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69 results for "moralism"

1. Plato, Republic, 412d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 116

2. Herodotus, Histories, 1.30.3, 1.33, 1.86-1.87, 1.86.6, 6.58.3 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) •ambiguity, moral, in the endings of lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 19, 20, 107

1.33. ταῦτα λέγων τῷ Κροίσῳ οὔ κως οὔτε ἐχαρίζετο, οὔτε λόγου μιν ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται, κάρτα δόξας ἀμαθέα εἶναι, ὃς τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεὶς τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε. 1.86. οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι τάς τε δὴ Σάρδις ἔσχον καὶ αὐτὸν Κροῖσον ἐζώγρησαν, ἄρξαντα ἔτεα τεσσερεσκαίδεκα καὶ τεσσερεσκαίδεκα ἡμέρας πολιορκηθέντα, κατὰ τὸ χρηστήριόν τε καταπαύσαντα τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μεγάλην ἀρχήν. λαβόντες δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ Πέρσαι ἤγαγον παρὰ Κῦρον. ὁ δὲ συννήσας πυρὴν μεγάλην ἀνεβίβασε ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὸν Κροῖσόν τε ἐν πέδῃσι δεδεμένον καὶ δὶς ἑπτὰ Λυδῶν παρʼ αὐτὸν παῖδας, ἐν νόῳ ἔχων εἴτε δὴ ἀκροθίνια ταῦτα καταγιεῖν θεῶν ὅτεῳ δή, εἴτε καὶ εὐχὴν ἐπιτελέσαι θέλων, εἴτε καὶ πυθόμενος τὸν Κροῖσον εἶναι θεοσεβέα τοῦδε εἵνεκεν ἀνεβίβασε ἐπὶ τὴν πυρήν, βουλόμενος εἰδέναι εἴ τίς μιν δαιμόνων ῥύσεται τοῦ μὴ ζῶντα κατακαυθῆναι. τὸν μὲν δὴ ποιέειν ταῦτα· τῷ δὲ Κροίσῳ ἑστεῶτι ἐπὶ τῆς πυρῆς ἐσελθεῖν, καίπερ ἐν κακῷ ἐόντι τοσούτῳ, τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος ὥς οἱ εἴη σὺν θεῷ εἰρημένον, τὸ μηδένα εἶναι τῶν ζωόντων ὄλβιον. ὡς δὲ ἄρα μιν προσστῆναι τοῦτο, ἀνενεικάμενόν τε καὶ ἀναστενάξαντα ἐκ πολλῆς ἡσυχίης ἐς τρὶς ὀνομάσαι “Σόλων.” καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀκούσαντα κελεῦσαι τοὺς ἑρμηνέας ἐπειρέσθαι τὸν Κροῖσον τίνα τοῦτον ἐπικαλέοιτο, καὶ τοὺς προσελθόντας ἐπειρωτᾶν· Κροῖσον δὲ τέως μὲν σιγὴν ἔχειν εἰρωτώμενον, μετὰ δὲ ὡς ἠναγκάζετο, εἰπεῖν “τὸν ἂν ἐγὼ πᾶσι τυράννοισι προετίμησα μεγάλων χρημάτων ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν.” ὡς δέ σφι ἄσημα ἔφραζε, πάλιν ἐπειρώτων τὰ λεγόμενα. λιπαρεόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄχλον παρεχόντων, ἔλεγε δὴ ὡς ἦλθε ἀρχὴν ὁ Σόλων ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος, καὶ θεησάμενος πάντα τὸν ἑωυτοῦ ὄλβον ἀποφλαυρίσειε οἷα δὴ εἶπας, ὥς τε αὐτῷ πάντα ἀποβεβήκοι τῇ περ ἐκεῖνος εἶπε, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν λέγων ἢ οὐκ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι ὀλβίους δοκέοντας εἶναι. τὸν μὲν Κροῖσον ταῦτα ἀπηγέεσθαι, τῆς δὲ πυρῆς ἤδη ἁμμένης καίεσθαι τὰ περιέσχατα. καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀκούσαντα τῶν ἑρμηνέων τὰ Κροῖσος εἶπε, μεταγνόντα τε καὶ ἐννώσαντα ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον, γενόμενον ἑωυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐλάσσω, ζῶντα πυρὶ διδοίη, πρός τε τούτοισι δείσαντα τὴν τίσιν καὶ ἐπιλεξάμενον ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ἀσφαλέως ἔχον, κελεύειν σβεννύναι τὴν ταχίστην τὸ καιόμενον πῦρ 1 καὶ καταβιβάζειν Κροῖσόν τε καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κροίσου. καὶ τοὺς πειρωμένους οὐ δύνασθαι ἔτι τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι. 1.87. ἐνθαῦτα λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν Κροῖσον μαθόντα τὴν Κύρου μετάγνωσιν, ὡς ὥρα πάντα μὲν ἄνδρα σβεννύντα τὸ πῦρ, δυναμένους δὲ οὐκέτι καταλαβεῖν, ἐπιβώσασθαι τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἐπικαλεόμενον, εἴ τί οἱ κεχαρισμένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐδωρήθη, παραστῆναι καὶ ῥύσασθαι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ παρεόντος κακοῦ. τὸν μὲν δακρύοντα ἐπικαλέεσθαι τὸν θεόν, ἐκ δὲ αἰθρίης τε καὶ νηνεμίης συνδραμεῖν ἐξαπίνης νέφεα καὶ χειμῶνά τε καταρραγῆναι καὶ ὗσαι ὕδατι λαβροτάτῳ, κατασβεσθῆναί τε τὴν πυρήν. οὕτω δὴ μαθόντα τὸν Κῦρον ὡς εἴη ὁ Κροῖσος καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, καταβιβάσαντα αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πυρῆς εἰρέσθαι τάδε. “Κροῖσε, τίς σε ἀνθρώπων ἀνέγνωσε ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν ἐμὴν στρατευσάμενον πολέμιον ἀντὶ φίλου ἐμοὶ καταστῆναι;” ὁ δὲ εἶπε “ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἔπρηξα τῇ σῇ μὲν εὐδαιμονίῃ, τῇ ἐμεωυτοῦ δὲ κακοδαιμονίῃ, αἴτιος δὲ τούτων ἐγένετο ὁ Ἑλλήνων θεὸς ἐπαείρας ἐμὲ στρατεύεσθαι. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητος ἐστὶ ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ εἰρήνης αἱρέεται· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι, ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δαίμοσί κου φίλον ἦν οὕτω γενέσθαι.”

1.30.3. Croesus asked this question believing that he was the most fortunate of men, but Solon, offering no flattery but keeping to the truth, said, “O King, it is Tellus the Athenian.” 1.33. By saying this, Solon did not at all please Croesus, who sent him away without regard for him, but thinking him a great fool, because he ignored the present good and told him to look to the end of every affair. 1.86. The Persians gained Sardis and took Croesus prisoner. Croesus had ruled fourteen years and been besieged fourteen days. Fulfilling the oracle, he had destroyed his own great empire. The Persians took him and brought him to Cyrus, ,who erected a pyre and mounted Croesus atop it, bound in chains, with twice seven sons of the Lydians beside him. Cyrus may have intended to sacrifice him as a victory-offering to some god, or he may have wished to fulfill a vow, or perhaps he had heard that Croesus was pious and put him atop the pyre to find out if some divinity would deliver him from being burned alive. ,So Cyrus did this. As Croesus stood on the pyre, even though he was in such a wretched position it occurred to him that Solon had spoken with god's help when he had said that no one among the living is fortunate. When this occurred to him, he heaved a deep sigh and groaned aloud after long silence, calling out three times the name “Solon.” ,Cyrus heard and ordered the interpreters to ask Croesus who he was invoking. They approached and asked, but Croesus kept quiet at their questioning, until finally they forced him and he said, “I would prefer to great wealth his coming into discourse with all despots.” Since what he said was unintelligible, they again asked what he had said, ,persistently harassing him. He explained that first Solon the Athenian had come and seen all his fortune and spoken as if he despised it. Now everything had turned out for him as Solon had said, speaking no more of him than of every human being, especially those who think themselves fortunate. While Croesus was relating all this, the pyre had been lit and the edges were on fire. ,When Cyrus heard from the interpreters what Croesus said, he relented and considered that he, a human being, was burning alive another human being, one his equal in good fortune. In addition, he feared retribution, reflecting how there is nothing stable in human affairs. He ordered that the blazing fire be extinguished as quickly as possible, and that Croesus and those with him be taken down, but despite their efforts they could not master the fire. 1.86.6. When Cyrus heard from the interpreters what Croesus said, he relented and considered that he, a human being, was burning alive another human being, one his equal in good fortune. In addition, he feared retribution, reflecting how there is nothing stable in human affairs. He ordered that the blazing fire be extinguished as quickly as possible, and that Croesus and those with him be taken down, but despite their efforts they could not master the fire. 1.87. Then the Lydians say that Croesus understood Cyrus' change of heart, and when he saw everyone trying to extinguish the fire but unable to check it, he invoked Apollo, crying out that if Apollo had ever been given any pleasing gift by him, let him offer help and deliver him from the present evil. ,Thus he in tears invoked the god, and suddenly out of a clear and windless sky clouds gathered, a storm broke, and it rained violently, extinguishing the pyre. Thus Cyrus perceived that Croesus was dear to god and a good man. He had him brought down from the pyre and asked, ,“Croesus, what man persuaded you to wage war against my land and become my enemy instead of my friend?” He replied, “O King, I acted thus for your good fortune, but for my own ill fortune. The god of the Hellenes is responsible for these things, inciting me to wage war. ,No one is so foolish as to choose war over peace. In peace sons bury their fathers, in war fathers bury their sons. But I suppose it was dear to the divinity that this be so.”

3. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 6.90.2-6.90.3 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 88

6.90.2. ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μέν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνους αὖθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. 6.90.3. εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους, τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίᾳ λαβόντες, τὰς δ’ ἐντειχισάμενοι, ῥᾳδίως ἠλπίζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν.

6.90.2. We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage . 6.90.3. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy ; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name.

4. Aristophanes, Birds, 137-138, 140-142, 139 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 193

139. “καλῶς γέ μου τὸν υἱὸν ὦ Στιλβωνίδη

5. Aristophanes, Knights, 735-740 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 196

740. καὶ σκυτοτόμοις καὶ βυρσοπώλαισιν δίδως.:

6. Aristophanes, Clouds, 1000-1025, 1073, 960-989, 991-999, 990 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 190

990. πρὸς ταῦτ' ὦ μειράκιον θαρρῶν ἐμὲ τὸν κρείττω λόγον αἱροῦ:

7. Aristophanes, The Rich Man, 149-159 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 192

159. ὀνόματι περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν.

8. Aristophanes, Wasps, 1023-1025, 1027-1028, 1026 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 194

1026. κωμῳδεῖσθαι παιδίχ' ἑαυτοῦ μισῶν ἔσπευσε πρὸς αὐτόν,

9. Demosthenes, Orations, 19.237 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •popular morality in athens Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 186

19.237. Perhaps he will find a brother to speak for him, Philochares or Aphobetus; to both of whom there is much that you can say with justice. (One must converse quite frankly, without any reserve.) We, Aphobetus and Philochares, although you, Philochares, were a painter of alabaster boxes and tambourines, and your brothers ordinary people, junior clerks and the like,—respectable occupations, but hardly suitable for commanding officers,—we, I say, dignified you with embassies, commands as generals, and other high distinctions.

10. Amphis, Fragments, 15 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •popular morality in athens Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 191

11. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 7.1237a1-3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 120

12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9.1166a13-19, 9.1168a27-35, 9.1169a28-29, 9.1169a25-26, 9.1169a18-22, 9.1169a11-13, 9.1169a3-6, 9.1168b33-34, 9.1168b28-31, 9.1168b19-21, 3.1115b7-13 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 119

13. Aristotle, Poetics, 1455a (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

14. Aristotle, Politics, 2.1262b22-3, 2.1262b14-22 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 116

15. Aeschines, Letters, 1.132-1.159 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •popular morality in athens Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 186, 187

1.132. But in the course of the defence one of the generals will, as I am told, mount the platform, with head held high and a self-conscious air, as one who should say, Behold the graduate of the wrestling schools, and the student of philosophy! And he will undertake to throw ridicule upon the whole idea of the prosecution, asserting that this is no legal process that I have devised, but the first step in a dangerous decline in the culture of our youth.Probably the hearers would be quick to catch the half-hidden thought suggested by the word a)paideusi/a. The Athenian gentlemen did indeed “cultivate” the handsome boys and young men, and for most immoral purposes. The culture that the boys received was too often not eu)paideusi/a, but paiderasti/a. He will cite first those benefactors of yours, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, describing their fidelity to one another, and telling how in their case this relationship proved the salvation of the state. 1.133. The story was that the tyrant Hipparchus sought to become the lover of Harmodius, who was loved by Aristogeiton, and that the jealousies of this paiderasti/a led to the liberation of the state. Indeed, they say he will not even spare the poems of Homer or the names of the heroes, but will celebrate the friendship between Patroclus and Achilles, which, we are told, had its source in passion. And he will pronounce an encomium on beauty now, as though it were not recognised long since as a blessing, if haply it be united with morality. For he says that if certain men by slandering this beauty of body shall cause beauty to be a misfortune to those who possess it, then in your public verdict you will contradict your personal prayers. 1.134. For you seem to him, he says, in danger of being strangely inconsistent; for when you are about to beget children, you pray one and all that your sons still unborn may be fair and beautiful in person, and worthy of the city; and yet when you have sons already born, of whom the city may well be proud, if by their surpassing beauty and youthful charm they infatuate one person or another, and become the subject of strife because of the passion they inspire, these sons, as it seems, you propose to deprive of civic rights—because Aeschines tells you to do it. 1.135. And just here I understand he is going to carry the war into my territory, and ask me if I am not ashamed on my own part, after having made a nuisance of myself in the gymnasia and having been many times a lover, now to be bringing the practice into reproach and danger. And finally—so I am told—in an attempt to raise a laugh and start silly talk among you, he says he is going to exhibit all the erotic poems I have ever addressed to one person or another, and he promises to call witnesses to certain quarrels and pommellings in which I have been involved in consequence of this habit. 1.136. Now as for me, I neither find fault with love that is honorable, nor do I say that those who surpass in beauty are prostitutes. I do not deny that I myself have been a lover and am a lover to this day, nor do I deny that the jealousies and quarrels that commonly arise from the practice have happened in my case. As to the poems which they say I have composed, some I acknowledge, but as to others I deny that they are of the character that these people will impute to them, for they will tamper with them. 1.137. The distinction which I draw is this: to be in love with those who are beautiful and chaste is the experience of a kind-hearted and generous soul; but to hire for money and to indulge in licentiousness is the act of a man who is wanton and ill-bred. And whereas it is an honor to be the object of a pure love, I declare that he who has played the prostitute by inducement of wages is disgraced. How wide indeed is the distinction between these two acts and how great the difference, I will try to show you in what I shall next say. 1.138. your fathers, when they were laying down laws to regulate the habits of men and those acts that inevitably flow from human nature, forbade slaves to do those things which they thought ought to be done by free men. “A slave,” says the law, “shall not take exercise or anoint himself in the wrestling-schools.” It did not go on to add, “But the free man shall anoint himself and take exercise;” for when, seeing the good that comes from gymnastics, the lawgivers forbade slaves to take part, they thought that in prohibiting them they were by the same words inviting the free. 1.139. again, the same lawgiver said, “A slave shall not be the lover of a free boy nor follow after him, or else he shall receive fifty blows of the public lash.” But the free man was not forbidden to love a boy, and associate with him, and follow after him, nor did the lawgiver think that harm came to the boy thereby, but rather that such a thing was a testimony to his chastity. But, I think, so long as the boy is not his own master and is as yet unable to discern who is a genuine friend, and who is not, the law teaches the lover self-control, and makes him defer the words of friendship till the other is older and has reached years of discretion; but to follow after the boy and to watch over him the lawgiver regarded as the best possible safeguard and protection for chastity. 1.140. and so it was that those benefactors of the state, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, men pre-eminent for their virtues, were so nurtured by that chaste and lawful love—or call it by some other name than love if you like—and so disciplined, that when we hear men praising what they did, we feel that words are inadequate to the eulogy of their deeds. 1.141. But since you make mention of Achilles and Patroclus, and of Homer and the other poets—as though the jury were men innocent of education, while you are people of a superior sort, who feel yourselves quite beyond common folks in learning—that you may know that we too have before now heard and learned a little something, we shall say a word about this also. For since they undertake to cite wise men, and to take refuge in sentiments expressed in poetic measures, look, fellow citizens, into the works of those who are confessedly good and helpful poets, and see how far apart they considered chaste men, who love their like, and men who are wanton and overcome by forbidden lusts. 1.142. I will speak first of Homer, whom we rank among the oldest and wisest of the poets. Although he speaks in many places of Patroclus and Achilles, he hides their love and avoids giving a name to their friendship, thinking that the exceeding greatness of their affection is manifest to such of his hearers as are educated men. 1.143. For Achilles says somewhere in the course of his lament for the death of Patroclus, as recalling one of the greatest of sorrows, that unwillingly he has broken the promise he had given to Menoetius, the father of Patroclus; for he had promised to bring his son back safe to Opus, if he would send him along with him to Troy, and entrust him to his care. It is evident from this that it was because of love that he undertook to take care of him. 1.144. But the verses, which I am about to recite, are these: “Ah me, I rashly spoke vain words that dayWhen in his halls I cheered Menoetius.I told the hero I would surely bringHis famous son to Opus back again,When he had ravaged Ilium, and wonHis share of spoil. But Zeus does not fulfilTo men their every hope. For fate decreesThat both of us make red one spot of earth.” Hom. Il. 324-329 1.145. And indeed not only here do we see his deep distress, but he mourned so sorely for him, that although his mother Thetis cautioned him and told him that if he would refrain from following up his enemies and leave the death of Patroclus unavenged, he should return to his home and die an old man in his own land, whereas if he should take vengeance, he should soon end his life, he chose fidelity to the dead rather than safety. And with such nobility of soul did he hasten to take vengeance on the man who slew his friend, that when all tried to comfort him and urged him to bathe and take food, he swore that he would do none of these things until he had brought the head of Hector to the grave of Patroclus. 1.146. And when he was sleeping by the funeral pyre, as the poet says, the ghost of Patroclus stood before him, and stirred such memories and laid upon Achilles such injunctions, that one may well weep, and envy the virtue and the friendship of these men. He prophesies that Achilles too is not far from the end of life, and enjoins upon him, if it he in any wise possible, to make provision that even as they had grown up and lived together, even so when they are dead their bones may be in the same coffer. 1.147. weeping, and recalling the pursuits which they had followed together in life, he says, “Never again shall we sit together alone as in the old days, apart from our other friends, and take high counsel,” feeling, I believe, that this fidelity and affection were what they would long for most. But that you may hear the sentiments of the poet in verse also, the clerk shall read to you the verses on this theme which Homer composed. 1.148. read first the verses about the vengeance on Hector. “But since, dear comrade, after thee I goBeneath the earth, I will not bury theeTill here I bring thee Hector's head and arms,The spoils of that proud prince who took thy life.” Hom. Il. 18.333-35 1.149. Now read what Patroclus says in the dream about their common burial and about the intercourse that they once had with one another. “For we no longer as in life shall sitApart in sweet communion. Nay, the doomAppointed me at birth has yawned for me.And fate has destined thee, Achilles, peerof gods, to die beneath the wall of Troy'sProud lords, fighting for fair-haired Helen's sake.More will I say to thee, pray heed it well:Let not my bones be laid apart from thine,Achilles, but that thou and I may beIn common earth, I beg that I may shareThat golden coffer which thy mother broughtTo be thine own, even as we in youthGrew up together in thy home. My sireMenoetius brought me, a little lad, from home,From Opus, to your house, for sad bloodshed,That day, when, all unwitting, in childish wrathAbout the dice, I killed Amphidamas' son.The knightly Peleus took me to his homeAnd kindly reared me, naming me thy squire.So let one common coffer hide our bones.” Hom. Il. 23.77 1.150. Now to show that it was possible for him to have been saved had he refrained from avenging the death of Patroclus, read what Thetis says. “Ah me, my son, swift fate indeed will fallOn thee, if thou dost speak such words. For know,Swift after Hector's death fate brings thine own.To her divine Achilles, swift of foot,In turn made answer. Straightway let me die,For when my friend was slain, my dearest friend,It was not granted me to succor him.” Hom. Il. 18.95 The above quotations from Homer show considerable variations from our MSS. of the poet. It seems that Aeschines was using a very corrupt text of Homer. In Hom. Il. 18.324 ff., there is variation in one word; in Hom. Il. 18.333-35, in two words; the long passage from Hom. Il. 23.77 has two lines that are not found in our MSS. of the Iliad, one line that is changed in position, and four that show verbal changes. The quotation from Hom. Il. 18.95-99 shows a verbal change in one line, and an entire change in the last half-line.That widely divergent texts of Homer were in circulation as early as the time of Aeschines has been proved by the papyrus fragments. 1.151. Again, Euripides, a poet than whom none is wiser, considering chaste love to be one of the most beautiful things, says somewhere,In the lost Sthenoboea, No. 672, Nauck. making love a thing to be prayed for: “There is a love that makes men virtuousAnd chaste, an envied gift. Such love I crave.” Euripides 1.152. Again the same poet, in the Phoenix, No. 812, Nauck. expresses his opinion, making defence against false charges brought by the father, and trying to persuade men habitually to judge, not under the influence of suspicion or of slander, but by a man's life: “Many a time ere now have I been madeThe judge in men's disputes, and oft have heardFor one event conflicting witnesses.And so, to find the truth, I, as do allWise men, look sharp to see the characterThat marks the daily life, and judge by that.The man who loves companionship of knavesI care not to interrogate. What needIs there? I know too well the man is suchAs is the company he loves to keep.” Euripides 1.153. Examine the sentiments, fellow citizens, which the poet expresses. He says that before now he has been made judge of many cases, as you today are jurors; and he says that he makes his decisions, not from what the witnesses say, but from the habits and associations of the accused; he looks at this, how the man who is on trial conducts his daily life, and in what manner he administers his own house, believing that in like manner he will administer the affairs of the state also; and he looks to see with whom he likes to associate. And, finally, he does not hesitate to express the opinion that a man is like those whose “company he loves to keep.” It is right, therefore, that in judging Timarchus you follow the reasoning of Euripides. 1.154. How has he administered his own property? He has devoured his patrimony, he has consumed all the wages of his prostitution and all the fruits of his bribery, so that he has nothing left but his shame. With whom does he love to be? Hegesandrus! And what are Hegesandrus' habits? The habits that exclude a man by law from the privilege of addressing the people. What is it that I say against Timarchus, and what is the charge that I have brought? That Timarchus addresses the people, a man who has made himself a prostitute and has consumed his patrimony. And what is the oath that you have taken? To give your verdict on the precise charges that are presented by the prosecution. 1.155. But not to dwell too long on the poets, I will recite to you the names of older and well-known men, and of youths and boys, some of whom have had many lovers because of their beauty, and some of whom, still in their prime, have lovers today, but not one of whom ever came under the same accusations as Timarchus. Again, I will tell over to you in contrast men who have prostituted themselves shamefully and notoriously, in order that by calling these to mind you may place Timarchus where he belongs. 1.156. First I will name those who have lived the life of free and honorable men. You know, fellow citizens, Crito, son of Astyochus, Pericleides of Perithoedae, Polemagenes, Pantaleon, son of Cleagoras, and Timesitheus the runner, men who were the most beautiful, not only among their fellow citizens, but in all Hellas, men who counted many a man of eminent chastity as lover; yet no man ever censured them. 1.157. and again, among the youths and those who are still boys, first, you know the nephew of Iphicrates, the son of Teisias of Rhamnos, of the same name as the defendant. He, beautiful to look upon, is so far from reproach, that the other day at the rural Dionysia when the comedies were being played in Collytus, and when Parmenon the comic actor addressed a certain anapaestic verse to the chorus, in which certain persons were referred to as “big Timarchian prostitutes,” nobody thought of it as aimed at the youth, but, one and all, as meant for you, so unquestioned is your title to the practice. Again, Anticles, the stadium runner, and Pheidias,the brother of Melesias. Although I could name many others, I will stop, lest I seem to be in a way courting their favor by my praise. 1.158. But as to those men who are kindred spirits with Timarchus, for fear of arousing their enmity I will mention only those toward whom I am utterly indifferent. Who of you does not know Diophantes, called “the orphan,” who arrested the foreigner and brought him before the archon, whose associate on the bench was Aristophon of Azenia?The archon eponymus is meant. When sitting as president of a court he was assisted by two advisers, pa/redroi. For Diophantes accused the foreigner of having cheated him out of four drachmas in connection with this practice, and he cited the laws that command the archon to protect orphans, when he himself had violated the laws that enjoin chastity. Or what Athenian was not indigt at Cephisodorus, called Molon's son, for having ruined his surpassing beauty by a most infamous life? Or Mnesitheus, known as the cook's son? Or many others, whose names I am willing to forget? 1.159. For I have no desire to tell over the whole list of them one by one in a spirit of bitterness. Nay, rather I could wish that I might be at a loss for such examples in my speech, for I love my city. But since we have selected for special mention a few from each of the two classes, on the one side men who have been loved with a chaste love, and on the other men who sin against themselves, now let me ask you this question, and pray answer me: To which class do you assign Timarchus—to those who are loved, or to those who are prostitutes? You see, Timarchus, you are not to be permitted to desert the company which you have chosen and go over to the ways of free men.

16. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.13, 3.74 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 29, 115

2.13. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est. nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Acci: Accius Atr. 234 Accii Probae Mur. acimprobe RK (acĭ pbe) acinprobe GV Probae falsumque ... probae om. H e/tsi in segetem su/nt deteriore/m datae Fruge/s, tamen ipsae ipse KR sua/pte natura natura alt. a in r. G 1 nature nitent K 1 e/nitent, sic animi non omnes culti fructum cultum fructi R 1 ferunt. atque, ut ut add. G 1 in eodem simili verser, ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus; ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit vitia radicitus et praeparat properat K 1 animos ad satus accipiendos eaque mandat mandat s mundat X is et, ut ita dicam, serit, quae adulta fructus uberrimos ferant. nam... 16 ferant H Agamus igitur, ut coepimus. dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat.

17. Polybius, Histories, 36.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 165

36.9. Both about the Carthaginians when they were crushed by the Romans and about the affair of the pseudo-Philip many divergent accounts were current in Greece, at first on the subject of the conduct of Rome to Carthage and next concerning their treatment of the pseudo-Philip. <, As regards the former the judgements formed and the opinions held in Greece were far from uimous. <, There were some who approved the action of the Romans, saying that they had taken wise and statesmanlike measures in defence of their empire. <, For to destroy this source of perpetual menace, this city which had constantly disputed the supremacy with them and was still able to dispute it if it had the opportunity and thus to secure the dominion of their own country, was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men. <, Others took the opposite view, saying that far from maintaining the principles by which they had won their supremacy, they were little by little deserting it for a lust of domination like that of Athens and Sparta, starting indeed later than those states, but sure, as everything indicated, to arrive at the same end. <, For at first they had made war with every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders. <, But now they had struck the first note of their new policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. <, For the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, although they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders. <, Others said that the Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud, and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate for them. <, But in the present case, throughout the whole of their proceedings in regard to Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud, offering certain things one at a time and keeping others secret, until they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies. <, This, they said, savoured more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a civilized state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as something very like impiety and treachery. <, And there were others who differed likewise from these latter critics. For, they said, if before the Carthaginians had committed themselves to the faith of Rome the Romans had proceeded in this manner, offering certain things one at a time and gradually disclosing others, they would of course have appeared to be guilty of the charge brought against them. <, But if, in fact, after the Carthaginians had of their own accord committed themselves to the faith of the Romans and given them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the Romans, being thus authorized to act as it seemed good to them, gave the orders and imposed the terms on which they had decided, what took place did not bear any resemblance to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an act of treachery; in fact some said it was not even of the nature of an injustice. <, For every crime must naturally fall under one of these three classes, and what the Romans did belongs to neither of the three. <, For impiety is sin against the gods, against parents, or against the dead; treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements; and injustice is what is done contrary to law and custom. <, of none of these three were the Romans guilty on the present occasion. Neither did they sin against the gods, against their parents, or against the dead, nor did they violate any sworn agreement or treaty; on the contrary they accused the Carthaginians of doing this. <, Nor, again, did they break any laws or customs or their personal faith. For having received from a people who consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when this people refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force. < 36.9. 1. Both about the Carthaginians when they were crushed by the Romans and about the affair of the pseudo-Philip many divergent accounts were current in Greece, at first on the subject of the conduct of Rome to Carthage and next concerning their treatment of the pseudo-Philip.,2. As regards the former the judgements formed and the opinions held in Greece were far from uimous.,3. There were some who approved the action of the Romans, saying that they had taken wise and statesmanlike measures in defence of their empire.,4. For to destroy this source of perpetual menace, this city which had constantly disputed the supremacy with them and was still able to dispute it if it had the opportunity and thus to secure the dominion of their own country, was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men.,5. Others took the opposite view, saying that far from maintaining the principles by which they had won their supremacy, they were little by little deserting it for a lust of domination like that of Athens and Sparta, starting indeed later than those states, but sure, as everything indicated, to arrive at the same end.,6. For at first they had made war with every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders.,7. But now they had struck the first note of their new policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage.,8. For the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, although they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders.,9. Others said that the Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud, and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate for them.,10. But in the present case, throughout the whole of their proceedings in regard to Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud, offering certain things one at a time and keeping others secret, until they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies.,11. This, they said, savoured more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a civilized state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as something very like impiety and treachery.,12. And there were others who differed likewise from these latter critics. For, they said, if before the Carthaginians had committed themselves to the faith of Rome the Romans had proceeded in this manner, offering certain things one at a time and gradually disclosing others, they would of course have appeared to be guilty of the charge brought against them.,13. But if, in fact, after the Carthaginians had of their own accord committed themselves to the faith of the Romans and given them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the Romans, being thus authorized to act as it seemed good to them, gave the orders and imposed the terms on which they had decided, what took place did not bear any resemblance to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an act of treachery; in fact some said it was not even of the nature of an injustice.,14. For every crime must naturally fall under one of these three classes, and what the Romans did belongs to neither of the three.,15. For impiety is sin against the gods, against parents, or against the dead; treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements; and injustice is what is done contrary to law and custom.,16. of none of these three were the Romans guilty on the present occasion. Neither did they sin against the gods, against their parents, or against the dead, nor did they violate any sworn agreement or treaty; on the contrary they accused the Carthaginians of doing this.,17. Nor, again, did they break any laws or customs or their personal faith. For having received from a people who consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when this people refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force.

18. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9, 2.16, 3.20-3.21, 3.31, 3.33, 3.50, 5.21-5.22, 5.30-5.32, 5.42, 5.49-5.50, 5.53-5.54, 5.58, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 28, 29, 61, 87, 111, 115, 116, 155, 167

19. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.9, 2.16, 3.20-3.21, 3.31, 3.33, 3.50, 5.21-5.22, 5.30-5.32, 5.42, 5.49-5.50, 5.53-5.54, 5.58, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.67 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 28, 29, 61, 87, 111, 115, 116, 155, 167

2.9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante paulo ante I 37—39 docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non Non cum non RN' tum non N 2 tum vero (~uo) V; tuum non dolere Lamb. dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis enim om. RN (siti immo alio genere restincta enim om. V) stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, inquit om. BE illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles dissimiles ( etiam A 2 )] difficiles A 1 eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, paulo ante p. 17, 17 sqq. inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? 2.16. si enim idem dicit, dicat RNV quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat putat BE putat dicat ARN dicat V adiungendam eam, quae sit in motu—sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: 'in motu', illam nihil dolentis 'in stabilitate'—, quid tendit? cum efficere non possit ut cuiquam, qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus inbuti sumus. quis enim est, est enim BEN qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum, cum in voluptate sumus, alterum, cum in dolore, tertium hoc, in quo nunc equidem sum, equidem sum Mdv. quidem sumus ARNV sumus BE credo item item Ernest. idem ABER 2 N 1 V quidem N 2 et fort. R 1, ubi littera i scripta est super ras. (////dē), cuius in loco fuisse potest q vos, nec vos AN 1 V nos BERN 2 in dolore nec in voluptate; ut in voluptate sit, qui epuletur, in dolore, qui torqueatur. tu autem inter haec tantam multitudinem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium nec dolentium? 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 3.33. Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 5.21. Sex igitur hae hee E, h (= haec) R summo BERNV summa dett. sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. quatuor defense quatuor BE iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus. nominavimus BER ( cf. p. 158, 30 sqq. ) nominamus NV sed quoniam quoniam q uo R non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. de vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. Quando igitur et de voluptate secl. Nissenius ( sec. Gz. ); cf. Muret. var. lect. 14, 20 cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris. 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. 5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? 5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. 5.49. ut add. Se. mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur videatur BER videtur N om. V in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. finxerit RN 1 V finxerint BE finxerat N 2 neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin quin N 2 qui puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum rerum Marsus regum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse patria esse (pat a ee, 1 et in ras. a ee ab alt. m. ) N patrie V patria BER cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. 5.50. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse add. ed. princ. Roman. ( sec. Mdv. sil. ) senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito aut democrito (de mocrito V) RNV loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum magnum ac Brem. magna ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. 5.53. Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE 5.54. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus phalereus R phalerius BEN phalerus V Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream alexandriam RNV contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa ipsa om. BE philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit scripsit ed. Veneta 1494 ; scribit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui qui N 2 quin etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus. soleamus valeamus R 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.60. itaque amplius itaque BE itaque amplius RNV nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est est Thurot. ( Revue critique 1870,1. semestrep.21 ); sunt R sit NV om. BE haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, consentanee sunt BE refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae quae Matthiae ( Vermischte Schriften 1833 p. 31 sq. ); queque sint notitiae, quae quidem quae quidem Se. quaeque (queque) BENV que R significentur significent BE rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis cuiusque vis NV cuiusvis BE cuius vis R et natura sit mox mox p. 189, 20 sqq. videbimus. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.64. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum verum sed Non. etiam historiae refertae talibus exp. ... refertae Non. p. 309 sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores misimus regibus, regibus misimus BE (misimus regem municissimum menibus, rell. om., R) nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret, nostra in re publica Lucretia et quae per del. Vict. vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui interficeret filiam, filiam interficeret BE ne stupraretur. quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin quin NV qui BER intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos inmemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? Quibus rebus expositis breviter breviter expositis BE —nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus—sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur ex hijs virtutibus oritur N et in iis iis Mdv. his R hijs NV illis BE haeret, per se esse expetendum. 5.67. atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, sint ( ante ut) BE sunt ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum.

2.9. "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.' " "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any pleasure in the act of drinking?" "That is undeniable," he answered. "Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst?" "No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one's thirst is a 'static' pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a 'kinetic' pleasure." "Why then," I asked, "do you call two such different things by the same name?" < 2.16. For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself â anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations â that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses â this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" < 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. < 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. < 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. < 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. < 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. < 5.21. "These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely. There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics."But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. < 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. < 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. < 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' < 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();"affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. < 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. < 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. < 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. < 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. < 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. < 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. < 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; < 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. < 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. < 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. <

20. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 9.2.2, 9.2.4 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 19, 20

21. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, De Veterum Censura, 31.3.1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

22. Horace, Odes, 1.35, 3.5, 3.24.25, 4.15 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •horace, complex use of moral decline theme Found in books: Hay, Saeculum: Defining Historical Eras in Ancient Roman Thought (2023) 77, 78

1.35. NUMIDA’S BACK AGAIN With music, and incense, and blood of a bullock, delight in placating the gods that guarded our Numida well, who’s returned safe and sound, from the farthest West, now, showering a host of kisses on every dear friend, but on none of us more than lovely Lamia, remembering their boyhood spent under the self-same master, their togas exchanged together. Don’t allow this sweet day to lack a white marker, no end to the wine jars at hand, no rest for our feet in the Salian fashion, Don’t let wine-heavy Damalis conquer our Bassus in downing the Thracian draughts. Don’t let our feast lack for roses, or the long-lasting parsley, or the brief lilies: we’ll all cast our decadent eyes on Damalis, but Damalis won’t be parted from that new lover of hers she’s clasping, more tightly than the wandering ivy. 3.5. NO SURRENDER We believe thunderous Jupiter rules the sky: Augustus is considered a god on earth, for adding the Britons, and likewise the weight of the Persians to our empire. Didn’t Crassus’ soldiers live in vile marriage with barbarian wives, and (because of our Senate and its perverse ways!) grow old, in the service of their hostile fathers. Marsians, Apulians ruled by a Mede, forgetting their shields, Roman names, and togas, and eternal Vesta, though Jove’s shrines and the city of Rome remained unharmed? Regulus’s far-seeing mind warned of this, when he objected to shameful surrender, and considered from its example harm would come to the following age, unless captured men were killed without pity. ‘I’ve seen standards and weapons,’ he said, ‘taken bloodlessly from our soldiers, hung there in the Carthaginian shrines, I’ve seen the arms of our freemen twisted behind their backs, enemy gates wide open, and the fields that our warfare ravaged being freely cultivated again. Do you think that our soldiers ransomed for gold, will fight more fiercely next time! You’ll add harm to shame: the wool that’s dyed purple never regains the colour that vanished, and true courage, when once departed, never cares to return to an inferior heart. When a doe that’s set free, from the thick hunting nets, turns to fight, then he’ll be brave who trusts himself to treacherous enemies and he’ll crush Carthage, in a second battle, who’s felt the chains on his fettered wrists, without a struggle, afraid of dying. He’s one who, not knowing how life should be lived, confuses war with peace. O, shame! O mighty Carthage, made mightier now because of Italy’s disgraceful decadence.’ It’s said he set aside his wife’s chaste kisses, and his little ones, as of less importance, and, grimly, he set his manly face to the soil, until he might be able to strengthen the Senate’s wavering purpose, by making of himself an example no other man had made, and hurrying, among grieving friends, to noble exile. Yet he knew what the barbarous torturer was preparing for him. Still he pushed aside the kinsmen who were blocking his way, and the people who delayed his going, as if, with some case decided, and leaving all that tedious business of his clients, he headed for Venafrum’s meadows, or Lacedaemonian Tarentum. 4.15. TO AUGUSTUS Phoebus condemned my verse, when I tried to sing of war and conquered cities, lest I unfurled my tiny sail on Tyrrhenianseas. Caesar, this age has restored rich crops to the fields, and brought back the standards, at last, to Jupiter, those that we’ve now recovered from insolent Parthian pillars, and closed the gates of Janus’ temple, freed at last from all war, and tightened the rein on lawlessness, straying beyond just limits, and has driven out crime, and summoned the ancient arts again, by which the name of Rome and Italian power grew great, and the fame and majesty of our empire, were spread from the sun’s lair in the west, to the regions where it rises at dawn. With Caesar protecting the state, no civil disturbance will banish the peace, no violence, no anger that forges swords, and makes mutual enemies of wretched towns. The tribes who drink from the depths of the Danube, will not break the Julian law, the Getae, nor Seres, nor faithless Persians, nor those who are born by the Don's wide stream. On working days, and the same on holy days, among laughter-loving Bacchus’ gifts to us, with our wives and our children we’ll pray, at first, to the gods, in the rites laid down, then, in the manner of our fathers, bravely, in verse, that’s accompanied by Lydian flutes, we’ll sing past leaders, we’ll sing of Troy, Anchises, and the people of Venus.END

23. Ovid, Epistulae Ex Ponto, 2.6, 3.1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •horace, complex use of moral decline theme Found in books: Hay, Saeculum: Defining Historical Eras in Ancient Roman Thought (2023) 78

2.6. vidi, fortunae verba dedique meae. 2.6. qui fuit, et dubitas cetera perlegere! 2.6. qua non est aevo rarior ulla tuo. 2.6. fasque putem iam te non meminisse mei. 2.6. exigit ut faciam talia vota tuus. 2.6. et mala me meritis ferre minora doces. 2.6. saepe supervacuos cogit habere metus, 2.6. quod, fuerit pretium cum rude, numen habet. 2.6. quamque potes, profugo (nam potes) adfer opem. 2.6. nec repetunt oculi signa vetusta tui? 2.6. pectore quam pietas sit tua pulsa meo:

24. Ovid, Tristia, 5.9 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •horace, complex use of moral decline theme Found in books: Hay, Saeculum: Defining Historical Eras in Ancient Roman Thought (2023) 78

25. Plutarch, On The Principle of Cold, 955c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 165

26. Plutarch, Demetrius, 1.5-1.6, 52.3-52.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 41, 121

1.5. τῶν δὲ κεχρημένων ἀσκεπτότερον αὑτοῖς καὶ γεγονότων ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ πράγμασι μεγάλοις ἐπιφανῶν εἰς κακίαν, οὐ χεῖρον ἴσως ἐστὶ συζυγίαν μίαν ἢ δύο παρεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων, οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡδονῇ, μὰ Δία, καὶ διαγωγῇ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ποικίλλοντας τὴν γραφήν, 1.6. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς μαθηταῖς καὶ τοὺς εὖ καὶ τοὺς κακῶς αὐλοῦντας εἰώθει λέγειν, οὕτως αὐλεῖν δεῖ, καὶ πάλιν, οὕτως αὐλεῖν οὐ δεῖ, ὁ δʼ Ἀντιγενίδας καὶ ἥδιον ᾤετο τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀκροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους αὐλητῶν ἐὰν καὶ τῶν φαύλων πεῖραν λαμβάνωσιν, οὕτω μοι δοκοῦμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς προθυμότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ μιμηταὶ βίων εἰ μηδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγομένων ἀνιστορήτως ἔχοιμεν.

1.5. still, when men have led reckless lives, and have become conspicuous, in the exercise of power or in great undertakings, for badness, perhaps it will not be much amiss for me to introduce a pair or two of them into my biographies, though not that I may merely divert and amuse my readers by giving variety to my writing. 1.6. Ismenias the Theban used to exhibit both good and bad players to his pupils on the flute and say, you must play like this one," or again, "you must not play like this one"; and Antigenidas used to think that young men would listen with more pleasure to good flute-players if they were given an experience of bad ones also. So, I think, we also shall be more eager to observe and imitate the better lives if we are not left without narratives of the blameworthy and the bad.

27. Plutarch, Fabius, 26.2-26.3, 27.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 102

28. Plutarch, Lucullus, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, 17.6, 17.7, 17.8, 19.4, 19.5, 24.1, 24.2, 30.4, 30.5, 32.1, 32.2, 32.3, 32.4, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, 33.6, 34, 35.1, 35.2, 35.3, 35.4, 35.5, 35.6, 35.7, 35.8, 35.9, 36.1, 36.4, 36.6, 37.1, 37.2, 37.3, 38.2, 42.7-43.1, 43.1, 43.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1

29. Plutarch, Lycurgus, 28.13, 30.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •ambiguity, moral, in the endings of lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1, 107

30.1. Ἄγιδος δὲ βασιλεύοντος εἰσερρύη νόμισμα πρῶτον εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην, καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομίσματος πλεονεξία καὶ πλούτου ζῆλος ἐπέβη διὰ Λύσανδρον, ὃς αὐτὸς ὢν ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ χρημάτων, ἐνέπλησε τὴν πατρίδα φιλοπλουτίας καὶ τρυφῆς, χρυσὸν καὶ ἄργυρον ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου καταγαγὼν καὶ τοὺς Λυκούργου καταπολιτευσάμενος νόμους.

30.1. But in the reign or Agis, gold and silver money first flowed into Sparta, and with money, greed and a desire for wealth prevailed through the agency of Lysander, who, though incorruptible himself, filled his country with the love of riches and with luxury, by bringing home gold and silver from the war, and thus subverting the laws of Lycurgus.

30. Plutarch, Lysander, 1.1, 2.7-2.8, 14.7, 25.5, 26.5, 30.1-30.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 106, 107, 108

30.2. καὶ γὰρ ἡ πενία τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τελευτήσαντος ἐκκαλυφθεῖσα φανερωτέραν ἐποίησε τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀπὸ χρημάτων πολλῶν καὶ δυνάμεως θεραπείας τε πόλεων καὶ βασιλέως τοσαύτης μηδὲ μικρὸν ἐπιλαμπρύναντος τὸν οἶκον εἰς χρημάτων λόγον, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Θεόπομπος, ᾧ μᾶλλον ἐπαινοῦντι πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις ἢ ψέγοντι, ψέγει γὰρ ἥδιον ἢ ἐπαινεῖ. 30.3. χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον Ἔφορός φησιν ἀντιλογίας τινὸς συμμαχικῆς ἐν Σπάρτῃ γενομένης, καὶ τὰ γράμματα διασκέψασθαι δεῆσαν ἃ παρʼ ἑαυτῷ κατέσχεν ὁ Λύσανδρος, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον. εὑρόντα δὲ τὸ βιβλίον ἐν ᾧ γεγραμμένος ἦν ὁ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας λόγος, ὡς χρὴ τῶν Εὐρυπωντιδῶν καὶ Ἀγιαδῶν τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφελομένους εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων, 30.4. ὁρμῆσαι μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολίτας τὸν λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν καὶ παραδεικνύναι τὸν Λύσανδρον, οἷος ὢν πολίτης διαλάθοι, Λακρατίδαν δέ, ἄνδρα φρόνιμον καὶ τότε προεστῶτα τῶν ἐφόρων, ἐπιλαβέσθαι τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡς δεῖ μὴ ἀνορύττειν τὸν Λύσανδρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῷ συγκατορύττειν οὕτω συντεταγμένον πιθανῶς καὶ πανούργως. 30.5. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τάς τε ἄλλας τιμὰς ἀπέδοσαν αὐτῷ τελευτήσαντι, καὶ τοὺς μνηστευσαμένους τὰς θυγατέρας, εἶτα μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ Λυσάνδρου πένητος εὑρεθέντος ἀπειπαμένους ἐζημίωσαν, ὅτι πλούσιον μὲν νομίζοντες ἐθεράπευον, δίκαιον δὲ καὶ χρηστὸν ἐκ τῆς πενίας ἐπιγνόντες ἐγκατέλιπον. ἦν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ ἀγαμίου δίκη καὶ ὀψιγαμίου καὶ κακογαμίου· ταύτῃ δὲ ὑπῆγον μάλιστα τοὺς ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ οἰκείων τοῖς πλουσίοις κηδεύοντας. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Λύσανδρον οὕτως ἱστορήσαμεν ἔχοντα.

30.2. For the poverty of Lysander, which was discovered at his death, made his excellence more apparent to all, since from the vast wealth and power in his hands, and from the great homage paid him by cities and the Great King, he had not, even in the slightest degree, sought to amass money for the aggrandizement of his family. This is the testimony of Theopompus, who is more to be trusted when he praises than when he blames; for he takes more pleasure in blaming than in praising. 30.3. But after some time had passed, according to Ephorus, some dispute arose at Sparta with her allies, and it became necessary to inspect the writings which Lysander had kept by him; for which purpose AgesilaÃ¼s went to his house. And when he found the book containing the speech on the constitution, which argued that the kingship ought to be taken from the Eurypontidae and Agiadae and made accessible to all Spartans alike, and that the choice should be made from the best of these, 30.4. he was eager to produce the speech before his countrymen, and show them what the real character of Lysander's citizenship had been. 451But Lacratidas, a prudent man, and at that time the principal ephor, held AgesilaÃ¼s back, saying that they ought not to dig Lysander up again, but rather to bury the speech along with him, since it was composed with such a subtle persuasiveness. 30.5. However, they paid him many honours at his death. In particular, they imposed a fine upon the men who had engaged to marry his daughters, and then, after Lysander's death, had renounced the engagement. The reason given for the fine was that the men had paid court to Lysander while they thought him rich, but when his poverty showed them that he was just a good man, they forsook him. For there was, as it appears, a penalty at Sparta not only for not marrying at all, and for a late marriage, but also a bad marriage; and to this last they subjected those especially who sought alliance with the rich, instead of with the good and with their own associates. Such, then, are the accounts we have found given of Lysander.

31. Plutarch, Coriolanus, 15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 75

32. Plutarch, Marius, 2.4, 28.1-28.2, 31.3, 34.6, 45.10-45.12, 46.1-46.5, 46.7-46.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 124, 125, 154

28.1. πέμπτην μὲν οὖν ὑπατείαν διεῖπε· τῆς δὲ ἕκτης ὡς οὐδὲ εἷς πρώτης ὠρέγετο, θεραπείαις τὸν δῆμον ἀναλαμβάνων καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἐνδιδοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὑγρός τις εἶναι βουλόμενος καὶ δημοτικός, ἥκιστα τοιοῦτος πεφυκώς. 28.2. ἀλλʼ ἦν, ὡς λέγουσι, πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἐν ὄχλοις θορύβους ὑπὸ φιλοδοξίας ἀτολμότατος, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὰς μάχας ἀνέκπληκτον καὶ στάσιμον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἀπέλειπεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων ἐξιστάμενον. καίτοι λέγεται Καμερίνων ἄνδρας ὁμοῦ χιλίους διαπρεπῶς ἀγωνισαμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δωρησάμενος πολιτείᾳ, δοκοῦντος εἶναι τούτου παρανόμου καί τινων ἐγκαλούντων, εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοῦ νόμου διὰ τὸν τῶν ὅπλων ψόφον οὐ κατακούσειεν. 46.1. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἤδη πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾶν γενόμενος ὕμνει τὸν αὐτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα Ἕλλην, οὐ βάρβαρος οὐδὲ ἄλογον τῇ φύσει θηρίον γένοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι τοῖς Σωκράτους χρόνοις ἀπήντησεν ἡ γένεσις αὐτοῦ. 46.2. καὶ νὴ Δία τὸν Ταρσέα λέγουσιν Ἀντίπατρον ὡσαύτως ὑπὸ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀναλογιζόμενον ὧν τύχοι μακαρίων μηδὲ τῆς εἰς Ἀθήνας οἴκοθεν εὐπλοίας ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καθάπερ φιλοχρήστου τῆς τύχης ἅπασαν δόσιν εἰς μεγάλην χάριν τιθέμενον καὶ σῴζοντα τῇ μνήμῃ διὰ τέλους, ἧς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ ταμιεῖον ἀγαθῶν βεβαιότερον. 46.3. τοὺς δὲ ἀμνήμονας ς καὶ ἀνοήτους ὑπεκρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου· διὸ μηθὲν στέγοντες μηδὲ διατηροῦντες ἀεὶ κενοὶ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, πλήρεις δὲ ἐλπίδων πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπουσι, τὸ παρὸν προϊέμενοι. καίτοι τὸ μὲν ἂν ἡ τύχη κωλῦσαι δύναιτο, τὸ δὲ ἀναφαίρετόν ἐστιν· 46.4. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τοῦτο τῆς τύχης ὡς ἀλλότριον ἐκβάλλοντες ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἄδηλον ὀνειρώττουσιν, εἰκότα πάσχοντες, πρὶν γὰρ ἐκ λόγου καὶ παιδείας ἕδραν ὑποβαλέσθαι καὶ κρηπῖδα τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἀγαθοῖς, συνάγοντες αὐτὰ καὶ συμφοροῦντες ἐμπλῆσαι τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ δύνανται τὸ ἀκόρεστον. 46.5. ἀποθνῄσκει δ’ οὖν Μάριος ἡμέρας ἑπτακαίδεκα τῆς ἑβδόμης ὑπατείας ἐπιλαβών. καὶ μέγα ἔσχε παραυτίκα τὴν Ῥώμην χάρμα καὶ θάρσος ὡς χαλεπῆς τυραννίδος ἀπηλλαγμένην· ὀλίγαις δὲ ἡμέραις ᾔσθοντο νέον ἀντηλλαγμένοι καὶ ἀκμάζοντα ἀντὶ πρεσβύτου δεσπότην τοσαύτην ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Μάριος ὠμότητα καὶ πικρίαν ἀπεδείξατο, τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ δοκιμωτάτους ἀναιρῶν.

28.1. Thus, then, his fifth consulship was coming to an end; but he was as eager for a sixth as another would have been for his first. He tried to win over the people by obsequious attentions, and yielded to the multitude in order to gain its favour, thus doing violence, not only to the dignity and majesty of his high office, but also to his own nature, since he wished to be a compliant man of the people when he was naturally at farthest remove from this. 28.2. In confronting a political crisis or the tumultuous throng, we are told, his ambition made him most timorous, and that undaunted firmness which he showed in battle forsook him when he faced the popular assemblies, so that he was disconcerted by the most ordinary praise or blame. And yet we are told that when he had bestowed citizenship upon as many as a thousand men of Camerinum for conspicuous bravery in the war, the act was held to be illegal and was impeached by some; to whom he replied that the clash of arms had prevented his hearing the voice of the law. 46.1. Plato, however, when he was now at the point of death, lauded his guardian genius and Fortune because, to begin with, he had been born a man and not an irrational animal; again, because he was a Greek and not a Barbarian; and still again, because his birth had fallen in the times of Socrates. 46.2. And indeed they say that Antipater of Tarsus, when he was in like manner near his end and was enumerating the blessings of his life, did not forget to mention his prosperous voyage from home to Athens, just as though he thought that every gift of a benevolent Fortune called for great gratitude, and kept it to the last in his memory, which is the most secure storehouse of blessings for a man. 46.3. Unmindful and thoughtless persons, on the contrary, let all that happens to them slip away as time goes on; therefore, since they do not hold or keep anything, they are always empty of blessings, but full of hopes, and are looking away to the future while they neglect the present. 46.4. And yet the future may be prevented by Fortune, while the present cannot be taken away; nevertheless these men cast aside the present gift of Fortune as something alien to them, while they dream of the future and its uncertainties. And this is natural. For they assemble and heap together the external blessings of life before reason and education have enabled them to build any foundation and basement for these things, and therefore they cannot satisfy the insatiable appetite of their soul. 46.5. So, then, Marius died, seventeen days after entering upon his seventh consulship. And immediately Rome was filled with great rejoicing and a confident hope that she was rid of a grievous tyranny; but in a few days the people perceived that they had got a new and vigorous master in exchange for the old one; such bitterness and cruelty did the younger Marius display, putting to death the best and most esteemed citizens.

33. Plutarch, Nicias, 1.1, 1.5, 2.2-2.6, 7.3-7.7, 8.2, 11.1, 12.1-12.2, 14.1-14.2, 16.9, 21.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6, 31, 85, 88

1.1. ἐπεὶ δοκοῦμεν οὐκ ἀτόπως τῷ Νικίᾳ τὸν Κράσσον παραβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ Παρθικὰ παθήματα τοῖς Σικελικοῖς, ὥρα παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ παρακαλεῖν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς συγγράμμασι τούτοις, ὅπως ἐπὶ ταῖς διηγήσεσιν αἷς Θουκυδίδης, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ περὶ ταῦτα παθητικώτατος, ἐναργέστατος, ποικιλώτατος γενόμενος, ἀμιμήτως ἐξενήνοχε, μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὑπολάβωσι πεπονθέναι Τιμαίῳ πάθος ὅμοιον, 1.5. ἃς γοῦν Θουκυδίδης ἐξήνεγκε πράξεις καὶ Φίλιστος, ἐπεὶ παρελθεῖν οὐκ ἔστι, μάλιστά γε δὴ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν καλυπτομένην περιεχούσας, ἐπιδραμὼν βραχέως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελὴς δοκῶ καὶ ἀργὸς εἶναι, τὰ διαφεύγοντα τοὺς πολλούς, ὑφʼ ἑτέρων δʼ εἰρημένα σποράδην ἢ πρὸς ἀναθήμασιν ἢ ψηφίσμασιν εὑρημένα παλαιοῖς πεπείραμαι συναγαγεῖν, οὐ τὴν ἄχρηστον ἀθροίζων ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατανόησιν ἤθους καὶ τρόπου παραδιδούς. 7.4. ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀνεδύετο, τῷ μὴ προσδοκῆσαι τοῦτο θορυβούμενος· ἐγκελευομένων δὲ ταὐτὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ Νικίου καταβοῶντος, ἐξαρθεὶς καὶ ἀναφλεχθεὶς τὸ φιλότιμον ὑπεδέξατό τε τὴν στρατηγίαν, καὶ προσδιωρίσατο πλεύσας ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἴκοσιν ἢ κατακτενεῖν ἐκεῖ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἢ ζῶντας ἄξειν Ἀθήναζε. τοῖς δʼ Ἀθηναίοις ἐπῆλθε γελάσαι μέγα μᾶλλον ἢ πιστεῦσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως εἰώθεσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κουφότητα καὶ μανίαν φέρειν μετὰ παιδιᾶς οὐκ ἀηδῶς. 7.5. λέγεται γὰρ ἐκκλησίας ποτὲ οὔσης τὸν μὲν δῆμον καθήμενον ἄνω περιμένειν πολὺν χρόνον, ὀψὲ δʼ εἰσελθεῖν ἐκεῖνον ἐστεφανωμένον καὶ παρακαλεῖν ὑπερθέσθαι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς αὔριον· ἀσχολοῦμαι γάρ, ἔφη, σήμερον, ἑστιᾶν μέλλων ξένους καὶ τεθυκὼς τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς δʼ Ἀθηναίους γελάσαντας ἀναστῆναι καὶ διαλῦσαι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. 12.1. ὁ δʼ οὖν Νικίας, τῶν Αἰγεστέων πρέσβεων καὶ Λεοντίνων παραγενομένων καὶ πειθόντων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Σικελίαν, ἀνθιστάμενος ἡττᾶτο τῆς βουλῆς Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ φιλοτιμίας, πρὶν ὅλως ἐκκλησίαν γενέσθαι, κατασχόντος ἤδη πλῆθος ἐλπίσι καὶ λόγοις προδιεφθαρμένον, ὥστε καὶ νέους ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γέροντας ἐν ἐργαστηρίοις καὶ ἡμικυκλίοις συγκαθεζομένους ὑπογράφειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς Σικελίας, καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν θαλάσσης, καὶ λιμένας καὶ τόπους οἷς τέτραπται πρὸς Λιβύην ἡ νῆσος. 12.2. οὐ γὰρ ἆθλον ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου Σικελίαν, ἀλλʼ ὁρμητήριον, ὡς ἀπʼ αὐτῆς διαγωνισόμενοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους καὶ σχήσοντες ἅμα Λιβύην καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν θάλασσαν. ὡς οὖν ὥρμηντο πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Νικίας ἐναντιούμενος οὔτε πολλοὺς οὔτε δυνατοὺς εἶχε συναγωνιστάς. οἱ γὰρ εὔποροι δεδιότες μὴ δοκῶσι τὰς λειτουργίας καὶ τριηραρχίας ἀποδιδράσκειν, παρὰ γνώμην ἡσύχαζον· 14.2. οὐδεὶς ἔτι καιρὸς ἦν τῆς πολλῆς εὐλαβείας καὶ μελλήσεως, ὥστε παιδὸς δίκην ἀπὸ τῆς νεὼς ὀπίσω βλέποντα καὶ τὸ μὴ κρατηθῆναι τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀναλαμβάνοντα καὶ στρέφοντα πολλάκις ἐναμβλῦναι καὶ τοὺς συνάρχοντας αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν διαφθεῖραι τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἔδει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμφύντα καὶ προσκείμενον ἐλέγχειν τὴν τύχην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγώνων.

1.1. I think that Nicias is a suitable parallel to Crassus, and the Sicilian to the Parthian disaster. I must therefore at once, and in all modesty, entreat my readers not to imagine for an instant that, in my narration of what Thucydides has inimitably set forth, surpassing even himself in pathos, vividness, and variety, I am so disposed as was Timaeus. 1.5. At all events, those deeds which Thucydides and Philistus have set forth, â since I cannot entirely pass them by, indicating as they do the nature of my hero and the disposition which lay hidden beneath his great many sufferings, â I have run over briefly, and with no unnecessary detail, in order to escape the reputation of utter carelessness and sloth; but those details which have escaped most writers, and which others have mentioned casually, or which are found on ancient votive offerings or in public decrees, these I have tried to collect, not massing together useless material of research, but handing on such as furthers the appreciation of character and temperament. 2 7.4. At first Cleon tried to draw back, confused by the unexpectedness of this offer; but the Athenians kept up the same cries of encouragement, and Nicias kept taunting him, until, his ambition excited and on fire, he undertook the command, and, besides, declared in so many words that within twenty days after sailing he would either slay the men on the island or bring them alive to Athens. The Athenians were moved to hearty laughter at this rather than to belief in it, for they were already in the way of treating his mad vanity as a joke, and a pleasant one too. 7.5. It is said, for instance, that once when the assembly was in session, the people sat out on the Pnyx a long while waiting for him to address them, and that late in the day he came in all garlanded for dinner and asked them to adjourn the assembly to the morrow. "I'm busy toâday," he said, "I'm going to entertain some guests, and have already sacrificed to the gods." The Athenians burst out laughing, then rose up and dissolved the assembly. 8 12.1. It was Nicias, then, who, when an embassy came from Egesta and Leontini seeking to persuade the Athenians to undertake an expedition against Sicily, opposed the measure, only to be defeated by the ambitious purposes of Alcibiades. Before the assembly had met at all, Alcibiades had already corrupted the multitude and got them into his power by means of his sanguine promises, so that the youth in their training-schools and the old men in their work-shops and lounging-places would sit in clusters drawing maps of Sicily, charts of the sea about it, and plans of the harbours and districts of the island which look towards Libya. 12.2. For they did not regard Sicily itself as the prize of the war, but rather as a mere base of operations, purposing therefrom to wage a contest with the Carthaginians and get possession of both Libya and of all the sea this side the Pillars of Heracles. Since, therefore, their hearts were fixed on this, Nicias, in his opposition to them, had few men, and these of no influence, to contend on his side. For the well-toâdo citizens feared accusations of trying to escape their contributions for the support of the navy, and so, despite their better judgement, held their peace. 14.2. then it was no longer a time for the exceeding caution and hesitation which he displayed, gazing back homewards from his ship like a child, and many times resuming and dwelling on the thought that the people had not yielded to his reasonings, till he took the edge from the zeal of his colleagues in command and lost the fittest time for action. He ought rather at once to have engaged the enemy at close quarters and put fortune to the test in struggles for the mastery.

34. Plutarch, Pericles, 1, 2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.5, 5.3, 7, 7.1, 7.3, 9, 9.5, 10, 10.4, 10.7, 11, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 12, 13, 13.15, 13.16, 14, 15.1, 16.1, 20.3, 20.4, 21.1, 22.1, 28.2, 28.3, 31.1, 31.2-32.6, 32.6, 39.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 41

1. On seeing certain wealthy foreigners in Rome carrying puppies and young monkeys about in their bosoms and fondling them, Caesar Caesar Augustus. asked, we are told, if the women in their country did not bear children, thus in right princely fashion rebuking those who squander on animals that proneness to love and loving affection which is ours by nature, and which is due only to our fellow-men.,Since, then, our souls are by nature possessed of great fondness for learning and fondness for seeing, it is surely reasonable to chide those who abuse this fondness on objects all unworthy either of their eyes or ears, to the neglect of those which are good and serviceable. Our outward sense, since it apprehends the objects which encounter it by virtue of their mere impact upon it, must needs, perhaps, regard everything that presents itself, be it useful or useless;,but in the exercise of his mind every man, if he pleases, has the natural power to turn himself away in every case, and to change, without the least difficulty, to that object upon which he himself determines. It is meet, therefore, that he pursue what is best, to the end that he may not merely regard it, but also be edified by regarding it. A color is suited to the eye if its freshness, and its pleasantness as well, stimulates and nourishes the vision; and so our intellectual vision must be applied to such objects as, by their very charm, invite it onward to its own proper good.,Such objects are to be found in virtuous deeds; these implant in those who search them out a great and zealous eagerness which leads to imitation. In other cases, admiration of the deed is not immediately accompanied by an impulse to do it. Nay, many times, on the contrary, while we delight in the work, we despise the workman, as, for instance, in the case of perfumes and dyes; we take a delight in them, but dyers and perfumers we regard as illiberal and vulgar folk.,Therefore it was a fine saying of Antisthenes, when he heard that Ismenias was an excellent piper: But he’s a worthless man, said he, otherwise he wouldn’t be so good a piper. And so Philip Philip of Macedon, to Alexander. once said to his son, who, as the wine went round, plucked the strings charmingly and skilfully, Art not ashamed to pluck the strings so well? It is enough, surely, if a king have leisure to hear others pluck the strings, and he pays great deference to the Muses if he be but a spectator of such contests.

35. Plutarch, Phocion, 3.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 157

36. Plutarch, Platonic Questions, 1000e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 2

37. Plutarch, Pompey, 31.6, 31.8, 31.10-31.13, 39.2, 48.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 91, 161

38. Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft, 799b, 799c, 800a, 802c, 802d, 799c- (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 88

39. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 7.3, 8.2, 8.6-8.7, 9.6, 12.2-12.8, 13.1-13.3, 22.1-22.3, 26.1-26.2, 26.14, 30.1-30.3, 34.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 125

40. Plutarch, Table Talk, 680c, 680d, 734d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 2

41. Plutarch, Dinner of The Seven Wise Men, 58d, 58e, 69e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 20

42. Plutarch, Solon, 27.8-27.9, 28.1, 28.5-28.6, 30.1-30.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 19, 20

30.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ κατατρώσας αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ Πεισίστρατος ἧκεν εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐπὶ ζεύγους κομιζόμενος, καὶ παρώξυνε τὸν δῆμον ὡς διὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπιβεβουλευμένος, καὶ πολλοὺς εἶχεν ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ βοῶντας, προσελθὼν ἐγγὺς ὁ Σόλων καὶ παραστάς, οὐ καλῶς, εἶπεν, ὦ παῖ Ἱπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνῃ τὸν Ὁμηρικὸν Ὀδυσσέα· ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρουόμενος οἷς ἐκεῖνος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησεν, αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτόν. 30.2. ἐκ τούτου τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἦν ἕτοιμον ὑπερμαχεῖν τοῦ Πεισιστράτου, καὶ συνῆλθεν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ὁ δῆμος. Ἀρίστωνος δὲ γράψαντος ὅπως δοθῶσι πεντήκοντα κορυνηφόροι τῷ Πεισιστράτῳ φυλακὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀντεῖπεν ὁ Σόλων ἀναστὰς καὶ πολλὰ διεξῆλθεν ὅμοια τούτοις οἷς διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων γέγραφεν· 30.3. ὁρῶν δὲ τοὺς μὲν πένητας ὡρμημένους χαρίζεσθαι τῷ Πεισιστράτῳ καὶ θορυβοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἀποδιδράσκοντας καὶ ἀποδειλιῶντας, ἀπῆλθεν εἰπὼν ὅτι τῶν μέν ἐστι σοφώτερος, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρειότερος· σοφώτερος μὲν τῶν μὴ συνιέντων τὸ πραττόμενον, ἀνδρειότερος δὲ τῶν συνιέντων μέν, ἐναντιοῦσθαι δὲ τῇ τυραννίδι φοβουμένων. τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα κυρώσας ὁ δῆμος οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἔτι τῶν κορυνηφόρων διεμικρολογεῖτο πρὸς τὸν Πεισίστρατον, ἀλλʼ ὅσους ἐβούλετο τρέφοντα καὶ συνάγοντα φανερῶς περιεώρα, μέχρι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν κατέσχε. 30.4. γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ τῆς πόλεως συνταραχθείσης, ὁ μὲν Μεγακλῆς εὐθὺς ἔφυγε μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀλκμαιωνιδῶν, ὁ δὲ Σόλων ἤδη μὲν ἦν σφόδρα γέρων καὶ τοὺς βοηθοῦντας οὐκ εἶχεν, ὅμως δὲ προῆλθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν καὶ διελέχθη πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὰ μὲν κακίζων τὴν ἀβουλίαν αὐτῶν καὶ μαλακίαν, τὰ δὲ παροξύνων ἔτι καὶ παρακαλῶν μὴ προέσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· 30.5. ὅτε καὶ τὸ μνημονευόμενον εἶπεν, ὡς πρώην μὲν ἦν εὐμαρέστερον αὐτοῖς τὸ κωλῦσαι τὴν τυραννίδα συνισταμένην, νῦν δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι καὶ λαμπρότερον ἐκκόψαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν συνεστῶσαν ἤδη καὶ πεφυκυῖαν. οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ διὰ τὸν φόβον ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ λαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα καὶ πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν θέμενος εἰς τὸν στενωπόν, ἐμοὶ μέν, εἶπεν, ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν βεβοήθηται τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις.

30.1. Now when Peisistratus, after inflicting a wound upon himself, Cf. Hdt. 1.59 ; Aristot. Const. Ath. 14.1 came into the market-place riding in a chariot, and tried to exasperate the populace with the charge that his enemies had plotted against his life on account of his political opinions and many of them greeted the charge with angry cries Solon drew near and accosted him, saying: O son of Hippocrates, thou art playing the Homeric Odysseus badly; for when he disfigured himself it was to deceive his enemies Hom. Od. 4.244-264 but thou doest it to mislead thy fellow-citizens. 30.2. After this the multitude was ready to fight for Peisistratus, and a general assembly of the people was held. Here Ariston made a motion that Peisistratus be allowed a body-guard of fifty club-bearers, but Solon formally opposed it, and said many things which were like what he has written in his poems:— Ye have regard indeed to the speech and words of a wily man. Yet every one of you walks with the steps of a fox, And in you all dwells an empty mind. Fragment 11 (Bergk), verses 7, 5, and 6. Plutarch has changed the order; Bekker and Cobet restore it. 30.3. But when he saw that the poor were tumultuously bent on gratifying Peisistratus, while the rich were fearfully slinking away from any conflict with him, he left the assembly, saying that he was wiser than the one party, and braver than the other; wiser than those who did not understand what was being done and braver than those who, though they understood it, were nevertheless afraid to oppose the tyranny. Cf. Aristot. Const. Ath. 14.2 . So the people passed the decree, and then held Peisistratus to no strict account of the number of his club-bearers, but suffered him to keep and lead about in public as many as he wished, until at last he seized the acropolis. 30.4. When this had been done, and the city was in an uproar, Megacles Grandson of the Megacles who brought the taint of pollution upon the family ( Plut. Sol. 12.1-3 ). He had been allowed to return from banishment. straightway fled, with the rest of the Alcmaeonidae. But Solon, although he was now a very old man, and had none to support him, went nevertheless into the market-place and reasoned with the citizens, partly blaming their folly and weakness, and partly encouraging them still and exhorting them not to abandon their liberty. 30.5. Then it was, too, that he uttered the famous saying, that earlier it had been easier for them to hinder the tyranny, while it was in preparation; but now it was a greater and more glorious task to uproot and destroy it when it had been already planted and was grown. No one had the courage to side with him, however, and so he retired to his own house, took his arms, and placed them in the street in front of his door, saying: I have done all I can to help my country and its laws. It was for others to do the same. Cf. Aristot. Const. Ath. 14.2 . 7. However, it is irrational and ignoble to renounce the acquisition of what we want for fear of losing it; for on this principle a man cannot be gratified by the possession of wealth, or honor, or wisdom, for fear he may be deprived of them. Indeed, even virtue, the most valuable and pleasing possession in the world, is often banished by sickness and drugs. And Thales himself, though unmarried, was nevertheless not wholly free from apprehension, unless he also avoided having friends, or relations, or country.,On the contrary, he had a son by his own adoption, as we are told, Cybisthus, his sister’s son. For the soul has in itself a capacity for affection, and loves just as naturally as it perceives, understands, and remembers. It clothes itself in this capacity, and attaches itself to those who are not akin to it, and just as if it were a house or an estate that lacks lawful heirs, this craving for affection is entered and occupied by alien and illegitimate children, or retainers, who, along with love for them, inspire anxiety and fear in their behalf.,So that you will find men of a somewhat rugged nature who argue against marriage and the begetting of children, and then, when children of their servants, or offspring of their concubines fall sick and die, these same men are racked with sorrow and lament abjectly. Some, too, at the death even of dogs and horses, have been plunged into shameful and intolerable grief. But others have borne the loss of noble sons without terrible sorrow or unworthy conduct, and have conformed the rest of their lives to the dictates of reason.,For it is weakness, not kindness, that brings men into endless pains and terrors when they are not trained by reason to endure the assaults of fortune. Such men do not even enjoy what they long for when they get it, but are filled with continual pangs, tremors, and struggles by the fear of future loss. However, we must be fortified not by poverty against deprivation of worldly goods, nor by friendlessness against loss of friends, nor by childlessness against death of children, but by reason against all adversities. This, under present circumstances, is more than enough on this head.

43. Plutarch, Sulla, 2.1-2.2, 38.3, 38.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ambiguity, moral, in the endings of lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 107, 108

2.2. τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις τῶν τεκμηρίων οὐκ ἄτοπόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι περὶ ἀνδρός, ὃν οὕτω φιλοσκώμμονα φύσει γεγονέναι λέγουσιν, ὥστε νέον μὲν ὄντα καὶ ἄδοξον ἔτι μετὰ μίμων καὶ γελωτοποιῶν διαιτᾶσθαι καὶ συνακολασταίνειν, ἐπεὶ δὲ κύριος ἁπάντων κατέστη, συναγαγόντα τῶν ἀπὸ σκηνῆς καὶ θεάτρου τοὺς ἰταμωτάτους ὁσημέραι πίνειν καὶ διαπληκτίζεσθαι τοῖς σκώμμασι, τοῦ τε γήρως ἀωρότερα πράττειν δοκοῦντα καὶ πρὸς τῷ καταισχύνειν τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς πολλὰ τῶν δεομένων ἐπιμελείας προϊέμενον.

2.2. Nor is it out of place to mention such testimonies in the case of a man said to have been by nature so fond of raillery, that when he was still young and obscure he spent much time with actors and buffoons and shared their dissolute life; and when he had made himself supreme master, he would daily assemble the most reckless stage and theatre folk to drink and bandy jests with them, although men thought that he disgraced his years, and although he not only dishonoured his high office, but neglected much that required attention.

44. Plutarch, On The Malice of Herodotus, 855-856a, 855e-, 874b, 854e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 170

45. Plutarch, Crassus, 16.3-16.8, 17.8-17.9, 27.1, 27.4-27.8, 30.3-30.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 91

16.3. καίτοι τῷ γραφέντι περὶ τούτων νόμῳ Παρθικὸς πόλεμος οὐ προσῆν. ᾔδεσαν δὲ πάντες ὅτι πρὸς τοῦτο τοῦτο Bekker adopts τοῦτον from Reiske. Κράσσος ἐπτόηται· καὶ Καῖσαρ ἐκ Γαλατίας ἔγραφεν αὐτῷ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπαινῶν καὶ παροξύνων ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δημαρχῶν Ἀτήιος ἔμελλε πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον ἐναντιώσεσθαι, καὶ συνίσταντο πολλοὶ χαλεπαίνοντες εἴ τις ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐνσπόνδοις, πολεμήσων ἄπεισι, δείσας ὁ Κράσσος ἐδεήθη Πομπηΐου παραγενέσθαι καὶ συμπροπέμψαι· 16.4. μέγα γὰρ ἦν ἐκείνου τὸ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἀξίωμα· καὶ τότε παρεσκευασμένους πολλοὺς ἐνίστασθαι καὶ καταβοᾶν ὁρώμενος πρὸ αὐτοῦ φαιδρῷ βλέμματι καὶ προσώπῳ κατεπράυνεν ὁ Πομπήιος, ὥσθʼ ὑπείκειν σιωπῇ διʼ αὐτῶν προϊοῦσιν. ὁ δʼ Ἀτήιος ἀπαντήσας πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ φωνῆς ἐκώλυε καὶ διεμαρτύρετο μὴ βαδίζειν, ἔπειτα τὸν ὑπηρέτην ἐκέλευεν ἁψάμενον τοῦ σώματος κατέχειν. 16.5. ἄλλων δὲ δημάρχων οὐκ ἐώντων, ὁ μὲν ὑπηρέτης ἀφῆκε τὸν Κράσσον, ὁ δʼ Ἀτήιος προδραμὼν ἐπὶ τὴν πύλην ἔθηκεν ἐσχαρίδα καιομένην, καὶ τοῦ Κράσσου γενομένου κατʼ αὐτήν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ κατασπένδων ἀρὰς ἐπηρᾶτο δεινὰς μὲν αὐτὰς καὶ φρικώδεις, δεινοὺς δέ τινας θεοὺς καὶ ἀλλοκότους ἐπʼ αὐταῖς καλῶν καὶ ὀνομάζων· 16.6. ταύτας φασὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς ἀρὰς ἀποθέτους καὶ παλαιὰς τοιαύτην ἔχειν δύναμιν ὡς περιφυγεῖν μηδένα τῶν ἐνσχεθέντων αὐταῖς, κακῶς δὲ πράσσειν καὶ τὸν χρησάμενον, ὅθεν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν αὐτὰς οὐδʼ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀρᾶσθαι. καὶ τότʼ οὖν ἐμέμφοντο τὸν Ἀτήιον, εἰ διʼ ἣν ἐχαλέπαινε τῷ Κράσσῳ πόλιν, εἰς αὐτήν ἀρὰς ἀφῆκε καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην.

16.3. And yet in the decree which was passed regarding his mission there was no mention of a Parthian war. But everybody knew that Crassus was all eagerness for this, and Caesar wrote to him from Gaul approving of his project, and inciting him on to the war. And when Ateius, one of the tribunes of the people, threatened to oppose his leaving the city, and a large party arose which was displeased that anyone should go out to wage war on men who had done the state no wrong, but were in treaty relations with it, then Crassus, in fear, begged Pompey to come to his aid and to join in escorting him out of the city. 16.4. For great was Pompey's reputation with the crowd. And now, when the multitude drawn up to resist the passage of Crassus, and to abuse him, saw Pompey's beaming countece in front of him, they were mollified, and gave way before them in silence. But Ateius, on meeting Crassus, at first tried to stop him with words, and protested against his advance; then he bade his attendant seize the person of Crassus and detain him. 16.5. And when the other tribunes would not permit this, the attendant released Crassus, but Ateius ran on ahead to the city gate, placed there a blazing brazier, and when Crassus came up, cast incense and libations upon it, and invoked curses which were dreadful and terrifying in themselves, and were reinforced by sundry strange and dreadful gods whom he summoned and called by name. The Romans say that these mysterious and ancient curses have such power that no one involved in them ever escapes, and misfortune falls also upon the one who utters them, wherefore they are not employed at random nor by many. And accordingly at this time they found fault with Ateius because it was for the city's sake that he was angered at Crassus, and yet he had involvedº the city in curses which awakened much superstitious terror. 17

46. Plutarch, Cato The Elder, 5.7, 24.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) •moralism, in the lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1, 91, 161, 165

47. Plutarch, Comparison of Crassus With Nicias, 3.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 85

48. Appian, Civil Wars, 2.35.140 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 75

49. Longinus, On The Sublime, 25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

50. Plutarch, Comparison of Fabius With Pericles, 1.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 96

1.4. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν οὐχ οὕτω χαλεπὸν εἶναι πόλιν ἐν συμφοραῖς μεταχειρίσασθαι ταπεινὴν καὶ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης κατήκοον γενομένην, ὡς διʼ εὐτυχίαν ἐπηρμένῳ καὶ σπαργῶντι τῷ δήμῳ χαλινὸν ἐμβαλεῖν ὕβρεως καὶ θρασύτητος· ᾧ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται τρόπῳ Περικλῆς Ἀθηναίων περιγενόμενος. ἀλλὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίοις συμπεσόντων τότε κακῶν τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἰσχυρόν τινα τὴν γνώμην τὴν γνώμην Coraës: γνώμην . καὶ μέγαν ἔδειξεν ἄνδρα τὸν μὴ συγχυθέντα μηδὲ προέμενον τοὺς αὑτοῦ λογισμούς.

1.4. And yet it would appear to be not so difficult a task to manage a city when she is humbled by adversity and rendered obedient to wisdom by necessity, as it is to bridle a people which is exalted by prosperity and swollen with insolence and boldness, which is precisely the way in which Pericles governed Athens. Still, the magnitude and multitude of evils which afflicted the Romans revealed the steadfast purpose and the greatness of the man who was not confounded by them, and would not abandon his own principles of action. 1.4. And yet it would appear to be not so difficult a task to manage a city when she is humbled by adversity and rendered obedient to wisdom by necessity, as it is to bridle a people which is exalted by prosperity and swollen with insolence and boldness, which is precisely the way in which Pericles governed Athens. Still, the magnitude and multitude of evils which afflicted the Romans revealed the steadfast purpose and the greatness of the man who was not confounded by them, and would not abandon his own principles of action.

51. Plutarch, Themistocles, 22.4-22.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 88

22.4. θάψας δὲ τὸν πατέρα, τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὴν εὐχὴν ἀπεδίδου τῇ ἑβδόμῃ τοῦ Πυανεψιῶνος μηνὸς ἱσταμένου· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἀνέβησαν εἰς ἄστυ σωθέντες. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἕψησις τῶν ὀσπρίων λέγεται γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ σωθέντας αὐτοὺς εἰς ταὐτὸ συμμῖξαι τὰ περιόντα τῶν σιτίων καὶ μίαν χύτραν κοινὴν ἑψήσαντας συνεστιαθῆναι καὶ συγκαταφαγεῖν ἀλλήλοις.

52. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 13.6, 17.3-17.4, 23.7-23.8, 24.3, 35.3, 39.1-39.2, 39.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 88, 106

17.3. καὶ Νικίας μὲν ὡς χαλεπὸν ἔργον ὂν τὰς Συρακούσας ἑλεῖν ἀπέτρεπε τὸν δῆμον, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ Καρχηδόνα καὶ Λιβύην ὀνειροπολῶν, ἐκ δὲ τούτων προσγενομένων Ἰταλίαν καὶ Πελοπόννησον ἤδη περιβαλλόμενος, ὀλίγου δεῖν ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου Σικελίαν ἐποιεῖτο. καὶ τοὺς μὲν νέους αὐτόθεν εἶχεν ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπηρμένους, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων ἠκροῶντο πολλὰ θαυμάσια περὶ τῆς στρατείας περαινόντων, ὥστε πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις καὶ τοῖς ἡμικυκλίοις καθέζεσθαι τῆς τε νήσου τὸ σχῆμα καὶ θέσιν Λιβύης καὶ Καρχηδόνος ὑπογράφοντας. 17.4. Σωκράτη μέντοι τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ Μέτωνα τὸν ἀστρολόγον οὐδὲν ἐλπίσαι τῇ πόλει χρηστὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατείας ἐκείνης λέγουσιν, ὁ μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ συνήθους δαιμονίου γενομένου καὶ προσημαίνοντος, ὁ δὲ Μέτων εἴτε δείσας ἐκ λογισμοῦ τὸ μέλλον εἴτε μαντικῆς τινι τρόπῳ χρησάμενος ἐσκήψατο μεμηνέναι, καὶ λαβὼν δᾷδα καιομένην οἷος ἦν αὑτοῦ τὴν οἰκίαν ὑφάπτειν. 23.7. Τιμαίαν γὰρ τὴν Ἄγιδος γυναῖκα τοῦ βασιλέως στρατευομένου καὶ ἀποδημοῦντος οὕτω διέφθειρεν ὥστε καὶ κύειν ἐξ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ μὴ ἀρνεῖσθαι, καὶ τεκούσης παιδάριον ἄρρεν ἔξω μὲν Λεωτυχίδην καλεῖσθαι, τὸ δʼ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ ψιθυριζόμενον ὄνομα πρὸς τὰς φίλας καὶ τὰς ὀπαδοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκιβιάδην εἶναι· τοσοῦτος ἔρως κατεῖχε τὴν ἄνθρωπον. ὁ δʼ ἐντρυφῶν ἔλεγεν οὐχ ὕβρει τοῦτο πράττειν οὐδὲ κρατούμενος ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς, ἀλλʼ ὅπως Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύσωσιν οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονότες. 23.8. οὕτω πραττόμενα ταῦτα πολλοὶ κατηγόρουν πρὸς τὸν Ἆγιν. ἐπίστευσε δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ μάλιστα, ὅτι σεισμοῦ γενομένου φοβηθεὶς ἐξέδραμε τοῦ θαλάμου παρὰ τῆς γυναικός, εἶτα δέκα μηνῶν οὐκέτι συνῆλθεν αὐτῇ, μεθʼ οὓς γενόμενον τὸν Λεωτυχίδην ἀπέφησεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς βασιλείας ἐξέπεσεν ὕστερον ὁ Λεωτυχίδης. 24.3. ὁ δʼ ἡσυχῆ προγνοὺς καὶ φοβηθεὶς τῶν μὲν πράξεων πασῶν ἐκοινώνει τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τὸ δʼ εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι παντάπασιν ἔφευγε, Τισαφέρνῃ δέ, τῷ βασιλέως σατράπῃ, δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας εὐθὺς ἦν παρʼ αὐτῷ πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος. 39.1. ὡς οὖν ὁ Λύσανδρος ἔπεμψε πρὸς τὸν Φαρνάβαζον ταῦτα πράττειν κελεύων, ὁ δὲ Μαγαίῳ τε τῷ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Σουσαμίθρῃ τῷ θείῳ προσέταξε τὸ ἔργον, ἔτυχε μὲν ἐν κώμῃ τινὶ τῆς Φρυγίας ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τότε διαιτώμενος, ἔχων Τιμάνδραν μεθʼ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἑταίραν, ὄψιν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους εἶδε τοιαύτην· 39.2. ἐδόκει περικεῖσθαι μὲν αὐτὸς τὴν ἐσθῆτα τῆς ἑταίρας, ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἔχουσαν αὐτοῦ κοσμεῖν τὸ πρόσωπον ὥσπερ γυναικὸς ὑπογράφουσαν καὶ ψιμυθιοῦσαν. ἕτεροι δέ φασιν ἰδεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποτέμνοντας αὐτοῦ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μαγαῖον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ τὸ σῶμα καιόμενον. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ὄψιν οὐ πολὺ γενέσθαι λέγουσι πρὸ τῆς τελευτῆς. οἱ δὲ πεμφθέντες πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ τὴν οἰκίαν περιστάντες ἐνεπίμπρασαν.

17.3. So while Nicias was trying to divert the people from the capture of Syracuse as an undertaking too difficult for them, Alcibiades was dreaming of Carthage and Libya, and, after winning these, of at once encompassing Italy and Peloponnesus. He almost regarded Sicily as the ways and means provided for his greater war. The young men were at once carried away on the wings of such hopes, and their elders kept recounting in their ears many wonderful things about the projected expedition. Many were they who sat in the palaestras and lounging-places mapping out in the sand the shape of Sicily and the position of Libya and Carthage. 17.4. Socrates the philosopher, however, and Meton the astrologer, are said to have had no hopes that any good would come to the city from this expedition; Socrates, as it is likely, because he got an inkling of the future from the divine guide who was his familiar. Meton â whether his fear of the future arose from mere calculation or from his use of some sort of divination â feigned madness, 200and seizing a blazing torch, was like to have set fire to his own house. 23.7. For while Agis the king was away on his campaigns, Alcibiades corrupted Timaea his wife, so that she was with child by him and made no denial of it. When she had given birth to a male child, it was called Leotychides in public, but in private the name which the boy's mother whispered to her friends and attendants was Alcibiades. Such was the passion that possessed the woman. But he, in his mocking way, said he had not done this thing for a wanton insult, nor at the behest of mere pleasure, but in order that descendants of his might be kings of the Lacedaemonians. 23.8. Such being the state of things, there were many to tell the tale to Agis, and he believed it, more especially owing to the lapse of time. There had been an earthquake, and he had run in terror out of his chamber and the arms of his wife, and then for ten months had had no further intercourse with her. And since Leotychides had been born at the end of this period, Agis declared that he was no child of his. For this reason Leotychides was afterwards refused the royal succession. 24 24.3. His stealthy discovery of this put him on his guard, and while in all their undertakings he took part with the Lacedaemonians, he sedulously avoided coming into their hands. Then, resorting to Tissaphernes, the King's satrap, for safety, he was soon first and foremost in that grandee's favour. 39.1. Accordingly, Lysander sent to Pharnabazus and bade him do this thing, and Pharnabazus commissioned Magaeus, his brother, and Sousamithras, his uncle, to perform the deed. At that time Alcibiades was living in a certain village of Phrygia, where he had Timandra the courtezan with him, and in his sleep he had the following vision. 39.2. He thought he had the courtezan's garments upon him, and that she was holding his head in her arms while she adorned his face like a woman's with paints and pigments. Others say that in his sleep he saw Magaeus' followers cutting off his head and his body burning. All agree in saying that he had the vision not long before his death. The party sent to kill him did not dare to enter his house, but surrounded it and set it on fire.

53. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 4.4-4.7, 5.1-5.3, 5.8-5.9, 6.7, 8.4-8.5, 20.2, 21.2, 21.8-21.9, 32.5-32.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 75, 78

4.4. Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ ἡ θερμότης τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ποτικὸν καὶ θυμοειδῆ παρεῖχεν. ἔτι δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ παιδὸς ἥ τε σωφροσύνη διεφαίνετο τῷ πρὸς τἆλλα ῥαγδαῖον ὄντα καὶ φερόμενον σφοδρῶς ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα δυσκίνητον εἶναι καὶ μετά πολλῆς πρᾳότητος ἅπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, 4.5. ἥ τε φιλοτιμία παρʼ ἡλικίαν ἐμβριθὲς εἶχε τὸ φρόνημα καὶ μεγαλόψυχον. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπὸ παντὸς οὔτε πᾶσαν ἠγάπα δόξαν, ὡς Φίλιππος λόγου τε δεινότητι σοφιστικῶς καλλωπιζόμενος καὶ τὰς ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, νίκας τῶν ἁρμάτων ἐγχαράττων τοῖς νομίσμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀποπειρωμένων εἰ βούλοιτʼ ἂν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίσασθαι στάδιον, ἦν γὰρ ποδώκης, εἴ γε, ἔφη, βασιλεῖς ἔμελλον ἕξειν ἀνταγωνιστάς. 4.6. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀθλητῶν γένος ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων πλείστους γέ τοι θεὶς ἀγῶνας οὐ μόνον τραγῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ κιθαρῳδῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν, θήρας τε παντοδαπῆς καὶ ῥαβδομαχίας, οὔτε πυγμῆς οὔτε παγκρατίου μετά τινος σπουδῆς ἔθηκεν ἆθλον. 5.3. οὐ γὰρ ἡδονὴν ζηλῶν οὐδὲ πλοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ δόξαν, ἐνόμιζεν, ὅσῳ πλείονα λήψεται παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, ἐλάττονα κατορθώσειν διʼ ἑαυτοῦ, διὸ τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐξομένοις καταναλίσκεσθαι τὰς πράξεις εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἡγούμενος, ἐβούλετο μὴ χρήματα μηδὲ τρυφὰς καὶ ἀπολαύσεις, ἀλλʼ ἀγῶνας καὶ πολέμους καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν παραλαβεῖν. 20.2. ἀποκριναμένου δὲ Δαρείου δεδιέναι μὴ φθάσωσιν αὑτὸν ἀποδράντες οἱ πολέμιοι καί διαφυγὼν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλὰ τούτου γε, εἶπεν, ὦ βασιλεῦ, χάριν θάρρει βαδιεῖται γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ σέ, καί σχεδὸν ἤδη βαδίζει. ταῦτα λέγων Ἀμύντας οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλʼ ἀναστὰς ἐπορεύετο Δαρεῖος εἰς Κιλικίαν, ἅμα δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς Συρίαν ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνον.

4.4. And in Alexander’s case, it was the heat of his body, as it would seem, which made him prone to drink, and choleric. But while he was still a boy his self-restraint showed itself in the fact that, although he was impetuous and violent in other matters, the pleasures of the body had little hold upon him, and he indulged in them with great moderation, while his ambition kept his spirit serious and lofty in advance of his years. 4.5. For it was neither every kind of fame nor fame from every source that he courted, as Philip did, who plumed himself like a sophist on the power of his oratory, and took care to have the victories of his chariots at Olympia engraved upon his coins; nay, when those about him inquired whether he would be willing to contend in the foot-race at the Olympic games, since he was swift of foot, Yes, said he, if I could have kings as my contestants. 4.6. And in general, too, Alexander appears to have been averse to the whole race of athletes; at any rate, though he instituted very many contests, not only for tragic poets and players on the flute and players on the lyre, but also for rhapsodists, as well as for hunting of every sort and for fighting with staves, he took no interest in offering prizes either for boxing or for the pancratium. 5.3. For since he did not covet pleasure, nor even wealth, but excellence and fame, he considered that the more he should receive from his father the fewer would be the successes won by himself. Therefore, considering that increase in prosperity meant the squandering upon his father of opportunities for achievement, he preferred to receive from him a realm which afforded, not wealth nor luxury and enjoyment, but struggles and wars and ambitions. 20.2. And when Dareius replied that he was afraid the enemy would run away before he could get at them, and Alexander thus escape him, Indeed, said Amyntas, on this point, O king, thou mayest be without fear; for he will march against thee, nay, at this very moment, probably, he is on the march. Dareius would not listen to these words of Amyntas, but broke camp and marched into Cilicia, and at the same time Alexander marched into Syria against him.

54. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 85.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 115

85.3. Certain of the Peripatetics reply to this syllogism by interpreting "unperturbed," "unwavering," and "free from sadness" in such a way as to make "unperturbed" mean one who is rarely perturbed and only to a moderate degree, and not one who is never perturbed. Likewise, they say that a person is called "free from sadness" who is not subject to sadness, one who falls into this objectionable state not often nor in too great a degree. It is not, they say, the way of human nature that a man's spirit should be exempt from sadness, or that the wise man is not overcome by grief but is merely touched by it, and other arguments of this sort, all in accordance with the teachings of their school.

55. Plutarch, Mark Antony, 19.4, 87.8-87.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1, 154

56. Plutarch, Sayings of The Spartans, 7.2, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1, 88, 107

8.1. Ἀκρότατος, ἐπεὶ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτὸν ἄδικόν τι συμπρᾶξαι αὐτοῖς ἠξίουν, μέχρι τινὸς ἀντέλεγεν· ὡς δὲ ἐνέκειντο, εἶπεν ἕως μὲν παρʼ ὑμῖν ἦν, οὐκ ἠπιστάμην δικαιοσύνης οὐδεμίαν ἔννοιαν ἐπεὶ δὲ με τῇ πατρίδι παρέδοτε καὶ τοῖς ταύτης νόμοις, ἔτι δὲ δὲ scrib. vid. δʼ ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ καλοκαγαθίᾳ ἐπαιδεύσατε ὡς ἠδύνασθε, τούτοις πειράσομαι ἢ ἢ ] μᾶλλον ἢ ? ὑμῖν ἕπεσθαι· καὶ ἐπεὶ θέλετε ἄριστα πράττειν, ἄριστα δὲ τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄρχοντι, πράξω ἃ θέλετε ἃ δὲ λέγετε παραιτήσομαι.

8.1. Acrotatus, when his parents claimed it was his duty to co-operate with them in some unjust action, spoke in opposition up to a certain limit. But when they insisted, he said, While I was with you, I had not the slightest idea of justice; but since you have surrendered me to our country and its laws, and, besides, have had me instructed in justice and honourable conduct so far as lay in your power, I shall try to follow these rather than you. And since your wish is for me to do what is best, and since what is just is best both for a private citizen, and much more so for a ruler, I will do what you wish; but as for what you propose I shall beg to be excused. Cf. a similar remark of Agesilaus, Moralia, 534 D.

57. Plutarch, Aristides, 7.2, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 1, 88, 107

8.1. τρίτῳ δʼ ἔτει Ξέρξου διὰ Θετταλίας καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐλαύνοντος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικήν, λύσαντες τὸν νόμον ἐψηφίσαντο τοῖς μεθεστῶσι κάθοδον, μάλιστα φοβούμενοι τὸν Ἀριστείδην, μὴ προσθέμενος τοῖς πολεμίοις διαφθείρῃ καὶ μεταστήσῃ πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὅς γε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δόγματος τούτου διετέλει προτρέπων καὶ παροξύνων τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, καὶ μετὰ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο, Θεμιστοκλέους στρατηγοῦντος αὐτοκράτορος, πάντα συνέπραττε καὶ συνεβούλευεν, ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κοινῇ ποιῶν τὸν ἔχθιστον.

8.1. But in the third year thereafter, when Xerxes was marching through Thessaly and Boeotia against Attica, they repealed their law of ostracism, and voted that those who had been sent away under it might return. The chief reason for this was their fear of Aristides, lest he attach himself to the enemy's cause, and corrupt and pervert many of his fellow-citizens to the side of the Barbarian. But they much misjudged the man. Even before this decree of theirs, he was ever inciting and urging the Hellenes to win their freedom; and after it was passed, when Themistocles was general with sole powers, he assisted him in every undertaking and counsel, although he thereby, for the sake of the general safety, made his chiefest foe the most famous of men.

58. Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

8.1. τὴν δὲ μάχην ἐκείνην πολλῶν μὲν ἀπηγγελκότων, Ξενοφῶντος δὲ μονονουχὶ δεικνύοντος ὄψει, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὡς οὐ γεγενημένοις, ἀλλὰ γινομένοις, ἐφιστάντος ἀεὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐμπαθῆ καὶ συγκινδυνεύοντα διὰ Τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οὐκ ἔστι νοῦν ἔχοντος ἐπεξηγεῖσθαι, πλὴν ὅσα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου παρῆλθεν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνον.

8.1. Now, since many writers have reported to us this battle, and since Xenophon brings it all before our eyes, and by the vigour of his description makes his reader always a participant in the emotions and perils of the struggle, as though it belonged, not to the past, but to the present, it would be folly to describe it again, except so far as he has passed over things worthy of mention.

59. Plutarch, Comparison of Lysander With Sulla, 2.1-2.7, 3.1-3.2, 3.6-3.8, 4.4-4.5, 5.3-5.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ambiguity, moral, in the endings of lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 107, 108

2.1. ἐπεχείρησε μὲν οὖν ὁ Λύσανδρος, ὡς εἴρηται, μεταστῆσαι τὰ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν πρᾳότερον καὶ νομιμώτερον ἢ Σύλλας· πειθοῖ γὰρ, οὐ διʼ ὅπλων οὐδὲ πάντα συλλήβδην ἀναιρῶν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλʼ αὐτὴν ἐπανορθούμενος τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν βασιλέων ὃ καὶ φύσει που δίκαιον ἐδόκει, τὸν ἐξ ἀρίστων ἄριστον ἄρχειν ἐν πόλει τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγουμένῃ διʼ ἀρετήν, οὐ διʼ εὐγένειαν. 2.2. ὥσπερ γὰρ κυνηγὸς οὐ ζητεῖ τὸ ἐκ κυνός, ἀλλὰ κύνα, καὶ ἱππικὸς ἵππον, οὐ τὸ ἐξ ἵππου· τί γὰρ, ἂν ἐξ ἵππου ἡμίονος γένηται; οὕτως ὁ πολιτικὸς ἁμαρτήσεται τοῦ παντός, ἐὰν μὴ ζητῇ τὸν ἄρχοντα τίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τίνος, αὐτοί γέ τοι Σπαρτιᾶται βασιλεύοντας ἐνίους ἀφείλοντο τὴν ἀρχήν, ὡς οὐ βασιλικούς, ἀλλὰ φαύλους καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὄντας, εἰ δὲ κακία καὶ μετά γένους ἄτιμον, οὐδʼ ἀρετὴ διʼ εὐγένειαν, ἀλλʼ ἀφʼ ἑαυτῆς ἔντιμον. 2.3. αἱ τοίνυν ἀδικίαι τῷ μὲν ὑπὲρ φίλων, τῷ δʼ ἄχρι φίλων ἐπράχθησαν. Λύσανδρος μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ τὰς πλείστας σφαγὰς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀπεργάσασθαι δυναστείας καὶ τυραννίδος· 4.4. Σύλλας μὲν οὖν ὅσας ἐκ παρατάξεως ἐνίκησε νίκας καὶ κατέβαλε μυριάδας πολεμίων οὐδὲ ἀριθμῆσαι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην δὶς εἷλε, καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐ λιμῷ καθάπερ Λύσανδρος, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ μεγάλοις, ἐκβαλὼν Ἀρχέλαον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν, κατέσχεν. ἔστι δὲ μέγα καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀντιστρατήγων, τρυφὴν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ παιδιὰν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον διαναυμαχεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου κυβερνήτην, καὶ Φιλοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατᾶν δημαγωγόν, ἄδοξον, ἄκραν γλῶσσαν ἠκονημένον οὓς οὐκ ἂν ἱπποκόμῳ Μιθριδάτης οὐδὲ ῥαβδούχῳ Μάριος ἠξίωσε παραβαλεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. 4.5. τῶν δὲ πρὸς Σύλλαν ἀνταραμένων δυναστῶν, ὑπάτων, στρατηγῶν, δημαγωγῶν, ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσω, τίς ἦν Ῥωμαίων Μαρίου φοβερώτερος ἢ Μιθριδάτου βασιλέων δυνατώτερος ἢ Λαμπωνίου καὶ Τελεσίνου τῶν Ἰταλικῶν μαχιμώτερος; ὧν ἐκεῖνος τὸν μὲν ἐξέβαλε, τὸν δὲ ὑπέταξε, τοὺς δὲ ἀπέκτεινε.

2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 4.4. 4.5.

60. Plutarch, Whether An Old Man Should Engage In Public Affairs, 792b, 792c, 785-786a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

61. Hierocles Stoicus, , 1.34-1.39 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, on moral failings of others Found in books: Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 55

62. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 5.31, 7.88 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 87, 115

5.31. He held that the virtues are not mutually interdependent. For a man might be prudent, or again just, and at the same time profligate and unable to control his passions. He said too that the wise man was not exempt from all passions, but indulged them in moderation.He defined friendship as an equality of reciprocal good-will, including under the term as one species the friendship of kinsmen, as another that of lovers, and as a third that of host and guest. The end of love was not merely intercourse but also philosophy. According to him the wise man would fall in love and take part in politics; furthermore he would marry and reside at a king's court. of three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the pleasure-loving life, he gave the preference to the contemplative. He held that the studies which make up the ordinary education are of service for the attainment of virtue. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.

63. Anon., Adespota K-A1, 12 Tagged with subjects: •popular morality in athens Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 196

64. Plutarch, Bellone An Pace 6, 347a Tagged with subjects: •moralism, in the lives •understand(ing) (as part of the process of moral evaluation) Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 6

65. Plutarch, Arist.-Cato Maj., 3.2-3.5 Tagged with subjects: •ambiguity, moral, in the endings of lives Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 107

66. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), 2 122.2-4 w., 2 125.19-21 w. Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 155

67. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2 75.1-6 w. Tagged with subjects: •honestum (or honestas) = gr. kalon (the honourable, fine or morally good) Found in books: Tsouni, Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics (2019) 87

68. Aeschines, Or., 1.132-1.159 Tagged with subjects: •popular morality in athens Found in books: Blondell and Ormand, Ancient Sex: New Essays (2015) 186, 187

69. Plutarch, Cor.-Alc., 1.3-1.4, 3.2-3.6 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Chrysanthou, Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement (2018) 106

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database