1. Hesiod, Theogony, 567 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227| 567. ἐν κοΐλῳ νάρθηκι· δάκεν δέ ἑ νειόθι θυμόν, | 567. Before by vast Earth, and he trusts in these |
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2. Homer, Iliad, 5.493 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227| 5.493. ὣς φάτο Σαρπηδών, δάκε δὲ φρένας Ἕκτορι μῦθος· | 5.493. and thou shouldest beseech the captains of thy far-famed allies to hold their ground unflinchingly, and so put away from thee strong rebukings. |
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3. Aeschylus, Persians, 571, 846 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227| 846. ἄλγη, μάλιστα δʼ ἥδε συμφορὰ δάκνει, | |
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4. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 378 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 | 378. and left not one unsaid, if he was indeed to rob me of my arms. At this point, stung by the abuse, though not given to anger, he answered,— You have not gone to where we have; instead you have been absent from where you were needed. And since your tongue is so arrogant, you will never sail back to Scyros with those arms in your possession. In that way rebuked, in that way insulted, I sail for home, deprived of what is my own by that worst offspring of a wicked line, Odysseus. |
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5. Euripides, Trojan Women, 108 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227| 108. ὦ πολὺς ὄγκος συστελλόμενος | 108. Ah me! ah me! What else but tears is now my hapless lot, whose country, children, husband, all are lost? Ah! the high-blown pride of ancestors, humbled! how brought to nothing after all! |
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6. Euripides, Hercules Furens, 1417 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 | 1417. How then can you say of me, that I am abased by my troubles? Theseu |
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| 7. Plato, Republic, 4.434b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 |
8. Herodotus, Histories, 5.81, 9.49 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227| 5.81. πειρησαμένων δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίην τῶν Αἰακιδέων καὶ τρηχέως περιεφθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, αὖτις οἱ Θηβαῖοι πέμψαντες τοὺς μὲν Αἰακίδας σφι ἀπεδίδοσαν, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐδέοντο. Αἰγινῆται δὲ εὐδαιμονίῃ τε μεγάλῃ ἐπαερθέντες καὶ ἔχθρης παλαιῆς ἀναμνησθέντες ἐχούσης ἐς Ἀθηναίους, τότε Θηβαίων δεηθέντων πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον Ἀθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον· ἐπικειμένων γὰρ αὐτῶν Βοιωτοῖσι, ἐπιπλώσαντες μακρῇσι νηυσὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατὰ μὲν ἔσυραν Φάληρον κατὰ δὲ τῆς ἄλλης παραλίης πολλοὺς δήμους, ποιεῦντες δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλως Ἀθηναίους ἐσικνέοντο. | 5.81. The Thebans took the field on the strength of their alliance with that family but were soundly beaten by the Athenians. Thereupon they sent a second message to Aegina, giving back the sons of Aeacus and asking for some men instead. ,The Aeginetans, who were enjoying great prosperity and remembered their old feud with Athens, accordingly made war on the Athenians at the entreaty of the Thebans without sending a herald. ,While the Athenians were busy with the Boeotians, they descended on Attica in ships of war, and ravaged Phaleron and many other seaboard townships. By so doing they dealt the Athenians a very shrewd blow. |
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| 9. Menander, Aspis, Jan-18 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 19 |
10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.2, 4.12-4.14, 4.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 36, 161, 227| 3.2. Quodsi talis nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere eademque optima duce cursum vitae conficere possemus, haut haut V 2 aut GK 1 RV 1 haud K 2 B s erat sane quod quisquam rationem ac doctrinam rationem ac doctrinam s ratione ac doctrina X rationedẽ V 2 hac pro ac G 1 et Gr.?) requireret. requiret G 1 nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravati depravati V 1? e corr. B s depravatis X sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina semita G innata virtutum, quae si adolescere adholescere G 1 adol. sed o in r. V 1 liceret, licet in liceret corr. R c licetret G 1 ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur, ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. cum vero parentibus redditi, dein reddit idem G reddit idemr R ( et r = require al.m. ) redditidē V 1 (redditi dein V 2 sec. Str. ) redditi idem HK ( demŭ ss. 2 ) redditi demum Gr.(?)B magistris traditi sumus, tum tum ... 9 cedat Non. 416, 32 ita variis imbuimur inb. KR erroribus, ut vanitati veritas et opinioni opinio G 1 confirmatae confirmatae s Non. confirmata X natura naturae K ipsa cedat. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.67. illud iam supra supra cf. p. 368, 2 diximus, contractionem contractione X corr. V 3 s animi recte fieri numquam posse, elationem posse. aliter enim Naevianus ille gaudet Hector: Hect. profic. 15 haector GK h octor V( e2) Lae/tus sum lauda/ri me abs te, pa/ter, a laudato/ viro, aliter ille apud Trabeam: Trab. fr. 1 Le/na deleni/ta argento argento ex -tum V nu/tum observabi/t meum, Qui/d velim, quid stu/deam. adveniens di/gito impellam ia/nuam, genuam K Fo/res patebunt. de i/nproviso Chry/sis ubi me aspe/xerit, A/lacris ob via/m mihi veniet co/mplexum exopta/ns meum, Mi/hi se dedet. se dedit K sedet V quam haec pulchra putet, ipse iam dicet: Fo/rtunam ipsam antei/bo fortuni/s meis. | |
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11. Cicero, On Duties, 1.43, 2.73, 2.78, 2.84, 3.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 328| 1.43. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 2.73. In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit—sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, non esse in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem baberent. Capitalis oratio est, ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur hominess, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. 2.78. Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem temptant, ut possessores pellantur suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas debitoribus condodas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei publicae, concordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum aliis adimuntur, aliis condotur pecuniae, deinde aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere suum cuique non licet. Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque custodia. 2.84. Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam? Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat, providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti, ut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes alienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe sublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea perfecit, cum eius iam nihil interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset. 3.26. Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius existimat. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. | 1.43. Now, there are many â and especially those who are ambitious for eminence and glory â who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous if it is not at the same time just. < 2.73. The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities. < 2.78. But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money loaned should be remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the commonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another; and second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the rights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property. < 2.84. And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money? We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred, we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for the repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my consulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to force the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this plague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was never greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully; for the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was enforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still carried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal advantage to him. So great was his passion for wrongdoing that the very doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake even when there was no motive for it. < 3.26. Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for himself he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of Nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of Nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he believes that, while such a course should be avoided, the other alternatives are much worse â namely, death, poverty, pain â he is mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his property are more serious than those affecting his soul. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed. < |
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12. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29-1.30, 3.16-3.17, 3.62-3.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 28| 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 | 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. < 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. < |
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| 13. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.29-1.30, 3.16-3.17, 3.62-3.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 28 |
14. Cicero, On Laws, 1.31-1.32, 1.47 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 160, 161 | 1.47. But our steady attention to this moral law of nature is often too much disturbed by the dissention of men and the variation of opinions. We might perhaps obey this law of nature more exactly, if we attended more accurately to the evidence of our senses, which being absolutely natural, are less likely to be deceived by artificial objects. Those objects, indeed, which sometimes present to us one appearance, sometimes another, we term fictions of the senses; but it is far otherwise. For neither parent, nor nurse, nor master, nor poet, nor drama, deceive our senses; nor do popular prejudices seduce them. But our delusions are connected with corruption of our mental opinions. And this corruption is either superinduced by those causes of error I have enumerated, which, taking possession of the young and uneducated, betray them into a thousand perversities, or by that voluptuousness which is the mimic of goodness, implicated and interfused through all our senses -- the prolific mother of all human disasters. For she so corrupts us by her bewitching blandishments that we no longer perceive that things may be essentially excellent, though they have none of this deliciousness and pruriency. (Quae natura bona sunt quia, dulcedine hac et scabie carent.) |
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| 15. Mishnah, Horayot, 3.4 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 76 |
| 16. Mishnah, Kelim, 3.4 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 76 |
| 17. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 6.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 75 |
18. Mishnah, Sotah, 1.5, 3.8 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 76| 1.5. אִם אָמְרָה טְמֵאָה אָנִי, שׁוֹבֶרֶת כְּתֻבָּתָהּ וְיוֹצֵאת. וְאִם אָמְרָה טְהוֹרָה אָנִי, מַעֲלִין אוֹתָהּ לְשַׁעַר הַמִּזְרָח שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח שַׁעַר נִקָּנוֹר, שֶׁשָּׁם מַשְׁקִין אֶת הַסּוֹטוֹת, וּמְטַהֲרִין אֶת הַיּוֹלְדוֹת, וּמְטַהֲרִין אֶת הַמְּצֹרָעִים. וְכֹהֵן אוֹחֵז בִּבְגָדֶיהָ, אִם נִקְרְעוּ נִקְרָעוּ, אִם נִפְרְמוּ נִפְרָמוּ, עַד שֶׁהוּא מְגַלֶּה אֶת לִבָּהּ, וְסוֹתֵר אֶת שְׂעָרָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אִם הָיָה לִבָּהּ נָאֶה, לֹא הָיָה מְגַלֵּהוּ. וְאִם הָיָה שְׂעָרָהּ נָאֶה, לֹא הָיָה סוֹתְרוֹ: 3.8. מַה בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשָּׁה. הָאִישׁ פּוֹרֵעַ וּפוֹרֵם, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה פוֹרַעַת וּפוֹרֶמֶת. הָאִישׁ מַדִּיר אֶת בְּנוֹ בְּנָזִיר, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה מַדֶּרֶת אֶת בְּנָהּ בְּנָזִיר. הָאִישׁ מְגַלֵּחַ עַל נְזִירוּת אָבִיו, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה מְגַלַּחַת עַל נְזִירוּת אָבִיהָ. הָאִישׁ מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה מוֹכֶרֶת אֶת בִּתָּהּ. הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה מְקַדֶּשֶׁת אֶת בִּתָּהּ. הָאִישׁ נִסְקָל עָרֹם, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה נִסְקֶלֶת עֲרֻמָּה. הָאִישׁ נִתְלֶה, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה נִתְלֵית. הָאִישׁ נִמְכָּר בִּגְנֵבָתוֹ, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה נִמְכֶּרֶת בִּגְנֵבָתָהּ: | 1.5. If she said, “I am defiled to you”, she gives him a receipt for her ketubah and goes out [with a get]. But if she says, “I am pure”, they bring her up to the east gate, Nicanor’s gate, where they give women suspected of adultery the water to drink, purify women after childbirth and purify lepers. A priest seizes her clothing if they are torn, then they are torn, and if they become unstitched, then they are unstitched, until he uncovers her bosom, and he undoes [the braids of] her hair. Rabbi Judah says: if her bosom was beautiful he does not uncover it, and if her hair was beautiful he does not undo it. 3.8. What [differences are there in law] between a man and a woman?A man [who has leprosy] rends his clothes and loosens his hair, but a woman does not rend her clothes and loosen her hair. A man may vow that his son will become a nazirite, but a woman may not vow that her son will become a nazirite. A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. A man may sell his daughter, but a woman may not sell her daughter. A man may give his daughter in betrothal, but a woman may not give her daughter in betrothal. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged [after being put to death], but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for [to make restitution for] his theft, but a woman is not sold [to make restitution] for her theft. |
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19. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 113.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 | 113.23. Now do not imagine that I am the first one of our school who does not speak from rules but has his own opinion: Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus could not agree in defining the act of walking. Cleanthes held that it was spirit transmitted to the feet from the primal essence, while Chrysippus maintained that it was the primal essence in itself.[11] Why, then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not every man claim his own freedom, and laugh down all these "living things," – so numerous that the universe itself cannot contain them? |
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| 20. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1057b (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 |
| 21. Tosefta, Sotah, 1.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 76 |
| 22. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.151-7.157 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 |
23. Babylonian Talmud, Sotah, 8a (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain torment of the body Found in books: Rosen-Zvi, The Mishnaic Sotah Ritual: Temple, Gender and Midrash (2012) 76| 8a. התם קיימא דמסקינן לה ומחתינן לה כדי לייגעה דתניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר בית דין מסיעין את העדים ממקום למקום כדי שתטרף דעתן עליהן ויחזרו בהן,ששם משקין את הסוטות וכו' בשלמא סוטות דכתיב (במדבר ה, יח) והעמיד הכהן את האשה לפני ה' מצורעין נמי דכתיב (ויקרא יד, יא) והעמיד הכהן המטהר וגו' אלא יולדת מאי טעמא,אילימא משום דאתיין וקיימין אקורבנייהו דתניא אין קרבנו של אדם קרב אלא אם כן עומד על גביו אי הכי זבין וזבות נמי אה"נ ותנא חדא מינייהו נקט,ת"ר אין משקין שתי סוטות כאחת כדי שלא יהא לבה גס בחבירתה רבי יהודה אומר לא מן השם הוא זה אלא אמר קרא (במדבר ה, יג) אותה לבדה,ות"ק הכתיב אותה ת"ק ר"ש היא דדריש טעם דקרא ומה טעם קאמר מה טעם אותה לבדה כדי שלא יהא לבה גס בחבירתה,מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו רותתת,ורותתת מי משקין והא אין עושין מצות חבילות חבילות,דתנן אין משקין שתי סוטות כאחת ואין מטהרין שני מצורעין כאחת ואין רוצעין שני עבדים כאחת ואין עורפין שתי עגלות כאחת לפי שאין עושין מצות חבילות חבילות,אמר אביי ואיתימא רב כהנא לא קשיא כאן בכהן אחד כאן בשני כהנים,והכהן אוחז בבגדיה תנו רבנן (במדבר ה, יח) ופרע את ראש האשה אין לי אלא ראשה גופה מנין ת"ל האשה אם כן מה ת"ל ופרע את ראשה מלמד שהכהן סותר את שערה,ר' יהודה אומר אם היה לבה וכו' למימרא דר' יהודה חייש להרהורא ורבנן לא חיישי,והא איפכא שמעינן להו דתניא האיש מכסין אותו פרק אחד מלפניו והאשה שני פרקים אחד מלפניה ואחד מלאחריה מפני שכולה ערוה דברי רבי יהודה וחכ"א האיש נסקל ערום ואין האשה נסקלת ערומה,אמר רבה הכא טעמא מאי שמא תצא מב"ד זכאית ויתגרו בה פרחי כהונה התם הא מסתלקא וכי תימא אתי לאיגרויי באחרניית' האמר רבא גמירי דאין יצר הרע שולט אלא במה שעיניו רואות,אמר רבא דר' יהודה אדר' יהודה קשיא דרבנן אדרבנן ל"ק אלא אמר רבא דר' יהודה אדר' יהודה ל"ק כדשנין | 8a. She is already standing there in the Temple courtyard, as that is where the Sanhedrin sits. The Gemara answers: This teaches that they would bring her up and would bring her down repeatedly in order to fatigue her, with the hope that her worn-down mental state will lead to her confession. This was also done with witnesses testifying in cases of capital law, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Sanhedrin 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.,§ The mishna teaches: Because there, at the Eastern Gate, they give the sota women the bitter water to drink, and there the lepers and women who have given birth are purified. The Gemara asks: Granted, the sota women are given the bitter water to drink there, as it is written: “And the priest shall stand the woman before the Lord” (Numbers 5:18), and the Eastern Gate is directly opposite the Sanctuary, which is the area referred to as “before the Lord.” Similarly, with regard to lepers as well, this is as it is written: “And the priest that cleans him shall set the man that is to be cleansed, and those things, before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:11). But what is the reason that a woman who has given birth must also be purified there?,The Gemara suggests: If we say it is because of the requirement for the women who have given birth to come and stand over their offerings, as it is taught in a baraita: The offering of a person is brought only if he stands over it while it is being sacrificed, and that is why they stand at this gate, which is as close to the sacrifice as they are permitted to be while they are ritually impure. If that is so, then the same halakha should apply to men who experience a gonorrhea-like discharge [zavim] and women who experience a discharge of uterine blood after their menstrual period [zavot] as well. They are also ritually impure while their offerings are sacrificed. Why would the mishna then specify women who have given birth? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, and the tanna cited one of them, and the same halakha applies to all others in that category.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (1:6): Two sota women are not given to drink simultaneously, in order that the heart of each one not be emboldened by the other, as there is a concern that when one sees that the other woman is not confessing, she will maintain her innocence even if she is guilty. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is not for that reason. Rather, it is because the verse states: “And the priest shall bring her [ota] near and stand her before the Lord” (Numbers 5:16). Rabbi Yehuda explains his inference: The word “ota” indicates her alone, and therefore there is a Torah edict not to have two women drink the bitter water simultaneously.,The Gemara asks: And as for the first tanna, isn’t it written “ota”? The Gemara answers: The first tanna is actually Rabbi Shimon, who interprets the reasons of halakhot written in verses, and he is saying: What is the reason? What is the reason the Torah requires her alone, that each sota drink individually? In order that the heart of each woman not be emboldened by the other.,The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? Why should it matter if this halakha is due to a logical reasoning or due to a Torah edict? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where one of the women is trembling from fear. Since she has obviously not been emboldened by the presence of the other, Rabbi Shimon would allow her to be given to drink at the same time as the other.,The Gemara asks: And if she is trembling, can the court give her to drink at the same time as the other? But there is a general principle that one does not perform mitzvot in bundles, as one who does so appears as if the mitzvot are a burden upon him, and he is trying to finish with them as soon as possible.,As we learned in a baraita: Two sota women are not given to drink simultaneously, and two lepers are not purified simultaneously, and two slaves are not pierced simultaneously, and two heifers do not have their necks broken simultaneously, because one does not perform mitzvot in bundles. Accordingly, even Rabbi Shimon would agree that under no circumstances can a priest give two sota women to drink simultaneously. How, then, can the Gemara say that a trembling woman can be given to drink together with another sota?,Abaye said, and some say it was Rav Kahana who said: This is not difficult. Here, the second baraita, which says that it is prohibited to give two sota women to drink simultaneously because one does not perform mitzvot in bundles, is speaking with regard to one priest. There, Rabbi Shimon in the first baraita, who permits a trembling sota to be given to drink together with another sota, is speaking with regard to two priests. Since no individual priest is giving two women to drink simultaneously, mitzvot are not being performed in bundles.,§ The mishna teaches: And the priest grabs hold of her clothing and pulls them until he reveals her heart, and he unbraids her hair. The Gemara cites the source for these acts. The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the priest shall stand the woman before the Lord and uncover the woman’s head” (Numbers 5:18). From this verse I have derived only that he uncovers her head; from where do I derive that he uncovers her body? The verse states: “The woman,” rather than just stating: And uncovers her head. This indicates that the woman’s body should be uncovered as well. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states specifically: “And uncover her head”? Once it has stated that he uncovers the woman, it is already apparent that she, including her hair, is uncovered. It teaches that the priest not only uncovers her hair but also unbraids her hair.,The mishna continues by citing that Rabbi Yehuda says: If her heart was attractive he would not reveal it, and if her hair was attractive he would not unbraid it. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that it is prohibited to uncover an attractive woman, is concerned about onlookers having sexual thoughts, and the Rabbis, who permit it, are not concerned about this?,But we have heard the opposite from them, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Sanhedrin 9:6): Although a man condemned to stoning is stoned unclothed, the court covers him with one small piece of material in front of him, to obscure his genitals, and they cover a woman with two small pieces of material, one in front of her and one behind her, because all of her loins are nakedness, as her genitals are visible both from the front and from the back. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: A man is stoned while naked, but a woman is not stoned while naked, but fully clothed. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned that the onlookers seeing the woman unclothed will lead to sexual thoughts, but the Rabbis are concerned about this.,Rabba said: What is the reason here, with regard to a sota, that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned? Perhaps the sota will leave the court having been proven innocent, and the young priests in the Temple who saw her partially naked will become provoked by the sight of her. There, in the case of a woman who is stoned, she departs from this world by being stoned and there is no concern for sexual thoughts. The Gemara comments: And if you would say that the fact that she is killed is irrelevant to their sexual thoughts, as the onlookers will be provoked with regard to other women, this is not a concern. As didn’t Rava say: It is learned as a tradition that the evil inclination controls only that which a person’s eyes see.,Rava said: Is the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda difficult, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the two rulings of the Rabbis, as with regard to a sota, they are not concerned about sexual thoughts, but with regard to a woman who is stoned they are. Rather, Rava said: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we answered above. |
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24. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.17, 7.102, 7.166 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 12, 19 | 4.17. Antigonus of Carystus in his Biographies says that his father was foremost among the citizens and kept horses to compete in the chariot-race; that Polemo himself had been defendant in an action brought by his wife, who charged him with cruelty owing to the irregularities of his life; but that, from the time when he began to study philosophy, he acquired such strength of character as always to maintain the same unruffled calm of demeanour. Nay more, he never lost control of his voice. This in fact accounts for the fascination which he exercised over Crantor. Certain it is that, when a mad dog bit him in the back of his thigh, he did not even turn pale, but remained undisturbed by all the clamour which arose in the city at the news of what had happened. In the theatre too he was singularly unmoved. 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.166. He is said to have had many admirers when a boy; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he compelled Herillus to have his head shaved, which disgusted them.His books are the following:of Training.of the Passions.Concerning Opinion or Belief.The Legislator.The Obstetrician.The Challenger.The Teacher.The Reviser.The Controller.Hermes.Medea.Dialogues.Ethical Themes. |
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| 26. Plato, Book, 10.608b Tagged with subjects: •body, pain and illness of •distress, distinguished from pain of body Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 |
| 27. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 24d, 2i Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 12 |
| 28. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.11m, 2.7.10b, 2.7.9b, 2.7.9, 2.7.7b Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 227 |
| 29. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 129 Tagged with subjects: •pain, of body Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 28 |
