came on, 1.475. / they lay down to rest by the stern cables of the ship, and as soon as early rosy-fingered Dawn appeared, then they set sail for the wide camp of the Achaeans. And Apollo, who works from afar, sent them a favouring wind, and they set up the mast and spread the white sail. 1.476. / they lay down to rest by the stern cables of the ship, and as soon as early rosy-fingered Dawn appeared, then they set sail for the wide camp of the Achaeans. And Apollo, who works from afar, sent them a favouring wind, and they set up the mast and spread the white sail. |
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| 5. Sappho, Fragments, 2.527.1-2.527.3, 3.568, 3.631 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •plato, on soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), transmigration of Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 37, 110, 276 |
| 6. Heraclitus of Ephesus, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 107 |
| 7. Pindar, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 255 |
| 8. Parmenides, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 107 |
| 9. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 110 |
| 10. Philolaus of Croton, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 33 |
| 11. Hippon, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 32 |
| 12. Anaxagoras, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 174 |
| 13. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 66 |
| 14. Hippocrates, The Sacred Disease, 7.10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 234 |
| 15. Diogenes of Apollonia, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plato, on soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 275 |
| 16. Empedocles, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 250 |
17. Aristophanes, Frogs, 145-149, 151, 274-276, 353-371, 150 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 560| 150. ἐπάταξεν, ἢ 'πίορκον ὅρκον ὤμοσεν, | |
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| 18. Antiphon, Orations, 17 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 7 |
19. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 260| 400c. σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται , δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδʼ ἓν γράμμα. | 400c. ign ( σῆμα ). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe ( σῶμα ) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not even a letter needs to be changed. |
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20. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 115| 904a. ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα πλήθεσιν ἄπειρʼ ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως· νῦν δʼ ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ. ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ΑΘ. ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες | 904a. then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy. Clin. How do you mean? Ath. Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal, as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, |
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| 21. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 115 |
22. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 146| 184c. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ διʼ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνῃ, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ διʼ οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ διʼ οὗ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. διʼ ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς. | 184c. SOC. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear? THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case. |
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| 23. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 111 |
24. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 33| 257a. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη. ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρʼ ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ. ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτως. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. ΘΕΑΙ. δικαιότατα εἴρηκας. | 257a. Str. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things. Theaet. Yes, it must. Str. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number. Theaet. That is not far from the truth. Str. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step. Theaet. That is very fair. |
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| 25. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 115 |
| 26. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 185 |
| 27. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 246 |
| 28. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 5 |
29. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 114| 271a. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἅμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα· πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ. ἦ γάρ; ΦΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι. ΦΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν. ΦΑΙ. τί μήν; | 271a. Socrates. Then this is the goal of all his effort; he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not that so? Phaedrus. Yes. Socrates. So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric, will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what we call explaining its nature. Phaedrus. Certainly. Socrates. And secondly he will say what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what. Phaedrus. To be sure. |
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| 30. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 50 |
31. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 115| 506d. παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν;—πάνυ γε.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσʼ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.—ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;—ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι.— | 506d. And is that thing pleasant by whose advent we are pleased, and that thing good by whose presence we are good? Certainly. But further, both we and everything else that is good, are good by the advent of some virtue? In my view this must be so, Callicles. But surely the virtue of each thing, whether of an implement or of a body, or again of a soul or any live creature, does not arrive most properly by accident, but by an order or rightness or art that is apportioned to each. Is that so? I certainly agree. |
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| 32. Euripides, Hippolytus, 1298-1299, 946-954, 956-957, 955 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 249, 259 |
33. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.3.3, 3.10.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul •plato, on soul (psyche) •myth of er, of the soul (psyche) •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and body •soul (psyche), as self Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 112; Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 65, 75| 1.3.3. θυσίας δὲ θύων μικρὰς ἀπὸ μικρῶν οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα θυόντων. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔφη καλῶς ἔχειν, εἰ ταῖς μεγάλαις θυσίαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς μικραῖς ἔχαιρον· πολλάκις γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτʼ ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἦν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν· ἀλλʼ ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. ἐπαινέτης δʼ ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τούτου· καδδύναμιν δʼ ἔρδειν ἱέρʼ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, Hes. WD 336 καὶ πρὸς φίλους δὲ καὶ ξένους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι τὴν καδδύναμιν δʼ ἔρδειν. 3.10.5. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἑστώτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις ἥδιον ὁρᾶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διʼ ὧν τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαπητὰ ἤθη φαίνεται ἢ διʼ ὧν τὰ αἰσχρά τε καὶ πονηρὰ καὶ μισητά; πολὺ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες. | 1.3.3. Though his sacrifices were humble, according to his means, he thought himself not a whit inferior to those who made frequent and magnificent sacrifices out of great possessions. The gods (he said) could not well delight more in great offerings than in small — for in that case must the gifts of the wicked often have found more favour in their sight than the gifts of the upright — and man would not find life worth having, if the gifts of the wicked were received with more favour by the gods than the gifts of the upright. No, the greater the piety of the giver, the greater (he thought) was the delight of the gods in the gift. He would quote with approval the line: According to thy power render sacrifice to the immortal gods, Hes. WD 336 and he would add that in our treatment of friends and strangers, and in all our behaviour, it is a noble principle to render according to our power. 3.10.5. Moreover, nobility and dignity, self-abasement and servility, prudence and understanding, insolence and vulgarity, are reflected in the face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in motion. True. Then these, too, can be imitated, can they not? Undoubtedly. Now which do you think the more pleasing sight, one whose features and bearing reflect a beautiful and good and lovable character, or one who is the embodiment of what is ugly and depraved and hateful? No doubt there is a great difference, Socrates . |
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| 34. Xenophon, Symposium, 2.15, 7.3-7.4, 10.1, 10.9-10.10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 117 |
| 35. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 150 |
| 36. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 33 |
| 37. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and body •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 277 |
| 38. Straton Comicus, Fragments, 108, 74 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 39. Aristotle, Generation And Corruption, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as proportion Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 53 |
| 40. Straton of Lampsacus, Fragments, 74, 108 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 41. Aristotle, Youth And Old Age, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 123 |
| 42. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 177 |
| 43. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 246 |
| 44. Aristotle, Respiration, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 123 |
| 45. Aristotle, Sense And Sensibilia, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 149 |
| 46. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and body •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 277 |
| 47. Aristotle, On Breath, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 174 |
| 48. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 250 |
| 49. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 33 |
| 50. Aristotle, History of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 145 |
| 51. Theophrastus, Characters, 16.1-16.12 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 254, 259 |
| 52. Aristotle, Physiognomonics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 177 |
| 53. Chrysippus, Fragments, 2.806 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 244 |
| 54. Ennius, Annales, 48, 55, 54 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 236 |
| 55. Archytas Amphissensis, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 32 |
| 56. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 149, 8, 14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 276 |
57. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.24, 1.51, 1.58 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plato, on soul (psyche) •myth of er, of the soul (psyche) •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 236| 1.24. nam si cor cor s. G aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; corpore V c s tempore X si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, harmonia GKR arm.V arm. H dissolvetur. quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? efficiet ... 25 dicit esse H his sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vita sensus amittitur; non sentientis autem nihil est ullam in partem quod intersit. reliquorum sententiae spem adferunt, si te hoc forte delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire. Me vero delectat, idque primum ita esse velim, deinde, etiamsi non sit, mihi persuaderi tamen velim. Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo: anima ex -o V c? amplius quod desideres nihil erit. Feci mehercule, et quidem saepius; sed nescio quo modo, dum lego, adsentior, cum posui librum et mecum ipse de inmortalitate imm. GR animorum coepi cogitare, adsensio omnis illa elabitur. Quid? 1.51. haec reputent isti qui negant animum sine corpore se intellegere posse: videbunt, quem in ipso corpore intellegant. mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multo obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit tamquam alienae domi, domui W cf. Wackernagel in comm. meo quam qualis, cum exierit et in liberum caelum quasi domum suam venerit. si si Po nis W etsi Kü si etiam Sey., sed nec—nec pro et—et scripto. enim, quod numquam vidimus, id quale sit intellegere non possumus, certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore possumus et certe animum ipsum corp. H liberatum cogitatione cogitatione R complecti possumus. Dicaearchus dicearchus (dice archus) X quidem et cf. Lact. inst. 7,13, 9 opif. 16, 13 Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid quid in quae corr. V 2 aut qualis esset intellegentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt. 1.58. cumque nihil esset , lac. ind. Po. (suppl. fere : eorum quae sensibus perciperentur cl. div.2,9 Tim.28A) ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur—nihil enim ille post enim hab. VBP s putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, esse s esset quod semper tale sit quale quale EIDEAN corr. Sey. est ( i)de/an appellat ille, nos speciem)—, non potuit animus haec in corpore inclusus c lusus V (ss ) adgnoscere, ad gn. G 1 a gn. V cognita attulit; ex quo tam multarum rerum rerum om. V cognitionis admiratio tollitur. neque ea plane videt animus, cum repente in in om. Boeth. tam insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium inmigravit, sed cum se collegit collegit s recollegit Boeth. colligit X (col V) atque recreavit, tum adgnoscit ad gn. R 1 agn. V Boeth. illa reminiscendo. in illo libro... 11 vita et 14 aiunt enim nullo modo fieri pos- se ut ... 247, 3 reminiscendo ( om. 18 cumque... 24 tollitur) libere reddit Boethius in Cic. top. 76 V p. 391, 7 Bai. (Stangl, Jahrb. 127 S. 290. 299) | |
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| 58. Varro, Menippeae, 557 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237 |
59. Terence, The Eunuch, 590 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plato, on soul (psyche) •myth of er, of the soul (psyche) •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 236| 590. Ego homuncio hoc non facerem? ego illud vero ita feci ac lubens. | |
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| 60. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 1.31-1.42, 2.22-2.23 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281, 284, 285, 286 |
| 61. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.4 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281 |
62. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 35-36 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 281 | 36. This is the continued unalterable course, up and down, of habit, which runners, imitating in their triennial festivals, in those great common spectacles of all men, display as a brilliant achievement, and a worthy subject of rivalry and contention. VIII. |
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63. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.136-3.176, 3.231-3.245, 3.262-3.273, 3.290, 5.7-5.12 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), as principle of life •soul (psyche), corporeal •soul (psyche), elements of •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), as pneuma Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 265; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 189, 190, 191, 192, 220, 228| 3.136. Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri 3.137. inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se, 3.138. sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto 3.139. consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus. 3.140. idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. 3.141. hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum 3.142. laetitiae mulcent: hic ergo mens animusquest. 3.143. cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus 3.144. paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur. 3.145. idque sibi solum per se sapit et sibi gaudet, 3.146. cum neque res animam neque corpus commovet una. 3.147. et quasi, cum caput aut oculus temptante dolore 3.148. laeditur in nobis, non omni concruciamur 3.149. corpore, sic animus nonnumquam laeditur ipse 3.150. laetitiaque viget, cum cetera pars animai 3.151. per membra atque artus nulla novitate cietur; 3.152. verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens, 3.153. consentire animam totam per membra videmus 3.154. sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto 3.155. corpore et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri, 3.156. caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus, 3.157. denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus 3.158. saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit 3.159. esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi 3.160. percussa est, exim corpus propellit et icit. 3.161. Haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai 3.162. corpoream docet esse; ubi enim propellere membra, 3.163. corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum 3.164. atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur, 3.165. quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus 3.166. nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendumst 3.167. corporea natura animum constare animamque? 3.168. praeterea pariter fungi cum corpore et una 3.169. consentire animum nobis in corpore cernis. 3.170. si minus offendit vitam vis horrida teli 3.171. ossibus ac nervis disclusis intus adacta, 3.172. at tamen insequitur languor terraeque petitus 3.173. suavis et in terra mentis qui gignitur aestus 3.174. inter dumque quasi exsurgendi incerta voluntas. 3.175. ergo corpoream naturam animi esse necessest, 3.176. corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat. 3.231. Nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est. 3.232. tenvis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura 3.233. mixta vapore, vapor porro trahit aera aëra secum; 3.234. nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et aer aër ; 3.235. rara quod eius enim constat natura, necessest 3.236. aeris aëris inter eum primordia multa moveri. 3.237. iam triplex animi est igitur natura reperta; 3.238. nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, 3.239. nil horum quoniam recipit mens posse creare 3.240. sensiferos motus, quae denique mente volutat. 3.241. quarta quoque his igitur quaedam natura necessest 3.242. adtribuatur; east omnino nominis expers; 3.243. qua neque mobilius quicquam neque tenvius extat 3.244. nec magis e parvis et levibus ex elementis; 3.245. sensiferos motus quae didit prima per artus. 3.262. inter enim cursant primordia principiorum 3.263. motibus inter se, nihil ut secernier unum 3.264. possit nec spatio fieri divisa potestas, 3.265. sed quasi multae vis unius corporis extant. 3.266. quod genus in quovis animantum viscere volgo 3.267. est odor et quidam color et sapor, et tamen ex his 3.268. omnibus est unum perfectum corporis augmen, 3.269. sic calor atque aer aër et venti caeca potestas 3.270. mixta creant unam naturam et mobilis illa 3.271. vis, initum motus ab se quae dividit ollis, 3.272. sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus. 3.273. nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque 3.290. est et frigida multa, comes formidinis, aura, 5.7. nam si, ut ipsa petit maiestas cognita rerum, 5.8. dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi, 5.9. qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae 5.10. nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem 5.11. fluctibus et tantis vitam tantisque tenebris 5.12. in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit. | |
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64. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 10.9.6, 12.20.1-12.20.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 65 | 12.20.1. Now Zaleucus was by birth a Locrian of Italy, a man of noble family, admired for his education, and a pupil of the philosopher Pythagoras. Having been accorded high favour in his native city, he was chosen lawmaker and committed to writing a thorough novel system of law, making his beginning, first of all, with the gods of the heavens. 12.20.2. For at the outset in the introduction to his legislation as a whole he declared it to be necessary that the inhabitants of the city should first of all assume as an article of their creed that gods exist, and that, as their minds survey the heavens and its orderly scheme and arrangement, they should judge that these creations are not the result of Chance or the work of men's hands; that they should revere the gods as the cause of all that is noble and good in the life of mankind; and that they should keep the soul pure from every kind of evil, in the belief that the gods take no pleasure in either the sacrifices or costly gifts of the wicked but in the just and honourable practices of good men. |
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| 65. Hippasus, Fragments, 11, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 32 |
66. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 65-70 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 285 | 70. And again, being raised up on wings, and so surveying and contemplating the air, and all the commotions to which it is subject, it is borne upwards to the higher firmament, and to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. And also being itself involved in the revolutions of the planets and fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music, and being led on by love, which is the guide of wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible by the external senses, it comes to aspire to such as is perceptible only by the intellect: |
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| 67. Plutarch, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 259 |
| 68. Plutarch, De Musica (1131B1147A), 42.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 185 |
| 69. Plutarch, On The Face Which Appears In The Orb of The Moon, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 39 |
| 70. Plutarch, The Stoics Speak More Paradoxically Than The Poets, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 110 |
| 71. Plutarch, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 259 |
72. Plutarch, Lucullus, 12.2-12.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237| 12.2. ἐξαναστὰς δὲ καὶ τοὺς φίλους καλέσας διηγεῖτο τὴν ὄψιν ἔτι νυκτὸς οὔσης. καὶ παρῆσαν ἐξ Ἰλίου τινὲς ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὦφθαι περὶ τὸν Ἀχαιῶν λιμένα τρισκαίδεκα πεντήρεις τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐπὶ Λῆμνον πλεούσας, εὐθὺς οὖν ἀναχθείς τούτους μὲν εἷλε καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν Ἰσίδωρον ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔπλει πρωρέας. 12.3. οἱ δὲ ἔτυχον ὁρμοῦντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα πρὸς τὴν γῆν συνέλκοντες ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων διεμάχοντο καὶ πληγὰς ἐδίδοσαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Λούκουλλον, οὔτε περιπλεῦσαι τοῦ χωρίου διδόντος οὔτε βιάσασθαι ναυσὶ μετεώροις τὰς τῶν πολεμίων προσερηρεισμένας τῇ γῇ καὶ βεβηκυίας ἀσφαλῶς. 12.4. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μόλις ᾗ προσβολήν τινα ἡ νῆσος εἶχεν ἀποβιβάζει τῶν στρατιωτῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους, οἳ κατόπιν ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς πολεμίοις τοὺς μὲν διέφθειρον αὐτῶν, τοὺς δʼ ἠνάγκαζον ἀποκόπτοντας τὰ πρυμνήσια τῶν νεῶν καὶ φεύγοντας ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀλλήλοις τε συγκρούειν τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς ταῖς περὶ τὸν Λούκουλλον ὑποπίπτειν. | 12.2. 12.3. 12.4. |
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| 73. Plutarch, Sayings of The Spartans, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 254 |
| 74. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 41.1, 41.4-41.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 265 |
| 75. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 279 |
| 76. Appian, Civil Wars, 2.69 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237 |
| 77. Suetonius, Augustus, 94.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237 |
| 78. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 4.3.11, 4.21.1-4.21.4, 5.4.2-5.4.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), corporeal •soul (psyche), elements of •soul (psyche), commanding faculty •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), definition of Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 173, 189, 193, 215, 220 |
79. Plutarch, Pompey, 68.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237| 68.2. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἔδοξε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους Πομπήϊος εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἰσιόντος αὐτόν κροτεῖν τὸν δῆμον, αὐτὸς δὲ κοσμεῖν ἱερὸν Ἀφροδίτης νικηφόρου πολλοῖς λαφύροις. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐθάρρει, τὰ δὲ ὑπέθραττεν αὐτὸν ἡ ὄψις, δεδοικότα μὴ τῷ γένει τῷ Καίσαρος εἰς Ἀφροδίτην ἀνήκοντι δόξα καὶ λαμπρότης ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γένηται· καὶ πανικοί τινες θόρυβοι διᾴττοντες ἐξανέστησαν αὐτόν. | 68.2. |
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80. Plutarch, Sulla, 9.7-9.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 237| 9.7. ἀλλʼ ἐμπαθὴς ὢν καὶ τῷ θυμῷ παραδεδωκὼς τὴν τῶν πρασσομένων ἡγεμονίαν, ὅς γε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς μόνον ἑώρα, φίλους δὲ καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκείους εἰς οὐδένα λόγον θέμενος οὐδʼ οἶκτον κατῄει διὰ πυρός, ᾧ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ μὴ διάγνωσις οὐκ ἦν. τούτων δὲ γινομένων Μάριος ἐξωσθεὶς πρὸς τὸ τῆς Γῆς ἱερὸν ἐκάλει διὰ κηρύγματος ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ τὸ οἰκετικόν ἐπελθόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων κρατηθεὶς ἐξέπεσε τῆς πόλεως. | 9.7. |
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| 81. Favorinus of Arles, Fragments, 81 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 64 |
| 82. Favorinus of Arles, Fragments, 81 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 64 |
| 83. Favorinus of Arles, Fragments, 81 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 64 |
| 84. Plutarch, Oracles At Delphi No Longer Given In Verse, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 276 |
| 85. Straton Historicus, Fragments, 108, 74 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 86. Galen, On The Art of Healing, 10.33-10.37, 10.63-10.86 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), dependent existence Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 243, 248 |
| 87. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.234, 9.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 83; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 193 |
| 88. Tertullian, On The Soul, 14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and change Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 89. Apuleius, The Golden Ass, 1.1, 2.1, 3.21-3.25 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (tripartite soul, psyche) Found in books: Pinheiro et al. (2018), Cultural Crossroads in the Ancient Novel, 223, 341 |
| 90. Galen, On The Art of Medicine, 1.406 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 235 |
| 91. Galen, On The Differences of Symptoms, 7.42-7.84 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 243 |
| 92. Galen, On The Movement of Muscles, 10.33-10.37, 10.63-10.86 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), dependent existence Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 243, 248 |
| 93. Galen, On Temperaments, 1.509-1.694 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as form Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 246 |
| 94. Galen, On The Use of The Pulse, 15.149-15.180 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 234, 236 |
| 95. Galen, That The Qualities of The Mind Depend On The Temperament of The Body, 4.768-4.775, 4.769.770, 4.777-4.778, 4.782-4.785, 4.816-4.821 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 178 |
| 96. Galen, Fragment On The Essence of Natural Properties, 4.760-4.761 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), dependent existence Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 248 |
| 97. Galen, On The Causes of Symptoms, 7.85-7.272 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 243 |
98. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.13.2, 1.15-1.16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 32, 64 | 1.15. Socrates, then, was a hearer of Archelaus, the natural philosopher; and he, reverencing the rule, Know yourself, and having assembled a large school, had Plato (there), who was far superior to all his pupils. (Socrates) himself left no writings after him. Plato, however, taking notes of all his (lectures on) wisdom, established a school, combining together natural, ethical, (and) logical (philosophy). But the points Plato determined are these following. 1.16. Plato (lays down) that there are three originating principles of the universe, (namely) God, and matter, and exemplar; God as the Maker and Regulator of this universe, and the Being who exercises providence over it; but matter, as that which underlies all (phenomena), which (matter) he styles both receptive and a nurse, out of the arrangement of which proceeded the four elements of which the world consists; (I mean) fire, air, earth, water, from which all the rest of what are denominated concrete substances, as well as animals and plants, have been formed. And that the exemplar, which he likewise calls ideas, is the intelligence of the Deity, to which, as to an image in the soul, the Deity attending, fabricated all things. God, he says, is both incorporeal and shapeless, and comprehensible by wise men solely; whereas matter is body potentially, but with potentiality not as yet passing into action, for being itself without form and without quality, by assuming forms and qualities, it became body. That matter, therefore, is an originating principle, and coeval with the Deity, and that in this respect the world is uncreated. For (Plato) affirms that (the world) was made out of it. And that (the attribute of) imperishableness necessarily belongs to (literally follows) that which is uncreated. So far forth, however, as body is supposed to be compounded out of both many qualities and ideas, so far forth it is both created and perishable. But some of the followers of Plato mingled both of these, employing some such example as the following: That as a waggon can always continue undestroyed, though undergoing partial repairs from time to time, so that even the parts each in turn perish, yet itself remains always complete; so after this manner the world also, although in parts it perishes, yet the things that are removed, being repaired, and equivalents for them being introduced, it remains eternal. Some maintain that Plato asserts the Deity to be one, ingenerable and incorruptible, as he says in The Laws: God, therefore, as the ancient account has it, possesses both the beginning, and end, and middle of all things. Thus he shows God to be one, on account of His having pervaded all things. Others, however, maintain that Plato affirms the existence of many gods indefinitely, when he uses these words: God of gods, of whom I am both the Creator and Father. But others say that he speaks of a definite number of deities in the following passage: Therefore the mighty Jupiter, wheeling his swift chariot in heaven; and when he enumerates the offspring of the children of heaven and earth. But others assert that (Plato) constituted the gods as generable; and on account of their having been produced, that altogether they were subject to the necessity of corruption, but that on account of the will of God they are immortal, (maintaining this) in the passage already quoted, where, to the words, God of gods, of whom I am Creator and Father, he adds, indissoluble through the fiat of My will; so that if (God) were disposed that these should be dissolved, they would easily be dissolved. And he admits natures (such as those) of demons, and says that some of them are good, but others worthless. And some affirm that he states the soul to be uncreated and immortal, when he uses the following words, Every soul is immortal, for that which is always moved is immortal; and when he demonstrates that the soul is self-moved, and capable of originating motion. Others, however, (say that Plato asserted that the soul was) created, but rendered imperishable through the will of God. But some (will have it that he considered the soul) a composite (essence), and generable and corruptible; for even he supposes that there is a receptacle for it, and that it possesses a luminous body, but that everything generated involves a necessity of corruption. Those, however, who assert the immortality of the soul are especially strengthened in their opinion by those passages (in Plato's writings), where he says, that both there are judgments after death, and tribunals of justice in Hades, and that the virtuous (souls) receive a good reward, while the wicked (ones) suitable punishment. Some notwithstanding assert, that he also acknowledges a transition of souls from one body to another, and that different souls, those that were marked out for such a purpose, pass into different bodies, according to the desert of each, and that after certain definite periods they are sent up into this world to furnish once more a proof of their choice. Others, however, (do not admit this to be his doctrine, but will have it that Plato affirms that the souls) obtain a place according to the desert of each; and they employ as a testimony the saying of his, that some good men are with Jove, and that others are ranging abroad (through heaven) with other gods; whereas that others are involved in eternal punishments, as many as during this life have committed wicked and unjust deeds. And people affirm that Plato says, that some things are without a mean, that others have a mean, that others are a mean. (For example, that) waking and sleep, and such like, are conditions without an intermediate state; but that there are things that had means, for instance virtue and vice; and there are means (between extremes), for instance grey between white and black, or some other color. And they say, that he affirms that the things pertaining to the soul are absolutely alone good, but that the things pertaining to the body, and those external (to it), are not any longer absolutely good, but reputed blessings. And that frequently he names these means also, for that it is possible to use them both well and ill. Some virtues, therefore, he says, are extremes in regard of intrinsic worth, but in regard of their essential nature means, for nothing is more estimable than virtue. But whatever excels or falls short of these terminates in vice. For instance, he says that there are four virtues- prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude- and that on each of these is attendant two vices, according to excess and defect: for example, on prudence, recklessness according to defect, and knavery according to excess; and on temperance, licentiousness according to defect, stupidity according to excess; and on justice, foregoing a claim according to defect, unduly pressing it according to excess; and on fortitude, cowardice according to defect, foolhardiness according to excess. And that these virtues, when inherent in a man, render him perfect, and afford him happiness. And happiness, he says, is assimilation to the Deity, as far as this is possible; and that assimilation to God takes place when any one combines holiness and justice with prudence. For this he supposes the end of supreme wisdom and virtue. And he affirms that the virtues follow one another in turn, and are uniform, and are never antagonistic to each other; whereas that vices are multiform, and sometimes follow one the other, and sometimes are antagonistic to each other. He asserts that fate exists; not, to be sure, that all things are produced according to fate, but that there is even something in our power, as in the passages where he says, The fault is his who chooses, God is blameless; and the following law of Adrasteia. And thus some (contend for his upholding) a system of fate, whereas others one of free-will. He asserts, however, that sins are involuntary. For into what is most glorious of the things in our power, which is the soul, no one would (deliberately) admit what is vicious, that is, transgression, but that from ignorance and an erroneous conception of virtue, supposing that they were achieving something honourable, they pass into vice. And his doctrine on this point is most clear in The Republic, where he says, But, again, you presume to assert that vice is disgraceful and abhorred of God; how then, I may ask, would one choose such an evil thing? He, you reply, (would do so) who is worsted by pleasures. Therefore this also is involuntary, if to gain a victory be voluntary; so that, in every point of view, the committing an act of turpitude, reason proves to be involuntary. Some one, however, in opposition to this (Plato), advances the contrary statement, Why then are men punished if they sin involuntary? But he replies, that he himself also, as soon as possible, may be emancipated from vice, and undergo punishment. For that the undergoing punishment is not an evil, but a good thing, if it is likely to prove a purification of evils; and that the rest of mankind, hearing of it, may not transgress, but guard against such an error. (Plato, however, maintains) that the nature of evil is neither created by the Deity, nor possesses subsistence of itself, but that it derives existence from contrariety to what is good, and from attendance upon it, either by excess and defect, as we have previously affirmed concerning the virtues. Plato unquestionably then, as we have already stated, collecting together the three departments of universal philosophy, in this manner formed his speculative system. |
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| 99. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 1.25, 15.280-15.284, 15.287-15.289, 15.521, 15.602-15.611, 15.720-15.723, 15.795-15.805 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 193, 235, 236, 243, 245 |
| 100. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 104.35-105.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 182 |
| 101. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 23.2-24.3, 24.3, 24.4, 24.21, 24.22, 24.23, 84.3, 84.4, 84.5, 84.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 178 |
| 102. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Problems, 1.28 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 177 |
| 103. Anon., Acts of Philip, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •psyche (“soul”) Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 104. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, 1.11.63-1.11.66, 3.8.27, 3.15.21-3.15.23 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 75 |
105. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.37, 2.86, 3.89, 7.14, 7.32-7.33, 7.83, 7.138-7.139, 8.36, 8.77, 9.34-9.35 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) •soul (psyche), functional account of •soul (psyche), transmigration of •soul (psyche), definition of •death and the afterlife, soul (psyche) Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 561; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 37, 64, 116, 276, 281; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 214, 239 | 1.37. What man is happy? He who has a healthy body, a resourceful mind and a docile nature. He tells us to remember friends, whether present or absent; not to pride ourselves upon outward appearance, but to study to be beautiful in character. Shun ill-gotten gains, he says. Let not idle words prejudice thee against those who have shared thy confidence. Whatever provision thou hast made for thy parents, the same must thou expect from thy children. He explained the overflow of the Nile as due to the etesian winds which, blowing in the contrary direction, drove the waters upstream.Apollodorus in his Chronology places his birth in the first year of the 35th Olympiad. 2.86. The case stands thus. The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist, subsequently as god. Antipater's pupil was Epitimides of Cyrene, his was Paraebates, and he had as pupils Hegesias, the advocate of suicide, and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. 3.89. The last division includes the man who is himself of a generous and high-minded spirit. He too is said to be noble. And this indeed is the highest form of nobility. Thus, of nobility, one kind depends on excellent ancestors, another on princely ancestors, a third on illustrious ancestors, while the fourth is due to the individual's own beauty and worth.Beauty has three divisions. The first is the object of praise, as of form fair to see. Another is serviceable; thus an instrument, a house and the like are beautiful for use. Other things again which relate to customs and pursuits and the like are beautiful because beneficial. of beauty, then, one kind is matter for praise, another is for use, and another for the benefit it procures. 7.14. He disliked, they say, to be brought too near to people, so that he would take the end seat of a couch, thus saving himself at any rate from one half of such inconvenience. Nor indeed would he walk about with more than two or three. He would occasionally ask the bystanders for coppers, in order that, for fear of being asked to give, people might desist from mobbing him, as Cleanthes says in his work On Bronze. When several persons stood about him in the Colonnade he pointed to the wooden railing at the top round the altar and said, This was once open to all, but because it was found to be a hindrance it was railed off. If you then will take yourselves off out of the way you will be the less annoyance to us.When Demochares, the son of Laches, greeted him and told him he had only to speak or write for anything he wanted to Antigonus, who would be sure to grant all his requests, Zeno after hearing this would have nothing more to do with him. 7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic. 7.138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena, a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods, book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. 7.139. For through some parts it passes as a hold or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion. 8.36. This is what Alexander says that he found in the Pythagorean memoirs. What follows is Aristotle's.But Pythagoras's great dignity not even Timon overlooked, who, although he digs at him in his Silli, speaks ofPythagoras, inclined to witching works and ways,Man-snarer, fond of noble periphrase.Xenophanes confirms the statement about his having been different people at different times in the elegiacs beginning:Now other thoughts, another path, I show.What he says of him is as follows:They say that, passing a belaboured whelp,He, full of pity, spake these words of dole:Stay, smite not ! 'Tis a friend, a human soul;I knew him straight whenas I heard him yelp ! 8.77. The sun he calls a vast collection of fire and larger than the moon; the moon, he says, is of the shape of a quoit, and the heaven itself crystalline. The soul, again, assumes all the various forms of animals and plants. At any rate he says:Before now I was born a boy and a maid, a bush and a bird, and a dumb fish leaping out of the sea.His poems On Nature and Purifications run to 5000 lines, his Discourse on Medicine to 600. of the tragedies we have spoken above. 9.34. 7. DEMOCRITUSDemocritus was the son of Hegesistratus, though some say of Athenocritus, and others again of Damasippus. He was a native of Abdera or, according to some, of Miletus. He was a pupil of certain Magians and Chaldaeans. For when King Xerxes was entertained by the father of Democritus he left men in charge, as, in fact, is stated by Herodotus; and from these men, while still a boy, he learned theology and astronomy. Afterwards he met Leucippus and, according to some, Anaxagoras, being forty years younger than the latter. But Favorinus in his Miscellaneous History tells us that Democritus, speaking of Anaxagoras, declared that his views on the sun and the moon were not original but of great antiquity, and that he had simply stolen them. 9.35. Democritus also pulled to pieces the views of Anaxagoras on cosmogony and on mind, having a spite against him, because Anaxagoras did not take to him. If this be so, how could he have been his pupil, as some suggest?According to Demetrius in his book on Men of the Same Name and Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers, he travelled into Egypt to learn geometry from the priests, and he also went into Persia to visit the Chaldaeans as well as to the Red Sea. Some say that he associated with the Gymnosophists in India and went to Aethiopia. Also that, being the third son, he divided the family property. Most authorities will have it that he chose the smaller portion, which was in money, because he had need of this to pay the cost of travel; besides, his brothers were crafty enough to foresee that this would be his choice. |
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106. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.19, 2.34, 2.36.3-2.36.5, 2.37.1, 2.37.4-2.37.5, 2.38.2-2.38.4, 2.39.1-2.39.4, 2.43, 2.43.1, 3.2, 3.26 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul •death and the afterlife, soul (psyche) Found in books: Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 424, 425; Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 75 | 1.19. 19.But some one may, perhaps, say it is not proper to destroy that which belongs to the same tribe with ourselves; if the souls of animals are of the same essence with ourselves. If, however, it should be granted that souls are inserted in bodies voluntarily, it must be said that it is through a love of juvenility: for in the season of youth there is an enjoyment of all things. Why, therefore, do they not again enter into the nature of man? But if they enter voluntarily, and for the sake of juvenility, and pass through every species of animals, they will be much gratified by being destroyed. For thus their return to the human form will be more rapid. The bodies also which are eaten will not produce any pain in the souls of those bodies, in consequence of the souls being liberated from them; and they will love to be implanted in the nature of man. Hence, as much as they are pained on leaving the human form, so much will they rejoice when they leave other bodies. For thus they will more swiftly become man again, who predominates over all irrational animals, in the same manner as God does over men. There is, therefore, a sufficient cause for destroying other animals, viz. their acting unjustly in destroying men. But if the souls of men are immortal, but those of irrational animals mortal, men will not act unjustly by destroying irrational animals. And if the souls of brutes are immortal, we shall benefit them by liberating them from their bodies. For, by killing them, we shall cause them to return to the human nature. SPAN 2.34. 34.Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a manner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to different powers;14 to the God indeed who is above all things, as a certain wise man said, neither sacrificing with incense, nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there is nothing material, which is not immediately impure to an immaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language, nor internal speech, adapted to the highest God, when it is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul, and with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, that being conjoined with and assimilated to him, we should offer to him, as a sacred sacrifice, the elevation of our intellect, which offering will be both a hymn and our salvation. In an impassive contemplation, therefore, of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected in perfection; |65 but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, hymns, orally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each of the divinities, a sacrifice is to be made of the first-fruits of the things which he bestows, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As therefore, the husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the season first produces; thus also we should offer to the divinities the first-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, giving them thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for truly nourishing us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us, associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for our salvation. SPAN 2.43. 43.On this account, a wise and temperate man will be religiously afraid to use sacrifices of this kind, through which he will attract to himself such-like daemons; but he will endeavour in all possible ways to purify his soul. For these malefic beings do not attack a pure soul, because it is dissimilar to them; but if it is necessary to cities to render them propitious, this is nothing to us. For by these riches, and things external and corporeal, are thought to be good, and their contraries evil; but the smallest attention is paid by them to the good of the soul. We however, to the utmost of our ability, endeavour not to be in want of those things which they impart; but all our endeavour is to become similar to God, and to the [divine] powers with which he is surrounded both from what pertains to the soul, and from externals; and this is effected through an entire liberation from the dominion of the passions, an evolved perception of truly existing beings, and a vital tendency towards them. On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to depraved men and evil daemons, and, in short, to every being that rejoices in a mortal and material nature. So that, conformably to what is said by Theophrastus, we also shall sacrifice from those things which theologists permit us to use for this purpose; as well knowing, that by how much the more we neglect to exempt ourselves from the passions of the soul, by so much the more we connect ourselves with a depraved power, and render it necessary that he should become propitious to us. For, as theologists say, it is necessary for those who are bound 18 to things |71 external, and have not yet vanquished their passions, should avert the anger of this [malefic] power; since, if they do not, there will be no end to their labours. SPAN 3.2. 2.Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, is internal, but the other external 1, and again, one kind being right, but the other erroneous, it is requisite to explain of which of these two, animals, according to them, are deprived. Are they therefore deprived of right reason alone? or are they entirely destitute both of internal and externally proceeding reason? They appear, indeed, to ascribe to brutes an entire privation of reason, and not a privation of right reason alone. For if they merely denied that brutes possess right reason, animals would not be irrational, but rational beings, in the same manner as nearly all men are according to them. For, according to their opinion, one or two wise men may be found in whom alone right reason prevails, but all the rest of mankind are depraved; though some |82of these make a certain proficiency, but others are profoundly depraved, and yet, at the same time, all of them are similarly rational. Through the influence, therefore, of self-love, they say, that all other animals are irrational; wishing to indicate by irrationality, an entire privation of reason. If, however, it be requisite to speak the truth, not only reason may plainly be perceived in all animals, but in many of them it is so great as to approximate to perfection. SPAN 3.26. 26.By making pleasure, therefore, the end of life, that which is truly justice cannot be preserved; since neither such things as are primarily useful according to nature, nor all such as are easily attainable, give completion to felicity. For, in many instances, the motions of the irrational nature, and utility and indigence, have been, and still are the sources of injustice. For men became indigent [as they pretended] of animal food, in order that they might preserve, as they said, the corporeal frame free from molestation, and without being in want of those things after which the animal nature aspires. But if an assimilation to divinity is the end of life, an innoxious conduct towards all things will be in the most eminent degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is led by his passions is innoxious only towards his children and his wife, but despises and acts fraudulently towards other persons, since in consequence of the irrational part predominating in him, he is excited to, and astonished about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason, preserves an innoxious conduct towards his fellow-citizens, and still more so towards strangers, and towards all men, through having the irrational part in subjection, and is therefore more rational and divine than the former character; - thus also, he who does not confine harmless conduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is more similar to divinity; and if it was possible to extend it even to plants, he would preserve this image in a still greater degree. As, however, this is not possible, we may in this respect lament, with the ancients 18, the defect of our nature, that we consist of such adverse and discordant principles, so that we are unable to preserve our divine part incorruptible, and in all respects innoxious. For we are not unindigent in all things: the cause of which is generation, and our becoming needy through the abundant corporeal efflux which we sustain. But want procures safety and ornament from things of a foreign nature, which are necessary to the existence of our mortal part. He, therefore, who is indigent of a greater number of externals, is in a greater degree agglutinated to penury; and by how much his wants increase, by so much is he destitute of divinity, |108 and an associate of penury. For that which is similar to deity, through this assimilation immediately possesses true wealth. But no one who is [truly] rich and perfectly unindigent injures any thing. For as long as any one injures another, though he should possess the greatest wealth, and all the acres of land which the earth contains, he is still poor, and has want for his intimate associate. On this account, also, he is unjust, without God, and impious, and enslaved to every kind of depravity, which is produced by the lapse of the soul into matter, through the privation of good. Every thing, therefore, is nugatory to any one, as long as he wanders from the principle of the universe; and he is indigent of all things, while he does not direct his attention to Porus [or the source of true abundance]. He likewise yields to the mortal part of his nature, while he remains ignorant of his real self. But Injustice is powerful in persuading and corrupting those that belong to her empire, because she associates with her votaries in conjunction with Pleasure. As, however, in the choice of lives, he is the more accurate judge who has obtained an experience of both [the better and the worse kind of life], than he who has only experienced one of them; thus also, in the choice and avoidance of what is proper, he is a safer judge who, from that which is more, judges of that which is less excellent, than he who from the less, judges of the more excellent. Hence, he who lives according to intellect, will more accurately define what is eligible and what is not, than he who lives under the dominion of irrationality. For the former has passed through the irrational life, as having from the first associated with it; but the latter, having had no experience of an intellectual life, persuades those that resemble himself, and acts with nugacity, like a child among children. If, however, say our opponents, all men were persuaded by these arguments, what would become of us? Is it not evident that we should be happy, injustice, indeed, being exterminated from men, and justice being conversant with us, in the same manner as it is in the heavens? But now this question is just the same as if men should be dubious what the life of the Danaids would be, if they were liberated from the employment of drawing water in a sieve, and attempting to fill a perforated vessel. For they are dubious what would be the consequence if we should cease to replenish our passions and desires, the whole of which replenishing continually flows away through the want of real good; since this fills up the ruinous clefts of the soul more than the greatest of external necessaries. Do you therefore ask, O man, what we should do? We should imitate those that lived in the golden age, we should imitate those of that period who were [truly] free. For with them modesty, Nemesis, and Justice associated, because they were satisfied with the fruits of the earth. |109 The fertile earth for them spontaneous yields Abundantly her fruits 19. But those who are liberated from slavery, obtain for themselves what they before procured for their masters. In like manner, also, do you, when liberated from the servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the passions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you nourished them in an all-various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself all-variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are [properly] your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which are foreign [to your true nature and real good]. [Footnotes moved to the end and numbered] 1.* This external reason (λογος προφορικος) is speech. 2.* Philostratus relates this of Apollonius, in his Life of him. 3.* The words within the brackets are added from the version of Felicianus. Hence it appears, that the words εκ των διαφορων μυκηματων are wanting in the original, after the word ζητει. But the defect is not noticed by any of the editors. 4.* Porphyry derived this from the treatise of Plutarch, in which it is investigated whether land are more sagacious than aquatic animals. 5.* This was the opinion of the Stoics; but is most erroneous. For the supreme divinity, being superessential, transcends even intellect itself, and much more reason, which is an evolved perception of things; and this is also the case with every other deity, according to the Platonic theology, when considered according to his hyparxis, or summit. See my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato. 6.* A musket, or male hawk of a small kind. This bird is mentioned by Homer, Iliad, XIV. v. 233. 7.* Reason in a divine intellect subsists causally, or in a way better than reason, and therefore is not a discursive energy (διεξοδικη ενεργεια), but an evolved cause of things. And though, in a divine soul, it is discursive, or transitive, yet it differs from our reason in this, that it perceives the whole of one form at once, and not by degrees, as we do when we reason. 8.* In the original, ουτω δ̕ εστι λογιστικα ων δρᾳ, κ.τ.λ. But for λογιστικα, Lipsius proposes to read, λογικα, and Meerman λογικη. There is, however, no occasion whatever to substitute any other word for λογιστικα, as, with Platonic writers, το λογιστικον is equivalent to to λογιζομενον. 9.* See the first book of Herodotus, chap. 159. 10.+ The more mystical cause why the Egyptians worshipped animals, appears to me to be this, that they conceived a living to be preferable to an iimate image of divinity. Hence, they reverenced animals as visible and living resemblances of certain invisible powers of the Gods. See Plutarch's Treatise on Isis and Osiris. 11.* See the Symposiacs of Plutarch, lib. ix. 8. 12.* Odyss. XII. v. 96. 13.+ The latter part of this sentence, which in the original is τι ουκ εδιδαξεν μηας ο δημιουργος οπη χρησιμα τη φυσει γεγονε; Valentinus most erroneously translates, "quare nos rerum opifex non edocuit, quomodo a natura in nostros usus facta fuerint?" 14.* i.e. The discursive energy of reason. 15.* In the original, μυημην δε καταληψις αξιωματος παρεληλυθος, οὐ το παρον εξ αισθησεως κατεληφθη; but for αξιωματος, I read πραγματος. Felicianus also appears to have found this reading in his manuscript copy of the work; for his version of the passage is, "vel memoriam rei praeteriae comprehensionem, quem praesentem sensus perciperat." 16.* This doubt may, perhaps, be solved, by admitting that brutes have an imperfect rationality, or the very dregs of the rational faculty, by which they form a link between men and zoophytes, just as zoophytes are a link between brutes and merely vegetable substances. Brutes, therefore, having an imperfect reason, possess only the beginning of perfection. 17.* Plutarch has written a most ingenious treatise on this subject. 18.* In the original, οσῳ μειζον το γενος το των ζωων, τυο ουτῳ και ωρος το μερος και το οικειον ταυτην διασωσει. On this passage, Reisk observes, "Forte οσῳ μειζων ῃ οικειωσις ωρος το γενος το των ζωων, τοσουτῳ (scilicet μαλλον) και προς το μερός, κ.τ.λ." But, instead of η οικειωσις, it appears to me that η φιλια should be substituted. 19.* Porphyry here particularly alludes to Empedocles. 20.* Hesiod. Oper. v. 117. BOOK FOUR [Translated by Thomas Taylor] SPAN |
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| 107. Plotinus, Enneads, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 152 |
108. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.2-3.1.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 215 | 3.1.2. of all things which move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves, others receive it from without: and all those things only are moved from without which are without life, as stones, and pieces of wood, and whatever things are of such a nature as to be held together by the constitution of their matter alone, or of their bodily substance. That view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Others, again, have the cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees, and all things which are held together by natural life or soul; among which some think ought to be classed the veins of metals. Fire, also, is supposed to be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of water. And of those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, some are said to be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. And they so distinguish them, because those things are moved out of themselves which are alive indeed, but have no soul; whereas those things which have a soul are moved by themselves, when a phantasy, i.e., a desire or incitement, is presented to them, which excites them to move towards something. Finally, in certain things endowed with a soul, there is such a phantasy, i.e., a will or feeling, as by a kind of natural instinct calls them forth, and arouses them to orderly and regular motion; as we see to be the case with spiders, which are stirred up in a most orderly manner by a phantasy, i.e., a sort of wish and desire for weaving, to undertake the production of a web, some natural movement undoubtedly calling forth the effort to work of this kind. Nor is this very insect found to possess any other feeling than the natural desire of weaving; as in like manner bees also exhibit a desire to form honeycombs, and to collect, as they say, aerial honey. 3.1.2. But with respect to the declaration of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Some one will perhaps say, that as the potter out of the same lump makes some vessels to honour, and others to dishonour, so God creates some men for perdition, and others for salvation; and that it is not therefore in our own power either to be saved or to perish; by which reasoning we appear not to be possessed of free-will. We must answer those who are of this opinion with the question, Whether it is possible for the apostle to contradict himself? And if this cannot be imagined of an apostle, how shall he appear, according to them, to be just in blaming those who committed fornication in Corinth, or those who sinned, and did not repent of their unchastity, and fornication, and uncleanness, which they had committed? How, also, does he greatly praise those who acted rightly, like the house of Onesiphorus, saying, The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he had come to Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. Now it is not consistent with apostolic gravity to blame him who is worthy of blame, i.e., who has sinned, and greatly to praise him who is deserving of praise for his good works; and again, as if it were in no one's power to do any good or evil, to say that it was the Creator's doing that every one should act virtuously or wickedly, seeing He makes one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour. And how can he add that statement, We must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one of us may receive in his body, according to what he has done, whether it be good or bad? For what reward of good will be conferred on him who could not commit evil, being formed by the Creator to that very end? Or what punishment will deservedly be inflicted on him who was unable to do good in consequence of the creative act of his Maker? Then, again, how is not this opposed to that other declaration elsewhere, that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, prepared unto every good work. He, accordingly, who purges himself, is made a vessel unto honour, while he who has disdained to cleanse himself from his impurity is made a vessel unto dishonour. From such declarations, in my opinion, the cause of our actions can in no degree be referred to the Creator. For God the Creator makes a certain vessel unto honour, and other vessels to dishonour; but that vessel which has cleansed itself from all impurity He makes a vessel unto honour, while that which has stained itself with the filth of vice He makes a vessel unto dishonour. The conclusion from which, accordingly, is this, that the cause of each one's actions is a pre-existing one; and then every one, according to his deserts, is made by God either a vessel unto honour or dishonour. Therefore every individual vessel has furnished to its Creator out of itself the causes and occasions of its being formed by Him to be either a vessel unto honour or one unto dishonour. And if the assertion appear correct, as it certainly is, and in harmony with all piety, that it is due to previous causes that every vessel be prepared by God either to honour or to dishonour, it does not appear absurd that, in discussing remoter causes in the same order, and in the same method, we should come to the same conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and (believe) that this was the reason why Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was contained in the womb of his mother. 3.1.2. Nay, that very declaration, that from the same lump a vessel is formed both to honour and to dishonour, will not push us hard; for we assert that the nature of all rational souls is the same, as one lump of clay is described as being under the treatment of the potter. Seeing, then, the nature of rational creatures is one, God, according to the previous grounds of merit, created and formed out of it, as the potter out of the one lump, some persons to honour and others to dishonour. Now, as regards the language of the apostle, which he utters as if in a tone of censure, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? he means, I think, to point out that such a censure does not refer to any believer who lives rightly and justly, and who has confidence in God, i.e., to such an one as Moses was, of whom Scripture says that Moses spoke, and God answered him by a voice; and as God answered Moses, so also does every saint answer God. But he who is an unbeliever, and loses confidence in answering before God owing to the unworthiness of his life and conversation, and who, in relation to these matters, does not seek to learn and make progress, but to oppose and resist, and who, to speak more plainly, is such an one as to be able to say those words which the apostle indicates, when he says, Why, then, does He yet find fault? For who will resist His will?— to such an one may the censure of the apostle rightly be directed, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? This censure accordingly applies not to believers and saints, but to unbelievers and wicked men. 3.1.2. But since the words of the apostle, in what he says regarding vessels of honour or dishonour, that if a man therefore purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's service, and prepared unto every good work, appear to place nothing in the power of God, but all in ourselves; while in those in which he declares that the potter has power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, another to dishonour, he seems to refer the whole to God — it is not to be understood that those statements are contradictory, but the two meanings are to be reduced to agreement, and one signification must be drawn from both, viz., that we are not to suppose either that those things which are in our own power can be done without the help of God, or that those which are in God's hand can be brought to completion without the intervention of our acts, and desires, and intention; because we have it not in our own power so to will or do anything, as not to know that this very faculty, by which we are able to will or to do, was bestowed on us by God, according to the distinction which we indicated above. Or again, when God forms vessels, some to honour and others to dishonour, we are to suppose that He does not regard either our wills, or our purposes, or our deserts, to be the causes of the honour or dishonour, as if they were a sort of matter from which He may form the vessel of each one of us either to honour or to dishonour; whereas the very movement of the soul itself, or the purpose of the understanding, may of itself suggest to him, who is not unaware of his heart and the thoughts of his mind, whether his vessel ought to be formed to honour or to dishonour. But let these points suffice, which we have discussed as we best could, regarding the questions connected with the freedom of the will. 3.1.2. of things that move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves; others, again, are moved only from without. Now only portable things are moved from without, such as pieces of wood, and stones, and all matter that is held together by their constitution alone. And let that view be removed from consideration which calls the flux of bodies motion, since it is not needed for our present purpose. But animals and plants have the cause of their motion within themselves, and in general whatever is held together by nature and a soul, to which class of things they say that metals also belong. And besides these, fire too is self-moved, and perhaps also fountains of water. Now, of those things which have the cause of their movement within themselves, some, they say, are moved out of themselves, others from themselves: things without life, out of themselves; animate things, from themselves. For animate things are moved from themselves, a phantasy springing up in them which incites to effort. And again, in certain animals phantasies are formed which call forth an effort, the nature of the phantasy stirring up the effort in an orderly manner, as in the spider is formed the phantasy of weaving; and the attempt to weave follows, the nature of its phantasy inciting the insect in an orderly manner to this alone. And besides its phantasial nature, nothing else is believed to belong to the insect. And in the bee there is formed the phantasy to produce wax. 3.1.2. But since the apostle in one place does not pretend that the becoming of a vessel unto honour or dishonour depends upon God, but refers back the whole to ourselves, saying, If, then, a man purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; and elsewhere does not even pretend that it is dependent upon ourselves, but appears to attribute the whole to God, saying, The potter has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another to dishonour; and as his statements are not contradictory, we must reconcile them, and extract one complete statement from both. Neither does our own power, apart from the knowledge of God, compel us to make progress; nor does the knowledge of God (do so), unless we ourselves also contribute something to the good result; nor does our own power, apart from the knowledge of God, and the use of the power that worthily belongs to us, make a man become (a vessel) unto honour or dishonour; nor does the will of God alone form a man to honour or to dishonour, unless He hold our will to be a kind of matter that admits of variation, and that inclines to a better or worse course of conduct. And these observations are sufficient to have been made by us on the subject of free-will. 3.1.3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the power of reason, by which it can judge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove and reject some, while approving and adopting others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men be governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it follows that, since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself the power of distinguishing between good and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it has approved, it may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and deserving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed must by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is found a more regular movement than in others, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be moved by a kind of rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of reason as of some natural instinct, largely bestowed for purposes of that kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a rational animal, some things may happen to us human beings from without; and these, coming in contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or the contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not within our own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and approve what use we ought to make of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no other than of that reason within us, i.e., of our own judgment; by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural movements being determined by its authority either to good actions or the reverse. 3.1.3. The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason. Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse. |
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| 109. Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulianum, 9.22.8-9.22.17 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •psyche (“soul”) Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 110. Basil of Caesarea, Homilia Exhortatoria Ad Sanctum Baptisma, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 5 |
| 111. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 3.296-3.297 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 256 |
| 112. Jerome, Letters, 112.15 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •psyche (“soul”) Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 113. Aetius, Opinions of The Philosophers, 4.3.11, 4.21.1-4.21.4, 5.4.2-5.4.3 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), corporeal •soul (psyche), elements of •soul (psyche), commanding faculty •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), definition of Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 173, 189, 193, 215, 220 |
| 114. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis De Caelo Libros Commentaria, 377.12 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 256 |
| 115. Quodvultdeus, Temp. Barb., 35.3-35.8 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 64 |
| 116. Papyri, Papyrus Paris Supplément Gr., None Tagged with subjects: •katharos, in gold leaves of psyche/soul Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 254 |
| 117. Galen, De Elementis Ex Hippoerate, 1.413-1.508 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as form Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 246 |
| 118. Nicephorus Saint, Breviarium Historicoum, 224, 287, 348, 474, 476, 489-491, 594, 488 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 277 |
| 119. Dead Sea Scrolls, Damascus Rule, 1 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and intellect (nous) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 32 |
| 120. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 64-67, 63 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 189, 218, 220 |
| 121. Hierocles Historicus, Fragments, 1.5-1.33 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty •soul (psyche), as pneuma Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 215, 228 |
| 122. Anon., Martyrium Phileae, Chester Beatty Papyri, 3, 2 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 123. Anon., Martyrium Phileae, 14 Tagged with subjects: •psyche (“soul”) Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 124. Anon., Apologia Phileae, 6 Tagged with subjects: •psyche (“soul”) Found in books: Maier and Waldner (2022), Desiring Martyrs: Locating Martyrs in Space and Time, 96 |
| 125. Aristotle, De Ceneratione Animalum, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 174 |
| 126. Galen, De Propriis Placitis, 7.1-7.3, 14.1-14.3, 15.1-15.3 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as form •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), dependent existence •soul (psyche), corporeal Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 246, 247, 248, 252 |
| 127. Aristotle, De Gaelo, None Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), definition of Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 150 |
| 128. Galen, De Naturalibus Faeultatibus, 2.10-2.20, 11.9-11.10 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 243, 245 |
| 129. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Didaskalikos, 61 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as body •soul (psyche), as form •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), harmonia theory of Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 168, 171, 175, 178 |
| 130. Theodore of Mopsuesta, In Hag., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 280 |
| 131. Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica Gommentaria, 964.15, 964.29-965.6, 965.7, 965.8, 965.9, 965.10, 965.11, 965.12, 965.13, 965.14, 965.15, 965.16 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 132. Plato, In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria, 25 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as form •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 250 |
| 133. Galen, Introduetio Seu Medieus, 14.726.7-14.726.11 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 193 |
| 134. Galen, De Utilitate Respirationis, 4.470-4.511 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties •soul (psyche), as pneuma Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 234, 235, 236 |
| 135. Galen, De Foetuum Formatione, 4.700.17-701.6 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), commanding faculty Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 182 |
| 136. Plautus, Frivolaria, 272.26-273.10 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche) Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 5 |
| 137. Herophilus, Fr., 217 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 234, 235 |
| 138. Plutarch, Apparet, None Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), construction by the demiurge Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 86 |
| 139. Andronicus, Fr., 178 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as form •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 250 |
| 140. Simplicius, Adversus Mathematicos, 51 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), and change Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 172 |
| 141. Galen, An In Arteriis Sanguis Eontineatur, 4.703 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), as pneuma Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 235 |
| 142. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 70.6-71.4, 164.15, 164.16, 164.17, 164.18 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 278 |
| 143. Theophrastus, Fro, 271 Tagged with subjects: •soul (psyche), capacities of, powers, faculties Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 171 |
| 144. Heraclitus Lesbius, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 107 |
