1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 22.23-22.27 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 119| 22.23. "כִּי יִהְיֶה נער [נַעֲרָה] בְתוּלָה מְאֹרָשָׂה לְאִישׁ וּמְצָאָהּ אִישׁ בָּעִיר וְשָׁכַב עִמָּהּ׃", 22.24. "וְהוֹצֵאתֶם אֶת־שְׁנֵיהֶם אֶל־שַׁעַר הָעִיר הַהִוא וּסְקַלְתֶּם אֹתָם בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתוּ אֶת־הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] עַל־דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־צָעֲקָה בָעִיר וְאֶת־הָאִישׁ עַל־דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר־עִנָּה אֶת־אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ׃", 22.25. "וְאִם־בַּשָּׂדֶה יִמְצָא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] הַמְאֹרָשָׂה וְהֶחֱזִיק־בָּהּ הָאִישׁ וְשָׁכַב עִמָּהּ וּמֵת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־שָׁכַב עִמָּהּ לְבַדּוֹ׃", 22.26. "ולנער [וְלַנַּעֲרָה] לֹא־תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר אֵין לנער [לַנַּעֲרָה] חֵטְא מָוֶת כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה׃", 22.27. "כִּי בַשָּׂדֶה מְצָאָהּ צָעֲקָה הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] הַמְאֹרָשָׂה וְאֵין מוֹשִׁיעַ לָהּ׃", | 22.23. "If there be a damsel that is a virgin betrothed unto a man, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her;", 22.24. "then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die: the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he hath humbled his neighbour’s wife; so thou shalt put away the evil from the midst of thee.", 22.25. "But if the man find the damsel that is betrothed in the field, and the man take hold of her, and lie with her; then the man only that lay with her shall die.", 22.26. "But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death; for as when a man riseth against his neighbour, and slayeth him, even so is this matter.", 22.27. "For he found her in the field; the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none to save her.", |
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| 2. Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q266, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 148 |
3. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 141| 48b. בשדה סתם אבל בשדה זו לא,ובשדה זו נמי לא אמרן אלא דלא ארצי זוזי אבל ארצי זוזי לא,ולא אמרן אלא דלא הוה לאישתמוטי אבל הוה ליה לאישתמוטי לא,והלכתא בכולהו דהוו זביניה זביני ואפילו בשדה זו דהא אשה כשדה זו דמיא ואמר אמימר תליוה וקדיש קדושיו קדושין,מר בר רב אשי אמר באשה ודאי קדושין לא הוו הוא עשה שלא כהוגן לפיכך עשו עמו שלא כהוגן ואפקעינהו רבנן לקידושיה מיניה,אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר אמר ליה שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות,טאבי תלא לפאפי אכינרא וזבין חתם רבה בר בר חנה אמודעא ואאשקלתא אמר רב הונא מאן דחתים אמודעא שפיר חתים ומאן דחתים אאשקלתא שפיר חתים,מה נפשך אי מודעא לא אשקלתא ואי אשקלתא לא מודעא הכי קאמר אי לאו מודעא מאן דחתים אאשקלתא שפיר חתים רב הונא לטעמיה דאמר רב הונא תליוהו וזבין זביניה זביני,איני והא"ר נחמן העדים שאמרו אמנה היו דברינו | 48b. b in /b a case where the seller was compelled to sell b an unspecified field. /b Since he had a choice as to which field to sell, the presumption is that he sold it sincerely. b But in /b a case where the one coercing him specified b this /b specific b field /b to be sold, the sale is b not /b valid, as the seller did not decide freely on any aspect of the sale., b And even in /b a case where the one coercing him specified b this /b specific b field /b to be sold, b we said /b that the sale is invalid b only where /b the seller b did not count [ i artzei /i ] /b the b money /b for the field, b but /b if the seller b did count /b the b money, /b then we do b not /b say that the sale is invalid., b And we said /b that the sale is invalid in the case of a specified field when money was not counted b only where /b the seller b had no /b way b to avoid /b the coercion. b But /b if the seller b had /b a way b to avoid /b the coercion and did not avoid it, then we do b not /b say that the sale is invalid.,The Gemara concludes: b And /b the b i halakha /i in all of /b these cases is that b the sale is valid, and /b this is so b even in /b the case of b a specified field. /b This can be inferred b because /b the case of b a woman /b forced to accept betrothal b is comparable to /b the case of b a specified field, /b as a specific man is performing the betrothal, b and Ameimar says: /b If a man b suspended /b a woman b and betrothed /b her, b his betrothal is valid, /b despite the fact that she was coerced., b Mar bar Rav Ashi said: In /b the case of b a woman /b who was forced to accept betrothal, the b betrothal is certainly not /b valid. b This /b man b acted improperly; consequently, /b the Sages b acted improperly with him, and the Sages expropriated her betrothal from him. /b , b Ravina said to Rav Ashi: /b This b works out well /b in a case b where he betrothed /b his wife b with money, /b as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated from the possession of its owner the money used for the betrothal, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if b he betrothed /b her b by means of sexual intercourse, /b then b what is there to say? /b Rav Ashi b said to him: The Sages deemed his sexual intercourse /b as b licentious sexual intercourse, /b which does not create a bond of betrothal.,§ The Gemara relates: Someone named b Tavi suspended /b another person named b Pafi on a i kinara /i and /b compelled him to b sell /b his field. b Rabba bar bar Ḥana signed /b both b on /b Pafi’s preemptive b declaration /b nullifying the sale (see 40b) b and on /b the b bill of sale [ i ashkalta /i ]. Rav Huna said: /b The b one who signed on /b the preemptive b declaration /b acted b well /b by b signing, and /b the b one who signed on /b the b bill of sale /b acted b well /b by b signing. /b ,The Gemara challenges: b Whichever way you /b look at it, Rav Huna’s statement is problematic. b If /b the preemptive b declaration /b is valid, then there is b no /b place for b a bill of sale. And if /b the b bill of sale /b is valid, then there is b no /b place for a preemptive b declaration. /b How can Rav Huna commend signing on both of these mutually exclusive documents? The Gemara explains: b This /b is what Rav Huna b is saying: If /b it were b not for /b his also having signed the preemptive b declaration, /b the b one who signed on /b the b bill of sale /b acted b well /b by b signing. /b In this statement, b Rav Huna /b conforms b to his /b line of b reasoning, as Rav Huna says: /b If one was b suspended /b and thereby coerced to sell a certain item b and he sold /b it, b his sale is valid. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Is that so /b that Rabba bar bar Ḥana can, by means of the preemptive declaration, invalidate the bill of sale that he himself signed? b But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: /b With regard to b witnesses who said: Our statement /b that we signed b was /b a document of b trust, /b i.e., a false promissory note given by one person to another, trusting that he will not make use of it until there is an actual loan, |
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4. Babylonian Talmud, Gittin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 141| 73a. והא קמ"ל דהלך על משענתו הוא דבעינן אומדנא אידך אומדנא נמי לא בעינן,שמעת מינה שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה אין דאמר רבי אלעזר משמיה דרב שכיב מרע שניתק מחולי לחולי מתנתו מתנה,רבה ורבא לא סבירא להו הא דרב הונא גזירה שמא יאמרו יש גט לאחר מיתה,ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא הוי גיטא ומשום גזירה שרינן אשת איש לעלמא,אין כל דמקדש אדעתא דרבנן מקדש ואפקעינהו רבנן לקדושין מיניה,א"ל רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר א"ל שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות,ת"ר זה גיטיך מהיום אם מתי מחולי זה ונפל הבית עליו או הכישו נחש אינו גט אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש ה"ז גט,מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא,שלחו מתם אכלו ארי אין לנו,ההוא גברא דזבין ארעא לחבריה קביל עליה כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף אפיקו בה נהרא,אתא לקמיה דרבינא א"ל זיל שפי ליה דהא קבילת עלך כל אונסא דמתיליד א"ל רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבינא אונסא דלא שכיח הוא,איגלגל מילתא ומטא לקמיה דרבא אמר להו אונסא דלא שכיח הוא איתיביה רבינא לרבא אם לא אעמוד מחולי זה ונפל עליו בית או הכישו נחש ה"ז גט,אמר ליה רבא ואימא מרישא אינו גט,א"ל רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ומשום דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא מותבינן תיובתא מינה,אמר ליה אין כיון דקשיא רישא אסיפא לא איתמר בי מדרשא ומשבשתא היא זיל בתר סברא,רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע זבן שומשמי אגידא דנהר מלכא אגור מלחי לעבורינהו קבילו עלייהו כל אונסא דמתיליד לסוף איסתכר נהר מלכא,אמרו להו אגורו חמרי אפקעינהו ניהלן דהא קבילתו עלייכו כל אונסא דמיתליד,אתו לקמיה דרבא אמר להו קאקי חיורי משלחי גלימי דאינשי אונסא דלא שכיח הוא:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big לא תתייחד עמו אלא בפני עדים,אפי' על פי עבד אפי' ע"פ שפחה חוץ משפחתה מפני שלבה גס בה בשפחתה,מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר | 73a. b And this teaches us that we require assessment /b only in a case b where he walked with his staff. /b But in b another /b case, where he did not arise from his illness and walk but immediately became ill again, b we do not even require assessment, /b as it is clear that his death from the second illness was a result of the first illness.,The Gemara asks: Can b you conclude from it /b that in the case of b a person on his deathbed who proceeded from /b one b illness /b immediately b to /b another b illness, his gift /b is a valid b gift, /b as he ultimately died as a result of the first illness? The Gemara answers: b Yes, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rav: /b In the case of b a person on his deathbed who proceeded from /b one b illness /b immediately b to /b another b illness, his gift /b is a valid b gift. /b ,The Gemara notes: b Rabba and Rava do not hold /b in accordance with b this /b i halakha /i stated b by Rav Huna, /b that if the husband was healed of his illness then the bill of divorce is nullified even if did not specify such a condition. They hold that there is a rabbinic b decree /b in place b lest /b people b say /b that b there /b can be a valid b bill of divorce /b given b after death. /b Since people will see that in this case the bill of divorce took effect only once the husband died, in the future they may mistakenly consider a bill of divorce to be valid even though the husband explicitly made a condition that it would take effect only after his death.,The Gemara asks: b And is there anything that by Torah law is not /b a valid b bill of divorce, but due to a /b rabbinic b decree we permit a married woman to /b marry b anyone, /b even though by Torah law she remains married to her husband? Both Rabba and Rava agree that by Torah law the bill of divorce is nullified once the husband is healed from his illness, yet they treat the bill of divorce as valid. How can this be?,The Gemara answers: b Yes, /b the Sages have the ability to nullify even a marriage that took effect by Torah law, because b anyone who betroths /b a woman b betroths /b her contingent b upon the will of the Sages, and /b when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce b the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him /b retroactively. Consequently, it is permitted for the woman to remarry., b Ravina said to Rav Ashi: /b This b works out well /b in a case b where he betrothed /b his wife b with money, /b as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if b he betrothed /b her b by means of sexual intercourse /b then b what is there to say? /b Rav Ashi b said to him: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse /b to be b licentious sexual intercourse, /b which does not create a bond of betrothal.,§ b The Sages taught /b ( i Tosefta /i 7:2): If a husband says to his wife: b This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, /b then b it is not /b a valid b bill of divorce. /b But if he said: This is your bill of divorce b if I will not arise /b healthy b from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, /b then b this is /b a valid b bill of divorce. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What is different /b in b the first clause /b such that the bill of divorce is not valid b and what is different /b in b the latter clause /b that the bill of divorce is valid? In neither case did he die from the illness. The Gemara gives no answer to this question., b They sent /b a ruling to Babylonia b from there, /b from Eretz Yisrael: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and b a lion ate him, /b then b we do not /b need to be concerned about this bill of divorce, for it is certainly not valid.,It is related: There was b a certain man who sold land to another, /b and he b accepted upon himself /b the responsibility for b any unavoidable accident that may happen /b to the land. In such a case he would reimburse the buyer for the damage. b In the end they diverted a river into it, /b meaning the government decided to make a new canal through the land that he sold.,The buyer b came before Ravina /b to lodge a claim. Ravina b said to /b the seller: b Go pacify him, /b i.e., reimburse him, b as you accepted upon yourself /b responsibility for b any unavoidable accident that might happen. Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa /b disagreed and b said to Ravina: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, /b and the condition of the sale should not apply in such a case., b The matter was circulated, /b as this ruling was never finalized, b and it came before Rava. He said to them: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, /b and the seller should not have to pay. b Ravina raised an objection to Rava: /b Isn’t it taught that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce b if I am not healed from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him /b then b it is /b a valid b bill of divorce? /b These cases are both uncommon, unavoidable accidents, yet the bill of divorce is valid., b Rava said to him: But /b you can b say /b an opposite inference b from the first clause: /b If a husband says: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then b it is not /b a valid b bill of divorce. /b Apparently, an uncommon, unavoidable accident is not included within his condition. If so, the inference from first clause of the i baraita /i contradicts the inference from latter clause and it cannot be used to prove either opinion., b Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because /b there is b a difficulty /b presented by the contradiction between b the first clause /b of the i baraita /i b and the latter clause, can we no /b longer b raise an objection from it? /b Seemingly, the challenge raised by Ravina from the latter clause of the i baraita /i is still valid.,Ravina b said to him: Yes, /b Rava was correct. b Since /b there is b a difficulty /b presented by the contradiction between b the first clause /b of the i baraita /i b and the latter clause, /b this i baraita /i b was /b never b stated /b in b the study hall and it is corrupted. /b As it is not possible to rely on this i baraita /i one must b follow reason, /b and the most reasonable interpretation is that his condition would not include an uncommon and unavoidable accident.,It is related that b Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, purchased sesame on the bank of the Malka River. They hired sailors to cross them /b to the other side of the river, and the sailors b accepted upon themselves /b responsibility for b any unavoidable accident that might occur. In the end the Malka River was dammed /b so that the merchandise could not be transported by river.,The two Sages b said to them: Hire donkeys and release them to us /b in order to transport the sesame, b as you accepted upon yourself /b responsibility for b any unavoidable accident that might arise. /b ,The two Sages b came /b to court b before Rava /b and b he said to /b them: b You white geese [ i kakei ḥivarei /i ], /b referring to their long, white beards, b who strip men of their cloaks. /b You are acting unfairly with the sailors. b It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident /b for the Malka River to be dammed, and the sailors did not accept responsibility for this case., strong MISHNA: /strong If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then b she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, /b lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse.,This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him b even in the presence of a slave /b or b even in the presence of a maidservant, except for /b the wife’s personal b maidservant. /b And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter b because she is accustomed to her maidservant, /b and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present., b What is /b the halakhic status of the wife b during these days /b between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? b Rabbi Yehuda says: /b She i |
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5. Babylonian Talmud, Ketuvot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 141| 3a. זימנין דלא אניס וסברה דאניס ומיעגנא ויתבה ומשום פרוצות דאי אמרת לא ליהוי גיטא זימנין דאניס ואמרה לא אניס ואזלא ומינסבא ונמצא גט בטל ובניה ממזרים,ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא להוי גט ומשום צנועות ומשום פרוצות שרינן אשת איש לעלמא,אין כל דמקדש אדעתא דרבנן מקדש ואפקעינהו רבנן לקידושי מיניה,אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח קדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות,איכא דאמרי אמר רבא וכן לענין גיטין אלמא קסבר רבא יש אונס בגיטין,מיתיבי הרי זה גיטיך אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש אינו גט מת הוא דאינו גט הא חלה הרי זה גט,לעולם אימא לך חלה נמי אינו גט והיא גופה קמ"ל דאין גט לאחר מיתה,אין גט לאחר מיתה הא תנא ליה רישא דלמא לאפוקי מדרבותינו,ת"ש מעכשיו אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש הרי זה גט מאי לאו הוא הדין לחלה לא מת דוקא דלא ניחא ליה דתפול קמי יבם,ת"ש מההוא דאמר להו אי לא אתינא מכאן ועד שלשים יום ליהוי גיטא אתא בסוף תלתין יומין ופסקיה מברא ואמר להו חזו דאתאי חזו דאתאי ואמר שמואל לא שמיה מתיא,אונסא דשכיח שאני דכיון דאיבעי ליה לאתנויי ולא אתני איהו הוא דאפסיד אנפשיה,אמר רב שמואל בר יצחק לא שנו אלא מתקנת עזרא ואילך שאין בתי דינין קבועין אלא בשני ובחמישי אבל קודם תקנת עזרא שבתי דינין קבועין בכל יום אשה נשאת בכל יום,קודם תקנת עזרא מאי דהוה הוה הכי קאמר אי איכא בתי דינין דקבועין האידנא כקודם תקנת עזרא אשה נשאת בכל יום,הא בעינן שקדו דטריח ליה | 3a. then b sometimes, where he was not /b detained b unavoidably /b but he fulfilled the condition willingly to effect the divorce, b and /b the wife b thinks /b that he was detained b unavoidably, she will sit deserted, /b forever unable to remarry. b And /b the concern b due to licentious women /b is, b as, if you said: Let it not be a bill of divorce, /b then b sometimes, when he was /b detained b unavoidably and she thinks /b that he was b not /b detained b unavoidably, /b she goes b and remarries. And /b the result will be b that the bill of divorce is void, and her children /b from the second marriage will be b i mamzerim /i , /b products of an adulterous relationship.,The Gemara questions the following premise: By Torah law, a condition that is unfulfilled due to circumstances beyond one’s control is considered fulfilled, and it is merely by rabbinic ordice that it is deemed unfulfilled: b And is there a matter where by Torah /b law b it is not a bill of divorce, but due to virtuous women and due to licentious women we permit a married woman to others? /b ,The Gemara answers: b Yes, /b it is within the authority of the Sages to institute an ordice freeing the woman from the marriage, as b anyone who betroths /b a woman, b betroths /b her contingent b upon the agreement of the Sages, /b and in certain cases, such as those mentioned above, b the Sages invalidated his betrothal /b retroactively., b Ravina said to Rav Ashi: /b That b works out well /b if b he betrothed /b her b with money, /b as in that case, the courts could declare the money ownerless, and one cannot betroth a woman with money that is not his. However, if b he betrothed /b her b with intercourse, what can be said? /b Rav Ashi answered: b The Sages rendered his intercourse licentious intercourse. /b , b Some say, /b to the contrary, that b Rava said: /b Just as with regard to postponement of a wedding due to circumstances beyond his control, the groom is not obligated to provide sustece for his betrothed, b the same is true with regard to the matter of bills of divorce. /b The Gemara concludes that b apparently Rava maintains: Unavoidable circumstances /b have legal standing b with regard to bills of divorce. /b , b The Gemara raises an objection /b from a mishna ( i Gittin /i 76b): With regard to one who said to his wife: b This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from now until /b the conclusion of b twelve months, and he died within /b those b twelve months, /b the document b is not a bill of divorce. /b The Gemara infers: If b he died, /b that b is when it is not a bill of divorce, /b since a divorce cannot take effect posthumously. However, in cases involving other circumstances beyond his control, e.g., if b he fell ill /b and therefore did not return, b it is a bill of divorce /b and it does take effect.,The Gemara answers: b Actually, I will say to you /b that in the case where b one falls ill it is also not a bill of divorce, /b and death is merely an example of circumstances beyond one’s control. b And /b the fact that the mishna cited b that /b example b itself teaches us that there is no bill of divorce posthumously. /b ,The Gemara asks: Does it come to teach that b there is no bill of divorce posthumously? Wasn’t it already taught in the first clause /b of that mishna? The Gemara answers: b Perhaps /b it was necessary for the first clause to mention specifically the case of death, b to exclude /b the opinion b of our Rabbis. /b , b Come and hear /b an additional proof from the latter clause of that mishna: If one said: This is your bill of divorce b from now if I have not returned from now until /b the conclusion of b twelve months, and he died within /b those b twelve months, /b then b this /b document b is a bill of divorce. What, is it not that the same is true /b if his failure to return is due to the fact that b he fell ill? /b The Gemara rejects that proof. The divorce takes effect b specifically /b in the case where b he died, /b and he wrote the bill of divorce because b he was not amenable /b to have his wife b happen before /b her b i yavam /i , /b his brother, for levirate marriage if he had no children. However, in cases where that is not a consideration, if other circumstances beyond his control caused the condition to be fulfilled, his intention is that the bill of divorce will not take effect., b Come and hear /b an additional proof b from /b the case of b a certain /b man b who said to /b the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: b If I do not return from now until thirty days /b have passed, b let this be a bill of divorce. He came at the end of thirty days, /b before the deadline passed, b but was prevented /b from crossing the river b by the ferry /b that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not come within the designated time. b He said to the /b people across the river: b See that I have come, see that I have come. Shmuel said: /b It b is not considered /b to be b a return. /b Apparently, even if the condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the condition is considered fulfilled.,The Gemara rejects that proof: b Perhaps unavoidable circumstances that are common /b and could be anticipated, e.g., the ferry being located at the other side of the river, b are different, since he should have stipulated /b that exception when giving his wife the bill of divorce. b And /b since he did not b stipulate /b it, b he brought the failure upon himself. /b ,§ b Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: /b The Sages b teach /b that this i halakha /i that a virgin is married on Wednesday is in effect b only from /b the institution of b the ordice of Ezra that courts are in regular session only on Monday and Thursday. However, prior to /b the institution of b the ordice of Ezra, when courts /b were in b regular /b session b every day, a woman was married on any day /b of the week.,The Gemara asks: b Prior to /b the institution of b the ordice of Ezra? What was /b in the past b was /b in the past. There are no halakhic ramifications to that statement. The Gemara answers: b This is what /b Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak b is saying: If there are courts /b in b regular /b daily session b today, as /b they were b prior to /b the institution of b the ordice of Ezra, a woman is married on any day /b of the week.,The Gemara asks: b Don’t we require /b the additional reason that a virgin is married on Wednesday because the Sages b were assiduous /b in seeing to the well-being of Jewish women and made certain that the groom would have several days to prepare for the wedding feast prior to the wedding? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case b where he /b already b exerted himself /b and prepared everything before Shabbat, so the feast will be prepared even if the wedding is Sunday or Monday. |
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6. Babylonian Talmud, Qiddushin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 141| 44a. קטנה מן האירוסין אין עושים בה מאמר אלא מדעת אביה והנערה בין מדעת עצמה בין מדעת אביה (מה שאין כן בקידושין),אלא אי איתמר הכי איתמר אמר רבי יוסי בר' חנינא מאי טעמיה דר' יוחנן אליבא דרבנן קידושין דמדעתה אביה ולא היא גירושין דבעל כרחה בין היא בין אביה,הרי מאמר דמדעתה וקתני בין היא ובין אביה התם במאמר דבעל כרחה ורבי היא דתניא העושה מאמר ביבמתו שלא מדעתה רבי אומר קנה וחכ"א לא קנה,מאי טעמיה דרבי גמר מביאה דיבמה מה ביאה דיבמה בעל כרחה אף הכא נמי בע"כ ורבנן סברי ילפינן מקידושין מה קידושין דמדעתה אף ה"נ דמדעתה,במאי קמיפלגי רבי סבר מילי דיבמה מיבמה הוה ליה למילף ורבנן סברי קידושין מקידושין הוה ליה למילף,ה"נ מסתברא כדקא מתרץ רבי יוחנן מדקתני סיפא מה שאין כן בקידושין אלא נימא תיהוי תיובתא דר"ל אמר לך ר"ל הא מני רבי יהודה היא דאמר אין שתי ידים זוכות כאחת,אי רבי יהודה מה שאין כן בקידושין מה שאין כן בגירושין מיבעי ליה אין ה"נ איידי דתנא מאמר דדמי לקידושין תנא נמי מה שאין כן בקידושין,ורבי יהודה מאי שנא מאמר הואיל וזקוקה ועומדת השתא דאתית להכי ר' יוחנן נמי לא תיקשי לך מעיקרא שאני מאמר הואיל וזקוקה ועומדת,תנן האיש מקדש את בתו כשהיא נערה בו ובשלוחו בו ובשלוחו אין בה ובשלוחה לא תיובתא דר"ל אמר לך ר"ל הא נמי רבי יהודה היא,ומי מצית מוקמת לה כרבי יהודה והקתני סיפא האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בתמרה זו התקדשי לי בזו ואמרינן מאן תנא התקדשי התקדשי,ואמר רבה ר"ש היא דאמר עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחד ואחד,וכי תימא כולה ר' יהודה ובפרטי סבר לה כר"ש ומי סבר לה,והתניא זה הכלל כלל אינו חייב אלא אחת פרט חייב על כל אחת ואחת דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר שבועה לא לך לא לך לא לך חייב על כל אחת ואחת רא"א לא לך לא לך לא לך ולא לך שבועה חייב על כל אחת ואחת ר' שמעון אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחד ואחד,אלא כולה ר' שמעון היא ובשליחות סבר לה כרבי יהודה,ר' אסי לא על לבי מדרשא אשכחיה לרבי זירא אמר ליה מאי אמור האידנא בי מדרשא אמר ליה אף אנא לא עייל ר' אבין הוא דעייל ואמר חברותא כולה כר' יוחנן וצווח ריש לקיש כי כרוכיא (דברים כד, ב) ויצאה והיתה וליכא דאשגח ביה אמר ליה רבי אבין בר סמכא הוא אמר ליה אין כמין ימא לטיגני הוא,אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אנא לא רבי אבין ברבי חייא ולא רבי אבין בר כהנא אלא רבי אבין סתם למאי נפקא מינה למירמא דידיה אדידיה,בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן | 44a. If b a minor girl /b was widowed b after /b her b betrothal, /b a surviving brother of her betrothed b can perform levirate betrothal only with the consent of her father. And /b in the case of b a young woman, /b he can do so b either with her consent [ i mida’at atzmah /i ] or with the consent of her father, unlike /b the i halakha /i b with regard to /b standard b betrothal. /b This indicates that a young woman can accept levirate betrothal on her own, despite the fact that it removes her from her father’s authority., b Rather, if /b it b was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: What is /b the b reason of Rabbi Yoḥa, in accordance with /b the opinion of b the Rabbis? /b With regard to b betrothal, which /b takes effect only b with /b the b consent /b of the one who accepts the betrothal, b her father /b can accept it b but not her, /b since betrothal requires his approval. With regard to a bill of b divorce, /b which can be given b without her consent, either she or her father /b can receive it.,The Gemara asks: b But isn’t levirate betrothal /b valid only b with her consent, /b like other betrothals, b and /b yet b it teaches /b in the i baraita /i that b either she or her father /b can accept it? The Gemara answers: b There /b it is referring b to levirate betrothal that is /b performed b against her will, and it is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If a i yavam /i b performs levirate betrothal with his i yevama /i without her consent, Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: /b The i yavam /i b acquires /b her. b And the Rabbis say: He does not acquire /b her.,The Gemara clarifies: b What is the reason of Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi? b He derives /b the i halakha /i of levirate betrothal b from /b the i halakha /i of b sexual intercourse that /b a i yavam /i engages in with b a i yevama /i : Just as intercourse with /b the b i yevama /i /b renders her acquired even if it is done b against her will, so too here, /b in the case of levirate betrothal, the i yavam /i can betroth her b against her will. And the Rabbis hold /b that b we derive /b the i halakha /i of levirate betrothal b from /b standard b betrothal: Just as betrothal /b can be performed only b with her consent, so too here, /b levirate betrothal can be performed only b with her consent. /b ,The Gemara clarifies: b With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b holds /b that b one should derive matters /b involving b a i yevama /i from /b other matters involving b a i yevama /i , /b and the marriage between a i yevama /i and a i yavam /i can be formalized against her will. b And the Rabbis hold /b that b one should derive /b matters involving b betrothal from /b the i halakhot /i of b betrothal, /b as levirate betrothal is structured like standard betrothal in other respects.,The Gemara comments: b So too, it is reasonable /b to rule with regard to betrothal b as Rabbi Yoḥa explains, /b that only the father can accept betrothal, b from /b the fact b that it teaches /b in the b latter clause /b of the i baraita /i that with regard to levirate betrothal, in the case of b a young woman, /b the i yavam /i can perform it either with her consent or with the consent of her father, b unlike /b the i halakha /i b with regard to /b standard b betrothal. /b This indicates that she can be betrothed in standard betrothal only with her father’s agreement. The Gemara asks: b Then shall we say /b that b this should be a conclusive refutation of /b the opinion of b Reish Lakish, /b who holds that according to the Rabbis a young woman can also accept her own betrothal? The Gemara answers: b Reish Lakish /b could have b said to you: /b In accordance with b whose /b opinion b is this /b i baraita /i ? b It is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Two hands do not acquire /b an item b as one. /b ,The Gemara asks: b If /b it is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b why does the i baraita /i state: b Unlike /b the i halakha /i b with regard to /b standard b betrothal? It should /b have stated: b Unlike /b the i halakha /i b with regard to divorce, /b as Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in the mishna with regard to divorce, not betrothal. The Gemara answers: b Yes, it is indeed so, /b it should have referred to divorce, but b since it taught /b the i halakha /i of b levirate betrothal, which /b is b similar to betrothal, it also taught: Unlike /b the i halakha /i b with regard to /b standard b betrothal. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b according to the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b in b what /b way b is levirate betrothal different from /b divorce? Why can a young woman accept the former but not receive a bill of divorce, when both levirate betrothal and divorce can be performed without her consent? The Gemara answers: The i halakha /i of levirate betrothal is different. b Since she is bonded /b to the i yavam /i b and standing /b in wait for him, acceptance of the betrothal money by the i yevama /i suffices to effect the levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: b Now that you have arrived at this /b explanation, the statement of b Rabbi Yoḥa also should not pose a difficulty for you from the outset. /b One cannot question his statement with regard to the Rabbis’ opinion in the case of betrothal. b Levirate betrothal is different, since /b the i yevama /i b is bonded /b to the i yavam /i b and standing /b in wait for him., b We learned /b in the mishna that b a man can betroth his daughter /b to a man b when she is a young woman, by himself or by /b means of b his agent. /b The Gemara analyzes this: b Yes, /b he can betroth her b by himself or by /b means of b his agent, but no, /b she cannot become betrothed b by herself or by /b means of b her agent. /b This is b a conclusive refutation of Reish Lakish, /b who holds that according to the opinion of the Rabbis a young woman can accept her own betrothal. The Gemara answers: b Reish Lakish /b could have b said to you: This /b mishna b too is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda. /b ,The Gemara asks: b But can you establish this /b mishna b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda? But the last clause, /b in the following mishna (46b), b teaches: /b In the case of b one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date /b and adds: b Be betrothed to me with that /b date, she is betrothed only if one of them is worth one i peruta /i on its own. b And we say: Who /b is the i tanna /i who b taught /b that the two dates are valued separately only if he said: b Become betrothed /b and: b Become betrothed, /b in a separate statement when giving each date, but that if he said: Become betrothed, only once, the value of the two dates are added together?, b And Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says /b that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance. For example, if one says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, he brings a single offering. This is the i halakha /i b unless one states /b an expression of b an oath to each and every one /b of the plaintiffs, by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours, in which case he brings multiple offerings. Consequently, the i tanna /i of this mishna is Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Yehuda., b And if you would say /b that the i tanna /i of the b entire /b mishna concerning betrothal is b Rabbi Yehuda, and /b that b with regard to the specification /b of separate oaths b he holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon, /b this cannot be. b But does he /b in fact b hold in accordance /b with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the specification of separate oaths?, b But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i : b This is the principle /b with regard to one’s liability to bring offerings for a false oath: If he b included /b all the statements in one oath b he is liable /b for b only one /b oath, but if he b specified /b them, b he is liable for each and every one; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b If one said: I take b an oath /b that I do not have your deposit, b nor yours, nor yours, nor yours, /b and he was found to have taken a false oath, b he is liable /b to bring an offering b for each and every one. Rabbi Eliezer says: /b If he said: I do b not /b have b yours, nor yours, nor yours, and nor yours, /b I take b an oath, /b then b he is liable for each and every one. /b Since he stated the oath at the end, it refers back to each element of his statement. b Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable /b to bring more than one offering b only if /b he b states /b an expression of b an oath for each and every one. /b This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the question of when oaths are considered distinct., b Rather, /b the Gemara explains in the opposite manner: The i tanna /i of the b entire /b mishna concerning betrothal is b Rabbi Shimon, and with regard to /b the i halakha /i of b agency he holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b that only the father of a young woman can appoint an agent to accept her betrothal or receive her bill of divorce.,The Gemara relates: One day b Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira /b and b said to him: What was said today in the study hall? /b Rabbi Zeira b said to him: I too did not go, /b but b Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie /b sided b with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yoḥa /b that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. b And Reish Lakish screamed /b at them b like a crane: /b Doesn’t the verse state: b “And she departs /b out of his house b and /b goes and b becomes /b another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the i halakhot /i of divorce and betrothal? b But no one paid any attention to him. /b Rabbi Asi b said to him: /b Is b Rabbi Avin reliable? /b Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira b said to him: Yes, /b in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time b was /b only b like /b the interval between catching a fish b from the sea /b and bringing it b to a frying pan [ i tignei /i ]. /b , b Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: /b When b I /b quote this statement, I do b not /b state it in the name of b Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but /b in the name of b Rabbi Avin, without specification. /b The Gemara asks: b What difference is there? /b Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were b to raise a contradiction between /b one of b his /b rulings and another one of b his /b rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e.g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin., b Rava asked Rav Naḥman: /b |
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7. Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 141| 110a. מאי לאו דלא בעל לא דבעל אי דבעל מאי טעמא דשמואל קסבר כל הבועל על דעת קדושין הראשונים הוא בועל,והא פליגי בה חדא זימנא דאיתמר קדשה על תנאי וכנסה סתם רב אמר צריכה הימנו גט ושמואל אמר אינה צריכה הימנו גט,רב אמר צריכה הימנו גט כיון דנסבה אחולי אחליה לתנאיה ושמואל אמר אינה צריכה הימנו גט כל הבועל על דעת קדושין הראשונים הוא בועל,צריכא דאי איתמר ההיא בההיא קאמר רב משום דאיכא תנאה וכיון דבעל אחליה לתנאיה אבל בהא אימא מודה ליה לשמואל ואי איתמר בהא בהך קאמר שמואל אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לרב צריכא,ומי אמר רב כי בעל אין אי לא בעל לא והא ההיא עובדא דהוה בנרש ואיקדישה כשהיא קטנה וגדלה ואותביה אבי כורסייא ואתא אחרינא וחטפה מיניה ורב ברונא ורב חננאל תלמידי דרב הוו התם ולא הצריכוה גיטא מבתרא,אמר רב פפא בנרש מינסב נסיבי והדר מותבי אבי כורסייא רב אשי אמר הוא עשה שלא כהוגן לפיכך עשו בו שלא כהוגן ואפקעינהו רבנן לקידושי מיניה,אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי אליעזר וכן אמר רבי אלעזר הלכה כרבי אליעזר:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big מי שהיה נשוי לשתי יתומות קטנות ומת ביאתה או חליצתה של אחת מהם פוטרת צרתה וכן שתי חרשות קטנה וחרשת אין ביאת אחת מהן פוטרת צרתה,פקחת וחרשת ביאת הפקחת פוטרת החרשת ואין ביאת החרשת פוטרת את הפקחת גדולה וקטנה ביאת הגדולה פוטרת הקטנה ואין ביאת הקטנה פוטרת הגדולה:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big וחרשת בת חליצה היא והתנן חרש שנחלץ וחרשת שחלצה וחולצת מן הקטן חליצתה פסולה,אמר רב גידל אמר רב אביאה רבא אמר אפילו תימא אחליצה כאן בחרשת מעיקרא כאן בפקחת ואח"כ נתחרשה,חרשת מעיקרא כי היכי דעל הכי נפק פקחת ואחר כך נתחרשה לא דמעכבא בה קרייה,איתיביה אביי וחרשת מעיקרא בת חליצה היא והתנן שני אחין אחד פקח ואחד חרש נשואין לשתי נכריות אחת פקחת ואחת חרשת מת חרש בעל חרשת מה יעשה פקח בעל פקחת כונס ואם רצה להוציא יוציא,מת פקח בעל פקחת מה יעשה חרש בעל חרשת כונס ואינו מוציא לעולם מאי לאו בחרשת מעיקרא וקתני כונס אין | 110a. b What, is it not /b a case b where he did not have intercourse /b with her after she reached majority? If so, Rav thinks that even when he did not have intercourse with her, her marriage is fully realized once she reaches majority. The Gemara rejects this: b No, /b this is referring to a case b where he did have intercourse with her. /b The Gemara asks: b If /b it is referring to a case b where he had intercourse with her, what is Shmuel’s reasoning? /b If the first one engaged in intercourse with her after she reached majority, then the marriage was fully realized. Under such circumstances, the second betrothal would not take effect. The Gemara answers: Shmuel b holds that /b when b anyone has sexual intercourse /b with a woman he married as a minor, his b intention is that the intercourse /b is within the framework established by b the initial betrothal /b and is not a new act of acquisition.,The Gemara asks: b But /b if this is the basis of the dispute, b they already disagreed about this once, as it was stated /b with regard to the following case: A man b betrothed /b a woman b on /b some b condition, and married her without mentioning /b the condition, and the condition was not fulfilled. b Rav says: She requires a bill of divorce from him, and Shmuel says: She does not require a bill of divorce from him. /b ,The Gemara explains: b Rav says she requires a bill of divorce from him, /b for b since he married her, he /b apparently b retracted his condition, /b and is therefore married to her even though the condition was not met. b And Shmuel says: She does not require a bill of divorce from him, /b because b anyone who has sexual intercourse /b with his wife, his b intention is that the intercourse /b is within the framework established by b the initial betrothal /b and the condition he set at the time of betrothal still stands. Since it was not fulfilled, the marriage is annulled. If so, Rav and Shmuel already disagreed about this same issue.,The Gemara answers: It is b necessary /b to state the dispute in both contexts, b for if only that /b i halakha /i about conditional betrothal b was stated, /b one might think: b In this case Rav says /b she needs a divorce b since there is a condition /b with regard to the betrothal, b but when he had intercourse /b with her, b he retracted the condition. But in this /b case of betrothal to a minor, b say that /b Rav b would concede to Shmuel /b that the intercourse was not performed with the intention of it constituting a full betrothal. b And if only this /b case of betrothal to a minor b was stated, /b one might think: b Shmuel said that /b the marriage is effective b in this /b case of betrothal to a minor, b but in that /b case of a conditional betrothal, b say /b that b he would concede to Rav. /b Therefore, it was b necessary /b to state the dispute explicitly in both instances.,The Gemara asks: b And did Rav /b actually b say /b that b when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, yes, /b the original marriage is valid, b and if he did not have intercourse with her, no, /b it is not valid? b Wasn’t there an incident in /b the city of b Neresh where /b a woman b was betrothed when she was a minor, and she reached majority, and /b the husband b seated her in a bridal chair /b under the marriage canopy and had not yet had intercourse with her, b and another /b man b came and seized her from him /b and married her? b And Rav Bruna and Rav Ḥael, the students of Rav, were there and they did not require her /b to receive b a bill of divorce from the latter /b husband. Presumably, they regarded her as fully married to the first husband, so the marriage to the second marriage never took effect, despite the fact that the first marriage had not yet been consummated., b Rav Pappa said: /b There is a difference, because b in Neresh their /b practice is to first b marry /b a woman and have intercourse with her, b and afterward they seat her in the bridal chair. /b In this incident, the husband had already had intercourse with her once she was an adult, and that is why Rav’s students did not require a bill of divorce from the second man. b Rav Ashi says: /b There was a different reason, even if the practice was not as Rav Pappa describes. b This /b bride snatcher b acted improperly. Consequently, they treated him improperly /b by annulling the legal validity of his actions, b and the Sages abrogated his betrothal. /b , b Ravina said to Rav Ashi: /b This b works out well if /b the second man b betrothed her with money, /b as then the Sages could declare that money to be ownerless property and void the betrothal. b If he betrothed her by means of intercourse, what /b is the i halakha /i ? How can the Sages dissolve the betrothal when the sexual act took place? The Gemara answers: b The Sages rendered his sexual act a licentious sexual act, /b which does not create a bond of betrothal. With regard to the dispute in the mishna, b Rav Yehuda said /b that b Shmuel said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer, /b and the minor is instructed to make a declaration of refusal. b Likewise, Rabbi Elazar said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong If b a man was married to two orphaned minors and died, consummation /b of levirate marriage b or i ḥalitza /i with one of them exempts her rival wife /b from either levirate marriage or i ḥalitza /i , rendering her free to remarry. b Likewise, /b if b two deaf-mutes /b were married to one man who died, consummation of levirate marriage or i ḥalitza /i with one of them exempts her rival wife. In both of these cases, both women are married by rabbinic law and consequently become i yevamot /i by rabbinic law. Since their statuses are equal, one can exempt the other. If one wife is a b minor and /b the other is b a deaf-mute, consummation /b of levirate marriage or i ḥalitza /i b with one of them does not exempt her rival wife. /b Although both women are married by rabbinic law, their statuses are not the same and one cannot exempt the other.,If one of them b was /b halakhically b competent and /b one was b a deaf-mute, consummation /b of levirate marriage b with the /b halakhically b competent /b wife b exempts the deaf-mute, /b as the halakhically competent women’s marriage and levirate marriage are by Torah law. b But consummation /b of levirate marriage b with the deaf-mute does not exempt the /b halakhically b competent /b wife. Likewise, if one was b an adult woman and one a minor girl, consummation /b of levirate marriage b with the adult exempts the minor but consummation /b of levirate marriage b with the minor does not exempt the adult. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna states that i ḥalitza /i by one deaf-mute exempts the other. The Gemara asks: b Can a deaf-mute perform i ḥalitza /i ? Didn’t we learn /b in a mishna (104b): If b a male deaf-mute performs i ḥalitza /i , and /b if b a female deaf-mute performs i ḥalitza /i , and /b if a woman b performs i ḥalitza /i on a minor boy, her i ḥalitza /i is disqualified? /b , b Rav Giddel said /b that b Rav said: /b The mishna is not referring to a deaf-mute’s i ḥalitza /i , but rather b to consummation /b of levirate marriage with one of the deaf-mutes. b Rava said: You /b can b even say it is referring to i ḥalitza /i . Here, /b the mishna is referring b to /b a woman who was b a deaf-mute from the outset, /b when he married her, and b there /b the mishna that disqualifies the i ḥalitza /i is referring b to /b someone who was halakhically b competent /b when she was married b and afterward became a deaf-mute. /b ,The difference is that b a deaf-mute from the outset, just as she entered /b into marriage with her first husband b so she leaves /b the levirate bond by means of i ḥalitza /i . Both her marriage and her status as a i yevama /i are by rabbinic law. However, b one who was /b halakhically b competent, /b so that she was married by Torah law, b and later became a deaf-mute, no, /b she cannot be released by i ḥalitza /i , b since recitation is indispensable for her /b i ḥalitza /i , and she cannot recite the text that a i yevama /i must recite., b Abaye raised an objection to this: And is one who is a deaf-mute from the outset a candidate for i ḥalitza /i ? Didn’t we learn /b in a mishna ( i Yevamot /i 112b): b Two brothers, one /b who is halakhically b competent and one /b who is b a deaf-mute, /b are b married /b to b two unrelated /b women, b one /b who is halakhically b competent and one deaf-mute. /b If b the male deaf-mute, /b who is b the husband of the female deaf-mute, dies, what should the /b halakhically b competent /b man, who is b the husband of the /b halakhically b competent woman, do? He may consummate /b the levirate marriage, but there is no option of performing i ḥalitza /i . b And if he wants to divorce /b her later, b he may divorce her. /b , b If the /b halakhically b competent man, husband of the /b halakhically b competent woman, dies, what should the /b male b deaf-mute, /b who is b the husband of the female deaf-mute, do? He may consummate the /b levirate marriage, b but he may never divorce her, /b as a deaf-mute is not halakhically competent to divorce a woman to whom he is married by Torah law. b What, is it not /b referring to b a deaf-mute from the outset? And it is taught: Yes, he may consummate the levirate marriage, /b |
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| 8. Ephrem, Prose Refutations, 2.170-2.189 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 119 |
| 9. Ephrem, Hymns On Paradise, 7.6 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 119 |
| 10. Ephrem, Hymns On Virginity, 3.13 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 119 |
| 11. Severus of Minorca, Letters, 40 Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
| 12. Anon., Syro-Roman Lawbook, 118, 60 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
| 13. Jesubocht, Code, 3.5.1, 3.5.3, 3.12 Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
| 14. Council of Chalcedon, Canons, 27 Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
| 15. Synod of Ezekiel, Canons, 8 Tagged with subjects: •rape, as adultery Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
| 16. Synod of Mar Aba, Canons, 12, 15 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 134 |
