Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

validated results only / all results

and or

Filtering options: (leave empty for all results)
By author:     
By work:        
By subject:
By additional keyword:       

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

99 results for "rhetorical"
1. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 9.10-9.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 73
9.11. "בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשֵּׁנִי בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם יַעֲשׂוּ אֹתוֹ עַל־מַצּוֹת וּמְרֹרִים יֹאכְלֻהוּ׃", 9.10. "’Speak unto the children of Israel, saying: If any man of you or of your generations shall be unclean by reason of a dead body, or be in a journey afar off, yet he shall keep the passover unto the LORD;", 9.11. "in the second month on the fourteenth day at dusk they shall keep it; they shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter herbs;",
2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.5 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 8
1.5. "וַיִּקְרָא אֱלֹהִים לָאוֹר יוֹם וְלַחֹשֶׁךְ קָרָא לָיְלָה וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם אֶחָד׃", 1.5. "And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day.",
3. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 4.6-4.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 235
4.6. "וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לוֹ עוֹד הָבֵא־נָא יָדְךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ וַיָּבֵא יָדוֹ בְּחֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ וְהִנֵּה יָדוֹ מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג׃", 4.7. "וַיֹּאמֶר הָשֵׁב יָדְךָ אֶל־חֵיקֶךָ וַיָּשֶׁב יָדוֹ אֶל־חֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ מֵחֵיקוֹ וְהִנֵּה־שָׁבָה כִּבְשָׂרוֹ׃", 4.6. "And the LORD said furthermore unto him: ‘Put now thy hand into thy bosom.’ And he put his hand into his bosom; and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous, as white as snow.", 4.7. "And He said: ‘Put thy hand back into thy bosom.—And he put his hand back into his bosom; and when he took it out of his bosom, behold, it was turned again as his other flesh.—",
4. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, None (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 9
5. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 49.20 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 203
49.20. "The children of thy bereavement Shall yet say in thine ears: ‘The place is too strait for me; Give place to me that I may dwell.’",
6. Homer, Iliad, 2.212-2.220 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •body, in rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 170, 171
2.212. / thundereth on the long beach, and the deep roareth.Now the others sate them down and were stayed in their places, only there still kept chattering on Thersites of measureless speech, whose mind was full of great store of disorderly words, wherewith to utter revilings against the kings, idly, and in no orderly wise, 2.213. / thundereth on the long beach, and the deep roareth.Now the others sate them down and were stayed in their places, only there still kept chattering on Thersites of measureless speech, whose mind was full of great store of disorderly words, wherewith to utter revilings against the kings, idly, and in no orderly wise, 2.214. / thundereth on the long beach, and the deep roareth.Now the others sate them down and were stayed in their places, only there still kept chattering on Thersites of measureless speech, whose mind was full of great store of disorderly words, wherewith to utter revilings against the kings, idly, and in no orderly wise, 2.215. / but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. 2.216. / but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. 2.217. / but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. 2.218. / but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. 2.219. / but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives. Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. 2.220. / Hateful was he to Achilles above all, and to Odysseus, for it was they twain that he was wont to revile; but now again with shrill cries he uttered abuse against goodly Agamemnon. With him were the Achaeans exceeding wroth, and had indignation in their hearts.
7. Herodotus, Histories, 1.32 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 185
1.32. Thus Solon granted second place in happiness to these men. Croesus was vexed and said, “My Athenian guest, do you so much despise our happiness that you do not even make us worth as much as common men?” Solon replied, “Croesus, you ask me about human affairs, and I know that the divine is entirely grudging and troublesome to us. ,In a long span of time it is possible to see many things that you do not want to, and to suffer them, too. I set the limit of a man's life at seventy years; ,these seventy years have twenty-five thousand, two hundred days, leaving out the intercalary month. But if you make every other year longer by one month, so that the seasons agree opportunely, then there are thirty-five intercalary months during the seventy years, and from these months there are one thousand fifty days. ,Out of all these days in the seventy years, all twenty-six thousand, two hundred and fifty of them, not one brings anything at all like another. So, Croesus, man is entirely chance. ,To me you seem to be very rich and to be king of many people, but I cannot answer your question before I learn that you ended your life well. The very rich man is not more fortunate than the man who has only his daily needs, unless he chances to end his life with all well. Many very rich men are unfortunate, many of moderate means are lucky. ,The man who is very rich but unfortunate surpasses the lucky man in only two ways, while the lucky surpasses the rich but unfortunate in many. The rich man is more capable of fulfilling his appetites and of bearing a great disaster that falls upon him, and it is in these ways that he surpasses the other. The lucky man is not so able to support disaster or appetite as is the rich man, but his luck keeps these things away from him, and he is free from deformity and disease, has no experience of evils, and has fine children and good looks. ,If besides all this he ends his life well, then he is the one whom you seek, the one worthy to be called fortunate. But refrain from calling him fortunate before he dies; call him lucky. ,It is impossible for one who is only human to obtain all these things at the same time, just as no land is self-sufficient in what it produces. Each country has one thing but lacks another; whichever has the most is the best. Just so no human being is self-sufficient; each person has one thing but lacks another. ,Whoever passes through life with the most and then dies agreeably is the one who, in my opinion, O King, deserves to bear this name. It is necessary to see how the end of every affair turns out, for the god promises fortune to many people and then utterly ruins them.”
8. Xenophon, Memoirs, 4.8.11 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 235, 236
4.8.11. τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω. 4.8.11. This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.
9. Plato, Republic, 25 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 41
10. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 127
11. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 4.10.1-4.10.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 105
4.10.1. ‘ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε ἀνάγκῃ ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὔελπις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχόμενα κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται. 4.10.2. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὰ πλείω ὁρῶ πρὸς ἡμῶν ὄντα, ἢν ἐθέλωμέν τε μεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν κρείσσω καταπροδοῦναι. 4.10.3. τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνεται, ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὂν εὔπορον ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέμιον δεινότερον ἕξομεν μὴ ῥᾳδίας αὐτῷ πάλιν οὔσης τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν βιάζηται ʽἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ ῥᾷστοί εἰσιν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἤδἠ, 4.10.4. τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄγαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι: κατ’ ὀλίγον γὰρ μαχεῖται καίπερ πολὺ ὂν ἀπορίᾳ τῆς προσορμίσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μείζων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἷς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεῖ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ξυμβῆναι. 4.10.5. ὥστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλήθει, καὶ ἅμα ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρίᾳ τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐπ’ ἄλλους ἀπόβασιν ὅτι, εἴ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροίη, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μεῖναί τε καὶ ἀμυνομένους παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σῴζειν ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον.’ 4.10.1. ‘Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is faced the better. 4.10.2. To my mind also most of the chances are for us, if we will only stand fast and not throw away our advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy. 4.10.3. One of the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. This, however, only helps us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will be practicable enough, in spite of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and the enemy will instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will have in retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he has landed and meets us on equal terms. 4.10.4. As to his numbers, these need not too much alarm you. Large as they may be he can only engage in small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to. Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is not that of an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops on board ship, upon an element where many favorable accidents are required to act with effect. 4.10.5. I therefore consider that his difficulties may be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same time I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing from ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to be frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing in, to stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the water's edge, and save yourselves and the place.’
12. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 173
13. Anaximenes of Lampsacus, Rhetoric To Alexander, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 89
14. Cicero, Topica, 23, 71 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 96
71. parium autem comparatio nec elationem habet nec summissionem; est enim aequalis. Multa autem sunt quae aequalitate ipsa comparantur comparantur OLbf : comparentur codd. ; quae ita fere con- cluduntur: Si consilio iuvare cives et auxilio aequa in laude ponendum est, pari gloria debent esse ei qui consu- lunt et ei qui defendunt; at quod at quod O b cf : atqui Boethius : et quod codd. primum, est; quod sequitur igitur. Perfecta est omnis argumentorum invenien- dorum praeceptio, ut, cum profectus sis a definitione, a partitione, a notatione, a coniugatis, a genere, a formis, a similitudine, a differentia, a contrariis, ab adiunctis, a consequentibus, ab antecedentibus, a repugtibus, a causis, ab effectis, a comparatione maiorum minorum parium, nulla praeterea sedes argumenti quaerenda sit.
15. Cicero, Pro Murena, 7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 197
7. sed me, iudices, non minus hominis sapientissimi atque ornatissimi, Ser. Sulpici, conquestio quam Catonis accusatio commovebat accusatio commovebat cattio acommovebat S : captio commovebat A qui gravissime et acerbissime se ferre se ferre Lambinus : ferme codd. dixit me familiaritatis necessitudinisque oblitum causam L. Lucii Murenae contra se defendere. huic ego, iudices, satis facere cupio vosque adhibere arbitros. nam cum grave est vere accusari in amicitia, tum, etiam si falso accuseris, non est neglegendum. ego, Ser. Sulpici, me in petitione tua tibi omnia studia atque officia pro nostra necessitudine et debuisse confiteor et praestitisse arbitror. nihil tibi consulatum petenti a me defuit quod esset aut ab amico aut a gratioso aut a consule postulandum. abiit abiit xyw : abit cett. illud tempus; mutata ratio est. sic existimo, sic mihi persuadeo, me tibi contra honorem Murenae L. Murenae Lambinus quantum tu a me postulare ausus sis, tantum debuisse, contra salutem nihil debere.
16. Cicero, Pro Milone, 72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 98
17. Cicero, Letters, 198-199, 201-211, 221-225, 200 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 206
18. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, 11-15, 27, 31-32, 53, 55, 83-90, 71 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 98, 99
71. omnia enim sunt profecto laudanda quae coniuncta cum virtute sunt, et quae cum vitiis vituperanda. Quam ob rem finis alterius est honestas alterius turpitude. Conficitur autem genus hoc dictionis narrandis exponendisque factis, quod sine ullis argumentationibus ad animi motus leniter tractandos magis quam ad fidem faciendam aut confirmandam accommodatur. Non enim dubia firmantur, sed ea quae certa aut pro certis posita sunt augentur. Quam ob rem ex eis quae ante dicta sunt et narrandi et augendi praecepta repetentur.
19. Cicero, Orator, 112, 116-117, 2, 237, 3, 43, 70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 24, 170, 171
20. Cicero, In Catilinam, 1.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 103
21. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 124
1.5. in summo apud illos honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius; at ad GR 1 V 1 nos metiendi ratiocidique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum. At contra oratorem celeriter complexi sumus, nec eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum, post autem eruditum. Cum ... 219, 15 eruditum H (218, 29 honos ... 219,2 improbantur bis ) etiam ante erud. add. V c mg. nam Galbam Africanum Laelium doctos fuisse traditum est, studiosum autem eum, qui is his X hos V c s aetate anteibat, Catonem, catonem X post vero Lepidum Carbonem carbonẽ V c Gracchos, inde ita magnos grac in r. V c ( in mg. at etiam idem ante versum gracchos-magnos) nostram ad aetatem, ut non multum aut nihil omnino Graecis cederetur. Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum; quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, possiumus G 1 otiosi. ut... otiosi Non. 355, 2
22. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 6.18.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 23
23. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.21, 1.24.158, 1.145-1.146, 2.40.172, 2.114-2.116, 2.128, 2.162-2.172, 2.307-2.308, 2.310, 2.334, 2.336, 3.54 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 234; Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 7, 12, 55, 56, 82, 87, 89, 90, 93, 96, 97; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 11, 24, 170, 171
1.21. Neque vero ego hoc tantum oneris imponam nostris praesertim oratoribus in hac tanta occupatione urbis ac vitae, nihil ut eis putem licere nescire, quamquam vis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri videtur, ut omni de re, quaecumque sit proposita, ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur. 1.145. Quin etiam, quae maxime propria essent naturae, tamen his ipsis artem adhiberi videram; nam de actione et de memoria quaedam brevia, sed magna cum exercitatione praecepta gustaram. In his enim fere rebus omnis istorum artificum doctrina versatur, quam ego si nihil dicam adiuvare, mentiar; habet enim quaedam quasi ad commonendum oratorem, quo quidque referat et quo intuens ab eo, quodcumque sibi proposuerit, minus aberret. 1.146. Verum ego hanc vim intellego esse in praeceptis omnibus, non ut ea secuti oratores eloquentiae laudem sint adepti, sed, quae sua sponte homines eloquentes facerent, ea quosdam observasse atque collegisse; sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio, sed artificium ex eloquentia natum; quod tamen, ut ante dixi, non eicio; est enim, etiam si minus necessarium ad bene dicendum, tamen ad cognoscendum non inliberale; 2.114. Cum igitur accepta causa et genere cognito rem tractare coepi, nihil prius constituo, quam quid sit illud, quo mihi sit referenda omnis illa oratio, quae sit propria quaestionis et iudici; deinde illa duo diligentissime considero, quorum alterum commendationem habet nostram aut eorum, quos defendimus, alterum est accommodatum ad eorum animos, apud quos dicimus, ad id, quod volumus, commovendos. 2.115. Ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa: ut probemus vera esse, quae defendimus; ut conciliemus eos nobis, qui audiunt; ut animos eorum, ad quemcumque causa postulabit motum, vocemus. 2.116. Ad probandum autem duplex est oratori subiecta materies: una rerum earum, quae non excogitantur ab oratore, sed in re positae ratione tractantur, ut tabulae, testimonia, pacta conventa, quaestiones, leges, senatus consulta, res iudicatae, decreta, responsa, reliqua, si quae sunt, quae non reperiuntur ab oratore, sed ad oratorem a causa atque a re deferuntur; altera est, quae tota in disputatione et in argumentatione oratoris conlocata est; 2.128. 'Depromam equidem,' inquit 'et quo facilius id a te exigam, quod peto, nihil tibi a me postulanti recusabo. Meae totius rationis in dicendo et istius ipsius facultatis, quam modo Crassus in caelum verbis extulit, tres sunt res, ut ante dixi: una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum. 2.162. Ego autem, si quem nunc plane rudem institui ad dicendum velim, his potius tradam adsiduis uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque tundentibus, qui omnis tenuissimas particulas atque omnia minima mansa ut nutrices infantibus pueris in os inserant; sin sit is, qui et doctrina mihi liberaliter institutus et aliquo iam imbutus usu et satis acri ingenio esse videatur, illuc eum rapiam, ubi non seclusa aliqua acula teneatur, sed unde universum flumen erumpat; qui illi sedis et quasi domicilia omnium argumentorum commonstret et ea breviter inlustret verbisque definiat. 2.163. Quid enim est, in quo haereat, qui viderit omne, quod sumatur in oratione aut ad probandum aut ad refellendum, aut ex re sua sumi vi atque natura aut adsumi foris? Ex sua vi, cum aut res quae sit tota quaeratur, aut pars eius, aut vocabulum quod habeat, aut quippiam, rem illam quod attingat; extrinsecus autem, cum ea, quae sunt foris neque haerent in rei natura, conliguntur. 2.164. Si res tota quaeritur, definitione universa vis explicanda est, sic: "si maiestas est amplitudo ac dignitas civitatis, is eam minuit, qui exercitum hostibus populi Romani tradidit, non qui eum, qui id 2.165. fecisset, populi Romani potestati tradidit." Sin pars, partitione, hoc modo: "aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; aliud consilium, superbum; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus." Si ex vocabulo, ut Carbo: "si consul est, qui consulit patriae, 2.166. quid aliud fecit Opimius?" Sin ab eo, quod rem attingit, plures sunt argumentorum sedes ac loci, nam et coniuncta quaeremus et genera et partis generibus subiectas et similitudines et dissimilitudines et contraria et consequentia et consentanea et quasi praecurrentia et repugtia et causas rerum vestigabimus et ea, quae ex causis orta sint, et maiora, paria, minora quaeremus. 2.167. Ex coniunctis sic argumenta ducuntur: "si pietati summa tribuenda laus est, debetis moveri, cum Q. Metellum tam pie lugere videatis." Ex genere autem: "si magistratus in populi Romani esse potestate debent, quid Norbanum accusas, cuius tribunatus 2.168. voluntati paruit civitatis?" Ex parte autem ea, quae est subiecta generi: "si omnes, qui rei publicae consulunt, cari nobis esse debent, certe in primis imperatores, quorum consiliis, virtute, periculis retinemus et nostram salutem et imperi dignitatem." Ex similitudine autem: "si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia 2.169. esse debemus?" At ex dissimilitudine: "si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent." Atque utroque in genere et similitudinis et dissimilitudinis exempla sunt ex aliorum factis aut dictis aut eventis et fictae narrationes saepe ponendae. Iam ex contrario: 2.170. "si Gracchus nefarie, praeclare Opimius." Ex consequentibus: "si et ferro interfectus ille et tu inimicus eius cum gladio cruento comprehensus in illo ipso loco et nemo praeter te ibi visus est et causa nemini et tu semper audax, quid est quod de facinore dubitare possimus?" Ex consentaneis et ex praecurrentibus et ex repugtibus, ut olim Crassus adulescens: "non si Opimium defendisti, Carbo, idcirco te isti bonum civem putabunt: simulasse te et aliquid quaesisse perspicuum est, quod Ti. Gracchi mortem saepe in contionibus deplorasti, quod P. Africani necis socius fuisti, quod eam legem in tribunatu tulisti, quod 2.171. semper a bonis dissedisti." Ex causis autem rerum sic: "avaritiam si tollere vultis, mater eius est tollenda, luxuries." Ex eis autem, quae sunt orta de causis: "si aerari copiis et ad belli adiumenta et ad ornamenta pacis utimur, vectigalibus 2.172. serviamus." Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore: "si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda!" ex minore: hic parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem tam fert familiariter: quid si ipse amasset? Quid hic mihi faciet patri? Ex pari: "est eiusdem et eripere et contra rem publicam 2.307. Itaque nunc illuc redeo, Catule, in quo tu me paulo ante laudabas, ad ordinem conlocationemque rerum ac locorum; cuius ratio est duplex; altera, quam adfert natura causarum, altera, quae oratorum iudicio et prudentia comparatur: nam ut aliquid ante rem dicamus, deinde ut rem exponamus, post ut eam probemus nostris praesidiis confirmandis, contrariis refutandis, deinde ut concludamus atque ita peroremus, hoc dicendi natura ipsa praescribit; 2.308. ut vero statuamus ea, quae probandi et docendi causa dicenda sunt, quem ad modum componamus, id est vel maxime proprium oratoris prudentiae. Multa enim occurrunt argumenta; multa, quae in dicendo profutura videantur; sed eorum partim ita levia sunt, ut contemnenda sint; partim, etiam si quid habent adiumenti, sunt non numquam eius modi, ut insit in eis aliquid viti neque tanti sit illud, quod prodesse videatur, ut cum aliquo malo coniungatur; 2.310. Et quoniam, quod saepe iam dixi, tribus rebus homines ad nostram sententiam perducimus, aut docendo aut conciliando aut permovendo, una ex tribus his rebus res prae nobis est ferenda, ut nihil aliud nisi docere velle videamur; reliquae duae, sicuti sanguis in corporibus, sic illae in perpetuis orationibus fusae esse debebunt; nam et principia et ceterae partes orationis, de quibus paulo post pauca dicemus, habere hanc vim magno opere debent, ut ad eorum 2.334. contio capit omnem vim orationis et gravitatem varietatemque desiderat. Ergo in suadendo nihil est optabilius quam dignitas; nam qui utilitatem petit, non quid maxime velit suasor, sed quid interdum magis sequatur, videt. Nemo est enim, praesertim in tam clara civitate, quin putet expetendam maxime dignitatem, sed vincit utilitas plerumque, cum subest ille timor ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri. 2.336. Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime est quaerendum; inciditur enim omnis iam deliberatio, si intellegitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas adfertur; et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit. 3.54. Qui ita dicerent, eos negavit adhuc se vidisse Antonius et eis hoc nomen dixit eloquentiae solis esse tribuendum. Qua re omnis istos me auctore deridete atque contemnite, qui se horum, qui nunc ita appellantur, rhetorum praeceptis omnem oratoriam vim complexos esse arbitrantur neque adhuc quam personam teneant aut quid profiteantur intellegere potuerunt. Vero enim oratori, quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent.
24. Polybius, Histories, None (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Honigman (2003), The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas, 30
12.27. 1.  Nature has given us two instruments, as it were, by the aid of which we inform ourselves and inquire about everything. These are hearing and sight, and of the two sight is much more veracious according to Heracleitus. "The eyes are more accurate witnesses than that ears," he says.,2.  Now, Timaeus enters on his inquiries by the pleasanter of the two roads, but the inferior one.,3.  For he entirely avoids employing his eyes and prefers to employ his ears. Now the knowledge derived from hearing being of two sorts, Timaeus diligently pursued the one, the reading of books, as I have above pointed out, but was very remiss in his use of the other, the interrogation of living witnesses.,4.  It is easy enough to perceive what caused him to make this choice. Inquiries from books may be made without any danger or hardship, provided only that one takes care to have access to a town rich in documents or to have a library near at hand.,5.  After that one has only to pursue one's researches in perfect repose and compare the accounts of different writers without exposing oneself to any hardship.,6.  Personal inquiry, on the contrary, requires severe labour and great expense, but is exceedingly valuable and is the most important part of history.,7.  This is evident from expressions used by historians themselves. Ephorus, for example, says that if we could be personally present at all transactions such knowledge would be far superior to any other.,8.  Theopompus says that the man who has the best knowledge of war is he who has been present at the most battles, that most capable speaker is he who has taken part in the greatest number of debates, and that the same holds good about medicine and navigation.,10.  Homer has been still more emphatic on this subject than these writers. Wishing to show us what qualities one should possess in order to be a man of action he says: The man for wisdom's various arts renowned, Long exercised in woes, O muse, resound, Wandering from clime to clime; and further on Observant strayed, Their manners noted, and their states surveyed: On stormy seas unnumbered toils he bore; and again â€” In scenes of death by tempest and by war.
25. Cicero, On Invention, 1.7.9, 1.9.6-1.9.7, 1.19-1.25, 1.27-1.29, 1.28.41, 1.34-1.43, 1.49, 1.51-1.77, 1.96, 1.100, 2.17.55, 2.32-2.34, 2.116-2.121, 2.146, 2.156-2.178 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks of •rhetorical handbooks •body, in rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 26; Iricinschi et al. (2013), Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels, 136; Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 55, 56, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 157, 188, 193, 194, 195, 196; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 10, 171, 172, 173
1.19. firmamentum est firmissima argu- mentatio defensoris et appositissima ad iudicationem: ut si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi sui potissimum petere debuerint. Et in ceteris quidem constitutionibus ad hunc modum iudicationes reperiuntur; in coniecturali autem constitutione, quia ratio non est—factum enim non conceditur—, non potest ex deductione rationis nasci iudicatio. quare ne- cesse est eandem esse quaestionem et iudicationem: factum est, non est factum, factumne sit? quot autem in causa constitutiones aut earum partes erunt, totidem necesse erit quaestiones, rationes, iudicationes, firma- menta reperire. Tum his omnibus in causa repertis denique sin- gulae partes totius causae considerandae sunt. nam non ut quidque dicendum primum est, ita primum animad- vertendum videtur; ideo quod illa, quae prima dicun- tur, si vehementer velis congruere et cohaerere cum causa, ex iis ducas oportet, quae post dicenda sunt. quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordidae sunt ceterae partes orationis. eae partes sex esse om- nino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, con- firmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Nunc quoniam exordium princeps debet esse, nos quoque primum in rationem exordiendi praecepta da- bimus. 1.20. Exordium est oratio animum auditoris idonee com- parans ad reliquam dictionem: quod eveniet, si eum benivolum, attentum, docilem confecerit. quare qui bene exordiri causam volet, eum necesse est genus suae causae diligenter ante cognoscere. Genera causarum quinque sunt: honestum, admirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra favet auditoris animus; admirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum, qui audituri sunt; humile, quod neglegitur ab auditore et non magno opere adtendendum videtur; anceps, in quo aut iudicatio dubia est aut causa et honestatis et turpitudinis parti- ceps, ut et benivolentiam pariat et offensionem; obscu- rum, in quo aut tardi auditores sunt aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa est implicata. quare cum tam diversa sint genera causarum, exordiri quo- que dispari ratione in uno quoque genere necesse est. igitur exordium in duas partes dividitur, in principium et insinuationem. principium est oratio perspicue et protinus perficiens auditorem benivolum aut docilem aut attentum. insinuatio est oratio quadam dissimu- latione et circumitione obscure subiens auditoris animum. 1.21. In admirabili genere causae, si non omnino infesti auditores erunt, principio benivolentiam conparare li- cebit. sin erunt vehementer abalienati, confugere ne- cesse erit ad insinuationem. nam ab iratis si perspicue pax et benivolentia petitur, non modo ea non inve- nitur, sed augetur atque inflammatur odium. in humili autem genere causae contemptionis tollendae causa ne- cesse est attentum efficere auditorem. anceps genus causae si dubiam iudicationem habebit, ab ipsa iudi- catione exordiendum est. sin autem partem turpitu- dinis, partem honestatis habebit, benivolentiam captare oportebit, ut in genus honestum causa translata vi- deatur. cum autem erit honestum causae genus, vel praeteriri principium poterit vel, si commodum fuerit, aut a narratione incipiemus aut a lege aut ab aliqua firmissima ratione nostrae dictionis; sin uti prin- cipio placebit, benivolentiae partibus utendum est, ut id, quod est, augeatur. in obscuro causae genere per principium dociles auditores efficere oportebit. Nunc quoniam quas res exordio conficere oporteat dictum est, reliquum est, ut ostendatur, quibus quae- que rationibus res confici possit. 1.22. Benivolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur: ab nostra, ab adversariorum, ab iudicum persona, a causa. ab nostra, si de nostris factis et officiis sine arrogantia dicemus; si crimina inlata et aliquas minus honestas suspiciones iniectas diluemus; si, quae incommoda acci- derint aut quae instent difficultates, proferemus; si prece et obsecratione humili ac supplici utemur. ab ad- versariorum autem, si eos aut in odium aut in invidiam aut in contemptionem adducemus. in odium ducentur, si quod eorum spurce, superbe, crudeliter, malitiose factum proferetur; in invidiam, si vis eorum, potentia, divitiae, cognatio pecuniae proferentur atque eorum usus arrogans et intolerabilis, ut his rebus magis vi- deantur quam causae suae confidere; in contemp- tionem adducentur, si eorum inertia, neglegentia, igna- via, desidiosum studium et luxuriosum otium profe- retur. ab auditorum persona benivolentia captabitur, si res ab iis fortiter, sapienter, mansuete gestae profe- rentur, ut ne qua assentatio nimia significetur, si de iis quam honesta existimatio quantaque eorum iudicii et auctoritatis exspectatio sit ostendetur; ab rebus, si nostram causam laudando extollemus, adversariorum causam per contemptionem deprimemus. 1.23. Attentos autem faciemus, si demonstrabimus ea, quae dicturi erimus, magna, nova, incredibilia esse, aut ad omnes aut ad eos, qui audient, aut ad aliquos inlustres ho- mines aut ad deos inmortales aut ad summam rem pu- blicam pertinere; et si pollicebimur nos brevi nostram causam demonstraturos atque exponemus iudica- tionem aut iudicationes, si plures erunt. Dociles audi- tores faciemus, si aperte et breviter summam causae exponemus, hoc est, in quo consistat controversia. nam et, cum docilem velis facere, simul attentum facias oportet. nam is est maxime docilis, qui attentissime est paratus audire. Nunc insinuationes quemadmodum tractari con- veniat, deinceps dicendum videtur. insinuatione igitur utendum est, cum admirabile genus causae est, hoc est, ut ante diximus, cum animus auditoris infestus est. id autem tribus ex causis fit maxime: si aut inest in ipsa causa quaedam turpitudo aut ab iis, qui ante dixerunt, iam quiddam auditori persuasum videtur aut eo tempore locus dicendi datur, cum iam illi, quos audire oportet, defessi sunt audiendo. nam ex hac quoque re non minus quam ex primis duabus in oratore nonnumquam animus auditoris offenditur. 1.24. Si causae turpitudo contrahit offensionem, aut pro eo homine, in quo offenditur, alium hominem, qui dili- gitur, interponi oportet; aut pro re, in qua offenditur, aliam rem, quae probatur; aut pro re hominem aut pro homine rem, ut ab eo, quod odit, ad id, quod diligit, auditoris animus traducatur; et dissimulare te id defensurum, quod existimeris; deinde, cum iam mi- tior factus erit auditor, ingredi pedetemptim in defen- sionem et dicere ea, quae indignentur adversarii, tibi quoque indigna videri; deinde, cum lenieris eum, qui audiet, demonstrare, nihil eorum ad te pertinere et ne- gare quicquam de adversariis esse dicturum, neque hoc neque illud, ut neque aperte laedas eos, qui diliguntur, et tamen id obscure faciens, quoad possis, alienes ab eis auditorum voluntatem; et aliquorum iudicium simili de re aut auctoritatem proferre imitatione dignam; deinde eandem aut consimilem aut maiorem aut minorem agi rem in praesenti demonstrare. 1.25. Sin oratio adversariorum fidem videbitur auditoribus fecisse—id quod ei, qui intellegit, quibus rebus fides fiat, facile erit cognitu— oportet aut de eo, quod adversarii firmissimum sibi pu- tarint et maxime ii, qui audient, probarint, primum te dicturum polliceri, aut ab adversarii dicto exordiri et ab eo potissimum, quod ille nuperrime dixerit, aut du- bitatione uti, quid primum dicas aut cui potissimum loco respondeas, cum admiratione. nam auditor cum eum, quem adversarii perturbatum putat oratione, vi- det animo firmissimo contra dicere paratum, plerum- que se potius temere assensisse quam illum sine causa confidere arbitratur. Sin auditoris studium defatigatio abalienavit a causa, te brevius, quam paratus fueris, esse dicturum commodum est polliceri; non imitaturum adversarium. sin res dabit, non inutile est ab aliqua re nova aut ridicula incipere aut ex tempore quae nata sit, quod genus strepitu, acclamatione; aut iam parata, quae vel apologum vel fabulam vel aliquam contineat inrisionem; aut si rei dignitas adimet iocandi facul- tatem, aliquid triste, novum, horribile statim non in- commodum est inicere. nam, ut cibi satietas et fasti- dium aut subamara aliqua re relevatur aut dulci miti- gatur, sic animus defessus audiendo aut admiratione integratur aut risu novatur. Ac separatim quidem, quae de principio et de insi- nuatione dicenda videbantur, haec fere sunt: nunc quiddam brevi communiter de utroque praecipiendum videtur. Exordium sententiarum et gravitatis plurimum debet habere et omnino omnia, quae pertinent ad dignitatem, in se continere, propterea quod id optime faciendum est, quod oratorem auditori maxime commendat; splendoris et festivitatis et concinnitudinis minimum, propterea quod ex his suspicio quaedam apparationis atque artificiosae diligentiae nascitur, quae maxime orationi fidem, oratori adimit auctoritatem. 1.27. Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expo- sitio. narrationum genera tria sunt: unum genus est, in quo ipsa causa et omnis ratio controversiae con- tinetur; alterum, in quo digressio aliqua extra causam aut criminationis aut similitudinis aut delectationis non alienae ab eo negotio, quo de agitur, aut amplificationis causa interponitur. tertium genus est remotum a civi- libus causis, quod delectationis causa non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur. eius partes sunt duae, quarum altera in negotiis, altera in personis maxime versatur. ea, quae in negotiorum expositione posita est, tres habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumen- tum. fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur, cuiusmodi est: Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota; quod genus: Appius indixit Cartha- giniensibus bellum. argumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit. huiusmodi apud Terentium: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis, Sosia illa autem narratio, quae versatur in personis, eiusmodi est, ut in ea simul cum rebus ipsis personarum sermones et animi perspici possint, hoc modo: Venit ad me saepe clam it ans: Quid agis, Micio? Cur perdis adulescentem nobis? cur amat? Cur potat? cur tu his rebus sumptum suggeris, Vestitu nimio indulges? nimium ineptus es. Nimium ipse est durus praeter aequumque et bonum. hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festivitas, confecta ex rerum varietate, animorum dissimilitudine, gravitate, lenitate, spe, metu, suspicione, desiderio, dissimulatione, errore, misericordia, fortunae commu- tatione, insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, iucundo exitu rerum. verum haec ex iis, quae postea de elocu- tione praecipientur, ornamenta sumentur. 1.28. Nunc de narratione ea, quae causae continet ex- positionem, dicendum videtur. oportet igitur eam tres habere res: ut brevis, ut aperta, ut probabilis sit. Brevis erit, si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur et non ab ultimo repetetur, et si, cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur—nam saepe satis est, quid factum sit, dicere, ut ne narres, quemadmo- dum sit factum—, et si non longius, quam quo opus est, in narrando procedetur, et si nullam in rem aliam transibitur; et si ita dicetur, ut nonnumquam ex eo, quod dictum est, id, quod non est dictum, intellegatur; et si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest nec adiuvat, praeteribitur; et si semel unum quicque dicetur; et si non ab eo, quo in proxime desi- tum erit, deinceps incipietur. ac multos imitatio brevi- tatis decipit, ut, cum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint; cum dent operam, ut res multas brevi dicant, non ut omnino paucas res dicant et non plures, quam ne- cesse sit. nam plerisque breviter videtur dicere, qui ita dicit: Accessi ad aedes. puerum vocavi. respondit. quaesivi dominum. domi negavit esse. hic, tametsi tot res brevius non potuit dicere, tamen, quia satis fuit dixisse: domi negavit esse, fit rerum multitudine longus. quare hoc quoque in genere vitanda est bre- vitatis imitatio et non minus rerum non necessaria- rum quam verborum multitudine supersedendum est. 1.29. Aperta autem narratio poterit esse, si, ut quidque primum gestum erit, ita primum exponetur, et rerum ac temporum ordo servabitur, ut ita narrentur, ut gestae res erunt aut ut potuisse geri videbuntur. hic erit considerandum, ne quid perturbate, ne quid con- torte dicatur, ne quam in aliam rem transeatur, ne ab ultimo repetatur, ne ad extremum prodeatur, ne quid, quod ad rem pertineat, praetereatur; et omnino, quae praecepta de brevitate sunt, hoc quoque in ge- nere sunt conservanda. nam saepe res parum est in- tellecta longitudine magis quam obscuritate narra- tionis. ac verbis quoque dilucidis utendum est; quo de genere dicendum est in praeceptis elocutionis. Pro- babilis erit narratio, si in ea videbuntur inesse ea, quae solent apparere in veritate; si personarum dignitates servabuntur; si causae factorum exstabunt; si fuisse facultates faciundi videbuntur; si tempus idoneum, si spatii satis, si locus opportunus ad eandem rem, qua de re narrabitur, fuisse ostendetur; si res et ad eorum, qui agent, naturam et ad vulgi morem et ad eorum, qui audient, opinionem accommodabitur. Ac veri quidem similis ex his rationibus esse poterit: 1.34. Confirmatio est, per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio. huius partis certa sunt praecepta, quae in singula causarum genera dividentur. verumtamen non incommodum videtur quandam silvam atque materiam universam ante permixtim et confuse exponere omnium argumentationum, post autem tradere, quemadmodum unum quodque causae genus hinc omnibus argumen- tandi rationibus tractis confirmari oporteat. Omnes res argumentando confirmantur aut ex eo, quod personis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis est adtributum. Ac personis has res adtributas putamus: nomen, na- turam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes. nomen est, quod uni cuique personae datur, quo suo quaeque proprio et certo vocabulo appellatur. naturam ipsam definire difficile est; 1.35. partes autem eius enumerare eas, quarum indigemus ad hanc praeceptionem, facilius est. eae autem partim divino, partim mortali in genere ver- santur. mortalium autem pars in hominum, pars in bestiarum genere numerantur. atque hominum genus et in sexu consideratur, virile an muliebre sit, et in natione, patria, cognatione, aetate. natione, Graius an barbarus; patria, Atheniensis an Lacedaemonius; co- gnatione, quibus maioribus, quibus consanguineis; aetate, puer an adulescens, natu grandior an senex. praeterea commoda et incommoda considerantur ab natura data animo aut corpori, hoc modo: valens an inbecillus, longus an brevis, formonsus an deformis, velox an tardus sit, acutus an hebetior, memor an obli- viosus, comis officiosus an infacetus, pudens, patiens an contra; et omnino quae a natura dantur animo et corpori considerabuntur et haec in natura conside- randa . nam quae industria comparantur, ad habitum pertinent, de quo posterius est dicendum. in victu con- siderare oportet, apud quem et quo more et cuius arbitratu sit educatus, quos habuerit artium liberalium magistros, quos vivendi praeceptores, quibus amicis utatur, quo in negotio, quaestu, artificio sit occupatus, quo modo rem familiarem administret, qua consuetu- dine domestica sit. in fortuna quaeritur, servus sit an liber, pecuniosus an tenuis, privatus an cum potestate: si cum potestate, iure an iniuria; felix, clarus an con- tra; quales liberos habeat. ac si de non vivo quaeretur, etiam quali morte sit affectus, erit considerandum. 1.36. habitum autem hunc appellamus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, ut virtutis aut artis alicuius perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam et item corporis aliquam commoditatem non natura datam, sed studio et industria partam. affectio est animi aut corporis ex tempore aliqua de causa commutatio, ut laetitia, cupiditas, metus, molestia, morbus, debilitas et alia, quae in eodem genere re- periuntur. studium est autem animi assidua et vehe- menter ad aliquam rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, ut philosophiae, poe+ticae, geometricae, lit- terarum. consilium est aliquid faciendi aut non fa- ciendi excogitata ratio. facta autem et casus et ora- tiones tribus ex temporibus considerabuntur: quid fecerit aut quid ipsi acciderit aut quid dixerit; aut quid faciat, quid ipsi accidat, quid dicat; aut quid fac- turus sit, quid ipsi casurum sit, qua sit usurus oratione. Ac personis quidem haec videntur esse adtributa: 1.37. negotiis autem quae sunt adtributa, partim sunt con- tinentia cum ipso negotio, partim in gestione negotii considerantur, partim adiuncta negotio sunt, partim negotium consequuntur. Continentia cum ipso negotio sunt ea, quae semper affixa esse videntur ad rem neque ab ea possunt se- parari. ex his prima est brevis conplexio totius neg- otii, quae summam continet facti, hoc modo: parentis occisio, patriae proditio; deinde causa eius summae, per quam et quam ob rem et cuius rei causa factum sit, quaeritur; deinde ante gestam rem quae facta sint continenter usque ad ipsum negotium; deinde, in ipso gerendo negotio quid actum sit; deinde, quid postea factum sit. 1.38. In gestione autem negotii, qui locus secundus erat de iis, quae negotiis adtributa sunt, quaeretur locus, tempus, modus, occasio, facultas. locus consideratur, in quo res gesta sit, ex opportunitate, quam videatur habuisse ad negotium administrandum. ea autem op- portunitas quaeritur ex magnitudine, intervallo, longin- quitate, propinquitate, solitudine, celebritate, natura ipsius loci et vicinitatis et totius regionis; ex his etiam attributionibus: sacer profanus, publicus anne privatus, alienus an ipsius, de quo agitur, locus sit aut fuerit. 1.39. tempus autem est—id quo nunc utimur, nam ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile est—pars quaedam aeternitatis cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni nocturnive spatii certa significatione. in hoc et quae praeterierint, considerantur: et eorum ipsorum, quae aut propter vetustatem obsoleverint aut incredi- bilia videantur, ut iam in fabularum numerum repo- tur; et quae iam diu gesta et a memoria nostra re- mota tamen faciant fidem vere tradita esse, quia eorum monumenta certa in litteris exstent; et quae nuper gesta sint, quae scire plerique possint; et item quae instent in praesentia et cum maxime fiant; et quae consequan- tur, in quibus potest considerari, quid ocius et quid serius futurum sit. et item communiter in tempore per- spiciendo longinquitas eius est consideranda. nam saepe oportet commetiri cum tempore negotium et vi- dere, potueritne aut magnitudo negotii aut multitudo rerum in eo transigi tempore. consideratur autem tem- pus et anni et mensis et diei et noctis et vigiliae et horae et in aliqua parte alicuius horum. 1.40. occasio au- tem est pars temporis habens in se alicuius rei idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem. quare cum tempore hoc differt: nam genere quidem utrumque idem esse intellegitur, verum in tempore spatium quo- dam modo declaratur, quod in annis aut in anno aut in aliqua anni parte spectatur, in occasione ad spatium temporis faciendi quaedam opportunitas intellegitur adiuncta. (quare cum genere idem sit, fit aliud, quod parte quadam et specie, ut diximus, differat.) haec distribuitur in tria genera: publicum, commune, sin- gulare. publicum est, quod civitas universa aliqua de causa frequentat, ut ludi, dies festus, bellum. commune, quod accidit omnibus eodem fere tempore, ut messis, vindemia, calor, frigus. singulare autem est, quod ali- qua de causa privatim alicui solet accidere, ut nup- 1.41. tiae, sacrificium, funus, convivium, somnus. modus autem est, in quo, quemadmodum et quo animo factum sit, quaeritur. eius partes sunt prudentia et inprudentia. prudentiae autem ratio quaeritur ex iis, quae clam, palam, vi, persuasione fecerit. inprudentia autem in purgationem confertur, cuius partes sunt inscientia, casus, necessitas, et in affectionem animi, hoc est molestiam, iracundiam, amorem et cetera, quae in simili genere versantur. facultates sunt, aut quibus fa- cilius fit aut sine quibus aliquid confici non potest. Adiunctum negotio autem id intellegitur, quod maius et quod minus et quod aeque magnum et quod simile erit ei negotio, quo de agitur, et quod contrarium et quod disparatum, et genus et pars et eventus. maius et minus et aeque magnum ex vi et ex numero et ex figura negotii, sicut ex statura corporis, consideratur. 1.42. simile autem ex specie conparabili aut ex conferunda at- que assimulanda natura iudicatur. contrarium est, quod positum in genere diverso ab eodem, cui contrarium di- citur, plurimum distat, ut frigus calori, vitae mors. disparatum autem est id, quod ab aliqua re praeposi- tione negationis separatur, hoc modo: sapere et non sapere. genus est, quod partes aliquas amplectitur, ut cupiditas. pars est, quae subest generi, ut amor, ava- ritia. eventus est exitus alicuius negotii, in quo quaeri solet, quid ex quaque re evenerit, eveniat, eventurum sit. quare hoc in genere, ut commode, quid eventurum sit, ante animo colligi possit, quid quaque ex re soleat evenire, considerandum est, hoc modo: ex arrogantia odium, ex insolentia arrogantia. 1.43. Quarta autem pars est ex iis rebus, quas negotiis dicebamus esse adtributas, consecutio. in hac eae res quaeruntur, quae gestum negotium consequuntur: pri- mum, quod factum est, quo id nomine appellari con- veniat; deinde eius facti qui sint principes et inven- tores, qui denique auctoritatis eius et inventionis com- probatores atque aemuli; deinde ecquae de ea re aut eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium; deinde natura eius, evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro; postea homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in iis consueverint; et cetera, quae factum aliquid similiter confestim aut ex inter- vallo solent consequi. deinde postremo adtendendum est, num quae res ex iis rebus, quae positae sunt in par- tibus honestatis aut utilitatis, consequantur; de quibus in deliberativo genere causae distinctius erit dicendum. Ac negotiis quidem fere res haec, quas commemora- vimus, sunt adtributae. 1.49. conparabile autem est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem continet. eius partes sunt tres: imago, conlatio, exemplum. imago est oratio demonstrans corporum aut naturarum simi- litudinem. conlatio est oratio rem cum re ex simili- tudine conferens. exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut in- firmat. horum exempla et descriptiones in praeceptis elocutionis cognoscentur. Ac fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura fere- bat, demonstratus est; quemadmodum autem quaeque constitutio et pars constitutionis et omnis contro- versia, sive in ratione sive in scripto versabitur, tractari debeat et quae in quamque argumentationes conve- niant, singillatim in secundo libro de uno quoque ge- nere dicemus. in praesentia tantummodo numeros et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permixtim dispersimus; post discripte et electe in genus quodque causae, quid cuique conveniat, ex hac copia digeremus. 1.51. Omnis igitur argumentatio aut per inductionem tractanda est aut per ratiocinationem. Inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, quicum instituta est; quibus assen- sionibus facit, ut illi dubia quaedam res propter si- militudinem earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur; velut apud Socraticum Aeschinen demonstrat Socrates cum Xenophontis uxore et cum ipso Xenophonte Aspa- siam locutam: dic mihi, quaeso, Xenophontis uxor, si vicina tua melius habeat aurum, quam tu habes, utrum illudne an tuum malis? illud, inquit. quid, si vestem et ceterum ornatum muliebrem pretii maioris habeat, quam tu habes, tuumne an illius malis? respondit: illius vero. age sis, inquit, quid? si virum illa me- liorem habeat, quam tu habes, utrumne tuum virum malis an illius? hic mulier erubuit. 1.52. Aspasia autem ser- monem cum ipso Xenophonte instituit. quaeso, inquit, Xenophon, si vicinus tuus equum meliorem habeat, quam tuus est, tuumne equum malis an illius? illius, inquit. quid, si fundum meliorem habeat, quam tu ha- bes, utrum tandem fundum habere malis? illum, in- quit, meliorem scilicet. quid, si uxorem meliorem ha- beat, quam tu habes, utrum tuamne an illius malis? atque hic Xenophon quoque ipse tacuit. post Aspasia: quoniam uterque vestrum, inquit, id mihi solum non respondit, quod ego solum audire volueram, egomet dicam, quid uterque cogitet. nam et tu, mulier, optumum virum vis habere et tu, Xenophon, uxorem habere lectissimam maxime vis. quare, nisi hoc per- feceritis, ut neque vir melior neque femina lectior in terris sit, profecto semper id, quod optumum putabitis esse, multo maxime requiretis, ut et tu maritus sis quam optumae et haec quam optimo viro nupta sit . hic cum rebus non dubiis assensum est, factum est propter similitudinem, ut etiam illud, quod dubium videretur, si qui separatim quaereret, id pro certo propter rationem rogandi concederetur. 1.53. hoc modo ser- monis plurimum Socrates usus est, propterea quod nihil ipse afferre ad persuadendum volebat, sed ex eo, quod sibi ille dederat, quicum disputabat, aliquid conficere malebat, quod ille ex eo, quod iam con- cessisset, necessario adprobare deberet. Hoc in genere praecipiendum nobis videtur primum, ut illud, quod inducimus per similitudinem, eiusmodi sit, ut sit necesse concedere. nam ex quo postulabimus nobis illud, quod dubium sit, concedi, dubium esse id ipsum non oportebit. deinde illud, cuius confirmandi causa fiet inductio, videndum est, ut simile iis rebus sit, quas res quasi non dubias ante induxerimus, nam aliquid ante concessum nobis esse nihil proderit, si ei dissimile erit id, cuius causa illud concedi primum voluerimus; deinde ne intellegat, quo spectent illae primae inductiones et ad quem sint exitum perven- 1.54. turae. nam qui videt, si ei rei, quam primo rogetur, recte assenserit, illam quoque rem, quae sibi displi- ceat, esse necessario concedendam, plerumque aut non respondendo aut male respondendo longius roga- tionem procedere non sinit; quare ratione rogationis inprudens ab eo, quod concessit, ad id, quod non vult concedere, deducendus est. extremum autem aut ta- ceatur oportet aut concedatur aut negetur. si negabitur, aut ostendenda similitudo est earum rerum, quae ante concessae sunt, aut alia utendum inductione. si con- cedetur, concludenda est argumentatio. si tacebitur, elicienda responsio est aut, quoniam taciturnitas imi- tatur confessionem, pro eo, ac si concessum sit, con- cludere oportebit argumentationem. ita fit hoc genus argumentandi tripertitum: prima pars ex similitudine constat una pluribusve; altera ex eo, quod concedi vo- lumus, cuius causa similitudines adhibitae sunt; tertia ex conclusione, quae aut confirmat concessionem aut quid ex ea conficiatur ostendit. 1.55. Sed quia non satis alicui videbitur dilucide demon- stratum, nisi quid ex civili causarum genere exempli subiecerimus, videtur eiusmodi quoque utendum ex- emplo, non quo praeceptio differat aut aliter hoc in sermone atque in dicendo sit utendum, sed ut eorum voluntati satis fiat, qui id, quod aliquo in loco viderunt, alio in loco, nisi monstratum est, nequeunt cognoscere. ergo in hac causa, quae apud Graecos est pervagata, cum Epaminondas, Thebanorum imperator, * quod ei, qui sibi ex lege praetor successerat, exercitum non tra- didit et, cum paucos ipse dies contra legem exercitum tenuisset, Lacedaemonios funditus vicit, poterit accusator argumentatione uti per inductionem, cum scrip- tum legis contra sententiam defendat, ad hunc modum: 1.56. si, iudices, id, quod Epaminondas ait legis scriptorem sensisse, adscribat ad legem et addat hanc ex- ceptionem: extra quam si quis rei publicae causa exercitum non tradiderit, patiemini? non opinor. quid, si vosmet ipsi, quod a vestra religione et a sa- pientia remotissimum est, istius honoris causa hanc eandem exceptionem iniussu populi ad legem adscribi iubeatis, populus Thebanus id patieturne fieri? pro- fecto non patietur. quod ergo adscribi ad legem nefas est, id sequi, quasi adscriptum sit, rectum vobis vi- deatur? novi vestram intellegentiam; non potest ita videri, iudices. quodsi litteris corrigi neque ab illo ne- que a vobis scriptoris voluntas potest, videte, ne multo indignius sit id re et iudicio vestro mutari, quod ne verbo quidem commutari potest. Ac de inductione quidem satis in praesentia dictum videtur. 1.57. nunc deinceps ratiocinationis vim et naturam consideremus. Ratiocinatio est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmet. hoc de genere qui diligentius con- siderandum putaverunt, cum idem in usu dicendi se- querentur, paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissense- runt. nam partim quinque eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres partes posse distribui putaverunt. eorum controversiam non incommodum vi- detur cum utrorumque ratione exponere. nam et brevis est et non eiusmodi, ut alteri prorsus nihil dicere pu- tentur, et locus hic nobis in dicendo minime neglegen- dus videtur. 1.58. Qui putant in quinque tribui partes oportere, aiunt primum convenire exponere summam argumentatio- nis, ad hunc modum: melius accurantur, quae con- silio geruntur, quam quae sine consilio administran- tur. hanc primam partem numerant; eam deinceps rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis adpro- bari putant oportere, hoc modo: domus ea, quae ra- tione regitur, omnibus est instructior rebus et appara- tior, quam ea, quae temere et nullo consilio admini- stratur. exercitus is, cui praepositus est sapiens et calli- dus imperator, omnibus partibus commodius regitur, quam is, qui stultitia et temeritate alicuius admini- stratur. eadem navigii ratio est. nam navis optime cur- sum conficit ea, quae scientissimo gubernatore utitur. 1.59. cum propositio sit hoc pacto adprobata et duae partes transierint ratiocinationis, tertia in parte aiunt, quod ostendere velis, id ex vi propositionis oportere assu- mere, hoc pacto: nihil autem omnium rerum melius, quam omnis mundus, administratur. huius assump- tionis quarto in loco aliam porro inducunt adproba- tionem, hoc modo: nam et signorum ortus et obitus definitum quendam ordinem servant et annuae commu- tationes non modo quadam ex necessitudine semper eodem modo fiunt, verum ad utilitates quoque rerum omnium sunt accommodatae, et diurnae nocturnaeque vicissitudines nulla in re umquam mutatae quicquam nocuerunt; quae signo sunt omnia non mediocri quo- dam consilio naturam mundi administrari. quinto in- ducunt loco conplexionem eam, quae aut id infert so- lum, quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur, hoc modo: consilio igitur mundus administratur; aut unum in locum cum conduxerit breviter propositionem et ad- sumptionem, adiungit, quid ex his conficiatur, ad hunc modum: quodsi melius geruntur ea, quae consilio, quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius administratur, quam omnis mun- dus, consilio igitur mundus administratur. quinque- pertitam igitur hoc pacto putant esse argumentationem. 1.60. Qui autem tripertitam putant esse, ii non aliter tractari putant oportere argumentationem, sed parti- tionem horum reprehendunt. negant enim neque a pro- positione neque ab adsumptione adprobationes earum separari oportere, neque propositionem absolutam ne- que adsumptionem sibi perfectam videri, quae appro- batione confirmata non sit. quare quas illi duas partes numerent, propositionem et adprobationem, sibi unam partem videri, propositionem; quae si adprobata non sit, propositio non sit argumentationis. item, quae ab illis adsumptio et adsumptionis adprobatio dicatur, eandem sibi adsumptionem solam videri. ita fit, ut eadem ratione argumentatio tractata aliis tripertita, aliis quinquepertita videatur. quare evenit, ut res non tam ad usum dicendi pertineat quam ad rationem praeceptionis. 1.61. Nobis autem commodior illa partitio videatur esse, quae in quinque partes tributa est, quam omnes ab Aristotele et Theophrasto profecti maxime secuti sunt. nam quemadmodum illud superius genus argumen- tandi, quod per inductionem sumitur, maxime Socrates et Socratici tractarunt, sic hoc, quod per ratiocina- tionem expolitur, summe est ab Aristotele atque a Peri- pateticis et Theophrasto frequentatum, deinde a rhetoribus iis, qui elegantissimi atque artificiosis- simi putati sunt. quare autem nobis illa magis partitio probetur, dicendum videtur, ne temere secuti putemur; et breviter dicendum, ne in huiusmodi rebus diutius, quam ratio praecipiendi postulat, commoremur. 1.62. Si quadam in argumentatione satis est uti pro- positione et non oportet adiungere adprobationem pro- positionis, quadam autem in argumentatione infirma est propositio, nisi adiuncta sit adprobatio, separatum est quiddam a propositione adprobatio. quod enim et adiungi et separari ab aliquo potest, id non potest idem esse, quod est id, ad quod adiungitur et a quo separatur; est autem quaedam argumentatio, in qua propositio non indiget approbationis, et quaedam, in qua nihil valet sine approbatione, ut ostendemus. sepa- rata igitur est a propositione approbatio. Ostendetur autem id, quod polliciti sumus, hoc modo: quae propo- sitio in se quiddam continet perspicuum et quod stare inter omnes necesse est, hanc velle approbare et firmare nihil attinet. ea est huiusmodi: 1.63. si, quo die ista caedes Romae facta est, ego Athenis eo die fui, in caede in- teresse non potui. hoc quia perspicue verum est, nihil attinet approbari. quare assumi statim oportet, hoc modo: fui autem Athenis eo die. hoc si non constat, indiget approbationis; qua inducta complexio conse- quitur. est igitur quaedam propositio, quae non indiget approbatione. nam esse quidem quandam, quae indi- geat, quid attinet ostendere, quod cuivis facile perspi- cuum est? quodsi ita est, ex hoc et ex eo, quod propo- sueramus, hoc conficitur, separatum esse quiddam a propositione approbationem. sin autem ita est, falsum est non esse plus quam tripertitam argumentationem. 1.64. Simili modo liquet alteram quoque approbationem separatam esse ab assumptione. si quadam in argu- mentatione satis est uti assumptione et non oportet adiungere approbationem assumptioni, quadam autem in argumentatione infirma est assumptio, nisi adiuncta sit approbatio, separatum quiddam est extra assump- tionem approbatio. est autem argumentatio quaedam, in qua assumptio non indiget approbationis, quaedam autem, in qua nihil valet sine approbatione, ut osten- demus. separata igitur est ab adsumptione approbatio. 1.65. Ostendemus autem, quod polliciti sumus, hoc modo: quae perspicuam omnibus veritatem continet assump- tio, nihil indiget approbationis. ea est huiusmodi: si oportet velle sapere, dare operam philosophiae con- venit. hic propositio indiget approbationis; non enim perspicua est neque constat inter omnes, propterea quod multi nihil prodesse philosophiam, plerique etiam obesse arbitrantur; assumptio perspicua; est enim haec: oportet autem velle sapere. hoc quia ipsum ex se perspicitur et verum esse intellegitur, nihil attinet approbari. quare statim concludenda est argumentatio. est ergo assumptio quaedam, quae approbationis non indiget; nam quandam indigere perspicuum est. se- parata est igitur ab adsumptione approbatio. falsum ergo est non esse plus quam tripertitam argumenta- 1.66. tionem. Atque ex his illud iam perspicuum est, esse quandam argumentationem, in qua neque propositio neque assumptio indigeat approbationis, huiusmodi, ut certum quiddam et breve exempli causa ponamus: si summopere sapientia petenda est, summo opere stul- titia vitanda est: summo autem opere sapientia pe- tenda est: summo igitur opere stultitia vitanda est. hic et propositio et assumptio perspicua est; quare neutra quoque indiget approbatione. ex hisce om- nibus illud perspicuum est approbationem tum adiungi, tum non adiungi. ex quo cognoscitur neque in pro- positione neque in assumptione contineri approba- tionem, sed utramque suo loco positam vim suam tam- quam certam et propriam obtinere. quodsi ita est, commode partiti sunt illi, qui in quinque partes tri- buerunt argumentationem. 1.67. Quinque igitur partes sunt eius argumentationis, quae per ratiocinationem tractatur: propositio, per quam locus is breviter exponitur, ex quo vis omnis oportet emanet ratiocinationis; approbatio, per quam id, quod breviter expositum est, rationibus adfirmatum probabilius et apertius fit; assumptio, per quam id, quod ex propositione ad ostendendum pertinet, assumi- tur; assumptionis approbatio, per quam id, quod assumptum est, rationibus firmatur; complexio, per quam id, quod conficitur ex omni argumentatione, bre- viter exponitur. quae plurimas habet argumentatio partes, ea constat ex his quinque partibus; secunda est quadripertita; tertia tripertita; dein bipertita; quod in controversia est. 1.68. de una quoque parte potest alicui videri posse consistere. eorum igitur, quae constant, exempla ponemus, horum, quae dubia sunt, rationes afferemus. Quinquepertita argumentatio est huiusmodi: “omnes leges, iudices, ad commodum rei publicae re- ferre oportet et eas ex utilitate communi, non ex scrip- tione, quae in litteris est, interpretari. ea enim virtute et sapientia maiores nostri fuerunt, ut in legibus scriben- dis nihil sibi aliud nisi salutem atque utilitatem rei publicae proponerent. neque enim ipsi, quod obesset, scribere volebant, et, si scripsissent, cum esset intellec- tum, repudiatum iri legem intellegebant. nemo enim leges legum causa salvas esse vult, sed rei publicae, quod ex legibus omnes rem publicam optime putant administrari. quam ob rem igitur leges servari oportet, ad eam causam scripta omnia interpretari convenit: hoc est, quoniam rei publicae servimus, ex rei publicae com- modo atque utilitate interpretemur. nam ut ex medicina nihil oportet putare proficisci, nisi quod ad corporis utilitatem spectet, quoniam eius causa est instituta, sic a legibus nihil convenit arbitrari, nisi quod rei publicae conducat, proficisci, quoniam eius causa sunt compara- 1.69. tae. ergo in hoc quoque iudicio desinite litteras legis perscrutari et legem, ut aequum est, ex utilitate rei publicae considerate. quid magis utile fuit Thebanis quam Lacedaemonios opprimi? cui magis Epaminon- dam, Thebanorum imperatorem, quam victoriae The- banorum consulere decuit? quid hunc tanta Thebano- rum gloria, tam claro atque exornato tropaeo carius aut antiquius habere convenit? scripto videlicet legis omisso scriptoris sententiam considerare debebat. at hoc quidem satis consideratum est, nullam esse legem nisi rei publicae causa scriptam. summam igitur amen- tiam esse existimabat, quod scriptum esset rei publicae salutis causa, id non ex rei publicae salute interpretari. quodsi leges omnes ad utilitatem rei publicae referri convenit, hic autem saluti rei publicae profuit, profecto non potest eodem facto et communibus fortunis con- suluisse et legibus non optemperasse.” 1.70. Quattuor autem partibus constat argumentatio, cum aut proponimus aut assumimus sine approbatione. id facere oportet, cum aut propositio ex se intellegitur aut assumptio perspicua est et nullius approbationis indiget. propositionis approbatione praeterita quattuor ex partibus argumentatio tractatur, ad hunc modum: iudices, qui ex lege iurati iudicatis, legibus optempe- rare debetis. optemperare autem legibus non potestis, nisi id, quod scriptum est in lege, sequimini. quod enim certius legis scriptor testimonium voluntatis suae re- linquere potuit, quam quod ipse magna cum cura atque diligentia scripsit? quodsi litterae non exstarent, magnopere eas requireremus, ut ex iis scriptoris vo- luntas cognosceretur; nec tamen Epaminondae per- mitteremus, ne si extra iudicium quidem esset, ut is nobis sententiam legis interpretaretur, nedum nunc istum patiamur, cum praesto lex sit, non ex eo, quod apertissime scriptum est, sed ex eo, quod suae causae convenit, scriptoris voluntatem interpretari. quodsi vos, iudices, legibus optemperare debetis et id facere non potestis, nisi id, quod scriptum est in lege, sequa- mini, quin istum contra legem fecisse iudicatis? 1.71. assumptionis autem approbatione praeterita quadri- pertita sic fiet argumentatio: qui saepenumero nos per fidem fefellerunt, eorum orationi fidem habere non debemus. si quid enim perfidia illorum detrimenti acceperimus, nemo erit praeter nosmet ipsos, quem iure accusare possimus. ac primo quidem decipi in- commodum est; iterum, stultum; tertio, turpe. Cartha- ginienses autem persaepe iam nos fefellerunt. summa igitur amentia est in eorum fide spem habere, quorum perfidia totiens deceptus sis. 1.72. Utraque approbatione praeterita tripertita fit, hoc pacto: aut metuamus Carthaginienses oportet, si incolumes eos reliquerimus, aut eorum urbem diruamus. at metuere quidem non oportet. restat igitur, ut urbem diruamus. Sunt autem, qui putant nonnumquam posse com- plexione supersederi, cum id perspicuum sit, quod conficiatur ex ratiocinatione; quod si fiat, bipertitam quoque fieri argumentationem, hoc modo: si peperit, virgo non est: peperit autem. hic satis esse proponere et adsumere: quod conficiatur quoniam perspicuum sit, complexionis rem non indigere. nobis autem vi- detur et omnis ratiocinatio concludenda esse et illud vitium, quod illis displicet, magnopere vitandum, ne, quod perspicuum sit, id in complexionem inferamus. 1.73. hoc autem fieri poterit, si complexionum genera intelle- gentur. nam aut ita complectemur, ut in unum con- ducamus propositionem et assumptionem, hoc modo: quodsi leges omnes ad utilitatem rei publicae referri convenit, hic autem saluti rei publicae profuit, pro- fecto non potest eodem facto et saluti communi con- suluisse et legibus non optemperasse; aut ita, ut ex contrario sententia conficiatur, hoc modo: summa igitur amentia est in eorum fide spem habere, quorum perfidia totiens deceptus sis; aut ita, ut id solum, quod conficitur, inferatur, ad hunc modum: urbem igitur diruamus; aut, ut id, quod eam rem, quae con- ficitur, sequatur necesse est. id est huiusmodi: si peperit, cum viro concubuit: peperit autem. conficitur hoc: concubuit igitur cum viro. hoc si nolis inferre et inferas id, quod sequitur: fecit igitur incestum, et concluseris argumentationem et perspicuam fugeris complexionem. 1.74. quare in longis argumentationibus ex conductionibus aut ex contrario complecti oportet, in brevibus id solum, quod conficitur, exponere, in iis, in quibus exitus perspicuus est, consecutione uti. Si qui autem ex una quoque parte putabunt constare argumentationem, poterunt dicere saepe satis esse hoc modo argumentationem facere: quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit; nam hoc nullius neque approbationis neque complexionis indigere. sed nobis ambiguitate nominis videntur errare. nam argumentatio nomine uno res duas significat, ideo quod et inventum ali- quam in rem probabile aut necessarium argumentatio vocatur et eius inventi artificiosa expolitio. 1.75. cum igitur proferent aliquid huiusmodi: quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit, inventum proferent, non expolitionem; nos autem de expolitionis partibus loquimur. Nihil igitur ad hanc rem ratio illa pertinebit; atque hac distinctione alia quoque, quae videbuntur officere huic partitioni, propulsabimus, si quis aut assumptio- nem aliquando tolli posse putet aut propositionem. quae si quid habet probabile aut necessarium, quoquo modo commoveat auditorem necesse est. quod si so- lum spectaretur ac nihil, quo pacto tractaretur id, quod esset excogitatum, referret, nequaquam tantum inter summos oratores et mediocres interesse existi- 1.76. maretur. variare autem orationem magnopere oporte- bit; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo mater est satietatis. id fieri poterit, si non similiter semper ingre- diamur in argumentationem. nam primum omnium generibus ipsis distinguere convenit, hoc est, tum in- ductione uti, tum ratiocinatione, deinde in ipsa ar- gumentatione non semper a propositione incipere nec semper quinque partibus abuti neque eadem partes ratione expolire, sed tum ab assumptione incipere, tum adprobatione alterutra, tum utraque, tum hoc, tum illo genere conplexionis uti. id ut perspiciatur, scribamus * in quolibet exemplo de iis, quae proposita sunt, hoc idem exerceamus, ut quam facile factu sit, periclitari licet. 1.77. Ac de partibus quidem argumentationis satis nobis dictum videtur: illud autem volumus intellegi nos probe tenere aliis quoque rationibus tractari argumen- tationes in philosophia multis et obscuris, de quibus certum est artificium constitutum. verum illa nobis abhorrere ab usu oratorio visa sunt. quae pertinere autem ad dicendum putamus, ea nos commodius quam ceteros adtendisse non affirmamus; perquisitius et diligentius conscripsisse pollicemur. nunc, ut statui- mus, proficisci ordine ad reliqua pergemus. 1.96. Quartus modus erat reprehensionis, per quem contra firmam argumentationem aeque firma aut firmior po- nitur. hoc genus in deliberationibus maxime versa- bitur, cum aliquid, quod contra dicatur, aequum esse concedimus, sed id, quod nos defendimus, necessarium esse demonstramus; aut cum id, quod illi defendant, utile esse fateamur, quod nos dicamus, honestum esse demonstremus. Ac de reprehensione haec quidem existimavimus esse dicenda. deinceps nunc de conclusione ponemus. 1.100. res autem inducetur, si alicui rei huiusmodi, legi, loco, urbi, mo- numento oratio attribuetur per enumerationem, hoc modo: quid? si leges loqui possent, nonne haec apud vos quererentur: quidnam amplius desideratis, iudi- ces, cum vobis hoc et hoc planum factum sit? in hoc quoque genere omnibus isdem modis uti licebit. com- mune autem praeceptum hoc datur ad enumerationem, ut ex una quaque argumentatione, quoniam tota iterum dici non potest, id eligatur, quod erit gravissimum, et unum quidque quam brevissime transeatur, ut me- moria, non oratio renovata videatur. Indignatio est oratio, per quam conficitur, ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur. in hoc genere illud primum in- tellegi volumus, posse omnibus ex locis iis, quos in confirmandi praeceptione posuimus, tractari indigna- tionem. nam ex iis rebus, quae personis aut quae negotiis sunt attributae, quaevis amplificationes et indignationes nasci possunt, sed tamen ea, quae se- paratim de indignatione praecipi possunt, considere- 2.32. Ac personis quidem res hae sunt adtributae, ex qui- bus omnibus unum in locum coactis accusatoris erit inprobatione hominis uti. nam causa facti parum fir- mitudinis habet, nisi animus eius, qui insimulatur, in eam suspicionem adducitur, uti a tali culpa non videa- tur abhorruisse. ut enim animum alicuius inprobare nihil attinet, cum causa, quare peccaret, non intercessit, sic causam peccati intercedere leve est, si animus nulli minus honestae rationi affinis ostenditur. quare vitam eius, quem arguit, ex ante factis accusator inprobare debebit et ostendere, si quo in pari ante peccato con- victus sit; si id non poterit, si quam in similem ante suspicionem venerit, ac maxime, si fieri poterit, simili quo in genere eiusdemmodi causa aliqua commotum peccasse aut in aeque magna re aut in maiore aut in minore, ut si qui, quem pecunia dicat inductum fecisse, possit demonstrare aliqua in re eius aliquod factum avarum. 2.33. item in omni causa naturam aut victum aut studium aut fortunam aut aliquid eorum, quae personis adtributa sunt, ad eam causam, qua commotum pec- casse dicet, adiungere atque ex dispari quoque genere culparum, si ex pari sumendi facultas non erit, inpro- bare animum adversarii oportebit: si avaritia inductum arguas fecisse et avarum eum, quem accuses, demon- strare non possis, aliis adfinem vitiis esse doceas, et ex ea re non esse mirandum, qui in illa re turpis aut cupidus aut petulans fuerit, hac quoque in re eum deliquisse. quantum enim de honestate et auctoritate eius, qui arguitur, detractum est, tantundem de facul- 2.34. tate eius totius est defensionis deminutum. si nulli affinis poterit vitio reus ante admisso demonstrari, locus inducetur ille, per quem hortandi iudices erunt, ut veterem famam hominis nihil ad rem putent per- tinere. nam eum ante celasse, nunc manifesto teneri; quare non oportere hanc rem ex superiore vita spec- tari, sed superiorem vitam ex hac re inprobari, et aut potestatem ante peccandi non fuisse aut causam; aut, si haec dici non poterunt, dicendum erit illud extremum, non esse mirum, si nunc primum deliquerit: nam necesse esse eum, qui velit peccare, aliquando primum delinquere. sin vita ante acta ignorabitur, hoc loco praeterito et, cur praetereatur, demonstrato argu- mentis accusationem statim confirmare oportebit. 2.116. In scripto versatur controversia, cum ex scriptio- nis ratione aliquid dubii nascitur. id fit ex ambiguo, ex scripto et sententia, ex contrariis legibus, ex ratio- cinatione, ex definitione. Ex ambiguo autem nascitur controversia, cum, quid senserit scriptor, obscurum est, quod scriptum duas pluresve res significat, ad hunc modum: paterfami- lias, cum filium heredem faceret, vasorum argenteo- rum centum pondo uxori suae sic legavit: heres meus uxori meae vasorum argenteorum pondo cen- tum, quae volet, dato . post mortem eius vasa ma- gnifica et pretiose caelata petit a filio mater. ille se, quae ipse vellet, debere dicit. primum, si fieri poterit, demonstrandum est non esse ambigue scrip- tum, propterea quod omnes in consuetudine sermo- nis sic uti solent eo verbo uno pluribusve in eam sen- tentiam, in quam is, qui dicet, accipiendum esse demon- 2.117. strabit. deinde ex superiore et ex inferiore scriptura docendum id, quod quaeratur, fieri perspicuum. quare si ipsa separatim ex se verba considerentur, omnia aut pleraque ambigua visum iri; quae autem ex omni considerata scriptura perspicua fiant, haec ambigua non oportere existimare. deinde, qua in sententia scriptor fuerit, ex ceteris eius scriptis et ex factis, dic- tis, animo atque vita eius sumi oportebit et eam ipsam scripturam, in qua inerit illud ambiguum, de quo quae- retur, totam omnibus ex partibus pertemptare, si quid aut ad id appositum sit, quod nos interpretemur, aut ei, quod adversarius intellegat, adversetur. nam facile, quid veri simile sit eum voluisse, qui scripsit, ex omni scriptura et ex persona scriptoris atque iis rebus, quae personis attributae sunt, considerabitur. 2.118. deinde erit demonstrandum, si quid ex re ipsa dabitur facultatis, id, quod adversarius intellegat, multo minus commode fieri posse, quam id, quod nos accipimus, quod illius rei neque administratio neque exitus ullus exstet; nos quod dicamus, facile et commode transigi posse; ut in hac lege—nihil enim prohibet fictam exempli loco ponere, quo facilius res intellegatur—: meretrix coronam auream ne habeto; si habuerit, publica esto, contra eum, qui meretricem publicari dicat ex lege oportere, possit dici neque administrationem esse ullam publicae meretricis neque exitum legis in mere- trice publicanda, at in auro publicando et admini- strationem et exitum facilem esse et incommodi nihil inesse. 2.119. ac diligenter illud quoque adtendere oportebit, num illo probato, quod adversarius intellegat, res uti- lior aut honestior aut magis necessaria ab scriptore neglecta videatur. id fiet, si id, quod nos demon- strabimus, honestum aut utile aut necessarium demon- strabimus, et si id, quod ab adversariis dicetur, minime eiusmodi esse dicemus. deinde si in lege erit ex amb- iguo controversia, dare operam oportebit, ut de eo, quod adversarius intellegat, alia in re lege cautum esse doceatur. 2.120. permultum autem proficiet illud demon- strare, quemadmodum scripsisset, si id, quod adver- sarius accipiat, fieri aut intellegi voluisset, ut in hac causa, in qua de vasis argenteis quaeritur, possit mulier dicere nihil adtinuisse adscribi quae volet, si heredis voluntati permitteret. eo enim non adscripto nihil esse dubitationis, quin heres, quae ipse vellet, daret. amentiae igitur fuisse, cum heredi vellet cavere, id adscribere, quo non adscripto nihilominus heredi caveretur. 2.121. quare hoc genere magnopere talibus in causis uti oportebit: hoc modo scripsisset, isto verbo usus non esset, non isto loco verbum istud con- locasset. nam ex his sententia scriptoris maxime perspicitur. deinde quo tempore scriptum sit, quaeren- dum est, ut, quid eum voluisse in eiusmodi tempore veri simile sit, intellegatur. post ex deliberationis partibus, quid utilius et quid honestius et illi ad scri- bendum et his ad conprobandum sit, demonstrandum; et ex his, si quid amplificationis dabitur, communi- bus utrimque locis uti oportebit. Ex scripto et sententia controversia consistit, cum alter verbis ipsis, quae scripta sunt, utitur, alter ad id, quod scriptorem sensisse dicet, omnem adiungit dictionem. 2.146. poena adiciatur aut in utra maior poena statuatur; nam maxime conservanda est ea, quae diligentissime sancta est; deinde, utra lex iubeat, utra vetet; nam saepe ea, quae vetat, quasi exceptione quadam corrigere videatur illam, quae iubet; deinde, utra lex de genere omni, utra de parte quadam; utra communiter in plures, utra in aliquam certam rem scripta videatur; nam quae in partem aliquam et quae in certam quandam rem scripta est, propius ad causam accedere videtur et ad iudicium magis pertinere; de- inde, ex lege utrum statim fieri necesse sit, utrum habeat aliquam moram et sustentationem; 2.156. nam placet in iudiciali genere finem esse aequitatem, hoc est partem quandam honestatis. in deliberativo autem Aristoteli placet utilitatem, nobis et honestatem et utilitatem, in demonstrativo honestatem. quare in hoc quoque genere causae quaedam argumentationes communiter ac similiter tractabuntur, quaedam separatius ad finem, quo referri omnem orationem oportet, adiungentur. atque unius cuiusque constitutionis exemplum subponere non gra- varemur, nisi illud videremus, quemadmodum res obscurae dicendo fierent apertiores, sic res apertas obscuriores fieri oratione. Nunc ad deliberationis praecepta pergamus. 2.157. Rerum expetendarum tria genera sunt; par autem numerus vitandarum ex contraria parte. nam est quiddam, quod sua vi nos adliciat ad sese, non emo- lumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate, quod genus virtus, scientia, veritas. est aliud autem non propter suam vim et naturam, sed propter fruc- tum atque utilitatem petendum; quod genus pecunia est. est porro quiddam ex horum partibus iunctum, quod et sua vi et dignitate nos inlectos ducit et prae se quandam gerit utilitatem, quo magis expetatur, ut amicitia, bona existimatio. 2.158. atque ex his horum contraria facile tacentibus nobis intellegentur. sed ut expeditius ratio tradatur, ea, quae posuimus, brevi nominabuntur. nam, in primo genere quae sunt, ho- nesta appellabuntur; quae autem in secundo, utilia. haec autem tertia, quia partem honestatis continent et quia maior est vis honestatis, iuncta esse omnino et duplici genere intelleguntur, sed in meliorem partem vocabuli conferantur et honesta nominentur. ex his illud conficitur, ut petendarum rerum partes sint ho- nestas et utilitas, vitandarum turpitudo et inutilitas. his igitur duabus rebus res duae grandes sunt adtri- butae, necessitudo et affectio; quarum altera ex vi, altera ex re et personis consideratur. de utraque post apertius perscribemus; nunc honestatis rationes pri- mum explicemus. 2.159. Quod aut totum aut aliqua ex parte propter se pe- titur, honestum nominabimus. quare, cum eius duae partes sint, quarum altera simplex, altera iuncta sit, simplicem prius consideremus. est igitur in eo genere omnes res una vi atque uno nomine amplexa virtus. nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus. quamobrem omnibus eius par- tibus cognitis tota vis erit simplicis honestatis con- siderata. habet igitur partes quattuor: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. 2.160. Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutra- rumque scientia. partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa, quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit, quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est. Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate con- servata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in con- suetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit. 2.161. naturae ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, ob- servantiam, veritatem. religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeri- moniamque affert; pietas, per quam sanguine con- iunctis patriaeque benivolum officium et diligens tri- buitur cultus; gratia, in qua amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria et remunerandi voluntas continetur; vindicatio, per quam vis aut iniuria et omnino omne, quod obfuturum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo pro- pulsatur; observantia, per quam homines aliqua digni- tate antecedentes cultu quodam et honore digtur; 2.162. veritas, per quam inmutata ea, quae sunt ante aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur. consuetudine ius est, quod aut leviter a natura tractum aluit et maius fecit usus, ut religionem, aut si quid eorum, quae ante diximus, ab natura profectum maius factum propter consuetudinem videmus, aut quod in morem vetustas vulgi adprobatione perduxit; quod genus pac- tum est, par, iudicatum. pactum est, quod inter ali- quos convenit; par, quod in omnes aequabile est; iudicatum, de quo alicuius aut aliquorum iam senten- tiis constitutum est. lege ius est, quod in eo scripto, quod populo expositum est, ut observet, continetur. 2.163. Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. eius partes magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia. magnificentia est rerum ma- gnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio; fidentia est, per quam magnis et honestis in rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae certa cum spe con- locavit; patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio; perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. 2.164. Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata domina- tio. eius partes continentia, clementia, modestia. con- tinentia est, per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur; clementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius * iniectionis concitati comitate retinentur; modestia, per quam pudor honesti curam et stabilem comparat auctoritatem. atque haec omnia propter se solum, ut nihil adiungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt. quod ut demonstretur, neque ad hoc nostrum institutum pertinet et a brevitate praecipiendi remo- 2.165. tum est. propter se autem vitanda sunt non ea modo, quae his contraria sunt, ut fortitudini ignavia et iustitiae iniustitia, verum etiam illa, quae propinqua videntur et finitima esse, absunt autem longissume; quod genus fidentiae contrarium est diffidentia et ea re vitium est; audacia non contrarium, sed appositum est ac propinquum et tamen vitium est. sic uni cuique virtuti finitimum vitium reperietur, aut certo iam no- mine appellatum, ut audacia, quae fidentiae, pertinacia, quae perseverantiae finitima est, superstitio, quae re- ligioni propinqua est, aut sine ullo certo nomine. quae omnia item uti contraria rerum bonarum in re- bus vitandis reponentur. Ac de eo quidem genere honestatis, quod omni ex parte propter se petitur, satis dictum est. 2.166. nunc de eo, in quo utilitas quoque adiungitur, quod tamen honestum vocamus, dicendum videtur. sunt igitur multa, quae nos cum dignitate tum quoque fructu suo ducunt; quo in genere est gloria, dignitas, ampli- tudo, amicitia. gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude; dignitas est alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas; ampli- tudo potentiae aut maiestatis aut aliquarum copiarum magna abundantia; amicitia voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa, quem diligit, cum eius pari voluntate. 2.167. hic, quia de civilibus causis lo- quimur, fructus ad amicitiam adiungimus, ut eorum quoque causa petenda videatur, ne forte, qui nos de omni amicitia dicere existimant, reprehendere inci- piant. quamquam sunt qui propter utilitatem modo petendam putant amicitiam; sunt qui propter se so- lum; sunt qui propter se et utilitatem. quorum quid verissime constituatur, alius locus erit considerandi. nunc hoc sic ad usum oratorium relinquatur, utram- 2.168. que propter rem amicitiam esse expetendam. ami- citiarum autem ratio, quoniam partim sunt religioni- bus iunctae, partim non sunt, et quia partim veteres sunt, partim novae, partim ab illorum, partim ab nostro beneficio profectae, partim utiliores, partim minus utiles, ex causarum dignitatibus, ex temporum opportunitatibus, ex officiis, ex religionibus, ex vetu- statibus habebitur. Utilitas autem aut in corpore posita est aut in extrariis rebus; quarum tamen rerum multo maxima pars ad corporis commodum revertitur, ut in re pu- blica quaedam sunt, quae, ut sic dicam, ad corpus pertinent civitatis, ut agri, portus, pecunia, classis, nautae, milites, socii, quibus rebus incolumitatem ac libertatem retinent civitates, aliae vero, quae iam quid- dam magis amplum et minus necessarium conficiunt, ut urbis egregia exornatio atque amplitudo, ut quae- dam excellens pecuniae magnitudo, amicitiarum ac societatum multitudo. 2.169. quibus rebus non illud solum conficitur, ut salvae et incolumes, verum etiam, ut amplae atque potentes sint civitates. quare utilitatis duae partes videntur esse, incolumitas et potentia. in- columitas est salutis rata atque integra conservatio; potentia est ad sua conservanda et alterius adtenuanda idonearum rerum facultas. atque in iis omnibus, quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit, oportet considerare. facile id dicemus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri, quod, quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longin- quitatis indiget atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen his suscep- tis difficultatibus confieri atque ad exitum perduci potest. 2.170. Quoniam ergo de honestate et de utilitate dixi- mus, nunc restat, ut de iis rebus, quas his adtributas esse dicebamus, necessitudine et affectione, perscriba- mus. puto igitur esse hanc necessitudinem, cui nulla vi resisti potest, quo ea setius id, quod facere pot- est, perficiat, quae neque mutari neque leniri potest. atque, ut apertius hoc sit, exemplo licet vim rei, qualis et quanta sit, cognoscamus. uri posse flamma ligneam materiam necesse est. corpus animal mortale aliquo tempore interire necesse est; atque ita necesse, ut vis postulat ea, quam modo describebamus, ne- cessitudinis. huiusmodi necessitudines cum in di- cendi rationes incident, recte necessitudines appella- buntur; 2.171. sin aliquae res accident difficiles, in illa su- periore, possitne fieri, quaestione considerabimus. at- que etiam hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adiunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et ab- solutas. nam aliter dicere solemus: necesse est Casilinenses se dedere Hannibali; aliter autem: ne- cesse est Casilinum venire in Hannibalis potestatem. illic, in superiore, adiunctio est haec: nisi si malunt fame perire; si enim id malunt, non est necesse; hoc inferius non item, propterea quod, sive velint Casili- nenses se dedere sive famem perpeti atque ita perire, necesse est Casilinum venire in Hannibalis potestatem. quid igitur haec perficere potest necessitudinis distri- butio? prope dicam plurimum, cum locus necessi- tudinis videbitur incurrere. nam cum simplex erit necessitudo, 2.172. nihil erit quod multa dicamus, cum eam nulla ratione lenire possimus; cum autem ita necesse erit, si aliquid effugere aut adipisci velimus, tum adiunctio illa quid habeat utilitatis aut quid honestatis, erit considerandum. nam si velis attendere, ita tamen, ut id quaeras, quod conveniat ad usum civitatis, re- perias nullam esse rem, quam facere necesse sit, nisi propter aliquam causam, quam adiunctionem nomi- namus; pariter autem esse multas res necessitatis, ad quas similis adiunctio non accedit; quod genus ut homines mortales necesse est interire, sine ad- iunctione; ut cibo utantur, non necesse est nisi cum illa exceptione extra quam si nolint fame perire. 2.173. ergo, ut dico, illud, quod adiungitur, semper, cuius- modi sit, erit considerandum. nam omni tempore id pertinebit, ut aut ad honestatem hoc modo expo- nenda necessitudo sit: necesse est, si honeste volu- mus vivere; aut ad incolumitatem, hoc modo: ne- cesse est, si incolumes volumus esse; aut ad commoditatem, hoc modo: necesse est, si sine incommodo volumus vivere. ac summa quidem necessitudo vi- detur esse honestatis; huic proxima incolumitatis; 2.174. tertia ac levissima commoditatis; quae cum his num- quam poterit duabus contendere. hasce autem inter se saepe necesse est comparari, ut, quamquam praestet honestas incolumitati, tamen, utri potissimum consu- lendum sit, deliberetur. cuius rei certum quoddam praescriptum videtur in perpetuum dari posse. nam, qua in re fieri poterit, ut, cum incolumitati consulueri- mus, quod sit in praesentia de honestate delibatum, virtute aliquando et industria recuperetur, incolumita- tis ratio videbitur habenda; cum autem id non poterit, honestatis. ita in huiusmodi quoque re, cum inco- lumitati videbimur consulere, vere poterimus dicere nos honestatis rationem habere, quoniam sine inco- lumitate eam nullo tempore possumus adipisci. qua in re vel concedere alteri vel ad condicionem alterius descendere vel in praesentia quiescere atque aliud tem- 2.175. pus exspectare oportebit, modo illud adtendatur, di- ge causa videatur ea, quae ad utilitatem pertine- bit, quare de magnificentia aut de honestate quiddam derogetur. atque in hoc loco mihi caput illud vide- tur esse, ut quaeramus, quid sit illud, quod si adi- pisci aut effugere velimus, aliqua res nobis sit ne- cessaria, hoc est, quae sit adiunctio, ut proinde, uti quaeque res erit, elaboremus et gravissimam quamque causam vehementissime necessariam iudicemus. 2.176. Affectio est quaedam ex tempore aut ex nego- tiorum eventu aut administratione aut hominum studio commutatio rerum, ut non tales, quales ante ha- bitae sint aut plerumque haberi soleant, habendae videantur esse; ut ad hostes transire turpe videatur esse, at non illo animo, quo Ulixes transiit; et pe- cuniam in mare deicere inutile, at non eo consilio, quo Aristippus fecit. sunt igitur res quaedam ex tempore et ex consilio, non ex sua natura conside- randae; quibus in omnibus, quid tempora petant, quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est et non quid, sed quo quidque animo, quicum, quo tempore, quam- diu fiat, attendendum est. his ex partibus ad senten- tiam dicendam locos sumi oportere arbitramur. 2.177. Laudes autem et vituperationes ex iis locis sumentur, qui loci personis sunt adtributi, de quibus ante dic- tum est. sin distributius tractare qui volet, partiatur in animum et corpus et extraneas res licebit. animi est virtus, cuius de partibus paulo ante dictum est; corporis valetudo, dignitas, vires, velocitas; extraneae honos, pecunia, adfinitas, genus, amici, patria, poten- tia, cetera, quae simili esse in genere intellegentur. 2.178. atque in his id, quod in omnia, valere oportebit; con- traria quoque, quae et qualia sint, intellegentur. vi- dere autem in laudando et in vituperando oportebit non tam, quae in corpore aut in extraneis rebus ha- buerit is, de quo agetur, quam quo pacto his rebus usus sit. nam fortunam quidem et laudare stultitia et vituperare superbia est, animi autem et laus ho- nesta et vituperatio vehemens est. Nunc quoniam omne in causae genus argumentan- di ratio tradita est, de inventione, prima ac maxima parte rhetoricae, satis dictum videtur. quare, quoniam et una pars ad exitum hoc ac superiore libro per- ducta est et hic liber non parum continet litterarum, quae restant, in reliquis dicemus.
26. Cicero, On Divination, 2.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 124
2.4. Cumque Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate, tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum referendi videntur. Ita tres erunt de oratore, quartus Brutus, quintus orator. Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem? his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refreda atque coe+rcenda sit. 2.4. Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator.[2] I have named the philosophic works so far written: to the completion of the remaining books of this series I was hastening with so much ardour that if some most grievous cause had not intervened there would not now be any phase of philosophy which I had failed to elucidate and make easily accessible in the Latin tongue. For what greater or better service can I render to the commonwealth than to instruct and train the youth — especially in view of the fact that our young men have gone so far astray because of the present moral laxity that the utmost effort will be needed to hold them in check and direct them in the right way?
27. Cicero, Brutus, 64, 68 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 170
68. sed cur nolunt Catones Catones vulg. : Catonis L ? Attico genere dicendi se gaudere dicunt. Sapienter id quidem; atque utinam imitarentur, nec ossa solum sed etiam sanguinem! Gratum est tamen quod volunt. gratum ... volunt secl. Eberhard —Cur igitur Lysias et Hyperides amatur, cum penitus ignoretur Cato? Antiquior est huius sermo et quaedam horridiora verba. Ita enim tum loquebantur. Id muta, quod tum ille non potuit, et adde numeros et ut ut add. vulg. aptior sit oratio, ipsa verba compone et quasi coagmenta, quod ne Graeci quidem veteres factitaverunt: iam neminem antepones Catoni.
28. Cicero, On Duties, 1.151 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 124
1.151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt. 1.151.  But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived — medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching — these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.
29. Horace, Letters, 1.4, 2.1.243-2.1.244 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •body, in rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 170, 173
30. Horace, Sermones, 2.7.11 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 15, 114
31. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 173
32. Anon., Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 1.1, 1.4-1.15, 2.13-2.18, 2.28, 3.2, 3.10-3.11, 3.14-3.15, 3.17, 4.25 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks •body, in rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 26; Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 55, 82, 88, 93, 101, 102, 157, 188, 189, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 124, 173
2.13.  When the intention of the framer appears at variance with the letter of a text, speaking in support of the letter we shall employ the following topics: first, after the Statement of Facts, a eulogy of the framer and then the reading aloud of the text; next the questioning of our adversaries: Are they duly aware that this text was in a law, will, contract, or any other document involved in the cause?; then a comparison of the text with the admitted act of our adversaries: Which should the judge follow — a document carefully draughted, or an interpretation cunningly invented? After that the interpretation devised and given to the text by our adversaries will be disparaged and weakened. Then the question will be raised: What risk would the writer have run by adding an entry of that kind had he really intended it, or was it impossible to write it out in full? Then we shall ascertain the writer's situation and present the reason why he had in mind what he wrote, and show that that text is clear, concise, apt, complete, and planned with precision. Thereupon we shall cite examples of judgements rendered in favour of the text, although adversaries raised the issue of spirit and intention. Finally, we shall show the danger of departing from the letter of the text. The commonplace here is that against one who, though confessing that he has violated the mandates of a statute or the directions of a will, yet seeks to defend his act. 2.14.  In favour of the intention we shall speak as follows: first we shall praise the framer for deft conciseness in having written only what was necessary; he did not think it necessary to write what could be understood without a text. Next we shall say that to follow the words literally and to neglect the intention is the method of a pettifogger. Then, we shall contend, the letter either cannot be carried out, or at least not without violation of Statute Law, Legal Custom, the Law of Nature, or Equity — all these, as no one will deny, the writer wished to be most strictly observed; but on the contrary, what we have done is absolutely just. Further, the interpretation of our adversaries is either no interpretation, or is unreasonable, unjust, impracticable, or inconsistent with past or subsequent interpretations, or is in disagreement with the common law or with other generally binding rules of law or with previous decisions. Next we shall cite instances of decisions rendered in favour of the intention and contrary to the letter, and then read and explain laws or contracts which had been written down in concise form and yet in which the intention of the framer is understood. The commonplace here is that against one who reads a text and does not interpret the writer's intention. 2.15.  When two laws conflict, we must first see whether they have been superseded or restricted, and then whether their disagreement is such that one commands and the other prohibits, or one compels and the other allows. It will be a weak defence indeed for a person to say that he failed to do what one law ordained, because another law made it optional; for obligation is more binding than mere permission. So also it is a meagre defence for a person to show that he has observed the obligation of a law which has been superseded or restricted, without heeding the obligation of the later law. After these considerations we shall at once pass to the exposition, reading, and warm recommendation of the law favourable to us. Then we shall elucidate the intention of the opposing law and appropriate it for the advantage of our cause. Finally, we shall take over the theory of Law from the Absolute Juridical Issue, and examine with which side the departments of Law hold; this subtype of a Juridical Issue I shall discuss later. 2.16.  If a text is regarded as ambiguous, because it can be interpreted in two or more meanings, the treatment is as follows: first we must examine whether it is indeed ambiguous; then we must show how it would have been written if the writer had wished it to have the meaning which our adversaries give to it; next, that our interpretation is practicable, and practicable in conformity with the Honourable and the Right, with Statute Law, Legal Custom, the Law of Nature, or Equity; of our adversaries' interpretation the opposite is true; and the text is not ambiguous since one well understands which is the true sense. There are some who think that for the development of this kind of cause a knowledge of amphibolies as taught by the dialecticians is highly useful. I, however, believe that this knowledge is of no help at all, and is, I may even say, a most serious hindrance. In fact these writers are on the lookout for all amphibolies, even for such as yield no sense at all in one of the two interpretations. Accordingly, when some one else speaks, they are his annoying hecklers, and when he writes, they are his boring and also misty interpreters. And when they themselves speak, wishing to do so cautiously and deftly, they prove to be utterly inarticulate. Thus, in their fear to utter some ambiguity while speaking, they cannot even pronounce their own names. Indeed I shall refute the childish opinions of these writers by the most straightforward proofs whenever you wish. For the present it has not been out of place to make this protest, in order to express my contempt for the wordy learning of this school of inarticulateness. 2.17.  When we deal with the Issue of Definition, we shall first briefly define the term in question, as follows: "He impairs the sovereign majesty of the state who destroys the elements constituting its dignity. What are these, Quintus Caepio? The suffrage of the people and the counsel of the magistracy. No doubt, then, in demolishing the bridges of the Comitium, you have deprived the people of their suffrage and the magistracy of their counselling." Likewise, in reply: "He impairs the sovereign majesty of the state who inflicts damage upon its dignity. I have not inflicted, but rather prevented, damage, for I have saved the Treasury, resisted the licence of wicked men, and kept the majesty of the state from perishing utterly." Thus the meaning of the term is first explained briefly, and adapted to the advantage of our cause; then we shall connect our conduct with the explanation of the term; finally, the principle underlying the contrary definition will be refuted, as being false, inexpedient, disgraceful, or harmful — and here we shall borrow our means from the departments of Law treated under the Absolute Juridical Issue, which I shall soon discuss. 2.18.  In causes based on Transference we first examine whether one has the right to institute an action, claim, or prosecution in this matter, or whether it should not rather be instituted at another time, or under another law, or before another examiner. The pertinent means will be provided by Statute Law, Legal Custom, and Equity, which I shall discuss in connection with the Absolute Juridical Issue. In a cause based on Analogy we shall first seek to know whether there exists any like text or decision on matters of greater, less, or like importance; next whether that matter is in fact like or unlike the matter in question; then whether the absence of a text concerning the matter here involved was intentional, because the framer was unwilling to make any provision, or because he thought that there was provision enough thanks to the similar provisions in the other legal texts. On the subdivisions of the Legal Issue I have said enough; now I shall turn back to the Juridical. 2.28.  The most complete and perfect argument, then, is that which is comprised of five parts: the Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the Embellishment, and the Résumé. Through the Proposition we set forth summarily what we intend to prove. The Reason, by means of a brief explanation subjoined, sets forth the causal basis for the Proposition, establishing the truth of what we are urging. The Proof of the Reason corroborates, by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason. Embellishment we use in order to adorn and enrich the argument, after the Proof has been established. The Résumé is a brief conclusion, drawing together the parts of the argument. Hence, to make the most complete use of these five parts, we shall develop an argument as follows:"We shall show that Ulysses had a motive in killing Ajax.""Indeed he wished to rid himself of his bitterest enemy, from whom, with good cause, he feared extreme danger to himself."He saw that, with Ajax alive, his own life would be unsafe; he hoped by the death of Ajax to secure his own safety; it was his habit to plan an enemy's destruction by whatsoever wrongful means, when he could not by rightful, as the undeserved death of Palamedes bears witness. Thus the fear of danger encouraged him to slay the man from whom he dreaded vengeance, and, in addition, the habit of wrong-doing robbed him of his scruples at undertaking the evil deed. 3.2.  Deliberative speeches are either of the kind in which the question concerns a choice between two courses of action, or of the kind in which a choice among several is considered. An example of a choice between two courses of action: Does it seem better to destroy Carthage, or to leave her standing? An example of a choice among several: If Hannibal, when recalled to Carthage from Italy, should deliberate whether to remain in Italy, or return home, or invade Egypt and seize Alexandria. Again, a question under deliberation is sometimes to be examined on its own account; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether or not to redeem the captives from the enemy. Or sometimes a question becomes one for deliberation and inquiry on account of some motive extraneous to the question itself; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether to exempt Scipio from the law so as to permit him to become consul while under age. And sometimes a question comes under deliberation on its own account and then provokes debate even more because of an extraneous motive; for example, if in the Italic War the Senate should deliberate whether or not to grant citizenship to the Allies. In causes in which the subject of itself engenders the deliberation, the entire discourse will be devoted to the subject itself. In those in which an extraneous motive gives rise to the deliberation, it is this motive which will have to be emphasized or depreciated. 3.10.  Let us now turn to the Epideictic kind of cause. Since epideictic includes Praise and Censure, the topics on which praise is founded will, by their contraries, serve us as the bases for censure. The following, then, can be subject to praise: External Circumstances, Physical Attributes, and Qualities of Character. To External Circumstances belong such as can happen by chance, or by fortune, favourable or adverse: descent, education, wealth, kinds of power, titles to fame, citizenship, friendships, and the like, and their contraries. Physical Attributes are merits or defect bestowed upon the body by nature: agility, strength, beauty, health, and their contraries. Qualities of Character rest upon our judgement and thought: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance, and their contraries. 3.11.  Such, then, in a cause of this kind, will be our Proof and Refutation. The Introduction is drawn from our own person, or the person we are discussing, or the person of our hearers, or from the subject-matter itself. From our own person: if we speak in praise, we shall say that we are doing so from a sense of duty, because ties of friendship exist; or from goodwill, because such is the virtue of the person under discussion that every one should wish to call it to mind; or because it is appropriate to show, from the praise accorded him by others, what his character is. If we speak in censure, we shall say that we are justified in doing so, because of the treatment we have suffered; or that we are doing so from goodwill, because we think it useful that all men should be apprised of a wickedness and a worthlessness without parallel; or because it is pleasing to show by our censure of others what conduct is pleasing to ourselves. When we draw our Introduction from the person being discussed: if we speak in praise, we shall say that we fear our inability to match his deeds with words; all men ought to proclaim his virtues; his very deeds transcend the eloquence of all eulogists. If we speak in censure, we shall, as obviously we can by the change of a few words, and as I have demonstrated just above, express sentiments to the contrary effect. 3.14.  (2) Next we must pass to the Physical Advantages: if by nature he has impressiveness and beauty, these have served him to his credit, and not, as in the case of others, to his detriment and shame; if he has exceptional strength and agility, we shall point out that these were acquired by worthy and diligent exercise; if he has continual good health, that was acquired by care and by control over his passions. In censure, if the subject has this physical advantages, we shall declare that he has abused what, like the meanest gladiator, he has had by chance and nature. If he lacks them, we shall say that to his own fault and want of self-control is his lack of every physical advantage, beauty apart, attributable. (3) Then we shall return to External Circumstances and consider his virtues and defects of Character evinced with respect to these: Has he been rich or poor? What kinds of power has he wielded? What have been his titles to fame? What his friendships? Or what his private feuds, and what act of bravery has he performed in conducting these feuds? With what motive has he entered into feuds? With what loyalty, goodwill, and sense of duty has he conducted his friendships? What character of man has he been in wealth, or in poverty? What has been his attitude in the exercise of his prerogatives? If he is dead, what sort of death did he die, and what sort of consequences followed upon it?   3.15.  In all circumstances, moreover, in which human character is chiefly studied, those four above-mentioned virtues of character will have to be applied. Thus, if we speak in praise, we shall say that one act was just, another courageous, another temperate, and another wise; if we speak in censure, we shall declare that one was unjust, another intemperate, another cowardly, and another stupid. From this arrangement it is now no doubt clear how we are to treat the three categories of praise and censure — with the added proviso that we need not use all three for praise or for censure, because often not all of them even apply, and often, too, when they do, the application is so slight that it is unnecessary to refer to them. We shall therefore need to choose those categories which seem to provide the greatest force. Our Conclusions will be brief, in the form of a Summary at the end of the discourse; in the discourse itself we shall by means of commonplaces frequently insert brief amplifications. Nor should this kind of cause be the less strongly recommended just because it presents itself only seldom in life. Indeed when a task may present itself, be it only occasionally, the ability to perform it as skilfully as possible must seem desirable. And if epideictic is only seldom employed by itself independently, still in judicial and deliberative causes extensive sections are often devoted to praise or censure. Therefore let us believe that this kind of cause also must claim some measure of our industry. Now that I have completed the most difficult part of rhetoric — thoroughly treating Invention and applying it to every kind of cause — it is time to proceed to the other parts. I shall therefore next discuss the Arrangement. 3.17.  This Arrangement, then, is twofold — one for the whole speech, and the other for the individual arguments — and is based upon the principles of rhetoric. But there is also another Arrangement, which, when we must depart from the order imposed by the rules of the art, is accommodated to circumstance in accordance with the speaker's judgement; for example, if we should begin our speech with the Statement of Facts, or with some very strong argument, or the reading of some documents; or if straightway after the Introduction we should use the Proof and then the Statement of Facts; or if we should make some other change of this kind in the order. But none of these changes ought to be made except when our cause demands them. For if the ears of the audience seem to have been deafened and their attention wearied by the wordiness of our adversaries, we can advantageously omit the Introduction, and begin the speech with either the Statement of Facts or some strong argument. Then, if it is advantageous — for it is not always necessary — one may recur to the idea intended for the Introduction.  If our cause seems to present so great a difficulty that no one can listen to the Introduction with patience, we shall begin with the Statement of Facts and then recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. If the Statement of Facts is not quite plausible, we shall begin with some strong argument. It is often necessary to employ such changes and transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the rules of the art. 4.25.  With a reason, as follows: "They who think that the sins of youth deserve indulgence are deceived, because that time of life does not constitute a hindrance to sound studious activities. But they act wisely who chastise the young with especial severity in order to inculcate at the age most opportune for it the desire to attain those virtues by which they can order their whole lives." We should insert maxims only rarely, that we may be looked upon as pleading the case, not preaching morals. When so interspersed, they will add much distinction. Furthermore, the hearer, when he perceives that an indisputable principle drawn from practical life is being applied to a cause, must give it his tacit approval. Reasoning by Contraries is the figure which, of two opposite statements, uses one so as neatly and directly to prove the other, as follows: "Now how should you expect one who has ever been hostile to his own interests to be friendly to another's?" Again: "Now why should you think that one who is, as you have learned, a faithless friend, can be an honourable enemy? Or how should you expect a person whose arrogance has been insufferable in private life, to be agreeable and not forget himself when in power, and one who in ordinary conversation and among friends has never spoken the truth, to refrain from lies before public assemblies?" Again: "Do we fear to fight them on the level plain when we have hurled them down from the hills? When they outnumbered us, they were no match for us; now that we outnumber them, do we fear that they will conquer us?"
33. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 1.1.1-1.1.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Honigman (2003), The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas, 30
34. Ignatius, To The Philadelphians, 9.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 189
9.1. The priests likewise were good, but better is the High-priest to whom is committed the holy of holies; for to Him alone are committed the hidden things of God; He Himself being the door of the Father, through which Abraham and Isaac and Jacob enter in, and the Prophets and the Apostles and the whole Church; all these things combine in the unity of God.
35. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 41548 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •handbooks, of rhetoric Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 106
36. New Testament, Hebrews, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7-4.13, 3.7-4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11-6.20, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 6, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 7.1-10.18, 9.11, 9.12, 9.13, 9.14, 10.19-12.17, 10.28, 10.29, 12.9, 12.14, 12.15, 12.16, 12.17, 12.18, 12.19, 12.20, 12.21, 12.22, 12.23, 12.24, 12.25, 12.26, 12.27, 12.28, 12.29, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9, 13.10, 13.11, 13.12, 13.13, 13.14, 13.15, 13.16, 13.17, 13.18, 13.19, 13.20, 13.21, 13.22, 13.23, 13.24, 13.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 193
13.20. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης,ὁ ἀναγαγὼνἐκ νεκρῶντὸν ποιμένά τῶν προβάτωντὸν μέγανἐν αἵματι διαθήκης αἰωνίου,τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν, 13.20. Now may the God of peace, who brought again from the dead the great shepherd of the sheep with the blood of an eternal covet, our Lord Jesus,
37. New Testament, John, 20.30-20.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 236
20.30. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα σημεῖα ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐνώπιον τῶν μαθητῶν, ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ 20.31. βιβλίῳ τούτῳ· ταῦτα δὲ γέγραπται ἵνα πιστεύητε ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἵνα πιστεύοντες ζωὴν ἔχητε ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ. 20.30. Therefore Jesus did many other signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; 20.31. but these are written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name.
38. Plutarch, Cato The Younger, 73 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 193
39. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
40. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
41. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 93
42. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, a b c d\n0 4.2.52 4.2.52 4 2 \n1 '12.17 '12.17 '12 17\n2 '12.73 '12.73 '12 73\n3 '12.10 '12.10 '12 10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
43. Seneca The Younger, Letters, a b c d\n0 '11.4.16 '11.4.16 '11 4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
44. Tosefta, Avodah Zarah, 8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 73
45. Theon Aelius, Exercises, 108, 5, 79, 8, 80-85, 11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 87, 98
46. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, 2.7.3-2.7.9 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 105
2.7.3. ὁ δὲ συγκαλέσας στρατηγούς τε καὶ ἰλάρχας καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἤδη σφίσι καλῶς κεκινδυνευμένων καὶ ὅτι πρὸς νενικημένους ὁ ἀγὼν νενικηκόσιν αὐτοῖς ἔσται καὶ ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὑπὲρ σφῶν στρατηγεῖ ἄμεινον, ἐπὶ νοῦν Δαρείῳ ἀγαγὼν καθεῖρξαι τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς εὐρυχωρίας ἐς τὰ στενόπορα, ἵνα σφίσι μὲν ξύμμετρον τὸ χωρίον ἀναπτύξαι τὴν φάλαγγα, τοῖς δὲ ἀχρεῖον τὸ πλῆθος [ὅτι] ἔσται τῇ μάχῃ, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς γνώμας παραπλησίοις. 2.7.4. Μακεδόνας τε γὰρ Πέρσαις καὶ Μήδοις, ἐκ πάνυ πολλοῦ τρυφῶσιν, αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς πόνοις τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πάλαι ἤδη μετὰ κινδύνων ἀσκουμένους, ἄλλως τε καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέρους, εἰς χεῖρας ἥξειν· ὅσοι τε Ἕλληνες Ἕλλησιν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ξὺν Δαρείῳ ἐπὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὐδὲ τούτῳ πολλῷ κινδυνεύοντας, τοὺς δὲ ξὺν σφίσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἑκόντας ἀμυνομένους· 2.7.5. βαρβάρων τε αὖ Θρᾷκας καὶ Παίονας καὶ Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους τε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην καὶ μαχιμωτάτους πρὸς τὰ ἀπονώτατά τε καὶ μαλακώτατα τῆς Ἀσίας γένη ἀντιτάξεσθαι· ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀντιστρατηγεῖν Δαρείῳ. 2.7.6. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐς πλεονεξίαν τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἐπεξῄει. τὰ δὲ ἆθλα ὅτι μεγάλα ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ κινδύνου ἐπεδείκνυεν. οὐ γὰρ τοὺς σατράπας τοὺς Δαρείου ἐν τῷ τότε κρατήσειν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἵππον τὴν ἐπὶ Γρανίκῳ ταχθεῖσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς δισμυρίους ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἀλλὰ Περσῶν τε ὅ τι περ ὄφελος καὶ Μήδων καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔθνη Πέρσαις καὶ Μήδοις ὑπήκοα ἐποικεῖ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ αὐτὸν μέγαν βασιλέα παρόντα, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπολειφθήσεταί σφισιν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ ἀγῶνι ὅτι μὴ κρατεῖν τῆς Ἀσίας ξυμπάσης καὶ πέρας τοῖς πολλοῖς πόνοις ἐπιθεῖναι. 2.7.7. ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τῶν τε ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ξὺν λαμπρότητι ἤδη πεπραγμένων ὑπεμίμνησκεν καὶ εἰ δή τῳ ἰδίᾳ τι διαπρεπὲς ἐς κάλλος τετολμημένον, ὀνομαστὶ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ ἀνακαλῶν. καὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ οὐκ ἀκίνδυνον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ὡς ἀνεπαχθέστατα ἐπεξῄει. 2.7.8. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντος καὶ τῶν ἅμα Ξενοφῶντι μυρίων ἐς μνήμην ἐλθεῖν, ὡς οὐδέν τι οὔτε κατὰ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀξίωσιν σφίσιν ἐπεοικότες, οὐδὲ ἱππέων αὐτοῖς παρόντων Θεσσαλῶν, οὐδὲ Βοιωτῶν ἢ Πελοποννησίων, οὐδὲ Μακεδόνων ἢ Θρᾳκῶν, οὐδὲ ὅση ἄλλη σφίσιν ἵππος ξυντέτακται, οὐδὲ τοξοτῶν ἢ σφενδονητῶν, ὅτι μὴ Κρητῶν ἢ Ῥοδίων ὀλίγων, καὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ ὑπὸ Ξενοφῶντος αὐτοσχεδιασθέντων, 2.7.9. οἱ δὲ βασιλέα τε ξὺν πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς Βαβυλῶνι αὐτῇ ἐτρέψαντο καὶ ἔθνη ὅσα κατιόντων ἐς τὸν Εὔξεινον πόντον καθʼ ὁδόν σφισιν ἐπεγένετο νικῶντες ἐπῆλθον· ὅσα τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐς παράκλησιν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος παραινεῖσθαι εἰκός. οἱ δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν δεξιούμενοί τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπαίροντες ἄγειν ἤδη ἐκέλευον.
47. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, a b c d\n0 33.4 33.4 33 4 \n1 '33.10 '33.10 '33 10\n2 33.3 33.3 33 3 \n3 33.2 33.2 33 2 \n4 33.5 33.5 33 5 \n5 33.1 33.1 33 1 \n6 33.6 33.6 33 6 \n7 '32.17 '32.17 '32 17\n8 '33.6 '33.6 '33 6 \n9 '33.15 '33.15 '33 15\n10 '32.1 '32.1 '32 1 \n11 '31.3 '31.3 '31 3 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
33.4.  You seem to me to have listened frequently to marvellous men, who claim to know all things, and regarding all things to be able to tell how they have been appointed and what their nature is, their repertoire including, not only human beings and demigods, but gods, yes, and even the earth, the sky, the sea, the sun and moon and other stars — in fact the entire universe — and also the processes of corruption and generation and ten thousand other things. And then, methinks, they come to you and ask you what you want them to say and upon what topic — as Pindar put it, Ismenus or Melia of the golden distaff or noble Cadmus; and whatsoever you may deem suitable, the speaker starts from there and pours forth a steady and copious flood of speech, like some abundant river that has been dammed upon within him.
48. Celsus, On Medicine, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 124
49. Lucian, The Runaways, '21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
50. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 113, 115-116, 118, 34, 36, 42, 86, 96, 33 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 189
33. Justin: And I am not ignorant that you venture to expound this psalm as if it referred to king Hezekiah; but that you are mistaken, I shall prove to you from these very words immediately. 'The Lord has sworn, and will not repent,' it is said; and, 'You are a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek,' with what follows and precedes. Not even you will venture to object that Hezekiah was either a priest, or is the everlasting priest of God; but that this is spoken of our Jesus, these expressions show. But your ears are shut up, and your hearts are made dull. For by this statement, 'The Lord has sworn, and will not repent: You are a priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek,' with an oath God has shown Him (on account of your unbelief) to be the High Priest after the order of Melchizedek; i.e., as Melchizedek was described by Moses as the priest of the Most High, and he was a priest of those who were in uncircumcision, and blessed the circumcised Abraham who brought him tithes, so God has shown that His everlasting Priest, called also by the Holy Spirit Lord, would be Priest of those in uncircumcision. Those too in circumcision who approach Him, that is, believing Him and seeking blessings from Him, He will both receive and bless. And that He shall be first humble as a man, and then exalted, these words at the end of the Psalm show: 'He shall drink of the brook in the way,' and then, 'Therefore shall He lift up the head.'
51. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, a b c d\n0 '11.19 '11.19 '11 19 \n1 '7.324 '7.324 '7 324 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
52. Palestinian Talmud, Horayot, 8 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 112, 113, 118
53. Palestinian Talmud, Pesahim, 35 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 113
54. Anon., Leviticus Rabba, 1.6 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 53
1.6. רַבִּי תַּנְחוּמָא פָּתַח (משלי כ, טו): יֵשׁ זָהָב וְרָב פְּנִינִים וּכְלִי יְקָר שִׂפְתֵי דָעַת, בְּנֹהַג שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם אָדָם יֵשׁ לוֹ זָהָב וָכֶסֶף אֲבָנִים טוֹבוֹת וּמַרְגָּלִיּוֹת וְכָל כְּלֵי חֶמְדָה שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם, וְטוֹבָה וְדַעַת אֵין בּוֹ, מַה קְּנִיָּה יֵשׁ לוֹ, מַתְלָא אָמַר דֵּעָה קָנִיתָ מֶה חָסַרְתָּ, דֵּעָה חָסַרְתָּ מַה קָּנִיתָ. יֵשׁ זָהָב, הַכֹּל הֵבִיאוּ נִדְבָתָן לַמִּשְׁכָּן זָהָב, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (שמות כה, ג): וְזֹאת הַתְּרוּמָה וגו'. וְרָב פְּנִינִים, זוֹ נִדְבָתָן שֶׁל נְשִׂיאִים, דִּכְתִיב (שמות לה, כז): וְהַנְּשִׂאִם הֵבִיאוּ וגו', וּכְלִי יְקָר שִׂפְתֵי דָעַת, לְפִי שֶׁהָיְתָה נַפְשׁוֹ שֶׁל משֶׁה עֲגוּמָה עָלָיו, וְאָמַר הַכֹּל הֵבִיאוּ נִדְבָתָן לַמִּשְׁכָּן וַאֲנִי לֹא הֵבֵאתִי, אָמַר לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא חַיֶּיךָ שֶׁדִּבּוּרְךָ חָבִיב עָלַי יוֹתֵר מִן הַכֹּל, שֶׁמִּכֻּלָּן לֹא קָרָא הַדִּבּוּר אֶלָּא לְמשֶׁה, וַיִּקְרָא אֶל משֶׁה.
55. Hermogenes, Rhetorical Exercises, 20.9-20.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Verhelst and Scheijnens (2022), Greek and Latin Poetry of Late Antiquity: Form, Tradition, and Context, 160
56. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 41
30b. כל יומא דשבתא הוה יתיב וגריס כולי יומא ההוא יומא דבעי למינח נפשיה קם מלאך המות קמיה ולא יכיל ליה דלא הוה פסק פומיה מגירסא אמר מאי אעביד ליה הוה ליה בוסתנא אחורי ביתיה אתא מלאך המות סליק ובחיש באילני נפק למיחזי הוה סליק בדרגא איפחית דרגא מתותיה אישתיק ונח נפשיה,שלח שלמה לבי מדרשא אבא מת ומוטל בחמה וכלבים של בית אבא רעבים מה אעשה שלחו ליה חתוך נבלה והנח לפני הכלבים ואביך הנח עליו ככר או תינוק וטלטלו ולא יפה אמר שלמה (קהלת ט, ד) כי לכלב חי הוא טוב מן האריה המת ולענין שאילה דשאילנא קדמיכון נר קרויה נר ונשמתו של אדם קרויה נר מוטב תכבה נר של בשר ודם מפני נרו של הקב"ה:,אמר רב יהודה בריה דרב שמואל בר שילת משמיה דרב בקשו חכמים לגנוז ספר קהלת מפני שדבריו סותרין זה את זה ומפני מה לא גנזוהו מפני שתחילתו דברי תורה וסופו דברי תורה תחילתו דברי תורה דכתיב (קהלת א, ג) מה יתרון לאדם בכל עמלו שיעמול תחת השמש ואמרי דבי ר' ינאי תחת השמש הוא דאין לו קודם שמש יש לו סופו דברי תורה דכתיב (קהלת יב, יג) סוף דבר הכל נשמע את האלהים ירא ואת מצותיו שמור כי זה כל האדם מאי כי זה כל האדם אמר רבי (אליעזר) כל העולם כולו לא נברא אלא בשביל זה ר' אבא בר כהנא אמר שקול זה כנגד כל העולם כולו שמעון בן עזאי אומר ואמרי לה שמעון בן זומא אומר לא נברא כל העולם כולו אלא לצוות לזה,ומאי דבריו סותרין זה את זה כתיב (קהלת ז, ג) טוב כעס משחוק וכתיב (קהלת ב, ב) לשחוק אמרתי מהלל כתיב (קהלת ח, טו) ושבחתי אני את השמחה וכתיב (קהלת ב, ב) ולשמחה מה זה עושה לא קשיא טוב כעס משחוק טוב כעס שכועס הקב"ה על הצדיקים בעוה"ז משחוק שמשחק הקב"ה על הרשעים בעולם הזה ולשחוק אמרתי מהלל זה שחוק שמשחק הקב"ה עם הצדיקים בעולם הבא,ושבחתי אני את השמחה שמחה של מצוה ולשמחה מה זה עושה זו שמחה שאינה של מצוה ללמדך שאין שכינה שורה לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות ולא מתוך שחוק ולא מתוך קלות ראש ולא מתוך שיחה ולא מתוך דברים בטלים אלא מתוך דבר שמחה של מצוה שנאמר (מלכים ב ג, טו) ועתה קחו לי מנגן והיה כנגן המנגן ותהי עליו יד ה' אמר רב יהודה וכן לדבר הלכה אמר רבא וכן לחלום טוב,איני והאמר רב גידל אמר רב כל תלמיד חכם שיושב לפני רבו ואין שפתותיו נוטפות מר תכוינה שנאמר (שיר השירים ה, יג) שפתותיו שושנים נוטפות מור עובר אל תקרי מור עובר אלא מר עובר אל תקרי שושנים אלא ששונים לא קשיא הא ברבה והא בתלמיד ואיבעית אימא הא והא ברבה ולא קשיא הא מקמי דלפתח הא לבתר דפתח כי הא דרבה מקמי דפתח להו לרבנן אמר מילתא דבדיחותא ובדחי רבנן לסוף יתיב באימתא ופתח בשמעתא,ואף ספר משלי בקשו לגנוז שהיו דבריו סותרין זה את זה ומפני מה לא גנזוהו אמרי ספר קהלת לאו עיינינן ואשכחינן טעמא הכא נמי ליעיינן ומאי דבריו סותרים זה את זה כתיב (משלי כו, ד) אל תען כסיל כאולתו וכתיב (משלי כו, ה) ענה כסיל כאולתו לא קשיא הא בדברי תורה הא במילי דעלמא,כי הא דההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבי אמר ליה אשתך אשתי ובניך בני אמר ליה רצונך שתשתה כוס של יין שתה ופקע ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבי חייא אמר ליה אמך אשתי ואתה בני אמר ליה רצונך שתשתה כוס של יין שתה ופקע אמר רבי חייא אהניא ליה צלותיה לרבי דלא לשווייה בני ממזירי דרבי כי הוה מצלי אמר יהי רצון מלפניך ה' אלהינו שתצילני היום מעזי. פנים ומעזות פנים,בדברי תורה מאי היא כי הא דיתיב רבן גמליאל וקא דריש עתידה אשה שתלד בכל יום שנאמר (ירמיהו לא, ח) הרה ויולדת יחדיו ליגלג עליו אותו תלמיד אמר אין כל חדש תחת השמש א"ל בא ואראך דוגמתן בעוה"ז נפק אחוי ליה תרנגולת,ותו יתיב רבן גמליאל וקא דריש עתידים אילנות שמוציאין פירות בכל יום שנאמר (יחזקאל יז, כג) ונשא ענף ועשה פרי מה ענף בכל יום אף פרי בכל יום ליגלג עליו אותו תלמיד אמר והכתיב אין כל חדש תחת השמש א"ל בא ואראך דוגמתם בעולם הזה נפק אחוי ליה צלף,ותו יתיב רבן גמליאל וקא דריש עתידה ארץ ישראל שתוציא גלוסקאות וכלי מילת שנאמר (תהלים עב, טז) יהי פסת בר בארץ ליגלג עליו אותו תלמיד ואמר אין כל חדש תחת השמש אמר ליה בא ואראך דוגמתן בעולם הזה נפק אחוי ליה כמיהין ופטריות ואכלי מילת נברא בר קורא:,. ת"ר לעולם יהא אדם ענוותן כהלל ואל יהא קפדן כשמאי מעשה בשני בני אדם 30b. What did David do? b Every Shabbat he would sit and learn all day /b long to protect himself from the Angel of Death. On b that day on which /b the Angel of Death b was supposed to put his soul to rest, /b the day on which David was supposed to die, b the Angel of Death stood before him and was unable /b to overcome him because b his mouth did not pause from study. /b The Angel of Death b said: What shall I do to him? David had a garden [ i bustana /i ] behind his house; the Angel of Death came, climbed, and shook the trees. /b David b went out to see. /b As b he climbed the stair, the stair broke beneath him. /b He was startled and b was silent, /b interrupted his studies for a moment, b and died. /b ,Since David died in the garden, b Solomon sent /b the following question b to the study hall: Father died and is lying in the sun, and the dogs of father’s house are hungry. /b There is room for concern lest the dogs come and harm his body. What shall I do? b They sent /b an answer b to him: Cut up an /b animal b carcass and place it before the dogs. /b Since the dogs are hungry, handling the animal carcass to feed them is permitted. b And /b with regard to b your father, /b it is prohibited to move his body directly. b Place a loaf /b of bread b or an infant on top of him, and /b you can b move him /b into the shade due to the bread or the infant. b And /b is it b not appropriate /b what b Solomon said: “ /b F b or a living dog is better than a dead lion.” /b The ultimate conclusion of this discussion is that life is preferable to death. b And /b now, b with regard to the question that I asked before you; /b Rav Tanḥum spoke modestly, as, actually, they had asked him the question. b A lamp is called i ner /i and a person’s soul is /b also b called i ner /i , /b as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp [ i ner /i ] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27). b It is preferable /b that b the lamp of /b a being of b flesh and blood, /b an actual lamp, b will be extinguished in favor of the lamp of the Holy One, Blessed be He, /b a person’s soul. Therefore, one is permitted to extinguish a flame for the sake of a sick person.,Since contradictions in Ecclesiastes were mentioned, the Gemara cites additional relevant sources. b Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: The Sages sought to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes /b and declare it apocryphal b because its statements contradict each other /b and it is liable to confuse its readers. b And why did they not suppress it? Because its beginning /b consists of b matters of Torah and its end /b consists of b matters of Torah. /b The ostensibly contradictory details are secondary to the essence of the book, which is Torah. The Gemara elaborates: b Its beginning /b consists of b matters of Torah, as it is written: “What profit has man of all his labor which he labors under the sun?” /b (Ecclesiastes 1:3), b and /b the Sages of b the school /b of b Rabbi Yannai said: /b By inference: b Under the sun is where /b man b has no /b profit from his labor; however, b before the sun, /b i.e., when engaged in the study of Torah, which preceded the sun, b he does have /b profit. b Its ending /b consists of b matters of Torah, as it is written: “The end of the matter, all having been heard: Fear God, and keep His mitzvot; for this is the whole man” ( /b Ecclesiastes 12:13). With regard to this verse, the Gemara asks: b What is /b the meaning of the phrase: b For this is the whole man? Rabbi Eliezer said: The entire world was only created for this /b person. b Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: This /b person b is equivalent to the entire world. Shimon ben Azzai says and some say /b that b Shimon ben Zoma says: The entire world was only created as companion to this /b man, so that he will not be alone., b And /b to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: b What is /b the meaning of: b Its statements /b that b contradict each other? It is written: “Vexation is better than laughter” /b (Ecclesiastes 7:3), b and it is written: “I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy” /b (Ecclesiastes 2:2), which is understood to mean that laughter is commendable. Likewise in one verse b it is written: “So I commended mirth” /b (Ecclesiastes 8:15), b and /b in another verse b it is written: “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” /b (Ecclesiastes 2:2). The Gemara answers: This is b not difficult, /b as the contradiction can be resolved. b Vexation is better than laughter /b means: The b vexation /b of b the Holy One, Blessed be He, toward the righteous in this world is preferable to the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the wicked in this world /b by showering them with goodness. b I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy, that is /b the b laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the righteous in the World-to-Come. /b ,Similarly, “ b So I commended mirth,” /b that is b the joy of a mitzva. “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” that is joy that is not /b the joy b of a mitzva. /b The praise of joy mentioned here is b to teach you that the Divine Presence rests /b upon an individual b neither from /b an atmosphere of b sadness, nor from /b an atmosphere of b laziness, nor from /b an atmosphere of b laughter, nor from /b an atmosphere of b frivolity, nor from /b an atmosphere of b idle conversation, nor from /b an atmosphere of b idle chatter, but rather from /b an atmosphere imbued with b the joy of /b a b mitzva. As it was stated /b with regard to Elisha that after he became angry at the king of Israel, his prophetic spirit left him until he requested: b “But now bring me a minstrel; and it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him” /b (II Kings 3:15). b Rav Yehuda said: And, so /b too, one should be joyful before stating b a matter of i halakha /i . Rava said: And, so too, /b one should be joyful before going to sleep in order b to /b have a b good dream. /b ,The Gemara asks: Is b that so, /b that one should introduce matters of i halakha /i joyfully? b Didn’t Rav Giddel say /b that b Rav said: Any Torah scholar who sits before his teacher and his lips are not dripping with myrrh /b due to fear of his teacher, those lips b shall be burnt, /b as b it is stated: “His lips are as lilies, dripping with flowing myrrh [ i shoshanim notefot mor over /i ]” /b (Song of Songs 5:13)? He interpreted homiletically: b Do not read i mor over /i , flowing myrrh; rather, /b read b i mar over /i , flowing bitterness. /b Likewise, b do not read i shoshanim /i , lilies; rather, /b read b i sheshonim /i , that are studying, /b meaning that lips that are studying Torah must be full of bitterness. The Gemara explains: This is b not difficult, /b there is no contradiction here, as b this, /b where it was taught that one should introduce matters of i halakha /i joyfully, is referring b to a rabbi, and that, /b where it was taught that one must be filled with bitterness, is referring b to a student, /b who must listen to his teacher with trepidation. b And if you wish, say /b instead that b this and that /b are referring b to a rabbi, and /b it is b not difficult. This, /b where it was taught that he must be joyful, is b before /b he b begins /b teaching, whereas b that, /b where it was taught that he must be filled with bitterness and trepidation, is b after /b he already b began /b teaching i halakha /i . That explanation is b like that which Rabba /b did. b Before he began /b teaching i halakha /i b to the Sages, he would say something humorous and the Sages would be cheered. Ultimately, he sat in trepidation and began /b teaching the i halakha /i ., b And, /b the Gemara continues, the Sages b sought to suppress the book of Proverbs as well /b because b its statements contradict each other. And why did they not suppress it? They said: /b In the case of b the book of Ecclesiastes, didn’t we analyze it and find an explanation /b that its statements were not contradictory? b Here too, let us analyze it. And what is /b the meaning of: b Its statements contradict each other? /b On the one hand, b it is written: “Answer not a fool according to his folly, /b lest you also be like him” (Proverbs 26:4), b and /b on the other hand, b it is written: “Answer a fool according to his folly, /b lest he be wise in his own eyes” (Proverbs 26:5). The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: This is b not difficult, /b as b this, /b where one should answer a fool, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims b about Torah matters; /b whereas b that, /b where one should not answer him, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims b about mundane matters. /b ,The Gemara relates how Sages conducted themselves in both of those circumstances. b As in /b the case b of that /b man b who came before Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi and b said to him: Your wife /b is b my wife and your children /b are b my children, /b Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi b said to him: /b Would b you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst /b and died. Similarly, the Gemara relates: b There was that man who came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: Your mother /b is b my wife, and you /b are b my son. He said to him: /b Would b you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst /b and died. b Rabbi Ḥiyya said /b with regard to the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi’s b prayer /b that b his children will not be rendered i mamzerim /i , /b children of illicit relations, b was effective for him. As when Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b would pray, he said /b after his prayer: b May it be Your will, O Lord, my God, that You will deliver me today from impudent people and from insolence. /b Insolence, in this case, refers to i mamzerut /i . It was due to his prayer that that man burst and was unsuccessful in disparaging Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s children., b In matters of Torah, what is /b the case with regard to which the verse said that one should respond to a fool’s folly? b As in /b the case b where Rabban Gamliel was sitting and he interpreted /b a verse b homiletically: In the future, /b in the World-to-Come, b a woman will give birth every day, as it says: “The woman with child and her that gives birth together” /b (Jeremiah 31:7), explaining that birth will occur on the same day as conception. b A certain student scoffed at him /b and b said: /b That cannot be, as it has already been stated: b “There is nothing new under the sun” /b (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Rabban Gamliel b said to him: Come and I will show you an example /b of this b in this world. He took him outside and showed him a chicken /b that lays eggs every day., b And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted /b a verse b homiletically: In the future, /b in the World-to-Come, b trees will produce fruits every day, as it is stated: “And it shall bring forth branches and bear fruit” /b (Ezekiel 17:23); b just as a branch /b grows b every day, so too, fruit /b will be produced b every day. A certain student scoffed at him /b and b said: Isn’t it written: There is nothing new under the sun? He said to him: Come and I will show you an example /b of this b in this world. He went outside and showed him a caper bush, /b part of which is edible during each season of the year., b And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted /b a verse b homiletically: In the future, /b the World-to-Come, b Eretz Yisrael will produce cakes and /b fine b wool garments /b that will grow in the ground, b as it is stated: “Let abundant grain be in the land /b .” b A certain student scoffed at him and said: There is nothing new under the sun. He said to him: Come and I will show you an example in this world. He went outside /b and b showed him truffles and mushrooms, /b which emerge from the earth over the course of a single night and are shaped like a loaf of bread. b And with regard to wool garments, /b he showed him b the covering of a heart of palm, /b a young palm branch, which is wrapped in a thin net-like covering.,Since the Gemara discussed the forbearance of Sages, who remain silent in the face of nonsensical comments, it cites additional relevant examples. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : b A person should always be patient like Hillel and not impatient like Shammai. /b The Gemara related: There was b an incident /b involving b two people /b
57. Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 234
13b. ונמלך ומצאו בן עירו ואמר שמך כשמי ושם אשתך כשם אשתי פסול לגרש בו,הכי השתא התם (דברים כד, א) וכתב לה כתיב בעינן כתיבה לשמה הכא ועשה לה כתיב בעינן עשייה לשמה עשייה דידה מחיקה היא,א"ר אחא בר חנינא גלוי וידוע לפני מי שאמר והיה העולם שאין בדורו של רבי מאיר כמותו ומפני מה לא קבעו הלכה כמותו שלא יכלו חביריו לעמוד על סוף דעתו שהוא אומר על טמא טהור ומראה לו פנים על טהור טמא ומראה לו פנים,תנא לא ר"מ שמו אלא רבי נהוראי שמו ולמה נקרא שמו ר"מ שהוא מאיר עיני חכמים בהלכה ולא נהוראי שמו אלא רבי נחמיה שמו ואמרי לה רבי אלעזר בן ערך שמו ולמה נקרא שמו נהוראי שמנהיר עיני חכמים בהלכה,אמר רבי האי דמחדדנא מחבראי דחזיתיה לר' מאיר מאחוריה ואילו חזיתיה מקמיה הוה מחדדנא טפי דכתיב (ישעיהו ל, כ) והיו עיניך רואות את מוריך,א"ר אבהו א"ר יוחנן תלמיד היה לו לר"מ וסומכוס שמו שהיה אומר על כל דבר ודבר של טומאה ארבעים ושמונה טעמי טומאה ועל כל דבר ודבר של טהרה ארבעים ושמונה טעמי טהרה,תנא תלמיד ותיק היה ביבנה שהיה מטהר את השרץ במאה וחמשים טעמים,אמר רבינא אני אדון ואטהרנו ומה נחש שממית ומרבה טומאה טהור שרץ שאין ממית ומרבה טומאה לא כ"ש,ולא היא מעשה קוץ בעלמא קעביד,א"ר אבא אמר שמואל שלש שנים נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו יצאה בת קול ואמרה אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים הן והלכה כב"ה,וכי מאחר שאלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים מפני מה זכו ב"ה לקבוע הלכה כמותן מפני שנוחין ועלובין היו ושונין דבריהן ודברי ב"ש ולא עוד אלא שמקדימין דברי ב"ש לדבריהן,כאותה ששנינו מי שהיה ראשו ורובו בסוכה ושלחנו בתוך הבית בית שמאי פוסלין וב"ה מכשירין אמרו ב"ה לב"ש לא כך היה מעשה שהלכו זקני ב"ש וזקני ב"ה לבקר את ר' יוחנן בן החורנית ומצאוהו יושב ראשו ורובו בסוכה ושלחנו בתוך הבית אמרו להן בית שמאי (אי) משם ראיה אף הן אמרו לו אם כך היית נוהג לא קיימת מצות סוכה מימיך,ללמדך שכל המשפיל עצמו הקב"ה מגביהו וכל המגביה עצמו הקב"ה משפילו כל המחזר על הגדולה גדולה בורחת ממנו וכל הבורח מן הגדולה גדולה מחזרת אחריו וכל הדוחק את השעה שעה דוחקתו וכל הנדחה מפני שעה שעה עומדת לו,ת"ר שתי שנים ומחצה נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים נוח לו לאדם שלא נברא יותר משנברא והללו אומרים נוח לו לאדם שנברא יותר משלא נברא נמנו וגמרו נוח לו לאדם שלא נברא יותר משנברא עכשיו שנברא יפשפש במעשיו ואמרי לה ימשמש במעשיו, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big הקורה שאמרו רחבה כדי לקבל אריח ואריח חצי לבנה של שלשה טפחים דייה לקורה שתהא רחבה טפח כדי לקבל אריח לרחבו,רחבה כדי לקבל אריח ובריאה כדי לקבל אריח רבי יהודה אומר רחבה אף על פי שאין בריאה היתה של קש ושל קנים רואין אותה כאילו היא של מתכת,עקומה רואין אותה כאילו היא פשוטה עגולה רואין אותה כאילו היא מרובעת כל שיש בהיקיפו שלשה טפחים יש בו רוחב טפח: 13b. b but /b later b reconsidered /b and did not divorce her, b and a resident of his city found him and said: Your name is /b the same b as my name, and your wife’s name is /b the same b as my wife’s name, /b and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce, and I will use it to divorce my wife, then this document b is invalid to divorce with it? /b Apparently, a man may not divorce his wife with a bill of divorce written for another woman, and the same should apply to the scroll of a i sota /i .,The Gemara rejects this argument: b How can you compare /b the two cases? b There, /b with regard to a bill of divorce, b it is written: “And he shall write for her” /b (Deuteronomy 24:1), and therefore b we require writing /b it b in her name, /b specifically for her; whereas b here, /b with regard to a i sota /i , b it is written: “And he shall perform with her /b all this ritual” (Numbers 5:30), and therefore b we require performance in her name. /b In b her /b case, the b performance is erasure; /b however, writing of the scroll need not be performed specifically for her.,On the topic of Rabbi Meir and his Torah study, the Gemara cites an additional statement. b Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that in the generation of Rabbi Meir there was no /b one of the Sages who is b his equal. Why /b then b didn’t /b the Sages b establish the i halakha /i in accordance with his /b opinion? It is b because his colleagues were unable to ascertain the profundity of his opinion. /b He was so brilliant that he could present a cogent argument for any position, even if it was not consistent with the prevalent i halakha /i . b As he /b would b state with regard to /b a ritually b impure /b item that it is b pure, and display justification /b for that ruling, and likewise he would state b with regard to /b a ritually b pure /b item that it is b impure, and display justification /b for that ruling. The Sages were unable to distinguish between the statements that were i halakha /i and those that were not., b It was taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Meir was not his name; rather, Rabbi Nehorai was his name. And why was he called /b by the b name Rabbi Meir? /b It was b because he illuminates [ i meir /i ] the eyes of the Sages in /b matters of b the i halakha /i . And Rabbi Nehorai was not the name /b of the i tanna /i known by that name; b rather, Rabbi Neḥemya was his name, and some say: Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh was his name. And why was he called /b by the b name Rabbi Nehorai? /b It is b because he enlightens [ i manhir /i ] the eyes of the Sages in /b matters of b the i halakha /i . /b ,The Gemara relates that b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b said: /b The fact b that I am /b more b incisive than my colleagues is /b due to the fact b that I saw Rabbi Meir from behind, /b i.e., I sat behind him when I was his student. b Had I seen him from the front, I would be /b even more b incisive, as it is written: “And your eyes shall see your teacher” /b (Isaiah 30:20). Seeing the face of one’s teacher increases one’s understanding and sharpens one’s mind.,And the Gemara stated that b Rabbi Abbahu said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said: Rabbi Meir had a disciple, and his name was Sumakhus, who would state with regard to each and every matter of ritual impurity forty-eight reasons /b in support of the ruling of b impurity, and with regard to each and every matter of ritual purity forty-eight reasons /b in support of the ruling of b purity. /b , b It was taught /b in a i baraita /i : b There was a distinguished disciple at Yavne who could /b with his incisive intellect b purify the creeping animal, /b explicitly deemed ritually impure by the Torah, adducing b one hundred and fifty reasons /b in support of his argument., b Ravina said: I /b too b will deliberate and purify it /b employing the following reasoning: b And just as a snake that kills /b people and animals b and /b thereby b increases ritual impurity /b in the world, as a corpse imparts impurity through contact, through being carried, and by means of a tent, b is ritually pure /b and transmits no impurity, b a creeping animal that does not kill and /b does not b increase impurity /b in the world, b all the more so /b should it be pure.,The Gemara rejects this: b And it is not so; /b that is not a valid i a fortiori /i argument, as it can be refuted. A snake b is performing a mere act of a thorn. /b A thorn causes injury and even death; nevertheless, it is not ritually impure. The same applies to a snake, and therefore this i a fortiori /i argument is rejected., b Rabbi Abba said /b that b Shmuel said: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with our /b opinion, b and these said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with our /b opinion. Ultimately, b a Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: /b Both b these and those are the words of the living God. However, the i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Beit Hillel. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Since both these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to /b have b the i halakha /i established in accordance with their /b opinion? The reason is b that they were agreeable and forbearing, /b showing restraint when affronted, and when they taught the i halakha /i they would b teach /b both b their /b own b statements and the statements of Beit Shammai. Moreover, /b when they formulated their teachings and cited a dispute, b they prioritized the statements of Beit Shammai to their /b own b statements, /b in deference to Beit Shammai., b As /b in the mishna b that we learned: /b In the case of b one whose head and most of his body were in the i sukka /i , but his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem /b this i sukka /i b invalid; and Beit Hillel deem it valid. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Wasn’t there an incident in which the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥa ben HaḤoranit, and they found him sitting /b with b his head and most of his body in the i sukka /i , but his table was in the house? Beit Shammai said to them: From there /b do you seek to adduce b a proof? /b Those visitors, b too, said to him: If that was /b the manner in which b you were accustomed /b to perform the mitzva, b you have never fulfilled the mitzva of i sukka /i in /b all b your days. /b It is apparent from the phrasing of the mishna that when the Sages of Beit Hillel related that the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel visited Rabbi Yoḥa ben HaḤoranit, they mentioned the Elders of Beit Shammai before their own Elders.,This is b to teach you that anyone who humbles himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, exalts him, and anyone who exalts himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humbles him. Anyone who seeks greatness, greatness flees from him, and, /b conversely, b anyone who flees from greatness, greatness seeks him. And anyone who /b attempts to b force the moment /b and expends great effort to achieve an objective precisely when he desires to do so, b the moment forces him /b too, and he is unsuccessful. b And /b conversely, b anyone who /b is patient and b yields to the moment, the moment stands /b by b his /b side, and he will ultimately be successful., b The Sages taught /b the following i baraita /i : b For two and a half years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These say: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. And those said: It is preferable for man to have been created than had he not been created. /b Ultimately, b they were counted and concluded: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. /b However, b now that he has been created, he should examine his actions /b that he has performed and seek to correct them. b And some say: He should scrutinize his /b planned b actions /b and evaluate whether or not and in what manner those actions should be performed, so that he will not sin., strong MISHNA: /strong b The /b cross b beam, which /b the Sages b stated /b may be used to render an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, must be b wide enough to receive /b and hold b a small brick. And /b this b small brick /b is b half a large brick, /b which measures b three handbreadths, /b i.e., a handbreadth and a half. b It is sufficient that the /b cross b beam will be a handbreadth in width, /b not a handbreadth and a half, b enough to hold a small brick across its width. /b ,And the cross beam must be b wide enough to hold a small brick /b and also b sturdy enough to hold a small brick /b and not collapse. b Rabbi Yehuda says: /b If it is b wide /b enough to hold the brick, b even though it is not sturdy /b enough to actually support it, it is sufficient. Therefore, even if the cross beam b is /b made b of straw or reeds, one considers it as though it were /b made b of metal. /b ,If the cross beam is b curved, /b so that a small brick cannot rest on it, b one considers it as though it were straight; /b if it is b round, one considers it as though it were square. /b The following principle was stated with regard to a round cross beam: b Any /b beam b with a circumference of three handbreadths is a handbreadth in width, /b i.e., in diameter.
58. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
10.14. And in his correspondence he replaces the usual greeting, I wish you joy, by wishes for welfare and right living, May you do well, and Live well.Ariston says in his Life of Epicurus that he derived his work entitled The Canon from the Tripod of Nausiphanes, adding that Epicurus had been a pupil of this man as well as of the Platonist Pamphilus in Samos. Further, that he began to study philosophy when he was twelve years old, and started his own school at thirty-two.He was born, according to Apollodorus in his Chronology, in the third year of the 109th Olympiad, in the archonship of Sosigenes, on the seventh day of the month Gamelion, in the seventh year after the death of Plato.
59. Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, 10, 8, 42 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 56, 98
60. Gregory of Nyssa, De Virginitate (Recensio Altera), 31.251.24-252.3 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 16
61. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 36-37, 35 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 118
62. Gregory of Nyssa, De Virginitate, 31.251.24-252.3 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 16
63. Gregory of Nyssa, De Vita Mosis, 1.2-1.3, 1.16-1.19, 2.1, 2.26, 2.48, 2.162-2.169, 2.305, 2.308 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 16, 72, 127, 235, 237
64. Libanius, Letters, 7 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 266
65. Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Makrina, 10, 18, 3-4, 1 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 16
66. Ammonius Hermiae, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius, 1, 10, 100-109, 11, 110-119, 12, 120-129, 13, 130-139, 14, 140-149, 15, 150-159, 16, 160-169, 17, 170-179, 18, 180-189, 19, 190-199, 2, 20, 200-209, 21, 210-219, 22, 220-229, 23, 230-239, 24, 240-249, 25, 250-254, 256-259, 26, 260-269, 27, 270-279, 28, 280-289, 29, 290-299, 3, 30, 300-309, 31, 310-319, 32, 320-322, 33-39, 4, 40-49, 5, 50-59, 6, 60-69, 7, 70-79, 8, 80-89, 9, 90-99, 255 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Honigman (2003), The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas, 15
67. Jerome, Letters, 57.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 115
68. Papyri, P.Lips., 1.41  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
69. Papyri, P.Oxy., 50.3579  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 115
70. Nicolaus, Progymnasmata, 8  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 237
71. Papyri, P.Thead., 16  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
72. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.525-1.526, 1.551-1.552, 2.353, 4.347-4.350, 10.279-10.284, 11.252-11.293, 11.296-11.335  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks •body, in rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 93, 103, 104, 105; Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 169
1.525. to Heaven's command; and in my ships I bear 1.526. my gods ancestral, which I snatched away 1.551. A flock of twelve, whose gayly fluttering file, 1.552. erst scattered by Jove's eagle swooping down 2.353. whom wrathful Heaven defended in that hour, 4.347. pale-featured ghosts, or, if he will, consigns 4.348. to doleful Tartarus; or by its power 4.349. gives slumber or dispels; or quite unseals 4.350. the eyelids of the dead: on this relying, 10.279. Manto, a prophetess: he gave good walls, 10.280. O Mantua , and his mother's name, to thee,— 10.281. to Mantua so rich in noble sires, 10.282. but of a blood diverse, a triple breed, 10.283. four stems in each; and over all enthroned 10.284. he rules her tribes: her strength is Tuscan born. 11.252. with loud lamenting, round the doleful flame. 11.253. The wail of warriors and the trumpets' blare 11.254. the very welkin rend. Cast on the flames 11.255. are spoils of slaughtered Latins,—helms and blades, 11.256. bridles and chariot-wheels. Yet others bring 11.257. gifts to the dead familiar, their own shields 11.258. and unavailing spears. Around them slain 11.259. great herds of kine give tribute unto death: 11.260. wine, bristly-backed, from many a field are borne, 11.261. and slaughtered sheep bleed o'er the sacred fire. 11.262. So on the shore the wailing multitude 11.263. behold their comrades burning, and keep guard 11.264. o'er the consuming pyres, nor turn away 11.265. till cooling night re-shifts the globe of heaven, 11.267. Likewise the mournful Latins far away 11.268. have built their myriad pyres. Yet of the slain 11.269. not few in graves are laid, and borne with tears 11.270. to neighboring country-side or native town; 11.271. the rest—promiscuous mass of dead unknown— 11.272. to nameless and unhonored ashes burn; 11.273. with multitude of fires the far-spread fields 11.274. blaze forth unweariedly. But when from heaven 11.275. the third morn had dispelled the dark and cold, 11.276. the mournful bands raked forth the mingled bones 11.277. and plenteous ashes from the smouldering pyres, 11.278. then heaped with earth the one sepulchral mound. 11.279. Now from the hearth-stones of the opulent town 11.280. of old Latinus a vast wail burst forth, 11.281. for there was found the chief and bitterest share 11.282. of all the woe. For mothers in their tears, 11.283. lone brides, and stricken souls of sisters fond, 11.284. and boys left fatherless, fling curses Ioud 11.285. on Turnus' troth-plight and the direful war: 11.286. “Let him, let Turnus, with his single sword 11.287. decide the strife,”—they cry,—“and who shall claim 11.288. Lordship of Italy and power supreme.” 11.289. Fierce Drances whets their fury, urging all 11.290. that Turnus singly must the challenge hear, 11.291. and singly wage the war; but others plead 11.292. in Turnus' favor; the Queen's noble name 11.293. protects him, and his high renown in arms 11.296. lo, the ambassadors to Diomed 11.297. arrive with cloudy forehead from their quest 11.298. in his illustrious town; for naught availed 11.299. their toilsome errand, nor the gifts and gold, 11.300. nor strong entreaty. Other help in war 11.301. the Latins now must find, or humbly sue 11.302. peace from the Trojan. At such tidings dire 11.303. even Latinus trembles: Heaven's decrees 11.304. and influence of gods too visible 11.305. ustain Aeneas; so the wrath divine 11.306. and new-filled sepulchres conspicuous 11.307. give warning clear. Therefore the King convenes 11.308. a general council of his captains brave 11.309. beneath the royal towers. They, gathering, 11.310. throng the approaches thither, where their Iord, 11.311. gray-haired Latinus, takes the central throne, 11.312. wearing authority with mournful brow. 11.313. He bids the envoys from Aetolia's King 11.314. ent back, to speak and tell the royal words 11.315. in order due. Forthwith on every tongue 11.316. fell silence, while the princely Venulus, 11.318. “My countrymen,” he said, “our eyes have seen 11.319. trongholds of Greeks and Diomed the King. 11.320. We braved all perils to our journey's end 11.321. and clasped that hand whereof the dreadful stroke 11.322. wrought Ilium 's fall. The hero built a town, 11.323. Argyripa, hereditary name, 11.324. near mount Garganus in Apulian land: 11.325. passing that city's portal and the King's, 11.326. we found free audience, held forth thy gifts, 11.327. and told our names and fatherland. We showed 11.328. what condict was enkindled, and what cause 11.329. brought us to Arpi's King. He, hearing all, 11.330. with brow benign made answer to our plea: 11.331. ‘O happy tribes in Saturn's kingdom born, 11.332. Ausonia's ancient stem! What fortune blind 11.333. tempts ye from peace away, and now ensnares 11.334. in wars unknown? Look how we men that dared 11.335. lay Ilium waste (I speak not of what woes
73. Menander Rhetor, Division of Epideictic Styles, 1.331.15  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 16
74. Menander Rhetor, On Epideictic Speeches, 2.371.27-2.371.30  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 72
75. Plutarch, Cato Major, 27.5  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 193
76. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi, 12-22, 51-53, 96-99, 11  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 72
77. Papyri, P.Col., 7.174  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
78. Papyri, P.Princ., 3.119  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
79. Anon., Anonymous Seguerianus, 3.145  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Liddel (2020), Decrees of Fourth-Century Athens (403/2-322/1 BC): Volume 2, Political and Cultural Perspectives, 233
81. Hecataeus, Frag. Apud Diodorus, Historical Library, 16.1.1  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Honigman (2003), The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas, 30
82. Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, Relationes, 39  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 26
83. Martianus Capella, ‘Liber De Arte Rhetorica’, 16, 3, 15  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 117
84. Chirius Fortunatianus, Ars Rhetorica, 1.1-1.3, 2.8-2.9, 2.15-2.23  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 109, 114, 117
85. Papyri, P. K¨Oln Panop., 31  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 114
86. Euripides, Rhadamanthus Fragments, '659  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
87. Hippocrates, De Victu, a b c d\n0 '24.8 '24.8 '24 8  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
88. Epigraphy, Cil, 6.1285  Tagged with subjects: •body, in rhetorical handbooks •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 29, 30, 171, 172
89. App., Caes. Gal., 7.23.1  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Oksanish (2019), Benedikt Eckhardt, and Meret Strothmann, Law in the Roman Provinces, 11
90. €˜Constantius of Lyon’, Life of St Germanus of Auxerre, None  Tagged with subjects: •rhetoric,handbooks of Found in books: Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 57
91. Anon., Anonymous Seguerianus, 10-12, 124-129, 13, 130-131, 14, 146, 15, 157, 16, 160, 163, 17, 171, 174, 18, 180, 230, 63, 88, 145  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 89
93. Ps. Hermogenes, Progymnasmata, 11, 19  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 56, 98
95. Anon., V. Thaisis, None  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 266
96. New Testament, 1 Clement, 36.1, 63.3, 64.1  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 189
97. Ignatius, Mag., 4.1, 7.2  Tagged with subjects: •rhetorical handbooks Found in books: Martin and Whitlark (2018), Inventing Hebrews: Design and Purpose in Ancient Rhetoric, 189
98. Nilus, De Mon. Ex., 3.16.1  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 53