| 1. Tosefta, Arakhin, 3.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 37 |
2. Mishnah, Hulin, 2.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 43| 2.7. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנָכְרִי, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְשֵׁרָה. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֲפִלּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל הַנָּכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ, פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחֲשֶׁבֶת נָכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, קַל וָחֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּמֻקְדָּשִׁין, אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּחֻלִּין, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט: \n", | 2.7. "If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!", |
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3. Mishnah, Gittin, 5.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38| 5.5. "הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גֻּדְגְּדָה עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ, שֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה בְגֵט. וְעַל קְטַנָּה בַת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְכֹהֵן, שֶׁאוֹכֶלֶת בַּתְּרוּמָה, וְאִם מֵתָה, בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. וְעַל הַמָּרִישׁ הַגָּזוּל שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ בַבִּירָה, שֶׁיִּטֹּל אֶת דָּמָיו, מִפְּנֵי תַקָּנַת הַשָּׁבִים. וְעַל חַטָּאת הַגְּזוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא נוֹדְעָה לָרַבִּים, שֶׁהִיא מְכַפֶּרֶת, מִפְּנֵי תִקּוּן הַמִּזְבֵּחַ: \n", | 5.5. "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value, because of the enactment to encourage repentance. And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.", |
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4. Mishnah, Eduyot, 7.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38| 7.9. "הֵעִיד רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶן גֻּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ, שֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה בְגֵט. וְעַל קְטַנָּה בַת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְכֹהֵן, שֶׁהִיא אוֹכֶלֶת בַּתְּרוּמָה, וְאִם מֵתָה, בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. וְעַל הַמָּרִישׁ הַגָּזוּל שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ בַבִּירָה, שֶׁיִּתֵּן אֶת דָּמָיו. וְעַל הַחַטָּאת הַגְּזוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא נוֹדְעָה לָרַבִּים, שֶׁהִיא מְכַפֶּרֶת, מִפְּנֵי תִקּוּן הַמִּזְבֵּחַ: \n", | 7.9. "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value; And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.", |
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5. Mishnah, Bikkurim, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 48| 3.3. "הַקְּרוֹבִים מְבִיאִים הַתְּאֵנִים וְהָעֲנָבִים, וְהָרְחוֹקִים מְבִיאִים גְּרוֹגָרוֹת וְצִמּוּקִים. וְהַשּׁוֹר הוֹלֵךְ לִפְנֵיהֶם, וְקַרְנָיו מְצֻפּוֹת זָהָב, וַעֲטֶרֶת שֶׁל זַיִת בְּרֹאשׁוֹ. הֶחָלִיל מַכֶּה לִפְנֵיהֶם, עַד שֶׁמַּגִּיעִים קָרוֹב לִירוּשָׁלָיִם. הִגִּיעוּ קָרוֹב לִירוּשָׁלַיִם, שָׁלְחוּ לִפְנֵיהֶם, וְעִטְּרוּ אֶת בִּכּוּרֵיהֶם. הַפַּחוֹת, הַסְּגָנִים וְהַגִּזְבָּרִים יוֹצְאִים לִקְרָאתָם. לְפִי כְבוֹד הַנִּכְנָסִים הָיוּ יוֹצְאִים. וְכָל בַּעֲלֵי אֻמָּנִיּוֹת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עוֹמְדִים לִפְנֵיהֶם וְשׁוֹאֲלִין בִּשְׁלוֹמָם, אַחֵינוּ אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי, בָּאתֶם לְשָׁלוֹם: \n", | 3.3. "Those who lived near [Jerusalem] would bring fresh figs and grapes, while those who lived far away would bring dried figs and raisins. An ox would go in front of them, his horns bedecked with gold and with an olive-crown on its head. The flute would play before them until they would draw close to Jerusalem. When they drew close to Jerusalem they would send messengers in advance, and they would adorn their bikkurim. The governors and chiefs and treasurers [of the Temple] would go out to greet them, and according to the rank of the entrants they would go forth. All the skilled artisans of Jerusalem would stand up before them and greet them saying, “Our brothers, men of such and such a place, we welcome you in peace.”", |
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6. Mishnah, Arakhin, 5.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 37| 5.6. "חַיָּבֵי עֲרָכִים, מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת, אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּבֵי עוֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים, מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַצֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא א), לִרְצוֹנוֹ, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, רוֹצֶה אָנִי. וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגִטֵּי נָשִׁים, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, רוֹצֶה אָנִי: \n", | 5.6. "With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them. With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge. With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge. And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree. The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.", |
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7. Mishnah, Yoma, 8.8 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 37| 8.8. "חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם וַדַּאי מְכַפְּרִין. מִיתָה וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפְּרִין עִם הַתְּשׁוּבָה. הַתְּשׁוּבָה מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל עֲבֵרוֹת קַלּוֹת עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. וְעַל הַחֲמוּרוֹת הִיא תוֹלָה עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים וִיכַפֵּר: \n", | 8.8. "The sin-offering and the certain guilt-offering effect atonement. Death and Yom HaKippurim effect atonement together with repentance. Repentance effects atonement for light transgressions: [the transgression of] positive commandments and negative commandments. And for severer transgressions [repentance] suspends [the divine punishment], until Yom HaKippurim arrives and effects atonement.", |
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8. Mishnah, Zevahim, 2.2-2.3, 3.3-3.6, 12.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 43, 46, 48| 2.2. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לִזְרֹק דָּמוֹ בַחוּץ אוֹ מִקְצָת דָּמוֹ בַחוּץ, לְהַקְטִיר אֶת אֵמוּרָיו בַּחוּץ אוֹ מִקְצָת אֵמוּרָיו בַּחוּץ, לֶאֱכֹל בְּשָׂרוֹ בַחוּץ אוֹ כַזַּיִת מִבְּשָׂרוֹ בַחוּץ אוֹ לֶאֱכֹל כַּזַּיִת מֵעוֹר הָאַלְיָה בַחוּץ, פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָרֵת. לִזְרֹק דָּמוֹ לְמָחָר אוֹ מִקְצָת דָּמוֹ לְמָחָר, לְהַקְטִיר אֵמוּרָיו לְמָחָר אוֹ מִקְצָת אֵמוּרָיו לְמָחָר, לֶאֱכֹל בְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר אוֹ כַזַּיִת מִבְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר אוֹ כַּזַּיִת מֵעוֹר הָאַלְיָה לְמָחָר, פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת: \n", 2.3. "זֶה הַכְּלָל, כָּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמְקַבֵּל וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ וְהַזּוֹרֵק, לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל, לְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיִּקְרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ: \n", 3.3. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, פָּחוֹת מִכַּזַּיִת, כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין:", 3.4. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכֹל כַּזַּיִת מִן הָעוֹר, מִן הָרֹטֶב, מִן הַקִּיפָה, מִן הָאָלָל, מִן הָעֲצָמוֹת, מִן הַגִּידִים, מִן הַטְּלָפַיִם, מִן הַקַּרְנַיִם, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ אוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, כָּשֵׁר, וְאֵין חַיָּבִים עֲלֵיהֶם מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל וְנוֹתָר וְטָמֵא:", 3.5. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין לֶאֱכֹל שָׁלִיל אוֹ שִׁלְיָא בַחוּץ, לֹא פִגֵּל. הַמּוֹלֵק תּוֹרִין בִּפְנִים לֶאֱכֹל בֵּיצֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ, לֹא פִגֵּל. חֲלֵב הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין וּבֵיצֵי תוֹרִין, אֵין חַיָּבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל וְנוֹתָר וְטָמֵא:", 3.6. "שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לְהַנִּיחַ דָּמוֹ אוֹ אֶת אֵמוּרָיו לְמָחָר, אוֹ לְהוֹצִיאָן לַחוּץ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פוֹסֵל, וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִתְּנוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הַכֶּבֶשׁ שֶׁלֹּא כְנֶגֶד הַיְסוֹד, לִתֵּן אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַטָּה, לְמַעְלָה, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַעְלָה, לְמַטָּה, אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בִּפְנִים, בַּחוּץ, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בַּחוּץ, בִּפְנִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, לְשַׁבֵּר עַצְמוֹת הַפֶּסַח וְלֶאֱכֹל הֵימֶנּוּ נָא, לְעָרֵב דָּמוֹ בְדַם פְּסוּלִין, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת אֶלָּא חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְהַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן:", 12.1. "טְבוּל יוֹם וּמְחֻסַּר כִּפּוּרִים, אֵינָן חוֹלְקִים בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לֶאֱכֹל לָעָרֶב. אוֹנֵן, נוֹגֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מַקְרִיב, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכֹל לָעָרֶב. בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין קְבוּעִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין עוֹבְרִין, חוֹלְקִין וְאוֹכְלִין, אֲבָל לֹא מַקְרִיבִין. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בַּבָּשָׂר, אֵין לוֹ בָעוֹרוֹת. אֲפִלּוּ טָמֵא בִשְׁעַת זְרִיקַת דָּמִים וְטָהוֹר בִּשְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים, אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ז), הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב מִבְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן לוֹ תִהְיֶה שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין לְמָנָה: \n", | 2.2. "One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. [One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth.", 2.3. "This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law.", 3.3. "If one slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten, or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid; But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice]. [If he slaughters it intending] to eat what is normally eaten and to burn what is normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], [but] less than the size of an olive, it is valid. To eat half as much as an olive and to burn half as much as an olive [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid, because [intentions concerning] eating and burning do not combine.", 3.4. "One who slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat as much as an olive of the skin, or of the juice, or of the jelly, or of the hardened meat, or of the bones, or of the tendons, or of the horns, or of the hoofs, either after time or out of bounds, it is valid, and one is not liable on their account in respect of piggul, remt, or uncleanness.", 3.5. "If one slaughters sacred animals [intending] to eat the fetus or the afterbirth outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render it piggul. If one plucks off [the necks of] doves, [intending] to eat their eggs outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render [them] piggul. The milk of sacred animals or the eggs of doves one is not liable for eating them in respect of piggul, remt, or uncleanness.", 3.6. "If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies [it], But the sages declare it valid. [If he slaughtered it] with the intention of sprinkling [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar] but not against its base; or of applying below [the scarlet line] what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; [Or with the intention] that unclean [persons] should eat it, [or] that unclean [priests] should offer it; [Or] that uncircumcised [persons] should eat it, [or] that uncircumcised persons should offer it; [Or with the intention] of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices]; [In all of these cases] it is valid, because an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesah and a hatat, [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice.", 12.1. "A tebul yom and one who lacks atonement do not share in sacrifices for consumption in the evening. An onen may handle [sacrifices], but he may not offer them, and he does not receive a share for consumption in the evening. Priests with blemishes, whether permanent or passing, receive a share and may eat [of the sacrifices] but they may not offer them. Whoever is not eligible for service does not share in the flesh. And he who does not share in the flesh does not share in the hides. Even if one was unclean when the blood was sprinkled but clean when the fats were burned [on the altar], he does not share in the flesh, for it is said: “he among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the shelamim, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33).", |
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9. Tosefta, Kippurim, 4.5, 4.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38| 4.5. "מי שאחזו בולמוס מאכילין אותו הקל הקל כיצד היו לפניו טבל ושביעית מאכילין אותו שביעית טבל ונבלה מאכילין אותו נבלה [נבלה] ותרומה מאכילין אותו תרומה תרומה ושביעית מאכילין אותו שביעית עד שיאורו עיניו מניין היו יודעין שיאורו עיניו כדי שיכיר בין יפה לרע.", 4.9. "רבי ישמעאל אומר ארבעה חלוקי כפרה הן עבר על מצות עשה ועשה תשובה אין זז ממקומו עד שמוחלין לו שנאמר (ירמיהו ג׳:כ״ב) שובו בנים שובבים ארפא משובותיכם עבר על מצות לא תעשה ועשה תשובה תשובה תולה ויום הכפורים מכפר שנאמר (ויקרא ט״ז:ל׳) כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם וגו' עבר על כריתות ומיתות בית דין מזיד ועשה תשובה תשובה ויום הכפורים תולין ויסורין שבשאר ימות השנה ממרקין שנאמר (תהילים פט) ופקדתי בשבט פשעם וגו' אבל מי שנתחלל בו שם שמים מזיד ועשה תשובה אין כח בתשובה לתלות ולא [יום הכפורים] לכפר אלא תשובה ויום הכפורים מכפרין שליש ויסורין מכפרין שליש ומיתה ממרקת עם היסורין ועל זה נאמר (ישעיהו כ״ב:י״ד) אם יכופר העון הזה לכם עד תמותון מלמד שיום המיתה ממרק.", | |
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| 10. Tosefta, Menachot, 13.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
| 11. Anon., Sifra, None (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38 |
| 12. Anon., Sifre Numbers, 143 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
13. Babylonian Talmud, Yoma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38| 85b. אבל להחיות אפילו מעל מזבחי ומה זה שספק יש ממש בדבריו ספק אין ממש בדבריו ועבודה דוחה שבת קל וחומר לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת נענה רבי אלעזר ואמר ומה מילה שהיא אחד ממאתים וארבעים ושמונה איברים שבאדם דוחה את השבת קל וחומר לכל גופו שדוחה את השבת,רבי יוסי בר' יהודה אומר (שמות לא, יג) את שבתותי תשמורו יכול לכל ת"ל אך חלק רבי יונתן בן יוסף אומר (שמות לא, יד) כי קודש היא לכם היא מסורה בידכם ולא אתם מסורים בידה,ר' שמעון בן מנסיא אומר (שמות לא, טז) ושמרו בני ישראל את השבת אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל אי הואי התם הוה אמינא דידי עדיפא מדידהו (ויקרא יח, ה) וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם,אמר רבא לכולהו אית להו פירכא בר מדשמואל דלית ליה פירכא דר' ישמעאל דילמא כדרבא דאמר רבא מאי טעמא דמחתרת חזקה אין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו והאי מידע ידע דקאי לאפיה ואמר אי קאי לאפאי קטילנא ליה והתורה אמרה בא להרגך השכם להרגו ואשכחן ודאי ספק מנלן,דר' עקיבא נמי דילמא כדאביי דאמר אביי מסרינן ליה זוגא דרבנן לידע אם ממש בדבריו ואשכחן ודאי ספק מנא לן,וכולהו אשכחן ודאי ספק מנא לן ודשמואל ודאי לית ליה פירכא אמר רבינא ואיתימא רב נחמן בר יצחק טבא חדא פלפלתא חריפא ממלא צנא דקרי, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big חטאת ואשם ודאי מכפרין מיתה ויוה"כ מכפרין עם התשובה תשובה מכפרת על עבירות קלות על עשה ועל לא תעשה ועל החמורות הוא תולה עד שיבא יוה"כ ויכפר האומר אחטא ואשוב אחטא ואשוב אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה אחטא ויוה"כ מכפר אין יוה"כ מכפר עבירות שבין אדם למקום יוה"כ מכפר עבירות שבין אדם לחבירו אין יוה"כ מכפר עד שירצה את חבירו,דרש ר' אלעזר בן עזריה (ויקרא טז, ל) מכל חטאתיכם לפני ה' תטהרו עבירות שבין אדם למקום יוה"כ מכפר עבירות שבין אדם לחבירו אין יוה"כ מכפר עד שירצה את חבירו אמר רבי עקיבא אשריכם ישראל לפני מי אתם מטהרין מי מטהר אתכם אביכם שבשמים שנאמר (יחזקאל לו, כה) וזרקתי עליכם מים טהורים וטהרתם ואומר (ירמיהו יז, יג) מקוה ישראל (ה') מה מקוה מטהר את הטמאים אף הקב"ה מטהר את ישראל, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אשם ודאי אין אשם תלוי לא והא כפרה כתיבא ביה הנך מכפרי כפרה גמורה אשם תלוי אינו מכפר כפרה גמורה,אי נמי הנך אין אחר מכפר כפרתן אשם תלוי אחר מכפר כפרתן דתנן חייבי חטאות ואשמות ודאין שעבר עליהן יוה"כ חייבין אשמות תלוין פטורין,מיתה ויוה"כ מכפרין עם התשובה: עם התשובה אין בפני עצמן לא נימא דלא כרבי דתניא רבי אומר על כל עבירות שבתורה בין עשה תשובה בין לא עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר חוץ (מפורק עול) ומגלה פנים בתורה ומיפר ברית בשר שאם עשה תשובה יוה"כ מכפר ואם לא עשה תשובה אין יוה"כ מכפר,אפילו תימא רבי תשובה בעיא יוה"כ יוה"כ לא בעיא תשובה,תשובה מכפרת על עבירות קלות על עשה ועל לא תעשה השתא על לא תעשה מכפרת על עשה מיבעיא אמר רב יהודה הכי קאמר על עשה ועל לא תעשה שניתק לעשה,ועל לא תעשה גמור לא ורמינהו אלו הן קלות עשה ולא תעשה | 85b. b but to preserve a life, /b e.g., if the priest can testify to the innocence of one who is sentenced to death, one removes him b even from on top of My altar, /b even while he is sacrificing an offering. b Just as this /b priest, about whom b there is uncertainty whether there is substance to his words /b of testimony b or whether there is no substance to his words, /b is taken from the Temple service in order to save a life, b and /b Temple b service overrides Shabbat, /b so too, b i a fortiori /i , saving a life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Elazar /b ben Azarya b answered and said: Just as /b the mitzva b of circumcision, which /b rectifies only b one of the 248 limbs of the body, overrides Shabbat, /b so too, b i a fortiori /i , /b saving b one’s whole body, /b which is entirely involved in mitzvot, b overrides Shabbat. /b ,Other i tanna’im /i debated this same issue. b Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says /b that b it /b is stated: “But b keep my i Shabbatot /i ” /b (Exodus 31:13). One b might /b have thought that this applies b to everyone /b in all circumstances; therefore, b the verse states “but,” /b a term that restricts and b qualifies. /b It implies that there are circumstances where one must keep Shabbat and circumstances where one must desecrate it, i.e., to save a life. b Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says /b that b it /b is stated: b “For it is sacred to you” /b (Exodus 31:14). This implies that Shabbat b is given into your hands, and you are not given to it /b to die on account of Shabbat., b Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: /b It is stated: b “And the children of Israel shall keep Shabbat, /b to observe Shabbat” (Exodus 31:16). b The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so he will observe many i Shabbatot /i . Rav Yehuda said /b that b Shmuel said: If I would /b have been b there /b among those Sages who debated this question, b I would have said /b that b my proof is preferable to theirs, /b as it states: “You shall keep My statutes and My ordices, which a person shall do b and live by them” /b (Leviticus 18:5), b and not that he /b should b die by them. /b In all circumstances, one must take care not to die as a result of fulfilling the mitzvot., b Rava /b commented on this: b All of these /b arguments b have refutations except for /b that b of Shmuel, which has no refutation. /b The Gemara explains Rava’s claim: The proof brought b by Rabbi Yishmael /b from the thief who breaks in could b perhaps /b be refuted based on the principle b of Rava, /b as b Rava said: What is the reason /b for the i halakha /i b about /b the thief who b breaks in? /b There is b a presumption /b that while b a person /b is being robbed he b does not restrain himself with respect to his money. And this /b thief b knows that /b the homeowner b will rise to oppose him /b and b said /b to himself from the start: b If he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah states: /b If a person b comes to kill you, rise to kill him first. We found /b a source for saving a life that is in b certain /b danger, but b from where do we /b derive that even in a case where there is b uncertainty /b as to whether a life is in danger one may desecrate Shabbat? Consequently, Rabbi Yishmael’s argument is refuted.,The proof b of Rabbi Akiva /b can b also /b be refuted. He brought the case of removing a priest from altar service in order to have him testify on another’s behalf, since his testimony might acquit the accused and save him from execution. But b perhaps /b that i halakha /i is b in accordance with /b the opinion b of Abaye, as Abaye said: /b If the accused says he has a witness in his favor, b we send a pair of rabbis /b on b his /b behalf b to determine if his words /b of testimony have b substance. /b These rabbis would first check that the testimony of the priest is substantive before removing him from the altar. If so, b we /b have b found /b that one interrupts the Temple service to save a life from b certain /b danger, but b from where do we /b derive that one interrupts the Temple service when the likelihood of saving life is b uncertain? /b , b And for all /b the other arguments as well, b we /b have b found /b proofs for saving a life from b certain /b danger. But for cases of uncertainty, b from where do we /b derive this? For this reason, all the arguments are refuted. However, the proof b that Shmuel /b brought from the verse: “And live by them,” which teaches that one should not even put a life in possible danger to observe mitzvot, b there is certainly no refutation. Ravina said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak /b who said with regard to this superior proof of Shmuel: b One spicy pepper is better than a whole basket of squash, /b since its flavor is more powerful than all the others., strong MISHNA: /strong b A sin-offering, /b which atones for unwitting performance of transgressions punishable by i karet /i , and b a definite guilt-offering, /b which is brought for robbery and misuse of consecrated items, b atone /b for those sins. b Death and Yom Kippur atone /b for sins when accompanied b by repentance. Repentance /b itself b atones for minor transgressions, for /b both b positive /b mitzvot b and negative /b mitzvot. b And /b repentance places punishment b for severe /b transgressions b in abeyance until Yom Kippur comes and /b completely b atones /b for the transgression. With regard to b one who says: I will sin and /b then b I will repent, I will sin and I will repent, /b Heaven b does not provide him the opportunity to repent, /b and he will remain a sinner all his days. With regard to one who says: b I will sin and Yom Kippur /b will b atone /b for my sins, b Yom Kippur does not atone /b for his sins. Furthermore, for b transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; /b however, for b transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases /b the b other /b person.,Similarly, b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya taught /b that point from the verse: b “From all your sins you shall be cleansed before the Lord” /b (Leviticus 16:30). For b transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; /b however, for b transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases /b the b other /b person. In conclusion, b Rabbi Akiva said: How fortunate are you, Israel; before Whom are you purified, and Who purifies you? /b It is b your Father in Heaven, as it is stated: “And I will sprinkle purifying water upon you, and you shall be purified” /b (Ezekiel 36:25). b And it says: “The ritual bath of Israel is God” /b (Jeremiah 17:13). b Just as a ritual bath purifies the impure, so too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, purifies Israel. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna says that a definite guilt-offering atones for sins. The Gemara analyzes this: With regard to b a definite guilt-offering, yes, /b it does atone for sins. This implies that b an uncertain guilt-offering /b does b not. /b The Gemara asks: b But isn’t atonement written with regard to it? /b Why, then, doesn’t it atone? The Gemara answers: b Those, /b the sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings, b facilitate complete atonement, /b but b an uncertain guilt-offering does not facilitate complete atonement. /b Instead, this offering provides temporary atonement for an individual, to protect him from punishment until he becomes aware of his sin and brings the appropriate offering., b Alternatively, /b there is this distinction: b Nothing else facilitates the atonement of those /b sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings, whereas something b else does facilitate the atonement of the uncertain guilt-offering, as we learned /b in a mishna: If b Yom Kippur passed, those who are obligated to bring sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings are /b still b obligated /b to bring their offerings; however, those obligated to bring b uncertain guilt-offerings are exempt /b because Yom Kippur atoned for them.,§ It was taught in the mishna that b death and Yom Kippur atone /b for sins when accompanied b by repentance. /b The Gemara analyzes this: b With repentance, yes, /b they do atone for sins; b but by themselves, /b without repentance, b they do not. Let us say /b that the mishna is b not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b as it was taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says /b that b for all transgressions in the Torah, whether one repented or did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, /b with the b exception /b of b rejecting the yoke /b of Torah and mitzvot; and denying the Holy One, Blessed be He; b and interpreting the Torah falsely; and violating the covet of the flesh, /b i.e., circumcision. In these cases, b if one repents Yom Kippur atones /b for his sin, b and if one does not repent Yom Kippur does not atone /b for his sin.,The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof; b even /b if b you say /b that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, the mishna can be understood as follows: b Repentance /b still b requires Yom Kippur /b in order to complete the atonement, whereas b Yom Kippur does not require repentance /b but atones even without it.,§ It was taught in the mishna: b Repentance /b itself b atones for minor transgressions, for /b both b a positive /b mitzva b and for a negative /b mitzva. The Gemara is surprised at this: b Now /b that it was stated that repentance b atones for a negative /b mitzva, which is severe and warrants lashes, is it b necessary /b to also teach that it atones b for a positive /b mitzva, which is more lenient? b Rav Yehuda said: This is /b what b it said, /b i.e., the mishna should be understood as follows: Repentance atones b for a positive /b mitzva b and for a negative /b mitzva whose violation b can be rectified by a positive /b mitzva. One is not punished by a court for violating a prohibition for which the Torah prescribes a positive act as a corrective measure and which thereby has the same i halakha /i as a positive mitzva.,The Gemara asks: b But /b does repentance b not /b atone b for a full-fledged negative /b mitzva? The Gemara b raises a contradiction /b from a separate source: It was taught that b these are minor /b transgressions: b A positive /b mitzva b and a negative /b mitzva, |
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14. Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intention, of giver/owner Found in books: Balberg (2017) 38| 13a. בעומד במרדו ורבי היא דתניא רבי אומר על כל עבירות שבתורה בין עשה תשובה בין לא עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר חוץ מפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ומפר ברית בבשר שאם עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר ואם לאו אין יום הכפורים מכפר,מאי טעמא דרבי דתניא (במדבר טו, לא) כי דבר ה' בזה זה הפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ואת מצותו הפר זה המפר ברית בבשר (במדבר טו, לא) הכרת תכרת הכרת לפני יוה"כ תכרת לאחר יוה"כ,יכול אפילו עשה תשובה ת"ל (במדבר טו, לא) עונה בה לא אמרתי אלא בזמן שעונה בה,ורבנן הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא עונה בה שאם עשה תשובה ומת מיתה ממרקת,ומי מצית מוקמת לה כרבי והא מדסיפא רבי יהודה היא רישא נמי ר' יהודה היא דקתני סיפא אחד ישראל ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח ומאן אית ליה האי סברא רבי יהודה מכלל דרישא ר' יהודה,אמר רב יוסף רבי היא וסבר לה כר' יהודה,א"ל אביי דוקא קאמר מר רבי סבר לה כר' יהודה אבל רבי יהודה לא סבר לה כרבי או דלמא מדרבי סבר לה כרבי יהודה אף רבי יהודה סבר לה נמי כרבי מיהו אורחא דמילתא קתני למימר דתלמיד סבר לה כרביה,א"ל אין דוקא קאמינא רבי סבר לה כרבי יהודה אבל ר' יהודה לא סבר לה כרבי,דתניא יכול יהא יוה"כ מכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים ודין הוא הואיל וחטאת ואשם מכפרין ויום הכפורים מכפר מה חטאת ואשם אין מכפרין אלא על השבים אף יוה"כ אין מכפר אלא על השבים מה לחטאת ואשם שאין מכפרין על המזיד כשוגג תאמר ליוה"כ שמכפר על המזיד כשוגג,הואיל ומכפר על המזיד כשוגג יכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כג, כז) אך חלק,סתם סיפרא מני ר' יהודה וקאמר שבים אין לא שבים לא,ורמי סתם סיפרא אסתם סיפרא דתניא יכול לא יהא יוה"כ מכפר אא"כ התענה בו וקראו מקרא קדש ולא עשה בו מלאכה לא התענה בו ולא קראו מקרא קדש ועשה בו מלאכה מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כג, כח) יום כפורים הוא מ"מ,אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי והא רבי יהודה,רבא אמר הא והא רבי ומודה רבי בכרת דיומא דאי לא תימא הכי כרת דיום הכפורים לרבי לית ליה,אלמה לא משכחת לה כגון דעבד בליליא ומית דלא אתא יממא לכפורי ליה,אלא אימא | 13a. The mishna is referring to a case b where /b the person did not repent and b persists in his rebellion, and it is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, that even for such a case Yom Kippur and the scapegoat will atone. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: For all transgressions that are /b stated b in the Torah, whether one repented, /b or b whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, except for one who divests /b himself of the b yoke /b of Heaven, by denying God’s existence, b and one who reveals facets of the Torah /b that differ from its true meaning, b and one who nullifies /b the b covet of /b circumcision of b the flesh. For /b these, b if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What is the reasoning of Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi? It is b as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i in interpretation of the verse: “For he scorned the word of the Lord and nullified His commandment; that person will be cut off [ i hikkaret tikkaret /i ], his sin is upon him” (Numbers 15:31): b “For he scorned the word of the Lord”; this /b is referring to b one who divests /b himself b of /b the b yoke /b of Heaven b and one who reveals facets of the Torah /b that differ from its true meaning. b “And nullified His commandment”; this /b is referring to b one who nullified the covet of /b circumcision of b the flesh. /b The use of the double verb form b i hikkaret tikkaret /i /b teaches that b he will be cut off, /b i.e., he is liable to receive i karet /i , b before Yom Kippur, and he will /b still b be cut off after Yom Kippur, /b as Yom Kippur does not atone for him.,One b might /b have thought that this applies b even /b if b he repented. /b To counter this, b the verse states: “His sin is upon him,” /b by which God indicates: b I said /b that Yom Kippur does not atone for these sins b only when his sin is /b still b upon him, /b as he did not repent. It is apparent from this i baraita /i that it is only for the three sins mentioned that Yom Kippur does not atone without repentance, but Yom Kippur atones for other sins even if one did not repent., b And /b with regard to b the Rabbis /b who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, how do they interpret the verse? If someone commits one of the three sins mentioned, then b he is cut off [ i hikkaret /i ] /b from life b in this world, /b and b he will be cut off [ i tikkaret /i ] in the World-to-Come. /b The phrase b “His sin is upon him” /b teaches b that if he repented and died, /b his b death cleanses /b him of his sin.,The Gemara asks: b And can you interpret /b the mishna to be b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi? b But from /b the fact b that the latter clause is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b by inference, b the first clause is also /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b but not of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, b as the latter clause /b of the mishna b teaches: Israelites and priests and /b the b anointed priest, /b i.e., the High Priest, all equally achieve atonement from the scapegoat. b And who accepts this reasoning? Rabbi Yehuda, /b as the Gemara will demonstrate. b By inference, the first clause /b is also in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b not of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi., b Rav Yosef said: /b It is possible that the entire mishna b is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b and /b the latter clause does not pose a difficulty, because with regard to whether priests achieve atonement through the scapegoat, b he holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda. /b , b Abaye said to him: /b Does b the Master /b mean b specifically /b what b he is saying, /b i.e., that b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda /b with regard to whether the scapegoat atones for both Israelites and priest, b but Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi with regard to atonement for one who did not repent? b Or perhaps from /b the fact b that Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b it follows that b Rabbi Yehuda also holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b but /b the reason that Rav Yosef did not make this clear is that b he teaches the matter in the manner in which it /b typically occurs, which is b to say that a disciple, /b in this case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, b holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b his teacher, /b i.e., Rabbi Yehuda.,Rav Yosef b said to him: Yes, /b I mean b specifically /b what b I was saying: Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, but Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi., b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i recorded in the i Sifra /i : One b might /b have thought that b Yom Kippur would atone for those who repent and for those who do not repent, and /b this assertion b is /b supported by the following b logical inference: /b Although it would appear that b since a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone and Yom Kippur atones, /b it should follow that b just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone only for those who repent, so too, Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent, /b this comparison is flawed. One can claim: b What /b is notable b about a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? /b They are notable in b that they do not atone for intentional /b sins b like /b they do for b unwitting /b sins. b Can you say /b the same b about Yom Kippur, which does atone for intentional /b sins b as /b it does for b unwitting /b sins?,The i baraita /i continues: b Since /b it is the case that the atonement of Yom Kippur is more far-reaching in that b it atones for intentional /b sins b as /b it does for b unwitting /b sins, it follows that b it should atone /b both b for those who repent and for those who do not repent. /b To counter this, b the verse states: “Yet /b on the tenth day of this seventh month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27). The word “yet” serves to b divide /b and limit the atonement of Yom Kippur in that it atones only for those who repent.,Rav Yosef attributes the i baraita /i to Rabbi Yehuda: b Whose /b opinion is expressed by the b unattributed /b i baraitot /i in the b i Sifra /i ? Rabbi Yehuda. And he says: /b For b those who repent, yes, /b Yom Kippur atones, but for b those who do not repent, /b Yom Kippur does b not /b atone.,The Gemara asks: b But raise a contradiction, /b setting one b unattributed /b i baraita /i in the b i Sifra /i , /b i.e., the one just cited, b against /b another b unattributed /b i baraita /i in the b i Sifra /i , as /b in another i baraita /i there b it is taught: /b One b might /b have thought that b Yom Kippur would atone only if one fasted on it and declared it a holy convocation and did not perform labor on it. From where /b is it derived that even if b one did not fast on it and did not declare it a holy convocation and performed labor on it, /b that it still atones? b The verse states: /b “Yet on the tenth day of this seventh month b it is Yom Kippur” /b (Leviticus 23:27). The additional emphasis on “it is” serves to teach that the day atones b in any case. /b This i baraita /i contradicts the one cited above that states clearly that Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent., b Abaye said: /b This is b not difficult: This /b second i baraita /i is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b and that /b first i baraita /i is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda. /b , b Rava said: /b Both b this /b i baraita /i b and that /b i baraita /i are in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that Yom Kippur atones for those who do not repent, b but /b even b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b concedes /b that b with regard to /b avoiding the punishment of b i karet /i /b incurred b for /b violating b the day /b of Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur atones and one is not liable to be punished with i karet /i only if one repented for the sin of violating the day of Yom Kippur. Perforce he must concede this point, b as if you do not say so, /b then b according to Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b there would be no /b instance in which one would be liable to be punished with b i karet /i for /b violating b Yom Kippur. /b ,The Gemara questions this proof: b Why not? You /b could b find it /b in a case b where he performed /b labor b on the night /b of Yom Kippur b and died /b that night, b as /b in such a case, b the daytime /b of Yom Kippur, which is the part of Yom Kippur that effects atonement, b never came to atone for him. /b , b Rather, say /b that Rava’s proof is as follows: |
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15. Babylonian Talmud, Hulin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 46| 38b. (ויקרא כב, כז) או כשב פרט לכלאים או עז פרט לנדמה כי יולד פרט ליוצא דופן שבעת ימים פרט למחוסר זמן תחת אמו פרט ליתום,האי יתום ה"ד אילימא דילידתיה אמיה והדר מתה לעולם תיחי ותיזיל אלא דמתה והדר ילידתיה מכי יולד נפקא,אלא פשיטא זה פירש למיתה וזה פירש לחיים אי אמרת בשלמא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה היינו דאיצטריך קרא למעוטי אלא אי אמרת לא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה למה ליה מכי יולד נפקא,אמר רבא הלכתא כי הא מתניתא בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה,במה דברים אמורים ביד אבל ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה בד"א בדקה אבל בגסה בין ביד בין ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה ועוף אפילו לא רפרף אלא גפו ולא כשכש אלא זנבו הרי זה פירכוס,מאי קמ"ל כולהו תננהי בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש יד אין רגל לא דקה אין גסה לא עוף איצטריכא ליה דלא תנן:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big השוחט לעובד כוכבי' שחיטתו כשרה ור"א פוסל אמר ר"א אפילו שחטה לאכול לעובד כוכבים מחצר כבד שלה פסולה שסתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים,א"ר יוסי ק"ו הדברים ומה במקום שהמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big הני תנאי אית להו דר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי דתניא אמר ר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין,מיהו ת"ק סבר אי שמעיניה דחשיב אין אי לא לא סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים לא אמרינן ור"א סבר אע"ג דלא שמעיניה דחשיב סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים אמרינן ואתא רבי יוסי למימר אע"ג דשמעיניה דחשיב זה מחשב וזה עובד לא אמרינן,איכא דאמרי בדשמעיניה דחשיב פליגי ת"ק סבר כי אמרינן זה מחשב וזה עובד הני מילי בפנים אבל בחוץ לא חוץ מפנים | 38b. b or a sheep” /b is b to the exclusion of /b an animal born to parents of b diverse kinds, /b which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase b “or a goat” /b is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b that resembles /b another species of animal. b “When it is born”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b born by caesarean section. /b “It shall be b seven days”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b whose time has not yet /b arrived. b “Under its mother”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal that is b an orphan. /b ,Rava elaborates: b What are the circumstances /b of b this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, /b this is unreasonable. Will the mother b continue living forever? Rather, /b perhaps the reference is to a case b where /b the mother b died and then gave birth to it. /b The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice b is derived from /b the phrase: b “When it is born,” /b since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section., b Rather, /b it is b obvious /b that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point b this /b mother b withdrew for death and that /b newborn b withdrew for life. Granted, if you say /b that b we require life at the conclusion of /b the b birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude /b the orphan. b But if you say /b that b we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, /b and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, b why is /b this verse necessary to exclude it? It can b be derived from /b the phrase: b “When it is born.” /b It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.,§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. b Rava says /b that b the i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion expressed in b this i baraita /i : /b The slaughter of b a small animal that extended its foreleg /b that was bent b and did not restore it /b to the bent position b is not valid. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b In what /b case b is this statement said? /b It is b with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether /b the animal b extended it and did not restore /b it to the bent position b or /b the animal b bent it but did not extend it, /b the slaughter b is valid. In what /b case b is this statement, /b about extending the foreleg, b said? /b It is b with regard to a small /b animal. b But with regard to a large /b animal, b whether /b the convulsion involves its b foreleg or its hind leg, /b and b whether /b the animal b extended it and did not restore /b it to the bent position b or /b the animal b bent it but did not extend it, /b the slaughter b is valid. And /b with regard to b a bird, even /b if it b fluttered [ i rifref /i ] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion /b and an indication of life.,The Gemara asks: b What is /b Rava b teaching us /b in ruling in accordance with the i baraita /i ? He is teaching us b all of /b those i halakhot /i b we learned /b in the mishna: The slaughter of b a small animal that /b when being slaughtered b extended its foreleg /b that was bent b and did not restore /b it to the bent position b is not valid, as /b extending the foreleg b is only /b part of the natural course of b removal /b of the animal’s b soul /b from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of b a foreleg /b alone, b yes, /b it is not an indication of life, but movement of b a hind leg, no, /b it is an indication of life. With regard to b a small /b animal, b yes, /b this is the i halakha /i ; with regard to b a large /b animal, b no, /b this is not the i halakha /i , and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It b was necessary for /b Rava to teach the i halakha /i in the i baraita /i with regard to b a bird, as we did not learn /b it in the mishna., strong MISHNA: /strong In the case of a Jew b who slaughters /b the animal of a gentile b for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if /b the Jew b slaughtered /b the animal with the intent b to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [ i meḥatzar kaved /i ], /b its slaughter is b not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is /b to slaughter the animal b for idol worship, /b and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it., b Rabbi Yosei says: /b The b matter /b of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of b an i a fortiori /i /b inference. b If in a place where intent /b while slaughtering the animal b invalidates /b the slaughter, i.e., b in sacrificial /b animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, b everything follows only /b the intent of the priest b performing the service /b and not the intent of the owner, then b in a place where intent does not invalidate /b the slaughter, i.e., b in non-sacred /b animals, b is it not right that everything should follow only /b the intent of b the one who slaughters /b the animal?, strong GEMARA: /strong In explanation of the dispute between the first i tanna /i and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: b These i tanna’im /i hold /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, /b and not only the priest, b render /b an offering b i piggul /i /b by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship., b But the first i tanna /i holds /b that b if we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, b yes, /b his intent invalidates the slaughter, and b if /b the gentile did b not /b voice his intent before us, his intent does b not /b invalidate the slaughter, as b we do not say /b that the b unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as b we say /b the b unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say /b that b even though we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, in a case where b this /b owner b has intent /b for idol worship b and that /b other person is b performing /b the slaughter, b we do not say /b that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter., b There are /b those b who say /b an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is b with regard to /b a case b where we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship that the i tanna’im /i b disagree. The first i tanna /i holds /b that b when we say /b in a case where b this /b owner b has /b improper b intent and that /b other person is b performing /b the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, b this statement /b applies only b inside /b the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. b But /b with regard to non-sacred slaughter b outside /b the Temple, the intent of the owner does b not /b invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the i halakhot /i of non-sacred slaughter b outside /b the Temple b from /b the i halakhot /i of slaughter of sacrificial animals b inside /b the Temple, |
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16. Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim, None Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 46| 47a. מנין למתעסק בקדשים שהוא פסול שנאמר (ויקרא א, ה) ושחט את בן הבקר לפני ה' עד שתהא שחיטה לשם בן בקר,א"ל זו בידינו היא לעכב מנין א"ל (ויקרא יט, ה) לרצונכם תזבחהו לדעתכם זביחו:,שאין המחשבה הולכת אלא אחר העובד: מתני' דלא כי האי תנא דתניא א"ר אלעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין אמר רבא מ"ט דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי דאמר קרא והקריב המקריב,אמר אביי רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי ורבי אליעזר ור"ש בן אלעזר כולהו סבירא להו זה מחשבה וזה עובד הויא מחשבה רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי הא דאמרן,רבי אליעזר דתנן השוחט לעובד כוכבים שחיטתו כשרה ורבי אליעזר פוסל,ר"ש בן אלעזר דתנן כלל אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר כל שאין כשר להצניע ואין מצניעין כמוהו הוכשר לזה והצניעו ובא אחר והוציאו נתחייב זה במחשבה של זה,תרוייהו אית להו דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי השתא בחוץ אמרינן בפנים מיבעיא,רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי לית להו דתרוייהו דלמא בפנים הוא דאמרינן בחוץ לא אמרינן,ר"ש בן אלעזר אית ליה דר' אליעזר השתא בשבת אמרינן בעבודת כוכבים מיבעיא,רבי אליעזר לית ליה דרבי שמעון בן אלעזר דלמא בעבודת כוכבים הוא דאמרת כעין בפנים אבל שבת מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה:, br br big strongהדרן עלך בית שמאי /strong /big br br,מתני׳ big strongאיזהו /strong /big מקומן של זבחים קדשי קדשים שחיטתן בצפון,פר ושעיר של יום הכיפורים שחיטתן בצפון וקיבול דמן בכלי שרת בצפון ודמן טעון הזיה על בין הבדים ועל הפרוכת ועל מזבח הזהב מתנה אחת מהן מעכבת שירי הדם היה שופך על יסוד מערבי של מזבח החיצון ואם לא נתן לא עכב:,פרים הנשרפים ושעירים הנשרפים שחיטתן בצפון וקיבול דמן בכלי שרת בצפון ודמן טעון הזיה על הפרוכת ועל מזבח הזהב | 47a. b From where /b is it derived with regard b to one who acts unawares /b in the case b of consecrated /b items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, b that /b the offering b is disqualified? /b Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, b as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” /b (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly b unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, /b i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.,Shmuel b said to /b Rav Huna: b We have this /b as an established i halakha /i already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but b from where /b is it derived that this requirement is b indispensable? /b Rav Huna b said to him /b that the verse states: b “With your will you shall slaughter it” /b (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., b with your /b full b awareness you shall slaughter /b it, in the form of a purposeful action.,§ The mishna teaches: b Because the intent follows only the one performing the /b sacrificial b rite. /b The Gemara comments: b The mishna is not in accordance with /b the opinion of b this i tanna /i , as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that /b even b the owner /b of an offering b can render it i piggul /i /b through improper intention. b Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice /b his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering i piggul /i with an improper intention., b Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold /b that even in a case involving two people, where b this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is /b the b intention /b that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, /b is b that which we /b just b said, /b that the owner can render his offering i piggul /i through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.,The statement of b Rabbi Eliezer /b is b as we learned /b in a mishna ( i Ḥullin /i 38b): With regard to b one who slaughters /b an animal on behalf b of a gentile, his slaughter is valid /b and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. b But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, /b as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.,The statement of b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar /b is b as we learned /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: /b In the case of b any /b item b that is not fit to be stored, and /b therefore people do b not /b typically b store /b items b like it, /b but b it was deemed fit /b for storage b by this /b person b and he stored it, and another /b person b came and carried out /b on Shabbat the item that was stored, b that /b one who carried it out b is rendered liable by the thought of this /b one who stored it.,The Gemara notes: b These two /b Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, b accept /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. /b The Gemara explains: b Now /b that concerning matters b outside /b the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, b we say /b that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, b is /b it b necessary /b to state that the same i halakha /i applies to matters b inside /b the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?,But b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not /b necessarily b accept /b as i halakha /i the rulings of b these two /b Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: b Perhaps /b it is only concerning b inside /b the Temple b that we say /b that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning b outside /b the Temple, b we do not say /b this.,The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Eliezer: Now /b that b with regard to Shabbat we say /b that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, b is /b it b necessary /b to say that the same applies b concerning idol worship, /b where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?,But b Rabbi Eliezer does not /b necessarily b accept /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is /b only b with regard to idol worship that you say /b that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat b similar to /b service performed b inside /b the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. b But /b with regard to b Shabbat, the Torah prohibited /b only b planned, /b constructive b labor, /b i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.,, strong MISHNA: /strong b What is the location /b of the slaughtering and consumption b of offerings? /b The principle is that with regard to b offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter /b is b in the north /b of the Temple courtyard.,Specifically, with regard to b the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter /b is b in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel /b is b in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves /b of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, b and upon the Curtain /b separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, b and on the golden altar. /b Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even b one placement of their /b blood b disqualifies /b the offering. As to b the remainder of the blood, /b which is left after those sprinklings, a priest b would pour /b it b onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place /b the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does b not disqualify /b the offering.,With regard to b bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter /b is b in the north /b of the Temple courtyard, b and the collection of their blood in a service vessel /b is b in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain /b separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, b and upon the golden altar, /b |
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| 17. Anon., Sifre Zuta Numbers, 28.2 Tagged with subjects: •owner, intention of Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
