1. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 11.7, 23.1, 91.11-91.12, 111.6-111.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 282, 283, 284, 323, 391| 11.7. כִּי־צַדִּיק יְהוָה צְדָקוֹת אָהֵב יָשָׁר יֶחֱזוּ פָנֵימוֹ׃ 23.1. מִזְמוֹר לְדָוִד יְהוָה רֹעִי לֹא אֶחְסָר׃ 91.11. כִּי מַלְאָכָיו יְצַוֶּה־לָּךְ לִשְׁמָרְךָ בְּכָל־דְּרָכֶיךָ׃ 91.12. עַל־כַּפַּיִם יִשָּׂאוּנְךָ פֶּן־תִּגֹּף בָּאֶבֶן רַגְלֶךָ׃ | 11.7. For the LORD is righteous, He loveth righteousness; the upright shall behold His face. 23.1. A Psalm of David. The LORD is my shepherd; I shall not want. 91.11. For He will give His angels charge over thee, To keep thee in all thy ways. 91.12. They shall bear thee upon their hands, Lest thou dash thy foot against a stone. |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 5.31, 8.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 282, 338| 8.3. וַיְעַנְּךָ וַיַּרְעִבֶךָ וַיַּאֲכִלְךָ אֶת הַמָּן אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָדַעְתָּ וְלֹא יָדְעוּן אֲבֹתֶיךָ לְמַעַן הוֹדִעֲךָ כִּי לֹא עַל־הַלֶּחֶם לְבַדּוֹ יִחְיֶה הָאָדָם כִּי עַל־כָּל־מוֹצָא פִי־יְהוָה יִחְיֶה הָאָדָם׃ | 8.3. And He afflicted thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that He might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of the LORD doth man live. |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 9.4, 9.13, 9.16-9.18, 10.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 281, 391| 9.4. מִי־פֶתִי יָסֻר הֵנָּה חֲסַר־לֵב אָמְרָה לּוֹ׃ 9.13. אֵשֶׁת כְּסִילוּת הֹמִיָּה פְּתַיּוּת וּבַל־יָדְעָה מָּה׃ 9.16. מִי־פֶתִי יָסֻר הֵנָּה וַחֲסַר־לֵב וְאָמְרָה לּוֹ׃ 9.17. מַיִם־גְּנוּבִים יִמְתָּקוּ וְלֶחֶם סְתָרִים יִנְעָם׃ 9.18. וְלֹא־יָדַע כִּי־רְפָאִים שָׁם בְּעִמְקֵי שְׁאוֹל קְרֻאֶיהָ׃ | 9.4. ’Whoso is thoughtless, let him turn in hither’; as for him that lacketh understanding, she saith to him: 9.13. The woman Folly is riotous; She is thoughtless, and knoweth nothing. 9.16. ’Whoso is thoughtless, let him turn in hither’; And as for him that lacketh understanding, she saith to him: 9.17. ’Stolen waters are sweet, And bread eaten in secret is pleasant.’ 9.18. But he knoweth not that the shades are there; that her guests are in the depths of the nether-world. |
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4. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 3.20, 4.8, 4.14, 15.16, 18.22 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143, 335, 338| 4.8. וַיֹּאמֶר קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיְהִי בִּהְיוֹתָם בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיָּקָם קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיַּהַרְגֵהוּ׃ 4.14. הֵן גֵּרַשְׁתָּ אֹתִי הַיּוֹם מֵעַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה וּמִפָּנֶיךָ אֶסָּתֵר וְהָיִיתִי נָע וָנָד בָּאָרֶץ וְהָיָה כָל־מֹצְאִי יַהַרְגֵנִי׃ 15.16. וְדוֹר רְבִיעִי יָשׁוּבוּ הֵנָּה כִּי לֹא־שָׁלֵם עֲוֺן הָאֱמֹרִי עַד־הֵנָּה׃ 18.22. וַיִּפְנוּ מִשָּׁם הָאֲנָשִׁים וַיֵּלְכוּ סְדֹמָה וְאַבְרָהָם עוֹדֶנּוּ עֹמֵד לִפְנֵי יְהוָה׃ | 3.20. And the man called his wife’s name Eve; because she was the mother of all living. 4.8. And Cain spoke unto Abel his brother. And it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him. 4.14. Behold, Thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the land; and from Thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer in the earth; and it will come to pass, that whosoever findeth me will slay me.’ 15.16. And in the fourth generation they shall come back hither; for the iniquity of the Amorite is not yet full.’ 18.22. And the men turned from thence, and went toward Sodom; but Abraham stood yet before the LORD. |
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5. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 9.19, 15.1, 15.21, 20.17 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143, 311, 343| 15.1. אָז יָשִׁיר־מֹשֶׁה וּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת־הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת לַיהוָה וַיֹּאמְרוּ לֵאמֹר אָשִׁירָה לַיהוָה כִּי־גָאֹה גָּאָה סוּס וְרֹכְבוֹ רָמָה בַיָּם׃ 15.1. נָשַׁפְתָּ בְרוּחֲךָ כִּסָּמוֹ יָם צָלֲלוּ כַּעוֹפֶרֶת בְּמַיִם אַדִּירִים׃ 15.21. וַתַּעַן לָהֶם מִרְיָם שִׁירוּ לַיהוָה כִּי־גָאֹה גָּאָה סוּס וְרֹכְבוֹ רָמָה בַיָּם׃ 20.17. וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־הָעָם אַל־תִּירָאוּ כִּי לְבַעֲבוּר נַסּוֹת אֶתְכֶם בָּא הָאֱלֹהִים וּבַעֲבוּר תִּהְיֶה יִרְאָתוֹ עַל־פְּנֵיכֶם לְבִלְתִּי תֶחֱטָאוּ׃ | 15.1. Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song unto the LORD, and spoke, saying: I will sing unto the LORD, for He is highly exalted; The horse and his rider hath He thrown into the sea. 15.21. And Miriam sang unto them: Sing ye to the LORD, for He is highly exalted: The horse and his rider hath He thrown into the sea. 20.17. And Moses said unto the people: ‘Fear not; for God is come to prove you, and that His fear may be before you, that ye sin not.’ |
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6. Hebrew Bible, 1 Samuel, 28.11, 28.19 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 337| 28.11. וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה אֶת־מִי אַעֲלֶה־לָּךְ וַיֹּאמֶר אֶת־שְׁמוּאֵל הַעֲלִי־לִי׃ 28.19. וְיִתֵּן יְהוָה גַּם אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל עִמְּךָ בְּיַד־פְּלִשְׁתִּים וּמָחָר אַתָּה וּבָנֶיךָ עִמִּי גַּם אֶת־מַחֲנֵה יִשְׂרָאֵל יִתֵּן יְהוָה בְּיַד־פְּלִשְׁתִּים׃ | 28.11. Then said the woman, Whom shall I bring up to thee? And he said, Bring me up Shemu᾽el. 28.19. Moreover the Lord will also deliver Yisra᾽el with thee into the hand of the Pelishtim: and to morrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me: the Lord also shall deliver the camp of Yisra᾽el into the hand of the Pelishtim. |
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| 7. Homer, Odyssey, 18.73 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 313, 314 |
8. Hesiod, Works And Days, 211 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 313, 314| 211. νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τʼ αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει. | 211. For men: against all evil there shall be |
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9. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 5.1-5.2, 5.5 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 286, 321| 5.1. אָשִׁירָה נָּא לִידִידִי שִׁירַת דּוֹדִי לְכַרְמוֹ כֶּרֶם הָיָה לִידִידִי בְּקֶרֶן בֶּן־שָׁמֶן׃ 5.1. כִּי עֲשֶׂרֶת צִמְדֵּי־כֶרֶם יַעֲשׂוּ בַּת אֶחָת וְזֶרַע חֹמֶר יַעֲשֶׂה אֵיפָה׃ 5.2. הוֹי הָאֹמְרִים לָרַע טוֹב וְלַטּוֹב רָע שָׂמִים חֹשֶׁךְ לְאוֹר וְאוֹר לְחֹשֶׁךְ שָׂמִים מַר לְמָתוֹק וּמָתוֹק לְמָר׃ 5.2. וַיְעַזְּקֵהוּ וַיְסַקְּלֵהוּ וַיִּטָּעֵהוּ שֹׂרֵק וַיִּבֶן מִגְדָּל בְּתוֹכוֹ וְגַם־יֶקֶב חָצֵב בּוֹ וַיְקַו לַעֲשׂוֹת עֲנָבִים וַיַּעַשׂ בְּאֻשִׁים׃ 5.5. וְעַתָּה אוֹדִיעָה־נָּא אֶתְכֶם אֵת אֲשֶׁר־אֲנִי עֹשֶׂה לְכַרְמִי הָסֵר מְשׂוּכָּתוֹ וְהָיָה לְבָעֵר פָּרֹץ גְּדֵרוֹ וְהָיָה לְמִרְמָס׃ | 5.1. Let me sing of my well-beloved, A song of my beloved touching his vineyard. My well-beloved had a vineyard In a very fruitful hill; 5.2. And he digged it, and cleared it of stones, And planted it with the choicest vine, And built a tower in the midst of it, And also hewed out a vat therein; And he looked that it should bring forth grapes, And it brought forth wild grapes. . 5.5. And now come, I will tell you What I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, And it shall be eaten up; I will break down the fence thereof, And it shall be trodden down; |
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10. Plato, Gorgias, 465c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 282| 465c. ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δʼ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι | 465c. as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them. For indeed, if the soul were not in command of the body, but the latter had charge of itself, and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed |
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| 11. Plato, Letters, 7.341c6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 51 |
| 12. Xenophon, Memoirs, 3.4 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 225, 226 |
| 13. Plato, Parmenides, 132e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 119 |
| 14. Plato, Phaedrus, 275b, 262b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 283 |
| 15. Plato, Philebus, 49a, 49d, 16c5-10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 52 |
| 16. Plato, Republic, 7.534e, 258e4-259d5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 284 |
17. Plato, Sophist, 231b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 435| 231b. γενήσεσθαι τότε ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν. ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν τό γε εἰκός. ΞΕ. ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική. ΘΕΑΙ. λεγέσθω μέν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ | 231b. when people are sufficiently on their guard. Theaet. No, probably not. Str. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry. Theaet. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a lo |
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| 18. Plato, Symposium, 172a1-174a2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 12 |
19. Plato, Timaeus, 47b, 47a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 52| 47a. δεδώρηται, μετὰ τοῦτο ῥητέον. ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη μήτε ἄστρα μήτε ἥλιον μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. νῦν δʼ ἡμέρα τε καὶ νὺξ ὀφθεῖσαι μῆνές τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι καὶ ἰσημερίαι καὶ τροπαὶ μεμηχάνηνται μὲν ἀριθμόν, χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν περί τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν· ἐξ ὧν | 47a. benefit effected by them, for the sake of which God bestowed them upon us. Vision, in my view, is the cause of the greatest benefit to us, inasmuch as none of the accounts now given concerning the Universe would ever have been given if men had not seen the stars or the sun or the heaven. But as it is, the vision of day and night and of months and circling years has created the art of number and has given us not only the notion of Time but also means of research into the nature of the Universe. From these we have procured Philosophy in all its range, |
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| 20. Xenophon, On Household Management, 1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 12 |
| 21. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.1015b6-9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 435 |
| 22. Aristotle, Politics, 1252a7-16 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
| 23. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
| 24. Cicero, Pro S. Roscio Amerino, 50 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226, 227 |
| 25. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 113 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 16 |
| 26. Cicero, On Old Age, 56.4-56.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
27. Cicero, Republic, 1.14, 1.39-1.70, 2.2.2-2.2.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17, 227, 228| 1.39. Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tia 1.41. quae dam quasi semina, neque reliquarum virtutum nec ipsius rei publicae reperiatur ulla institutio. Hi coetus igitur hac, de qua exposui, causa instituti sedem primum certo loco domiciliorum causa constituerunt; quam cum locis manuque saepsissent, eius modi coniunctionem tectorum oppidum vel urbem appellaverunt delubris distinctam spatiisque communibus. Omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui, omnis civitas, quae est constitutio populi, omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi res est, consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit. Id autem consilium primum semper ad eam causam referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem. 1.42. Deinde aut uni tribuendum est aut delectis quibusdam aut suscipiendum est multitudini atque omnibus. Quare cum penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus et regnum eius rei publicae statum. Cum autem est penes delectos, tum illa civitas optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis (sic enim appellant), in qua in populo sunt omnia. Atque horum trium generum quodvis, si teneat illud vinclum, quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate devinxit, non perfectum illud quidem neque mea sententia optimum est, sed tolerabile tamen, ut aliud alio possit esse praestantius. Nam vel rex aequus ac sapiens vel delecti ac principes cives vel ipse populus, quamquam id est minime probandum, tamen nullis interiectis iniquitatibus aut cupiditatibus posse videtur aliquo esse non incerto statu. 1.43. Sed et in regnis nimis expertes sunt ceteri communis iuris et consilii, et in optimatium dominatu vix particeps libertatis potest esse multitudo, cum omni consilio communi ac potestate careat, et cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis. Itaque si Cyrus ille Perses iustissimus fuit sapientissimusque rex, tamen mihi populi res (ea enim est, ut dixi antea, publica) non maxime expetenda fuisse illa videtur, cum regeretur unius nutu ac modo; si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione populi similitudo quaedam servitutis; si Athenienses quibusdam temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis agebant, quoniam distinctos dignitatis gradus non habebant, non tenebat ornatum suum civitas. 1.44. Atque hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum non turbatis atque permixtis, sed suum statum tenentibus. Quae genera primum sunt in iis singula vitiis, quae ante dixi, deinde habent perniciosa alia vitia; nullum est enim genus illarum rerum publicarum, quod non habeat iter ad finitimum quoddam malum praeceps ac lubricum. Nam illi regi, ut eum potissimum nominem, tolerabili aut, si voltis, etiam amabili, Cyro, subest ad inmutandi animi licentiam crudelissimus ille Phalaris, cuius in similitudinem dominatus unius proclivi cursu et facile delabitur. Illi autem Massiliensium paucorum et principum administrationi civitatis finitimus est, qui fuit quodam tempore apud Athenienses triginta virorum consensus et factio. Iam Atheniensium populi potestatem omnium rerum ipsi, ne alios requiramus, ad furorem multitudinis licentiamque conversam pesti 1.45. deterrimus et ex hac vel optimatium vel factiosa tyrannica illa vel regia vel etiam persaepe popularis, itemque ex ea genus aliquod ecflorescere ex illis, quae ante dixi, solet, mirique sunt orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum; quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere inpendentis in guberda re publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem magni cuiusdam civis et divini paene est viri. Itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicae maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus. 1.46. Hic Laelius: Scio tibi ita placere, Africane; saepe enim ex te audivi; sed tamen, nisi molestum est, ex tribus istis modis rerum publicarum velim scire quod optimum iudices. Nam vel profuerit aliquod ad cog 1.47. et talis est quaeque res publica, qualis eius aut natura aut voluntas, qui illam regit. Itaque nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas summa est, ullum domicilium libertas habet; qua quidem certe nihil potest esse dulcius, et quae, si aequa non est, ne libertas quidem est. Qui autem aequa potest esse, omitto dicere in regno, ubi ne obscura quidem est aut dubia servitus, sed in istis civitatibus, in quibus verbo sunt liberi omnes? ferunt enim suffragia, mandant inperia, magistratus, ambiuntur, rogantur, sed ea dant, quae, etiamsi nolint, danda sint, et quae ipsi non habent, unde alii petunt; sunt enim expertes imperii, consilii publici, iudicii delectorum iudicum, quae familiarum vetustatibus aut pecuniis ponderantur. In libero autem populo, ut Rhodi, ut Athenis, nemo est civium, qui 1.48. po pulo aliquis unus pluresve divitiores opulentioresque extitissent, tum ex eorum fastidio et superbia nata esse commemorant cedentibus ignavis et inbecillis et adrogantiae divitum succumbentibus. Si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, capitis unius cuiusque, pecuniae. Hanc unam rite rem publicam, id est rem populi, appellari putant. Itaque et a regum et a patrum dominatione solere in libertatem rem populi vindicari, non ex liberis populis reges requiri aut potestatem atque opes optimatium. 1.49. Et vero negant oportere indomiti populi vitio genus hoc totum liberi populi repudiari, concordi populo et omnia referente ad incolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse inmutabilius, nihil firmius; facillimam autem in ea re publica esse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, cum aliis aliud expediat, nasci discordias; itaque, cum patres rerum potirentur, numquam constitisse civitatis statum; multo iam id in regnis minus, quorum, ut ait Ennius, 'nulla regni sancta societas nec fides est.' Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas? 1.50. Ceteras vero res publicas ne appellandas quidem putant iis nominibus, quibus illae sese appellari velint. Cur enim regem appellem Iovis optimi nomine hominem domidi cupidum aut imperii singularis, populo oppresso domitem, non tyrannum potius? tam enim esse clemens tyrannus quam rex inportunus potest; ut hoc populorum intersit, utrum comi domino an aspero serviant; quin serviant quidem, fieri non potest. Quo autem modo adsequi poterat Lacedaemo illa tum, cum praestare putabatur disciplina rei publicae, ut bonis uteretur iustisque regibus, cum esset habendus rex, quicumque genere regio natus esset? Nam optimatis quidem quis ferat, qui non populi concessu, sed suis comitiis hoc sibi nomen adrogaverunt? Qui enim iudicatur iste optimus? doctrina, artibus, studiis 1.51. si fortuito id faciet, tam cito evertetur quam navis, si e vectoribus sorte ductus ad gubernacula accesserit. Quodsi liber populus deliget, quibus se committat, deligetque, si modo salvus esse vult, optimum quemque, certe in optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus, praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit, non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeessent inbecillioribus, sed ut hi etiam parere summis velint. Verum hunc optimum statum pravis hominum opinionibus eversum esse dicunt, qui ignoratione virtutis, quae cum in paucis est, tum a paucis iudicatur et cernitur, opulentos homines et copiosos, tum genere nobili natos esse optimos putant. Hoc errore vulgi cum rem publicam opes paucorum, non virtutes tenere coeperunt, nomen illi principes optimatium mordicus tenent, re autem carent eo nomine . Nam divitiae, nomen, opes vacuae consilio et vivendi atque aliis imperandi modo dedecoris plenae sunt et insolentis superbiae, nec ulla deformior species est civitatis quam illa, in qua opulentissimi optimi putantur. 1.52. Virtute vero guberte rem publicam quid potest esse praeclarius? cum is, qui inperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati, cum, quas ad res civis instituit et vocat, eas omnis conplexus est ipse nec leges inponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus. Qui si unus satis omnia consequi posset, nihil opus esset pluribus; si universi videre optimum et in eo consentire possent, nemo delectos principes quaereret. Difficultas ineundi consilii rem a rege ad plures, error et temeritas populorum a multitudine ad paucos transtulit. Sic inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum, quo nihil potest esse moderatius; quibus rem publicam tuentibus beatissimos esse populos necesse est vacuos omni cura et cogitatione aliis permisso otio suo, quibus id tuendum est neque committendum, ut sua commoda populus neglegi a principibus putet. 1.53. Nam aequabilitas quidem iuris, quam amplexantur liberi populi, neque servari potest (ipsi enim populi, quamvis soluti ecfrenatique sint, praecipue multis multa tribuunt, et est in ipsis magnus dilectus hominum et dignitatum), eaque, quae appellatur aequabilitas, iniquissima est. Cum enim par habetur honos summis et infimis, qui sint in omni populo necesse est, ipsa aequitas iniquissima est; quod in iis civitatibus, quae ab optimis reguntur, accidere non potest. Haec fere, Laeli, et quaedam eiusdem generis ab iis, qui eam formam rei publicae maxime laudant, disputari solent. 1.54. Tum Laelius: Quid tu, inquit, Scipio? e tribus istis quod maxime probas? S. Recte quaeris, quod maxime e tribus, quoniam eorum nullum ipsum per se separatim probo anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. Sed si unum ac simplex pro bandum sit, regium pro bem....... pri........ in .................... hoc loco appellatur, occurrit nomen quasi patrium regis, ut ex se natis, ita consulentis suis civibus et eos conservantis stu dios ius quam .....entis.......tem.........is.........tibus ...........uos sustentari unius optimi et summi viri diligentia. 1.55. Adsunt optimates, qui se melius hoc idem facere profiteantur plusque fore dicant in pluribus consilii quam in uno et eandem tamen aequitatem et fidem. Ecce autem maxima voce clamat populus neque se uni neque paucis velle parere; libertate ne feris quidem quicquam esse dulcius; hac omnes carere, sive regi sive optimatibus serviant. Ita caritate nos capiunt reges, consilio optimates, libertate populi, ut in comparando difficile ad eligendum sit, quid maxime velis. L. Credo, inquit, sed expediri, quae restant, vix poterunt, si hoc incohatum reliqueris. 1.56. S. Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Iove incipiendum putat. L. Quo Iove? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio? S. Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principia capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique † expoliri consentiunt. Quid? inquit Laelius. Et ille: Quid censes, nisi quod est ante oculos? Sive haec ad utilitatem vitae constituta sunt a principibus rerum publicarum, ut rex putaretur unus esse in caelo, qui nutu, ut ait Homerus, totum Olympum converteret idemque et rex et pater haberetur omnium, magna auctoritas est multique testes, siquidem omnis multos appellari placet, ita consensisse gentes decretis videlicet principum, nihil esse rege melius, quoniam deos omnis censent unius regi numine; sive haec in errore inperitorum posita esse et fabularum similia didicimus, audiamus communis quasi doctores eruditorum hominum, qui tamquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscimus. Quinam, inquit Laelius, isti sunt? Et ille: Qui natura omnium rerum pervestiganda senserunt omnem hunc mundum mente 1.58. Sed, si vis, Laeli, dabo tibi testes nec nimis antiquos nec ullo modo barbaros. L. Istos, inquit, volo. S. Videsne igitur minus quadringentorum annorum esse hanc urbem, ut sine regibus sit? L. Vero minus. S. Quid ergo? haec quadringentorum annorum aetas ut urbis et civitatis num valde longa est? L. Ista vero, inquit, adulta vix. S. Ergo his annis quadringentis Romae rex erat? L. Et superbus quidem. S. Quid supra? L. Iustissimus, et deinceps retro usque ad Romulum, qui ab hoc tempore anno sescentesimo rex erat. S. Ergo ne iste quidem pervetus? L. Minime ac prope senescente iam Graecia. S. Cedo, num, Scipio, barbarorum Romulus rex fuit? L. Si, ut Graeci dicunt omnis aut Graios esse aut barbaros, vereor, ne barbarorum rex fuerit; sin id nomen moribus dandum est, non linguis, non Graecos minus barbaros quam Romanos puto. Et Scipio: Atqui ad hoc, de quo agitur, non quaerimus gentem, ingenia quaerimus. Si enim et prudentes homines et non veteres reges habere voluerunt, utor neque perantiquis neque inhumanis ac feris testibus. 1.59. Tum Laelius: Video te, Scipio, testimoniis satis instructum, sed apud me, ut apud bonum iudicem, argumenta plus quam testes valent. Tum Scipio: Utere igitur argumento, Laeli, tute ipse sensus tui. Cuius, inquit ille, sensus? S. Si quando, si forte, tibi visus es irasci alicui. L. Ego vero saepius, quam vellem. S. Quid? tum, cum tu es iratus, permittis illi iracundiae dominatum animi tui? L. Non mehercule, inquit, sed imitor Archytam illum Tarentinum, qui cum ad villam venisset et omnia aliter offendisset ac iusserat, 'A te infelicem', inquit vilico, 'quem necassem iam verberibus, nisi iratus essem.' Optime, inquit Scipio. 1.60. Ergo Archytas iracundiam videlicet dissidentem a ratione seditionem quandam animi vere ducebat eam que consilio sedari volebat; adde avaritiam, adde imperii, adde gloriae cupiditatem, adde libidines; et illud vides, si in animis hominum regale imperium sit, unius fore dominatum, consilii scilicet (ea est enim animi pars optima), consilio autem domite nullum esse libidinibus, nullum irae, nullum temeritati locum. L. Sic, inquit, est. S. Probas igitur animum ita adfectum? L. Nihil vero, inquit, magis. S. Ergo non probares, si consilio pulso libidines, quae sunt innumerabiles, iracundiaeve tenerent omnia? L. Ego vero nihil isto animo, nihil ita animato homine miserius ducerem. S. Sub regno igitur tibi esse placet omnis animi partes, et eas regi consilio? L. Mihi vero sic placet. S. Cur igitur dubitas, quid de re publica sentias? in qua, si in plures translata res sit, intellegi iam licet nullum fore, quod praesit, inperium, quod quidem, nisi unum sit, esse nullum potest. 1.61. Tum Laelius: Quid, quaeso, interest inter unum et plures, si iustitia est in pluribus? Et Scipio: Quoniam testibus meis intellexi, Laeli, te non valde moveri, non desinam te uti teste, ut hoc, quod dico, probem. Me, inquit ille, quonam modo? S. Quia animum adverti nuper, cum essemus in Formiano, te familiae valde interdicere, ut uni dicto audiens esset. L. Quippe vilico. S. Quid? domi pluresne praesunt negotiis tuis? L. Immo vero unus, inquit. S. Quid? totam domum num quis alter praeter te regit? L. Minime vero. S. Quin tu igitur concedis idem in re publica, singulorum dominatus, si modo iusti sint, esse optimos? L. Adducor, inquit, ut prope modum adsentiar. 1.62. Et Scipio: Tum magis adsentiare, Laeli, si, ut omittam similitudines, uni gubernatori, uni medico, si digni modo sint iis artibus, rectius esse alteri navem committere, aegrum alteri quam multis, ad maiora pervenero. L. Quaenam ista sunt? S. Quid? tu non vides unius inportunitate et superbia Tarquinii nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium? L. Video vero, inquit. S. Ergo etiam illud vides, de quo progrediente oratione plura me dicturum puto, Tarquinio exacto mira quadam exultasse populum insolentia libertatis; tum exacti in exilium innocentes, tum bona direpta multorum, tum annui consules, tum demissi populo fasces, tum provocationes omnium rerum, tum secessiones plebei, tum prorsus ita acta pleraque, ut in populo essent omnia. L. Est, inquit, ut dicis. 1.63. Est vero, inquit Scipio, in pace et otio; licet enim lascivire, dum nihil metuas, ut in navi ac saepe etiam in morbo levi. Sed ut ille, qui navigat, cum subito mare coepit horrescere, et ille aeger ingravescente morbo unius opem inplorat, sic noster populus in pace et domi imperat et ipsis magistratibus minatur, recusat, appellat, provocat, in bello sic paret ut regi; valet enim salus plus quam libido. Gravioribus vero bellis etiam sine collega omne imperium nostri penes singulos esse voluerunt, quorum ipsum nomen vim suae potestatis indicat. Nam dictator quidem ab eo appellatur, quia dicitur, sed in nostris libris vides eum, Laeli, magistrum populi appellari. L. Video, inquit. Et Scipio: Sapienter igitur illi vete res 1.64. iusto quidem rege cum est populus orbatus, 'pectora diu tenet desiderium', sicut ait Ennius, 'post optimi regis obitum'; simul inter Sese sic memorant: 'o Romule, Romule die, Qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! O pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum!' Non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa; quid enim adiungunt? Tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras. Vitam, honorem, decus sibi datum esse iustitia regis existimabant. Mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris, si regum similitudo permansisset, sed vides unius iniustitia concidisse genus illud totum rei publicae. L. Video vero, inquit, et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni re publica noscere. 1.65. Et Scipio: Est omnino, cum de illo genere rei publicae, quod maxime probo, quae sentio, dixero, accuratius mihi dicendum de commutationibus rerum publicarum, etsi minime facile eas in ea re publica futuras puto. Sed huius regiae prima et certissima est illa mutatio: Cum rex iniustus esse coepit, perit illud ilico genus, et est idem ille tyrannus, deterrimum genus et finitimum optimo; quem si optimates oppresserunt, quod ferme evenit, habet statum res publica de tribus secundarium; est enim quasi regium, id est patrium consilium populo bene consulentium principum. Sin per se populus interfecit aut eiecit tyrannum, est moderatior, quoad sentit et sapit, et sua re gesta laetatur tuerique vult per se constitutam rem publicam. Si quando aut regi iusto vim populus attulit regnove eum spoliavit aut etiam, id quod evenit saepius, optimatium sanguinem gustavit ac totam rem publicam substravit libidini suae (cave putes autem mare ullum aut flammam esse tantam, quam non facilius sit sedare quam effrenatam insolentia multitudinem), tum fit illud, quod apud Platonem est luculente dictum, si modo id exprimere Latine potuero; difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen. 1.66. 'Cum' enim inquit 'inexplebiles populi fauces exaruerunt libertatis siti malisque usus ille ministris non modice temperatam, sed nimis meracam libertatem sitiens hausit, tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint et large sibi libertatem ministrent, insequitur, insimulat, arguit, praepotentes, reges, tyrannos vocat.' Puto enim tibi haec esse nota. L. Vero mihi, inquit ille, notissima. 1.67. S. Ergo illa sequuntur: 'eos, qui pareant principibus, agitari ab eo populo et servos voluntarios appellari; eos autem, qui in magistratu privatorum similes esse velint, eosque privatos, qui efficiant, ne quid inter privatum et magistratum differat, ferunt laudibus et mactant honoribus, ut necesse sit in eius modi re publica plena libertatis esse omnia, ut et privata domus omnis vacet dominatione et hoc malum usque ad bestias perveniat, denique ut pater filium metuat, filius patrem neglegat, absit omnis pudor, ut plane liberi sint, nihil intersit, civis sit an peregrinus, magister ut discipulos metuat et iis blandiatur spertque discipuli magistros, adulescentes ut senum sibi pondus adsumant, senes autem ad ludum adulescentium descendant, ne sint iis odiosi et graves; ex quo fit, ut etiam servi se liberius gerant, uxores eodem iure sint, quo viri, inque tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli denique liberi sic incurrant, ut iis de via decedendum sit. Ergo ex hac infinita,' inquit, 'licentia haec summa cogitur, ut ita fastidiosae mollesque mentes evadant civium, ut, si minima vis adhibeatur imperii, irascantur et perferre nequeant; ex quo leges quoque incipiunt neglegere, ut plane sine ullo domino sint.' 1.68. Tum Laelius: Prorsus, inquit, expressa sunt a te, quae dicta sunt ab illo. S. Atque, ut iam ad sermonis mei auctorem revertar, ex hac nimia licentia, quam illi solam libertatem putant, ait ille ut ex stirpe quadam existere et quasi nasci tyrannum. Nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum populum libertas ipsa servitute adficit. Sic omnia nimia, cum vel in tempestate vel in agris vel in corporibus laetiora fuerunt, in contraria fere convertuntur, maximeque id in rebus publicis evenit, nimiaque illa libertas et populis et privatis in nimiam servitutem cadit. Itaque ex hac maxima libertate tyrannus gignitur et illa iniustissima et durissima servitus. Ex hoc enim populo indomito vel potius immani deligitur aliqui plerumque dux contra illos principes adflictos iam et depulsos loco audax, inpurus, consectans proterve bene saepe de re publica meritos, populo gratificans et aliena et sua; cui quia privato sunt oppositi timores, dantur imperia et ea continuantur, praesidiis etiam, ut Athenis Pisistratus, saepiuntur, postremo, a quibus producti sunt, existunt eorum ipsorum tyranni; quos si boni oppresserunt, ut saepe fit, recreatur civitas; sin audaces, fit illa factio, genus aliud tyrannorum, eademque oritur etiam ex illo saepe optimatium praeclaro statu, cum ipsos principes aliqua pravitas de via deflexit. Sic tamquam pilam rapiunt inter se rei publicae statum tyranni ab regibus, ab iis autem principes aut populi, a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni, nec diutius umquam tenetur idem rei publicae modus. 1.69. Quod ita cum sit, ex tribus primis generibus longe praestat mea sententia regium, regio autem ipsi praestabit id, quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in re publica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum inpartitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas iudicio voluntatique multitudinis. Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem quandam magnam, qua carere diutius vix possunt liberi, deinde firmitudinem, quod et illa prima facile in contraria vitia convertuntur, ut existat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio, quodque ipsa genera generibus saepe conmutantur novis, hoc in hac iuncta moderateque permixta conformatione rei publicae non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit. Non est enim causa conversionis, ubi in suo quisque est gradu firmiter collocatus et non subest, quo praecipitet ac decidat. 1.70. Sed vereor, Laeli vosque homines amicissimi ac prudentissimi, ne, si diutius in hoc genere verser, quasi praecipientis cuiusdam et docentis et non vobiscum simul considerantis esse videatur oratio mea. Quam ob rem ingrediar in ea, quae nota sunt omnibus, quaesita autem a nobis iam diu. Sic enim decerno, sic sentio, sic adfirmo, nullam omnium rerum publicarum aut constitutione aut discriptione aut disciplina conferendam esse cum ea, quam patres nostri nobis acceptam iam inde a maioribus reliquerunt. Quam, si placet, quoniam ea, quae tenebatis ipsi, etiam ex me audire voluistis, simul et qualis sit et optimam esse ostendam expositaque ad exemplum nostra re publica accommodabo ad eam, si potero, omnem illam orationem, quae est mihi habenda de optimo civitatis statu. Quod si tenere et consequi potuero, cumulate munus hoc, cui me Laelius praeposuit, ut opinio mea fert, effecero. | 1.39. Scipio. Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The hist cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man . For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men . . . 1.39. Scipio. Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . ** But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man . ** For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men . . . 1.41. . . . certain seeds, as we may call them, for otherwise no source for the other virtues nor for the State itself could be discovered. Such an assemblage of men, therefore, originating for the reason I have mentioned, established itself in a definite place, at first in order to provide dwellings ; and this place being fortified by its natural situation and by their labours, they called such a collection of dwellings a town or city, and provided it with shrines and gathering places which were common property. Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I have described, every city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is "the property of a people," must be governed by some deliberative body if it is to be permanent. And this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its beginning to the same cause as that which produced the State itself. 1.42. In the second place, this function must either be granted to one man, or to certain selected citizens, or must be assumed by the whole body of citizens And so when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this State a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the State is ruled by an aristocracy. But a popular government (for so it is called) exists when all the power is in the hands of the people. And any one of these three forms of government (if only the bond which originally joined the citizens together in the partnership of the State holds fast), though not perfect or in my opinion the best, is tolerable, though one of them may be superior to another. For either a just and wise king, or a select number of leading citizens, or even the people itself, though this is the least commendable type, can nevertheless, as it seems, form a government that is not unstable, provided that no elements of injustice or greed are mingled with it. 1.43. But in kingships the subjects have too small a share in the administration of justice and in deliberation , and in aristocracies the masses can hardly have their share of liberty, since they are entirely excluded from deliberation for the common weal and from power ; and when all the power is in the people's hands, even though they exercise it with justice and, moderation, yet the resulting equality itself is inequitable, since it allows no distinctions in rank. Therefore, even though the Persian Cyrus was the most just and wisest of kings, that form of government does not seem to me the most desirable, since "the property of the people " (for that is what a commonwealth is, as I have said) is administered at the nod and caprice of one man ; even though the Massilians, now under our protection, are ruled with the greatest justice by a select number of their leading citizens, such a situation is nevertheless to some extent like slavery for a people; and even though the Athenians at certain periods, after they had deprived the Areopagus of its power, succeeded in carrying on all their public business by the resolutions and decrees of the people, their State, because it had no definite distinctions in rank, could not maintain its fair renown. 1.44. I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character ; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of popular government - when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob . . . 1.44. I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character ; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. ** And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of popular government - when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob . . . 1.45. . . . and likewise some other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental forms. A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three which I mentioned at first. 1.45. . . . and likewise some other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental forms. ** A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three which I mentioned at first. 1.46. Laelius. I know that is your opinion, Africanus, for I have often heard you say so. Nevertheless, if it will not give you too much trouble, I should like to know which you consider the best of the three forms of government of which you have been speaking. For it might help us somewhat to understand . . . 1.47. Scipio. . . . and every State is such as its ruler's character and will make it. Hence liberty has no dwelling-place in any State except that in which the people's power is the greatest, and surely nothing can be sweeter than liberty ; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty. And how can it be the same for all, I will not say in a kingdom, where there is no obscurity or doubt about the slavery of the subject, but even in States where everyone is ostensibly free ? I mean States in which the people vote, elect commanders and officials, are canvassed for their votes, and have bills proposed to them, but really grant only what they would have to grant even if they were unwilling to do so, and are asked to give to others what they do not possess themselves. For they have no share in the governing power, in the deliberative function, or in the courts, over which selected judges preside, for those privileges are granted on the basis of birth or wealth. But in a free nation, such as the Rhodians or the Athenians, there is not one of the citizens who may not hold the offices of State and take an active part in the government . . . 1.48. . . . Our authorities say that when one person or a few stand out from the crowd as richer and more prosperous, then, as a result of the haughty and arrogant behaviour of these, there arises a government of one or a few], the cowardly and weak giving way and bowing down to the pride of wealth. But if the people would maintain their rights, they say that no form of government would be superior, either in liberty or happiness, for they themselves would be masters of the laws and the courts, of war and peace, of international agreements, and of every citizen's life and property; this government alone, they believe, can rightly be called a commonwealth, that is, "the property of the people." And it is for that reason, they say, that "the property of the people " is often liberated from the domination of kings or senators, while free peoples do not seek kings or the power and wealth of aristocracies. 1.49. And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of haimony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens. Therefore they maintain that when a senate has been supreme, the State has never had a stable government, and that such stability is less attainable by far in kingdoms, in which, as Ennius says, No sacred partnership or honour is. Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens ? For if we cannot agree to equalise men's wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice ? . . . 1.49. And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of harmony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens. Therefore they maintain that when a senate has been supreme, the State has never had a stable government, and that such stability is less attainable by far in kingdoms, in which, as Ennius says, No sacred partnership or honour is. ** Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens ? For if we cannot agree to equalise men's wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice ? . . . 1.50. . . . Indeed they think that States of the other kinds have no right at all to the names which they arrogate to themselves. For why should I give the name of king, the title of Jupiter the Best, to a man who is greedy for personal power and absolute authority, a man who lords it over an oppressed people ? Should I not rather call him tyrant? For tyrants may be merciful as well as oppressive ; so that the only difference between the nations governed by these rulers is that between the slaves of a kind and those of a cruel master; for in any case the subjects must be slaves And how could Sparta, at the time when the mode of life inculcated by her constitution was considered so excellent, be assured of always having good and just kings, when a person of any sort, if he was born of the royal family, had to be accepted as king? As to aristocrats, who could tolerate men that have claimed the title without the people's acquiescence, but merely by their own will? For how is a man adjudged to be "the best"? On the basis of knowledge, skill, learning, and similar qualities surely, not because of his own desire to possess the title ! . . , 1.51. ... If the State leaves the selection of its rulers to chance, it will be as quickly overturned as a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men, especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger. But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich, prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men, these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the "best." For riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule over others, are full of dishonour and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State than that in which the richest are accounted the best. 1.51. ... If the State leaves the selection of its rulers to chance, ** it will be as quickly overturned as a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men, especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger. But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich, prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men, these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the "best." For riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule over others, are full of dishonour and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State than that in which the richest are accounted the best. 1.52. But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler , or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation , and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests aie being neglected by their rulers. 1.52. But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler , or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation , and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers. 1.53. For that equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be maintained (for the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, give very many special powers to many individuals, and create great distinctions among men and the honours granted to them), and what is called equality is really most inequitable. For when equal honour is given to the highest and the lowest - for men of both types must exist in every nation - then this very "fairness" is most unfair ; but this cannot happen in States ruled by their best citizens. These arguments and others like them, Laelius, are approximately those which are advanced by men who consider this form of government the best. 1.54. Laelius. But what about yourself, Scipio ? Which of these three forms do you consider the best? Scipio. You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, I might choose the kingship . . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than . . . 1.54. Laelius. But what about yourself, Scipio ? Which of these three forms do you consider the best? Scipio. You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, I might choose the kingship . . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than ** . . . 1.55. to be sustained by the care of one man who is the most virtuous and most eminent. But here are the aristocrats, with the claim that they can do this more effectively, and that there will be more wisdom in the counsels of several than in those of one man, and an equal amount of fairness and scrupulousness And here also are the people, shouting with a loud voice that they are willing to obey neither one nor a few, that nothing is sweeter than liberty even to wild beasts, and that all who are slaves, whether to a king or to an aristocracy, are deprived of liberty. Thus kings attract us by our affection for them, aristocracies by their wisdom, and popular governments by then freedom, so that in comparing them it is difficult to say which one prefers. Laelius. No doubt ; but it will be almost impossible to solve the problems that follow, if you abandon this one before reaching a solution. 1.56. Scipio. Then let us imitate Aratus, who, in beginning the treatment of lofty subjects, thought he must commence with Jupiter. Laelius. With Jupiter ? And what similarity has Aratus' poem with our present discussion ? Scipio. Only this, that is proper for us to begin our discussion with that god who alone is admitted by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be king of all gods and men. Laelius. Why ? 1.56. Scipio. Then let us imitate Aratus, ** who, in beginning the treatment of lofty subjects, thought he must commence with Jupiter. Laelius. With Jupiter ? And what similarity has Aratus' poem with our present discussion ? Scipio. Only this, that is proper for us to begin our discussion with that god who alone is admitted by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be king of all gods and men. Laelius. Why ? 1.57. Scipio. Why do you imagine, except for the reason that lies before your eyes? It may be that the rulers of States have introduced, for its usefulness in practical life, the belief that there is one king m heaven, who moves all Olympus with a nod, as Homer says, and is both king and father of all ; in that case we have an excellent precedent and the testimony of many witnesses - if all can be called "many" - to the fact that the nations have agreed (to wit, by the decisions of their rulers) that nothing is better than a king, since, as they believe, all the gods are ruled by the authority of one. But if, on the other hand, we have become convinced that these beliefs have their origin in the false ideas of the ignorant and are to be classed as fables, then let us listen to those who may be called the teachers of educated men, to those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears. Laelius. What men are these ? Scipio. Those who by searching out the nature of all things have come to realize that the whole universe is ruled by a single mind . . . 1.57. Scipio. Why do you imagine, except for the reason that lies before your eyes? It may be that the rulers of States have introduced, for its usefulness in practical life, the belief that there is one king in heaven, who moves all Olympus with a nod, as Homer says, ** and is both king and father of all ; in that case we have an excellent precedent and the testimony of many witnesses - if all can be called "many" - to the fact that the nations have agreed (to wit, by the decisions of their rulers) that nothing is better than a king, since, as they believe, all the gods are ruled by the authority of one. ** But if, on the other hand, we have become convinced that these beliefs have their origin in the false ideas of the ignorant and are to be classed as fables, then let us listen to those who may be called the teachers of educated men, to those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears. Laelius. What men are these ? Scipio. Those who by searching out the nature of all things have come to realize that the whole universe is ruled by a single mind . . . 1.58. Scipio. . . But, if you like, Laelius, I will bring before you witnesses who are neither so very ancient nor by any means barbarians. Laelius. It is such witnesses that I desire. Scipio. Are you aware that it is less than four hundred years since this city was ruled by kings ? Laelius. It is certainly less than that. Scipio. Well, four hundred years is not very long , is it, in the life of a city or State ? Laelius. Hardly enough to bring it to maturity. Scipio. Then there was a king at Rome less than four hundred years ago ? Laelius. Yes, and a proud one. Scipio. And who preceded him ? Laelius. A very just king, and the line reaches all the way back to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years ago. Scipio. Then even he is not very remote from us ? Laelius. Not at all ; for Greece was already approaching old age in his time Scipio. Now tell me : was Romulus a king of barbarians ? Laelius. If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid be was, but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans. Scipio. Yet for the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race. For if they were sensible men and lived at a period not very remote, who desired to be ruled by kings, then the witnesses I am bringing forward are neither of very ancient date nor uncivilized savage 1.58. Scipio. . . But, if you like, Laelius, I will bring before you witnesses who are neither so very ancient nor by any means barbarians. Laelius. It is such witnesses that I desire. Scipio. Are you aware that it is less than four hundred years since this city was ruled by kings ? Laelius. It is certainly less than that. Scipio. Well, four hundred years is not very long , is it, in the life of a city or State ? Laelius. Hardly enough to bring it to maturity. Scipio. Then there was a king at Rome less than four hundred years ago ? Laelius. Yes, and a proud one. ** Scipio. And who preceded him ? Laelius. A very just king, ** and the line reaches all the way back to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years ago. Scipio. Then even he is not very remote from us ? Laelius. Not at all ; for Greece was already approaching old age in his time Scipio. Now tell me : was Romulus a king of barbarians ? Laelius. If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid be was, but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans. Scipio. Yet for the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race. For if they were sensible men and lived at a period not very remote, who desired to be ruled by kings, then the witnesses I am bringing forward are neither of very ancient date nor uncivilized savage 1.59. Laelius. I see that you are plentifully supplied with witnesses, Scipio, but to me, as to any good judge, demonstrations are more convincing than the testimony of witnesses. Scipio. Then, Laelius, make use of an argument from your own feelings Laelius. What feelings are those ? Scipio. Those which you have experienced in case, by any chance, you have ever been conscious of being angry with anyone Laelius. I have been in that state, and oftener than I could wish. Scipio. Well, when you are angry, do you allow your anger to rule your mind ? Laelius. Certainly not, but I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, who, when he found, upon arriving at his country place, that all his orders had been disobeyed, said to his superintendent: "You are at fault, wretched man, and I should have had you flogged to death ere this were I not angry ! " 1.60. Scipio. Excellent! Then Archytas clearly regarded anger, when it disagreed with calm judgment, as a sort of rebellion within the mind, which he desired should be put down by reason. Take as further examples avarice, greed for power and glory, and the passions ; you see, if there is any kingly power in the minds of men, it must be the domination of a single element, and this is reason (for that is the best part of the mind), and, if reason holds dominion, there is no room for the passions, for anger, for rash action. Laelius. That is true. Scipio. Well then, does a mind so governed meet with your approval ? Laelius. Nothing could be better. Scipio. In that case you would not approve if reason should be dethroned, and our innumerable passions, or our anger, should obtain complete domination ? Laelius. I can think of nothing more wretched than such a mind, or than the man that possesses it. Scipio. Then you think that the mind should be a kingdom, all of whose parts are to be ruled reason ? Laelius. I certainly do . Scipio. How then can you be doubtful as to your conclusion about the State ? For if the management of a State is committed to more than one, you can see that there will be no authority at all to take command, for unless such authority is a unit, it can amount to nothing. 1.61. Laelius. But let me ask what difference there is between one and many, if the many possess justice. Scipio. As I realise that no great impression has been made upon you by my witnesses, I shall continue using you as my witness in order to prove what I say. Laelius. Me ? In what way ? Scipio. A short time ago, when we were at your place at Formiae, I noticed that you gave your people emphatic orders to obey the directions of one person only. Laelius. Certainly ; my superintendent, of course. Scipio. How about your residence in the city? Are several persons in charge there ? Laelius. of course not ; only one. Scipio. And no one else but yourself rules your whole household ? Laelius. Certainly not Scipio. Why then will you not admit that in the State likewise, the rule one man is best, if he be just? Laelius. I am almost forced to agree with you. 1.62. Scipio. You will be all the more inclined to agree, Laelius, if, omitting the analogies of the ship and the sick man, more advantageously entrusted to a single pilot and a single physician, if only they be proficient in their professions, I go on to examples of greater importance. Laelius. What examples are these ? Scipio. Are you not aware that it was the insolence and pride of one man, Tarquinius, that made the title of king odious to our people ? Laelius. Certainly I am aware of it . Scipio. Then you are also aware of a fact about which I expect to have more to say in the course of my discussion - that when Tarquinius was driven out, the people showed a strange way of rejoicing in their unwonted liberty; then it was that innocent men were driven into exile, then that the property of many citizens was pillaged, that the annual consulship was introduced, that the rods were lowered before the people, that appeals were allowed in cases of every sort, that secessions of the plebeians took place, and that, in a word, almost everything was done to give the people full power in all things. 1.62. Scipio. You will be all the more inclined to agree, Laelius, if, omitting the analogies of the ship and the sick man, more advantageously entrusted to a single pilot and a single physician, if only they be proficient in their professions, ** I go on to examples of greater importance. Laelius. What examples are these ? Scipio. Are you not aware that it was the insolence and pride of one man, Tarquinius, that made the title of king odious to our people ? Laelius. Certainly I am aware of it . Scipio. Then you are also aware of a fact about which I expect to have more to say in the course of my discussion - that when Tarquinius was driven out, the people showed a strange way of rejoicing in their unwonted liberty; then it was that innocent men were driven into exile, then that the property of many citizens was pillaged, that the annual consulship was introduced, that the rods were lowered before the people, ** that appeals were allowed in cases of every sort, that secessions of the plebeians took place, and that, in a word, almost everything was done to give the people full power in all things. ** 1.63. Laelius. What you say is quite true. Scipio. Yes, and it is generally true in times of peace and security, for licence is possible as long as one has nothing to fear ; as, for example, on board a ship, or frequently in the case of an illness that is trivial. But just as the sailor, when the sea suddenly grows rough, and the invalid when his illness becomes severe, both implore the assistance of one man, so our people, that in times of peace and while engaged at home wield authority, threaten even their magistrates, refuse to obey them, and appeal from one to another or to the people, yet in time of war yield obedience to their rulers as to a king , for safety prevails over caprice. Indeed, in wars of more serious import our people have preferred that all the power should be granted to one man without a colleague. And this man's title shows the character of his power, for though he is commonly called "dictator" from the fact that he is "named," yet you know, Laelius, that in our books he is called "master of the people." Laelius. I do. Scipio. Therefore the men of old time acted wisely . . . 1.63. Laelius. What you say is quite true. Scipio. Yes, and it is generally true in times of peace and security, for licence is possible as long as one has nothing to fear ; as, for example, on board a ship, or frequently in the case of an illness that is trivial. But just as the sailor, when the sea suddenly grows rough, and the invalid when his illness becomes severe, both implore the assistance of one man, so our people, that in times of peace and while engaged at home wield authority, threaten even their magistrates, refuse to obey them, and appeal from one to another or to the people, yet in time of war yield obedience to their rulers as to a king , for safety prevails over caprice. Indeed, in wars of more serious import our people have preferred that all the power should be granted to one man without a colleague. And this man's title shows the character of his power, for though he is commonly called "dictator" from the fact that he is "named," ** yet you know, Laelius, that in our books ** he is called "master of the people." Laelius. I do. Scipio. Therefore the men of old time acted wisely . . . 1.64. . . . indeed when a people is orphaned by the loss of a just king, as Ennius says, For many a day doth sorrow fill their breasts, Whenever a goodly king hath met his end ; In grief one to another thus they speak : O Romulus, O Romulus divine, A mighty bulwark of our native land Wast thou, - sent down from heaven to our need ; O sire, O father, blood from gods derived ! Neither "masters" nor "lords" did they call those men whom they lawfully obeyed, nay, not "kings" either, but "guardians of the fatherland," "fathers," "gods" ; and not without reason, for what is the next line ? To realms of light thy people hast thou led. They thought that life, honour, and glory had been granted to them through the justice of their king. And the same goodwill toward kings would have abided in their descendants had the true image of kingship abided; but, as you know, it was through the injustice of one man alone that this whole form of government was overthrown Laelius. I know it, and am eager to learn the course taken by such changes of government, not merely in our own State, but in all others as well. 1.64. . . . indeed when a people is orphaned by the loss of a just king, as Ennius says, For many a day doth sorrow fill their breasts, Whenever a goodly king hath met his end ; In grief one to another thus they speak : O Romulus, O Romulus divine, A mighty bulwark of our native land You were, - sent down from heaven to our need ; O sire, O father, blood from gods derived ! Neither "masters" nor "lords" did they call those men whom they lawfully obeyed, nay, not "kings" either, but "guardians of the fatherland," "fathers," "gods" ; and not without reason, for what is the next line ? To realms of light thy people hast thou led. ** They thought that life, honour, and glory had been granted to them through the justice of their king. And the same goodwill toward kings would have abided in their descendants had the true image of kingship abided; but, as you know, it was through the injustice of one man alone that this whole form of government was overthrown Laelius. I know it, and am eager to learn the course taken by such changes of government, not merely in our own State, but in all others as well. 1.65. Scipio. When I have set forth my ideas in regard to the form of State which I consider the best, I shall have to take up in greater detail those changes to which States are liable, though I think it will not be at all easy for any such changes to take place in the State which I have in mind. But the first and most certain of these changes is the one that takes place in kingships : when the king begins to be unjust, that form of government is immediately at an end, and the king has become a tyrant. This is the worst sort of government, though closely related to the best. If the best men overthrow it, as usually happens, then the State is in the second of its three stages; for this form is similar to a kingship, being one in which a paternal council of leading men makes good provision for the people's welfare. But if the people themselves have killed or driven out the tyrant, they govern rather moderately, as long as they are wise and prudent, and, delighting in their exploit, they endeavour to maintain the government they have themselves set up. But if the people ever rebel against a just king and deprive him of his kingdom, or, as happens more frequently, taste the blood of the aristocracy and subject the whole State to their own caprices (and do not dream, Laelius, that any sea or any conflagration is so powerful that it cannot be more easily subdued than an unbridled multitude enjoying unwonted power), then we have a condition which is splendidly described by Plato, if only I can reproduce his description in Latin; it is difficult, but I will attempt it. 1.65. Scipio. When I have set forth my ideas in regard to the form of State which I consider the best, I shall have to take up in greater detail those changes to which States are liable, though I think it will not be at all easy for any such changes to take place in the State which I have in mind. But the first and most certain of these changes is the one that takes place in kingships : when the king begins to be unjust, that form of government is immediately at an end, and the king has become a tyrant. This is the worst sort of government, though closely related to the best. If the best men overthrow it, as usually happens, then the State is in the second of its three stages; for this form is similar to a kingship, being one in which a paternal council of leading men makes good provision for the people's welfare. But if the people themselves have killed or driven out the tyrant, they govern rather moderately, as long as they are wise and prudent, and, delighting in their exploit, they endeavour to maintain the government they have themselves set up. But if the people ever rebel against a just king and deprive him of his kingdom, or, as happens more frequently, taste the blood of the aristocracy and subject the whole State to their own caprices (and do not dream, Laelius, that any sea or any conflagration is so powerful that it cannot be more easily subdued than an unbridled multitude enjoying unwonted power), then we have a condition which is splendidly described by Plato, ** if only I can reproduce his description in Latin; it is difficult, but I will attempt it. 1.66. He says: "When the insatiable throats of the people have become dry with the thirst for liberty, and, served by evil ministers, they have drained in their thirst a draught of liberty which, instead of being moderately tempered, is too strong for them, then, unless the magistrates and men of high rank are very mild and indulgent, serving them with liberty in generous quantities, the people persecute them, charge them with crime and impeach them, calling them despots, kings, and tyrants." I think you are acquainted with this passage Laelius. It is very familiar to me. 1.67. Scipio. He continues thus: "Those who follow the lead of prominent citizens are persecuted by such a people and called willing slaves ; but those who, though in office, try to act like private citizens, and those private citizens who try to destroy all distinction between a private citizen and a magistrate are praised to the skies and loaded with honours. It necessarily follows in such a State that liberty prevails everywhere, to such an extent that not only are homes one and all without a master, but the vice of anarchy extends even to the domestic animals, until finally the father fears his son, the son flouts his father, all sense of shame disappears, and all is so absolutely free that there is no distinction between citizen and alien , the schoolmaster fears and flatters his pupils, and pupils despise their masters; youths take on the gravity of age, and old men stoop to the games of youth, for fear they may be disliked by their juniors and seem to them too serious. Under such conditions even the slaves come to behave with unseemly freedom, wives have the same rights as their husbands, and in the abundance of liberty even the dogs, the horses, and the asses are so free in their running about that men must make way for them in the streets. Therefore," he concludes, "the final result of this boundless licence is that the minds of the citizens become so squeamish and sensitive that, if the authority of government is exercised in the smallest degree, they become angry and cannot bear it. On this account they begin to neglect the laws as well, and so finally are utterly without a master of any kind." 1.68. Laelius. You have given us his description with great exactness. Scipio. Well, to return now to my own style of discourse, he also says that from this exaggerated licence, which is the only thing such people call liberty, tyrants spring up as from a root, and are, as it were, engendered. For just as an excess of power in the hands of the aristocrats results in the overthrow of an aristocracy, so liberty itself reduces a people who possess it in too great degree to servitude. Thus everything which is in excess - when, for instance, either in the weather, or in the fields, or in men's bodies, conditions have been too favourable - is usually changed into its opposite ; and this is especially true in States, where such excess of liberty either in nations or in individuals turns into an excess of servitude. This extreme liberty gives birth to a tyrant and the utterly unjust and cruel servitude of the tyranny. For out of such an ungovemed, or rather, untamed, populace someone is usually chosen as leader against those leading citizens who have already been subjected to persecution and cast down from their leadership - some bold and depraved man, who shamelessly harasses oftentimes even those who have deserved well of the State, and curries favour with the people by bestowing upon them the property of others as well as his own. To such a man, because he has much reason to be afraid if he remains a private citizen, official power is given and continually renewed, he is also surrounded by armed guards, as was Pisistratus at Athens ; and finally he emerges as a tyrant over the very people who have raised him to power. If the better citizens overthrow such a tyrant, as often happens, then the State is re-established , but if it is the bolder sort who do so, then we have that oligarchy which is only a tyranny of another kind. This same form of government also arises from the excellent rule of an aristocracy, when some bad influence turns the leading citizens themselves from the right path. Thus the ruling power of the State, like a ball, is snatched from kings by tyrants, from tyrants by aristocrats or the people, and from them again by an oligarchical faction or a tyrant, so that no single form of government ever maintains itself very long. 1.68. Laelius. You have given us his description with great exactness. Scipio. Well, to return now to my own style of discourse, he also says that from this exaggerated licence, which is the only thing such people call liberty, tyrants spring up as from a root, and are, as it were, engendered. For just as an excess of power in the hands of the aristocrats results in the overthrow of an aristocracy, so liberty itself reduces a people who possess it in too great degree to servitude. Thus everything which is in excess - when, for instance, either in the weather, or in the fields, or in men's bodies, conditions have been too favourable - is usually changed into its opposite ; and this is especially true in States, where such excess of liberty either in nations or in individuals turns into an excess of servitude. This extreme liberty gives birth to a tyrant and the utterly unjust and cruel servitude of the tyranny. For out of such an ungoverned, or rather, untamed, populace someone is usually chosen as leader against those leading citizens who have already been subjected to persecution and cast down from their leadership - some bold and depraved man, who shamelessly harasses oftentimes even those who have deserved well of the State, and curries favour with the people by bestowing upon them the property of others as well as his own. To such a man, because he has much reason to be afraid if he remains a private citizen, official power is given and continually renewed, he is also surrounded by armed guards, as was Pisistratus at Athens ; and finally he emerges as a tyrant over the very people who have raised him to power. If the better citizens overthrow such a tyrant, as often happens, then the State is re-established , but if it is the bolder sort who do so, then we have that oligarchy which is only a tyranny of another kind. This same form of government also arises from the excellent rule of an aristocracy, when some bad influence turns the leading citizens themselves from the right path. Thus the ruling power of the State, like a ball, is snatched from kings by tyrants, from tyrants by aristocrats or the people, and from them again by an oligarchical faction or a tyrant, so that no single form of government ever maintains itself very long. 1.69. Since this is true, the kingship, in my opinion, is by far the best of the three primary forms, but a moderate and balanced form of government which is a combination of the three good simple forms is preferable even to the kingship. For there should be a supreme and royal element in the State, some power also ought to be granted to the leading citizens, and certain matters should be left to the judgment and desires of the masses. Such a constitution, in the fist place, offers in a high degree a sort of equality, which is a thing free men can hardly do without for any consideiable length of time, and, secondly, it has stability. For the primary forms already mentioned degenerate easily into the corresponding perverted foims, the king being replaced by a despot, the aristocracy by an oligarchical faction, and the people by a mob and anarchy, but whereas these forms are frequently changed into new ones, this does not usually happen in the case of the mixed and evenly balanced constitution, except through great faults in the governing class. For there is no reason for a change when every citizen is fiimly established in his own station, and there underlies it no perverted form into which it can plunge and sink. 1.69. Since this is true, the kingship, in my opinion, is by far the best of the three primary forms, but a moderate and balanced form of government which is a combination of the three good simple forms is preferable even to the kingship. For there should be a supreme and royal element in the State, some power also ought to be granted to the leading citizens, and certain matters should be left to the judgment and desires of the masses. Such a constitution, in the first place, offers in a high degree a sort of equality, which is a thing free men can hardly do without for any considerable length of time, and, secondly, it has stability. For the primary forms already mentioned degenerate easily into the corresponding perverted forms, the king being replaced by a despot, the aristocracy by an oligarchical faction, and the people by a mob and anarchy, but whereas these forms are frequently changed into new ones, this does not usually happen in the case of the mixed and evenly balanced constitution, except through great faults in the governing class. For there is no reason for a change when every citizen is firmly established in his own station, and there underlies it no perverted form into which it can plunge and sink. 1.70. But I am afraid that you, Laelius, and you, my very dear and learned friends, may think, if I spend more time upon this aspect of the subject, that my discourse is rather that of a master or teacher than of one who is merely considering these matters in company with yourselves. Therefore I will pass to a topic which is familiar to everyone, and which we ourselves discussed some time ago. For I am convinced, I believe, and I declare that no other form of government is comparable, either m its general character, in its distribution of powers, or in the training it gives, with that which our ancestors received from their own forefathers, and have handed down to us. Therefore, if you have no objection - since you have desired to hear me discourse upon matters with which you are already familiar - I will explain the character of this constitution and show why it is the best; and, using our own government as my pattern, I will fit to it, if I can, all I have to say about the ideal State. If I can keep to this intention and carry it through, the task that Laelius has imposed upon me will, in my opinion, have been abundantly accomplished . 1.70. But I am afraid that you, Laelius, and you, my very dear and learned friends, may think, if I spend more time upon this aspect of the subject, that my discourse is rather that of a master or teacher than of one who is merely considering these matters in company with yourselves. Therefore I will pass to a topic which is familiar to everyone, and which we ourselves discussed some time ago. For I am convinced, I believe, and I declare that no other form of government is comparable, either in its general character, in its distribution of powers, or in the training it gives, with that which our ancestors received from their own forefathers, and have handed down to us. Therefore, if you have no objection - since you have desired to hear me discourse upon matters with which you are already familiar - I will explain the character of this constitution and show why it is the best; and, using our own government as my pattern, I will fit to it, if I can, all I have to say about the ideal State. If I can keep to this intention and carry it through, the task that Laelius has imposed upon me will, in my opinion, have been abundantly accomplished . |
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28. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.24-1.27 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17| 1.24. Cum igitur vehementius inveheretur in causam principum consul Philippus Drusique tribunatus pro senatus auctoritate susceptus infringi iam debilitarique videretur, dici mihi memini ludorum Romanorum diebus L. Crassum quasi conligendi sui causa se in Tusculanum contulisse; venisse eodem, socer eius qui fuerat, Q. Mucius dicebatur et M. Antonius, homo et consiliorum in re publica socius et summa cum Crasso familiaritate coniunctus. 1.26. Hi primo die de temporibus deque universa re publica, quam ob causam venerant, multum inter se usque ad extremum tempus diei conlocuti sunt; quo quidem sermone multa divinitus a tribus illis consularibus Cotta deplorata et commemorata narrabat, ut nihil incidisset postea civitati mali, quod non impendere illi tanto ante vidissent. | 1.24. At the time, then, when the consul Philippus was vehemently inveighing against the cause of the nobility, and the tribuneship of Drusus, undertaken to support the authority of the senate, seemed to be shaken and weakened, I was told, I remember, that Lucius Crassus, as if for the purpose of collecting his thoughts, betook himself, during the days of the Ludi Romani, to his Tusculan country-seat, whither also Quintus Mucius, who had been his father-in-law, is said to have come at the same time, as well as Marcus Antonius, a sharer in all the political proceedings of Crassus, and united in the closest friendship with him. 1.26. These, on the first day, conferred much together until very late in the evening, concerning the condition of those times, and the whole commonwealth, for which purpose they had met. Cotta repeated to me many things then prophetically lamented and noticed by the three of consular dignity in that conversation; so that no misfortune afterwards happened to the state which they had not perceived to be hanging over it so long before; |
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29. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17 | 1.15. This has often struck me, but it did so with especial force on one occasion, when the topic of the immortal gods was made the subject of a very searching and thorough discussion at the house of my friend Gaius Cotta. It was the Latin Festival, and I had come at Cotta's express invitation to pay him a visit. I found him sitting in an alcove, engaged in debate with Gaius Velleius, a Member of the Senate, accounted by the Epicureans as their chief Roman adherent at the time. With them was Quintus Lucilius Balbus, who was so accomplished a student of Stoicism as to rank with the leading Greek exponents of that system. When Cotta saw me, he greeted me with the words: "You come exactly at the right moment, for I am just engaging in a dispute with Velleius on an important topic, in which you with your tastes will be interested to take part." |
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30. Cicero, On Laws, 2.3, 3.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17 | 2.3. MARCUS: I acknowledge that when I can escape for a few days, especially in this delectable season, I usually come here, on account of the beauty of the scenery, and the salubrity of the air; but these vacations occur not very often. There is one reason, however, why I am so fond of this Arpinum, which does not apply to you. ATTICUS: Prithee, what reason is that? MARCUS: Because, to confess the truth, it is my native place, and my brotherʼs, for here indeed, descended from a very ancient race, we first saw the day. Here was our altar, here our ancestry, and here still remains many vestiges of our family. Besides, this villa which you behold in its present form, was originally constructed under my fatherʼs superintendence; for having very infirm health, he spent the later years of his life here, engaged in literary pursuits. At the time of my birth, my grandfather also lived here, and resided according to the olden custom, in that little villa, like another Curius on his Sabine farm. There is, therefore, an indiscribable sympathy which attaches me to the spot; it pervades my soul and sense with a peculiar fascination, whenever I reside here. Even the wisest Ulysses was not wholly exempt from a similar weakness, for Homer tells us that he renounced immortality, that he might once more re-visit his beloved Ithaca. |
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31. Cicero, De Domo Sua, 86 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226| 86. in hac enim causa cum viderent illos amplissimam pecuniam possidere, hunc in summa mendicitate esse, illud quidem non quaererent, cui bono fuisset, sed eo perspicuo perspicuo Puteanus : perspicuum codd. crimen et suspicionem potius ad praedam adiungerent quam ad egestatem. quid si accedit eodem ut tenuis antea fueris? quid si ut avarus? quid si ut audax? quid si ut illius qui occisus est inimicissimus? num quaerenda causa cause ω ω : om. cett. quae te ad tantum facinus adduxerit adduxerunt (edux. ς ) σχψ ? quid ergo horum negari potest? tenuitas hominis eius modi est ut dissimulari non queat atque eo magis eluceat elucet Heumann quo magis occultatur. | |
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32. Cicero, Brutus, 10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17| 10. nam cum inambularem in xysto et essem otiosus domi, M. ad me Brutus, ut consueverat, cum T. Pomponio venit venit Fleckeisen : venerat L , homines cum inter se coniuncti tum mihi ita cari itaque itaque codd. : atque O iucundi, ut eorum aspectu omnis quae me angebat de re publica cura consederit. Quos postquam salutavi: Quid vos, inquam, Brute et Attice ? numquid numquid Nipperdey : nunc quid L tandem novi? Nihil sane, inquit Brutus, quod quidem aut tu audire velis aut ego pro certo dicere audeam. | 10. For, not long ago, when I was walking for my amusement, in a private avenue at home, I was agreeably interrupted by my friend Brutus, and T. Pomponius, who came, as indeed they frequently did, to visit me;- two worthy citizens who were united to each other in the closest friendship, and were so dear and so agreeable to me, that, on the first sight of them, all my anxiety for the Commonwealth subsided. After the usual salutations,- "Well, gentlemen," said I, "how go the times? What news have you brought?""None," replied Brutus, "that you would wish to hear, or that I can venture to tell you for truth." |
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33. Cicero, Brutus, 10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 17| 10. nam cum inambularem in xysto et essem otiosus domi, M. ad me Brutus, ut consueverat, cum T. Pomponio venit venit Fleckeisen : venerat L , homines cum inter se coniuncti tum mihi ita cari itaque itaque codd. : atque O iucundi, ut eorum aspectu omnis quae me angebat de re publica cura consederit. Quos postquam salutavi: Quid vos, inquam, Brute et Attice ? numquid numquid Nipperdey : nunc quid L tandem novi? Nihil sane, inquit Brutus, quod quidem aut tu audire velis aut ego pro certo dicere audeam. | 10. For, not long ago, when I was walking for my amusement, in a private avenue at home, I was agreeably interrupted by my friend Brutus, and T. Pomponius, who came, as indeed they frequently did, to visit me;- two worthy citizens who were united to each other in the closest friendship, and were so dear and so agreeable to me, that, on the first sight of them, all my anxiety for the Commonwealth subsided. After the usual salutations,- "Well, gentlemen," said I, "how go the times? What news have you brought?""None," replied Brutus, "that you would wish to hear, or that I can venture to tell you for truth." |
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34. Varro, On Agriculture, 1.4.1, 2.pre6, 2.8.5, 3.3.1, 2.11.12, 3.5.10, 3.5.9, 2.1.10, 2.1.9, 2.1.8, 2.1.7, 3.5.11, 2.1.6, 2.1.4, 2.1.3, 1.1.7, 2.1.5, 3.5.12, 3.17.10, 3.2.2, 1.69.2, 2.8.1, 2.1.1, 1.2.1, 3.5.16, 3.5.15, 3.2.4, 3.5.14, 3.5.17, 3.5.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 231 | 1.4.1. "Its elements are the same as those which Ennius says are the elements of the universe — water, earth, air, and fire. You should have some knowledge of these before you cast your seed, which is the first step in all production. Equipped with this knowledge, the farmer should aim at two goals, profit and pleasure; the object of the first is material return, and of the second enjoyment. The profitable plays a more important rôle than the pleasurable; 2 and yet for the most part the methods of cultivation which improve the aspect of the land, such as the planting of fruit and olive trees in rows, make it not only more profitable but also more saleable, and add to the value of the estate. For any man would rather pay more for a piece of land which is attractive than for one of the same value which, though profitable, is unsightly. 3 Further, land which is more wholesome is more valuable, because on it the profit is certain; while, on the other hand, on land that is unwholesome, however rich it may be, misfortune does not permit the farmer to reap a profit. For where the reckoning is with death, not only is the profit uncertain, but also the life of the farmers; so that, lacking wholesomeness, agriculture becomes nothing else than a game of chance, in which the life and the property of the owner are at stake. 4 And yet this risk can be lessened by science; for, granting that healthfulness, being a product of climate and soil, is not in our power but in that of nature, still it depends greatly on us, because we can, by care, lessen the evil effects. For if the farm is unwholesome on account of the nature of the land or the water, from the miasma which is exhaled in some spots; or if, on account of the climate, the land is too hot or the wind is not salubrious, these faults can be alleviated by the science and the outlay of the owner. The situation of the buildings, their size, the exposure of the galleries, the doors, and the windows, are matters of the highest importance. 5 Did not that famous physician, Hippocrates, during a great pestilence save not one farm but many cities by his skill? But why do I cite him? Did not our friend Varro here, when the army and fleet were at Corcyra, and all the houses were crowded with the sick and the dead, by cutting new windows to admit the north wind, and shutting out the infected winds, by changing the position of doors, and other precautions of the same kind, bring back his comrades and his servants in good health? |
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| 35. Cicero, Letters, 89.2, 326.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 13, 14, 16 |
36. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14, 3.4, 3.7, 3.62, 5.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of dialogue form in •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 12, 17, 231| 1.14. nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos inter nos primo BE de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, nacti te VN 2 hac tite A 1 BER, N 1 (ut videtur); hac die A 2 inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent pertinent R ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, aristoteli A 1 aristotili E aristotilis Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud illuc NV ad illud A 2 quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 3.7. nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem ne re pn sionē R ne pren- sionem ABE rep hensionem N nec reprensionem V quidem vulgi iem reformidans iem non ut credo reformidans (punct. ab alt. m. pos.) N in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 5.1. Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. | 3.4. Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street. < 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. < 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. < 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. < |
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37. Livy, History, 3.26.7-3.26.10 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226| 3.26.7. operae pretium est audire, qui omnia prae divitiis humana spernunt neque honori magno locum neque virtuti putant esse, nisi ubi effuse afluant opes. spes unica imperii populi Romani, 3.26.8. L. Quinctius trans Tiberim, contra eum ipsum locum, ubi nunc navalia sunt, quattuor iugerum colebat agrum, quae prata Quinctia vocantur. 3.26.9. ibi ab legatis, seu fossam fodiens palae innixus seu cum araret, operi certe, id quod constat, agresti intentus, salute data in vicem redditaque rogatus, ut, quod bene verteret ipsi reique publicae, togatus mandata senatus audiret, admiratus rogitansque “satin salve?” togam propere e tugurio proferre uxorem Raciliam iubet. 3.26.10. qua simul absterso pulvere ac sudore velatus processit, dictatorem eum legati gratulantes consalutant, in urbem vocant, qui terror sit in exercitu, exponunt. | 3.26.9. After mutual salutations he was requested to put on his toga that he might hear the mandate of the senate, and they expressed the hope that it might turn out well for him and for the State. He asked them, in surprise, if all was well, and bade his wife, Racilia, bring him his toga quickly from the cottage. [10] Wiping off the dust and perspiration, he put it on and came forward, on which the deputation saluted him as Dictator and congratulated him, invited him to the City and explained the state of apprehension in which the army were. [11] A vessel had been provided for him by the government, and after he had crossed over, he was welcomed by his three sons, who had come out to meet him. They were followed by other relatives and friends, and by the majority of the senate. Escorted by this numerous gathering and preceded by the lictors, he was conducted to his house. |
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38. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 15-16, 162, 164, 14 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 284 | 14. At all events, men say, that the ancients compared the principles of philosophy, as being threefold, to a field; likening natural philosophy to trees and plants, and moral philosophy to fruits, for the sake of which the plants are planted; and logical philosophy to the hedge or fence: |
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39. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 35, 38, 41, 44, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 1. And Cain said to Abel his brother, "Let us go to the field. And it came to pass, that while they were in the field, Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew Him." What Cain proposes to do is this: having by invitation led Abel on to a dispute, to convince him by main force, using plausible and probable sophisms; for the field to which he invites him to come, we may call a symbol of rivalry and contention, forming our conjectures of things that are uncertain from our perception of those which are manifest. |
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40. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 82, 85 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 85. Therefore "the rod of Aaron swallowed up their Rods," as the holy scripture tells us. For all sophistical reasons are swallowed up and destroyed by the varied skilfulness of nature; so that they are forced to confess that what is done is "the finger of God," an expression equivalent to confessing the truth of the divine scripture which asserts that sophistry is always subdued by wisdom. For the sacred account tells us that "the tables" on which the commandments were engraved as on a pillar, "were also written by the finger of God." On which account the conjurors were not able to stand before Moses, but fell down as in a wrestling match, being overcome by the superior strength of their antagonist. XVI. |
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41. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 240 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 240. Therefore the most excellent, and most perfect kind of purification is this, not to admit into one's mind any improper notions, but to regulate it in peace and obedience to law, the ruler of which principles is justice. The next kind is, not to offend in one's language either by speaking falsely, or by swearing falsely, or by deceiving, or by practicing sophistry, or by laying false informations; or, in short, by letting loose one's mouth and tongue to the injury of any one, as it is better to put a bridle and an insuperable chain on those members. XLII. |
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| 42. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 10.17.3 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
43. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 53 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 53. Now of such a city as this, every impious man is found to be a builder in his own miserable soul, until God deliberately causes complete and great confusion to their sophistical Arts. And this will be, when not only "they build a city and tower, the head of which will reach to heaven," that is to say, [...] the mind or the reason of each individual as conversant about making great works, which they represent as having for its head a conception peculiar to itself, which is called in symbolical language heaven. For it is plain that the head and object of every reasoning must be the aforesaid mind; for the sake of which, long digressions and sentences are in the habit of being used by men who write histories. XVI. |
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44. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 2.40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 2.40. he who, in something of a piratical fashion, lays ambuscades against those who counterplot against him, takes up deceit, cajolery, trickery, sophistry, pretence, and hypocrisy, which being in their own nature blamable, are nevertheless praised when employed against the enemy; he who studies to be rich in the riches of nature takes up temperance and frugality; he who loves peace takes up obedience to law, a good reputation, freedom from pride, and equality. VI. |
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| 45. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.94 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 |
| 46. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 3.232-3.233 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 |
| 47. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 125, 304-305, 85, 302 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 |
48. Philo of Alexandria, On Drunkenness, 71 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 143 | 71. Why, then, are we not also to repel this being, too, who is a sophist and a polluted person, condemning him to the death which is suited to him, namely, silence (for silence is the death of speech), in order that the mind may be no longer led away by its sophisms, but being completely emancipated from all the pleasures which are according to the body, "the brother," and being alienated from, and having shaken off the yoke of, all the trickeries according to "the neighbour," and the neighbouring outward senses, and from the sophistries in accordance with the "nearest" speech, may be able, in all purity, to apply itself to all the proper objects of the intellect. |
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49. New Testament, Galatians, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 342, 343, 344| 5.17. ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε. | 5.17. For the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and theSpirit against the flesh; and these are contrary to one other, that youmay not do the things that you desire. |
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50. New Testament, Acts, 15.25, 15.28-15.29 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 322, 323| 15.25. ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν γενομένοις ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐκλεξαμένοις ἄνδρας πέμψαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς σὺν τοῖς ἀγαπητοῖς ἡμῶν Βαρνάβᾳ καὶ Παύλῳ, 15.28. ἔδοξεν γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ ἡμῖν μηδὲν πλέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι ὑμῖν βάρος πλὴν τούτων τῶν ἐπάναγκες, ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πνικτῶν καὶ πορνείας· 15.29. ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε. Ἔρρωσθε. | 15.25. it seemed good to us, having come to one accord, to choose out men and send them to you with our beloved Barnabas and Paul, 15.28. For it seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay no greater burden on you than these necessary things: 15.29. that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from sexual immorality, from which if you keep yourselves, it will be well with you. Farewell." |
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51. New Testament, Romans, 2.14, 2.26 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 281| 2.14. ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος· 2.26. ἐὰν οὖν ἡ ἀκροβυστία τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φυλάσσῃ, οὐχ ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται; | 2.14. (for when Gentiles who don't have the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves, 2.26. If therefore the uncircumcised keep the ordices of the law, won't his uncircumcision be accounted as circumcision? |
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52. New Testament, John, 1.14, 7.34, 8.44 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 337, 338, 344, 405| 1.14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔ 7.34. ζητήσετέ με καὶ οὐχ εὑρήσετέ με, καὶ ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν. 8.44. ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν. ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἔστηκεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ. ὅταν λαλῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ, ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ. | 1.14. The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth. 7.34. You will seek me, and won't find me; and where I am, you can't come." 8.44. You are of your Father, the devil, and you want to do the desires of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning, and doesn't stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks on his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it. |
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| 53. Seneca The Younger, De Otio Sapientis (Dialogorum Liber Viii), 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 229 |
54. New Testament, Mark, 4.3-4.7, 12.1, 12.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 286, 396, 435| 4.3. Ἀκούετε. ἰδοὺ ἐξῆλθεν ὁ σπείρων σπεῖραι. 4.4. καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ σπείρειν ὃ μὲν ἔπεσεν παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν, καὶ ἦλθεν τὰ πετεινὰ καὶ κατέφαγεν αὐτό. 4.5. καὶ ἄλλο ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τὸ πετρῶδες [καὶ] ὅπου οὐκ εἶχεν γῆν πολλήν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐξανέτειλεν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βάθος γῆς· 4.6. καὶ ὅτε ἀνέτειλεν ὁ ἥλιος ἐκαυματίσθη καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ῥίζαν ἐξηράνθη. 4.7. καὶ ἄλλο ἔπεσεν εἰς τὰς ἀκάνθας, καὶ ἀνέβησαν αἱ ἄκανθαι καὶ συνέπνιξαν αὐτό, καὶ καρπὸν οὐκ ἔδωκεν. 12.1. Καὶ ἤρξατο αὐτοῖς ἐν παραβολαῖς λαλεῖν Ἀμπελῶνα ἄνθρωπος ἐφύτευσεν, καὶ περιέθηκεν φραγμὸν καὶ ὤρυξεν ὑπολήνιον καὶ ᾠκοδόμησεν πύργον, καὶ ἐξέδετο αὐτὸν γεωργοῖς, καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν. 12.39. καὶ πρωτοκαθεδρίας ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ πρωτοκλισίας ἐν τοῖς δείπνοις, | 4.3. "Listen! Behold, the farmer went out to sow, 4.4. and it happened, as he sowed, some seed fell by the road, and the birds came and devoured it. 4.5. Others fell on the rocky ground, where it had little soil, and immediately it sprang up, because it had no depth of soil. 4.6. When the sun had risen, it was scorched; and because it had no root, it withered away. 4.7. Others fell among the thorns, and the thorns grew up, and choked it, and it yielded no fruit. 12.1. He began to speak to them in parables. "A man planted a vineyard, put a hedge around it, dug a pit for the winepress, built a tower, rented it out to a farmer, and went into another country. 12.39. and the best seats in the synagogues, and the best places at feasts: |
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55. New Testament, Matthew, 4.1, 4.4, 4.6, 7.7, 13.25-13.26, 14.3-14.7, 18.10, 21.33, 23.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 282, 283, 286, 337, 344, 391, 396, 404, 405, 435| 4.1. Τότε [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς ἀνήχθη εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. 4.4. ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν Γέγραπται Οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ. 4.6. καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν κάτω· γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι Τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀροῦσίν σε, μή ποτε προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου. 7.7. Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν. 13.25. ἐν δὲ τῷ καθεύδειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ ὁ ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἐπέσπειρεν ζιζάνια ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σίτου καὶ ἀπῆλθεν. 13.26. ὅτε δὲ ἐβλάστησεν ὁ χόρτος καὶ καρπὸν ἐποίησεν, τότε ἐφάνη καὶ τὰ ζιζάνια. 14.3. Ὁ γὰρ Ἡρῴδης κρατήσας τὸν Ἰωάνην ἔδησεν καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ ἀπέθετο διὰ Ἡρῳδιάδα τὴν γυναῖκα Φιλίππου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ, 14.4. ἔλεγεν γὰρ ὁ Ἰωάνης αὐτῷ Οὐκ ἔξεστίν σοι ἔχειν αὐτήν· 14.5. καὶ θέλων αὐτὸν ἀποκτεῖναι ἐφοβήθη τὸν ὄχλον, ὅτι ὡς προφήτην αὐτὸν εἶχον. 14.6. γενεσίοις δὲ γενομένοις τοῦ Ἡρῴδου ὠρχήσατο ἡ θυγάτηρ τῆς Ἡρῳδιάδος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἤρεσεν τῷ Ἡρῴδῃ, 14.7. ὅθεν μετὰ ὅρκου ὡμολόγησεν αὐτῇ δοῦναι ὃ ἐὰν αἰτήσηται. 18.10. Ὁρᾶτε μὴ καταφρονήσητε ἑνὸς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων, λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς διὰ παντὸς βλέπουσι τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς. 21.33. Ἄλλην παραβολὴν ἀκούσατε. Ἄνθρωπος ἦν οἰκοδεσπότης ὅστις ἐφύτευσεν ἀμπελῶνα καὶ φραγμὸν αὐτῷ περιέθηκεν καὶ ὤρυξεν ἐν αὐτῷ ληνὸν καὶ ᾠκοδόμησεν πύργον, καὶ ἐξέδετο αὐτὸν γεωργοῖς, καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν. 23.6. φιλοῦσι δὲ τὴν πρωτοκλισίαν ἐν τοῖς δείπνοις καὶ τὰς πρωτοκαθεδρίας ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς | 4.1. Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil. 4.4. But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God.'" 4.6. and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down, for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge concerning you.' and, 'On their hands they will bear you up, So that you don't dash your foot against a stone.'" 7.7. "Ask, and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. 13.25. but while people slept, his enemy came and sowed darnel also among the wheat, and went away. 13.26. But when the blade sprang up and brought forth fruit, then the darnel appeared also. 14.3. For Herod had laid hold of John, and bound him, and put him in prison for the sake of Herodias, his brother Philip's wife. 14.4. For John said to him, "It is not lawful for you to have her." 14.5. When he would have put him to death, he feared the multitude, because they counted him as a prophet. 14.6. But when Herod's birthday came, the daughter of Herodias danced among them and pleased Herod. 14.7. Whereupon he promised with an oath to give her whatever she should ask. 18.10. See that you don't despise one of these little ones, for I tell you that in heaven their angels always see the face of my Father who is in heaven. 21.33. "Hear another parable. There was a man who was a master of a household, who planted a vineyard, set a hedge about it, dug a winepress in it, built a tower, leased it out to farmers, and went into another country. 23.6. and love the place of honor at feasts, the best seats in the synagogues, |
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56. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 11.2-11.3, 11.14-11.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 335, 336, 337| 11.2. ζηλῶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς θεοῦ ζήλῳ, ἡρμοσάμην γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ παρθένον ἁγνὴν παραστῆσαι τῷ χριστῷ· 11.3. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πως, ὡςὁ ὄφις ἐξηπάτησενΕὕαν ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτοῦ, φθαρῇ τὰ νοήματα ὑμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁπλότητος [καὶ τῆς ἁγνότητος] τῆς εἰς τὸν χριστόν. 11.14. καὶ οὐ θαῦμα, αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ Σατανᾶς μετασχηματίζεται εἰς ἄγγελον φωτός· 11.15. οὐ μέγα οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ διάκονοι αὐτοῦ μετασχηματίζονται ὡς διάκονοι δικαιοσύνης, ὧν τὸ τέλος ἔσται κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν. | |
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| 57. Anon., The Life of Adam And Eve, 9 (1st cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 337 |
58. New Testament, Luke, 8.5-8.7, 11.9, 11.43, 14.7-14.8, 20.46 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 396, 404, 435| 8.5. Ἐξῆλθεν ὁ σπείρων τοῦ σπεῖραι τὸν σπόρον αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐν τῷ σπείρειν αὐτὸν ὃ μὲν ἔπεσεν παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν, καὶ κατεπατήθη καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατέφαγεν αὐτό. 8.6. καὶ ἕτερον κατέπεσεν ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, καὶ φυὲν ἐξηράνθη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἰκμάδα. 8.7. καὶ ἕτερον ἔπεσεν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἀκανθῶν, καὶ συνφυεῖσαι αἱ ἄκανθαι ἀπέπνιξαν αὐτό. 11.9. Κἀγὼ ὑμῖν λέγω, αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν. 11.43. οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι ἀγαπᾶτε τὴν πρωτοκαθεδρίαν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀσπασμοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς. 14.7. Ἔλεγεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς κεκλημένους παραβολήν, ἐπέχων πῶς τὰς πρωτοκλισίας ἐξελέγοντο, 14.8. λέγων πρὸς αὐτούς Ὅταν κληθῇς ὑπό τινος εἰς γάμους, μὴ κατακλιθῇς εἰς τὴν πρωτοκλισίαν, μή ποτε ἐντιμότερός σου ᾖ κεκλημένος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, 20.46. Προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῶν γραμματέων τῶν θελόντων περιπατεῖν ἐν στολαῖς καὶ φιλούντων ἀσπασμοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς καὶ πρωτοκαθεδρίας ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ πρωτοκλισίας ἐν τοῖς δείπνοις, | 8.5. "The farmer went out to sow his seed. As he sowed, some fell along the road, and it was trampled under foot, and the birds of the sky devoured it. 8.6. Other seed fell on the rock, and as soon as it grew, it withered away, because it had no moisture. 8.7. Other fell amid the thorns, and the thorns grew with it, and choked it. 11.9. "I tell you, keep asking, and it will be given you. Keep seeking, and you will find. Keep knocking, and it will be opened to you. 11.43. Woe to you Pharisees! For you love the best seats in the synagogues, and the greetings in the marketplaces. 14.7. He spoke a parable to those who were invited, when he noticed how they chose the best seats, and said to them, 14.8. "When you are invited by anyone to a marriage feast, don't sit in the best seat, since perhaps someone more honorable than you might be invited by him, 20.46. "Beware of the scribes, who like to walk in long robes, and love greetings in the marketplaces, the best seats in the synagogues, and the best places at feasts; |
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59. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 4.3-4.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 321| 4.3. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ ἁγιασμὸς ὑμῶν, ἀπέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας, 4.4. εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσθαι ἐν ἁγιασμῷ καὶ τιμῇ, 4.5. μὴ ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας καθάπερ καὶτὰ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ εἰδότα τὸν θεόν, 4.6. τὸ μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ, διότιἔκδικος Κύριοςπερὶ πάντων τούτων, καθὼς καὶ προείπαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ διεμαρτυράμεθα. 4.7. οὐ γὰρ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ ἀλλʼ ἐν ἁγιασμῷ. 4.8. τοιγαροῦν ὁ ἀθετῶν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀθετεῖ ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸνδιδόντα τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦτὸ ἅγιονεἰς ὑμᾶς. | 4.3. For this is the will of God: your sanctification, that you abstain from sexual immorality, 4.4. that each one of you know how to possess himself of his own vessel in sanctification and honor, 4.5. not in the passion of lust, even as the Gentiles who don't know God; 4.6. that no one should take advantage of and wrong a brother or sister in this matter; because the Lord is an avenger in all these things, as also we forewarned you and testified. 4.7. For God called us not for uncleanness, but in sanctification. 4.8. Therefore he who rejects doesn't reject man, but God, who has also given his Holy Spirit to you. |
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| 60. Plutarch, On Chance, 329b, 329a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 229, 230, 231 |
61. New Testament, 1 Peter, 2.9, 4.15-4.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 315, 316, 404| 2.9. ὑμεῖς δὲ γένος ἐκλεκτόν, βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα, ἔθνος ἅγιον, λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν, ὅπως τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξαγγείλητε τοῦ ἐκ σκότους ὑμᾶς καλέσαντος εἰς τὸ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ φῶς· 4.15. μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεὺς ἢ κλέπτης ἢ κακοποιὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος· 4.16. εἰ δὲ ὡς Χριστιανός, μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω, δοξαζέτω δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ. | 2.9. But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people for God's own possession, that you may show forth the excellencies of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light: 4.15. For let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or an evil doer, or as a meddler in other men's matters. 4.16. But if one of you suffers for being a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorify God in this matter. |
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| 62. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 4.4.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
63. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 1.24, 2.6, 8.1, 8.7, 8.9-8.10, 9.4-9.5, 9.12, 9.17, 9.19, 9.25, 10.25-10.32, 11.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 286, 323, 391, 396| 1.24. αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς κλητοῖς, Ἰουδαίοις τε καὶ Ἕλλησιν, Χριστὸν θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν. 2.6. Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· 8.1. Περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων, οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν. 8.7. τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον ἐσθίουσιν, καὶ ἡ συνείδησις αὐτῶν ἀσθενὴς οὖσα μολύνεται. 8.9. βλέπετε δὲ μή πως ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη πρόσκομμα γένηται τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν. 8.10. ἐὰν γάρ τις ἴδῃ [σὲ] τὸν ἔχοντα γνῶσιν ἐν εἰδωλίῳ κατακείμενον, οὐχὶ ἡ συνείδησις αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος οἰκοδομηθήσεται εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθίειν; 9.4. μὴ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν φαγεῖν καὶ πεῖν; 9.5. μὴ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα περιάγειν, ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ Κηφᾶς; 9.12. εἰ ἄλλοι τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας μετέχουσιν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ, ἀλλὰ πάντα στέγομεν ἵνα μή τινα ἐνκοπὴν δῶμεν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ χριστοῦ. 9.17. εἰ γὰρ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράσσω, μισθὸν ἔχω· εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι. 9.19. Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω· 9.25. πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄφθαρτον. 10.25. Πᾶν τὸ ἐν μακέλλῳ πωλούμενον ἐσθίετε μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντες διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, 10.26. τοῦ κυρίουγὰρἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς. 10.27. εἴ τις καλεῖ ὑμᾶς τῶν ἀπίστων καὶ θέλετε πορεύεσθαι, πᾶν τὸ παρατιθέμενον ὑμῖν ἐσθίετε μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντες διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν· 10.28. ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν εἴπῃ Τοῦτο ἱερόθυτόν ἐστιν, μὴ ἐσθίετε διʼ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μηνύσαντα καὶ τὴν συνείδησιν· 10.29. συνείδησιν δὲ λέγω οὐχὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου· ἵνα τί γὰρ ἡ ἐλευθερία μου κρίνεται ὑπὸ ἄλλης συνειδήσεως; 10.30. εἰ ἐγὼ χάριτι μετέχω, τί βλασφημοῦμαι ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐγὼ εὐχαριστῶ; 10.31. Εἴτε οὖν ἐσθίετε εἴτε πίνετε εἴτε τι ποιεῖτε, πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε. 10.32. ἀπρόσκοποι καὶ Ἰουδαίοις γίνεσθε καὶ Ἕλλησιν καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, 11.19. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι· ἵνα [καὶ] οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν. | 1.24. but to thosewho are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God andthe wisdom of God. 2.6. We speak wisdom, however, among those who are fullgrown; yet a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world,who are coming to nothing. 8.1. Now concerning things sacrificed to idols: We know that we allhave knowledge. Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up. 8.7. However, that knowledgeisn't in all men. But some, with consciousness of the idol until now,eat as of a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience, beingweak, is defiled. 8.9. But be careful that by no means does this liberty ofyours become a stumbling block to the weak. 8.10. For if a man seesyou who have knowledge sitting in an idol's temple, won't hisconscience, if he is weak, be emboldened to eat things sacrificed toidols? 9.4. Have we no right to eat and to drink? 9.5. Have we noright to take along a wife who is a believer, even as the rest of theapostles, and the brothers of the Lord, and Cephas? 9.12. If others partake of this right overyou, don't we yet more? Nevertheless we did not use this right, but webear all things, that we may cause no hindrance to the gospel ofChrist. 9.17. For if I do this of my own will, Ihave a reward. But if not of my own will, I have a stewardshipentrusted to me. 9.19. For though I was free fromall, I brought myself under bondage to all, that I might gain the more. 9.25. Every man who strives in thegames exercises self-control in all things. Now they do it to receive acorruptible crown, but we an incorruptible. 10.25. Whatever is sold in the butcher shop, eat, asking no questionfor the sake of conscience, 10.26. for "the earth is the Lord's, andits fullness." 10.27. But if one of those who don't believe invitesyou to a meal, and you are inclined to go, eat whatever is set beforeyou, asking no questions for the sake of conscience. 10.28. But ifanyone says to you, "This was offered to idols," don't eat it for thesake of the one who told you, and for the sake of conscience. For "theearth is the Lord's, and all its fullness." 10.29. Conscience, I say,not your own, but the other's conscience. For why is my liberty judgedby another conscience? 10.30. If I partake with thankfulness, why am Idenounced for that for which I give thanks? 10.31. Whether thereforeyou eat, or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God. 10.32. Give no occasions for stumbling, either to Jews, or to Greeks,or to the assembly of God; 11.19. For there also mustbe factions among you, that those who are approved may be revealedamong you. |
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64. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 18.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 | 18.20. No grain is greedier than wheat or draws more nourishment out of the soil. Common wheat may properly designate the choicest variety, whether in whiteness or goodness or weight. It is suitable for moist districts like those in Italy and Gallia Comata, but across the Alps it only keeps its character in the territory of the Allobroges and Remi, while in the other parts of that country it changes in two years into ordinary wheat. The cure for this is to select its heaviest grains for sowing. Common wheat flour makes bread of the highest quality and the most famous pastry. The top place in Italy is taken by a mixture of Campanian common wheat flour with that grown at Pisa, the former being reddish but the chalk-like Pisa variety whiter and heavier. A fair yield from the Campanian grain called 'bolted' is to give four sixteenths of fine flour to the peck, or from what is called common grain, not bolted, five sixteenths, as well as half a peck of fine flour and four sixteenths of the coarse meal called 'seconds', and the same amount of bran; whereas Pisa wheat should give four sixteenths of prime flour, while of the other kinds the yield is the same. The wheats of Clusium and Arezzo give an additional sixteenth of prime flour, but in the remaining qualities they are on a level. If however it is wished to make special flour, the return is sixteen pounds of bread and three pecks of seconds and half a peck of bran. This depends on different methods of milling; for grain ground when dry gives more flour, but if sprinkled with salt water it makes a whiter meal, but keeps more back in the bran. The name for flour, farina, is obviously derived from far, emmer. A peck of flour made of Gallic conmion wheat gives 20 pounds of bread, that of the Italian kind two or three pounds more, in the case of bread baked in a tin — for loaves baked in the oven they add two pounds in either kind of wheat. 'Hard' flour is made from hard wheat, the most highly esteemed coming from Africa. A fair return is half a peck from a peck with five sixteenths of special flour — that is the name given in the case of hard wheat to what in common wheat is called the 'flower'; this is used in copper works and paper mills — and in addition four sixteenths of second quality flour and the same amount of bran, but from a peek of 'hard' flour 22 pounds of bread and from a peck of flower of wheat 16 pounds. The price for this when the market rate is moderate is 40 asses a peek for flour, 8 asses more for 'hard' flour and twice as much for bolted common wheat. There is also another distinction, that when bolted a single time it gives 17 pounds of bread, when twice 18, when three times 19 1/3, and 2 1/2 pounds of second quality bread, the same amount of shorts and six sixteenths of bran., Common wheat never ripens evenly, and yet no corn crop is less able to stand delay as, owing to its delicacy of structure, the ears that have ripened shed their grain at once. But it is less exposed to danger in the straw than other cereals, because it always has the ear on a straight stalk and it does not hold dew to cause rust. Best emmer makes the sweetest bread; the grain itself is of closer fibre than ordinary emmer and the ear is at once larger and heavier: a peck of the grain seldom fails to make 16 pounds. In Greece it is difficult to thresh and consequently Homer speaks of it as being fed to cattle — for his word olyra means this grain; but on the other hand in Egypt it is easy to thresh and gives a good yield. Emmer has no beard, nor has common wheat, excepting the kind called Laconian. With these are also to be classed bromos and tragos, entirely foreign grains, resembling rice imported from the east. Tiphe itself also belongs to the same class — the grain from which a rice is produced in our part of the world. With the Greeks there is also zea, and according to their account that grain and tiphe degenerate and go back to wheat, if they are sown after being ground, though not at once, but two years later. |
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65. Clement of Rome, 1 Clement, 48.4-48.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 391| 48.5. ἤτω τις πιστός, ἤτω δυνατὸς γνῶσιν ἐξειπεῖν, ἤτω σοφὸς ἐν διακρίσει λόγων, ἤτω ἁγνὸς Clement tsice #3uotes this passage sith gorgo/s (energetic) instead of a(gno/s before e)n e)/rgois, but the second time he adds h)/tw a(gno/s as sell. ἐν ἔργοις. | |
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| 66. Justin, First Apology, 4.8, 7.3, 26.6-26.7, 44.9 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 52, 54, 55, 58 |
| 67. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.233 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 283 |
| 68. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 5.12.7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 336, 337 |
| 69. Tertullian, On The Soul, 57.8 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 336, 337 |
| 70. Tertullian, Prescription Against Heretics, 6.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 336, 337, 405 |
| 71. Tertullian, On The Resurrection of The Flesh, 55.12 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 336, 337 |
| 72. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 10.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 53 |
| 73. Hermas, Visions, 5.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 337, 338 |
| 74. Clement of Alexandria, Extracts From The Prophets, 25.1, 29.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 284, 343, 405 |
| 75. Clement of Alexandria, Excerpts From Theodotus, 1.3, 7.3, 13.4, 23.4-23.5, 24.1-24.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 281, 344 |
| 76. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 281 |
| 77. Justin, Second Apology, 13.2-13.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 53, 54, 55 |
| 78. Clement of Alexandria, A Discourse Concerning The Salvation of Rich Men, 15.3, 20.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 323 |
| 79. Galen, On Anatomical Procedures, 3.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 343 |
| 80. Gellius, Attic Nights, 11.5 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 404 |
81. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 2.1-2.3, 7.1, 8.1-8.4, 17.1, 35.4, 35.6, 59.1, 59.5, 62.3, 80.4, 108.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58| 2.1. Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ ὅ γέ μοι καταφαίνεται. Ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτῆμα καὶ τιμιώτατον θεῷ. ᾧ τε προσάγει καὶ συνίστησιν ἡμᾶς μόνη, καὶ ὅσιοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκότες. [fol. 51] Τί ποτε δέ ἐστι φιλοσοφία καὶ οὗ χάριν κατεπέμφθη εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς πολλοὺς λέληθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν Πλατωνικοὶ ἦσαν οὐδὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐδὲ Θεωρητικοὶ οὐδὲ Πυθαγορικοί, μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης ἐπιστήμης. 2.2. Οὗ δὲ χάριν πολύκρανος ἐγενήθη, θέλω εἰπεῖν. Συνέβη τοῖς πρώτοις ἁψαμένοις αὐτῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδόξοις γενομένοις ἀκολουθῆσαι τοὺς ἔπειτα μηδὲν ἐξετάσαντας ἀληθείας πέρι, καταπλαγέντας δὲ μόνον τὴν καρτερίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὸ ξένον τῶν λόγων ταῦτα ἀληθῆ νομίσαι ἅ παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ἕκαστος ἔμαθεν, εἶτα καὶ αὐτούς, τοῖς ἔπειτα παραδόντας τοιαῦτα ἅττα καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις προσεοικότα, τοῦτο κληθῆναι τοὔνομα, ὅπερ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. 2.3. Ἐγώ τε κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς οὕτω ποθῶν καὶ αὐτὸς συμβαλεῖν τούτων ἑνί, ἐπέδωκα ἐμαυτὸν Στωϊκῷ τινι· καὶ διατρίψας ἱκανὸν μετ᾿ αὐτοῦ χρόνον, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον ἐγίνετό μοι περὶ θεοῦ (οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠπίστατο, οὐδὲ ἀναγκαίαν ἔλεγε ταύτην εἶναι τὴν μάθησιν), τούτου μὲν ἀπηλλάγην, ἐπ᾿ ἄλλον δὲ ἦκα, Περιπατητικὸν καλούμενον, δριμ(??)ν, ὡς ᾤετο. Καί μου ἀνασχόμενος οὗτος τὰς πρώτας ἡμέρας ἠξίου με ἔπειτα μισθὸν ὁρίσαι, ὡς μὴ ἀνωφελὴς ἡ συνουσία [fol. 52] γίνοιτο ἡμῖν. Καὶ αὐτὸν ἐγὼ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κατέλιπον, μηδὲ φιλόσοφον οἰηθεὶς ὅλως. 7.1. Τίνι οὖν, φημί, ἔτι τις χρήσαιτο διδασκάλῳ (??) πόθεν ὠφεληθείη τις. εἰ μηδὲ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἀληθές ἐστιν; Ἐγένοντό τινες πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου πάντων τούτων τῶν νομιζομένων φιλοσόφων παλαιότεροι, μακάριοι καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ θεοφιλεῖς, θείῳ πνεύματι λαλήσαντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα θεσπίσαντες, ἃ δὴ νῦν γίνεται· προφήτας δὲ αὐτοὺς καλοῦσιν. Οὗτοι μόνοι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ εἶδον καὶ ἐξεῖπον ἀνθρώποις, μήτ᾿ εὐλαβηθέντες μήτε δυσωπηθέντες τινά. μὴ ἡττημένοι δόξης. ἀλλὰ μόνα ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἃ ἤκουσαν καὶ ἃ εἶδον ἁγίῳ πληρωθέντες πνεύματι. 8.1. Ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος, ἃ νυν καιρὸς οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν, ᾤχετο, κελεύσας διώκειν αὐτά· καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸν εἶδον. Ἐμοὶ δὲ παραχρῆμα πῦρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνήφθη, καὶ ἔρως εἶχέ με τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων, οἵ εἰσι Χριστοῦ φίλοι· διαλογιζόμενός τε πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ ταύτην μόνην εὕρισκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον. 8.2. Οὕτως δὴ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φιλόσοφος ἐγώ. Βουλοίμην δ᾿ ἂν καὶ πάντας ἴσον ἐμοὶ θυμὸν ποιησαμένους μὴ ἀφίστασθαι τῶν τοῦ σωτῆρος λόγων· δέος γάρ τι ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἱκανοὶ δυσωπῆσαι τοὺς ἐκτρεπομένους τῆς ὀρθῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀνάπαυσίς τε ἡδίστη γίνεται τοῖς ἐκμελετῶσιν αὐτούς. Εὗ οἰν τι καὶ σοὶ περὶ σεαυτοῦ [fol. 58] μέλει καὶ ἀντιποιῇ σωτηρίας καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ πέποιθας, ἅπερ οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ τοῦ πράγματος, πάρεστιν ἐπιγνόντι σοὶ τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τελείῳ γενομένῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν. 8.3. Ταῦτά μου, φίλτατε, εἰπόντος οἱ μετὰ τοῦ Τρύφωνος ἀνεγέλασαν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπομειδιάσας· Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σου, φησίν, ἀποδέχομαι καὶ ἄγαμαι τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ὁρμῆς, ἄμεινον δὲ ἦν φιλοσοφεῖν ἔτι σε τὴν Πλάτωνος ἢ ἄλλου του φιλοσοφίαν, ἀσκοῦντα καρτερίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, ἢ λόγοις ἐξαπατηθῆναι ψευδέσι καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἀκολουθῆσαι οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις. Μένοντι γάρ σοι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τρόπῳ καὶ ζῶντι ἀμέμπτως ἐλπὶς ὑπελείπετο ἀμείνονος μοίρας· καταλιπόντι δὲ τὸν θεὸν καὶ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἐλπίσαντι ποία ἔτι περιλείπεται σωτηρία; 8.4. Εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐμοῦ θέλεις ἀκοῦσαι, φίλον γάρ σε ἤδη νενόμικα, πρῶτον μὲν περιτεμοῦ. εἶτα φύλαξον, ὡς νενόμισται, τὸ σάββατον καὶ τὰς ἑορτὰς καὶ τὰς νουμηνίας τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένα πάντα ποίει, καὶ τότε σοι ἴσως ἔλεος ἔσται παρὰ θεοῦ. Χριστὸς δέ, εἰ καὶ γεγένηται καὶ ἔστι που, ἄγνωστός ἐστι καἰ οὐδὲ αὐτός πω ἑαυτὸν ἐπίσταται οὐδὲ ἔχει δύναμίν τινα. μέχρις ἂν ἐλθὼν Ἡλίας χρίσῃ [fol. 58] αὐτὸν καὶ φανερὸν πᾶσι ποιήσῃ· ὑμεῖς δέ, ματαίαν ἀκοὴν παραδεξάμενοι, Χριστὸν ἑαυτοῖς τινα ἀναπλάσσετε καὶ αὐτοῦ χάριν τανῦν ἀσκόπως ἀπόλλυσθε. 17.1. Οὐχ οὕτως γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἔθνη εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἀδικίαν τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἐνέχονται, ὅσον ὑμεῖς, οἳ κἀκείνοις τῆς κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἡμῶν τῶν ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνου κακῆς προλήψεως αἴτιοι ὑπάρχετε· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ σταυρῶσαι ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνον τὸν μόνον ἄμωμον [cf. LUC, I, 6, et Ps. CXVIII, 1] καὶ δίκαιον ἄνθρωπον, δι᾿ οὗ τῶν μωλώπων ἴασις γίνεται [cf. Is., LIII, 5] τοῖς δι᾿ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν πατέρα προσχωροῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ἐγνώκατε αὐτὸν ἀναστάντα ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ ἀναβάντα εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, ὡς αἱ προφητεῖαι προεμήνυον γενησόμενον, οὐ μόνον οὐ μετενοήσατε ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἐπράξατε κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄνδρας ἐκλεκτοὺς ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐκλεξάμενοι τότε ἐξεπέμψατε εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν, λέγοντας αἵρεσιν ἄθεον Χριστιανῶν πεφηνέναι, καταλέγοντάς τε ταῦτα ἅπερ καθ᾿ ἡμῶν οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες ἡμᾶς πάντες λέγουσιν· ὥστε οὐ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ἀδικίας αἴτιοι ὑπάρχετε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἁπλῶς ἀνθρώποις. 35.4. Εἰσὶν οὖν καὶ ἐγένοντο, ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, πολλοὶ οἳ ἄθεα καὶ βλάσφημα λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ἐδίδαξαν, ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ προσελθόντες [MT., XXIV, 5]· καὶ καλούμενοί εἰσιν ὑφ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς προσωνυμίας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐξ οὗπερ ἑκάστη διδαχὴ καὶ γνώμη ἤρξατο. 35.6. Καὶ Χριστιανοὺς ἑαυτοὺς λέγουσιν, ὃν τρόπον οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγράφουσι τοῖς χειροποιήτοις [fol. 85], καὶ ἀνόμοις καὶ ἀθέοις τελεταῖς κοινωνοῦσι. Καί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ μέν τινες καλούμενοι Μαρκιανοί. οἱ δὲ Οὐαλεντινιανοί, οἱ δὲ Βασιλειδιανοί, οἱ δὲ Σατορνιλιανοί, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλῳ ὀνόματι. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχηγέτου τῆς γνώμης ἕκαστος ὀνομαζόμενος, ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν νομιζόντων, ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ προεῖπον, ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ ὄνομα ἧς φιλοσοφεῖ φιλοσοφίας ἡγεῖται φέρειν. 59.1. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰπών· Ἀνάσχεσθέ μου, ἔλεγον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς βίβλου τῆς Ἐξόδου ἀποδεικνύοντος ὑμῖν, πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ ἄγγελος καὶ θεὸς καὶ κύριος καὶ ἀνὴρ [cf. Gen., XVIII, 2] καὶ ἄνθρωπος [cf. Gen., XXXII, 24], Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰακὼβ φανείς, ἐν πυρὶ φλογὸς ἐκ βάτου πέφανται καὶ·ὡμίλησε τῷ Μωσεῖ [cf. Exod., III, 2]. Κἀκείνων ἡδέως καὶ ἀκαμάτως καὶ προθύμως ἀκούειν λεγόντων, ἐπέφερον· 62.3. Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι· Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός· Ἰδοὺ Ἀδὰμ γέγονεν ὡς εἶς ἐξ ἡμῶν τοῦ γινώσκειν καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν [GEN., III, 22]. Οὐκοῦν εἰπὼν Ὡς εἶς ἐξ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀλλήλοις συνόντων, καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον δύο μεμήνυκεν. Οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἡ παρ᾿ ὑμῖν λεγομένη αἵρεσις δογματίζει φαίην ἂν ἐγὼ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ἐκείνης διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεῖξαι δύνανται ὅτι ἀγγέλοις ἔλεγεν ἢ ὅτι ἀγγέλων ποίημα ἦν τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον. 80.4. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνεβάλετε ὑμεῖς τισι λεγομένοις Χριστιανοῖς. καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλασφημεῖν τολμῶσι τὸν θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἰακώβ. οἳ καὶ λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, ἀλλὰ ἅμα τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, μὴ ὑπολάβητε αὐτοὺς Χριστιανούς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Ἰουδαίους, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐξετάσῃ, ὁμολογήσειεν εἶναι τοὺς Σαδδουκαίους ἢ τὰς ὁμοίας αἱρέσεις Γενιστῶν καὶ Μεριστῶν καὶ Γαλιλαίων καὶ Ἑλληνιανῶν καὶ Φαρισαίων καὶ Βαπτιστῶν (καὶ μὴ ἀηδῶς ἀκούσητέ μου πάντα ἃ φρονῶ λέγοντος), ἀλλὰ λεγομένους μὲν Ἰουδαίους καὶ τέκνα Ἀβραάμ, καὶ χείλεσιν ὁμολογοῦντας τὸν θεόν, ὡς αὐτὸς κέκραγεν ὁ θεός, τὴν δὲ καρδίαν πόρρω ἔχειν ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ [Is., XXIX, 13]. 108.2. καὶ οὐ μόνον οὐ μετενοήσατε, μαθόντες αὐτὸν ἀναστάντα ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἀλλ᾿, ὡς προεῖπον, ἄνδρας χειροτονήσαντες ἐκλεκτοὺς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπέμψατε [cf. MT., XXVIII, 15], κηρύσσοντας ὅτι αἵρεσίς τις ἄθεος καὶ ἄνομος ἐγήγερται ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ τινος Γαλιλαίου πλάνου ὃν σταυρωσάντων ἡμῶν, οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ κλέψαντες αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ μνήματος νυκτός, ὁπόθεν κατετέθη ἀφηλωθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ, πλανῶσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λέγοντες ἐγηγέρθαι αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν [cf. MT., XXVII, 63-64; XXVIII, 13; Éuang. de Pierre, 21, 44] καὶ εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνεληλυθέναι [cf. MC., XVI, 10, et Actes, I, 10-11] κατειπόντες δεδιδαχέναι καὶ ταῦτα ἅπερ κατὰ τῶν ὁμολογούντων Χριστὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον καὶ υἱὸν θεοῦ εἶναι παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων ἄθεα καὶ ἄνομα καὶ ἀνόσια λέγετε. | |
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82. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.11.5, 2.1, 2.1.3, 2.1.5, 2.2.1, 2.2.3-2.2.4, 2.5.4, 2.7.3, 2.7.5, 2.8.2, 2.14.5, 2.31.1, 3.24.2, 5.21.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 119, 143, 282, 283 | 1.11.5. Others still, however, have called their primary and first-begotten Ogdoad by the following names: first, Proarche; then Anennoetos; thirdly, Arrhetos; and fourthly, Aoratos. Then, from the first, Proarche, there was produced, in the first and fifth place, Arche; from Anennoetos, in the second and sixth place, Acataleptos; from Arrhetos, in the third and seventh place, Anonomastos; and from Aoratos, in the fourth and eighth place, Agennetos. This is the Pleroma of the first Ogdoad. They maintain that these powers were anterior to Bythus and Sige, that they may appear more perfect than the perfect, and more knowing than the very Gnostics To. these persons one may justly exclaim: "O ye trifling sophists!" since, even respecting Bythus himself, there are among them many and discordant opinions. For some/declare him to be without a consort, and neither male nor female, and, in fact, nothing at all; while others affirm him to be masculo-feminine, assigning to him the nature of a hermaphrodite; others, again, allot Sige to him as a spouse, that thus may be formed the first conjunction. 2.1. IT is proper, then, that I should begin with the first and most important head, that is, God the Creator, who made the heaven and the earth, and all things that are therein (whom these men blasphemously style the fruit of a defect), and to demonstrate that there is nothing either above Him or after Him; nor that, influenced by any one, but of His own free will, He created all things, since He is the only God, the only Lord, the only Creator, the only Father, alone containing all things, and Himself commanding all things into existence.,For how can there be any other Fulness, or Principle, or Power, or God, above Him, since it is matter of necessity that God, the Pleroma (Fulness) of all these, should contain all things in His immensity, and should be contained by no one? But if there is anything beyond Him, He is not then the Pleroma of all, nor does He contain all. For that which they declare to be beyond Him will be wanting to the Pleroma, or, [in other words,] to that God who is above all things. But that which is wanting, and falls in any way short, is not the Pleroma of all things. In such a case, He would have both beginning, middle, and end, with respect to those who are beyond Him. And if He has an end in regard to those things which are below, He has also a beginning with respect to those things which are above. In like manner, there is an absolute necessity that He should experience the very same thing at all other points, and should be held in, bounded, and enclosed by those existences that are outside of Him. For that being who is the end downwards, necessarily circumscribes and surrounds him who finds his end in it. And thus, according to them, the Father of all (that is, He whom they call Proon and Proarche), with their Pleroma, and the good God of Marcion, is established and enclosed in some other, and is surrounded from without by another mighty Being, who must of necessity be greater, inasmuch as that which contains is greater than that which is contained. But then that which is greater is also stronger, and in a greater degree Lord; and that which is greater, and stronger, and in a greater degree Lord--must be God.,Now, since there exists, according to them, also something else which they declare to be outside of the Pleroma, into which they further hold there descended that higher power who went astray, it is in every way necessary that the Pleroma either contains that which is beyond, yet is contained (for otherwise, it will not be beyond the Pleroma; for if there is anything beyond the Pleroma, there will be a Pleroma within this very Pleroma which they declare to be outside of the Pleroma, and the Pleroma will be contained by that which is beyond: and with the Pleroma is understood also the first God); or, again, they must be an infinite distance separated from each other--the Pleroma [I mean], and that which is beyond it. But if they maintain this, there will then be a third kind of existence, which separates by immensity the Pleroma and that which is beyond it. This third kind of existence will therefore bound and contain both the others, and will be greater both than the Pleroma, and than that which is beyond it, inasmuch as it contains both in its bosom. In this way, talk might go on for ever concerning those things which are contained, and those which contain. For if this third existence has its beginning above, and its end beneath, there is an absolute necessity that it be also bounded on the sides, either beginning or ceasing at certain other points, [where new existences begin.] These, again, and others which are above and below, will have their beginnings at certain other points, and so on ad infinitum; so that their thoughts would never rest in one God, but, in consequence of seeking after more than exists, would wander away to that which has no existence, and depart from the true God.,These remarks are, in like manner, applicable against the followers of Marcion. For his two gods will also be contained and circumscribed by an immense interval which separates them from one another. But then there is a necessity to suppose a multitude of gods separated by an immense distance from each other on every side, beginning with one another, and ending in one another. Thus, by that very process of reasoning on which they depend for teaching that there is a certain Pleroma or God above the Creator of heaven and earth, any one who chooses to employ it may maintain that there is another Pleroma above the Pleroma, above that again another, and above Bythus another ocean of Deity, while in like manner the same successions hold with respect to the sides; and thus, their doctrine flowing out into immensity, there will always be a necessity to conceive of other Pleroma, and other Bythi, so as never at any time to stop, but always to continue seeking for others besides those already mentioned. Moreover, it will be uncertain whether these which we conceive of are below, or are, in fact, themselves the things which are above; and, in like manner, will be doubtful] respecting those things which are said by them to be above, whether they are really above or below; and thus our opinions will have no fixed conclusion or certainty, but will of necessity wander forth after worlds without limits, and gods that cannot be numbered.,These things, then, being so, each deity will be contented with his own possessions, and will not be moved with any curiosity respecting the affairs of others; otherwise he would be unjust, and rapacious, and would cease to be what God is. Each creation, too, will glorify its own maker, and will be contented with him, not knowing any other; otherwise it would most justly be deemed an apostate by all the others, and would receive a richly-deserved punishment. For it must be either that there is one Being who contains all things, and formed in His own territory all those things which have been created, according to His own will; or, again, that there are numerous unlimited creators and gods, who begin from each other, and end in each other on every side; and it will then be necessary to allow that all the rest are contained from without by some one who is greater, and that they are each of them shut up within their own territory, and remain in it. No one of them all, therefore, is God. For there will be [much] wanting to every one of them, possessing [as he will do] only a very small part when compared with all the rest. The name of the Omnipotent will thus be brought to an end, and such an opinion will of necessity fall to impiety. 2.1.3. Now, since there exists, according to them, also something else which they declare to be outside of the Pleroma, into which they further hold there descended that higher power who went astray, it is in every way necessary that the Pleroma either contains that which is beyond, yet is contained (for otherwise, it will not be beyond the Pleroma; for if there is anything beyond the Pleroma, there will be a Pleroma within this very Pleroma which they declare to be outside of the Pleroma, and the Pleroma will be contained by that which is beyond: and with the Pleroma is understood also the first God); or, again, they must be an infinite distance separated from each other--the Pleroma [I mean], and that which is beyond it. But if they maintain this, there will then be a third kind of existence, which separates by immensity the Pleroma and that which is beyond it. This third kind of existence will therefore bound and contain both the others, and will be greater both than the Pleroma, and than that which is beyond it, inasmuch as it contains both in its bosom. In this way, talk might go on for ever concerning those things which are contained, and those which contain. For if this third existence has its beginning above, and its end beneath, there is an absolute necessity that it be also bounded on the sides, either beginning or ceasing at certain other points, [where new existences begin.] These, again, and others which are above and below, will have their beginnings at certain other points, and so on ad infinitum; so that their thoughts would never rest in one God, but, in consequence of seeking after more than exists, would wander away to that which has no existence, and depart from the true God. 2.2.4. This manner of speech may perhaps be plausible or persuasive to those who know not God, and who liken Him to needy human beings, and to those who cannot immediately and without assistance form anything, but require many instrumentalities to produce what they intend. But it will not be regarded as at all probable by those who know that God stands in need of nothing, and that He created and made all things by His Word, while He neither required angels to assist Him in the production of those things which are made, nor of any power greatly inferior to Himself, and ignorant of the Father, nor of any defect or ignorance, in order that he who should know Him might become man. But He Himself in Himself, after a fashion which we can neither describe nor conceive, predestinating all things, formed them as He pleased, bestowing harmony on all things, and assigning them their own place, and the beginning of their creation. In this way He conferred on spiritual things a spiritual and invisible nature, on super-celestial things a celestial, on angels an angelical, on animals an animal, on beings that swim a nature suited to the water, and on those that live on the land one fitted for the land--on all, in short, a nature suitable to the character of the life assigned them--while He formed all things that were made by His Word that never wearies. 2.5.4. It is not seemly, however, to say of Him who is God over all, since He is free and independent, that He was a slave to necessity, or that anything takes place with His permission, yet against His desire; otherwise they will make necessity greater and more kingly than God, since that which has the most power is superior to all [others]. And He ought at the very beginning to have cut off the causes of [the fancied] necessity, and not to have allowed Himself to be shut up to yielding to that necessity, by permitting anything besides that which became Him. For it would have been much better, more consistent, and more God-like, to cut off at the beginning the principle of this kind of necessity, than afterwards, as if moved by repentance, to endeavour to extirpate the results of necessity when they had reached such a development. And if the Father of all be a slave to necessity, and must yield to fate, while He unwillingly tolerates the things which are done, but is at the same time powerless to do anything in opposition to necessity and fate (like the Homeric Jupiter, who says of necessity, "I have willingly given thee, yet with unwilling mind"), then, according to this reasoning, the Bythus of whom they speak will be found to be the slave of necessity and fate. 2.14.5. Moreover, as to their saying that the Saviour was formed out of all the AEons, by every one of them depositing, so to speak, in Him his own special flower, they bring forward nothing new that may not be found in the Pandora of Hesiod. For what he says respecting her, these men insinuate concerning the Saviour, bringing Him before us as Pandoros (All-gifted), as if each of the AEons had bestowed on Him what He possessed in the greatest perfection. Again, their opinion as to the indifference of [eating of] meats and other actions, and as to their thinking that, from the nobility of their nature, they can in no degree at all contract pollution, whatever they eat or perform, they have derived it from the Cynics, since they do in fact belong to the same society as do these [philosophers]. They also strive to transfer to [the treatment of matters of] faith that hairsplitting and subtle mode of handling questions which is, in fact, a copying of Aristotle. 2.31.1. Those, then, who are of the school of Valentinus being overthrown, the whole multitude of heretics are, in fact, also subverted. For all the arguments I have advanced against their Pleroma, and with respect to those things which are beyond it, showing how the Father of all is shut up and circumscribed by that which is beyond Him (if, indeed, there be anything beyond Him), and how there is an absolute necessity [on their theory] to conceive of many Fathers, and many Pleromas, and many creations of worlds, beginning with one set and ending with another, as existing on every side; and that all [the beings referred to] continue in their own domains, and do not curiously intermeddle with others, since, indeed, no common interest nor any fellowship exists between them; and that there is no other God of all, but that that name belongs only to the Almighty;--[all these arguments, I say,] will in like manner apply against those who are of the school of Marcion, and Simon, and Meander, or whatever others there may be who, like them, cut off that creation with which we are connected from the Father. The arguments, again, which I have employed against those who maintain that the Father of all no doubt contains all things, but that the creation to which we belong was not formed by Him, but by a certain other power, or by angels having no knowledge of the Propator, who is surrounded as a centre by the immense extent of the universe, just as a stain is by the [surrounding] cloak; when I showed that it is not a probable supposition that any other being than the Father of all formed that creation to which we belong,--these same arguments will apply against the followers of Saturninus, Basilides, Carpocrates, and the rest of the Gnostics, who express similar opinions. Those statements, again, which have been made with respect to the emanations, and the Aeons, and the [supposed state of] degeneracy, and the inconstant character of their Mother, equally overthrow Basilides, and all who are falsely styled Gnostics, who do, in fact, just repeat the same views under different names, but do, to a greater extent than the former, transfer those things which lie outside of the truth to the system of their own doctrine. And the remarks I have made respecting numbers will also apply against all those who misappropriate things belonging to the truth for the support of a system of this kind. And all that has been said respecting the Creator (Demiurge) to show that he alone is God and Father of all, and whatever remarks may yet be made in the following books, I apply against the heretics at large. The more moderate and reasonable among them thou wilt convert and convince, so as to lead them no longer to blaspheme their Creator, and Maker, and Sustainer, and Lord, nor to ascribe His origin to defect and ignorance; but the fierce, and terrible, and irrational [among them] thou wilt drive far from thee, that you may no longer have to endure their idle loquaciousness. 3.24.2. Alienated thus from the truth, they do deservedly wallow in all error, tossed to and fro by it, thinking differently in regard to the same things at different times, and never attaining to a well- grounded knowledge, being more anxious to be sophists of words than disciples of the truth. For they have not been founded upon the one rock, but upon the sand, which has in itself a multitude of stones. Wherefore they also imagine many gods, and they always have the excuse of searching [after truth] (for they are blind), but never succeed in finding it. For they blaspheme the Creator, Him who is truly God, who also furnishes power to find [the truth]; imagining that they have discovered another god beyond God, or another Pleroma, or another dispensation. Wherefore also the light which is from God does not illumine them, because they have dishonoured and despised God, holding Him of small account, because, through His love and infinite benignity, He has come within reach of human knowledge (knowledge, however, not with regard to His greatness, or with regard to His essence--for that has no man measured or handled--but after this sort: that we should know that He who made, and formed, and breathed in them the breath of life, and nourishes us by means of the creation, establishing all things by His Word, and binding them together by His Wisdom--this is He who is the only true God); but they dream of a non-existent being above Him, that they may be regarded as having found out the great God, whom nobody, [they hold,] can recognise holding communication with the human race, or as directing mundane matters: that is to say, they find out the god of Epicurus, who does nothing either for himself or others; that is, he exercises no providence at all. 5.21.2. Now the Lord would not have recapitulated in Himself that ancient and primary enmity against the serpent, fulfilling the promise of the Creator (Demiurgi), and performing His command, if He had come from another Father. But as He is one and the same, who formed us at the beginning, and sent His Son at the end, the Lord did perform His command, being made of a woman, by both destroying our adversary, and perfecting man after the image and likeness of God. And for this reason He did not draw the means of confounding him from any other source than from the words of the law, and made use of the Father's commandment as a help towards the destruction and confusion of the apostate angel. Fasting forty days, like Moses and Elias, He afterwards hungered, first, in order that we may perceive that He was a real and substantial man--for it belongs to a man to suffer hunger when fasting; and secondly, that His opponent might have an opportunity of attacking Him. For as at the beginning it was by means of food that [the enemy] persuaded man, although not suffering hunger, to transgress God's commandments, so in the end he did not succeed in persuading Him that was an hungered to take that food which proceeded from God. For, when tempting Him, he said, "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." But the Lord repulsed him by the commandment of the law, saying, "It is written, Man doth not live by bread alone." As to those words '[of His enemy,] "If thou be the Son of God," [the Lord] made no remark; but by thus acknowledging His human nature He baffled His adversary, and exhausted the force of his first attack by means of His Father's word. The corruption of man, therefore, which occurred in paradise by both [of our first parents] eating, was done away with by [the Lord's] want of food in this world. But he, being thus vanquished by the law, endeavoured again to make an assault by himself quoting a commandment of the law. For, bringing Him to the highest pinnacle of the temple, he said to Him, "If thou art the Son of God, cast thyself down. For it is written, That God shall give His angels charge concerning thee, and in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest perchance thou dash thy foot against a stone;" thus concealing a falsehood under the guise of Scripture, as is done by all the heretics. For that was indeed written, [namely], "That He hath given His angels charge concerning Him;" but "east thyself down from hence" no Scripture said in reference to Him: this kind of persuasion the devil produced from himself. The Lord therefore confuted him out of the law, when He said, "It is written again, Thou shalt not tempt the LORD thy God;" pointing out by the word contained in the law that which is the duty of man, that he should not tempt God; and in regard to Himself, since He appeared in human form, [declaring] that He would not tempt the LORD his God. The pride of reason, therefore, which was in the serpent, was put to nought by the humility found in the man [Christ], and now twice was the devil conquered from Scripture, when he was detected as advising things contrary to God's commandment, and was shown to be the enemy of God by [the expression of] his thoughts. He then, having been thus signally defeated, and then, as it were, concentrating his forces, drawing up in order all his available power for falsehood, in the third place "showed Him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them," saying, as Luke relates, "All these will I give thee,--for they are delivered to me; and to whom I will, I give them,--if thou wilt fall down and worship me." The Lord then, exposing him in his true character, says, "Depart, Satan; for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve." He both revealed him by this name, and showed [at the same time] who He Himself was. For the Hebrew word "Satan" signifies an apostate. And thus, vanquishing him for the third time, He spurned him from Him finally as being conquered out of the law; and there was done away with that infringement of God's commandment which had occurred in Adam, by means of the precept of the law, which the Son of man observed, who did not transgress the commandment of God. |
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| 83. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 1.28.177, 2.8.38, 2.18.78-2.18.96, 8.7.22, 8.15.2-8.15.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 312 |
| 84. Hermas, Mandates, 11.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 337, 338 |
85. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.40, 7.32-7.33, 7.101-7.103, 7.160-7.161 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 323; Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 229 | 4.40. Once indeed, when at Athens, he stopped too long in the Piraeus, discussing themes, out of friendship for Hierocles, and for this he was censured by certain persons. He was very lavish, in short another Aristippus, and he was fond of dining well, but only with those who shared his tastes. He lived openly with Theodete and Phila, the Elean courtesans, and to those who censured him he quoted the maxims of Aristippus. He was also fond of boys and very susceptible. Hence he was accused by Ariston of Chios, the Stoic, and his followers, who called him a corrupter of youth and a shameless teacher of immorality. 7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good. 7.160. 2. ARISTONAriston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics. 7.161. Dialectical reasonings, he said, are like spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet of no use. He would not admit a plurality of virtues with Zeno, nor again with the Megarians one single virtue called by many names; but he treated virtue in accordance with the category of relative modes. Teaching this sort of philosophy, and lecturing in the Cynosarges, he acquired such influence as to be called the founder of a sect. At any rate Miltiades and Diphilus were denominated Aristoneans. He was a plausible speaker and suited the taste of the general public. Hence Timon's verse about him:One who from wily Ariston's line boasts his descent. |
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| 86. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 9.6.9, 14.5.4, 14.5.8, 14.5.12-14.5.14, 14.6.1-14.6.16, 14.7-14.15, 14.8.1-14.8.12, 14.9.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 51, 143 |
| 87. Origen, Homilies On Luke, 14.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 319 |
88. Origen, Against Celsus, 1.14, 8.53 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 51, 317 | 1.14. Celsus, being of opinion that there is to be found among many nations a general relationship of doctrine, enumerates all the nations which gave rise to such and such opinions; but for some reason, unknown to me, he casts a slight upon the Jews, not including them among the others, as having either laboured along with them, and arrived at the same conclusions, or as having entertained similar opinions on many subjects. It is proper, therefore, to ask him why he gives credence to the histories of Barbarians and Greeks respecting the antiquity of those nations of whom he speaks, but stamps the histories of this nation alone as false. For if the respective writers related the events which are found in these works in the spirit of truth, why should we distrust the prophets of the Jews alone? And if Moses and the prophets have recorded many things in their history from a desire to favour their own system, why should we not say the same of the historians of other countries? Or, when the Egyptians or their histories speak evil of the Jews, are they to be believed on that point; but the Jews, when saying the same things of the Egyptians, and declaring that they had suffered great injustice at their hands, and that on this account they had been punished by God, are to be charged with falsehood? And this applies not to the Egyptians alone, but to others; for we shall find that there was a connection between the Assyrians and the Jews, and that this is recorded in the ancient histories of the Assyrians. And so also the Jewish historians (I avoid using the word prophets, that I may not appear to prejudge the case) have related that the Assyrians were enemies of the Jews. Observe at once, then, the arbitrary procedure of this individual, who believes the histories of these nations on the ground of their being learned, and condemns others as being wholly ignorant. For listen to the statement of Celsus: There is, he says, an authoritative account from the very beginning, respecting which there is a constant agreement among all the most learned nations, and cities, and men. And yet he will not call the Jews a learned nation in the same way in which he does the Egyptians, and Assyrians, and Indians, and Persians, and Odrysians, and Samothracians, and Eleusinians. 8.53. Having said so much on this subject, let us proceed to another statement of Celsus: Since men are born united to a body, whether to suit the order of the universe, or that they may in that way suffer the punishment of sin; or because the soul is oppressed by certain passions until it is purged from these at the appointed period of time - for, according to Empedocles, all mankind must be banished from the abodes of the blessed for 30,000 periods of time - we must therefore believe that they are entrusted to certain beings as keepers of this prison-house. You will observe that Celsus, in these remarks, speaks of such weighty matters in the language of doubtful human conjecture. He adds also various opinions as to the origin of man, and shows considerable reluctance to set down any of these opinions as false. When he had once come to the conclusion neither indiscriminately to accept nor recklessly to reject the opinions held by the ancients, would it not have been in accordance with that same rule of judging, if, when he found himself not disposed to believe the doctrines taught by the Jewish prophets and by Jesus, at any rate to have held them as matters open to inquiry? And should he not have considered whether it is very probable that a people who faithfully served the Most High God, and who ofttimes encountered numberless dangers, and even death, rather than sacrifice the honour of God, and what they believed to be the revelations of His will, should have been wholly overlooked by God? Should it not rather be thought probable that people who despised the efforts of human art to represent the Divine Being, but strove rather to rise in thought to the knowledge of the Most High, should have been favoured with some revelation from Himself? Besides, he ought to have considered that the common Father and Creator of all, who sees and hears all things, and who duly esteems the intention of every man who seeks Him and desires to serve Him, will grant unto these also some of the benefits of His rule, and will give them an enlargement of that knowledge of Himself which He has once bestowed upon them. If this had been remembered by Celsus and the others who hate Moses and the Jewish prophets, and Jesus, and His faithful disciples, who endured so much for the sake of His word, they would not thus have reviled Moses, and the prophets, and Jesus, and His apostles; and they would not have singled out for their contempt the Jews beyond all the nations of the earth, and said they were worse even than the Egyptians, - a people who, either from superstition or some other form of delusion, went as far as they could in degrading the Divine Being to the level of brute beasts. And we invite inquiry, not as though we wished to lead any to doubt regarding the truths of Christianity, but in order to show that it would be better for those who in every way revile the doctrines of Christianity, at any rate to suspend their judgment, and not so rashly to state about Jesus and His apostles such things as they do not know, and as they cannot prove, either by what the Stoics call apprehensive perception, or by any other methods used by different sects of philosophers as criteria of truth. |
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| 89. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 16.70 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 284 |
| 90. Augustine, Sermons, 150.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •clement of alexandria, positive use of philosophy •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 283 |
| 91. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 6.844 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 226 |
| 92. Oribasius, History, 15.6 Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, positive invocation and use of Found in books: Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 343 |
| 93. Hierocles, Col., 11.14 von arnim Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, use of analogy and metaphor in Found in books: Nelsestuen, Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic (2015) 230 |
