1. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 1.4, 4.7, 8.5, 8.12 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (φρόνησις) Found in books: James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 246| 1.4. "לָתֵת לִפְתָאיִם עָרְמָה לְנַעַר דַּעַת וּמְזִמָּה׃", 4.7. "רֵאשִׁית חָכְמָה קְנֵה חָכְמָה וּבְכָל־קִנְיָנְךָ קְנֵה בִינָה׃", 8.5. "הָבִינוּ פְתָאיִם עָרְמָה וּכְסִילִים הָבִינוּ לֵב׃", 8.12. "אֲנִי־חָכְמָה שָׁכַנְתִּי עָרְמָה וְדַעַת מְזִמּוֹת אֶמְצָא׃", | 1.4. "To give prudence to the simple, To the young man knowledge and discretion;", 4.7. "The beginning of wisdom is: Get wisdom; Yea, with all thy getting get understanding.", 8.5. "O ye thoughtless, understand prudence, And, ye fools, be ye of an understanding heart.", 8.12. "I wisdom dwell with prudence, And find out knowledge of devices.", |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 3.1, 9.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (φρόνησις) •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 99, 112, 141, 246; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 246| 3.1. "וַיֹּאמֶר אֶת־קֹלְךָ שָׁמַעְתִּי בַּגָּן וָאִירָא כִּי־עֵירֹם אָנֹכִי וָאֵחָבֵא׃", 3.1. "וְהַנָּחָשׁ הָיָה עָרוּם מִכֹּל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה אַף כִּי־אָמַר אֱלֹהִים לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִכֹּל עֵץ הַגָּן׃", | 3.1. "Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman: ‘Yea, hath God said: Ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?’", 9.20. "And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.", |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 21.15, 22.6 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (φρόνησις) •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 246; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 246| 21.15. "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת׃", 22.6. "כִּי־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ־כֵלִים לִשְׁמֹר וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ אִם־יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם׃", | 21.15. "And he that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall be surely put to death. .", 22.6. "If a man deliver unto his neighbour money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man’s house; if the thief be found, he shall pay double.", |
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4. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 27.16-27.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 141| 27.16. "יִפְקֹד יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחֹת לְכָל־בָּשָׂר אִישׁ עַל־הָעֵדָה׃", 27.17. "אֲשֶׁר־יֵצֵא לִפְנֵיהֶם וַאֲשֶׁר יָבֹא לִפְנֵיהֶם וַאֲשֶׁר יוֹצִיאֵם וַאֲשֶׁר יְבִיאֵם וְלֹא תִהְיֶה עֲדַת יְהוָה כַּצֹּאן אֲשֶׁר אֵין־לָהֶם רֹעֶה׃", | 27.16. "’Let the LORD, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man over the congregation,", 27.17. "who may go out before them, and who may come in before them, and who may lead them out, and who may bring them in; that the congregation of the LORD be not as sheep which have no shepherd.’", |
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| 5. Xenophanes, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 215 |
| 6. Xenophanes, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 215 |
| 7. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 8. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 9. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 213 |
| 10. Plato, Alcibiades Ii, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 11. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212 |
12. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 346| 209a. ψυχήν—εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, οἳ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κυοῦσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν· τί οὖν προσήκει; φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν—ὧν δή εἰσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες γεννήτορες καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὑρετικοὶ εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις, ᾗ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη—τούτων δʼ αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ | 209a. But pregcy of soul—for there are persons, she declared, who in their souls still more than in their bodies conceive those things which are proper for soul to conceive and bring forth; and what are those things? Prudence, and virtue in general; and of these the begetters are all the poets and those craftsmen who are styled inventors. Now by far the highest and fairest part of prudence is that which concerns the regulation of cities and habitations; it is called sobriety |
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| 13. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212 |
| 14. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212 |
| 15. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 16. Plato, Euthyphro, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 83 |
| 17. Plato, Definitions, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 213 |
| 18. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom, practical (ϕρόνησις) Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 8 |
| 19. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212 |
| 20. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 135 |
| 22. Aristotle, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 10 |
| 23. Aristotle, History of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 135 |
| 24. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 10 |
| 25. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
26. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.30, 1.71, 4.17, 5.18, 5.38, 5.42-5.43, 5.60-5.61, 5.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (lat. prudentia = gr. phronēsis) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 132, 134, 135, 155, 187 | 4.17. But they held that wisdom is the guardian and protectress of the whole man, as being the comrade and helper of nature, and so they said that the function of wisdom, as protecting a being that consisted of a mind and a body, was to assist and preserve him in respect of both. After thus laying the first broad foundations of the theory, they went on to work it out in greater detail. The goods of the body, they held, required no particular explanation, but the goods of the soul they investigated with more elaboration, finding in the first place that in them lay the germs of Justice; and they were the first of any philosophers to teach that the love of parents for their offspring is a provision of nature; and that nature, so they pointed out, has ordained the union of men and women in marriage, which is prior in order of time, and is the root of all the family affections. Starting from these first principles they traced out the origin and growth of all the virtues. From the same source was developed loftiness of mind, which could render us proof against the assaults of fortune, because the things that matter were under the control of the Wise Man; whereas to the vicissitudes and blows of fortune a life directed by the precepts of the old philosophers could easily rise superior. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. |
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27. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.30, 4.12 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom •practical wisdom (lat. prudentia = gr. phronēsis) Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 132| 3.30. quod autem Theseus a docto se audisse dicit, id de se ipso de ipso K 1 ( ex dese ipse) V 1 (se add. 1 ) Anax. A 33 loquitur Euripides. fuerat enim auditor Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. quae vox declarat is esse haec acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quae mala putentur, sint inprovisa graviora. itaque quamquam non haec una res efficit maximam aegritudinem, tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. et et ex e V c nimirum haec est illa praestans et divina sapientia, et perceptas penitus et pertractatas res humanas habere, nihil admirari, ammirari GR 1 V cum acciderit, nihil, ante quam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari. Quam ob rem o/mnis, cum secu/ndae res sunt ma/xume, tum ma/xume tum maxume add. K c maxime alt. loco GRV bis H Medita/ri secum opo/rtet, quo pacto a/dversam adversum KRH aerumna/m ferant. fuerant H ferat K 1 Peri/cla, pericula X damna pe/regre rediens se/mper secum co/gitet, pericla damna exilia peregre rediens semper cogitet Ter. codd. Aut fi/li filii p. X peccatum au/t uxoris mo/rtem aut morbum fi/liae, Commu/nia esse haec, ne/ quid horum umquam a/ccidat animo/ novum; c. e. haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novom Ter. Quicqui/d praeter praeter propter K spem eve/niat, omne id de/putare esse i/n lucro. ergo .. 22 lucro H ... 22 Ter. Phormio 241–6 ergo hoc hoc ex haec G 2 Terentius a philosophia sumptum cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius et constantius sentiemus? 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. | |
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| 28. Cicero, On Laws, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 218 |
29. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.30, 1.71, 3.72-3.73, 4.17, 5.18, 5.38, 5.42-5.43, 5.60-5.61, 5.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (lat. prudentia = gr. phronēsis) •practical wisdom Found in books: Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 84; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 132, 134, 135, 155, 187| 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.71. Quapropter si ea, quae dixi, sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt, si omnia dixi hausta omnia dixi hausta = nihil dixi nisi quod haustum esset e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur magistra ac duce natura nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, depravatae ... corruptae A nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus, qui hac exaudita quasi voce naturae sic eam firme graviterque comprehenderit, ut omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret. 3.72. Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, didicerimus BE didiceremus A diceremus RNV ut tenere teneri AR ne BE tuerique possimus. nam sine hac arte quemvis quamvis RBE arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 4.17. Sed cum sapientiam totius hominis custodem et procuratricem esse vellent, quae esset naturae comes et adiutrix, hoc sapientiae munus esse dicebant, ut, cum eum tueretur, qui constaret add. Mdv. ex animo et corpore, in utroque iuvaret eum ac contineret. atque ita re simpliciter primo collocata reliqua subtilius persequentes corporis bona facilem quandam rationem habere censebant; de animi bonis accuratius exquirebant in primisque reperiebant inesse inesse R in esse NV esse BE in iis iustitiae semina primique ex omnibus philosophis natura tributum esse docuerunt, ut ii, qui procreati essent, a procreatoribus amarentur, et, id quod temporum ordine antiquius est, ut coniugia virorum et uxorum natura coniuncta esse dicerent, qua ex stirpe orirentur amicitiae cognationum. Atque ab his initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et progressionem persecuti sunt. ex quo magnitudo quoque animi existebat, qua facile posset repugnari obsistique fortunae, quod maximae res essent in potestate sapientis. varietates autem iniuriasque fortunae facile veterum philosophorum praeceptis instituta vita superabat. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 5.60. itaque amplius itaque BE itaque amplius RNV nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est est Thurot. ( Revue critique 1870,1. semestrep.21 ); sunt R sit NV om. BE haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, consentanee sunt BE refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae quae Matthiae ( Vermischte Schriften 1833 p. 31 sq. ); queque sint notitiae, quae quidem quae quidem Se. quaeque (queque) BENV que R significentur significent BE rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis cuiusque vis NV cuiusvis BE cuius vis R et natura sit mox mox p. 189, 20 sqq. videbimus. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.67. atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, sint ( ante ut) BE sunt ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. | 3.72. "To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us for giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 4.17. But they held that wisdom is the guardian and protectress of the whole man, as being the comrade and helper of nature, and so they said that the function of wisdom, as protecting a being that consisted of a mind and a body, was to assist and preserve him in respect of both. After thus laying the first broad foundations of the theory, they went on to work it out in greater detail. The goods of the body, they held, required no particular explanation, but the goods of the soul they investigated with more elaboration, finding in the first place that in them lay the germs of Justice; and they were the first of any philosophers to teach that the love of parents for their offspring is a provision of nature; and that nature, so they pointed out, has ordained the union of men and women in marriage, which is prior in order of time, and is the root of all the family affections. Starting from these first principles they traced out the origin and growth of all the virtues. From the same source was developed loftiness of mind, which could render us proof against the assaults of fortune, because the things that matter were under the control of the Wise Man; whereas to the vicissitudes and blows of fortune a life directed by the precepts of the old philosophers could easily rise superior. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. |
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30. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 69 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 112 | 69. These men, therefore, who prefer idleness to industry, have not only hindered the shoots of virtue from thriving, but have even dried up all the roots, and withered and destroyed them; while those on the contrary, who look upon idleness as pernicious and who are willing to labour, cultivate it as husbandmen would cultivate flourishing shoots of good kinds of plants, with incessant care, and thus they raise the virtues to the height of heaven itself in ever-flourishing and undying branches, bearing a fruit of happiness which never ceases, or rather, as some say, not bearing happiness, but rather actually being happiness, which Moses was in the habit of calling by one compound name, holokarpoµmata (whole offerings of entire fruit). |
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31. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 67 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 112 | 67. Therefore the lawgiver, being a most admirable physician of the passions and diseases of the soul, has proposed to himself one task and one end, namely, to eradicate the diseases of the mind by the roots, so that there may not be a single one left behind to put forth any shoot of incurable distemper. |
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| 32. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 1.65, 2.90, 3.249 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 99, 246 |
| 33. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 11-14, 73-74, 79 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 99 |
| 34. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.5.10-2.5.11, 3.24.105 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom, practical (ϕρόνησις) •practical wisdom Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 136; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226 |
| 35. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226 |
| 36. Plutarch, Marius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 214 |
| 37. Plutarch, Table Talk, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 38. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 89.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 11 |
| 39. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Polybium (Ad Polybium De Consolatione) (Dialogorum Liber Xi), 2.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226 |
40. New Testament, Romans, 3.4, 6.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212| 3.4. μὴ γένοιτο· γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής,πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης,καθάπερ γέγραπται 6.10. ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ· | 3.4. May it never be! Yes, let God be found true, but every man a liar. As it is written, "That you might be justified in your words, And might prevail when you come into judgment." 6.10. For the death that he died, he died to sin one time; but the life that he lives, he lives to God. |
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| 41. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 213 |
| 42. Palestinian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 3 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom, practical wisdom Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 108 |
| 43. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212, 213, 214 |
| 44. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.219 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (lat. prudentia = gr. phronēsis) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 187 |
| 45. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 5.5.38-5.5.40 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 52, 75, 76 |
46. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.13, 2.55, 4.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom •aristotle, definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 10; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226 | 2.13. When news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his comment on the sentence was, Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death; and on his sons, I knew that my children were born to die. Some, however, tell this story of Solon, and others of Xenophon. That he buried his sons with his own hands is asserted by Demetrius of Phalerum in his work On Old Age. Hermippus in his Lives says that he was confined in the prison pending his execution; that Pericles came forward and asked the people whether they had any fault to find with him in his own public career; to which they replied that they had not. Well, he continued, I am a pupil of Anaxagoras; do not then be carried away by slanders and put him to death. Let me prevail upon you to release him. So he was released; but he could not brook the indignity he had suffered and committed suicide. 2.55. Some say that he did not even shed tears, but exclaimed, I knew my son was mortal. Aristotle mentions that there were innumerable authors of epitaphs and eulogies upon Gryllus, who wrote, in part at least, to gratify his father. Hermippus too, in his Life of Theophrastus, affirms that even Isocrates wrote an encomium on Gryllus. Timon, however, jeers at Xenophon in the lines:A feeble pair or triad of works, or even a greater number, such as would come from Xenophon or the might of Aeschines, that not unpersuasive writer.Such was his life. He flourished in the fourth year of the 94th Olympiad, and he took part in the expedition of Cyrus in the archonship of Xenaenetus in the year before the death of Socrates. 4.14. Elementary Principles of Monarchy, in four books, dedicated to Alexander.To Arybas.To Hephaestion.On Geometry, two books.These works comprise in all 224,239 lines.Such was his character, and yet, when he was unable to pay the tax levied on resident aliens, the Athenians put him up for sale. And Demetrius of Phalerum purchased him, thereby making twofold restitution, to Xenocrates of his liberty, and to the Athenians of their tax. This we learn from Myronianus of Amastris in the first book of his Chapters on Historical Parallels. He succeeded Speusippus and was head of the school for twenty-five years from the archonship of Lysimachides, beginning in the second year of the 110th Olympiad. He died in his 82nd year from the effects of a fall over some utensil in the night.Upon him I have expressed myself as follows: |
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| 47. Porphyry, Aids To The Study of The Intelligibles, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 216 |
| 48. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.2, 1.8.4, 5.8.13, 6.7.41 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 8, 41, 136; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212, 217, 226 |
| 49. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 215 |
| 50. Porphyry, Fragments, 275, 274 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 216, 217, 219 |
| 51. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 77 |
| 52. Sallustius, On The Gods, None (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 212 |
| 53. Marinus, Vita Proclus, 14-17 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 20 |
| 54. John Philoponus, In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria, 15.117.27 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (φρόνησις) Found in books: James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 249 |
| 55. Elias, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria, 118.18-118.19 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom (φρόνησις) Found in books: James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 249 |
| 56. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 214 |
| 57. Jerome, Ecclesiasticus, 34.8 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 11 |
| 58. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, None (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 59. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.375, 2.35, 3.366, 3.390, 3.581 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 246; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 84; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 214, 219, 226 |
| 60. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 132 |
| 61. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 134 |
| 62. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •wisdom, practical (ϕρόνησις) Found in books: Omeara (2005), Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 136 |
| 63. Fds, Fds, 2 Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 11 |
| 64. Aristocles of Messene, Vest., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 65. Philoponus, Commentary On Nichomachus' Introduction To Arithmetic, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 67. Sextus, The Sentences of Sextus, 257, 473 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 215 |
| 69. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 213 |
| 70. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •wisdom (sophia), definition of theoretical wisdom, distinguished from practical wisdom Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 11 |
| 72. Julian, Orat., None Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 218 |
| 86. Proclus Arabus, Works, 9 Tagged with subjects: •practical wisdom Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 226 |
| 87. Maximus Tyrius, Dialexeis, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 217 |
| 89. Pseudo-Phocylides, The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, 107, 42, 108 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 215 |
