1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 21.12-21.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 32| 21.12. "מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת׃", 21.13. "וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה׃", 21.14. "וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת׃", | 21.12. "He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death.", 21.13. "And if a man lie not in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee.", 21.14. "And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die.", |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 7.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 47| 7.18. "וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר־זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֹא יֵרָצֶה הַמַּקְרִיב אֹתוֹ לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב לוֹ פִּגּוּל יִהְיֶה וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת מִמֶּנּוּ עֲוֺנָהּ תִּשָּׂא׃", | 7.18. "And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it; it shall be an abhorred thing, and the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity.", |
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| 3. Tosefta, Menachot, 13.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
4. Mishnah, Berachot, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 32| 2.1. "הָיָה קוֹרֵא בַתּוֹרָה, וְהִגִּיעַ זְמַן הַמִּקְרָא, אִם כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ, יָצָא. וְאִם לָאו, לֹא יָצָא. בַּפְּרָקִים שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד וּמֵשִׁיב, וּבָאֶמְצַע שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַיִּרְאָה וּמֵשִׁיב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, בָּאֶמְצַע שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַיִּרְאָה, וּמֵשִׁיב מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד, בַּפְּרָקִים שׁוֹאֵל מִפְּנֵי הַכָּבוֹד, וּמֵשִׁיב שָׁלוֹם לְכָל אָדָם: \n", | 2.1. "If one was reading in the Torah [the section of the Shema] and the time for its recital arrived, if he directed his heart [to fulfill the mitzvah] he has fulfilled his obligation. In the breaks [between sections] one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting; in the middle [of a section] one may give greeting out of fear and return it, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: in the middle one may give greeting out of fear and return it out of respect, in the breaks one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting to anyone.", |
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5. Mishnah, Kelim, 25.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 32| 25.9. "כְּלֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין לָהֶם אֲחוֹרַיִם וָתוֹךְ, וְאֵין לָהֶם בֵּית צְבִיעָה. וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִים כֵּלִים בְתוֹךְ כֵּלִים לְקֹדֶשׁ. כָּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִין לִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן בְּמַחֲשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָן עוֹלִים מִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְשִׁנּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהַמַּעֲשֶׂה מְבַטֵּל מִיַּד הַמַּעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה, וּמַחֲשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מְבַטֶּלֶת לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה: \n", | 25.9. "Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention.", |
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6. Mishnah, Menachot, 13.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 36| 13.11. "נֶאֱמַר בְּעוֹלַת הַבְּהֵמָה אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (ויקרא א), וּבְעוֹלַת הָעוֹף אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (שם), וּבַמִּנְחָה אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ (שם ב), לְלַמֵּד, שֶׁאֶחָד הַמַּרְבֶּה וְאֶחָד הַמַּמְעִיט, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּכַוֵּן אָדָם אֶת דַּעְתּוֹ לַשָּׁמָיִם: \n", | 13.11. "It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Menahot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. It is no accident that the last mishnah of the tractate finishes with the message that we learned today. After having learned 14 chapters of Zevahim and 13 chapters of Menahot, there is a grave danger that one could learn that all God cares about, and all that is important in Judaism, is bringing the proper sacrifice in the proper manner. Our mishnah teaches that the important issue is the proper intent, that one’s intent in sacrifice should be to worship God. This is not to deny that that the minutiae of rules are extremely important, both in the eyes of the rabbis and surely in the eyes of the priests who served in the Temple while it still stood. Rather, what today’s mishnah seems to say is that the rules are an outer manifestation of the inner kavannah, intent, of the worshipper. Without following the rules, there is no way to bring that intent into the world. But without the intent, the rules are just empty exercises devoid of meaning. I believe that this is a message that is as true of Judaism today as it was in Temple times. Mishnah Menahot has probably been a great challenge for many of you; I know it was for me. So please accept an extra congratulations on completing it. Tomorrow we begin Hullin, the one tractate in all of Seder Kodashim that does not deal with sacrifices or the Temple.", |
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7. Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah, 3.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 32| 3.7. "הַתּוֹקֵעַ לְתוֹךְ הַבּוֹר אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַדּוּת אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַפִּטָּס, אִם קוֹל שׁוֹפָר שָׁמַע, יָצָא. וְאִם קוֹל הֲבָרָה שָׁמַע, לֹא יָצָא. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁהָיָה עוֹבֵר אֲחוֹרֵי בֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בֵיתוֹ סָמוּךְ לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, וְשָׁמַע קוֹל שׁוֹפָר אוֹ קוֹל מְגִלָּה, אִם כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ, יָצָא, וְאִם לָאו, לֹא יָצָא. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁזֶּה שָׁמַע וְזֶה שָׁמַע, זֶה כִּוֵּן לִבּוֹ וְזֶה לֹא כִוֵּן לִבּוֹ: \n", | 3.7. "One who blows into a pit or a cistern or a jug, if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he hears the echo [also], he has not fulfilled his obligation. And also one who was passing behind a synagogue or if his house was next to the synagogue and he heard the sound of the shofar or of the megillah [being read], if he directed his heart (had intention), then he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not he has not fulfilled his obligation. Even though this one heard and this one heard, this one directed his heart and this one did not.", |
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8. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 9.2 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 32| 9.2. "נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם, לַנָּכְרִי וְהָרַג אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, לִנְפָלִים, וְהָרַג בֶּן קְיָמָא, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. אֲבָל נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה, פָּטוּר: \n", | 9.2. "If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.", |
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9. Mishnah, Zevahim, 3.3-3.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 46| 3.3. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, פָּחוֹת מִכַּזַּיִת, כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין:", 3.4. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכֹל כַּזַּיִת מִן הָעוֹר, מִן הָרֹטֶב, מִן הַקִּיפָה, מִן הָאָלָל, מִן הָעֲצָמוֹת, מִן הַגִּידִים, מִן הַטְּלָפַיִם, מִן הַקַּרְנַיִם, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ אוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, כָּשֵׁר, וְאֵין חַיָּבִים עֲלֵיהֶם מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל וְנוֹתָר וְטָמֵא:", 3.5. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין לֶאֱכֹל שָׁלִיל אוֹ שִׁלְיָא בַחוּץ, לֹא פִגֵּל. הַמּוֹלֵק תּוֹרִין בִּפְנִים לֶאֱכֹל בֵּיצֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ, לֹא פִגֵּל. חֲלֵב הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין וּבֵיצֵי תוֹרִין, אֵין חַיָּבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל וְנוֹתָר וְטָמֵא:", 3.6. "שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לְהַנִּיחַ דָּמוֹ אוֹ אֶת אֵמוּרָיו לְמָחָר, אוֹ לְהוֹצִיאָן לַחוּץ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פוֹסֵל, וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִתְּנוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הַכֶּבֶשׁ שֶׁלֹּא כְנֶגֶד הַיְסוֹד, לִתֵּן אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַטָּה, לְמַעְלָה, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין לְמַעְלָה, לְמַטָּה, אֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בִּפְנִים, בַּחוּץ, וְאֶת הַנִּתָּנִין בַּחוּץ, בִּפְנִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ טְמֵאִים, שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּהוּ עֲרֵלִים, לְשַׁבֵּר עַצְמוֹת הַפֶּסַח וְלֶאֱכֹל הֵימֶנּוּ נָא, לְעָרֵב דָּמוֹ בְדַם פְּסוּלִין, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת אֶלָּא חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְהַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן:", | 3.3. "If one slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten, or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid; But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice]. [If he slaughters it intending] to eat what is normally eaten and to burn what is normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], [but] less than the size of an olive, it is valid. To eat half as much as an olive and to burn half as much as an olive [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid, because [intentions concerning] eating and burning do not combine.", 3.4. "One who slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat as much as an olive of the skin, or of the juice, or of the jelly, or of the hardened meat, or of the bones, or of the tendons, or of the horns, or of the hoofs, either after time or out of bounds, it is valid, and one is not liable on their account in respect of piggul, remt, or uncleanness.", 3.5. "If one slaughters sacred animals [intending] to eat the fetus or the afterbirth outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render it piggul. If one plucks off [the necks of] doves, [intending] to eat their eggs outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render [them] piggul. The milk of sacred animals or the eggs of doves one is not liable for eating them in respect of piggul, remt, or uncleanness.", 3.6. "If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies [it], But the sages declare it valid. [If he slaughtered it] with the intention of sprinkling [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar] but not against its base; or of applying below [the scarlet line] what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; [Or with the intention] that unclean [persons] should eat it, [or] that unclean [priests] should offer it; [Or] that uncircumcised [persons] should eat it, [or] that uncircumcised persons should offer it; [Or with the intention] of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices]; [In all of these cases] it is valid, because an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesah and a hatat, [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice.", |
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| 10. Anon., Sifra, None (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
| 11. Anon., Sifre Numbers, 143 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
12. Babylonian Talmud, Hulin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 46| 38b. (ויקרא כב, כז) או כשב פרט לכלאים או עז פרט לנדמה כי יולד פרט ליוצא דופן שבעת ימים פרט למחוסר זמן תחת אמו פרט ליתום,האי יתום ה"ד אילימא דילידתיה אמיה והדר מתה לעולם תיחי ותיזיל אלא דמתה והדר ילידתיה מכי יולד נפקא,אלא פשיטא זה פירש למיתה וזה פירש לחיים אי אמרת בשלמא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה היינו דאיצטריך קרא למעוטי אלא אי אמרת לא בעינן חיותא בסוף לידה למה ליה מכי יולד נפקא,אמר רבא הלכתא כי הא מתניתא בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה,במה דברים אמורים ביד אבל ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה בד"א בדקה אבל בגסה בין ביד בין ברגל בין פשטה ולא כפפה בין כפפה ולא פשטה כשרה ועוף אפילו לא רפרף אלא גפו ולא כשכש אלא זנבו הרי זה פירכוס,מאי קמ"ל כולהו תננהי בהמה דקה שפשטה ידה ולא החזירה פסולה שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש יד אין רגל לא דקה אין גסה לא עוף איצטריכא ליה דלא תנן:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big השוחט לעובד כוכבי' שחיטתו כשרה ור"א פוסל אמר ר"א אפילו שחטה לאכול לעובד כוכבים מחצר כבד שלה פסולה שסתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים,א"ר יוסי ק"ו הדברים ומה במקום שהמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big הני תנאי אית להו דר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי דתניא אמר ר' אליעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין,מיהו ת"ק סבר אי שמעיניה דחשיב אין אי לא לא סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים לא אמרינן ור"א סבר אע"ג דלא שמעיניה דחשיב סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים אמרינן ואתא רבי יוסי למימר אע"ג דשמעיניה דחשיב זה מחשב וזה עובד לא אמרינן,איכא דאמרי בדשמעיניה דחשיב פליגי ת"ק סבר כי אמרינן זה מחשב וזה עובד הני מילי בפנים אבל בחוץ לא חוץ מפנים | 38b. b or a sheep” /b is b to the exclusion of /b an animal born to parents of b diverse kinds, /b which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase b “or a goat” /b is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b that resembles /b another species of animal. b “When it is born”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b born by caesarean section. /b “It shall be b seven days”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal b whose time has not yet /b arrived. b “Under its mother”; /b this is b to the exclusion of /b an animal that is b an orphan. /b ,Rava elaborates: b What are the circumstances /b of b this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, /b this is unreasonable. Will the mother b continue living forever? Rather, /b perhaps the reference is to a case b where /b the mother b died and then gave birth to it. /b The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice b is derived from /b the phrase: b “When it is born,” /b since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section., b Rather, /b it is b obvious /b that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point b this /b mother b withdrew for death and that /b newborn b withdrew for life. Granted, if you say /b that b we require life at the conclusion of /b the b birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude /b the orphan. b But if you say /b that b we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, /b and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, b why is /b this verse necessary to exclude it? It can b be derived from /b the phrase: b “When it is born.” /b It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.,§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. b Rava says /b that b the i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion expressed in b this i baraita /i : /b The slaughter of b a small animal that extended its foreleg /b that was bent b and did not restore it /b to the bent position b is not valid. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b In what /b case b is this statement said? /b It is b with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether /b the animal b extended it and did not restore /b it to the bent position b or /b the animal b bent it but did not extend it, /b the slaughter b is valid. In what /b case b is this statement, /b about extending the foreleg, b said? /b It is b with regard to a small /b animal. b But with regard to a large /b animal, b whether /b the convulsion involves its b foreleg or its hind leg, /b and b whether /b the animal b extended it and did not restore /b it to the bent position b or /b the animal b bent it but did not extend it, /b the slaughter b is valid. And /b with regard to b a bird, even /b if it b fluttered [ i rifref /i ] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion /b and an indication of life.,The Gemara asks: b What is /b Rava b teaching us /b in ruling in accordance with the i baraita /i ? He is teaching us b all of /b those i halakhot /i b we learned /b in the mishna: The slaughter of b a small animal that /b when being slaughtered b extended its foreleg /b that was bent b and did not restore /b it to the bent position b is not valid, as /b extending the foreleg b is only /b part of the natural course of b removal /b of the animal’s b soul /b from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of b a foreleg /b alone, b yes, /b it is not an indication of life, but movement of b a hind leg, no, /b it is an indication of life. With regard to b a small /b animal, b yes, /b this is the i halakha /i ; with regard to b a large /b animal, b no, /b this is not the i halakha /i , and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It b was necessary for /b Rava to teach the i halakha /i in the i baraita /i with regard to b a bird, as we did not learn /b it in the mishna., strong MISHNA: /strong In the case of a Jew b who slaughters /b the animal of a gentile b for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if /b the Jew b slaughtered /b the animal with the intent b to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [ i meḥatzar kaved /i ], /b its slaughter is b not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is /b to slaughter the animal b for idol worship, /b and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it., b Rabbi Yosei says: /b The b matter /b of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of b an i a fortiori /i /b inference. b If in a place where intent /b while slaughtering the animal b invalidates /b the slaughter, i.e., b in sacrificial /b animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, b everything follows only /b the intent of the priest b performing the service /b and not the intent of the owner, then b in a place where intent does not invalidate /b the slaughter, i.e., b in non-sacred /b animals, b is it not right that everything should follow only /b the intent of b the one who slaughters /b the animal?, strong GEMARA: /strong In explanation of the dispute between the first i tanna /i and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: b These i tanna’im /i hold /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, /b and not only the priest, b render /b an offering b i piggul /i /b by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship., b But the first i tanna /i holds /b that b if we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, b yes, /b his intent invalidates the slaughter, and b if /b the gentile did b not /b voice his intent before us, his intent does b not /b invalidate the slaughter, as b we do not say /b that the b unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as b we say /b the b unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say /b that b even though we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship, in a case where b this /b owner b has intent /b for idol worship b and that /b other person is b performing /b the slaughter, b we do not say /b that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter., b There are /b those b who say /b an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is b with regard to /b a case b where we heard /b the gentile say b that he intends /b the animal for idol worship that the i tanna’im /i b disagree. The first i tanna /i holds /b that b when we say /b in a case where b this /b owner b has /b improper b intent and that /b other person is b performing /b the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, b this statement /b applies only b inside /b the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. b But /b with regard to non-sacred slaughter b outside /b the Temple, the intent of the owner does b not /b invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the i halakhot /i of non-sacred slaughter b outside /b the Temple b from /b the i halakhot /i of slaughter of sacrificial animals b inside /b the Temple, |
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13. Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim, None Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 46| 47a. מנין למתעסק בקדשים שהוא פסול שנאמר (ויקרא א, ה) ושחט את בן הבקר לפני ה' עד שתהא שחיטה לשם בן בקר,א"ל זו בידינו היא לעכב מנין א"ל (ויקרא יט, ה) לרצונכם תזבחהו לדעתכם זביחו:,שאין המחשבה הולכת אלא אחר העובד: מתני' דלא כי האי תנא דתניא א"ר אלעזר ברבי יוסי שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין אמר רבא מ"ט דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי דאמר קרא והקריב המקריב,אמר אביי רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי ורבי אליעזר ור"ש בן אלעזר כולהו סבירא להו זה מחשבה וזה עובד הויא מחשבה רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי הא דאמרן,רבי אליעזר דתנן השוחט לעובד כוכבים שחיטתו כשרה ורבי אליעזר פוסל,ר"ש בן אלעזר דתנן כלל אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר כל שאין כשר להצניע ואין מצניעין כמוהו הוכשר לזה והצניעו ובא אחר והוציאו נתחייב זה במחשבה של זה,תרוייהו אית להו דרבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי השתא בחוץ אמרינן בפנים מיבעיא,רבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי לית להו דתרוייהו דלמא בפנים הוא דאמרינן בחוץ לא אמרינן,ר"ש בן אלעזר אית ליה דר' אליעזר השתא בשבת אמרינן בעבודת כוכבים מיבעיא,רבי אליעזר לית ליה דרבי שמעון בן אלעזר דלמא בעבודת כוכבים הוא דאמרת כעין בפנים אבל שבת מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה:, br br big strongהדרן עלך בית שמאי /strong /big br br,מתני׳ big strongאיזהו /strong /big מקומן של זבחים קדשי קדשים שחיטתן בצפון,פר ושעיר של יום הכיפורים שחיטתן בצפון וקיבול דמן בכלי שרת בצפון ודמן טעון הזיה על בין הבדים ועל הפרוכת ועל מזבח הזהב מתנה אחת מהן מעכבת שירי הדם היה שופך על יסוד מערבי של מזבח החיצון ואם לא נתן לא עכב:,פרים הנשרפים ושעירים הנשרפים שחיטתן בצפון וקיבול דמן בכלי שרת בצפון ודמן טעון הזיה על הפרוכת ועל מזבח הזהב | 47a. b From where /b is it derived with regard b to one who acts unawares /b in the case b of consecrated /b items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, b that /b the offering b is disqualified? /b Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, b as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” /b (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly b unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, /b i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.,Shmuel b said to /b Rav Huna: b We have this /b as an established i halakha /i already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but b from where /b is it derived that this requirement is b indispensable? /b Rav Huna b said to him /b that the verse states: b “With your will you shall slaughter it” /b (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., b with your /b full b awareness you shall slaughter /b it, in the form of a purposeful action.,§ The mishna teaches: b Because the intent follows only the one performing the /b sacrificial b rite. /b The Gemara comments: b The mishna is not in accordance with /b the opinion of b this i tanna /i , as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that /b even b the owner /b of an offering b can render it i piggul /i /b through improper intention. b Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice /b his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering i piggul /i with an improper intention., b Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold /b that even in a case involving two people, where b this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is /b the b intention /b that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, /b is b that which we /b just b said, /b that the owner can render his offering i piggul /i through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.,The statement of b Rabbi Eliezer /b is b as we learned /b in a mishna ( i Ḥullin /i 38b): With regard to b one who slaughters /b an animal on behalf b of a gentile, his slaughter is valid /b and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. b But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, /b as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.,The statement of b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar /b is b as we learned /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: /b In the case of b any /b item b that is not fit to be stored, and /b therefore people do b not /b typically b store /b items b like it, /b but b it was deemed fit /b for storage b by this /b person b and he stored it, and another /b person b came and carried out /b on Shabbat the item that was stored, b that /b one who carried it out b is rendered liable by the thought of this /b one who stored it.,The Gemara notes: b These two /b Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, b accept /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. /b The Gemara explains: b Now /b that concerning matters b outside /b the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, b we say /b that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, b is /b it b necessary /b to state that the same i halakha /i applies to matters b inside /b the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?,But b Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not /b necessarily b accept /b as i halakha /i the rulings of b these two /b Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: b Perhaps /b it is only concerning b inside /b the Temple b that we say /b that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning b outside /b the Temple, b we do not say /b this.,The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. b Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Eliezer: Now /b that b with regard to Shabbat we say /b that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, b is /b it b necessary /b to say that the same applies b concerning idol worship, /b where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?,But b Rabbi Eliezer does not /b necessarily b accept /b as i halakha /i the ruling b of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is /b only b with regard to idol worship that you say /b that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat b similar to /b service performed b inside /b the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. b But /b with regard to b Shabbat, the Torah prohibited /b only b planned, /b constructive b labor, /b i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.,, strong MISHNA: /strong b What is the location /b of the slaughtering and consumption b of offerings? /b The principle is that with regard to b offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter /b is b in the north /b of the Temple courtyard.,Specifically, with regard to b the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter /b is b in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel /b is b in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves /b of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, b and upon the Curtain /b separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, b and on the golden altar. /b Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even b one placement of their /b blood b disqualifies /b the offering. As to b the remainder of the blood, /b which is left after those sprinklings, a priest b would pour /b it b onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place /b the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does b not disqualify /b the offering.,With regard to b bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter /b is b in the north /b of the Temple courtyard, b and the collection of their blood in a service vessel /b is b in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain /b separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, b and upon the golden altar, /b |
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| 14. Anon., Sifre Zuta Numbers, 28.2 Tagged with subjects: •legislation, rabbinic, intention in Found in books: Balberg (2017) 33 |
