| 1. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 96 |
2. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.76.307, 2.78.310-2.78.311, 2.81-2.82 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 37, 63, 96| 2.81. Ne haec quidem reprehendo; sunt enim concinne distributa, sed tamen, id quod necesse fuit hominibus expertibus veritatis, non perite: quae enim praecepta principiorum et narrationum esse voluerunt, ea in totis orationibus sunt conservanda; 2.82. nam ego mihi benevolum iudicem facilius facere possum, cum sum in cursu orationis, quam cum omnia sunt inaudita; docilem autem non cum polliceor me demonstraturum, sed tum, cum doceo et explano; attentum vero crebro tota actione excitandis mentibus iudicum, non prima denuntiatione efficere possumus. | |
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| 3. Cicero, Orator, 2.76.307, 2.78.310-2.78.311, 2.81-2.82 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 37, 63, 96 |
4. Anon., Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 3.2-3.9, 3.16-3.17 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 38, 97 | 3.2. Deliberative speeches are either of the kind in which the question concerns a choice between two courses of action, or of the kind in which a choice among several is considered. An example of a choice between two courses of action: Does it seem better to destroy Carthage, or to leave her standing? An example of a choice among several: If Hannibal, when recalled to Carthage from Italy, should deliberate whether to remain in Italy, or return home, or invade Egypt and seize Alexandria. Again, a question under deliberation is sometimes to be examined on its own account; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether or not to redeem the captives from the enemy. Or sometimes a question becomes one for deliberation and inquiry on account of some motive extraneous to the question itself; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether to exempt Scipio from the law so as to permit him to become consul while under age. And sometimes a question comes under deliberation on its own account and then provokes debate even more because of an extraneous motive; for example, if in the Italic War the Senate should deliberate whether or not to grant citizenship to the Allies. In causes in which the subject of itself engenders the deliberation, the entire discourse will be devoted to the subject itself. In those in which an extraneous motive gives rise to the deliberation, it is this motive which will have to be emphasized or depreciated. 3.3. The orator who gives counsel will through his speech properly set up Advantage as his aim, so that the complete economy of his entire speech may be directed to it. Advantage in political deliberation has two aspects: Security and Honour. To consider Security is to provide some plan or other for ensuring the avoidance of a present or imminent danger. Subheads under Security are Might and Craft, which we shall consider either separately or conjointly. Might is determined by armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, recruiting of man power, and the like. Craft is exercised by means of money, promises, dissimulation, accelerated speed, deception, and the other means, topics which I shall discuss at a more appropriate time, if ever I attempt to write on the art of war or on state administration. The Honourable is divided into the Right and the Praiseworthy. The Right is that which is done in accord with Virtue and Duty. Subheads under the Right are Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Temperance. Wisdom is intelligence capable, by a certain judicious method, of distinguishing good and bad; likewise the knowledge of an art is called Wisdom; and again, a well-furnished memory, or experience in diverse matters, is termed Wisdom. Justice is equity, giving to each thing what it is entitled to in proportion to its worth. Courage is the reaching for great things and contempt for what is mean; also the endurance of hardship in expectation of profit. Temperance is self-control that moderates our desires. 3.4. We shall be using the topics of Wisdom in our discourse if we compare advantages and disadvantages, counselling the pursuit of the one and the avoidance of the other; if we urge a course in a field in which we have a technical knowledge of the ways and means whereby each detail should be carried out; or if we recommend some policy in a matter whose history we can recall either from direct experience or hearsay â in this instance we can easily persuade our hearers to the course we wish by adducing the precedent. We shall be using the topics of Justice if we say that we ought to pity innocent persons and suppliants; if we show that it is proper to repay the well-deserving with gratitude; if we explain that we ought to punish the guilty; if we urge that faith ought zealously to be kept; if we say that the laws and customs of the state ought especially to be preserved; if we contend that alliances and friendships should scrupulously be honoured; if we make it clear that the duty imposed by nature toward parents, gods, and fatherland must be religiously observed; if we maintain that ties of hospitality, clientage, kinship, and relationship by marriage must inviolably be cherished; if we show that neither reward nor favour nor peril nor animosity ought to lead us astray from the right path; if we say that in all cases a principle of dealing alike with all should be established. With these and like topics of Justice we shall demonstrate that an action of which we are sponsors in Assembly or council is just, and by their contraries we shall demonstrate that an action is unjust. As a result we shall be provided with the same commonplaces for both persuasion and dissuasion. 3.5. When we invoke as motive for a course of action steadfastness in Courage, we shall make it clear that men ought to follow and strive after noble and lofty actions, and that, by the same token, actions base and unworthy of the brave ought therefore to be despised by brave men and considered as beneath their dignity. Again, from an honourable act no peril or toil, however great, should divert us; death ought to be preferred to disgrace; no pain should force an abandonment of duty; no man's enmity should be feared in defence of truth; for country, for parents, guest-friends, intimates, and for the things justice commands us to respect, it behoves us to brave any peril and endure any toil. We shall be using the topics of Temperance if we censure the inordinate desire for office, money, or the like; if we restrict each thing to its definite natural bounds; if we show how much is enough in each case, advise against going too far, and set the due limit to every matter. 3.6. Virtues of this kind are to be enlarged upon if we are recommending them, but depreciated if we are urging that they be disregarded, so that the points which I have made above will be belittled. To be sure, no one will propose the abandonment of virtue, but let the speaker say that the affair is not of such a sort that we can put any extraordinary virtue to the test; or that the virtue consists rather of qualities contrary to those here evinced. Again, if it is at all possible, we shall show that what our opponent calls justice is cowardice, and sloth, and perverse generosity; what he has called wisdom we shall term impertinent, babbling, and offensive cleverness; what he declares to be temperance we shall declare to be inaction and lax indifference; what he has named courage we shall term the reckless temerity of a gladiator. 3.7. The Praiseworthy is what produces an honourable remembrance, at the time of the event and afterwards. I have separated the Praiseworthy from the Right, not because the four categories which I list under the appellative Right usually fail to engender this honourable remembrance, but because, although the praiseworthy has its source in the right, we must nevertheless in speaking treat one apart from the other. Indeed we should pursue the right not alone for the sake of praise; but if praise accrues, the desire to strive after the right is doubled. When, therefore, a thing is shown to be right, we shall show that it is also praiseworthy, whether in the opinion of qualified persons (if, for example, something should please a more honourable class of men, and be disapproved by a lower class), or of certain allies, or all our fellow citizens, or foreign nations, or our descendants. Such being the division of topics in deliberative speaking, I must briefly explain how to develop the cause as a whole. The Introduction may be made by means of the Direct Opening or of the Subtle Approach, or by the same means as in a judicial cause. If there happens to be a Statement of Facts, the same method will properly be followed in the narrative. 3.8. Since in causes of this kind the end is Advantage, and Advantage is divided into the consideration of Security and the consideration of Honour, if we can prove that both ends will be served, we shall promise to make this twofold proof in our discourse; if we are going to prove that one of the two will be served, we shall indicate simply the one thing we intend to affirm. If, now, we say that our aim is Security, we shall use its subdivisions, Might and Strategy. For that which, in instructing, I have, in order to give clarity and emphasis called Craft, we shall in speaking call by the more honourable name of Strategy. If we say that our counsel aims at the Right, and all four categories of Right apply, we shall use them all. If these categories do not all apply, we shall in speaking set forth as many as do. We shall use Proof and Refutation when we establish in our favour the topics explained above, and refute the contrary topics. The rules for developing an argument artistically will be found in Book II. But if it happens that in a deliberation the counsel of one side is based on the consideration of security and that of the other on honour, as in the case of those who, surrounded by Carthaginians, deliberate on a course of action, then the speaker who advocates security will use the following topics: Nothing is more useful than safety; no one can make use of his virtues if he has not based his plans upon safety; not even the gods help those who thoughtlessly commit themselves to danger; nothing ought to be deemed honourable which does not produce safety. 3.9. One who prefers the considerations of honour to security will use the following topics: Virtue ought never to be renounced; either pain, if that is feared, or death, if that is dreaded, is more tolerable than disgrace and infamy; one must consider the shame which will ensue â indeed neither immortality nor a life everlasting is achieved, nor is it proved that, once this peril is avoided, another will not be encountered; fortune, though, habitually favours the brave; not he who is safe in the present, but he who lives honourably, lives safely â whereas he who lives shamefully cannot be secure for ever. As a general rule we employ virtually the same Conclusions in these as in judicial causes, except that here especially it is useful to present examples from the past in the greatest possible number. 3.16. Since it is through the Arrangement that we set in order the topics we have invented so that there may be a definite place for each in the delivery, we must see how kind of method one should follow in the process of arranging. The kinds of Arrangement are two: one arising from the principles of rhetoric, the other accommodated to particular circumstances. Our Arrangement will be based on the principles of rhetoric when we observe instructions that I have set forth in Book I â to use the Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion, and in speaking to follow the order enjoined above. It is likewise on the principles of the art that we shall be basing our Arrangement, not only of the whole case throughout the discourse, but also of the individual arguments, according to Proposition, Reason, Proof of the Reason, Embellishment, and Résumé, as I have explained in Book II. 3.17. This Arrangement, then, is twofold â one for the whole speech, and the other for the individual arguments â and is based upon the principles of rhetoric. But there is also another Arrangement, which, when we must depart from the order imposed by the rules of the art, is accommodated to circumstance in accordance with the speaker's judgement; for example, if we should begin our speech with the Statement of Facts, or with some very strong argument, or the reading of some documents; or if straightway after the Introduction we should use the Proof and then the Statement of Facts; or if we should make some other change of this kind in the order. But none of these changes ought to be made except when our cause demands them. For if the ears of the audience seem to have been deafened and their attention wearied by the wordiness of our adversaries, we can advantageously omit the Introduction, and begin the speech with either the Statement of Facts or some strong argument. Then, if it is advantageous â for it is not always necessary â one may recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. If our cause seems to present so great a difficulty that no one can listen to the Introduction with patience, we shall begin with the Statement of Facts and then recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. If the Statement of Facts is not quite plausible, we shall begin with some strong argument. It is often necessary to employ such changes and transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the rules of the art. |
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5. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 1.9.1, 1.10.7, 1.10.13, 3.7.10, 3.7.12, 3.7.39, 3.8.1, 3.8.6, 3.8.15, 3.8.22-3.8.25, 3.8.34, 3.8.36, 3.8.66, 4.2.52-4.2.55, 7.10.16-7.10.17, 10.7.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 36, 37, 38, 39, 96, 97, 98, 99 | 1.9.1. I have now finished with two of the departments, with which teachers of literature profess to deal, namely the art of speaking correctly and the interpretation of authors; the former they call methodice, the latter historice. We must however add to their activities instruction in certain rudiments of oratory for the benefit of those who are not yet ripe for the schools of rhetoric. 1.10.7. so too dumb insects produce honey, whose taste is beyond the skill of man to imitate, from different kinds of flowers and juices. Shall we marvel then, if oratory, the highest gift of providence to man, needs the assistance of many arts, which, although they do not reveal or intrude themselves in actual speaking, supply hidden forces and make their silent presence felt? 1.10.13. As for Plato, there are certain passages in his works, more especially in the Timaeus, which are quite unintelligible to those who have not studied the theory of music. But why speak only of the philosophers, whose master, Socrates, did not blush to receive instruction in playing the lyre even when far advanced in years? 3.7.10. There is greater variety required in the praise of men. In the first place there is a distinction to be made as regards time between the period in which the objects of our praise lived and the time preceding their birth; and further, in the case of the dead, we must also distinguish the period following their death. With regard to things preceding a man's birth, there are his country, his parents and his ancestors, a theme which may be handled in two ways. For either it will be creditable to the objects of our praise not to have fallen short of the fair fame of their country and of their sires or to have ennobled a humble origin by the glory of their achievements. 3.7.12. The praise of the individual himself will be based on his character, his physical endowments and external circumstances. Physical and accidental advantages provide a comparatively unimportant theme, which requires variety of treatment. At time for instance we extol beauty and strength in honorific terms, as Homer does in the case of Agamemnon and Achilles; at times again weakness may contribute largely to our admiration, as when Homer says that Tydeus was small of stature but a good fighter. 3.8.1. I am surprised that deliberative oratory also has been restricted by some authorities to questions of expediency. If it should be necessary to assign one single aim to deliberative I should prefer Cicero's view that this kind of oratory is primarily concerned with what is honourable. I do not doubt that those who maintain the opinion first mentioned adopt the lofty view that nothing can be expedient which is not good. 3.8.6. The deliberative department of oratory (also called the advisory department), while it deliberates about the future, also enquires about the past, while its functions are twofold and consist in advising and dissuading. Deliberative oratory does not always require an exordium, such as is necessary in forensic speeches, since he who asks an orator for his opinion is naturally well disposed to him. But the commencement, whatever be its nature, must have some resemblance to an exordium. For we must not begin abruptly or just at the point where the fancy takes us, since in every subject there is something which naturally comes first. 3.8.15. This type of oratory seems to me to offer a more varied field for eloquence, since both those who ask for advice and the answers given to them may easily present the greatest diversity. Consequently there are three points which must be specially borne in mind in advice or dissuasion: first the nature of the subject under discussion, secondly the nature of those who are engaged in the discussion, and thirdly the nature of the speaker who offers them advice. 3.8.22. Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything. 3.8.23. Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words "otherwise we shall perish" must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium. 3.8.24. It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour. "But," it will be urged, "if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife." Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife. 3.8.25. It appears to me, therefore, that where necessity exists, there is no room for deliberation, any more than where it is clear that a thing is not feasible. For deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists. Those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be Ïὸ δÏ
ναÏÏν or "possibility" as we translate it; the translation may seem clumsy, but it is the only word available. 3.8.34. On the other hand in deliberative oratory there will never be any doubt about circumstances wholly in our favour. For there can clearly be no doubt about points against which there is nothing to be said. Consequently as a rule all deliberative speeches are based simply on comparison, and we must consider what we shall gain and by what means, that it may be possible to form an estimate whether there is more advantage in the aims we pursue or greater discipline advantage in the means we employ to that end. 3.8.36. Consequently, though examples are of the greatest value in deliberative speeches, because reference to historical parallels is the quickest method of securing assent, it matters a great deal whose authority is adduced and to whom it is commended. For the minds of those who deliberate on any subject differ from one another and our audience may be of two kinds. 3.8.66. As regards the use of examples practically all authorities are with good reason agreed that there is no subject to which they are better suited, since as a rule history seems to repeat itself and the experience of the past is a valuable support to reason. 7.10.16. And it is not enough merely to arrange the various parts: each several part has its own internal economy, according to which one thought will come first, another second, another third, while we must struggle not merely to place these thoughts in their proper order, but to link them together and give them such cohesion that there will be no trace of any suture: they must form a body, not a congeries of limbs. 7.10.17. This end will be attained if we note what best suits each position, and take care that the words which we place together are such as will not clash, but will mutually harmonise. Thus different facts will not seem like perfect strangers thrust into uncongenial company from distant places, but will be united with what precedes and follows by an intimate bond of union, with the result that our speech will give the impression not merely of having been put together, but of natural continuity. I fear, however, that I have been lured on from one thing to another and have advanced somewhat too far, since I find myself gliding from the subject of arrangement to the discussion of the general rules of style, which will form the opening theme of the next book. 10.7.14. When this occurred, the old orators, such as Cicero, used to say that some god had inspired the speaker. But the reason is obvious. For profound emotion and vivid imagination sweep on with unbroken force, whereas, if retarded by the slowness of the pen, they are liable to grow cold and, if put off for the moment, may never return. Above all, if we add to these obstacles an unhealthy tendency to quibble over the choice of words, and check our advance at every step, the vehemence of our onset loses its impetus; while even though our choice of individual words may be of the happiest, the style will be a mere patchwork with no regular pattern. |
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| 6. Augustine, Confessions, 1.16.26, 1.18.29 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 22 |
| 7. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 1.1.1, 4.8.22, 4.29.63 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 30 |
| 8. Augustine, Enarrationes In Psalmos, 106.7, 147.20 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 30, 131 |
| 9. Augustine, Sermons, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 15 |
| 10. Augustine, Letters, 82.5 (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 30 |
| 11. Augustine of Hippo, Cat. Rud., 6.10, 7.11, 10.15, 25.47-25.48 Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 66, 73, 75 |
| 12. Cicero, Inu., 1.27, 2.51.56 Tagged with subjects: •sermones, audience Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 37, 97 |
