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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

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subject book bibliographic info
selected, and edited by a christian, sextus, sentences of pagan spiritual work Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 396
selected, not chosen, indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, indifferents Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 50, 53, 170, 185, 328
selection Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 128, 139, 230, 243
Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022), The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography, 94, 333
selection, as apostle, matthias Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 324, 325
selection, criteria, divine appellations/attributes , and, selection Laemmle (2021), Lists and Catalogues in Ancient Literature and Beyond: Towards a Poetics of Enumeration, 156, 180, 181, 182, 189, 366
selection, evolution, legal and social Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 46, 47
selection, natural, selection, evolution, legal and social Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 42
selection, of hearth-initiate Parker (2005), Polytheism and Society at Athens, 220, 226
selection, of imperial cult Kalinowski (2021), Memory, Family, and Community in Roman Ephesos, 209
selection, of judges Schiffman (1983), Testimony and the Penal Code, 10, 28, 29, 30
selection, of judges by, lots Schiffman (1983), Testimony and the Penal Code, 28, 45
selection, of language Czajkowski et al. (2020), Vitruvian Man: Rome under Construction, 93
selection, of orations of gregory of liturgical orations, byzantine nazianzus MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 2, 144
selection, of passages from, beneficent power, philo’s Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 43, 44
selection, of priests and priestesses Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 102, 178, 179
selection, of readings Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 438, 440, 441, 442, 446, 447, 449, 450
selection, of translators, of lxx, in letter of aristeas, their qualities Honigman (2003), The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas, 56, 57, 58
selection, self-definition, and text Reed (2005), Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature. 159
selection, subset, selection, evolution, legal and social Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 42
selection, transactional practices, evolution, legal and social Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 42, 44
selective, emotion, epicureans Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 196, 201, 202, 203
selective, inscription of proliferation across boiotia Wilding (2022), Reinventing the Amphiareion at Oropos, 122
selective, inscription, memory, and Wilding (2022), Reinventing the Amphiareion at Oropos, 16, 260, 262
selective, inscription, reinvention, and Wilding (2022), Reinventing the Amphiareion at Oropos, 7, 111, 113, 260, 262
selective, memory Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 98, 103, 121, 123, 179
Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 189, 190, 223, 225
selective, memory, achilles Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216
selective, memory, achilles, and Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216
selective, memory, analepsis Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209
selective, memory, demosthenes Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 217
selective, memory, hoplon krisis Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223
selective, memory, iliad Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 194, 195, 197, 204, 206, 207, 208, 217, 218
selective, memory, in speeches Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223
selective, selectivity, memory, and poetic Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202
selectivity Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022), The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography, 11, 21
selectivity, poetic Greensmith (2021), The Resurrection of Homer in Imperial Greek Epic: Quintus Smyrnaeus' Posthomerica and the Poetics of Impersonation, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202

List of validated texts:
4 validated results for "selection"
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.50-3.53 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, Indifferents selected, not chosen • selection

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 230; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 170

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3.50 quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE' "3.51 quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere." "3.52 Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus." '3.53 quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum praepositum edd. propositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis satis om. A aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse esse P. Man. esset praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur:'' None
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3.50 \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <' "3.51 \xa0Again among things valuable â\x80\x94 e.g.\xa0health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â\x80\x94 they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄ\x93gmena and the opposite, apoproÄ\x93gmena â\x80\x94 for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. <" '3.52 \xa0"In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as \'promoted\' to honour (for that is the meaning of proÄ\x93gmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal preâ\x80\x91eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proÄ\x93gmenon, that is, \'promoted,\' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or \'advanced\' and \'degraded,\' or the term we have been using all along, \'preferred\' or \'superior,\' and for the opposite \'rejected.\' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. <' "3.53 \xa0But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value â\x80\x94 since it has occurred to me that I\xa0may use the word 'indifferent' to represent their term adiaphoron. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be 'preferred.' <"' None
2. New Testament, Acts, 9.10-9.16 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Double dreams and visions, selection of examples • Matthias, selection as apostle

 Found in books: Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 275; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 324

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9.10 Ἦν δέ τις μαθητὴς ἐν Δαμασκῷ ὀνόματι Ἁνανίας, καὶ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν ὁράματι ὁ κύριος Ἁνανία. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν Ἰδοὺ ἐγώ, κύριε. 9.11 ὁ δὲ κύριος πρὸς αὐτόν Ἀνάστα πορεύθητι ἐπὶ τὴν ῥύμην τὴν καλουμένην Εὐθεῖαν καὶ ζήτησον ἐν οἰκίᾳ Ἰούδα Σαῦλον ὀνόματι Ταρσέα, ἰδοὺ γὰρ προσεύχεται, 9.12 καὶ εἶδεν ἄνδρα ἐν ὁράματι Ἁνανίαν ὀνόματι εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἐπιθέντα αὐτῷ τὰς χεῖρας ὅπως ἀναβλέψῃ. 9.13 ἀπεκρίθη δὲ Ἁνανίας Κύριε, ἤκουσα ἀπὸ πολλῶν περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου, ὅσα κακὰ τοῖς ἁγίοις σου ἐποίησεν ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ· 9.14 καὶ ὧδε ἔχει ἐξουσίαν παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιερέων δῆσαι πάντας τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους τὸ ὄνομά σου. 9.15 εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ κύριος Πορεύου, ὅτι σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς ἐστίν μοι οὗτος τοῦ βαστάσαι τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐνώπιον τῶν ἐθνῶν τε καὶ βασιλέων υἱῶν τε Ἰσραήλ, 9.16 ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑποδείξω αὐτῷ ὅσα δεῖ αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματός μου παθεῖν.'' None
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9.10 Now there was a certain disciple at Damascus named Aias. The Lord said to him in a vision, "Aias!"He said, "Behold, it\'s me, Lord." 9.11 The Lord said to him, "Arise, and go to the street which is called Straight, and inquire in the house of Judas for one named Saul, a man of Tarsus. For behold, he is praying, 9.12 and in a vision he has seen a man named Aias coming in, and laying his hands on him, that he might receive his sight." 9.13 But Aias answered, "Lord, I have heard from many about this man, how much evil he did to your saints at Jerusalem. 9.14 Here he has authority from the chief priests to bind all who call on your name." 9.15 But the Lord said to him, "Go your way, for he is my chosen vessel to bear my name before the nations and kings, and the children of Israel. 9.16 For I will show him how many things he must suffer for my name\'s sake."'' None
3. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, Indifferents selected, not chosen • selection

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 243; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 50

4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.101-7.105 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, Indifferents selected, not chosen • selection

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 230; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 170

sup>
7.101 And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102 Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.103 For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.' "7.104 To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.The term indifferent has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one's head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent," '7.105 they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.'' None



Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.