| 1. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
| 2. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.8-2.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232 |
| 3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 101, 103, 104 |
| 4. Cicero, On Fate, 10, 41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232 |
5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.11, 4.16-4.21, 4.52, 4.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions •responsibility, moral, in psychopaths Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232, 241, 242| 3.11. quod aliis quoque multis locis reperietur; reperitur G 1 sed id alias, nunc, quod instat. totum igitur id alt. id om. H s quod quaerimus quid et quale sit, sit fit V verbi vis ipsa declarat. eos enim sanos quoniam intellegi necesse est, quorum mens motu quasi morbo perturbata nullo nulla X corr. V 1? sit, qui quia K 1 contra adfecti affecti GR 2 insani G 1 sint, hos insanos appellari necesse est. itaque nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui ecfrenati hecfrenati G (h del. 2 ) hęc fr. V effr. R rec V rec feruntur aut libidine aut iracundia— quamquam ipsa iracundia libidinis est pars; sic enim definitur: iracundia ulciscendi libido ulciscendi libido cf. Aug. civ. 14,15 quis V 1 —; qui igitur exisse ex potestate dicimus ... 20 ex potestate om. H dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non sint in potestate mentis, cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est. Graeci autem mani/an manian X (man in r. V 1 ) appellant X unde appellent, non facile dixerim; eam tamen ipsam ipsa KGH (ipsāR, sed vix m. 1 ) distinguimus nos melius quam illi. hanc enim insaniam, quae iuncta stultitiae stultitiae K 2 V c BGr.(?) stultitia X patet latius, nos post latius add. V c a furore disiungimus. distinguimus R Graeci volunt illi quidem, sed parum valent verbo: quem nos furorem, melagxoli/an melancholian GV -iam KRH illi vocant; quasi vero atra bili atribili V 1 K (-bi li) atra- bili GR solum mens ac non non add. R c saepe vel iracundia graviore vel timore vel timore add. G 2 vel dolore moveatur; totum . . 322, 3 moveatur H quo genere Athamantem Alcmaeonem alomeonem K 1 alc meonem V (on in r. V c ) Aiacem Orestem furere dicimus. qui ita sit adfectus, eum dominum esse rerum suarum vetant duodecim duodecem R 1 V tab. 5, 7. Ciceronis locus obversatur Horatio s. 2, 3, 217 tabulae; itaque non est scriptum si insanus, sed si furiosus insanus et fur. Non. escit Bouhier esse incipit W esset Non. escit . stultitiam stultiam V ( ss rec ) stultia K (- 2 ) stultitia GR 1 (-ă 2 ) H enim censuerunt constantia, inconstantiam KR ( etiam m a m. 1 ut. v. ) V 1 ( sed in et m exp. 1 ) H inconstantia G insaniam enim censuerunt constantiam, id est sanitatem, tamen posse tueri Non. id est sanitate, vacantem posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum et vitae communem cultum atque usitatum; furorem autem autem om. Non. esse rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem. quod cum maius magis R 1 esse videatur quam insania, tamen eius modi est, ut furor in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania. itaque stultitia censuerunt ... 13 insania itaque ... 13 cadere possit, insania non Non. 443, 2 sed haec alia quaestio est; nos ad propositum revertamur. 4.16. Sed singulis in singulis G ( exp. 2 ) perturbationibus partes eiusdem generis plures subiciuntur, ut aegritudini invidentia— utendum est enim docendi dicendi V 1 causa verbo minus usitato, quoniam invidia non in eo qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur ut... 369, 3 invidetur Non. 443, 19 —, aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aerumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adflictatio, adflectatio K 1 R 1 desperatio, et si quae sunt de genere eodem. sub metum autem subiecta sunt pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, examinatio GK 1 conturbatio, formido, voluptati voluptatis X -ti s vol uptatis V ( ss. rec ) malivolentia... 9 similia Non. 16, 24 s. l. lactare ( sed in textu laetans) malev. hic 370, 21 et 395, 6 X maliv. hic Non. ( 370, 21 R 2 ) malivolentia laetans laetari H malo alieno, laet. m. al. addit C., ut appareat cur mal. voluptati subiciatur delectatio, iactatio et similia, lubidini libidinis V rec inimicitiae Non. ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, ludisne ira... inimicitiae discordia Non. 103, 12 indigentia, desiderium et cetera eius modi. Haec St. fr. 3, 415. 410. 403. 398 cf. om- nino fr. 391–416, quae graecas harum definitionum formas exhibent. autem definiunt hoc modo: invidentiam esse dicunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. 4.17. (nam si qui qui quid K 1 (d eras. ) RH doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere, ut si Hectori haectori X (ut ... Agamemno om. H) Agamemno; qui autem, cui alterius commoda comoda GRV 1 nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat is frui, is frui is R rec s frui se GR 1 V (se exp. rec ) K 2 fuisse K 1 invideat profecto.) aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur— sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis—, et et om. G est aemulatio aegritudo, est aegritudo aemulatio G 1 si eo eo ea H quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat. obtrectatio autem est, ea quam intellegi zhlotupi/an zelotypian GRV (n ut sequens u in r. ) H (i pro y) zelo t ypiam K volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur eo quod ipse concupiverit. 4.18. misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria iniuria K laborantis (nemo enim parricidae patricidae G 1 V aut proditoris supplicio subpl. KH misericordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit interitu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio adflictio V (G 1 in lemmate mg. ) aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum. Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris,. 4.19. . . terrorem metum pudorem metum dedecoris add. Sey. ( ai)sxu/nh fo/bos a)doci/as pudorem metum sanguinem diffundentem Bai. ( cf. Gell. 19, 6 ); quae coniungenda videntur : pudorem metum dedecoris sanguinem diffundentem concutientem, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, laboris; Terrorem metum mali adp. K 1 Terrorem in Timorem corr. et verba terrorem ... 15 consequatur in mg. add. K 2 timorem metum metu mientem V ( add. rec ) metu mentem GKRH mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mali... 16 metum add. G 2 in mg. mentem loco loquo K 1 moventem, ex quo illud Ennius: ennius X enni V rec M s (et We. coll. nat. deor. 2, 60 fat. 35 off. 2, 89 al. ) Enn. Alcm. 23 tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi omne mmihi ( vel mihi omnem) exanimato expectorat fere de orat. 3, 154. 218 Non. 16, 7. omnem mihi ex anima expectaret X (expectorat K 2 expectoret B ex- pelleret V rec ) exanimato expectorat ex ... 18 expectorat om. H, exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris, conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem. 4.20. Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, descr. cf. 366, 18 describit K 1 ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo, delectatio declaratio K 1 voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens; et qualis est haec aurium, tales sunt oculorum et tactionum sunt toculorum et actionum Non. L 1 sunt et ocul. B adorationum K 1 et odorationum et saporum, qualis haec ... 3 saporum Non. 227, 9 quae sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptates. iactatio est voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius. 4.21. Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi poen. ex pen. V 2 pun. HV rec eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo modo W ( o)rgh\ e)narxome/nh ) sine modo Non. existens, excandescentia... 9 existens Non. 103, 14 desistens V 3 quae qu/mwsis Graece dicitur, odium Qg M w ClC fere X ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo animo Lb. ( cf. Th. 1. 1. 4, 940 ) odio et corde concepta, indigentia Idigentia K 1 libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. distinguunt distingunt X illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae kathgorh/mata K a TH G opphm a T L fere X dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia diligentia X indigentia s V 3 quod verum videtur, etsi Cic. non bene expressit spa/nin duplici sensu adhiberi ( de re cf. St. fr. 3, 91 rerum ipsarum sit, sit Man. est ( def. Küh. ) ut honorum, ut St. fr. 3, 379 pecuniae. ut pec. et pec. H 4.52. nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in re p. fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus. an est quicquam similius insaniae insaniae s insania X quam ira? quam bene Ennius initium dixit Enn. fr. inc. 18 insaniae. color, vox, oculi, spiritus, inpotentia dictorum ac factorum quam partem habent sanitatis? quid Achille Homerico foedius, quid Agamemnone in iurgio? nam Aiacem quidem ira ad furorem mortemque perduxit. non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam; satis est instructa parata armata per sese. nam isto quidem modo isto modo quidem s corr. We. licet dicere utilem vinulentiam ad fortitudinem, utilem vinul.... 27 utilem om. V etiam dementiam, quod et insani et ebrii multa faciunt saepe vehementius. semper Aiax fortis, fortissimus tamen in furore; nam Trag. inc. 64 nam poetae tribuunt alii Fa/cinus fecit ma/ximum, cum Da/nais inclina/ntibus Summa/m rem perfeci/t perfecit s perficit X manu. manu Bentl. manus s manu sua restituit proelium Insaniens G. Hermann op. 7, 382 sed cf. Plasberg, Festschr. f. Vahlen 224, qui recte proel. r. ins. Ciceroni, non poetae tribuisse vid. proelium restituit insaniens: 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae — | |
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| 6. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232 |
7. New Testament, Romans, 6.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 122| 6.5. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα· | 6.5. For if we have become united with him in the likeness of his death, we will also be part of his resurrection; |
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8. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 4.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 120| 4.16. Διὸ οὐκ ἐγκακοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος διαφθείρεται, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ. | |
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| 9. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
| 10. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.1, 1.1.3-1.1.7, 1.3.3, 1.5.2, 1.13.3, 1.20.3, 2.5.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, set aside •responsibility, moral, in psychopaths Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 111, 242 |
| 11. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 18.14, 59.15, 83.25-83.26, 87.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility •responsibility, moral, in psychopaths Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241, 242 |
12. Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, 1.9.2, 3.4.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241| 1.9.2. Ἀθάμας δὲ ὕστερον διὰ μῆνιν Ἥρας καὶ τῶν ἐξ Ἰνοῦς ἐστερήθη παίδων· αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ μανεὶς ἐτόξευσε Λέαρχον, Ἰνὼ δὲ Μελικέρτην μεθʼ ἑαυτῆς εἰς πέλαγος ἔρριψεν. ἐκπεσὼν δὲ τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐπυνθάνετο τοῦ θεοῦ ποῦ κατοικήσει· χρησθέντος δὲ αὐτῷ κατοικεῖν ἐν ᾧπερ ἂν τόπῳ ὑπὸ ζῴων ἀγρίων ξενισθῇ, πολλὴν χώραν διελθὼν ἐνέτυχε λύκοις προβάτων μοίρας νεμομένοις· οἱ δέ, θεωρήσαντες αὐτόν, ἃ διῃροῦντο ἀπολιπόντες ἔφυγον. Ἀθάμας δὲ κτίσας τὴν χώραν Ἀθαμαντίαν ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ προσηγόρευσε, καὶ γήμας Θεμιστὼ τὴν Ὑψέως ἐγέννησε Λεύκωνα Ἐρύθριον Σχοινέα Πτῶον. 3.4.3. Σεμέλης δὲ Ζεὺς ἐρασθεὶς Ἥρας κρύφα συνευνάζεται. ἡ δὲ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ὑπὸ Ἥρας, κατανεύσαντος αὐτῇ Διὸς πᾶν τὸ αἰτηθὲν ποιήσειν, αἰτεῖται τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν οἷος ἦλθε μνηστευόμενος Ἥραν. Ζεὺς δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος ἀνανεῦσαι παραγίνεται εἰς τὸν θάλαμον αὐτῆς ἐφʼ ἅρματος ἀστραπαῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ βρονταῖς, καὶ κεραυνὸν ἵησιν. Σεμέλης δὲ διὰ τὸν φόβον ἐκλιπούσης, ἑξαμηνιαῖον τὸ βρέφος ἐξαμβλωθὲν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ἁρπάσας ἐνέρραψε τῷ μηρῷ. ἀποθανούσης δὲ Σεμέλης, αἱ λοιπαὶ Κάδμου θυγατέρες διήνεγκαν λόγον, συνηυνῆσθαι θνητῷ τινι Σεμέλην καὶ καταψεύσασθαι Διός, καὶ ὅτι 1 -- διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεραυνώθη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν καθήκοντα Διόνυσον γεννᾷ Ζεὺς λύσας τὰ ῥάμματα, καὶ δίδωσιν Ἑρμῇ. ὁ δὲ κομίζει πρὸς Ἰνὼ καὶ Ἀθάμαντα καὶ πείθει τρέφειν ὡς κόρην. ἀγανακτήσασα δὲ Ἥρα μανίαν αὐτοῖς ἐνέβαλε, καὶ Ἀθάμας μὲν τὸν πρεσβύτερον παῖδα Λέαρχον ὡς ἔλαφον θηρεύσας ἀπέκτεινεν, Ἰνὼ δὲ τὸν Μελικέρτην εἰς πεπυρωμένον λέβητα ῥίψασα, εἶτα βαστάσασα μετὰ νεκροῦ τοῦ παιδὸς ἥλατο κατὰ βυθοῦ. 1 -- καὶ Λευκοθέα μὲν αὐτὴν καλεῖται, Παλαίμων δὲ ὁ παῖς, οὕτως ὀνομασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πλεόντων· τοῖς χειμαζομένοις γὰρ βοηθοῦσιν. ἐτέθη δὲ ἐπὶ Μελικέρτῃ ὁ 2 -- ἀγὼν τῶν Ἰσθμίων, Σισύφου θέντος. Διόνυσον δὲ Ζεὺς εἰς ἔριφον ἀλλάξας τὸν Ἥρας θυμὸν ἔκλεψε, καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸν Ἑρμῆς πρὸς νύμφας ἐκόμισεν ἐν Νύσῃ κατοικούσας τῆς Ἀσίας, ἃς ὕστερον Ζεὺς καταστερίσας ὠνόμασεν Ὑάδας. | |
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| 13. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 65 |
| 14. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.243-7.247, 9.211 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232, 241 |
15. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 2.3, 2.4.1, 2.5-2.8, 2.9.2, 2.9.4-2.9.5, 3.23.4, 5.10.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 115, 119, 121 | 2.3. It will therefore be right for us, as we enter on the examination of the known God, when the question arises, in what condition He is known to us, to begin with His works, which are prior to man; so that His goodness, being discovered immediately along with Himself, and then constituted and prescriptively settled, may suggest to us some sense whereby we may understand how the subsequent order of things came about. The disciples of Marcion, moreover, may possibly be able, while recognising the goodness of our God, to learn how worthy it is likewise of the Divine Being, on those very grounds whereby we have proved it to be unworthy in the case of their god. Now this very point, which is a material one in their scheme, Marcion did not find in any other god, but eliminated it for himself out of his own god. The first goodness, then, was that of the Creator, whereby God was unwilling to remain hidden for ever; in other words, (unwilling) that there should not be a something by which God should become known. For what, indeed, is so good as the knowledge and fruition of God? Now, although it did not transpires that this was good, because as yet there existed nothing to which it could transpire, yet God foreknew what good would eventually transpire, and therefore He set Himself about developing His own perfect goodness, for the accomplishment of the good which was to transpire; not, indeed, a sudden goodness issuing in some accidental boon or in some excited impulse, such as must be dated simply from the moment when it began to operate. For if it did itself produce its own beginning when it began to operate, it had not, in fact, a beginning itself when it acted. When, however, an initial act had been once done by it, the scheme of temporal seasons began, for distinguishing and noting which, the stars and luminaries of heaven were arranged in their order. Let them be, says God, for seasons, and for days, and years. Genesis 1:14 Previous, then, to this temporal course, (the goodness) which created time had not time; nor before that beginning which the same goodness originated, had it a beginning. Being therefore without all order of a beginning, and all mode of time, it will be reckoned to possess an age, measureless in extent and endless in duration; nor will it be possible to regard it as a sudden or adventitious or impulsive emotion, because it has nothing to occasion such an estimate of itself; in other words, no sort of temporal sequence. It must therefore be accounted an eternal attribute, inbred in God, and everlasting, and on this account worthy of the Divine Being, putting to shame for ever the benevolence of Marcion's god, subsequent as he is to (I will not say) all beginnings and times, but to the very malignity of the Creator, if indeed malignity could possibly have been found in goodness. 2.5. Now then, you dogs, whom the apostle puts outside, Revelation 22:15 and who yelp at the God of truth, let us come to your various questions. These are the bones of contention, which you are perpetually gnawing! If God is good, and prescient of the future, and able to avert evil, why did He permit man, the very image and likeness of Himself, and, by the origin of his soul, His own substance too, to be deceived by the devil, and fall from obedience of the law into death? For if He had been good, and so unwilling that such a catastrophe should happen, and prescient, so as not to be ignorant of what was to come to pass, and powerful enough to hinder its occurrence, that issue would never have come about, which should be impossible under these three conditions of the divine greatness. Since, however, it has occurred, the contrary proposition is most certainly true, that God must be deemed neither good, nor prescient, nor powerful. For as no such issue could have happened had God been such as He is reputed - good, and prescient, and mighty - so has this issue actually happened, because He is not such a God. In reply, we must first vindicate those attributes in the Creator which are called in question - namely, His goodness and foreknowledge, and power. But I shall not linger long over this point for Christ's own definition John 10:25 comes to our aid at once. From works must proofs be obtained. The Creator's works testify at once to His goodness, since they are good, as we have shown, and to His power, since they are mighty, and spring indeed out of nothing. And even if they were made out of some (previous) matter, as some will have it, they are even thus out of nothing, because they were not what they are. In short, both they are great because they are good; and God is likewise mighty, because all things are His own, whence He is almighty. But what shall I say of His prescience, which has for its witnesses as many prophets as it inspired? After all, what title to prescience do we look for in the Author of the universe, since it was by this very attribute that He foreknew all things when He appointed them their places, and appointed them their places when He foreknew them? There is sin itself. If He had not foreknown this, He would not have proclaimed a caution against it under the penalty of death. Now if there were in God such attributes as must have rendered it both impossible and improper for any evil to have happened to man, and yet evil did occur, let us consider man's condition also - whether it were not, in fact, rather the cause why that came to pass which could not have happened through God. I find, then, that man was by God constituted free, master of his own will and power; indicating the presence of God's image and likeness in him by nothing so well as by this constitution of his nature. For it was not by his face, and by the lineaments of his body, though they were so varied in his human nature, that he expressed his likeness to the form of God; but he showed his stamp in that essence which he derived from God Himself (that is, the spiritual, which answered to the form of God), and in the freedom and power of his will. This his state was confirmed even by the very law which God then imposed upon him. For a law would not be imposed upon one who had it not in his power to render that obedience which is due to law; nor again, would the penalty of death be threatened against sin, if a contempt of the law were impossible to man in the liberty of his will. So in the Creator's subsequent laws also you will find, when He sets before man good and evil, life and death, that the entire course of discipline is arranged in precepts by God's calling men from sin, and threatening and exhorting them; and this on no other ground than that man is free, with a will either for obedience or resistance. 2.6. But although we shall be understood, from our argument, to be only so affirming man's unshackled power over his will, that what happens to him should be laid to his own charge, and not to God's, yet that you may not object, even now, that he ought not to have been so constituted, since his liberty and power of will might turn out to be injurious, I will first of all maintain that he was rightly so constituted, that I may with the greater confidence commend both his actual constitution, and the additional fact of its being worthy of the Divine Being; the cause which led to man's being created with such a constitution being shown to be the better one. Moreover, man thus constituted will be protected by both the goodness of God and by His purpose, both of which are always found in concert in our God. For His purpose is no purpose without goodness; nor is His goodness goodness without a purpose, except forsooth in the case of Marcion's god, who is purposelessly good, as we have shown. Well, then, it was proper that God should be known; it was no doubt a good and reasonable thing. Proper also was it that there should be something worthy of knowing God. What could be found so worthy as the image and likeness of God? This also was undoubtedly good and reasonable. Therefore it was proper that (he who is) the image and likeness of God should be formed with a free will and a mastery of himself; so that this very thing - namely, freedom of will and self-command - might be reckoned as the image and likeness of God in him. For this purpose such an essence was adapted to man as suited this character, even the afflatus of the Deity, Himself free and uncontrolled. But if you will take some other view of the case, how came it to pass that man, when in possession of the whole world, did not above all things reign in self-possession - a master over others, a slave to himself? The goodness of God, then, you can learn from His gracious gift to man, and His purpose from His disposal of all things. At present, let God's goodness alone occupy our attention, that which gave so large a gift to man, even the liberty of his will. God's purpose claims some other opportunity of treatment, offering as it does instruction of like import. Now, God alone is good by nature. For He, who has that which is without beginning, has it not by creation, but by nature. Man, however, who exists entirely by creation, having a beginning, along with that beginning obtained the form in which he exists; and thus he is not by nature disposed to good, but by creation, not having it as his own attribute to be good, because, (as we have said,) it is not by nature, but by creation, that he is disposed to good, according to the appointment of his good Creator, even the Author of all good. In order, therefore, that man might have a goodness of his own, bestowed on him by God, and there might be henceforth in man a property, and in a certain sense a natural attribute of goodness, there was assigned to him in the constitution of his nature, as a formal witness of the goodness which God bestowed upon him, freedom and power of the will, such as should cause good to be performed spontaneously by man, as a property of his own, on the ground that no less than this would be required in the matter of a goodness which was to be voluntarily exercised by him, that is to say, by the liberty of his will, without either favour or servility to the constitution of his nature, so that man should be good just up to this point, if he should display his goodness in accordance with his natural constitution indeed, but still as the result of his will, as a property of his nature; and, by a similar exercise of volition, should show himself to be too strong in defense against evil also (for even this God, of course, foresaw), being free, and master of himself; because, if he were wanting in this prerogative of self-mastery, so as to perform even good by necessity and not will, he would, in the helplessness of his servitude, become subject to the usurpation of evil, a slave as much to evil as to good. Entire freedom of will, therefore, was conferred upon him in both tendencies; so that, as master of himself, he might constantly encounter good by spontaneous observance of it, and evil by its spontaneous avoidance; because, were man even otherwise circumstanced, it was yet his bounden duty, in the judgment of God, to do justice according to the motions of his will regarded, of course, as free. But the reward neither of good nor of evil could be paid to the man who should be found to have been either good or evil through necessity and not choice. In this really lay the law which did not exclude, but rather prove, human liberty by a spontaneous rendering of obedience, or a spontaneous commission of iniquity; so patent was the liberty of man's will for either issue. Since, therefore, both the goodness and purpose of God are discovered in the gift to man of freedom in his will, it is not right, after ignoring the original definition of goodness and purpose which it was necessary to determine previous to any discussion of the subject, on subsequent facts to presume to say that God ought not in such a way to have formed man, because the issue was other than what was assumed to be proper for God. We ought rather, after duly considering that it behooved God so to create man, to leave this consideration unimpaired, and to survey the other aspects of the case. It is, no doubt, an easy process for persons who take offense at the fall of man, before they have looked into the facts of his creation, to impute the blame of what happened to the Creator, without any examination of His purpose. To conclude: the goodness of God, then fully considered from the beginning of His works, will be enough to convince us that nothing evil could possibly have come forth from God; and the liberty of man will, after a second thought, show us that it alone is chargeable with the fault which itself committed. 2.7. By such a conclusion all is reserved unimpaired to God; both His natural goodness, and the purposes of His goverce and foreknowledge, and the abundance of His power. You ought, however, to deduct from God's attributes both His supreme earnestness of purpose and most excellent truth in His whole creation, if you would cease to inquire whether anything could have happened against the will of God. For, while holding this earnestness and truth of the good God, which are indeed capable of proof from the rational creation, you will not wonder at the fact that God did not interfere to prevent the occurrence of what He wished not to happen, in order that He might keep from harm what He wished. For, since He had once for all allowed (and, as we have shown, worthily allowed) to man freedom of will and mastery of himself, surely He from His very authority in creation permitted these gifts to be enjoyed: to be enjoyed, too, so far as lay in Himself, according to His own character as God, that is, for good (for who would permit anything hostile to himself?); and, so far as lay in man, according to the impulses of his liberty (for who does not, when giving anything to any one to enjoy, accompany the gift with a permission to enjoy it with all his heart and will?). The necessary consequence, therefore, was, that God must separate from the liberty which He had once for all bestowed upon man (in other words, keep within Himself), both His foreknowledge and power, through which He might have prevented man's falling into danger when attempting wrongly to enjoy his liberty. Now, if He had interposed, He would have rescinded the liberty of man's will, which He had permitted with set purpose, and in goodness. But, suppose God had interposed; suppose Him to have abrogated man's liberty, by warning him from the tree, and keeping off the subtle serpent from his interview with the woman; would not Marcion then exclaim, What a frivolous, unstable, and faithless Lord, cancelling the gifts He had bestowed! Why did He allow any liberty of will, if He afterwards withdrew it? Why withdraw it after allowing it? Let Him choose where to brand Himself with error, either in His original constitution of man, or in His subsequent abrogation thereof! If He had checked (man's freedom), would He not then seem to have been rather deceived, through want of foresight into the future? But in giving it full scope, who would not say that He did so in ignorance of the issue of things? God, however, did foreknow that man would make a bad use of his created constitution; and yet what can be so worthy of God as His earnestness of purpose, and the truth of His created works, be they what they may? Man must see, if he failed to make the most of the good gift he had received, how that he was himself guilty in respect of the law which he did not choose to keep, and not that the Lawgiver was committing a fraud against His own law, by not permitting its injunctions to be fulfilled. Whenever you are inclined to indulge in such censure (and it is the most becoming for you) against the Creator, recall gently to your mind in His behalf His earnestness, and endurance, and truth, in having given completeness to His creatures both as rational and good. 2.8. For it was not merely that he might live the natural life that God had produced man, but that he should live virtuously, that is, in relation to God and to His law. Accordingly, God gave him to live when he was formed into a living soul; but He charged him to live virtuously when he was required to obey a law. So also God shows that man was not constituted for death, by now wishing that he should be restored to life, preferring the sinner's repentance to his death. Ezekiel 18:23 As, therefore, God designed for man a condition of life, so man brought on himself a state of death; and this, too, neither through infirmity nor through ignorance, so that no blame can be imputed to the Creator. No doubt it was an angel who was the seducer; but then the victim of that seduction was free, and master of himself; and as being the image and likeness of God, was stronger than any angel; and as being, too, the afflatus of the Divine Being, was nobler than that material spirit of which angels were made. Who makes, says he, His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire. He would not have made all things subject to man, if he had been too weak for the dominion, and inferior to the angels, to whom He assigned no such subjects; nor would He have put the burden of law upon him, if he had been incapable of sustaining so great a weight; nor, again, would He have threatened with the penalty of death a creature whom He knew to be guiltless on the score of his helplessness: in short, if He had made him infirm, it would not have been by liberty and independence of will, but rather by the withholding from him these endowments. And thus it comes to pass, that even now also, the same human being, the same substance of his soul, the same condition as Adam's, is made conqueror over the same devil by the self-same liberty and power of his will, when it moves in obedience to the laws of God. |
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| 16. Tertullian, On Baptism, 4.5, 5.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 116, 121 |
| 17. Tertullian, On The Soul, 7.3-7.4, 11.4-11.6, 24.2, 27.2-27.4, 39.1-39.2, 58.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 115, 118, 119, 121 |
| 18. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
19. Tertullian, To The Martyrs, 4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 121 | 4. From the saying of our Lord we know that the flesh is weak, the spirit willing. Matthew 26:41 Let us not, withal, take delusive comfort from the Lord's acknowledgment of the weakness of the flesh. For precisely on this account He first declared the spirit willing, that He might show which of the two ought to be subject to the other - that the flesh might yield obedience to the spirit - the weaker to the stronger; the former thus from the latter getting strength. Let the spirit hold convene with the flesh about the common salvation, thinking no longer of the troubles of the prison, but of the wrestle and conflict for which they are the preparation. The flesh, perhaps, will dread the merciless sword, and the lofty cross, and the rage of the wild beasts, and that punishment of the flames, of all most terrible, and all the skill of the executioner in torture. But, on the other side, let the spirit set clearly before both itself and the flesh, how these things, though exceeding painful, have yet been calmly endured by many - and, have even been eagerly desired for the sake of fame and glory; and this not only in the case of men, but of women too, that you, O holy women, may be worthy of your sex. It would take me too long to enumerate one by one the men who at their own self-impulse have put an end to themselves. As to women, there is a famous case at hand: the violated Lucretia, in the presence of her kinsfolk, plunged the knife into herself, that she might have glory for her chastity. Mucius burned his right hand on an altar, that this deed of his might dwell in fame. The philosophers have been outstripped - for instance Heraclitus, who, smeared with cow dung, burned himself; and Empedocles, who leapt down into the fires of Ætna; and Peregrinus, who not long ago threw himself on the funeral pile. For women even have despised the flames. Dido did so, lest, after the death of a husband very dear to her, she should be compelled to marry again; and so did the wife of Hasdrubal, who, Carthage being on fire, that she might not behold her husband suppliant as Scipio's feet, rushed with her children into the conflagration, in which her native city was destroyed. Regulus, a Roman general, who had been taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, declined to be exchanged for a large number of Carthaginian captives, choosing rather to be given back to the enemy. He was crammed into a sort of chest; and, everywhere pierced by nails driven from the outside, he endured so many crucifixions. Woman has voluntarily sought the wild beasts, and even asps, those serpents worse than bear or bull, which Cleopatra applied to herself, that she might not fall into the hands of her enemy. But the fear of death is not so great as the fear of torture. And so the Athenian courtezan succumbed to the executioner, when, subjected to torture by the tyrant for having taken part in a conspiracy, still making no betrayal of her confederates, she at last bit off her tongue and spat it in the tyrant's face, that he might be convinced of the uselessness of his torments, however long they should be continued. Everybody knows what to this day is the great Laced monian solemnity- the διαμαστύγωσις, or scourging; in which sacred rite the Spartan youths are beaten with scourges before the altar, their parents and kinsmen standing by and exhorting them to stand it bravely out. For it will be always counted more honourable and glorious that the soul rather than the body has given itself to stripes. But if so high a value is put on the earthly glory, won by mental and bodily vigour, that men, for the praise of their fellows, I may say, despise the sword, the fire, the cross, the wild beasts, the torture; these surely are but trifling sufferings to obtain a celestial glory and a divine reward. If the bit of glass is so precious, what must the true pearl be worth? Are we not called on, then, most joyfully to lay out as much for the true as others do for the false? |
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| 20. Tertullian, On The Resurrection of The Flesh, 7.9-7.13, 8.3-8.5, 9.1-9.2, 14.2-14.3, 14.8, 14.10-14.11, 16.1-16.3, 16.11-16.15, 32.1-32.2, 40.3, 45.15 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 |
21. Tertullian, Apology, 48.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 116, 119| 48.7. in testimonium vobis. | 17. The object of our worship is the One God, He who by His commanding word, His arranging wisdom, His mighty power, brought forth from nothing this entire mass of our world, with all its array of elements, bodies, spirits, for the glory of His majesty; whence also the Greeks have bestowed on it the name of Κόσμος . The eye cannot see Him, though He is (spiritually) visible. He is incomprehensible, though in grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though our human faculties conceive of Him. He is therefore equally real and great. But that which, in the ordinary sense, can be seen and handled and conceived, is inferior to the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is tainted, and the faculties by which it is discovered; but that which is infinite is known only to itself. This it is which gives some notion of God, while yet beyond all our conceptions - our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as at once known and unknown. And this is the crowning guilt of men, that they will not recognize One, of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant. Would you have the proof from the works of His hands, so numerous and so great, which both contain you and sustain you, which minister at once to your enjoyment, and strike you with awe; or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul itself? Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, though led astray by depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of God; using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true God. God is great and good - Which may God give, are the words on every lip. It bears witness, too, that God is judge, exclaiming, God sees, and, I commend myself to God, and, God will repay me. O noble testimony of the soul by nature Christian! Then, too, in using such words as these, it looks not to the Capitol, but to the heavens. It knows that there is the throne of the living God, as from Him and from thence itself came down. |
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22. Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 12 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 118 | 12. If the number of the Trinity also offends you, as if it were not connected in the simple Unity, I ask you how it is possible for a Being who is merely and absolutely One and Singular, to speak in plural phrase, saying, Let us make man in our own image, and after our own likeness; Genesis 1:26 whereas He ought to have said, Let me make man in my own image, and after my own likeness, as being a unique and singular Being? In the following passage, however, Behold the man has become as one of us, Genesis 3:22 He is either deceiving or amusing us in speaking plurally, if He is One only and singular. Or was it to the angels that He spoke, as the Jews interpret the passage, because these also acknowledge not the Son? Or was it because He was at once the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, that He spoke to Himself in plural terms, making Himself plural on that very account? Nay, it was because He had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, Let us make; and, in our image; and, become as one of us. For with whom did He make man? And to whom did He make him like? (The answer must be), the Son on the one hand, who was one day to put on human nature; and the Spirit on the other, who was to sanctify man. With these did He then speak, in the Unity of the Trinity, as with His ministers and witnesses. In the following text also He distinguishes among the Persons: So God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him. Genesis 1:27 Why say image of God? Why not His own image merely, if He was only one who was the Maker, and if there was not also One in whose image He made man? But there was One in whose image God was making man, that is to say, Christ's image, who, being one day about to become Man (more surely and more truly so), had already caused the man to be called His image, who was then going to be formed of clay - the image and similitude of the true and perfect Man. But in respect of the previous works of the world what says the Scripture? Its first statement indeed is made, when the Son has not yet appeared: And God said, Let there be light, and there was light. Genesis 1:3 Immediately there appears the Word, that true light, which lights man on his coming into the world, John 1:9 and through Him also came light upon the world. From that moment God willed creation to be effected in the Word, Christ being present and ministering unto Him: and so God created. And God said, Let there be a firmament,...and God made the firmament; Genesis 1:6-7 and God also said, Let there be lights (in the firmament); and so God made a greater and a lesser light. But all the rest of the created things did He in like manner make, who made the former ones - I mean the Word of God, through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. John 1:3 Now if He too is God, according to John, (who says,) The Word was God, John 1:1 then you have two Beings - One that commands that the thing be made, and the Other that executes the order and creates. In what sense, however, you ought to understand Him to be another, I have already explained, on the ground of Personality, not of Substance - in the way of distinction, not of division. But although I must everywhere hold one only substance in three coherent and inseparable (Persons), yet I am bound to acknowledge, from the necessity of the case, that He who issues a command is different from Him who executes it. For, indeed, He would not be issuing a command if He were all the while doing the work Himself, while ordering it to be done by the second. But still He did issue the command, although He would not have intended to command Himself if He were only one; or else He must have worked without any command, because He would not have waited to command Himself. |
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| 23. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 2.161 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
24. Origen, Against Celsus, 8.51 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 | 8.51. In the next place, he expresses his approval of those who hope that eternal life shall be enjoyed with God by the soul or mind, or, as it is variously called, the spiritual nature, the reasonable soul, intelligent, holy, and blessed; and he allows the soundness of the doctrine, that those who had a good life shall be happy, and the unrighteous shall suffer eternal punishments. And yet I wonder at what follows, more than at anything that Celsus has ever said; for he adds, And from this doctrine let not them or any one ever swerve. For certainly in writing against Christians, the very essence of whose faith is God, and the promises made by Christ to the righteous, and His warnings of punishment awaiting the wicked, he must see that, if a Christian were brought to renounce Christianity by his arguments against it, it is beyond doubt that, along with his Christian faith, he would cast off the very doctrine from which he says that no Christian and no man should ever swerve. But I think Celsus has been far surpassed in consideration for his fellow-men by Chrysippus in his treatise, On the Subjugation of the Passions. For when he sought to apply remedies to the affections and passions which oppress and distract the human spirit, after employing such arguments as seemed to himself to be strong, he did not shrink from using in the second and third place others which he did not himself approve of. For, says he, if it were held by any one that there are three kinds of good, we must seek to regulate the passions in accordance with that supposition; and we must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away. And he adds, Thus, supposing that pleasure were the highest good, or that he was of that opinion whose mind was under the dominion of passion, we should not the less give him help, and show that, even on the principle that pleasure is the highest and final good of man, all passion is disallowed. And Celsus, in like manner, after having embraced the doctrine, that the righteous shall be blessed, and the wicked shall suffer eternal punishments, should have followed out his subject; and, after having advanced what seemed to him the chief argument, he should have proceeded to prove and enforce by further reasons the truth that the unjust shall surely suffer eternal punishment, and those who lead a good life shall be blessed. |
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| 25. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
26. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.15, 7.46, 7.111-7.114, 7.116, 7.118, 7.126, 7.129 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions •children, and moral responsibility •responsibility, moral, set aside Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 116, 232, 241 | 7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue. 7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness. 7.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or make-up whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. 7.126. For if a man be possessed of virtue, he is at once able to discover and to put into practice what he ought to do. Now such rules of conduct comprise rules for choosing, enduring, staying, and distributing; so that if a man does some things by intelligent choice, some things with fortitude, some things by way of just distribution, and some steadily, he is at once wise, courageous, just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject with which it deals, as, for instance, courage is concerned with things that must be endured, practical wisdom with acts to be done, acts from which one must abstain, and those which fall under neither head. Similarly each of the other virtues is concerned with its own proper sphere. To wisdom are subordinate good counsel and understanding; to temperance, good discipline and orderliness; to justice, equality and fair-mindedness; to courage, constancy and vigour. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. |
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| 27. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, and moral responsibility Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 104 |
28. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, and moral responsibility Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 104| 61b. מ"ש איהו מינן דידן ואין דקאמרי אחוכי עליה,ומתני' כאן ביחיד הניסת כאן ברבים הניסתים יחיד לא מימלך וטעי בתריה רבים מימלכי ולא טעו בתריה,אמר רב יוסף מנא אמינא לה דכתיב (דברים יג, ט) לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו הא אבה ושמע חייב,איתיביה אביי מי שאני בין ניסת דרבים לניסת יחיד והתניא (דברים יג, ז) כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך אחד יחיד הניסת ואחר רבים הניסתים והוציא הכתוב יחיד מכלל רבים ורבים מכלל יחיד,יחיד מכלל רבים להחמיר על גופו ולהקל על ממונו,רבים מכלל יחיד להקל על גופם ולהחמיר על ממונם,בהא מילתא הוא דשאני אבל בכל מילי כי הדדי נינהו,אלא אמר אביי כאן בניסת מפי עצמו כאן בניסת מפי אחרים מפי עצמו מימלך מפי אחרים גריר בתרייהו,אמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דכתיב לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו הא אבה ושמע חייב,רבא אמר אידי ואידי בניסת מפי אחרים הא דא"ל כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה הא דלא א"ל כך אוכלת כך שותה כו',אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דכתיב (דברים יג, ח) מאלהי העמים אשר סביבותיכם הקרובים אליך וגו' מה לי קרובים ומה לי רחוקים הכי קא"ל מטיבותן של קרובים אתה למד מה טיבותן של רחוקים,מאי לאו דאמר ליה כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה ש"מ,רב אשי אמר סיפא בישראל מומר,רבינא אמר לא זו אף זו קתני,איתמר העובד עבודת כוכבים מאהבה ומיראה אביי אמר חייב רבא אמר פטור,אביי אמר חייב דהא פלחה רבא אמר פטור אי קבליה עליה באלוה אין אי לא לא:,סימן עב"ד ישתחו"ה למשי"ח:,ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתנן העובד עבודת כוכבים אחד העובד כו' מאי לאו אחד העובד מאהבה ומיראה,ורבא אמר לך לא כדמתרץ רבי ירמיה,אמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתניא (שמות כ, ד) לא תשתחוה להם להם אי אתה משתחוה אבל אתה משתחוה לאדם כמותך יכול אפילו נעבד כהמן ת"ל (שמות כ, ד) ולא תעבדם והא המן מיראה הוה נעבד,ורבא כהמן ולא כהמן כהמן דאיהו גופיה עבודת כוכבים ולא כהמן דאילו המן מיראה והכא לאו מיראה,ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתניא כהן משיח בעבודת כוכבים רבי אומר בשגגת מעשה וחכמים אומרים בהעלם דבר,ושוין שבשעירה כיחיד ושוין שאין מביא אשם תלוי,האי שגגת מעשה דעבודת כוכבים ה"ד אי קסבר בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לו הרי לבו לשמים אלא דחזא אנדרטא והשתחוה לו,אי קבליה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא | 61b. In b what /b way b is he different from us? /b The suggestion to worship him is nonsense. b And /b the fact b that they say to him: Yes, /b is because b they ridicule him. /b , b And /b the contradiction between the b i mishnayot /i /b can be resolved as follows: b There, /b where the mishna states that one is liable for speech alone, the reference is b to an individual /b who was b incited; here, /b where the mishna indicates that one not is liable for speech alone, it is referring b to /b a case of b an incited multitude /b of people. The Gemara explains: b An individual /b who was incited b does not /b typically b change his mind, and he goes astray after /b idol worship. Therefore, once he agrees to the suggestion to worship an idol, he has fully accepted the idol upon himself as a god and is liable. By contrast, b a multitude /b of people are apt to b change their minds, and /b consequently they b do not go astray after /b idol worship., b Rav Yosef said: From where do I say /b that the i halakha /i that one is liable for merely stating that he will worship an idol is referring to an individual who was incited? b As it is written /b with regard to one who incites people to engage in idol worship: b “You shall not approve of him, nor listen to him” /b (Deuteronomy 13:9), which indicates that if one b approved /b of b and listened /b to the inciter, stating his intention to engage in idol worship, he is b liable /b even if he does not actually worship an idol., b Abaye raised an objection to /b Rav Yosef’s opinion: b Is /b there b a difference /b in i halakha /i b between /b the cases of b an incited multitude /b of people b and an individual /b who was b incited? But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i with regard to the verse: b “If your brother, the son of your mother, /b or your son, or your daughter, or the wife of your bosom, or your neighbor who is like your own soul, b incites you /b secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7), that b both an individual /b who was b incited and an incited multitude /b of people are included in this i halakha /i , b but the verse singles out the individual from the category of the multitude, and /b another verse singles out b the multitude from the category of the individual. /b ,The Torah states separately the i halakhot /i of an individual who is incited to engage in idol worship and of an entire city that is subverted to engage in idol worship in order to distinguish between the two cases, as follows: b An individual /b who was incited is singled out b from the category of /b a subverted b multitude /b of people in order b to render /b the punishment b to /b an individual’s b body /b more b stringent. /b The individual is executed by stoning, whereas the residents of an idolatrous city are executed by decapitation. b And /b an individual was singled out b to render /b the treatment of b the property of /b an individual who was incited more b lenient, /b as it is not destroyed like that of the residents of an idolatrous city.,Additionally, the Torah singles out the subverted b multitude /b of people b from the category of an individual /b who was incited in order b to render /b the punishment given b to the bodies of /b the residents of an idolatrous city, decapitation, more b lenient /b than that given to an individual who was incited, b and to render /b the treatment b of their property /b more b stringent, /b as the city and the property of its residents are burned.,Abaye concluded his objection to Rav Yosef’s opinion: It can be inferred from the i baraita /i that only b with regard to this matter, /b i.e., the i halakhot /i mentioned in the i baraita /i , b is /b the i halakha /i of an individual who was incited b different /b than that of an incited multitude of people, b but with regard to all /b other halakhic b matters they are the same. /b Therefore, a distinction cannot be made between them with regard to the i halakha /i in the case of a verbal commitment to idol worship., b Rather, Abaye said /b that the contradiction between the i mishnayot /i is to be resolved as follows: b Here, /b where the mishna indicates that one is liable only for actual worship, the reference is b to /b one who is b incited by himself, /b i.e., no one incited him to idol worship and he made the decision on his own. Whereas b there, /b in the mishna that deems one liable for stating that he will worship an idol, the reference is b to /b one who is b incited by others. /b The reason for the difference is that one who makes the decision b on his own /b is apt to b change his mind, /b whereas one who is incited b by others is drawn after them /b and is unlikely to change his mind., b Abaye said: From where do I say /b that this distinction is correct? b As it is written: “You shall not approve of him, nor listen to him” /b (Deuteronomy 13:9), referring to another individual who tried to incite him, and the verse indicates that if one b approved /b of b and listened /b to the inciter, he is b liable /b even for the approval alone., b Rava says: /b Both b this /b mishna b and that /b mishna are referring b to one incited by others, /b and they should be differentiated as follows: b That /b mishna, which deems one liable for merely expressing approval, is referring to a case b where /b the inciter described the qualities of the idol and b said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good /b for its worshippers b like this; /b and b it harms /b those who do not worship it b like this. /b In this case, expressing approval verbally suffices to render one liable, as he was evidently convinced by the description. b This /b mishna, which indicates that one is not liable for speech alone, is referring to a case b where /b the inciter b did not say to him: It eats like this; it, drinks like this, /b it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this., b Rava said: From where do I say /b that this distinction is correct? b As it is written: /b “Let us go and worship other gods… b from the gods of the peoples that surround you, the ones near to you /b or the ones far from you” (Deuteronomy 13:7–8). b What /b difference is there b to me /b whether they are b near, and what /b difference is there b to me /b whether they are b far? /b Why would the distance affect the prohibition? Rather, b this /b is what the Torah b is saying to you: /b Do not be tempted to listen to the inciter, as b from the nature of /b the objects of idol worship that are b near /b you, which you recognize to be false, b you can derive what the nature /b is b of /b the ones that are b far /b from you. Therefore, if you are told that there is an idol in a distant land that is real, realize that it is a lie.,It is from this interpretation that Rava derives his halakhic distinction: b What, /b is it b not /b referring to a case b where /b the inciter described to another the qualities of the idol and b said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good /b for its worshippers b like this; /b and b it harms /b those who do not worship it b like this? Conclude from it /b that only in such a case is the incited person liable for stating his approval., b Rav Ashi says /b that there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the i mishnayot /i : b The latter clause /b of the mishna (67a), which deems one liable for speech alone, is referring b to an apostate Jew; /b since he is already an apostate, his stated commitment to idol worship is certainly final. Consequently, he is liable. By contrast, a regular Jew is not liable for speech alone., b Ravina says /b that there is no contradiction; rather, the i tanna /i b teaches /b the mishna employing the style: b Not /b only b this /b but b also that. /b In other words, the i tanna /i first teaches the elementary i halakha /i that one who worships an idol is liable, and afterward it teaches the more novel i halakha /i that even one who merely says that he will engage in idol worship is immediately liable.,§ b It was stated /b that i amora’im /i engaged in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of b one who worships idols due to /b his b love /b of another who requested that he bow before the statue, b or due to fear /b of someone coercing him to do so, but not due to faith in that idol, what is the i halakha /i ? b Abaye says: /b He is b liable. Rava says: /b He is b exempt. /b ,The Gemara explains: b Abaye says /b he is b liable because he worshipped it. Rava says /b he is b exempt, /b as the criterion for becoming liable for idol worship is as follows: b If /b one sincerely b accepted /b the idol b upon himself as a god, yes, /b he is liable; but b if /b he did b not /b accept it sincerely, he is b not /b liable.,Abaye attempts to cite several proofs, whose b mnemonic /b is: b A slave will bow to the anointed. /b , b And Abaye said: From where do I say /b that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? b As we learned /b in the mishna: b One who worships idols /b is executed by stoning. This includes b one who worships /b an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering. b What /b is added by the mishna by stating twice: One who worships? b Is it not /b to include the case of b one who worships /b idols b due to love or due to fear, /b in addition to the case of one who worships idols out of faith? Evidently, in this case as well, the worshipper is liable., b And Rava /b could have b said to you /b in response that the term: One who worships, should b not /b be understood as Abaye suggests but rather b as Rabbi Yirmeya explains /b it, namely, that one who worships an idol in its standard manner of worship is liable, and one who sacrifices an idolatrous offering is liable even if that is not the standard manner of worship of that particular idol., b Abaye /b attempts to cite another proof for his opinion. He b said: From where do I say /b that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i with regard to the verse: b “You shall not bow to them /b nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5): b “To them,” /b to idols, b you may not bow, but you may bow to a person like yourself; /b bowing to a person is merely the acceptance of authority. One b might /b have thought that it is permitted to bow b even /b to a person who b is worshipped /b like a god, b like Haman; /b therefore, b the verse states: “Nor worship them,” /b i.e., any form of pagan worship is prohibited. Abaye concludes: b And wasn’t Haman worshipped due to fear, /b and not because the people considered him a god? Evidently, one who engages in idol worship due to fear is liable., b And Rava /b explains this i baraita /i as follows: One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person b like Haman /b in one regard, b but not like Haman /b in all aspects. It is referring to one b like Haman /b in b that /b Haman b himself was /b an object of b idol worship, /b as he claimed he was a god, and one who worships a person out of belief in his divinity is liable. b But /b the reference is to one who is b not like Haman /b in all aspects, b as while Haman /b was worshipped b due to fear, and /b one who engages in idol worship due to fear is not liable, b here /b the reference is to one who worships a person b not due to fear, /b but because he believes in that person’s divinity., b And Abaye /b furthermore b said: From where do I say /b my opinion? b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If b an anointed priest, /b i.e., the High Priest, unwittingly engaged b in idol worship, Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: /b He brings an offering b for /b the b unwitting act. And the Rabbis say: /b A High Priest does not bring an offering b for /b an unwitting act of idol worship unless it was due to b a lapse of awareness /b concerning the fundamental i halakhot /i of idol worship, i.e., he thought that this action was halakhically permitted., b And they agree that /b a High Priest brings b a female goat /b as his offering to atone for his act of idol worship, b as /b does an ordinary b individual, /b and not a bull, as a High Priest brings as a sin-offering for other sins. b And they agree that /b a High Priest b does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, /b which is ordinarily brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires him to bring a sin-offering. In such a case, he is exempt.,Abaye infers: b What are the circumstances of /b the High Priest’s b unwitting act of idol worship /b that is not due to a lack of awareness of the fundamental i halakhot /i of idol worship? b If /b the High Priest b thought /b that a certain building was b a synagogue and bowed to it, /b and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, why should he be obligated to bring an offering, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Since b his heart /b was directed b toward Heaven, /b it is not even an unwitting transgression. b Rather, /b it is a case b where /b the High Priest b saw /b the b statue /b of a person b and bowed to it. /b ,This case must also be clarified: b If he accepted /b that person b upon himself as a god, he is an intentional /b transgressor, and he is liable to receive the death penalty and not to bring an offering. |
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29. Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, and moral responsibility Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 132| 28b. אבל הכא (ויקרא כג, כד) זכרון תרועה כתיב והאי מתעסק בעלמא הוא קמ"ל אלמא קסבר רבא מצות אין צריכות כוונה,איתיביה היה קורא בתורה והגיע זמן המקרא אם כוון לבו יצא ואם לאו לא יצא מאי לאו כוון לבו לצאת,לא לקרות לקרות הא קא קרי בקורא להגיה,ת"ש היה עובר אחורי בית הכנסת או שהיה ביתו סמוך לבית הכנסת ושמע קול שופר או קול מגילה אם כוון לבו יצא ואם לאו לא יצא מאי לאו אם כוון לבו לצאת,לא לשמוע לשמוע והא שמע סבור חמור בעלמא הוא,איתיביה נתכוון שומע ולא נתכוון משמיע משמיע ולא נתכוון שומע לא יצא עד שיתכוון שומע ומשמיע בשלמא נתכוון משמיע ולא נתכוון שומע כסבור חמור בעלמא הוא אלא נתכוון שומע ולא נתכוון משמיע היכי משכחת לה לאו בתוקע לשיר,דלמא דקא מנבח נבוחי,א"ל אביי אלא מעתה הישן בשמיני בסוכה ילקה,אמר לו שאני אומר מצות אינו עובר עליהן אלא בזמנן,מתיב רב שמן בר אבא מנין לכהן שעולה לדוכן שלא יאמר הואיל ונתנה לי תורה רשות לברך את ישראל אוסיף ברכה אחת משלי כגון (דברים א, יא) ה' אלהי אבותיכם יוסף עליכם ת"ל (דברים ד, ב) לא תוסיפו על הדבר והא הכא כיון דבריך ליה עברה ליה זמניה וקתני דעבר,הכא במאי עסקינן בדלא סיים,והתניא סיים סיים ברכה אחת,והתניא סיים כל ברכותיו שאני הכא כיון דאלו מתרמי ליה צבורא אחרינא הדר מברך כוליה יומא זמניה הוא,ומנא תימרא דתנן הניתנין במתנה אחת שנתערבו בניתנין מתנה אחת ינתנו מתנה אחת מתן ד' במתן ד' ינתנו במתן ד',מתן ד' במתן אחת ר"א אומר ינתנו במתן ד' רבי יהושע אומר ינתנו במתן אחת,אמר לו ר"א הרי הוא עובר על בל תגרע אמר לו ר' יהושע הרי הוא עובר על בל תוסיף,א"ל ר"א לא נאמר בל תוסיף אלא כשהוא בעצמו אמר לו ר' יהושע לא נאמר בל תגרע אלא כשהוא בעצמו,ועוד אמר רבי יהושע כשלא נתת עברת על בל תגרע ולא עשית מעשה בידך כשנתת עברת על בל תוסיף ועשית מעשה בידך,והא הכא כיון דיהיב ליה מתנה מבכור עברה ליה לזמניה וקתני דעבר משום בל תוסיף לאו משום דאמרינן כיון דאילו מתרמי ליה בוכרא אחרינא הדר מזה מיניה כוליה יומא זמניה,[ממאי] דלמא קסבר ר' יהושע מצות עובר עליהן אפי' שלא בזמנן,אנן הכי קאמרינן רב שמן בר אבא מ"ט שביק מתני' ומותיב מברייתא לותיב ממתניתין מתניתין מ"ט לא מותיב כיון דאילו מתרמי ליה בוכרא אחרינא בעי מזה מיניה כוליה יומא זמניה הוא ברייתא נמי כיון דאי מתרמי צבורא אחרינא הדר מברך כוליה יומא זמניה,ורב שמן בר אבא התם לא סגי דלא יהיב הכא אי בעי מברך אי בעי לא מברך,רבא אמר לצאת לא בעי כוונה לעבור בעי כוונה,והא מתן דמים לרבי יהושע דלעבור ולא בעי כוונה אלא אמר רבא לצאת לא בעי כוונה לעבור בזמנו לא בעי כוונה שלא בזמנו בעי כוונה,אמר ליה ר' זירא לשמעיה | 28b. b But here, /b with regard to a i shofar /i , b it is written: “A memorial of blasts” /b (Leviticus 23:24), which might have been understood as requiring conscious intent, b and this one was merely acting unawares, /b without having any intent whatsoever of performing the mitzva. Therefore, Rava b teaches us /b that the absence of intent does not invalidate fulfillment of the mitzva, even in the case of i shofar /i . The Gemara concludes: b Apparently, Rava maintains /b that the fulfillment of b mitzvot does not require intent. /b That is to say, if one performs a mitzva, he fulfills his obligation even if he has no intention of doing so.,The Gemara b raised an objection to /b this conclusion from what we learned in a mishna: If b one was reading /b the passage of i Shema /i b in the Torah, and the time of reciting /b i Shema /i b arrived, if he focused his heart, he has fulfilled /b his obligation, b but if not, he has not fulfilled /b his obligation. The Gemara reasons: b What, is it not that he focused his heart to fulfill /b his obligation, and if he failed to do so, he has not fulfilled his duty, therefore implying that the fulfillment of mitzvot requires intent?,The Gemara rejects this argument: b No, /b the mishna means that he intended b to read /b the passage. The Gemara asks in astonishment: b To read? But he is /b already b reading /b it, for the mishna explicitly states: If one was reading in the Torah. The Gemara answers: We are discussing b one who was reading /b from a Torah scroll in order b to correct /b it, uttering the words indistinctly. The mishna teaches that if such an individual intends to articulate the words correctly, he has fulfilled his obligation.,The Gemara raises another objection: b Come /b and b hear /b that which we learned in our mishna: If b one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of /b the b i shofar /i or the sound of the Scroll /b of Esther, b if he focused his heart, he has fulfilled /b his obligation, b but if not, he has not fulfilled /b his obligation. b What, is it not /b that b he focused his heart to fulfill /b his obligation, and if he failed to do so, he has not fulfilled his duty, therefore implying that the fulfillment of mitzvot requires intent?,The Gemara rejects this argument: b No, /b the mishna means that he intended b to hear /b the sound of the i shofar /i . The Gemara immediately asks: b To hear? But he /b already b hears /b it, since the mishna explicitly states: And he heard the sound of the i shofar /i . The Gemara answers: We are discussing one b who thinks /b that b it is merely /b the sound of b a donkey /b that he is hearing, and in this case, where the listener thinks that the sound was not that of a i shofar /i , he does not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, the mishna teaches that it is sufficient that one have intent and know that he is hearing the sound of a i shofar /i .,The Gemara b raised an objection to /b this answer from a i baraita /i : If b the hearer /b of the i shofar /i b had intent, but the sounder /b of the i shofar /i b did not have intent, /b or if b the sounder /b of the i shofar /i had intent, b but the hearer did not have /b intent, b he has not fulfilled /b his obligation, b until /b both b the hearer and the sounder have intent. Granted, /b with regard to the case where b the sounder had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, /b Rava can say that this is referring to a case where the hearer b thinks /b that b it is merely /b the sound of b a donkey /b and he did not have intent to hear the sound of a i shofar /i . b But /b with regard to the case where b the hearer had intent, but the sounder did not have intent, /b under b what circumstances /b can this case b be found? Is it not /b where b he sounds /b a i shofar /i b for music /b and despite the intent of the hearer he has not fulfilled his obligation? This implies that unless the sounder of the i shofar /i has intent to fulfill the mitzva the hearer does not fulfill his obligation.,The Gemara rejects this argument: b Perhaps /b the i baraita /i is referring to a case b where he sounded bark-like blasts /b with the i shofar /i , i.e., he did not sound the i shofar /i in the proper manner, but merely acted unawares without intent to perform the mitzva. The i baraita /i teaches us that if he has intent to sound the blasts in the correct manner, he has fulfilled his obligation., b Abaye said to /b Rava: b However, if /b that is b so, /b that the fulfillment of a mitzva does not require intent, b one who sleeps in a i sukka /i on the Eighth Day of Assembly should receive lashes /b for violating the prohibition against adding to mitzvot, since he is adding to the mitzva of: “You shall dwell in i sukkot /i for seven days” (Leviticus 23:42). Since, according to Rava, even if one did not intend to observe the mitzva of i sukka /i but slept in the i sukka /i for a different reason, his sleeping in the i sukka /i constitutes the fulfillment of a mitzva to dwell there, then, if one did so at an inappropriate time, he is considered to have transgressed the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot. Yet the Sages instituted that in the Diaspora one must observe i Sukkot /i for eight days.,Rava b said to him: /b This is b because I say /b that b mitzvot can be transgressed only /b by adding to them b in their /b prescribed b times. /b But if one adds to a mitzva outside of the period of obligation for the mitzva, there is no violation of the prohibition against adding to mitzvot. On the Eighth Day of Assembly there is no longer a mitzva to sleep in the i sukka /i . Therefore, sleeping in the i sukka /i on that day does not constitute a prohibited act., b Rav Shemen bar Abba raised an objection /b from that which was taught in a i baraita /i : b From where /b is it derived b that a priest who went up to the platform /b to recite the Priestly Blessing b should not say: Since the Torah granted me permission to bless the Jewish people, I will add a blessing of my own, /b which is not part of the Priestly Blessing stated in the Torah, b for example: /b “May b the Lord God of your fathers make you /b a thousand times b as many as you are” /b (Deuteronomy 1:11)? It is derived from b the verse /b that b states: “You shall not add to the word /b which I command you” (Deuteronomy 4:2). b But here, since /b the priest already b recited /b the Priestly b Blessing, the time /b of the mitzva b has passed, /b and according to Rava, after the prescribed time for performing a mitzva, one does not transgress the prohibition against adding to mitzvot, yet b it /b nevertheless b teaches that he has transgressed. /b ,The Gemara answers: b With what are we dealing here? With /b a case b where he did not complete /b the fixed text of the blessing but added to it in the middle.,The Gemara raises an objection: b Isn’t it taught /b explicitly in a parallel i baraita /i : If b he completed /b the Priestly Blessing. The Gemara answers: The i baraita /i means that b he completed one blessing, /b i.e., the first verse of the Priestly Blessing, but he still has two more blessings to recite.,The Gemara raises a further difficulty: b Isn’t it taught /b in another i baraita /i dealing with the same issue: If b he completed all of his blessings. /b The Gemara explains: b Here, /b with regard to the Priestly Blessings, b it is different, since if he encounters another congregation, he may recite the blessings again, /b from which we learn that b the entire day is the /b prescribed b time /b of the mitzva. Therefore, even if he added a blessing of his own only after he finished reciting all three verses of the Priestly Blessing, he is still considered to have added to the mitzva in its prescribed time, and he therefore transgresses the prohibition against adding to mitzvot.,The Gemara comments: b And from where do you say /b that if a mitzva may be performed again, the whole day is considered its prescribed time? b As we learned /b in a mishna: If the blood of sacrifices b that require /b only b one sprinkling, /b such as the firstborn offering, b became mingled with /b the blood of other sacrifices that b require /b only b one sprinkling, /b the mixture of blood b is sprinkled once. /b Similarly, if the blood of sacrifices that require b four sprinklings, /b such as burnt-offerings, became mingled b with /b the blood of other sacrifices that require b four sprinklings, /b the mixture b is sprinkled four times. /b ,However, if the blood of an offering that requires b four sprinklings /b became mingled b with /b the blood of an offering that requires only b one sprinkling, /b the i tanna’im /i disagree: b Rabbi Eliezer says: /b The mixture of blood b is sprinkled four times. /b And b Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is sprinkled once. /b , b Rabbi Eliezer said to /b Rabbi Yehoshua: But if he sprinkles the blood only once, b he /b thereby b transgresses /b the prohibition: b Do not diminish, /b which renders it prohibited to take away any element in the performance of a mitzva, as he has not sprinkled the blood of an offering requiring four sprinklings, i.e., the burnt-offering in the proper manner. b Rabbi Yehoshua said to /b Rabbi Eliezer: But according to your position, that he must sprinkle the blood four times, b he /b thereby b transgresses /b the prohibition: b Do not add, /b which renders it prohibited to add elements to a mitzva, e.g. an offering requiring one sprinkling, like the firstborn animal., b Rabbi Eliezer said /b to Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition: b Do not add, is stated only /b in a case b where /b the blood stands b by itself, /b but not when it is part of a mixture. b Rabbi Yehoshua said /b to Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition: b Do not diminish, is stated only /b in a case b where /b the blood stands b by itself. /b , b Rabbi Yehoshua said further, /b in defense of his position: b When you do not sprinkle /b four times, even if b you transgress /b the prohibition: b Do not diminish, you do not perform the act with your /b own b hand, /b since it is merely an omission, not an action. Whereas b when you sprinkle /b four times, b you transgress /b the prohibition: b Do not add, /b with regard to one of the sacrifices, b and you perform the act with your /b own b hand, /b i.e., you transgress the Torah’s command by means of a positive act. If one is forced to deviate from the words of the Torah, it is preferable to do so in a passive manner. The Gemara concludes the citation from the mishna.,The Gemara proceeds to derive from here that if the mitzva may be performed again the whole day is considered its prescribed time: b And here, once he has already offered /b one b sprinkling /b of the blood b of the firstborn /b as required, b its time has passed, /b since he has already completed the mitzva of sprinkling the blood of the firstborn, and b it /b nevertheless b teaches /b that b he transgresses /b the prohibition: b Do not add. Is it not because we say /b as follows: b Since if he encounters another firstborn /b to be sacrificed, b he would sprinkle /b of its blood b again? /b If so, b the entire day is /b considered the prescribed b time /b for the mitzva of sprinkling.,The Gemara rejects this argument: b From where /b do you conclude that this is so? b Perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua maintains /b that b mitzvot can be transgressed /b by adding to them b even outside their /b prescribed b times. /b Therefore, this source provides no proof.,The Gemara explains: b This is /b what b we /b were b saying /b when we cited this mishna: b What is the reason that Rav Shemen bar Abba set aside the mishna, /b which deals with the sprinkling of blood, b and raised an objection from a i baraita /i ? He should have raised an objection from the mishna, /b which is more generally accepted. b What is the reason that he does not raise an objection /b from b the mishna? Since /b he knows that it can be argued as follows: b Because if he encounters another firstborn he will be required to sprinkle /b its blood. Therefore b the entire day is /b considered b the /b prescribed b time /b of the mitzva. If so, with regard to b the i baraita /i as well, /b it can be argued that b because if he encounters another congregation, he may recite /b the Priestly b Blessing again, the whole day is /b considered b its /b prescribed b time. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b what is the opinion of b Rav Shemen bar Abba, /b who raised the objection from the i baraita /i ? The Gemara explains: b There, it is not possible to refrain /b from b sprinkling /b the blood of another firstborn that comes his way, so the entire day is certainly its prescribed time. But b here, if he wishes, he may bless /b the other congregation, and b if he wishes, he may refrain from blessing /b them, since he is obligated to recite the Priestly Blessing only once a day., b Rava /b himself b said: /b There is no difficulty at all, since b the fulfillment /b of a mitzva b does not require intent, /b but b the transgression /b of the prohibition: Do not add, or: Do not diminish, b requires intent. /b ,The Gemara raises a difficulty: b But /b in the case of b the sprinkling of blood, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, the transgression /b of the prohibition: Do not add, b does not require intent, /b since he holds that if one added to the required sprinklings, he transgresses. b Rather, Rava said: /b One must say as follows: b The fulfillment /b of a mitzva b does not require intent, /b and b the transgression /b of the prohibition: Do not add, b during the /b prescribed b time /b of the mitzva, b does not require intent, /b and the sprinkler of the blood therefore transgresses, as Rabbi Yehoshua maintains. However, the transgression of the prohibition: Do not add, when it is b not in its /b prescribed b time, /b e.g., in the case of sleeping in the i sukka /i on the Eighth Day of Assembly, b requires intent /b to fulfill the mitzva, and in the absence of such intent, there is no transgression.,With regard to the intent required in order to fulfill the mitzva of i shofar /i , b Rabbi Zeira said to his servant: /b |
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| 30. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, 41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •will, as morally responsible Found in books: Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 59 |
| 31. Augustine, Contra Adversarium Legis Et Prophetarum, 1.18 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •will, as morally responsible Found in books: Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 59 |
| 32. Proclus, On The Existence of Evils, 58.2-58.7 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moral/morality responsibility Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 241 |
| 33. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 19.229-21.235 Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232 |
| 34. Bavli, B. Metzia, None Tagged with subjects: •intention, and moral responsibility Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 103 |
| 35. Bavli, B. Qama, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schick (2021), Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed, 108 |
37. Vergil, Aeneis, 3.616 Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, in psychopaths Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 242 | 3.616. who from beneath the hollow scarped crag |
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| 40. Cicero, Pref., 4 Tagged with subjects: •children, and moral responsibility Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
| 45. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 23-24, 26-29, 25 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 150 |
| 46. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 241 |
| 47. Cicero, Posterior Academics, 1.38 Tagged with subjects: •responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 62 |
| 48. Pseudo-Tertullian, To His Wife, 1.4 Tagged with subjects: •body, moral responsibility of •soul, moral responsibility of Found in books: Mcglothlin (2018), Resurrection as Salvation: Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism, 121 |
