1. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Judicial authority (misuse of) • Royal justice (judiciary), Philo and the concept of
Found in books: Flatto (2021) 43; Schiffman (1983) 189
19.16. לֹא־תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל־דַּם רֵעֶךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃''. None | 19.16. Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour: I am the LORD.''. None |
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2. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • judicial (forensic) • judicial oratory
Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006) 416; Martin and Whitlark (2018) 87
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3. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Constitutionalism comparative, judicial • Judicial authority (misuse of), service, age limits for
Found in books: Flatto (2021) 72; Schiffman (1983) 56
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4. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 4.214, 20.123 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Decisions, judicial • Qumran literature, on the judiciary • Roman Empire, judicial procedure
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 740, 746; Czajkowski et al (2020) 92; Flatto (2021) 37
4.214. ̓Αρχέτωσαν δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην πόλιν ἄνδρες ἑπτὰ οἱ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ δίκαιον σπουδὴν προησκηκότες: ἑκάστῃ δὲ ἀρχῇ δύο ἄνδρες ὑπηρέται διδόσθωσαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν Λευιτῶν φυλῆς." '
20.123. οἱ δὲ πρῶτοι κατὰ τιμὴν καὶ γένος τῶν ̔Ιεροσολυμιτῶν, ὡς εἶδον εἰς οἷον κακῶν μέγεθος ἥκουσιν, μετενδυσάμενοι σάκκους καὶ σποδοῦ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀναπλήσαντες παντοῖοι τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας παρακαλοῦντες ἦσαν καὶ πείθοντες πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θεμένους κατασκαφησομένην μὲν αὐτῶν τὴν πατρίδα, τὸ δὲ ἱερὸν πυρποληθησόμενον, αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν σὺν τέκνοις ἀνδραποδισμοὺς ἐσομένους, μεταθέσθαι τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥίψαντας ἠρεμεῖν εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν ἀποχωρήσαντας εἰς τὰ αὑτῶν.'". None | 4.214. 14. Let there be seven men to judge in every city, and these such as have been before most zealous in the exercise of virtue and righteousness. Let every judge have two officers allotted him out of the tribe of Levi.
20.123. whereupon those that were the most eminent persons at Jerusalem, and that both in regard to the respect that was paid them, and the families they were of, as soon as they saw to what a height things were gone, put on sackcloth, and heaped ashes upon their heads, and by all possible means besought the seditious, and persuaded them that they would set before their eyes the utter subversion of their country, the conflagration of their temple, and the slavery of themselves, their wives, and children, which would be the consequences of what they were doing; and would alter their minds, would cast away their weapons, and for the future be quiet, and return to their own homes. These persuasions of theirs prevailed upon them.''. None |
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5. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 2.1, 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Judicial administration, criticism of alternative models • Judicial administration, responses to priestly justice • Judiciary deposing the ruler • Judiciary deposing the ruler, in rabbinic literature • Judiciary deposing the ruler, judging the ruler • Judiciary deposing the ruler, law as a check on power • Judiciary deposing the ruler, seating configuration • Judiciary deposing the ruler, thin traces of a hierarchy and the Ab Bet Din • Mumheh (a judicial expert) • Nasi, judicial appointments • Priestly justice, incorporating into a broader judicial framework • Rabbi Ismael, royalty and judicial authority in • Roman Empire, judicial procedure • Royal justice (judiciary) • Royal justice (judiciary), royal texts • judicial review
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 730; Flatto (2021) 113, 126, 132, 149, 151, 175, 184, 191, 193; Rubenstein (2018) 218
2.1. כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל דָּן וְדָנִין אוֹתוֹ, מֵעִיד וּמְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ, חוֹלֵץ וְחוֹלְצִין לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וּמְיַבְּמִין אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, אֲבָל הוּא אֵינוֹ מְיַבֵּם, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר בָּאַלְמָנָה. מֵת לוֹ מֵת, אֵינוֹ יוֹצֵא אַחַר הַמִּטָּה, אֶלָּא הֵן נִכְסִין וְהוּא נִגְלֶה, הֵן נִגְלִין וְהוּא נִכְסֶה, וְיוֹצֵא עִמָּהֶן עַד פֶּתַח הָעִיר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ יוֹצֵא מִן הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כא) וּמִן הַמִּקְדָּשׁ לֹא יֵצֵא. וּכְשֶׁהוּא מְנַחֵם אֲחֵרִים, דֶּרֶךְ כָּל הָעָם עוֹבְרִין בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וְהַמְמֻנֶּה מְמַצְּעוֹ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין הָעָם. וּכְשֶׁהוּא מִתְנַחֵם מֵאֲחֵרִים, כָּל הָעָם אוֹמְרִים לוֹ אָנוּ כַפָּרָתְךָ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לָהֶן תִּתְבָּרְכוּ מִן הַשָּׁמָיִם. וּכְשֶׁמַּבְרִין אוֹתוֹ, כָּל הָעָם מְסֻבִּין עַל הָאָרֶץ וְהוּא מֵסֵב עַל הַסַּפְסָל:
4.1. אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כד) מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם. מַה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַחֲזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחֲזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם לִזְכוּת וּבְיוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה, לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין לֹא בְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא בְעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב:''. None | 2.1. The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed priest stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
4.1. Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry of the witnesses, as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases are decided by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either from conviction to acquittal or from acquittal to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict from conviction to acquittal but not from acquittal to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.''. None |
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6. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 3.8.22-3.8.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Genre, Forensic/Judicial • judicial (forensic)
Found in books: Glowalsky (2020) 96; Martin and Whitlark (2018) 87
| 3.8.22. \xa0Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I\xa0can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything. 3.8.23. \xa0Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words "otherwise we shall perish" must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium. 3.8.24. \xa0It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour. "But," it will be urged, "if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife." Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife. 3.8.25. \xa0It appears to me, therefore, that where necessity exists, there is no room for deliberation, any more than where it is clear that a thing is not feasible. For deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists. Those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be Ï\x84ὸ δÏ\x85ναÏ\x84Ï\x8cν or "possibility" as we translate it; the translation may seem clumsy, but it is the only word available.''. None |
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7. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Decisions, judicial • Roman Empire, judicial procedure • judicial prayer
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 748, 749; Czajkowski et al (2020) 92; Faraone (1999) 12
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8. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Roman Empire, judicial procedure • torture, judicial
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 743; de Ste. Croix et al. (2006) 42, 127
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9. Babylonian Talmud, Gittin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Roman Empire, judicial procedure • Roman law, Jewish use of judicial system
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 785; Hayes (2022) 355
88b. אמר רב אחא בר יעקב שמע מינה מהרה דמרי עלמא תמני מאה וחמשין ותרתי הוא:,88b. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Learn from this numerical value that soon mehera for the Master of the World is eight hundred and fifty-two years, as it is stated in the verse in Deuteronomy: “You will soon maher utterly perish.” Since the Jewish people dwelled in Eretz Yisrael for almost this amount of time, it is apparently considered soon.,a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is invalid. But with regard to gentiles they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and it is a valid divorce.,Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by a Jewish court to give his wife, if they did so lawfully, as the halakha obligated the husband to divorce his wife, it is valid. This is referring to cases where sexual intercourse is forbidden or specific cases where the Sages instituted that the husband is obligated to divorce his wife. If they did so unlawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it is not considered entirely invalid, as it disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest after her husband’s death.,And in a case where the husband was compelled by gentiles, if he was compelled lawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest. But if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, and the wife is not even disqualified from marrying a priest.,The Gemara raises an objection: With regard to the statement that if the husband was compelled by gentiles the divorce is invalid but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest, whichever way you look at it, the statement is difficult. If gentiles are legally capable of compulsion, it should be rendered valid with regard to the woman’s permission to remarry as well. If they are not legally capable of compulsion, it should not disqualify her either.,Rav Mesharshiyya says: By Torah law a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by gentiles to write and give his wife is valid, and what is the reason the Sages said that it is invalid? It is so that each and every woman will not go and depend on a gentile to compel her husband to divorce her through temptation or bribery, and thereby she will release herself from her husband unlawfully.,The Gemara asks: If that is so, that where the husband was compelled by gentiles the bill of divorce is valid by Torah law, why did Shmuel rule that if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce? Let a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles to give his wife be compared to a case where he was compelled unlawfully by Jews, and disqualify the wife from marrying a priest as well.,Rather, that statement of Rav Mesharshiyya, that by Torah law a bill of divorce is valid even if the husband was compelled by gentiles to write it and give it to his wife, is a mistake. In principle it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, even if the husband is required by law to divorce his wife.,And what is the reason that the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest in this case? It is because the case where the husband was compelled lawfully by gentiles can be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews. If a bill of divorce that gentiles compelled the husband to write and give to his wife carries no weight, people might think that this is likewise the halakha with regard to a case where Jews compelled the husband to do so. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree that even if the husband was compelled by gentiles the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest. By contrast, the case where the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles cannot be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews, as they are too dissimilar. Therefore, a bill of divorce that gentiles unlawfully compelled the husband to write and give his wife is entirely invalid.,§ Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting in court as the judge and compelling husbands to give their wives bills of divorce. He said to him: But aren’t we ordinary people, not ordained judges? And it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Tarfon would say: With regard to any place where you find gentile courts agoriot, even if their laws are like Jewish laws, you may not attend them, as it is stated: “Now these are the ordices which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). It is derived from here that one may go to court only before them, i.e., Jewish judges, and not before gentiles. Alternatively, it is derived that one may go to court before them, i.e., ordained judges, and not before ordinary people. Since we are not ordained judges, how can you perform a distinctly judicial act?,Rav Yosef said to him: We see ourselves as agents of the ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael, and we are performing our task as judges on the basis of their agency, just as is the case with regard to cases of admissions and loans, which we attend to on the same basis.,The Gemara asks: If so, why is the halakha that judges living outside Eretz Yisrael do not judge in cases of robbery and personal injury? They should judge in these cases as well. The Gemara answers: When we perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency, it is with regard to common matters, e.g., cases that pertain to the halakhot of admissions and loans, which arise frequently between people. But with regard to uncommon matters, e.g., cases of robbery or personal injury, we do not perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency.,a rumor circulated in the city that an unmarried woman is betrothed, she is considered to be betrothed. Similarly, if a rumor circulated that a married woman is divorced, she is divorced, provided there is no valid alternative explanation amatla for the rumor.,What is considered a valid explanation? For example, it is a case where there is a rumor that so-and-so divorced his wife but that the bill of divorce was given to her conditionally. It is therefore possible that the condition was not fulfilled and she is not actually divorced. Similarly, if there is a rumor that a woman was betrothed but that the man threw her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, to her, and it is uncertain whether it was closer to her and uncertain whether it was closer to him, and therefore the status of their betrothal is likewise uncertain, this is considered a valid explanation.,do we render her forbidden to her husband if she is married to a priest? But didn’t Rav Ashi say that we are not concerned about any rumor that circulates after marriage? Accordingly, a woman should not be compelled to leave her husband merely on the basis of a rumor.,The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: If a rumor circulated in the city that a woman is betrothed, she is betrothed, and she may not marry another man until she receives a bill of divorce from the man to whom she is rumored to be betrothed. If she is rumored to have been betrothed to a certain man and subsequently divorced from him,''. None | |
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10. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Decisions, judicial • Roman Empire, consistency of judicial procedures • Roman Empire, judicial procedure
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 760, 825; Czajkowski et al (2020) 160, 214
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11. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Decisions, judicial • Roman Empire, judicial procedure
Found in books: Bickerman and Tropper (2007) 743; Czajkowski et al (2020) 191, 214
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