| 1. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
| 2. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213 |
| 3. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233, 241 |
| 4. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
| 5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 191, 241 |
| 6. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 7. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, but also accuses aristotelians of accepting the cruelty of anger Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 8. Democritus Ephesius, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
9. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.18.60, 2.96, 2.98, 3.41, 4.20, 4.72, 5.16-5.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, misrepresents stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of emotion •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for eupatheiai •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for homosexual love Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 207, 233, 234 | 2.96. "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.' 2.98. The words of a philosopher, Epicurus, command my attention; but you forget what you logically ought to say. In the first place, if the things in the recollection of which you profess to find pleasure, I mean your writings and discoveries, are true, you cannot really be feeling pleasure. All feelings referable to the body are over for you; yet you have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. He says 'I take pleasure in my past feelings.' What past feelings? If you mean bodily feelings, I notice that it is not the memory of bodily delights, but your philosophical theories, that counterbalance for you your present pains; if mental feelings, your doctrine that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body is an error. And secondly, why do you provide for the children of Metrodorus? What standard of bodily pleasure are you following in this signal act (for so I esteem it) of loyalty and duty? 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 4.20. As I understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity. 4.72. "Who, pray, did not know that? However, let us hear what he has to say. â 'The things you mentioned,' he continues, 'health, affluence, freedom from pain, I do not call goods, but I will call them in Greek proÄgmena, that is in your language "brought forward" (though I will rather use "preferred" or "preâeminent," as these sound smoother and more acceptable) and on the other hand disease, poverty and pain I do not style evils, but, if you please, "things rejected." Accordingly I do not speak of "desiring" but "selecting" these things, not of "wishing" but "adopting" them, and not of "avoiding" their opposites but so to speak "discarding" them.' What say Aristotle and the other pupils of Plato? That they call all things in accordance with nature good and all things contrary to nature bad. Do you see therefore that between your master Zeno and Aristo there is a verbal harmony but a real difference; whereas between him and Aristotle and the rest there is a real agreement and a verbal disagreement? Why, then, as we are agreed to the fact, do we not prefer to employ the usual terminology? Or else let him prove that I shall be readier to despise money if I believe it to be a 'thing preferred' than if I believe it to be a good, and braver to endure pain if I say it is irksome and hard to bear and contrary to nature, than if I call it an evil. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.17. Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.19. "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. â Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. 5.20. "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, â that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics. |
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10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241| 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. | |
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11. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.18.60, 2.96, 2.98, 3.41, 4.20, 4.72, 5.16-5.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, misrepresents stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of emotion •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for eupatheiai •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for homosexual love Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 207, 233, 234| 2.96. Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas intellegas (intellig.) BEA 2 intellegat A 1 intelligat R intelligantur N intelligatur V facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem autem om. A aderant aderant om. BE vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam me et philosophiam Bai. me (ne R) et philosophia A 1 RN me philosophia BE me et philosophia et A 2 V voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos. 2.98. Audio equidem philosophi vocem, Epicure, sed quid tibi dicendum sit oblitus es. primum enim, si vera sunt ea, quorum recordatione te gaudere dicis, hoc est, si vera sunt tua scripta et inventa, gaudere non potes. nihil enim iam habes, quod ad corpus referas; est autem a te semper dictum nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere. 'Praeteritis', inquit, gaudeo. Quibusnam praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, non memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum; sin autem ad animum, falsum est, quod negas animi ullum esse gaudium, quod non referatur ad corpus. cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas? quid in add. Mdv. ('ex addidit, opinor, A. Man. Ex (de?) an in (cum tam officiose agis) adden- dum fuerit dubitari potest' Mdv. sed ī ante isto facilius excidit quam ex) isto egregio tuo officio et tanta fide—sic enim existimo—ad corpus refers? 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 4.20. Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri veri ( corr., ut videtur, ex vere) N vere BEV vero R investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute virtute una BE consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant. 4.72. Quis istud, quaeso, quaeso Man., Lamb. ; quasi nesciebat? verum audiamus.— Ista, inquit, quae dixisti, valere, locupletem esse, non dolere, bona non dico, sed dicam Graece prohgme/na, Latine autem producta—sed praeposita proposita RNV aut praecipua malo, sit tolerabilius et mollius—; illa autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala, sed, si libet, si libet BE, N (libet ab alt. m. in ras. ); si lilibet R scilicet V reiectanea. itaque illa non dico me expetere, sed legere, nec optare, sed sumere, contraria autem non fugere, sed quasi secernere. Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Platonis alumni? Se omnia, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare, quae autem contra, mala. Videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis concinere, concinere C. F. W. Mue. consistere re re N 2 om. BERN 1 V dissidere, cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? discrepare BE disceptare cur igitur, cum de re conveniat, non malumus malimus NV usitate loqui? aut doceat paratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniam fore, si illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, fortioremque in patiendo dolore, si eum asperum et difficilem perpessu et contra perpessu et contra perpessi contra BE naturam esse quam si malum dixero. 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh\n o(rmh/n ] bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.19. ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo aliquo uno BE ex tribus illis congruere possit, possit. u aut non dolendi ita sit ut quanta ( v. 19 ) R rell. om. ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam secl. Mdv. non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam etiam N 2 in ras., aut BEV si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita ita N 2 aut non dolendi ita R ( cf. ad v. 14 ), N 1 V; aut nichil dolendi ita BE fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda. 5.20. expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. superiores tres erant, quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia, cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi nisi Urs. ne si etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt BE etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt. | 2.96. "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.' 2.98. The words of a philosopher, Epicurus, command my attention; but you forget what you logically ought to say. In the first place, if the things in the recollection of which you profess to find pleasure, I mean your writings and discoveries, are true, you cannot really be feeling pleasure. All feelings referable to the body are over for you; yet you have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. He says 'I take pleasure in my past feelings.' What past feelings? If you mean bodily feelings, I notice that it is not the memory of bodily delights, but your philosophical theories, that counterbalance for you your present pains; if mental feelings, your doctrine that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body is an error. And secondly, why do you provide for the children of Metrodorus? What standard of bodily pleasure are you following in this signal act (for so I esteem it) of loyalty and duty? 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 4.20. As I understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity. 4.72. "Who, pray, did not know that? However, let us hear what he has to say. â 'The things you mentioned,' he continues, 'health, affluence, freedom from pain, I do not call goods, but I will call them in Greek proÄgmena, that is in your language "brought forward" (though I will rather use "preferred" or "preâeminent," as these sound smoother and more acceptable) and on the other hand disease, poverty and pain I do not style evils, but, if you please, "things rejected." Accordingly I do not speak of "desiring" but "selecting" these things, not of "wishing" but "adopting" them, and not of "avoiding" their opposites but so to speak "discarding" them.' What say Aristotle and the other pupils of Plato? That they call all things in accordance with nature good and all things contrary to nature bad. Do you see therefore that between your master Zeno and Aristo there is a verbal harmony but a real difference; whereas between him and Aristotle and the rest there is a real agreement and a verbal disagreement? Why, then, as we are agreed to the fact, do we not prefer to employ the usual terminology? Or else let him prove that I shall be readier to despise money if I believe it to be a 'thing preferred' than if I believe it to be a good, and braver to endure pain if I say it is irksome and hard to bear and contrary to nature, than if I call it an evil. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.17. Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.19. "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. â Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. 5.20. "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, â that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics. |
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| 12. Cicero, Academica, 2.44, 2.44.135, 2.135 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, anger not useful for punishment Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 191 |
| 13. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 191 |
| 14. Philodemus of Gadara, De Musica \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91, 234 |
| 15. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 10.5.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, exercises against curiosity and against fear of giving offence Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213 |
| 16. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 17.109 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 246 |
17. Philo of Alexandria, On The Virtues, 177 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 | 177. For absolutely never to do anything wrong at all is a peculiar attribute of God, and perhaps one may also say of a God-like man. But when one has erred, then to change so as to adopt a blameless course of life for the future is the part of a wise man, and of one who is not altogether ignorant of what is expedient. |
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18. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.103 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 | 1.103. For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers become united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts. For the scars and impressions of their old offences remain not the less in the souls of those who repent. |
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19. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.91 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 | 1.91. Why so? Because, even if the mind, fancying that though it does wrong it can escape the notice of the Deity as not being able to see everything, should sin secretly and in dark places, and should after that, either by reason of its own notions or through the suggestions of some one else, conceive that it is impossible that anything should be otherwise than clear to God, and should disclose itself and all its actions, and should bring them forward, as it were, out of the light of the sun, and display them to the governor of the universe, saying, that it repents of the perverse conduct which it formerly exhibited when under the influence of foolish opinion (for that nothing is indistinct before God, but all things are known and clear to him, not merely such as have been done, but even such are merely hoped or designed, by reason of the boundless character of his wisdom), it then is purified and benefited, and it propitiates the chastiser who was ready to punish it, namely, conscience, who was previously filled with just anger towards it, and who now admits repentance as the younger brother of perfect innocence and freedom from sin. XVI. |
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20. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 26 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 | 26. But we must not be ignorant that repentance occupies the second place only, next after perfection, just as the change from sickness to convalescence is inferior to perfect uninterrupted health. Therefore, that which is continuous and perfect in virtues is very near divine power, but that condition which is improvement advancing in process of time is the peculiar blessing of a welldisposed soul, which does not continue in its childish pursuits, but by more vigorous thoughts and inclinations, such as really become a man, seeks a tranquil steadiness of soul, and which attains to it by its conception of what is good. V. |
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21. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.31-3.93, 3.830-3.1094 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 228, 241, 248| 3.31. Et quoniam docui, cunctarum exordia rerum 3.32. qualia sint et quam variis distantia formis 3.33. sponte sua volitent aeterno percita motu, 3.34. quove modo possint res ex his quaeque creari, 3.35. hasce secundum res animi natura videtur 3.36. atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse 3.37. et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, 3.38. funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo 3.39. omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam 3.40. esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit. 3.41. nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos 3.42. infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti 3.43. et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse, 3.44. aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, 3.45. nec prosum quicquam nostrae rationis egere, 3.46. hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis 3.47. iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur. 3.48. extorres idem patria longeque fugati 3.49. conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 3.50. omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt, 3.51. et quo cumque tamen miseri venere parentant 3.52. et nigras mactant pecudes et manibus divis 3.53. inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 3.54. acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 3.55. quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 3.56. convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit; 3.57. nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo 3.58. eliciuntur et eripitur persona amanare. 3.59. denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido, 3.60. quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 3.61. iuris et inter dum socios scelerum atque ministros 3.62. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 3.63. ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 3.64. non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 3.65. turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 3.66. semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 3.67. et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante; 3.68. unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 3.69. effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 3.70. sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 3.71. conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 3.72. crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 3.73. et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.78. intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo. 3.79. et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae 3.80. percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 3.81. ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum 3.82. obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem: 3.83. hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai 3.84. rumpere et in summa pietate evertere suadet: 3.85. nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 3.86. prodiderunt vitare Acherusia templa petentes. 3.87. nam vel uti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 3.88. in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 3.89. inter dum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 3.90. quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 3.91. hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 3.92. non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 3.93. discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 3.830. Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 3.831. quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur. 3.832. et vel ut ante acto nihil tempore sensimus aegri, 3.833. ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, 3.834. omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu 3.835. horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, 3.836. in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum 3.837. omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, 3.838. sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 3.839. discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, 3.840. scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 3.841. accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.842. non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo. 3.843. et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 3.844. distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, 3.845. nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 3.846. corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 3.847. nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 3.848. post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, 3.849. atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, 3.850. pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 3.851. interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. 3.852. et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante 3.853. qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor. 3.854. nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne 3.855. praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 3.856. multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis, 3.857. semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta 3.858. haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. 3.859. nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente; 3.860. inter enim iectast vitai pausa vageque 3.861. deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. 3.862. debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst; 3.863. ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit 3.864. accidere. id quoniam mors eximit, esseque prohibet 3.865. illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 3.866. scire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum 3.867. nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum 3.868. differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, 3.869. mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit. 3.870. Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 3.871. post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto 3.872. aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum, 3.873. scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse 3.874. caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse 3.875. credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum; 3.876. non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde 3.877. nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, 3.878. sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. 3.879. vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, 3.880. corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 3.881. ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim 3.882. nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum 3.883. se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans. 3.884. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum 3.885. nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 3.886. qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum 3.887. stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. 3.888. nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum 3.889. tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum 3.890. ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis 3.891. aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere 3.892. frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi, 3.893. urgerive superne obrutum pondere terrae. 3.894. 'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor 3.895. optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 3.896. praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 3.897. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 3.898. praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 3.899. una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.' 3.900. illud in his rebus non addunt 'nec tibi earum 3.901. iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.' 3.902. quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, 3.903. dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. 3.904. 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 3.905. quod super est cunctis privatus doloribus aegris; 3.906. at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 3.907. insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 3.908. nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.' 3.909. illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari 3.910. tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem, 3.911. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 3.950. quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 3.951. naturam et veram verbis exponere causam? 3.952. grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur 3.953. atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo, 3.954. non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri: 3.955. 'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas. 3.956. omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 3.957. sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 3.958. inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 3.959. et nec opiti mors ad caput adstitit ante 3.960. quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 3.961. nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte 3.962. aequo animoque, age dum, magnis concede necessis?' 3.963. iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque; 3.964. cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas 3.965. semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. 3.966. Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra; 3.967. materies opus est, ut crescant postera saecla; 3.968. quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; 3.969. nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere cadentque. 3.970. sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri 3.971. vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 3.972. respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas 3.973. temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. 3.974. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 3.975. temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 3.976. numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 3.977. quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? 3.978. Atque ea ni mirum quae cumque Acherunte profundo 3.979. prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. 3.980. nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere aëre saxum 3.981. Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; 3.982. sed magis in vita divom metus urget iis 3.983. mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors. 3.984. nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem 3.985. nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 3.986. perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto. 3.987. quam libet immani proiectu corporis exstet, 3.988. qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris 3.989. optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem, 3.990. non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 3.991. nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper. 3.992. sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem 3.993. quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 3.994. aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.995. Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 3.996. qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 3.997. imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 3.998. nam petere imperium, quod iest nec datur umquam, 3.999. atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 3.1000. hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 3.1001. saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rusum 3.1002. volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 3.1003. deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 3.1004. atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam, 3.1005. quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 3.1006. cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 3.1007. nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam, 3.1008. hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas 3.1009. quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 3.1010. quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 3.1011. Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas, 3.1012. Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus! 3.1013. qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto; 3.1014. sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 3.1015. est insignibus insignis scelerisque luela, 3.1016. carcer et horribilis de saxo iactus deorsum, 3.1017. verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 3.1018. quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 3.1019. praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 3.1020. nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 3.1021. possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 3.1022. atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 3.1023. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. 3.1024. Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis. 3.1025. 'lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit, 3.1026. qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. 3.1027. inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes 3.1028. occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt. 3.1029. ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum 3.1030. stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 3.1031. ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas 3.1032. et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti, 3.1033. lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit. 3.1034. Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, 3.1035. ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 3.1036. adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum, 3.1037. adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus 3.1038. sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitus quietest. 3.1039. denique Democritum post quam matura vetustas 3.1040. admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 3.1041. sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse. 3.1042. ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 3.1043. qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 3.1044. restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. 3.1045. tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 3.1046. mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti, 3.1047. qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi, 3.1048. et viligans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 3.1049. sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 3.1050. nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 3.1051. ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 3.1052. atque animo incerto fluitans errore vagaris.' 3.1053. Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 3.1054. pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget, 3.1055. e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 3.1056. tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet, 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1068. hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, 3.1069. effugere haut potis est: ingratius haeret et odit 3.1070. propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 3.1071. quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis 3.1072. naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum, 3.1073. temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 3.1074. ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis 3.1075. aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manendo. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. | |
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| 22. Epictetus, Discourses, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216 |
| 23. New Testament, Luke, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 24. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 228 |
| 25. Plutarch, Consolation To His Wife, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 228 |
| 26. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 15, 18, 3, 34, 9, 20 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
27. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 1.10.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, music comforts non-rational element in soul Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91 | 1.10.32. We are told that Pythagoras on one occasion, when some young men were led astray by their passions to commit an outrage on a respectable family, calmed them by ordering the piper to change her strain to a spondaic measure, while Chrysippus selects a special tune to be used by nurses to entice their little charges to sleep. |
|
| 28. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 272 |
| 29. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 272 |
| 30. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 2.4, 3.3, 5.6, 26.6-26.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 248 |
| 31. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, confession Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 218 |
| 32. Plutarch, How To Tell A Flatterer From A Friend, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, confession Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 218 |
| 33. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 228 |
| 34. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, 2.5-2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162 |
| 35. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 1.2, 1.5, 2.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, confession •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, tranquillity Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 182, 218 |
| 36. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 207 |
| 37. Plutarch, On The Sign of Socrates, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, exercises against curiosity and against fear of giving offence Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213 |
| 38. Plutarch, On The E At Delphi, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 245, 247, 248 |
| 39. Plutarch, On Being A Busybody, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213 |
| 40. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 207 |
41. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 1.10.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, music comforts non-rational element in soul Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91 | 1.10.32. We are told that Pythagoras on one occasion, when some young men were led astray by their passions to commit an outrage on a respectable family, calmed them by ordering the piper to change her strain to a spondaic measure, while Chrysippus selects a special tune to be used by nurses to entice their little charges to sleep. |
|
| 42. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 231, 232, 233, 244 |
| 43. Seneca The Younger, Letters, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 153 |
| 44. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 4.50 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 45. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.7, 4.7.14, 4.7.26, 4.7.28, 4.7.30, 4.7.32-4.7.33, 4.7.35, 4.7.41, 4.7.43-4.7.44, 5.5.31, 5.6.31-5.6.32 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 153, 162, 241 |
| 46. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.237 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, tranquillity Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 182 |
| 47. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, time available to check anger Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 70 |
| 48. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, appreciating something more by imagining it absent Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 216 |
| 49. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 32.186.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, anger not useful for punishment Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 162, 191 |
| 50. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.12 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 153 |
51. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 35 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 | 35. Try not to wrong thy slaves nor to correct them when thou art angry. And before correcting them, prove to them that thou dost this for their good, and give them an opportunity for excuse. When purchasing slaves, avoid the stubborn ones. Practise doing many things thyself, for our own labour is simple and easy. And men should use each limb for the purpose for which nature intended it to be used, for nature needs no more. They who do not use their own bodies, but make excessive use of others, commit a twofold wrong, and are ungrateful to nature that has given them these parts. Never use thy bodily parts merely for the sake of pleasure, for it is far better to die than to obscure thy soul by intemperance . . . . correct the vice of thy nature. . . . If thou give aught to thy slaves, distinguish the better ones by a share of honour . . . . for it is impossible that he who does wrong to man should honour God. But look on the love of mankind as the foundation of thy piety. And . . . . |
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| 52. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 207 |
| 53. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.5.8-1.5.9 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 234 |
| 54. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 31.187, 31.197, 31.217 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, exercises against curiosity and against fear of giving offence •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213, 241, 277 |
55. Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 40 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, exercises against curiosity and against fear of giving offence Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 213 | 40. He advised special regard to two times; that when we go to sleep, and that when we awake. At each of these we should consider our past actions, and those that are to come. We ought to require of ourselves an account of our past deeds, while of the future we should have a providential care. Therefore he advised everybody to repeat to himself the following verses before he fell asleep: "Nor suffer sleep to close thine eyes Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast run o'er;How slipt? What deeds? What duty left undone?" On rising: "As soon as ere thou wakest, in order lay The actions to be done that following day" SPAN |
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| 56. Porphyry, On Abstinence, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
57. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 | 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again. |
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| 58. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 246 |
59. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4-9.5, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, misrepresents stoic recognition of first movements as acceptance of emotion •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for eupatheiai •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, similarly for homosexual love •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, anger not useful for punishment Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 191, 207 | 9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi , and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears. 9.5. We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consot with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of C sar, when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible. |
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| 60. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 246 |
| 61. Augustine, Reply To Faustus, 22.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
| 62. Augustine, Against Julian, 4.14.69, 5.5.22-5.5.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, music comforts non-rational element in soul Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91, 277, 410 |
63. Augustine, Confessions, 1.6-1.7, 4.4, 4.8.13, 10.14, 10.21.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233, 241, 410 | 1.6. 7. Still suffer me to speak before Your mercy - me, dust and ashes. Genesis 18:27 Allow me to speak, for, behold, it is Your mercy I address, and not derisive man. Yet perhaps even You deride me; but when You are turned to me You will have compassion on me. Jeremiah 12:15 For what do I wish to say, O Lord my God, but that I know not whence I came hither into this - shall I call it dying life or living death? Yet, as I have heard from my parents, from whose substance You formed me - for I myself cannot remember it - Your merciful comforts sustained me. Thus it was that the comforts of a woman's milk entertained me; for neither my mother nor my nurses filled their own breasts, but You by them gave me the nourishment of infancy according to Your ordice and that bounty of Yours which underlies all things. For You caused me not to want more than You gave, and those who nourished me willingly to give me what You gave them. For they, by an instinctive affection, were anxious to give me what You had abundantly supplied. It was, in truth, good for them that my good should come from them, though, indeed, it was not from them, but by them; for from You, O God, are all good things, and from my God is all my safety. Proverbs 21:31 This is what I have since discovered, as You have declared Yourself to me by the blessings both within me and without me which You have bestowed upon me. For at that time I knew how to suck, to be satisfied when comfortable, and to cry when in pain - nothing beyond. 8. Afterwards I began to laugh - at first in sleep, then when waking. For this I have heard mentioned of myself, and I believe it (though I cannot remember it), for we see the same in other infants. And now little by little I realized where I was, and wished to tell my wishes to those who might satisfy them, but I could not; for my wants were within me, while they were without, and could not by any faculty of theirs enter into my soul. So I cast about limbs and voice, making the few and feeble signs I could, like, though indeed not much like, unto what I wished; and when I was not satisfied - either not being understood, or because it would have been injurious to me - I grew indigt that my elders were not subject unto me, and that those on whom I had no claim did not wait on me, and avenged myself on them by tears. That infants are such I have been able to learn by watching them; and they, though unknowing, have better shown me that I was such an one than my nurses who knew it. 9. And, behold, my infancy died long ago, and I live. But You, O Lord, who ever livest, and in whom nothing dies (since before the world was, and indeed before all that can be called before, You exist, and are the God and Lord of all Your creatures; and with You fixedly abide the causes of all unstable things, the unchanging sources of all things changeable, and the eternal reasons of all things unreasoning and temporal), tell me, Your suppliant, O God; tell, O merciful One, Your miserable servant - tell me whether my infancy succeeded another age of mine which had at that time perished. Was it that which I passed in my mother's womb? For of that something has been made known to me, and I have myself seen women with child. And what, O God, my joy, preceded that life? Was I, indeed, anywhere, or anybody? For no one can tell me these things, neither father nor mother, nor the experience of others, nor my own memory. Do you laugh at me for asking such things, and command me to praise and confess You for what I know? 10. I give thanks to You, Lord of heaven and earth, giving praise to You for that my first being and infancy, of which I have no memory; for You have granted to man that from others he should come to conclusions as to himself, and that he should believe many things concerning himself on the authority of feeble women. Even then I had life and being; and as my infancy closed I was already seeking for signs by which my feelings might be made known to others. Whence could such a creature come but from You, O Lord? Or shall any man be skilful enough to fashion himself? Or is there any other vein by which being and life runs into us save this, that You, O Lord, hast made us, with whom being and life are one, because You Yourself art being and life in the highest? You are the highest, You change not, Malachi 3:6 neither in You does this present day come to an end, though it does end in You, since in You all such things are; for they would have no way of passing away unless You sustained them. And since Your years shall have no end, Your years are an ever present day. And how many of ours and our fathers' days have passed through this Your day, and received from it their measure and fashion of being, and others yet to come shall so receive and pass away! But You are the same; and all the things of tomorrow and the days yet to come, and all of yesterday and the days that are past, You will do today, You have done today. What is it to me if any understand not? Let him still rejoice and say, What is this? Let him rejoice even so, and rather love to discover in failing to discover, than in discovering not to discover You. 1.7. 11. Hearken, O God! Alas for the sins of men! Man says this, and You have compassion on him; for You created him, but did not create the sin that is in him. Who brings to my remembrance the sin of my infancy? For before You none is free from sin, not even the infant which has lived but a day upon the earth. Who brings this to my remembrance? Does not each little one, in whom I behold that which I do not remember of myself? In what, then, did I sin? Is it that I cried for the breast? If I should now so cry - not indeed for the breast, but for the food suitable to my years - I should be most justly laughed at and rebuked. What I then did deserved rebuke; but as I could not understand those who rebuked me, neither custom nor reason suffered me to be rebuked. For as we grow we root out and cast from us such habits. I have not seen any one who is wise, when purging John 15:2 anything cast away the good. Or was it good, even for a time, to strive to get by crying that which, if given, would be hurtful - to be bitterly indigt that those who were free and its elders, and those to whom it owed its being, besides many others wiser than it, who would not give way to the nod of its good pleasure, were not subject unto it - to endeavour to harm, by struggling as much as it could, because those commands were not obeyed which only could have been obeyed to its hurt? Then, in the weakness of the infant's limbs, and not in its will, lies its innocency. I myself have seen and known an infant to be jealous though it could not speak. It became pale, and cast bitter looks on its foster-brother. Who is ignorant of this? Mothers and nurses tell us that they appease these things by I know not what remedies; and may this be taken for innocence, that when the fountain of milk is flowing fresh and abundant, one who has need should not be allowed to share it, though needing that nourishment to sustain life? Yet we look leniently on these things, not because they are not faults, nor because the faults are small, but because they will vanish as age increases. For although you may allow these things now, you could not bear them with equanimity if found in an older person. 12. You, therefore, O Lord my God, who gave life to the infant, and a frame which, as we see, You have endowed with senses, compacted with limbs, beautified with form, and, for its general good and safety, hast introduced all vital energies - You command me to praise You for these things, to give thanks unto the Lord, and to sing praise unto Your name, O Most High; for You are a God omnipotent and good, though You had done nought but these things, which none other can do but You, who alone made all things, O You most fair, who made all things fair, and orders all according to Your law. This period, then, of my life, O Lord, of which I have no remembrance, which I believe in the word of others, and which I guess from other infants, it chagrins me - true though the guess be - to reckon in this life of mine which I lead in this world; inasmuch as, in the darkness of my forgetfulness, it is like to that which I passed in my mother's womb. But if I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me, where, I pray you, O my God, where, Lord, or when was I, Your servant, innocent? But behold, I pass by that time, for what have I to do with that, the memories of which I cannot recall? 4.4. 7. In those years, when I first began to teach rhetoric in my native town, I had acquired a very dear friend, from association in our studies, of my own age, and, like myself, just rising up into the flower of youth. He had grown up with me from childhood, and we had been both classmates and playmates. But he was not then my friend, nor, indeed, afterwards, as true friendship is; for true it is not but in such as You bind together, cleaving unto You by that love which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us. Romans 5:5 But yet it was too sweet, being ripened by the fervour of similar studies. For, from the true faith (which he, as a youth, had not soundly and thoroughly become master of), I had turned him aside towards those superstitious and pernicious fables which my mother mourned in me. With me this man's mind now erred, nor could my soul exist without him. But behold, You were close behind Your fugitives - at once God of vengeance and Fountain of mercies, who turnest us to Yourself by wondrous means. You removed that man from this life when he had scarce completed one whole year of my friendship, sweet to me above all the sweetness of that my life. 8. Who can show forth all Your praise which he has experienced in himself alone? What was it that Thou did then, O my God, and how unsearchable are the depths of Your judgments! For when, sore sick of a fever, he long lay unconscious in a death-sweat, and all despaired of his recovery, he was baptized without his knowledge; myself meanwhile little caring, presuming that his soul would retain rather what it had imbibed from me, than what was done to his unconscious body. Far different, however, was it, for he was revived and restored. Straightway, as soon as I could talk to him (which I could as soon as he was able, for I never left him, and we hung too much upon each other), I attempted to jest with him, as if he also would jest with me at that baptism which he had received when mind and senses were in abeyance, but had now learned that he had received. But he shuddered at me, as if I were his enemy; and, with a remarkable and unexpected freedom, admonished me, if I desired to continue his friend, to desist from speaking to him in such a way. I, confounded and confused, concealed all my emotions, till he should get well, and his health be strong enough to allow me to deal with him as I wished. But he was withdrawn from my frenzy, that with You he might be preserved for my comfort. A few days after, during my absence, he had a return of the fever, and died. 9. At this sorrow my heart was utterly darkened, and whatever I looked upon was death. My native country was a torture to me, and my father's house a wondrous unhappiness; and whatsoever I had participated in with him, wanting him, turned into a frightful torture. My eyes sought him everywhere, but he was not granted them; and I hated all places because he was not in them; nor could they now say to me, Behold; he is coming, as they did when he was alive and absent. I became a great puzzle to myself, and asked my soul why she was so sad, and why she so exceedingly disquieted me; but she knew not what to answer me. And if I said, Hope in God, she very properly obeyed me not; because that most dear friend whom she had lost was, being man, both truer and better than that phantasm she was bid to hope in. Naught but tears were sweet to me, and they succeeded my friend in the dearest of my affections. 10.14. 21. This same memory contains also the affections of my mind; not in the manner in which the mind itself contains them when it suffers them, but very differently according to a power peculiar to memory. For without being joyous, I remember myself to have had joy; and without being sad, I call to mind my past sadness; and that of which I was once afraid, I remember without fear; and without desire recall a former desire. Again, on the contrary, I at times remember when joyous my past sadness, and when sad my joy. Which is not to be wondered at as regards the body; for the mind is one thing, the body another. If I, therefore, when happy, recall some past bodily pain, it is not so strange a thing. But now, as this very memory itself is mind (for when we give orders to have a thing kept in memory, we say, See that you bear this in mind; and when we forget a thing, we say, It did not enter my mind, and, It slipped from my mind, thus calling the memory itself mind), as this is so, how comes it to pass that when being joyful I remember my past sorrow, the mind has joy, the memory sorrow - the mind, from the joy than is in it, is joyful, yet the memory, from the sadness that is in it, is not sad? Does not the memory perchance belong unto the mind? Who will say so? The memory doubtless is, so to say, the belly of the mind, and joy and sadness like sweet and bitter food, which, when entrusted to the memory, are, as it were, passed into the belly, where they can be reposited, but cannot taste. It is ridiculous to imagine these to be alike; and yet they are not utterly unlike. 22. But behold, out of my memory I educe it, when I affirm that there be four perturbations of the mind - desire, joy, fear, sorrow; and whatsoever I shall be able to dispute on these, by dividing each into its peculiar species, and by defining it, there I find what I may say, and thence I educe it; yet am I not disturbed by any of these perturbations when by remembering them I call them to mind; and before I recollected and reviewed them, they were there; wherefore by remembrance could they be brought thence. Perchance, then, even as meat is in ruminating brought up out of the belly, so by calling to mind are these educed from the memory. Why, then, does not the disputant, thus recollecting, perceive in the mouth of his meditation the sweetness of joy or the bitterness of sorrow? Is the comparison unlike in this because not like in all points? For who would willingly discourse on these subjects, if, as often as we name sorrow or fear, we should be compelled to be sorrowful or fearful? And yet we could never speak of them, did we not find in our memory not merely the sounds of the names, according to the images imprinted on it by the senses of the body, but the notions of the things themselves, which we never received by any door of the flesh, but which the mind itself, recognising by the experience of its own passions, entrusted to the memory, or else which the memory itself retained without their being entrusted to it. |
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| 64. Boethius, De Consolatione, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 |
| 65. Boethius, De Institutione Musica, 184.10-185.11, 185.23-186.1 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91 |
| 66. Ammonius Hermiae, In Porphyrii Isagogen Sive V Voces, 13.25 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, music comforts non-rational element in soul Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91 |
| 67. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 68. David, Prolegomena Philosophiae, 31.8-31.25 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, music comforts non-rational element in soul Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 91 |
| 69. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, but also accuses aristotelians of accepting the cruelty of anger Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 70. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 2 Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, momentary self Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 248 |
| 71. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 410 |
| 72. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, None (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 233 |
| 73. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 126 Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 75. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 76. Athenaeus, Sophists At Dinner, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 77. Musonius Rufus, Ed.Hense, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 153 |
| 78. Antiphon, On Emotions, None Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 80. Augustine, On The Catholic And Manichaean Ways of Life, 2.17, 18.15 Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, homosexuality assessed •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, marriage connotes companionship and sex Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
| 81. Plutarch, Erotikos, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 277 |
| 82. Philodemus, On Conversation (Cronache Ercolanesi 5), None Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, confession Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 218 |
| 84. Barlaam of Seminaria, Ethics According To The Stoics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 209 |
| 85. Seneca The Younger, On The Shortness of Life, 10 Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, memory, value of •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, weaving life together autobiographically Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 231 |
| 86. Pseudo-Plato, 'Axiochus, None Tagged with subjects: •plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 228 |
| 87. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, 4-5 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 241 |
| 88. Anon., Scholium On Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 410 |
| 89. Anon., Epicurea, Ed.Usener, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 410 |
| 90. Pseudo‐Plutarch, Is The Emotional Element In Humans A Part Or A Capacity of The Soul?, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 305 |
