1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 22.23-22.27 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 133| 22.23. "כִּי יִהְיֶה נער [נַעֲרָה] בְתוּלָה מְאֹרָשָׂה לְאִישׁ וּמְצָאָהּ אִישׁ בָּעִיר וְשָׁכַב עִמָּהּ׃", 22.24. "וְהוֹצֵאתֶם אֶת־שְׁנֵיהֶם אֶל־שַׁעַר הָעִיר הַהִוא וּסְקַלְתֶּם אֹתָם בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתוּ אֶת־הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] עַל־דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־צָעֲקָה בָעִיר וְאֶת־הָאִישׁ עַל־דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר־עִנָּה אֶת־אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ׃", 22.25. "וְאִם־בַּשָּׂדֶה יִמְצָא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] הַמְאֹרָשָׂה וְהֶחֱזִיק־בָּהּ הָאִישׁ וְשָׁכַב עִמָּהּ וּמֵת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־שָׁכַב עִמָּהּ לְבַדּוֹ׃", 22.26. "ולנער [וְלַנַּעֲרָה] לֹא־תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר אֵין לנער [לַנַּעֲרָה] חֵטְא מָוֶת כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה׃", 22.27. "כִּי בַשָּׂדֶה מְצָאָהּ צָעֲקָה הנער [הַנַּעֲרָה] הַמְאֹרָשָׂה וְאֵין מוֹשִׁיעַ לָהּ׃", | 22.23. "If there be a damsel that is a virgin betrothed unto a man, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her;", 22.24. "then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die: the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he hath humbled his neighbour’s wife; so thou shalt put away the evil from the midst of thee.", 22.25. "But if the man find the damsel that is betrothed in the field, and the man take hold of her, and lie with her; then the man only that lay with her shall die.", 22.26. "But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death; for as when a man riseth against his neighbour, and slayeth him, even so is this matter.", 22.27. "For he found her in the field; the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none to save her.", |
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| 2. Mishnah, Qiddushin, 1.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116 |
3. Tosefta, Kiddushin, 1.3-1.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 1.3. "איזהו גרעון כסף רצה לפדות א\"ע בתוך השנים האלו מחשב את המעות ואת השנים ונותן לרבו מפני שיד העבד על העליונה איזו היא חזקת קרקעות נעל וגדר ופרץ כל שהוא הרי זו חזקה איזו היא חזקת עבדים נעל לו סנדלו [והתיר] לו סנדלו [והוליך אחריו כלים למרחץ ה\"ז חזקה הגביהו ר\"ש אומר] אין [לך] חזקה גדולה מזו.", 1.4. "וקונה א\"ע בראשי אברים וקונה א\"ע בכסף ע\"י אחרים ובשטר על ידי עצמו מפני שהוא כנותן משמאלו לימינו דברי ר\"מ וחכ\"א בכסף ע\"י עצמו בשטר ע\"י אחרים ובלבד שיהא [כסף] של אחרים ואומר לו ע\"מ שאין לך רשות אלא לפדות בו רשב\"א [אמר] משום ר\"מ אף בשטר ע\"י אחרים אבל לא ע\"י עצמו.", | 1.3. "Which is \"deduction of price\" [through which a Hebrew slave can go free according to Mishnah Kiddushin 1:2]? He wanted to redeem himself within those [6] years [that he is a slave], he calculated the coins and the years [remaining] and payed them to his master, and the slave has the upper hand [he can calculate based on how much his price was worth when he sold himself originally or how much that would be worth now, whichever is better for him]. Which is presumption [of ownership] of land? A lock, fence or opening of any size [that belongs to him]—this is a presumption [of ownership]. Which is presumption [of ownership] of [Canaanite] slaves? If [the slave] ties [the owner's] shoe, undoes his shoe, brings vessels after him to the bathhouse—this is a presumption. If he lifted him up [e.g. to help him get on a horse]—Rabbi Shimon said: There is no greater presumption than this.", 1.4. "[The Hebrew slave] acquires himself with [loss of] major limbs (see Shemot 21:26). He acquires himself with money via others and a contract via himself, [and he can't acquire with his own money] because he is like one who gives from the left hand to his right [i.e. whatever is his is his master's, so the money needs to come from elsewhere]—words of Rabbi Meir. But Hakhamim say: [Even] money via himself or a contract via others, as long as the money belongs to others and he says to him [when he gives him the money], \"[This is] with the understanding that you can only redeem [yourself] with this money\". Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Meir: Even a contract via others, but not one via himself.", |
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4. Tosefta, Qiddushin, 1.3-1.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 1.3. "איזהו גרעון כסף רצה לפדות א\"ע בתוך השנים האלו מחשב את המעות ואת השנים ונותן לרבו מפני שיד העבד על העליונה איזו היא חזקת קרקעות נעל וגדר ופרץ כל שהוא הרי זו חזקה איזו היא חזקת עבדים נעל לו סנדלו [והתיר] לו סנדלו [והוליך אחריו כלים למרחץ ה\"ז חזקה הגביהו ר\"ש אומר] אין [לך] חזקה גדולה מזו.", 1.4. "וקונה א\"ע בראשי אברים וקונה א\"ע בכסף ע\"י אחרים ובשטר על ידי עצמו מפני שהוא כנותן משמאלו לימינו דברי ר\"מ וחכ\"א בכסף ע\"י עצמו בשטר ע\"י אחרים ובלבד שיהא [כסף] של אחרים ואומר לו ע\"מ שאין לך רשות אלא לפדות בו רשב\"א [אמר] משום ר\"מ אף בשטר ע\"י אחרים אבל לא ע\"י עצמו.", | 1.3. "Which is \"deduction of price\" [through which a Hebrew slave can go free according to Mishnah Kiddushin 1:2]? He wanted to redeem himself within those [6] years [that he is a slave], he calculated the coins and the years [remaining] and payed them to his master, and the slave has the upper hand [he can calculate based on how much his price was worth when he sold himself originally or how much that would be worth now, whichever is better for him]. Which is presumption [of ownership] of land? A lock, fence or opening of any size [that belongs to him]—this is a presumption [of ownership]. Which is presumption [of ownership] of [Canaanite] slaves? If [the slave] ties [the owner's] shoe, undoes his shoe, brings vessels after him to the bathhouse—this is a presumption. If he lifted him up [e.g. to help him get on a horse]—Rabbi Shimon said: There is no greater presumption than this.", 1.4. "[The Hebrew slave] acquires himself with [loss of] major limbs (see Shemot 21:26). He acquires himself with money via others and a contract via himself, [and he can't acquire with his own money] because he is like one who gives from the left hand to his right [i.e. whatever is his is his master's, so the money needs to come from elsewhere]—words of Rabbi Meir. But Hakhamim say: [Even] money via himself or a contract via others, as long as the money belongs to others and he says to him [when he gives him the money], \"[This is] with the understanding that you can only redeem [yourself] with this money\". Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Meir: Even a contract via others, but not one via himself.", |
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5. Mishnah, Yevamot, 6.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 6.1. "הַבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג, בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאֹנֶס, בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן, אֲפִלּוּ הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא מְזִידָה, הוּא מֵזִיד וְהִיא שׁוֹגֶגֶת, הוּא אָנוּס וְהִיא לֹא אֲנוּסָה, הִיא אֲנוּסָה וְהוּא לֹא אָנוּס, אֶחָד הַמְעָרֶה וְאֶחָד הַגּוֹמֵר, קָנָה, וְלֹא חָלַק בֵּין בִּיאָה לְבִיאָה: \n", | 6.1. "One who has intercourse with his yevamah, whether in error or with presumption, whether under compulsion or of his own free will, even if he acted in error and she in presumption, or he in presumption and she in error, or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion, whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse, he has acquired her as a wife. The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse.", |
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| 6. Palestinian Talmud, Yevamot, None (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 7. Anon., Sifre Deuteronomy, 288, 241 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116 |
| 8. Anon., Mekhilta Derabbi Shimeon Ben Yohai, 22.15 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116 |
| 9. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 5.1.2, 5.17.2, 9.9.20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 129, 162 |
10. Babylonian Talmud, Qiddushin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 9b. יציאה בעינן לשמה אף הוייה בעינן לשמה או דלמא הויות להדדי מקשינן מה הוייה דכסף לא בעינן לשמה אף הוייה דשטר לא בעינן לשמה,בתר דבעיא הדר פשטה הוייה ליציאה מקשינן דאמר קרא (דברים כד, ב) ויצאה והיתה :,איתמר כתבו לשמה ושלא מדעתה רבא ורבינא אמרי מקודשת רב פפא ורב שרביא אמרי אינה מקודשת אמר רב פפא אימא טעמא דידהו ואימא טעמא דידי אימא טעמא דידהו דכתיב ויצאה והיתה מקיש הוייה ליציאה מה יציאה לשמה ושלא מדעתה אף הוייה נמי לשמה ושלא מדעתה,ואימא טעמא דידי ויצאה והיתה מקיש הוייה ליציאה מה יציאה בעינן דעת מקנה אף הוייה בעינן דעת מקנה,מיתיבי אין כותבין שטרי אירוסין ונשואין אלא מדעת שניהן מאי לאו שטרי אירוסין ונשואין ממש לא שטרי פסיקתא וכדרב גידל אמר רב,דאמר רב גידל אמר רב כמה אתה נותן לבנך כך וכך לבתך כך וכך עמדו וקדשו קנו הן הן הדברים הנקנים באמירה :,ובביאה : מנא לן אמר ר' אבהו א"ר יוחנן דאמר קרא (דברים כב, כב) בעולת בעל מלמד שנעשה לה בעל על ידי בעילה א"ל ר' זירא לר' אבהו ואמרי לה ר"ל לרבי יוחנן כעורה זו ששנה רבי (דברים כד, א) ובעלה מלמד שנקנית בביאה,אי מהתם הוה אמינא עד דמקדש והדר בעיל קמ"ל,מתקיף לה ר' אבא בר ממל אם כן נערה המאורסה דאמר רחמנא בסקילה היכי משכחת לה,אי דאקדיש והדר בעיל בעולה היא אי דאקדיש ולא בעיל לאו כלום הוא אמרוה רבנן קמיה דאביי משכחת לה כגון שבא עליה ארוס שלא כדרכה,א"ל אביי עד כאן לא פליגי רבי ורבנן אלא באחר אבל בעל דברי הכל אם בא עליה שלא כדרכה עשאה בעולה,מאי היא דתניא באו עליה י' אנשים ועדיין היא בתולה כולן בסקילה רבי אומר אומר אני הראשון בסקילה וכולן בחנק,אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק משכחת לה כגון שקדשה בשטר הואיל וגומר ומוציא גומר ומכניס,ור' יוחנן האי ובעלה מאי עביד ליה ההוא מיבעי ליה זו נקנית בביאה ואין אמה העבריה נקנית בביאה,ס"ד אמינא תיתי בק"ו מיבמה ומה יבמה שאין נקנית בכסף נקנית בביאה זו שנקנית בכסף אינו דין שנקנית בביאה,מה ליבמה שכן זקוקה ועומדת ס"ד אמינא הואיל וכתב (שמות כא, י) אם אחרת יקח לו הקישה הכתוב לאחרת מה אחרת מיקניא בביאה אף אמה העבריה מיקניא בביאה קמ"ל,ורבי האי סברא מנא ליה א"כ לכתוב רחמנא ובעל מאי ובעלה שמע מינה תרתי,ולרבא דאמר בר אהינא אסברה לי (דברים כד, א) כי יקח איש אשה ובעלה קידושין המסורין לביאה הוו קידושין קידושין שאין מסורין לביאה לא הוו קידושין מאי איכא למימר,אם כן נכתוב קרא או בעלה מאי ובעלה שמע מינה כולהו,ורבי האי בעולת בעל מאי עביד ליה האי מיבעי ליה בעל עושה אותה בעולה שלא כדרכה ואין אחר עושה אותה בעולה שלא כדרכה,ומי אית ליה לרבי האי סברא והתניא באו עליה י' אנשים ועדיין היא בתולה כולם בסקילה רבי אומר אומר אני הראשון בסקילה וכולם בחנק | 9b. b we require /b that the document of b leaving, /b i.e., a bill of divorce, must be written specifically b for her sake, so too, we require /b that the document of b becoming /b betrothed be written b for her sake. Or perhaps we juxtapose /b the different b modes of becoming /b betrothed b to each other /b and say: b Just as we do not require /b that b becoming /b betrothed b with money /b must be carried out with coins minted b for her sake, so too, we do not require /b that b becoming /b betrothed b with a document /b must be with a document written b for her sake. /b , b After he raised the dilemma, /b Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish b then resolved it. We juxtapose becoming /b betrothed b to leaving /b a marriage, b as the verse states: “And she departs /b out of his house, and goes b and becomes” /b (Deuteronomy 24:2). This shows that the i halakhot /i of a betrothal document are derived from those of a bill of divorce, and therefore a document of betrothal must also be written for her sake., b It was stated /b that i amora’im /i disagreed with regard to the following issue: If a man b wrote /b a document of betrothal b for her sake but without her consent, /b i.e., she did not know at the time that they were writing it but accepted it afterward, b Rava and Ravina say: She is betrothed. Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed. Rav Pappa said: I will say their reason and I will say my reason. I will state their reason, as it is written: “And she departs /b out of his house, and goes b and becomes,” /b by which the verse b juxtaposes becoming /b betrothed b to leaving /b a marriage. b Just as /b a bill of divorce, written for b leaving /b a marriage must be written b for her own sake but /b can be written b without her consent, so too, /b a document written for b becoming /b betrothed must be written b for her own sake and /b can even be b without her consent. /b , b And I will say my reason: /b The verse says: b “And she departs /b out of his house, and goes b and becomes.” /b The verse b juxtaposes becoming /b betrothed b to leaving /b a marriage. b Just as /b with regard to a bill of divorce, written for b leaving /b a marriage, b we require the consent of the one transferring /b ownership, i.e., the man, as he divorces and transfers authority of the woman to herself, b so too, /b with regard to a document written for b becoming /b betrothed, b we require the consent of the one transferring /b ownership, which in this case is the woman, who must agree to the marriage.,The Gemara b raises an objection /b from a mishna ( i Bava Batra /i 167b) against the opinion that she is betrothed if the document was written without her consent. b One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both /b the man and woman. b What, is /b the mishna b not /b referring to b actual documents of betrothal and marriage, /b which indicates that the document must be written with the woman’s consent? The Gemara rejects this proof: b No, /b this is referring to b documents of stipulation, /b which contain the details of the dowry. b And /b this statement is b in accordance with /b that which b Rav Giddel /b says that b Rav says. /b , b As Rav Giddel says /b that b Rav says: /b If the father of one member of the couple says to the father of the other: b How much are you giving to your son? /b And he answers: b Such and such, /b and adds: How much are you giving b to your daughter? /b And the other responds: b Such and such, /b then if b they, /b the couple, subsequently b arose and /b became b betrothed, they acquire /b everything that was promised. b These are the matters that are acquired through speech, /b and they do not require an act of acquisition. The documents of betrothal mentioned here that require the woman’s consent are those which contain this type of monetary obligation, not actual documents of betrothal.,§ The mishna teaches that a woman can be betrothed b through sexual intercourse. /b The Gemara asks: b From where do we /b derive this? b Rabbi Abbahu said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said /b that b the verse states: /b “If a man be found lying with b a married woman [ i beulat ba’al /i ]” /b (Deuteronomy 22:22). This b teaches that he becomes her husband [ i ba’al /i ] by means of sexual intercourse [ i be’ila /i ]. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abbahu, and some say /b it was b Reish Lakish /b who said this b to Rabbi Yoḥa: /b Is b this /b other proof, b taught by Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b unacceptable: /b “When a man takes a woman b and engages in sexual intercourse with her” /b (Deuteronomy 24:1)? This verse b teaches /b that b she can be acquired through intercourse. /b ,The Gemara answers that the verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is insufficient proof that a woman can be betrothed via intercourse, as, b if /b this i halakha /i were derived only b from there, I would say /b that she is not considered his wife b unless he /b first b betroths /b her through money, indicated by the phrase “takes a woman,” b and then engages in intercourse /b with her. This is the only valid mode of betrothal, and intercourse alone is not enough. Therefore, the verse states “a married woman [ i beulat ba’al /i ]” and b teaches us /b that intercourse by itself is a valid means of betrothal., b Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: /b The above suggestion, that both money and sexual intercourse are required for betrothal, cannot be the correct interpretation of the verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her.” This is because, b if /b it is b so, /b that a woman can be acquired only through both betrothal money and intercourse, the case of one who engages in intercourse with b a betrothed young woman, /b concerning which b the Merciful One states /b in the Torah that he is punished b by stoning /b (see Deuteronomy 22:23–24) b , how can you find /b a case where he is liable to be punished in this manner?,Rabbi Abba bar Memel elaborates: b If /b this is referring to a case b where he betrothed /b her with money b and then engaged in sexual intercourse /b with her, b she is a non-virgin, /b and the punishment of stoning applies only to one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young virgin. b If /b it is referring to a case b where he betrothed /b her with money b and did not engage in intercourse /b with her, this b is nothing, /b as the betrothal has not been completed. b The Rabbis said before Abaye: You find it /b in a case b where /b he betrothed her with money and then the b betrothed man engaged in intercourse with her in an atypical manner, /b i.e., anal intercourse. Despite the fact that she is still a virgin, the betrothal has taken effect by means of this type of sexual intercourse., b Abaye said to /b those Sages: The verse cannot be explained in that manner, as b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to another /b man, i.e., whether a woman is considered to be a virgin after engaging in anal intercourse with another man. b But /b with regard to her b husband, everyone agrees /b that b if he engages in intercourse in an atypical manner with her he has rendered her a non-virgin. /b If so, she is no longer considered a virgin with regard to the i halakha /i of a betrothed young woman.,The Gemara clarifies: b What is /b the dispute to which Abaye refers? b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i ( i Tosefta /i , i Sanhedrin /i 10:4): If b ten men engaged in sexual intercourse with /b a betrothed young woman, b and she is still a virgin, /b as they engaged in anal intercourse with her, b they are all /b punished b by stoning. Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: I say /b that b the first /b one is punished b by stoning, /b as he engaged in intercourse with a virgin young woman, b but all /b the others are punished b by strangulation. /b Once the first man engages in intercourse with her she is no longer considered a virgin, even if he engaged in anal intercourse with her., b Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said /b a different answer to Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s question: b You find /b a situation where a man who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is punished by stoning in a case b where he betrothed her with a document. /b Everyone agrees that b since /b a document, i.e., a bill of divorce, b completely removes /b a woman from her husband, without the need for an additional act, it also b completely brings /b her into the state of betrothal. If a young woman is betrothed by means of a document, she can be a betrothed young woman while remaining a virgin.,The Gemara returns to the different derivations of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yoḥa. b And Rabbi Yoḥa, /b who maintains that the mode of betrothal through intercourse is derived from the verse: “If a man be found lying with a married woman [ i beulat ba’al /i ]” (Deuteronomy 22:22), what does he b do with this /b verse: “When a man takes a woman b and engages in sexual intercourse with her” /b (Deuteronomy 24:1)? The Gemara answers: b He requires that /b verse for a different i halakha /i , as he maintains that it teaches that b this /b woman b can be acquired through intercourse, but a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse. /b ,As it might b enter your mind to say: Let /b the i halakha /i of a Hebrew maidservant b be derived through an i a fortiori /i /b inference b from /b the i halakha /i of b a i yevama /i : Just as a i yevama /i , who cannot be acquired through money /b at all, nevertheless b can be acquired through intercourse, /b which indicates that the ability of an act of sexual intercourse to effect acquisition is greater than that of money, b is it not logical that this /b Hebrew maidservant, b who can be acquired through money, can /b also b be acquired through intercourse? /b ,The Gemara rejects this opinion: b What /b is unique b about a i yevama /i is that she is bound and standing /b waiting for the i yavam /i , i.e., there is already a connection between them. Perhaps it is for this reason that intercourse enables a i yavam /i to acquire a i yevama /i , and the same cannot be said of a maidservant. Rather, it might b enter your mind to say /b a different claim: b Since it is written /b with regard to a the master of a Hebrew maidservant: b “If he take himself another /b wife” (Exodus 21:10), this b verse juxtaposes /b a Hebrew maidservant b with another /b woman that a master marries: b Just as another /b woman that a master marries b can be acquired through intercourse, so too, a Hebrew maidservant can be acquired through intercourse. Therefore, /b the verse b teaches us, /b with the phrase “and engages in sexual intercourse with her,” that this is not the case.,The Gemara asks: b And Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, who learns that betrothal can be effected through sexual intercourse from this verse, b from where does he /b derive b this conclusion /b that a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse? The Gemara answers: b If so, /b that this verse is teaching only one i halakha /i , b let the Merciful One write /b simply: b And he engages in sexual intercourse. What /b is the meaning of the phrase b “And he engages in sexual intercourse with her”? Learn two /b i halakhot /i b from it. /b One can learn from this verse both that a woman can be acquired through intercourse, and that an ordinary woman can be betrothed through intercourse but a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse.,The Gemara asks: b And according to /b the opinion of b Rava, who said: Bar Ahina explained this to me /b by citing a proof from the following verse: b “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” /b (Deuteronomy 24:1), which teaches that b betrothal that is given to consummation, /b i.e., betrothal when it is permitted for the man and woman to engage in intercourse, b is a betrothal, /b but b betrothal that is not given to consummation is not /b a valid b betrothal, what is there to say? /b Since he uses this verse for a different purpose, from where does Rava derive that a woman can be betrothed through intercourse and that a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired in this manner?,The Gemara answers: b If so, /b that a woman cannot be betrothed through intercourse, b let the verse write: /b When a man takes a woman b or engages in intercourse with her. What is /b indicated by the phrase: b “And engages in sexual intercourse with her”? /b One can b learn from /b the verse b all /b these i halakhot /i , that intercourse is a valid mode of betrothing a woman but not acquiring a maidservant, and betrothal is effective only when it is given to consummation.,The Gemara asks: b And Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b what does he do with this /b verse: “If a man be found lying with b a married woman [ i beulat ba’al /i ]” /b (Deuteronomy 22:22), from which Rabbi Yoḥa derives that intercourse is a valid means of betrothal? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi b requires this /b verse for the i halakha /i that b the husband renders her a non-virgin /b even if he engages b in intercourse /b with her b in an atypical manner, but no other /b man b renders her a non-virgin /b by engaging b in intercourse /b with her b in an atypical manner. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And does Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b accept this opinion? But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i : If b ten men engaged in intercourse with /b a betrothed young woman, b and she is still a virgin, they are all /b punished b by stoning. Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: I say /b that b the first /b one is punished b by stoning, but /b the others are b all /b punished b by strangulation. /b This proves that in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, even one who is not her husband can render a woman a non-virgin by engaging in anal intercourse with her. |
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11. Babylonian Talmud, Sotah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 24b. שעמום ורבי יאשיה האי תחת אישה מאי עביד ליה מיבעי ליה להקיש איש לאשה ואשה לאיש,אלא טעמא דכתיבי הני קראי הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא ארוסה שתיא והא כי אתא רבי אחא בר חנינא מדרומא אתא ואייתי מתניתא בידיה (במדבר ה, כ) מבלעדי אישך משקדמה שכיבת בעל לבועל ולא שקדמה שכיבת בועל לבעל,אמר רמי בר חמא משכחת לה כגון שבא עליה ארוס בבית אביה,דכוותה גבי שומרת יבם כגון שבא עליה יבם בבית חמיה הא שומרת יבם קרית לה אשתו מעלייתא היא דהאמר רב קנה לכל,כשמואל דאמר לא קנה אלא לדברים האמורים בפרשה,אי הכי לימא רב דאמר כרבי יאשיה ושמואל דאמר כרבי יונתן אמר לך רב אנא דאמרי אפילו לרבי יונתן מדאיצטריך קרא למעוטה מכלל דאשתו מעלייתא היא | 24b. b a mentally ill person [ i shiamum /i ], /b whom the court warns on behalf of the husband. The Gemara asks: b And /b according to b Rabbi Yoshiya, what does he do with this /b term b “while under her husband”? /b The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya b requires it /b in order b to compare a man to a woman and a woman to a man, /b as explained later (27a).,The Gemara asks: b But /b according to both opinions, b the reason /b for the exclusion of a betrothed woman is b that these verses are written; /b if it b were not so, I would say /b that b a betrothed woman drinks. But when Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina came from the South, he came and brought /b the following b i baraita /i with him: /b The verse states: “But if you have gone astray while under your husband, and if you are defiled, and some man has lain with you b besides your husband” /b (Numbers 5:20). This indicates that the i halakhot /i of a i sota /i apply only b when sexual intercourse with the husband preceded /b sexual intercourse with b the paramour, and not /b in a case b when sexual intercourse with the paramour preceded /b intercourse with b the husband. /b In the case of a betrothed woman who committed adultery, intercourse with the paramour preceded intercourse with the betrothed, and this verse excludes her from drinking the bitter water of the i sota /i ., b Rami bar Ḥama said: You find /b the necessity for an additional exclusion in a case b where /b her b betrothed engaged in sexual intercourse with her in her father’s house, /b i.e., before they were married, and before the sexual intercourse with the paramour.,The Gemara questions this explanation: b In the corresponding /b situation b with regard to a widow awaiting her i yavam /i , /b whom Rabbi Yonatan excludes from the i sota /i ritual due to the exclusion from the phrase “while under your husband,” is the necessity for this exclusion due to a case b where /b the b i yavam /i engaged in sexual intercourse with her in her father-in-law’s house /b before the levirate marriage took place? b But do you call that /b woman b a widow awaiting her i yavam /i ? She is his full-fledged wife, as didn’t Rav say: /b If a widow awaiting her i yavam /i engaged in sexual intercourse with her i yavam /i , even without the intention of implementing a levirate marriage, he b has acquired /b her as his wife with respect b to all /b aspects of marriage, including the i halakhot /i of a i sota /i .,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion is b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Shmuel, as /b Shmuel b says: /b A i yavam /i who engages in sexual intercourse with his i yevama /i without intending to consummate the levirate marriage b does not acquire /b her as his wife b except with regard to /b those b matters that are stated in the passage /b in the Torah that deals with levirate marriage, i.e., that he inherits his brother’s estate, and he can free the widow with a bill of divorce without i ḥalitza /i (see i Yevamot /i 56a). He is not considered fully married to the woman, and, according to Rabbi Yonatan, the i halakhot /i of a i sota /i do not apply to her.,The Gemara asks: b If so, let us say /b that b Rav stated /b his opinion b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yoshiya, and Shmuel stated /b his opinion b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yonatan. /b The Gemara rejects this interpretation: b Rav /b could have b said to you: I state /b my opinion b even according to /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yonatan. Since /b it b was necessary /b for b the verse to exclude /b a i yevama /i who engaged in sexual intercourse with her i yavam /i from the i sota /i ritual, b by inference /b one may derive b that she is his full-fledged wife /b with regard to all other matters. |
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12. Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 116| 54a. ישן לא קנה ביבמתו אלא בנתקע והא אמר רבה נפל מן הגג ונתקע חייב בארבעה דברים וביבמתו לא קנה,אלא כגון שנתכוון לאשתו ותקפתו יבמתו ובא עליה שניהם אנוסים דבי רבי חייא היכי דמי כגון שנתכוון לאשתו ותקפוהו עובדי כוכבים ודבקום זה בזה ובא עליה,מנא הני מילי דתנו רבנן (דברים כה, ה) יבמה יבא עליה מצוה דבר אחר יבמה יבא עליה בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון,והא אפיקתיה למצוה למצוה (דברים כה, ז) מואם לא יחפוץ האיש נפקא הא חפץ יבם וכי אתא קרא בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון,תניא אידך יבמה יבא עליה כדרכה ולקחה שלא כדרכה ויבם ביאה גומרת בה ואין כסף ושטר גומרין בה ויבמה בעל כרחה ד"א יבמה יבא עליה בין בשוגג כו',והא אפיקתי' לכדרכה ההוא (דברים כה, ז) מלהקים לאחיו שם נפקא במקום שמקים שם וכי אתא קרא בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון,גופא אמר רב יהודה ישן לא קנה ביבמתו דאמר קרא יבמה יבא עליה עד דמכוין לה לשם ביאה והתניא בין ער [בין ישן אימא בין ערה בין ישנה,והתניא בין ער] הוא בין ישן הוא בין ערה היא בין ישנה היא הכא במאי עסקינן במתנמנם ה"ד מתנמנם אמר רב אשי נים ולא נים תיר ולא תיר כגון דקרו ליה ועני ולא ידע לאהדורי סברא וכי מדכרו ליה מדכר,גופא אמר רבה נפל מן הגג ונתקע חייב בארבעה דברים וביבמתו לא קנה בנזק בצער בשבת ברפוי אבל בושת לא מיחייב דאמר מר אין חייב על הבושת עד שיתכוון,אמר רבא נתכוון להטיח בכותל והטיח ביבמתו לא קנה להטיח בבהמה והטיח ביבמה קנה דהא קמכוין לשם ביאה בעולם:,אחד המערה: אמר עולא מנין להעראה מן התורה שנאמר (ויקרא כ, יח) ואיש אשר ישכב את אשה דוה וגלה את ערותה את מקורה הערה מכאן להעראה מן התורה,אשכחן נדה שאר עריות מנין וכ"ת נילף מנדה מה לנדה שכן מטמאה את בועלה,אלא אתיא מאשת אח דכתיב (ויקרא כ, כא) ואיש אשר יקח את אשת אחיו נדה היא וכי אשת אחיו [לעולם] נדה היא אלא כנדה מה נדה בהעראה אף אשת אח בהעראה,מה לאשת אח שכן בידו לרבות דאי בעי מקדש ואזיל כי אלפא,אלא אתיא מאחות אב ואחות אם דכתיב (ויקרא כ, יט) וערות אחות אמך ואחות אביך לא תגלה כי את שארו הערה איכא למיפרך מה לאחות אב ואחות אם שכן איסור הבא מאליו,מחדא לא אתיא תיתי [חדא] מתרתי מהי תיתי תיתי מאשת אח ואחות אב ואחות אם מה להנך שכן אסורין משום שאר,אלא תיתי מנדה ואחות אב ואחות אם מה להנך שכן איסור הבא מאליו אלא תיתי מנדה ואשת אח דמאי פרכת,מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא מה לנדה ואשת אח שכן אין להם היתר בחיי אוסרן תאמר באשת איש שכן יש לה היתר בחיי אוסרה,אמר ליה רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא אטו נדה ואשת אח בחיי אוסרן הוא דאין להם היתר אבל לאחר מכאן יש להם היתר נדה | 54a. b a sleeping /b man b has not acquired his i yevama /i , /b as he did not intend to perform the act of intercourse at all? b Rather, /b the mishna was referring b to one who was inserted /b into his i yevama /i by accident. But b didn’t Rabba say: /b One who b fell from a roof and was inserted /b into a woman due to the force of his fall b is liable /b to pay b four /b of the five b types of indemnity /b that must be paid by one who damaged another: Injury, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as he did not intend to perform the act, b and if /b she is b his i yevama /i , he has not acquired /b her in this manner., b Rather, /b it is a case b where he intended /b to have intercourse with b his wife /b and became erect, b and his i yevama /i /b forcefully b grabbed hold of him and he had intercourse with her. /b The Gemara further asks: If so, b what are the circumstances /b of the case when b both of them were coerced /b that was mentioned by b the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya? /b The Gemara answers: It is a case b where he intended /b to have intercourse with b his wife, and gentiles grabbed hold of him and pressed /b him and his i yevama /i b against each other, and he /b thereby b had intercourse with her. /b ,§ The Gemara inquires as to the source of these i halakhot /i : b From where are these matters /b derived? b As the Sages taught /b with regard to the verse b “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” /b (Deuteronomy 25:5), that this indicates that the act of intercourse in this circumstance is b a mitzva, /b i.e., it is preferable to the alternative, which is i ḥalitza /i . b Alternatively, /b the verse b “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” /b indicates that it does not matter how he had intercourse with her, b whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether /b due to b coercion or willingly. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Didn’t you derive /b from this phrase that the act of intercourse in this case is a b mitzva? /b How can the same phrase also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: The fact that it is b a mitzva is derived from /b the verse: b “And if the man does not wish /b to take his i yevama /i ” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that if he b wishes, he performs levirate marriage, /b which is preferable to i ḥalitza /i . Therefore, b when /b the b verse /b cited above b came, /b it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred b whether /b the parties acted b unwittingly or intentionally, whether /b due to b coercion or willingly. /b , b It is taught /b in b another /b i baraita /i that the phrase: b “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” /b indicates that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in b typical /b sexual intercourse. The next phrase, b “and take her,” /b includes even b atypical, /b i.e., anal, sexual intercourse. The concluding phrase of the verse, b “and consummate the levirate marriage,” /b indicates that b sexual intercourse completes her /b acquisition, b but money and a /b marriage b document do not complete her /b acquisition to him as his fully betrothed wife, in contrast to the regular i halakhot /i of marriage. By emphasizing b “and consummate the levirate marriage with her,” /b the verse teaches that he acquires her even if he acted b against her will. Alternatively: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” /b indicates that levirate marriage has occurred b whether /b the parties acted b unwittingly /b or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.,The Gemara asks: b Didn’t you derive /b from this phrase that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in b typical /b sexual intercourse? How can it also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: b That /b i halakha /i b is derived from /b a different verse: b “To establish a name for his brother” /b (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that intercourse must occur b in the place where he establishes a name, /b i.e., where it can lead to childbirth. Therefore, b when /b the b verse /b cited above b came, /b it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred b whether /b the parties acted b unwittingly or intentionally, whether /b due to b coercion or willingly. /b ,§ The Gemara addresses b the /b matter b itself /b cited in the previous discussion. b Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping /b man b has not acquired his i yevama /i , as the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” /b (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he does not acquire her b unless he intends /b to act b for the sake of sexual intercourse. /b Since a sleeping man does not intend to engage in sexual intercourse, he does not acquire his i yevama /i . The Gemara asks: b Isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i that one acquires his i yevama /i through sexual intercourse regardless of b whether he /b was b awake or asleep? /b The Gemara answers: b Say /b the i baraita /i in the following emended form: b Whether she /b was b awake or asleep. /b The woman’s awareness is not a necessary component in order to perform levirate marriage.,The Gemara asks further: b Wasn’t it taught /b in another i baraita /i that one acquires his i yevama /i through sexual intercourse regardless of b whether he was awake or he was asleep /b and regardless of b whether she was awake or she was asleep? /b The Gemara answers: b With what are we dealing here /b when the i baraita /i says that a sleeping man acquires his i yevama /i ? It is referring to a man b who is dozing. /b The Gemara asks: b What are the circumstances /b of b dozing? Rav Ashi said: /b One is b asleep but not asleep, awake but not awake, when, /b if b they call him, he /b will b answer, but he is unable to provide a reasonable /b answer. b And when they /b later b inform him /b of what happened, b he remembers /b it.,The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabba cited earlier in order to discuss b the /b matter b itself /b that Rabba addressed. b Rabba said: /b One who b fell from a roof and was inserted /b into a woman due to the force of his fall b is liable /b to pay b four /b of the five b types of indemnity /b that must be paid by one who damaged another, b and if /b she is b his i yevama /i he has not acquired /b her in this manner. He is liable to pay for b injury, pain, loss of livelihood, /b and b medical costs. However, he is not liable /b to pay for the b shame /b he caused her, b as the Master said: One is not liable /b to pay b for shame unless he intends /b to humiliate his victim. Consequently, one who fell from a roof accidentally is not liable to pay for the shame he caused the woman., b Rava said: /b If b he intended to press /b his sexual organ b into a wall, and he /b accidentally b pressed /b it b into his i yevama /i , he has not acquired /b her, as he did not intend to engage in an act of sexual intercourse. However, if he intended b to press /b his sexual organ b into an animal, and he pressed /b it b into his i yevama /i , he has acquired /b her, b as he /b at least b intended /b to act b for the purpose of sexual intercourse in general, /b i.e., for some form of sexual intercourse.,§ We learned in the mishna that b both one who /b merely b begins the act of intercourse /b and one who completes it has acquired the i yevama /i through this act. b Ulla said: From where /b is it derived that b the initial stage of intercourse /b is considered an act of sexual intercourse b by Torah law? As it is stated: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked [ i he’era /i ] her fountain” /b (Leviticus 20:18). The verse is referring to the first stage of intercourse, and b from here /b it is derived that b the initial stage of intercourse [ i ha’ara’a /i ] /b is considered sexual intercourse b by Torah law. /b ,The Gemara asks: b We have found /b a source for this i halakha /i in the case of b a menstruating woman, /b the subject of the verse cited above. b From where /b is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to b the rest of those with whom relations are forbidden? And if you say we should derive it from /b the i halakha /i with regard to b a menstruating woman, what /b comparison can be made b to a menstruating woman, /b concerning whom the i halakha /i is more stringent than others with whom relations are forbidden, b in that she causes one who has intercourse with her to become ritually impure? /b , b Rather, /b the i halakha /i in other cases b comes from /b a verse about b a brother’s wife, as it is written: “And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity [ i nidda /i ]” /b (Leviticus 20:21). The word i nidda /i generally refers to a menstruating woman, and so the Gemara asks: b Is his brother’s wife always menstruating? Rather, /b it means that the i halakha /i with regard to her is b like /b that of b a menstruating woman: Just as /b one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with b a menstruating woman through the initial stage of intercourse, so too, /b one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with b a brother’s wife through the initial stage of intercourse. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What /b comparison can be made between b a brother’s wife /b and other women with whom relations are forbidden? The prohibition with regard to a brother’s b wife is /b more stringent in that b it is within his power to increase /b the number of women forbidden by this prohibition, b as, if he wishes, he can go on betrothing a thousand /b women, all of whom would be forbidden to his brother. Consequently, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife cannot serve as a model for other prohibitions., b Rather, /b the i halakha /i in other cases b comes from /b a verse with regard to b a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as it is written: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [ i he’era /i ] his kin” /b (Leviticus 20:19). The Gemara asks: b It is /b possible b to refute /b this source as follows: b What /b comparison can be made between other women with whom relations are forbidden and b a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, which are /b unique in that they are prohibited due to b a prohibition that comes on its own? /b The prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister does not stem from marriage, but from the biological fact that she is his father’s or mother’s sister. It is therefore dissimilar to prohibitions that result from marriage.,The Gemara states: The principle that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse b does not come from /b any b one /b of the sources cited above. b Let it come /b by deriving the i halakha /i in any b one /b other case b from /b the common denominator of b two /b of the sources mentioned above. The Gemara asks: b From which /b two sources could this principle b come /b to be derived? If you say it can b comes /b to be derived b from /b the combination of the source with regard to b a brother’s wife and /b the source with regard to b a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, what /b comparison may be drawn from these cases, b which are /b unique in that they are b prohibited because /b they are b kin? /b , b Rather, let it come from /b the prohibition proscribing b a menstruating woman and /b the prohibition with regard to b a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, /b as a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a family relative. The Gemara raises a difficulty: b What /b comparison may be drawn from these cases, b which are /b each a b prohibition that comes of its own /b accord, as neither one is created through marriage? b Rather, let it come from /b the prohibition proscribing b a menstruating woman and /b the prohibition proscribing b a brother’s wife. As, what /b can you say to b refute /b this teaching? These two cases do not share any unique features that might be cause for stringency., b Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly objects to this: What /b comparison may be drawn based upon the precedent of b a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife, which are /b stringent in that b they cannot be permitted /b to others for the duration of b the existence of the /b factor b that renders them prohibited? /b A menstruating woman is forbidden as long as she experiences a flow of menstrual blood, while a brother’s wife is forbidden for the duration of the brother’s lifetime. Can b you say /b the same b with regard to a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who renders her prohibited, /b i.e., if her husband divorces her?, b Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is that to say /b that b it is /b only during b the existence of the /b factor b that renders them prohibited that a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife cannot be permitted /b to others, b but afterward, /b when the prohibiting factor has been resolved, b they can be permitted? /b In the case of b a menstruating woman, /b |
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| 13. Anon., Apostolic Constitutions, 8.47.67 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 131 |
| 14. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 199.25, 199.30, 199.38, 199.46, 199.49, 217.53, 217.59 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 133 |
| 15. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 199.25, 199.30, 199.38, 199.46, 199.49, 217.53, 217.59 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 133 |
| 16. John Chrysostom, Homilies On Matthew, 75.5 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 133 |
| 17. Jerome, Letters, a b c d\n0 55.5(4) 55.5(4) 55 5(4) (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 133 |
| 18. Justinian, Digest, 3.2.1, 3.2.13, 23.1.17 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 162 |
| 19. Theodosius Ii Emperor of Rome, Theodosian Code, 3.5.4-3.5.5 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 162 |
| 20. Jesubocht, Code, 3.9 Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 162 |
| 21. Jesubarnun, Code, 21 Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 162 |
| 22. Severus of Minorca, Letters, 29 Tagged with subjects: •matrimony, consent Found in books: Monnickendam (2020) 162 |
