| 30a. וכל לישני דבי דינא ולא הוה כתב בה במותב תלתא הוינא וחד ליתוהי,סבר רבינא למימר היינו דריש לקיש א"ל רב נתן בר אמי הכי אמרינן משמיה דרבא כל כי האי גוונא חיישינן לב"ד טועין,אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אי כתב בה בי דינא תו לא צריך,ודילמא בית דין חצוף הוא דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו ב"ד חצוף דכתב ביה בי דינא דרבנא אשי,ודילמא רבנן דבי רב אשי כשמואל סבירא להו דכתיב בו (ואמרנא ליה לרבנא אשי) ואמר לן רבנא אשי,ת"ר אמר להן אחד אני ראיתי אביכם שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן בבית לא אמר כלום בשדה דבריו קיימין,כללו של דבר כל שבידו ליטלן דבריו קיימין אין בידו ליטלן לא אמר כלום,הרי שראו את אביהן שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן אם כמוסר דבריו קיימין אם כמערים לא אמר כלום,הרי שהיה מצטער על מעות שהניח לו אביו ובא בעל החלום ואמר לו כך וכך הן במקום פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן זה היה מעשה ואמרו דברי חלומות לא מעלין ולא מורידין:,שנים אומרים זכאי כו': מיכתב היכי כתבי,ר' יוחנן אמר זכאי ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין (ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין) רבי (אליעזר) אמר מדבריהן נזדכה פלוני,מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו לשלומי איהו מנתא בהדייהו דלמאן דאמר זכאי משלם ולמאן דאמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלם,ולמ"ד זכאי משלם לימא להו אי לדידי צייתיתון אתון נמי לא שלמיתון,אלא איכא בינייהו לשלומי אינהו מנתא דידיה למ"ד זכאי משלמי למ"ד פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלמי,ולמאן דאמר זכאי משלמי ולימרו ליה אי לאו את בהדן לא הוה סליק דינא מידי,אלא איכא בינייהו משום (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך רבי יוחנן אמר זכאי משום לא תלך רכיל,ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני פלוני מחייבין משום דמיחזי כשיקרא,ור' אלעזר אית ליה דמר ואית ליה דמר הלכך כתבי הכי מדבריהם נזדכה פלוני:,גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין כו': למאן אילימא לבעלי דינין התם קיימי אלא לעדים,כמאן דלא כרבי נתן דתניא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהן כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה,ואין עדותן מתקיימת בבית דין עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד רבי נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין את דבריו,לא לעולם לבעלי דינין ורבי נחמיה היא דתניא רבי נחמיה אומר כך היה מנהגן של נקיי הדעת שבירושלים מכניסין לבעלי דינין ושומעין דבריהן ומכניסין את העדים ושומעין דבריהם ומוציאין אותן לחוץ ונושאין ונותנין בדבר (גמרו את הדבר מכניסין אותן כו'),והתניא גמרו את הדבר מכניסין את העדים ההיא דלא כרבי נתן,גופא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהם כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא קרא ואיבעית אימא סברא,איבעית אימא סברא אמנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קא מסהיד האי ומנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קמסהיד האי ואידך אמנה בעלמא תרוייהו קמסהדי,ואיבעית אימא קרא דכתיב (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע,ותניא ממשמע שנאמר (דברים יט, טו) לא יקום עד איני יודע שהוא אחד מה תלמוד לומר אחד,זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר עד הרי כאן שנים עד שיפרט לך הכתוב אחד,ואפקיה רחמנא בלשון חד למימר עד דחזו תרווייהו כחד ואידך והוא עד או ראה או ידע מ"מ:,ואין עדותן מתקיימת בב"ד עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד ר' נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין דבריו במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא סברא איבעית אימא קרא,אב"א סברא מר סבר עד אחד כי אתי לשבועה אתי לממונא לא אתי,ואידך אטו כי אתו בהדי הדדי בחד פומא קא מסהדי אלא מצרפינן להו הכא נמי ליצרפינהו,ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו | 30a. b and all of the formulations /b of an enactment b of the court /b were written in it. But only two were signed on it, b and /b the following statement b was not written in it: We were /b convened b in a session of three /b judges, b and one /b of the judges b is no /b longer here, as he died or left for another reason. There was therefore room for concern that perhaps there were only two witnesses, and they wrote the document of admission improperly., b Ravina thought to say /b that b this is /b a case in which the principle b of Reish Lakish, /b that witnesses do not sign a document unless the action was performed appropriately, applies. b Rav Natan bar Ami said to him: This /b is what b we say in the name of Rava: /b In b any cases like this, we are concerned for /b the possibility of b an erroneous court /b that thinks that two constitute a court., b Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: If it was written in /b the document: We, the members of b the court, /b convened, it is b unnecessary /b for the deed to b further /b state that one of the judges is no longer there, as a standard court consists of three judges.,The Gemara asks: b But perhaps it was an impudent court, as Shmuel says: /b With regard to b two /b judges b who /b convened a tribunal and b judged, their verdict is /b a binding b verdict; but /b because they contravened the rabbinic ordice mandating that a court must be composed of three judges, b they are called an impudent court. /b The Gemara answers: It was a document b in which it was written: /b We, the members of b the court of Rabbana Ashi, /b convened. Rav Ashi’s court presumably conformed to rabbinic protocol.,The Gemara asks: b But perhaps the Sages of the court of Rav Ashi hold like Shmuel, /b that the verdict of two judges is binding, and they convened an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It is a document b in which it is written: And we said to Rabbana Ashi, and Rabbana Ashi said to us. /b Rav Ashi himself certainly would not have participated in the discussions of an impudent court.,§ The Gemara continues its discussion of when an admission is deemed credible. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : In a case where b one said to /b the children of another: b I saw that your father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, saying: /b This money b belongs to so-and-so, /b or: This money b is second tithe, /b and the money was found where he said, the i halakha /i depends on the circumstances. If the chest, box, or cabinet was b in the house, /b the witness has b said nothing. /b His testimony about the status of the money is not accepted, as he is only one witness, and he could not have taken the money for himself had he wanted to. But if it was b in the field, his statement stands, /b i.e., is accepted., b The principle of the matter /b is as follows: In b any /b case b where it is in /b the b power of /b the witness b to take /b the money, b his statement stands; /b if b it is not in his power to take /b the money, b he has said nothing. /b ,In a case b where /b the children themselves b saw that their father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and /b the father b said: /b This money b belongs to so-and-so, /b or: This money b is second tithe, if /b he said so b as one who relays /b information to his own children, b his statement stands. /b But b if /b he said so b as one who employs artifice, /b i.e., he appears to have told them that the money was not his only so that they would not take it, b he has said nothing, /b and they may spend the money.,In a case b where /b one b was distressed about money that his father left him /b as an inheritance, because he could not find it, b and the master of the dream, /b i.e., someone in his dream, b came and said to him: It is such and such /b an amount of money and b it is in such and such a place, /b but the money b is second tithe, /b and he found this amount in the place of which he dreamed; and b this was /b an actual b incident /b that was brought before the Sages, b and they said /b that he can spend the money, as b matters /b appearing in b dreams do not make a difference /b in determining the practical i halakha /i .,§ The mishna teaches that if b two /b judges b say /b the defendant is b exempt /b and one says he is liable, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: When there is a dispute between the judges, b how do they write /b the verdict?, b Rabbi Yoḥa says: /b They write that he is b exempt, /b without mentioning the dispute. b Reish Lakish says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable; /b they must mention that there was a dispute. b Rabbi Eliezer says /b that they do not specify the names of the judges, but rather they add the phrase: b From the statement of /b the judges b so-and-so was deemed exempt, /b to the wording of the verdict. This indicates that not all the judges agreed that he is exempt, but does not specify which judges came to which conclusion.,The Gemara asks: b What /b is the difference b between /b these opinions, besides the wording of the verdict? The Gemara answers: The practical difference b between them /b is b with regard to /b whether or not, in a case where it is discovered that the verdict was erroneous, the judge who was in the minority must b pay /b his b portion /b of restitution b along with /b the judges of the majority. b As according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b the minority judge b pays /b as well, b and according to the one who says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, he does not pay. /b ,The Gemara asks: b But according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b why b does he pay? Let him say to /b the other judges: b If you would have listened to me you would not have paid either. /b Why should I have to pay for your mistake?, b Rather, /b he does not pay, and the practical difference b between /b the opinions is b with regard to /b whether or not b those /b other judges must b pay his portion /b of the restitution. b According to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, they pay /b the full sum, as they did not mention that there was a dispute over the matter. But b according to the one who says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, they do not pay /b the portion of the overruled judge, and he does not pay it either.,The Gemara asks: b But according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b why b do they pay /b his portion? b Let them say to him: If you had not been with us the judgment would have had no verdict at all, /b as two judges cannot issue a verdict. Therefore, you share the responsibility with us and should participate in the payment., b Rather, /b the difference b between /b the opinions is only with regard to the wording of the verdict, and is b due to /b the prohibition of: b “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” /b (Leviticus 19:16). b Rabbi Yoḥa says /b that they write that he is b exempt due to /b the prohibition of gossip, as derived from the verse: b “You shall not go as a talebearer.” /b , b Reish Lakish says /b they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, because /b otherwise the document would b have the appearance of falsehood, /b as not all the judges deemed him exempt., b And Rabbi Elazar accepts /b the opinion b of /b this b Sage, /b Rabbi Yoḥa, b and accepts /b the opinion b of /b that b Sage, /b Reish Lakish. b Therefore, this /b is what b they write: From the statement of /b the judges, b so-and-so was deemed exempt. /b This wording indicates that the ruling was not based on a consensus among the judges, so that it will not have the appearance of falsehood, but it also does not specify what each judge said, to avoid gossip.,§ The mishna teaches that after the judges b finished the matter /b and reached a decision, b they would bring /b them b in. /b The Gemara asks: b Whom /b would they bring in? b If we say /b they would bring in b the litigants, /b this cannot be, as b they were there /b the whole time; they never left the room. b Rather, /b they would bring in b the witnesses. /b ,If so, b in accordance with whose /b opinion is the mishna? It is b not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Natan; as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b The testimonies of /b individual witnesses b are never combined /b into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: /b Their testimonies are combined b even in /b a case where they saw the incident b one after the other. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b And /b furthermore, b their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify /b together b as one. Rabbi Natan says: /b They need not testify together. Rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges b hear the statement of this /b witness b today, and when the other /b witness b comes tomorrow /b the judges b hear his statement. /b The mishna, by contrast, indicates that the verdict must be given with the two witnesses present together.,The Gemara reverses its interpretation of the mishna: b No, actually /b it can be explained that the judges would bring in b the litigants; and it is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the custom of the scrupulous people of Jerusalem: /b When they would judge, b they /b would b bring in the litigants and hear their statements, and /b then b they /b would b bring in the witnesses and hear their statements /b in the presence of the litigants, b and /b then b they /b would b take them /b all b outside /b of the courtroom b and discuss the matter /b in their absence. Once b they finished the matter they /b would b bring them, /b i.e., the litigants, b in, /b to hear their verdict.,The Gemara asks: b But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i explicitly: When b they finished the matter they /b would b bring in the witnesses? /b The Gemara answers: b That /b i baraita /i is certainly b not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Natan. /b ,§ The Gemara discusses b the /b matter b itself: The testimonies of /b individual witnesses b are never combined /b into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: /b Their testimonies are combined b even in /b a case where they saw the incident b one after the other. /b The Gemara asks: b With regard to what do they disagree? /b The Gemara answers: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse, and if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning. /b ,The Gemara elaborates: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning: /b The first i tanna /i holds that the witnesses must see the incident transpire together, as otherwise, b about the one hundred dinars /b of debt b that this /b one b is testifying, that /b one b is not testifying, and /b about b the one hundred dinars that that /b one b is testifying, this one is not testifying. /b There is only one witness of each incident, which is not sufficient. b And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, holds that since b both /b witnesses b are testifying about one hundred dinars in general, /b the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff one hundred dinars., b And if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse, as it is written: /b “And if anyone sins, hearing the voice of adjuration, b and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known, /b if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).,The Gemara explains: b And it is taught /b in a i baraita /i with regard to the verse: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); b by inference, from that /b which b is stated /b in the verse: b A witness shall not rise up /b against a man, even without the word “one,” b do I not know that it is /b referring to b one /b witness? After all, the verse is written in the singular. Therefore, b what /b is the meaning when b the verse states /b explicitly: b “One /b witness”?, b This established a paradigm, /b a basis for the principle that in b every place /b in the Torah b where /b the word b “witness” is stated, /b it means that b there are two /b witnesses, b unless the verse specifies for you /b that it is referring to only b one /b witness., b And /b according to the first i tanna /i , b the Merciful One expresses it in the singular form, /b i.e., “witness” and not “witnesses,” b to say /b that they are not combined into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, derives from the phrase: b “And he is a witness, whether he has seen or known,” /b that b in any case /b where one testifies about what he sees and knows, his testimony is valid.,The i baraita /i cited above teaches: b And /b furthermore, b their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify /b together b as one. Rabbi Natan says: /b They need not testify together; rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges b hear the statement of this /b witness b today, and when the other /b witness b comes tomorrow /b the judges b hear his statement. /b The Gemara asks: b With regard to what do they disagree? /b The Gemara answers: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning, /b and b if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse. /b ,The Gemara elaborates: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning, /b as one b Sage, /b the first i tanna /i , b holds /b that b when one witness comes /b to testify, b he comes to /b render the defendant liable to take b an oath. /b This is the i halakha /i when there is one witness against the defendant in a case of monetary law. b He does not come to /b render the defendant liable to pay b money, /b because for this two witnesses are necessary., b And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Natan, responds: b Is that to say /b that b when they come together, /b they render the defendant ficially liable because b they testify with one mouth? /b Obviously they testify one after the other. b Rather, /b clearly it is the judges who b combine /b their two testimonies into one. b Here too, /b when the witnesses come to court at different times, b let /b the judges b combine /b their testimonies., b And if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” /b (Leviticus 5:1), |
