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subject book bibliographic info
dialectic/logic, analysis, ἀνάλυσις‎, in d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185, 186
logic Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 18, 127, 154, 158, 205, 212, 222
Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 24, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110
Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 232, 237, 283
Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 95, 96, 344
Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280
MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 61, 101
Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 302, 509, 619, 630, 636, 761, 800, 809, 813, 814, 815, 830, 831
Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 7, 17, 61, 62, 65, 67, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 108, 131, 134, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 159
Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 126, 132, 215, 331, 332
Osborne (2001), Irenaeus of Lyons, 21, 173, 205, 254
Rohmann (2016), Christianity, Book-Burning and Censorship in Late Antiquity, 121, 180
Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 149, 155
Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 9, 64, 80, 84
Zachhuber (2022), Time and Soul: From Aristotle to St. Augustine. 23
d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 24
van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 123
logic, aim of d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 202
logic, al exercise, parmenides as d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 208
logic, allegory/allegorizing on d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185
logic, and mathematics d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 172, 176
logic, and ontology d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 52
logic, and philosophical system d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 63
logic, and, ezra-nehemiah, archival Halser (2020), Archival Historiography in Jewish Antiquity, 50, 67, 81, 82, 102, 103, 122, 123
logic, aristotelian Dignas Parker and Stroumsa (2013), Priests and Prophets Among Pagans, Jews and Christians, 179
Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167
Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 94, 101, 262, 277, 278
d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 29, 187, 188, 189
logic, aristotle MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 15
logic, as an excellence Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
logic, as part/instrument of philosophy d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184, 185, 186, 187
logic, as precedent xi, stoic Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 36, 37, 40, 112, 194
logic, as validation of commands, stoic Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 25
logic, as, excellence, aretē Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40
logic, augustine, on dialectic Pollmann and Vessey (2007), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions, 108, 117, 135, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 221
logic, change, metabolē, to wisdom, in Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61, 62
logic, comparison with plato, in Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 70, 71, 72
logic, corresponding with knowledge Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19
logic, deductive Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 160
logic, dialectic Pollmann and Vessey (2007), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 221
logic, dialectic and rhetoric as parts of Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 22, 61
logic, dialectic, part of Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 22
logic, dialectic, διαλέγομαι, διάλογος Pollmann and Vessey (2007), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions, 153, 154, 160
logic, establishing, stoic Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 36, 37, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58
logic, higayon Hirshman (2009), The Stabilization of Rabbinic Culture, 100 C, 74
logic, in enneads d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185, 186, 187
logic, in hymns, temporal Faulkner and Hodkinson (2015), Hymnic Narrative and the Narratology of Greek Hymns, 20, 51, 55, 56, 66, 68, 107, 108, 115, 116, 124, 125, 134, 150, 163, 231, 233
logic, in the stoic, table Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 44
logic, interpretation, and James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71
logic, key roots, svr, know through Hirshman (2009), The Stabilization of Rabbinic Culture, 100 C, 75
logic, narrative Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 147
Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022), The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography, 281
logic, of commands Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81
logic, of exemplarity, productive Roller (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 38, 89, 157, 218, 245
logic, of god, sunnat stoic allāh Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 35, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 65, 66, 67
logic, of proleptic honors Gygax (2016), Benefaction and Rewards in the Ancient Greek City: The Origins of Euergetism, 53
logic, of stoicism, stoics Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 50, 119, 120, 130, 131, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 246, 247, 383, 384
logic, of the prophet, stoic Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 57
logic, ontology and d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 52, 63
logic, principles of allegedly derived by rabbis from greeks Feldman (2006), Judaism and Hellenism Reconsidered, 23
logic, proverbs, teaches James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 273
logic, ratio Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 59, 84, 96, 150, 154, 160, 205, 206, 216, 221, 222, 223, 319, 327
logic, see dialectic, λόγος Pollmann and Vessey (2007), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions, 216, 217
logic, stoic Dawson (2001), Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, 196, 197
Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 228
Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 31, 141, 233
Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 151, 152, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191
Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 615
logic, stoicism Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 16
Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 293, 621, 628
logic, stoicism/stoics/stoic d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184, 185, 186, 188
logic, sunna breach of stoic Gwynne (2004), Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'an: God's Arguments, 34, 113
logic, λογικὴ James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 115, 273
logic, λογικὴ, aristotelian James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70, 115
logic/dialectic, aristotle on d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185, 186
logic/dialectic, in middle platonism d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184
logic/language/dialectic, epistemology and d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184, 185, 186, 187, 192, 203, 205
logical, classification Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 32, 39, 92, 215
logical, classification, taxonomies, vs. Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 32, 39, 92, 215
logical, coherence Osborne (2001), Irenaeus of Lyons, 173
Pierce et al. (2022), Gospel Reading and Reception in Early Christian Literature, 150, 151
logical, consequence Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 428
logical, consequence from, con-sequence, transition to Folit-Weinberg (2022), Homer, Parmenides, and the Road to Demonstration, 218, 260, 264
logical, critic, grammarian, contrast with James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 34, 35
logical, curriculum MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 15
logical, divisions on scala naturae Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75
logical, features of geometry James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 249, 250
logical, interpretation James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 287, 288, 291
logical, method Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 332
logical, methods Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 211
logical, methods of alcinous Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 208, 210, 211
logical, necessity in parmenides’ poem, hodos, and Folit-Weinberg (2022), Homer, Parmenides, and the Road to Demonstration, 40, 45, 108, 254, 257, 259, 260
logical, necessity, and hodos as physical object Folit-Weinberg (2022), Homer, Parmenides, and the Road to Demonstration, 40, 45, 108, 259, 260
logical, order, τάξις Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91, 95, 99, 101, 102, 103, 109, 163, 164
logical, problem of writing, γραφή James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 269
logical, “middle methods, term, ” Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 262

List of validated texts:
8 validated results for "logic"
1. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 18 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • logic • logic, Stoic

 Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 108; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 233

sup>
18 And dialectic science, which is the sister, the twin sister of rhetoric, as some persons have called it, separating true from false arguments, and refuting the plausibilities of sophistical arguments, will cure the great disease of the soul, deceit. It is profitable, therefore, to aide among these and other sciences resembling them, and to devote one's especial attention to them. For perhaps, I say, as has happened to many, we shall become known to the queenly virtues by means of their subjects and handmaidens. "" None
2. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.1.25-3.1.26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • logic • logical divisions on scala naturae

 Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 72; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 302

sup>
3.1.25 A CERTAIN young man a rhetorician came to see Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to bebeautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a. wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. It is so said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful: but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly ( αἰσχρόν ) even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. Further I do not know what to say to you: for if I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps leave the school and not return to it: and if I do not say what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say, What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word? did he so much despair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to reason? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Polemon; yet he might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me dressed like—what shall I say?—he kept silent. I do not say like what; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress. If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defence shall I make? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for the oracle? Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth? I indeed do not know, whether you will be persuaded by me or not; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the words Know yourself written in front of the temple, though no person takes any notice of them? Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges? If you acquit me on these conditions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist; but I will go up both to young and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now; and most particularly will I do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more nearly related to me. —Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a busy—body? and how does it concern you how we act? and what is it that you say? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. Who then are you?— Here it is a great thing to say, I am be whose duty it is to take care of men; for it is not every little heifer which dares to resist a lion; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, and who are you, and what business have you here? Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels, Who then are you? If you do, it will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a thing as the purple in a garment: do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men. What then? am I such a man? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can listen to the truth? I wish you were. But however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by rationally ? Conformably to nature and completely. What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appearances? No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing: adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you man or woman? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster: but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to work then upon the whole business. Take away—what is its name?— that which is the cause of the hairs: make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken: do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them as a man. Well; but they like smooth men. Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a praefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up. Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, Epictetus has not said this to me; for how could he? but some propitious God through him: for it Would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger. You say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the poet says: For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent Hermes the careful watcher, Argus’ slayer, The husband not to kill nor wed the wife. Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him (Aegisthus)? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will ( προαίρεσις ); and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades: Try then to be beautiful. What does he say to him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How with the body? Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things: intrust them to him. What then, must a man be uncleaned? Certainly not; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say no: but let us also pluck out the lion’s mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock’s comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog. 3.1.26 A CERTAIN young man a rhetorician came to see Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to bebeautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a. wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. It is so said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful: but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly ( αἰσχρόν ) even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. Further I do not know what to say to you: for if I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps leave the school and not return to it: and if I do not say what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say, What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word? did he so much despair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to reason? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Polemon; yet he might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me dressed like—what shall I say?—he kept silent. I do not say like what; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress. If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defence shall I make? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for the oracle? Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth? I indeed do not know, whether you will be persuaded by me or not; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the words Know yourself written in front of the temple, though no person takes any notice of them? Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges? If you acquit me on these conditions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist; but I will go up both to young and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now; and most particularly will I do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more nearly related to me. —Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a busy—body? and how does it concern you how we act? and what is it that you say? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. Who then are you?— Here it is a great thing to say, I am be whose duty it is to take care of men; for it is not every little heifer which dares to resist a lion; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, and who are you, and what business have you here? Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels, Who then are you? If you do, it will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a thing as the purple in a garment: do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men. What then? am I such a man? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can listen to the truth? I wish you were. But however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by rationally ? Conformably to nature and completely. What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appearances? No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing: adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you man or woman? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster: but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to work then upon the whole business. Take away—what is its name?— that which is the cause of the hairs: make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken: do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them as a man. Well; but they like smooth men. Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one? Is this your business? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a praefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up. Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, Epictetus has not said this to me; for how could he? but some propitious God through him: for it Would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger. You say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the poet says: For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent Hermes the careful watcher, Argus’ slayer, The husband not to kill nor wed the wife. Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him (Aegisthus)? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will ( προαίρεσις ); and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades: Try then to be beautiful. What does he say to him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How with the body? Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things: intrust them to him. What then, must a man be uncleaned? Certainly not; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say no: but let us also pluck out the lion’s mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock’s comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog.'' None
3. New Testament, Romans, 6.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • consequence (logical) • logical divisions on scala naturae

 Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 67; Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 295

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6.12 Μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ,'' None		sup>
6.12 Therefore don't let sin reign in your mortal body, that you should obey it in its lusts. "" None
4. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • change (metabolē) to wisdom, in logic • interpretation, and logic • logic (λογικὴ), Aristotelian • proverbs, teaches logic

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 62; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 70
5. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Logic • Stoicism, Stoics, logic of • aim of logic • logic

 Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 50; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 92; Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 84; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 202
6. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.39-7.45, 7.49, 7.51, 7.62-7.63, 7.66, 7.78-7.79, 7.83, 7.87, 7.93, 7.134-7.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Logic • Order (τάξις), logical • Stoicism, Stoics, logic of • dialectic, part of logic • excellence (aretē), logic as • grammarian, contrast with logical critic • interpretation, and logic • logic • logic (λογικὴ), Aristotelian • logic, Stoic • logic, as an excellence • logic, corresponding with knowledge • logic, dialectic and rhetoric as parts of • logical divisions on scala naturae • proverbs, teaches logic

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 19, 22, 40; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 60, 72; Geljon and Runia (2013), Philo of Alexandria: On Cultivation: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 108, 228; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 233; James (2021), Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation, 34, 70; Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 280; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 120, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 246; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 91, 98, 100, 149

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7.39 Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40 Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41 Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.42 Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. 7.43 Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language; 7.44 these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers.The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style. 7.45 The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things.An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended.A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.
7.49 The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.
7.51 According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man.
7.62 Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, of goods some are mental, others bodily.Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that A house has three times fallen, in the other that a dancing-girl has fallen.Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language. 7.63 To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.
7.66 There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place.
7.78 of conclusive some are denoted by the common name of the whole class, conclusive proper, others are called syllogistic. The syllogistic are such as either do not admit of, or are reducible to such as do not admit of, immediate proof in respect of one or more of the premisses; e.g. If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion; but Dion is walking, therefore Dion is in motion. Conclusive specifically are those which draw conclusions, but not by syllogism; e.g. the statement It is both day and night is false: now it is day; therefore it is not night. Arguments not syllogistic are those which plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but are not cogent proof; e.g. If Dion is a horse, he is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore he is not an animal. 7.79 Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm. Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive. Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical.
7.83 Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic.
7.87 This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.
7.93 magimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge.
7.134 They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form. 7.135 Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136 In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.'' None
7. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Logic • Stoicism, Stoics, logic of • change (metabolē) to wisdom, in logic • excellence (aretē), logic as • logic, as an excellence

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 40, 62; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 120; Motta and Petrucci (2022), Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity, 98
8. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • logic • logic,

 Found in books: MacDougall (2022), Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition. 101; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021), The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 163



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