| 1. Parmenides, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy (platonic school in athens) ch. Found in books: d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 110 |
| 2. Heraclides Ponticus, Fragments, 99, 98 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 485 |
| 3. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 485 |
| 4. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 46 |
5. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.240, 3.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 266, 268| 1.240. ut vidit hominem, "suspenso" inquit "animo et occupato Crassum tibi respondisse video," deinde ipsum Crassum manu prehendit et "heus tu," inquit "quid tibi in mentem venit ita respondere?" Tum ille fidenter homo peritissimus confirmare ita se rem habere, ut respondisset, nec dubium esse posse; Galba autem adludens varie et copiose multas similitudines adferre multaque pro aequitate contra ius dicere; atque illum, cum disserendo par esse non posset— quamquam fuit Crassus in numero disertorum, sed par Galbae nullo modo—ad auctores confugisse et id, quod ipse diceret, et in P. Muci fratris sui libris et in Sex. Aeli commentariis scriptum protulisse ac tamen concessisse Galbae disputationem sibi probabilem et prope veram videri. 3.148. Tum Crassus 'pervulgatas res requiris' inquit 'et tibi non incognitas, Sulpici: quis enim de isto genere non docuit, non instituit, non scriptum etiam reliquit? Sed geram morem et ea dumtaxat, quae mihi nota sunt, breviter exponam tibi; censebo tamen ad eos, qui auctores et inventores sunt harum sane minutarum rerum, revertendum. | |
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6. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 264, 270 | 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.16. "Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine. |
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7. Cicero, On Invention, 1.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 100; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 94; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 184| 1.19. firmamentum est firmissima argu- mentatio defensoris et appositissima ad iudicationem: ut si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi sui potissimum petere debuerint. Et in ceteris quidem constitutionibus ad hunc modum iudicationes reperiuntur; in coniecturali autem constitutione, quia ratio non est—factum enim non conceditur—, non potest ex deductione rationis nasci iudicatio. quare ne- cesse est eandem esse quaestionem et iudicationem: factum est, non est factum, factumne sit? quot autem in causa constitutiones aut earum partes erunt, totidem necesse erit quaestiones, rationes, iudicationes, firma- menta reperire. Tum his omnibus in causa repertis denique sin- gulae partes totius causae considerandae sunt. nam non ut quidque dicendum primum est, ita primum animad- vertendum videtur; ideo quod illa, quae prima dicun- tur, si vehementer velis congruere et cohaerere cum causa, ex iis ducas oportet, quae post dicenda sunt. quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordidae sunt ceterae partes orationis. eae partes sex esse om- nino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, con- firmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Nunc quoniam exordium princeps debet esse, nos quoque primum in rationem exordiendi praecepta da- bimus. | |
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8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.29, 4.5, 4.51, 4.61, 5.1-5.3, 5.7-5.9, 5.13-5.14, 5.74, 5.87-5.88 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 106; Wardy and Warren (2018) 266, 268, 269, 270, 271| 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 4.5. quarum cum una sit, qua mores conformari confirmari (' emendqvisse videtur A, Man.' Mdv. ) putantur, differo eam partem, quae quasi stirps est huius quaestionis. qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox, hoc loco tantum dico, a veteribus Peripateticis Academicisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, eum locum, quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur, Graeci politiko/n, graviter et copiose esse tractatum. Quam multa illi de re publica scripserunt, quam multa de legibus! quam multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus bene dicendi reliquerunt! primum enim ipsa illa, quae subtiliter disserenda erant, polite apteque dixerunt tum definientes, tum partientes, ut vestri etiam; sed vos squalidius, illorum vides quam niteat oratio. 4.51. dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo, etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit (25 poterit, sc. non Polemo, sed qui virtute una praeditus est, caret ceteris) virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedetur, concedetur Se. concedet praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere, in quo iure possit possit iure BE gloriari, etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas. 4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes? 5.1. Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. 5.2. tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.3. Tum Quintus: Est plane, Piso, ut dicis, inquit. nam me ipsum huc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, locus lucus Valckenarius ad Callimach. p. 216 cf. Va. II p. 545 sqq. cuius incola Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis huc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine quaenam essent ipsa haec hec ipsa BE loca requirentis species quaedam commovit, iiter scilicet, sed commovit tamen. Tum Pomponius: At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, praeteribamus edd. praeteriebamus sed veteris proverbii admonitu vivorum memini, nec tamen Epicuri epicureum Non. licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis nec tamen ... anulis habent Non. p. 70 anulis anellis Non. anelis R ambus anulis V habent. habebant Non. 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.8. Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. sed a te ... Peripat. sententia Non. p. 91 est sed et enim Non. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Staseam dett. stans eam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me videtur legenduim : in me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo. 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est? 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.88. sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc ab hoc enucleate BE de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, dubium R quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ' de eadem re fecit alio modo '. hoc tu del. P. Man. nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo minimo RV omnino BE momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. | 4.5. One of these departments is the science that is held to give rules for the formation of moral character; this part, which is the foundation of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. For the present I only say that the topic of what I think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjective in Greek is politikos) was handled with authority and fullness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, who agreed in substance though they differed in terminology."What a vast amount they have written on politics and on jurisprudence! how many precepts of oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how many examples in their discourses! In the first place, even the topics that required close reasoning they handled in a neat and polished manner, employing now definition, now division; as indeed your school does also, but your style is rather out-atâelbows, while theirs is noticeably elegant. 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." 5.3. "Perfectly true, Piso," rejoined Quintus. "I myself on the way here just now noticed yonder village of Colonus, and it brought to my imagination Sophocles who resided there, and who is as you know my great admiration and delight. Indeed my memory took me further back; for I had a vision of Oedipus, advancing towards this very spot and asking in those most tender verses, 'What place is this?' â a mere fancy no doubt, yet still it affected me strongly." "For my part," said Pomponius, "you are fond of attacking me as a devotee of Epicurus, and I do spend much of my time with Phaedrus, who as you know is my dearest friend, in Epicurus's Gardens which we passed just now; but I obey the old saw: I 'think of those that are alive.' Still I could not forget Epicurus, even if I wanted; the members of our body not only have pictures of him, but even have his likeness on their drinking-cups and rings." 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.8. "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." 5.87. On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.88. But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. |
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9. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.29, 4.5, 4.51, 4.61, 5.9, 5.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 266, 268, 269, 270, 271 | 4.5. One of these departments is the science that is held to give rules for the formation of moral character; this part, which is the foundation of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. For the present I only say that the topic of what I think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjective in Greek is politikos) was handled with authority and fullness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, who agreed in substance though they differed in terminology."What a vast amount they have written on politics and on jurisprudence! how many precepts of oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how many examples in their discourses! In the first place, even the topics that required close reasoning they handled in a neat and polished manner, employing now definition, now division; as indeed your school does also, but your style is rather out-atâelbows, while theirs is noticeably elegant. 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. |
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10. Cicero, Academica, 1.17, 1.19, 1.34-1.35, 2.60 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 264, 268, 269, 270, 271| 1.17. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta constituta *g est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duo duos p 2 p 1 p 2 rg 2 f c autem praestantissimo praestatnissimos mn studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia quia *g*p qui wn Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter dubitanter Bai. -tantem *g -tationem *d (tionem in ras. p ) de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem consuetudine mn ; adh. cons. in. ras. p disserendi reliquerunt. ita facta est, est disserendi *d (diss. in ras. p ) quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 1.19. VA. Pergamus igitur inquit, inquit om. *gx 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio rat. phil. p 1 triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum uerum et *d quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve prauumue accedit s quid consentiens consentiens sit Goer. quid repugnet repugnat s -ans s -ans esset Mue. iudicando. Ac primum primam *d illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum summum illud psmn bonum quo omnia referrentur, referrentur *d*g -ere- *g constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura omn. e nat. Om. *g et animo anima *g et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem; 1.34. Nam Strato eius auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in in om. mgf moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo Polemon *g et Crates unaque Crantor Cranto p 2 wg 2 Cratero g 1 Crator *g*d in Academia congregati diligenter ea eis px quae a superioribus acceperant tuebantur. utebantur *d Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Archesilaus x 1.35. sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam Archesilaum p 1 w anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.” Mihi vero inquam videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. VA. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos neruis p virtutis inciderit, incideret s Lb. -rent n sed contra qui omnia quae que om. s quaecumque Reid ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. | |
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| 11. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 88 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95 |
| 12. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 19, 33, 43, 18 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91, 94 |
13. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 283 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: O, Brien (2015) 64 | 283. These then are the things of the body; but the intellectual and heavenly race of the soul will ascend to the purest aether as to its father. For the fifth essence, as the account of the ancients tells us, may be a certain one, which brings things round in a cycle, differing from the other four as being superior to them, from which the stars and the whole heavens appear to be generated, and of which, as a natural consequence, one must lay it down that the human soul is a fragment. LVIII. |
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| 14. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95 |
| 15. Plutarch, On The Birth of The Spirit In Timaeus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •monad, in the old academy Found in books: O, Brien (2015) 27 |
| 16. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 106 |
| 17. Plutarch, Table Talk, 3.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 106 |
18. New Testament, John, 3.15-3.16, 3.36, 4.10-4.14, 4.36, 5.21, 5.24, 5.26, 5.39, 6.27, 6.40, 6.47, 6.51, 6.54, 6.58, 6.68, 7.38-7.39, 10.28, 12.25, 12.50, 17.2-17.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 396| 3.15. ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 3.16. Οὕτως γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται ἀλλὰ ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 3.36. ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον· ὁ δὲ ἀπειθῶν τῷ υἱῷ οὐκ ὄψεται ζωήν, ἀλλʼ ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μένει ἐπʼ αὐτόν. 4.10. ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῇ Εἰ ᾔδεις τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ λέγων σοι Δός μοι πεῖν, σὺ ἂν ᾔτησας αὐτὸν καὶ ἔδωκεν ἄν σοι ὕδωρ ζῶν. 4.11. λέγει αὐτῷ Κύριε, οὔτε ἄντλημα ἔχεις καὶ τὸ φρέαρ ἐστὶν βαθύ· πόθεν οὖν ἔχεις τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ζῶν; 4.12. μὴ σὺ μείζων εἶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ, ὃς ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὸ φρέαρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔπιεν καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θρέμματα αὐτοῦ; 4.13. ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῇ Πᾶς ὁ πίνων ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος τούτου διψήσει πάλιν· 4.14. ὃς δʼ ἂν πίῃ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος οὗ ἐγὼ δώσω αὐτῷ, οὐ μὴ διψήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὕδωρ ὃ δώσω αὐτῷ γενήσεται ἐν αὐτῷ πηγὴ ὕδατος ἁλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 4.36. ἤδη ὁ θερίζων μισθὸν λαμβάνει καὶ συνάγει καρπὸν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἵνα ὁ σπείρων ὁμοῦ χαίρῃ καὶ ὁ θερίζων. 5.21. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγείρει τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ υἱὸς οὓς θέλει ζωοποιεῖ. 5.24. Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ὁ τὸν λόγον μου ἀκούων καὶ πιστεύων τῷ πέμψαντί με ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν. 5.26. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ· 5.39. ἐραυνᾶτε τὰς γραφάς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε ἐν αὐταῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχειν· καὶ ἐκεῖναί εἰσιν αἱ μαρτυροῦσαι περὶ ἐμοῦ· 6.27. ἐργάζεσθε μὴ τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν ἀπολλυμένην ἀλλὰ τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν μένουσαν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἣν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑμῖν δώσει, τοῦτον γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐσφράγισεν ὁ θεός. 6.40. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου ἵνα πᾶς ὁ θεωρῶν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐγὼ τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. 6.47. ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ πιστεύων ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 6.51. ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς· ἐάν τις φάγῃ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἄρτου ζήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ ὁ ἄρτος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω ἡ σάρξ μου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς. 6.54. ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ πίνων μου τὸ αἷμα ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον, κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ· 6.58. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, οὐ καθὼς ἔφαγον οἱ πατέρες καὶ ἀπέθανον· ὁ τρώγων τοῦτον τὸν ἄρτον ζήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. 6.68. ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ Σίμων Πέτρος Κύριε, πρὸς τίνα ἀπελευσόμεθα; ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἔχεις, 7.38. ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, καθὼς εἶπεν ἡ γραφή, ποταμοὶ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ ῥεύσουσιν ὕδατος ζῶντος. 7.39. Τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος οὗ ἔμελλον λαμβάνειν οἱ πιστεύσαντες εἰς αὐτόν· οὔπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὔπω ἐδοξάσθη. 10.28. κἀγὼ δίδωμι αὐτοῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀπόλωνται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ οὐχ ἁρπάσει τις αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς χειρός μου. 12.25. ὁ φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολλύει αὐτήν, καὶ ὁ μισῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον φυλάξει αὐτήν. 12.50. καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιός ἐστιν. ἃ οὖν ἐγὼ λαλῶ, καθὼς εἴρηκέν μοι ὁ πατήρ, οὕτως λαλῶ. 17.2. δόξασόν σου τὸν υἱόν, ἵνα ὁ υἱὸς δοξάσῃ σέ, καθὼς ἔδωκας αὐτῷ ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκός, ἵνα πᾶν ὃ δέδωκας αὐτῷ δώσει αὐτοῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 17.3. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ ἵνα γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεὸν καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν. | 3.15. that whoever believes in him should not perish, but have eternal life. 3.16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish, but have eternal life. 3.36. One who believes in the Son has eternal life, but one who disobeys the Son won't see life, but the wrath of God remains on him." 4.10. Jesus answered her, "If you knew the gift of God, and who it is who says to you, 'Give me a drink,' you would have asked him, and he would have given you living water." 4.11. The woman said to him, "Sir, you have nothing to draw with, and the well is deep. From where then have you that living water? 4.12. Are you greater than our father, Jacob, who gave us the well, and drank of it himself, as did his sons, and his cattle?" 4.13. Jesus answered her, "Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again, 4.14. but whoever drinks of the water that I will give him will never thirst again; but the water that I will give him will become in him a well of water springing up to eternal life." 4.36. He who reaps receives wages, and gathers fruit to eternal life; that both he who sows and he who reaps may rejoice together. 5.21. For as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, even so the Son also gives life to whom he desires. 5.24. "Most assuredly I tell you, he who hears my word, and believes him who sent me, has eternal life, and doesn't come into judgment, but has passed out of death into life. 5.26. For as the Father has life in himself, even so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. 5.39. "You search the Scriptures, because you think that in them you have eternal life; and these are they which testify about me. 6.27. Don't work for the food which perishes, but for the food which remains to eternal life, which the Son of Man will give to you. For God the Father has sealed him." 6.40. This is the will of the one who sent me, that everyone who sees the Son, and believes in him, should have eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day." 6.47. Most assuredly, I tell you, he who believes in me has eternal life. 6.51. I am the living bread which came down out of heaven. If anyone eats of this bread, he will live forever. Yes, the bread which I will give for the life of the world is my flesh." 6.54. He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. 6.58. This is the bread which came down out of heaven -- not as our fathers ate the manna, and died. He who eats this bread will live forever." 6.68. Simon Peter answered him, "Lord, to whom would we go? You have the words of eternal life. 7.38. He who believes in me, as the Scripture has said, from within him will flow rivers of living water." 7.39. But he said this about the Spirit, which those believing in him were to receive. For the Holy Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus wasn't yet glorified. 10.28. I give eternal life to them. They will never perish, and no one will snatch them out of my hand. 12.25. He who loves his life will lose it. He who hates his life in this world will keep it to eternal life. 12.50. I know that his commandment is eternal life. The things therefore which I speak, even as the Father has said to me, so I speak." 17.2. even as you gave him authority over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom you have given him. 17.3. This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true God, and him whom you sent, Jesus Christ. |
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19. New Testament, Apocalypse, 7.17, 21.6, 22.1, 22.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 396| 7.17. ἥλιος οὐδὲ πᾶνκαῦμα,ὅτι τὸ ἀρνίον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ θρόνουποιμανεῖ αὐτούς, καὶ ὁδηγήσει αὐτοὺςἐπὶζωῆς πηγὰς ὑδάτων· καὶ ἐξαλείψει ὁ θεὸς πᾶν δάκρυον ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶναὐτῶν. 21.6. καὶ εἶπέν μοι Γέγοναν. ἐγὼ τὸ Ἄλφα καὶ τὸ Ὦ, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἐγὼτῷ διψῶντιδώσω ἐκ τῆς πηγῆςτοῦ ὕδατος τῆς ζωῆς δωρεάν. 22.1. καὶ ἔδειξέν μοιποταμὸν ὕδατος ζωῆςλαμπρὸν ὡς κρύσταλλον,ἐκπορευό- μενονἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀρνίου 22.17. Καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ νύμφη λέγουσιν Ἔρχου· καὶ ὁ ἀκούων εἰπάτω Ἔρχου· καὶὁ διψῶν ἐρχέσθω,ὁ θέλων λαβέτωὕδωρ ζωῆς δωρεάν. | 7.17. for the Lamb who is in the midst of the throne shepherds them, and leads them to living springs of waters. God will wipe away every tear from their eyes." 21.6. He said to me, "It is done! I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End. I will give freely to him who is thirsty from the spring of the water of life. 22.1. He showed me a river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb, 22.17. The Spirit and the bride say, "Come!" He who hears, let him say, "Come!" He who is thirsty, let him come. He who desires, let him take the water of life freely. |
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20. New Testament, 1 John, 2.25, 3.15, 5.11, 5.13, 5.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 396| 2.25. καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία ἣν αὐτὸς ἐπηγγείλατο ἡμῖν, τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον. 3.15. πᾶς ὁ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστίν, καὶ οἴδατε ὅτι πᾶς ἀνθρωποκτόνος οὐκ ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἐν αὐτῷ μένουσαν. 5.11. καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία, ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν. 5.13. Ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ. 5.20. οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἥκει, καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν ἵνα γινώσκομεν τὸν ἀληθινόν· καί ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. | 2.25. This is the promise which he promised us, the eternal life. 3.15. Whoever hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life remaining in him. 5.11. The testimony is this, that God gave to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. 5.13. These things I have written to you who believe in the name of the Son of God, that you may know that you have eternal life, and that you may continue to believe in the name of the Son of God. 5.20. We know that the Son of God has come, and has given us an understanding, that we know him who is true, and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life. |
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| 21. Albinus, Introduction To Plato, '6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 800 |
| 22. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 91 |
| 23. Atticus, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 561 |
| 24. Nag Hammadi, The Apocryphon of John, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 396 |
| 25. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 6.159.43-6.159.44 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 561 |
| 26. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.19 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95 |
| 27. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.16, 7.141-7.144 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 269 |
28. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.56-3.61, 3.65-3.66, 7.2, 7.16, 7.25, 7.39-7.41 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old •old academy •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 46, 91; Wardy and Warren (2018) 246, 270 | 3.56. But, just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, Thespis devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was completed, so too with philosophy: in early times it discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection. Thrasylus says that he published his dialogues in tetralogies, like those of the tragic poets. Thus they contended with four plays at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea and the festival of Chytri. of the four plays the last was a satiric drama; and the four together were called a tetralogy. 3.57. Now, says Thrasylus, the genuine dialogues are fifty-six in all, if the Republic be divided into ten and the Laws into twelve. Favorinus, however, in the second book of his Miscellaneous History declares that nearly the whole of the Republic is to be found in a work of Protagoras entitled Controversies. This gives nine tetralogies, if the Republic takes the place of one single work and the Laws of another. His first tetralogy has a common plan underlying it, for he wishes to describe what the life of the philosopher will be. To each of the works Thrasylus affixes a double title, the one taken from the name of the interlocutor, the other from the subject. 3.58. This tetralogy, then, which is the first, begins with the Euthyphro or On Holiness, a tentative dialogue; the Apology of Socrates, an ethical dialogue, comes second; the third is Crito or On what is to be done, ethical; the fourth Phaedo or On the Soul, also ethical. The second tetralogy begins with Cratylus or On Correctness of Names, a logical dialogue, which is followed by Theaetetus or On Knowledge, tentative, the Sophist or On Being, a logical dialogue, the Statesman or On Monarchy, also logical. The third tetralogy includes, first, Parmenides or On Ideas, which is logical, next Philebus or On Pleasure, an ethical dialogue, the Banquet or On the Good, ethical, Phaedrus or On Love, also ethical. 3.59. The fourth tetralogy starts with Alcibiades or On the Nature of Man, an obstetric dialogue; this is followed by the second Alcibiades or On Prayer, also obstetric; then comes Hipparchus or The Lover of Gain, which is ethical, and The Rivals or On Philosophy, also ethical. The fifth tetralogy includes, first, Theages or On Philosophy, an obstetric dialogue, then Charmides or On Temperance, which is tentative, Laches or On Courage, obstetric, and Lysis or On Friendship, also obstetric. The sixth tetralogy starts with Euthydemus or The Eristic, a refutative dialogue, which is followed by Protagoras or Sophists, critical, Gorgias or On Rhetoric, refutative, and Meno or On Virtue, which is tentative. 3.60. The seventh tetralogy contains, first, two dialogues entitled Hippias, the former On Beauty, the latter On Falsehood, both refutative; next Ion or On the Iliad, which is tentative, and Menexenus or The Funeral Oration, which is ethical. The eighth tetralogy starts with Clitophon or Introduction, which is ethical, and is followed by the Republic or On Justice, political, Timaeus or On Nature, a physical treatise, and Critias or Story of Atlantis, which is ethical. The ninth tetralogy starts with Minos or On Law, a political dialogue, which is followed by the Laws or On Legislation, also political, Epinomis or Nocturnal Council, or Philosopher, political, 3.61. and lastly the Epistles, thirteen in number, which are ethical. In these epistles his heading was Welfare, as that of Epicurus was A Good Life, and that of Cleon All Joy. They comprise: one to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermias, Erastus and Coriscus, one each to Leodamas, Dion and Perdiccas, and two to Dion's friends. This is the division adopted by Thrasylus and some others.Some, including Aristophanes the grammarian, arrange the dialogues arbitrarily in trilogies. 3.65. The right interpretation of his dialogues includes three things: first, the meaning of every statement must be explained; next, its purpose, whether it is made for a primary reason or by way of illustration, and whether to establish his own doctrines or to refute his interlocutor; in the third place it remains to examine its truth.And since certain critical marks are affixed to his works let us now say a word about these. The cross × is taken to indicate peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any idiom of Platonic usage; the diple ( ) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato; 3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them. 7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty. 7.16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countece. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off. 7.25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up. A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as The Reaper, and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod's lines thus:He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself. 7.39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. |
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| 29. Plotinus, Enneads, a b c d\n0 5.8[31]1 5.8[31]1 5 8[31]1\n1 3.9 3.9 3 9 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 184 |
| 30. Philoponus John, Philoponi (Olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 1.5.15-1.5.20 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17 |
| 31. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.138.17-2.138.23, 2.152.6-2.152.26, 2.154.10-2.154.12, 2.193.13-2.193.14 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 130 |
| 33. Strabo, Geography, 1.15 Tagged with subjects: •old academy Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 246 |
| 34. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, None (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17; Wardy and Warren (2018) 269 |
| 35. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.42 Tagged with subjects: •academy, old (i.e., antiochus’) Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 95 |
| 36. Nicolaus Damascenus, De Philosophia Aristotelis, 4.1 Tagged with subjects: •academy, old Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17 |
