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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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74 results for "intellect"
1. Homer, Odyssey, 2.276-2.277 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 147
2. Homer, Iliad, 15.641-15.643 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 147
15.641. / to the mighty Heracles. of him, a father baser by far, was begotten a son goodlier in all manner of excellence, both in fleetness of foot and in fight, and in mind he was among the first of the men of Mycenae; he it was who then yielded to Hector the glory of victory. 15.642. / to the mighty Heracles. of him, a father baser by far, was begotten a son goodlier in all manner of excellence, both in fleetness of foot and in fight, and in mind he was among the first of the men of Mycenae; he it was who then yielded to Hector the glory of victory. 15.643. / to the mighty Heracles. of him, a father baser by far, was begotten a son goodlier in all manner of excellence, both in fleetness of foot and in fight, and in mind he was among the first of the men of Mycenae; he it was who then yielded to Hector the glory of victory.
3. Solon, Fragments, 20 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 46
4. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
197a. ΛΑ. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῂς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾷς μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν; ΝΙ. οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλʼ ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἴει με 197a. Lach. Heavens, Socrates, how admirably you argue! Now answer us sincerely, Nicias, and say whether those animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we are; or whether you dare, in contradiction of everyone else, describe them as not even courageous. Nic. No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children
5. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
6. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 144
7. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
376b. φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον. 376b. trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom. In what respect, pray? In respect, said I, that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you, can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance? It certainly cannot, he said. But you will admit, said I, that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same? The same, he said. Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be
8. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
9. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
10. Eudemus Naxius, Fragments, 130 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 163
11. Epicharmus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 154
12. Anaxagoras, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
13. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
99a. ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν’ ἂν τάττῃ. ΦΑΙΔ. ἀλλ’ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον: εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ’ ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι: ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, ἀλλ’ οὐ 99a. For, by Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. Phaedo. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do,
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
15. Aristotle, History of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 163
16. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 154
17. Eudemus of Rhodes, Fragments, 130 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 163
18. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 152
19. Theophrastus, On The Senses, 25 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
20. Archelaus Chersonensis, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
21. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
22. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 152
23. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
24. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 152
25. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 152
26. Aristotle, Memory And Reminiscence, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151
27. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 151, 152
28. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.12, 2.64.160 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 138, 146
2.12. The augur's office is one of high dignity; surely the soothsayer's art also is divinely inspired. Is not one who considers these and countless similar facts compelled to admit that the gods exist? If there be persons who interpret the will of certain beings, it follows that those beings must themselves exist; but there are persons who interpret the will of the gods; therefore we must admit that the gods exist. But perhaps it may be argued that not all prophecies come true. Nor do all sick persons get well, but that does not prove that there is no art of medicine. Signs of future events are manifested by the gods; men may have mistaken these signs, but the fault lay with man's powers of inference, not with the divine nature. "Hence the main issue is agreed among all men of all nations, inasmuch as all have engraved in their minds an innate belief that the gods exist.
29. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.13.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 138
30. Plutarch, On Affection For offspring, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 143, 159
495c. and one which does not advance beyond utility; but in the case of man, a rational and social animal, Nature, by introducing him to a conception of justice and law and to the worship of the gods and to the founding of cities and to human kindness, has furnished noble and beautiful and fruitful seeds of all these in the joy we have in our children and our love of them, emotions which accompany their first beginnings; and these qualities are found in the very constitution of their bodies. For although Nature is everywhere exact and workmanlike with no deficiency or superfluity, "and has," as Erasistratus said, "no trumpery about her"; yet when it comes to the processes of procreation, it is impossible to describe them in a fitting manner, and perhaps it would not be decent to fix our attention too precisely
31. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
32. Plutarch, On The Fortune Or Virtue of Alexander The Great, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 157
33. Plutarch, Beasts Are Rational, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146, 147
34. Plutarch, On The E At Delphi, 386 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 143, 147, 152, 156, 159
35. Plutarch, On The Eating of Flesh I, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 157, 163
999b. Nor, one might reply, have you with perfume or exotic sweetmeats either. Refrain from animals also, if you are expelling the useless and unnecessary element in pleasure from all its lurking-places. Let us, however, now examine the point whether we really have no compact of justice with animals; and let us do so in no artificial or sophistical manner, but fixing our attention on our own emotions and conversing like human beings with ourselves and weighing...
36. Plutarch, On Chance, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 154
98b. How can we help doing so when we pluck out sagacity, as it were our own eyes, and take as our guide in life a blind leader? Yet, suppose someone among us should say that the act of seeing is chance and not vision nor the use of "light-bringing orbs," as Plato calls the eyes, and that the act of hearing is chance and not a faculty apperceptive of a vibration in the air which is carried onward through ear and brain. If such were the case, it were well for us, as it appears, to beware of trusting our senses! But, as a matter of fact, Nature has conferred upon us sight, hearing, taste, smell, and our other members and their faculties to be
37. Plutarch, On Isis And Osiris, 382 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
38. Plutarch, Oracles At Delphi No Longer Given In Verse, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 164
39. Plutarch, On The Birth of The Spirit In Timaeus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 164
40. Plutarch, Cato The Elder, 5.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 158, 159
5.2. καίτοι τὴν χρηστότητα τῆς δικαιοσύνης πλατύτερον τόπον ὁρῶμεν ἐπιλαμβάνουσαν νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους μόνον χρῆσθαι πεφύκαμεν, πρὸς εὐεργεσίας δὲ καὶ χάριτας ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς πλουσίας ἀπορρεῖ τῆς ἡμερότητος. καὶ γὰρ ἵππων ἀπειρηκότων ὑπὸ χρόνου τροφαὶ καὶ κυνῶν οὐ σκυλακεῖαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γηροκομίαι τῷ χρηστῷ προσήκουσιν. 5.2.
41. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 117.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
42. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 159
43. Plutarch, Whether Land Or Sea Animals Are More Clever, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 154, 163
44. Plutarch, Sulla, 9.6-9.8, 11.1-11.2, 12.5-12.14, 17.1, 17.4, 17.6, 19.9, 27.3, 27.6-27.14, 28.7-28.8, 28.11-28.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 125
9.6. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Βάσιλλον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐμπεσόντων καὶ κρατούντων, ὁ πολὺς καὶ ἄνοπλος δῆμος ἀπὸ τῶν τεγῶν κεράμῳ καὶ λίθῳ βάλλοντες ἐπέσχον αὐτοὺς τοῦ πρόσω χωρεῖν καὶ συνέστειλαν εἰς τὸ τεῖχος, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Σύλλας παρῆν ἤδη, καὶ συνιδὼν τὸ γινόμενον ἐβόα τὰς οἰκίας ὑφάπτειν, καὶ λαβὼν δᾷδα καιομένην ἐχώρει πρῶτος αὐτός, καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἐκέλευε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πυροβόλοις ἄνω τῶν στεγασμάτων ἐφιεμένους, κατʼ οὐδένα λογισμόν, 9.7. ἀλλʼ ἐμπαθὴς ὢν καὶ τῷ θυμῷ παραδεδωκὼς τὴν τῶν πρασσομένων ἡγεμονίαν, ὅς γε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς μόνον ἑώρα, φίλους δὲ καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκείους εἰς οὐδένα λόγον θέμενος οὐδʼ οἶκτον κατῄει διὰ πυρός, ᾧ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ μὴ διάγνωσις οὐκ ἦν. τούτων δὲ γινομένων Μάριος ἐξωσθεὶς πρὸς τὸ τῆς Γῆς ἱερὸν ἐκάλει διὰ κηρύγματος ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ τὸ οἰκετικόν ἐπελθόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων κρατηθεὶς ἐξέπεσε τῆς πόλεως. 11.1. λέγεται δὲ ὑπὸ τάς ἡμέρας ἐκείνας ἐν αἷς ὁ Σύλλας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐκίνει τὸν στόλον, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ Μιθριδάτῃ διατρίβοντι περὶ τὸ Πέργαμον ἐπισκῆψαι δαιμόνια, καὶ Νίκην στεφανηφόρον καθιεμένην ὑπὸ τῶν Περγαμηνῶν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἔκ τινων ὀργάνων ἄνωθεν ὅσον οὔπω τῆς κεφαλῆς ψαύουσαν συντριβῆναι, καὶ τὸν στέφανον ἐκπεσόντα κατὰ τοῦ θεάτρου φέρεσθαι χαμᾶζε διαθρυπτόμενον, ὥστε φρίκην μὲν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀθυμίαν δὲ πολλὴν Μιθριδάτῃ παρασχεῖν, καίπερ αὐτῷ τότε τῶν πραγμάτων ἐλπίδος πέρα προχωρούντων. 11.2. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ Ἀσίαν τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Βιθυνιαν καὶ Καππαδοκίαν τῶν βασιλέων ἀφῃρημένος ἐν Περγάμῳ καθῆστο, πλούτους καὶ δυναστείας καὶ τυραννίδας διανέμων τοῖς φίλοις, τῶν δὲ παίδων ὁ μὲν ἐν Πόντῳ καὶ Βοσπόρῳ τὴν παλαιὰν ἄχρι τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν Μαιῶτιν ἀοικήτων ἀρχὴν κατεῖχεν οὐδενὸς παρενοχλοῦντος, Ἀριαράθης δὲ Θρᾴκην καὶ Μακεδονίαν ἐπῄει στρατῷ μεγάλῳ προσαγόμενος, 12.5. ἐνίων δὲ φασκόντων ἀκοῦσαι φθεγγομένης τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀνακτόροις κιθάρας, εἴτε πιστεύσας εἴτε τὸν Σύλλαν βουλόμενος ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἐπέστειλε πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ σκώπτων ἀντέγραψε θαυμάζειν τὸν Κάφιν, εἰ μὴ συνίησιν ὅτι χαίροντος, οὐ χαλεπαίνοντος, εἴη τὸ ᾅδειν· ὥστε θαρροῦντα λαμβάνειν ἐκέλευσεν, ὡς ἡδομένου τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ διδόντος. 12.6. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα διέλαθε τούς γε πολλοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκπεμπόμενα, τὸν δὲ ἀργυροῦν πίθον, ὃς ἦν ὑπόλοιπος ἔτι τῶν βασιλικῶν, διὰ βάρος καὶ μέγεθος οὐ δυναμένων ἀναλαβεῖν τῶν ὑποζυγίων, ἀναγκαζόμενοι κατακόπτειν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες εἰς μνήμην ἐβάλοντο τοῦτο μὲν Τίτον Φλαμινῖνον καὶ Μάνιον Ἀκύλιον, τοῦτο δὲ Αἰμίλιον Παῦλον, ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἀντίοχον ἐξελάσας τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οἱ δὲ τούς Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖς καταπολεμήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἀπέσχοντο τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δῶρα καὶ τιμὴν αὐτοῖς καὶ σεμνότητα πολλὴν προσέθεσαν. 12.7. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἀνδρῶν τε σωφρόνων καὶ μεμαθηκότων σιωπῇ τοῖς ἄρχουσι παρέχειν τὰς χεῖρας ἡγούμενοι κατὰ νόμον, αὐτοί τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς βασιλικοὶ καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις εὐτελεῖς ὄντες, μετρίοις ἐχρῶντο καὶ τεταγμένοις ἀναλώμασι, τὸ κολακεύειν τούς στρατιώτας αἴσχιον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ δεδιέναι τούς πολεμίους· 12.8. οἱ δὲ τότε στρατηγοὶ βίᾳ τὸ πρωτεῖον, οὐκ ἀρετῇ, κτώμενοι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπʼ ἀλλήλους δεόμενοι τῶν ὅπλων ἢ τούς πολεμίους, ἠναγκάζοντο δημαγωγεῖν ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν, εἶθʼ ὧν εἰς τὰς ἡδυπαθείας τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἀνήλισκον ὠνούμενοι τούς πόνους αὑτῶν, ἔλαθον ὤνιον ὅλην τήν πατρίδα ποιήσαντες ἑαυτούς τε δούλους τῶν κακίστων ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν βελτιόνων ἄρχειν. ταῦτα ἐξήλαυνε Μάριον, εἶτʼ αὖθις ἐπὶ Σύλλαν κατῆγε, ταῦτα Ὀκταουΐου τούς περὶ Κίνναν, ταῦτα Φλάκκου τούς περὶ Φιμβρίαν αὐτόχειρας ἐποίησεν. 12.9. ὧν οὐχ ἥκιστα Σύλλας ἐνέδωκεν ἀρχάς, ἐπὶ τῷ διαφθείρειν καὶ μετακαλεῖν τούς ὑπʼ ἄλλοις ταττομένους καταχορηγῶν εἰς τούς ὑφʼ αὑτῷ καὶ δαπανώμενος, ὥστε ἅμα τούς ἄλλους μὲν εἰς προδοσίαν, τούς δὲ ὑφʼ αὑτῷ εἰς ἀσωτίαν διαφθείρων χρημάτων δεῖσθαι πολλῶν, καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν ἐκείνην. 17.1. ἐκ δὲ Λεβαδείας καὶ τοῦ Τροφωνίου φῆμαί τε χρησταὶ καὶ νικηφόρα μαντεύματα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐξεπέμποντο. περὶ ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐπιχώριοι πλείονα λέγουσιν ὡς δὲ Σύλλας αὐτὸς ἐν δεκάτῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων γέγραφε, Κόϊντος Τίτιος, οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πραγματευομένων, ἧκε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἤδη τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ νενικηκότα μάχην, ἀπαγγέλλων ὅτι καὶ δευτέραν ὁ Τροφώνιος αὐτόθι μάχην καὶ νίκην προσημαίνει ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου. 17.4. αὐτὸς δὲ παρὰ τὸν Κηφισὸν ἐσφαγιάζετο, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν γενομένων ἐχώρει πρὸς τὴν Χαιρώνειαν, ἀναληψόμενός τε τὴν αὐτόθι στρατιὰν καὶ κατοψόμενος τὸ καλούμενον Θούριον ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προκατειλημμένον. ἔστι δὲ κορυφὴ τραχεῖα καὶ στροβιλῶδες ὄρος, ὃ καλοῦμεν Ὀρθόπαγον, ὑπὸ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ῥεῦμα τοῦ Μόλου καὶ Θουρίου νεὼς Ἀπόλλωνος. ὠνόμασται δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ Θουροῦς, τῆς Χαίρωνος μητρός, ὃν οἰκιστὴν γεγονέναι τῆς Χαιρωνείας ἱστοροῦσιν. 17.6. ὡς δὲ δεξάμενος ἠσπάσατο τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ παρώρμησε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ δύο τῶν Χαιρωνέων ἄνδρες, Ὁμολόϊχος καὶ Ἀναξίδαμος, ὑφιστάμενοι τοὺς τὸ Θούριον κατασχόντας ἐκκόψειν, ὀλίγους στρατιώτας παρʼ ἐκείνου λαβόντες· ἀτραπὸν γὰρ εἶναι τοῖς βαρβάροις ἄδηλον, ἀπὸ τοῦ καλουμένου Πετράχου παρὰ τὸ Μουσεῖον ἐπὶ τὸ Θούριον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἄγουσαν, ᾗ πορευθέντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐπιπεσεῖσθαι καὶ καταλεύσειν ἄνωθεν αὐτοὺς ἢ συνώσειν εἰς τὸ πεδίον. 27.3. μέλλοντος δὲ τοὺς στρατιώτας διαπεραιοῦν, καὶ δεδιότος μὴ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπιλαβόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι διαρρυῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὤμοσαν ἀφʼ αὑτῶν παραμενεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἑκουσίως κακουργήσειν τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἔπειτα χρημάτων δεόμενον πολλῶν ὁρῶντες, ἀπήρχοντο καὶ συνεισέφερον ὡς ἕκαστος εἶχεν εὐπορίας. οὐ μὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ὁ Σύλλας, ἀλλʼ ἐπαινέσας καὶ παρορμήσας διέβαινεν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, ἐπὶ πεντεκαίδεκα στρατηγοὺς πολεμίους πεντήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίας σπείρας ἔχοντας, ἐκδηλότατα τοῦ θεοῦ τὰς εὐτυχίας προσημαίνοντος αὐτῷ. 27.6. τοῦτο αἴτιον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι φησὶ τοῦ μὴ διαλυθῆναι τοὺς στρατιώτας κατὰ πόλεις, ἀλλὰ συμμεῖναι καὶ καταφρονῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων πολλαπλασίων ὄντων, ἐν δὲ Σιλβίῳ φησὶν οἰκέτην Ποντίου θεοφόρητον ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ λέγοντα παρὰ τῆς Ἐνυοῦς κράτος πολέμου καὶ νίκην ἀπαγγέλλειν εἰ δὲ μὴ σπεύσειεν, ἐμπεπρήσεσθαι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ὃ καὶ συμβῆναι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἧς ὁ ἄνθρωπος προηγόρευσεν ἦν δὲ αὕτη πρὸ μιᾶς νωνῶν Κυντιλίων, ἃς νῦν Ἰουλίας καλοῦμεν. 27.7. ἔτι δὲ Μάρκος Λεύκολλος, εἷς τῶν ὑπὸ Σύλλᾳ στρατηγούντων, περὶ Φιδεντίαν ἑκκαίδεκα σπείραις πρὸς πεντήκοντα τῶν πολεμίων ἀντιταχθεὶς τῇ μὲν προθυμίᾳ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐπίστευεν, ἀνόπλους δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔχων ὤκνει. βουλευομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ διαμέλλοντος, ἀπὸ τοῦ πλησίον πεδίου λειμῶνα ἔχοντος αὔρα φέρουσα μαλακὴ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθέων ἐπέβαλε τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ κατέσπειρεν, αὐτομάτως ἐπιμένοντα καὶ περιπίπτοντα τοῖς θυρεοῖς καὶ τοῖς κράνεσιν αὑτῶν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐστεφανωμένους. 27.8. γενόμενοι δὲ ὑπὸ τούτου προθυμότεροι συνέβαλον καὶ νικήσαντες ὀκτακισχιλίους ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον εἷλον. οὗτος ὁ Λεύκολλος ἀδελφὸς ἦν Λευκόλλου τοῦ Μιθριδάτην ὕστερον καὶ Τιγράνην καταπολεμήσαντος. 28.7. οἱ δὲ οὐ πολὺν ὑπέστησαν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ γίνεται πολὺς φόνος αὐτῶν τραπέντων. Μάριος δὲ φεύγων εἰς Πραινεστὸν ἤδη τὰς πύλας εὗρε κεκλειμένας· καλωδίου δὲ ἄνωθεν ἀφεθέντος ἐνζώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀνελήφθη πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, ἔνιοι δέ φασιν, ὧν καὶ Φαινεστέλλας ἐστίν, οὐδὲ αἰσθέσθαι τῆς μάχης τὸν Μάριον, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀγρυπνιῶν καὶ κόπων ὑπὸ σκιᾷ τινι χαμαὶ κατακλινέντα τοῦ συνθήματος δοθέντος ἐνδοῦναι πρὸς ὕπνον, εἶτα μόλις ἐξεγείρεσθαι τῆς φυγῆς γενομένης. 28.8. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ Σύλλας φησὶν εἰκοσιτρεῖς μόνους ἀποβαλεῖν, ἀποκτεῖναι δὲ τῶν πολεμίων δισμυρίους καὶ λαβεῖν ζῶντας ὀκτακισχιλίους. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὁμοίως εὐτυχεῖτο διὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν, Πομπηΐου, Κράσσου, Μετέλλου, Σερουϊλίου. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ μικρὰ προσκρούσαντες οὗτοι μεγάλας συνέτριψαν δυνάμεις τῶν πολεμίων, ὥστε τὸν μάλιστα τὴν ἐναντίαν στάσιν συνέχοντα Κάρβωνα νύκτωρ ἀποδράντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρατιὰν εἰς Λιβύην ἐκπλεῦσαι. 9.6. 9.7. 11.1. 11.2. 12.5. 12.6. 12.7. 12.8. 12.9. 17.1. 17.4. 17.6. 27.3. 27.6. 27.7. 27.8. 28.7. 28.8.
45. Plutarch, Solon, 8.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 46
8.4. τὰ μὲν οὖν δημώδη τῶν λεγομένων τοιαῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὅτι πλεύσας ἐπὶ Κωλιάδα μετὰ τοῦ Πεισιστράτου, καὶ καταλαβὼν αὐτόθι πάσας τὰς γυναῖκας τῇ Δήμητρι τὴν πάτριον θυσίαν ἐπιτελούσας, ἔπεμψεν ἄνδρα πιστὸν εἰς Σαλαμῖνα προσποιούμενον αὐτόμολον εἶναι, κελεύοντα τοὺς Μεγαρεῖς, εἰ βούλονται τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὰς πρώτας λαβεῖν γυναῖκας, ἐπὶ Κωλιάδα μετʼ αὐτοῦ πλεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. 8.4. The popular account of his campaign is as follows. Having sailed to Cape Colias with Peisistratus, he found all the women of the city there, performing the customary sacrifice to Demeter. He therefore sent a trusty man to Salamis, who pretended to be a deserter, and bade the Megarians, if they wished to capture the principal women of Athens, to sail to Colias with him as fast as they could.
46. Plutarch, How The Young Man Should Study Poetry, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 147
47. Plutarch, On Superstition, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
167b. for it is as if the soul had suffered the extinction of the brightest and most domit of its many eyes, the conception of God. But superstition is attended by emotion, as has already been said, and by sore distress and disturbance and mental enslavement from the very beginning. Plato says that music, the creator of harmony and order, was given to mankind by the gods not for the sake of pampering them or tickling their ears, but so that whatever in a man's body is disturbing and errant, affecting the cycles and concords of the soul, and in many instances, for lack of culture and refinement, waxing wanton because of licentiousness and error,
48. Plutarch, On The Delays of Divine Vengeance, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 147
49. Epictetus, Discourses, 4123 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
50. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 4.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
51. Plutarch, Numa Pompilius, 8.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
8.8. ἀλλʼ ἐν ἑκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα τοῖς πρώτοις ἔτεσι ναοὺς μὲν οἰκοδομού μεν οι καὶ καλιάδας ἱερὰς ἱστῶντες, ἄγαλμα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔμμορφον ποιούμενοι διετέλουν, ὡς οὔτε ὅσιον ἀφομοιοῦν τὰ βελτίονα τοῖς χείροσιν οὔτε ἐφάπτεσθαι θεοῦ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἢ νοήσει, κομιδῆ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν θυσιῶν ἔχεται τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς ἁγιστείας· ἀναίμακτοι γάρ ἦσαν αἵ γε πολλαί, διʼ ἀλφίτου καὶ σπονδῆς καὶ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων πεποιημέναι. 8.8. but while for the first hundred and seventy years they were continually building temples and establishing sacred shrines, they made no statues in bodily form for them, convinced that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that it was impossible to apprehend Deity except by the intellect. Their sacrifices, too, were altogether appropriate to the Pythagorean worship; for most of them involved no bloodshed, but were made with flour, drink-offerings, and the least costly gifts.
52. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 145
53. Plutarch, Fragments, 73, 193 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 157
54. Plutarch, Greek Questions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 147
55. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 164
56. Aelian, Nature of Animals, 4.53 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 163
57. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 7.6.33 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 138
58. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 146
59. Polyaenus, Stratagems, 1.20.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 46
60. Straton Historicus, Fragments, 112 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 154
61. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.69-1.71, 2.5.26-2.5.27, 2.26 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 145, 156, 158
62. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 1.6.3, 1.7-1.12, 1.10.1, 1.14.3, 2.22.1-2.22.3, 2.25.1-2.25.3, 3.6, 3.6.5, 3.8.3, 3.9.5, 3.10.3, 3.19.2, 3.20-3.24, 3.20.1-3.20.4, 3.22.2, 3.23.1-3.23.2, 3.24.5-3.24.6, 3.25.1, 3.26.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 138, 145, 146, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164
1.7. 7.The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordice, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. SPAN 1.8. 8.For none of those legal institutes which were established from the |15 first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right. SPAN 1.9. 9.Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes, by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the |16 vulgar everywhere require something which may impede them from promptly performing what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, though proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other without discrimination. SPAN 1.10. 10.Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but also for defence against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did not alone recall this to their memory in an irrational manner. SPAN 1.11. 11.Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past |17 transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way injurious to our life. For as I may say, no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use. SPAN 1.12. 12.On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men respecting those who establish the laws, are full of a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities of |18 life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which are unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other animals, than from iimate natures. But we can alone obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death. And such are the arguments of the Epicureans. The Arguments of Claudius the Neapolitan who published a Treatise against Abstinence from Animal Food. SPAN 3.6. 6.Neither, therefore, are animals ignorant of the meaning of the voice of men, when they are angry, or speak kindly to, or call them, or pursue them, or ask them to do something, or give something to them; nor, in short, are they ignorant of any thing that is usually said to them, but are aptly obedient to it; which it would be impossible for them to do, unless that which is similar to intellection energized, in consequence |86 of being excited by its similar. The immoderation of their passions, also, is suppressed by certain modulations, and stags, bulls, and other animals, from being wild become tame. Those, too, who are decidedly of opinion that brutes are deprived of reason, yet admit that dogs have a knowledge of dialectic, and make use of the syllogism which consists of many disjunctive propositions, when, in searching for their game, they happen to come to a place where there are three roads. For they thus reason, the beast has either fled through this road, or through that, or through the remaining road; but it has not fled either through this, or through that, and therefore it must have fled through the remaining third of these roads 4. After which syllogistic process, they resume their pursuit in that road. It may, however, be readily said, that animals do these things naturally, because they were not taught by any one to do them; as if we also were not allotted reason by nature, though we likewise give names to things, because we are naturally adapted to do so. Besides, if it be requisite to believe in Aristotle, animals are seen to teach their offspring, not only something pertaining to other things, but also to utter vocal sounds; as the nightingale, for instance, teaches her young to sing. And as he likewise says, animals learn many things from each other, and many from men; and the truth of what he asserts is testified by all the tamers of colts, by every jockey, horseman, and charioteer, and by all hunters, herdsmen, keepers of elephants, and masters of wild beasts and birds. He, therefore, who estimates things rightly, will be led, from these instances, to ascribe intelligence to brutes; but he who is inconsiderate, and is ignorant of these things, will be induced to act rashly, through his inexhaustible avidity co operating with him against them. For how is it possible that he should not defame and calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in pieces, as if they were stones? Aristotle, however, Plato, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, and all such as endeavoured to discover the truth concerning animals, have acknowledged that they participate of reason. SPAN 3.20. 20.But, by Jupiter, the assertion of Chrysippus is considered by our opponents to be very probable, that the Gods made us for the sake of themselves, and for the sake of each other, and that they made animals for the sake of us; horses, indeed, in order that they might assist us in battle, dogs, that they might hunt with us, and leopards, bears, and lions, for the sake of exercising our fortitude. But the hog (for here the pleasantry of Chrysippus is most delightful) was not made for any other purpose than to be sacrificed; and God mingled soul, as if it were salt, with the flesh of this animal, that he might procure for us excellent food. In order, likewise, that we might have an abundance of broth, and luxurious suppers, divinity provided for us all-various kinds of shell-fish, the fishes called purples, sea-nettles, and the various kinds of winged animals; and this not from a certain other cause, but only that he might supply man with an exuberance of pleasure; in so doing, surpassing all nurses [in kindness], and thickly filling with pleasures and enjoyments the terrestrial place. Let him, however, to whom these assertions appear to possess a certain probability, and to participate of something worthy of deity, consider what he will reply to the saying of Carneades, that every thing which is produced by nature, is benefited when it obtains the end to which it is adapted, and for which it was generated. But benefit is to be understood in a more general way, as signifying what the Stoics call useful. The hog, however, [says he] was produced by nature for the purpose of being slaughtered and used for food; and when it suffers this, it obtains the end for which it is adapted, and is benefited. But if God fashioned animals for the use of men, in what do we use flies, lice, bats, beetles, scorpions, and vipers? of which some are odious to the sight, defile the touch, are intolerable to the smell, and in their voice dire and unpleasant; and others, on the contrary, are destructive to those that meet with them. And with respect to the balance, pistrices, and other species of whales, an infinite number of which, as Homer says 12, the loud-sounding Amphitrite nourishes, does not the Demiurgus teach us, that they were generated for the utility of the nature of things? 13 And if our opponents should admit that all things were not generated for us, and with a view to our advantage, in addition to the distinction which they make being very confused and obscure, we shall not avoid acting |98 unjustly, in attacking and noxiously using those animals which were not produced for our sake, but according to nature [i.e. for the sake of the universe], as we were. I omit to mention, that if we define, by utility, things which pertain to us, we shall not be prevented from admitting, that we were generated for the sake of the most destructive animals, such as crocodiles, balaenae, and dragons. For we are not in the least benefited by them; but they seize and destroy men that fall in their way, and use them for food; in so doing acting not at all more cruelly than we do, excepting that they commit this injustice through want and hunger, but we through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of luxury, frequently sporting in theatres, and in hunting slaughter the greater part of animals. And by thus acting, indeed, a murderous disposition and a brutal nature become strengthened in us, and render us insensible to pity: to which we may add, that those who first dared to do this, blunted the greatest part of lenity, and rendered it inefficacious. The Pythagoreans, however, made lenity towards beasts to be an exercise of philanthropy and commiseration. So that, how is it possible they should not in a greater degree excite us to justice, than those who assert that, by not slaughtering animals, the justice which is usually exercised towards men will be corrupted? For custom is most powerful in increasing those passions in man which were gradually introduced into his nature. SPAN 3.21. 21.It is so, say our antagonists; but as the immortal is opposed to the mortal, the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the incorporeal to the corporeal, so to the rational essence which has an existence in the nature of things, the irrational essence must be opposed, which has a subsistence contrary to it; nor in so many conjugations of things, is this alone to be left imperfect and mutilated. [Our opponents, however, thus speak], as if we did not grant this, or as if we had not shown that there is much of the irrational among beings. For there is an abundance of it in all the natures that are destitute of soul, nor do we require any other opposition to that which is rational; but immediately every thing which is deprived of soul, being irrational and without intellect, is opposed to that which possesses reason and dianoia 14. If, however, some one should think fit to assert that not nature in common, but the animated nature, is divided into that which possess and that which is without imagination, and into that which is sensitive, and that which is deprived of sensation, in order that these oppositions of habits and privations may |99 subsist about the same genus, as being equiponderant; - he who says this speaks absurdly. For it would be absurd to investigate in the animated nature that which is sensitive, and that which is without sensation, that which employs, and that which is without imagination, because every thing animated is immediately adapted to be sensitive and imaginative. So that neither thus will he justly require, that one part of the animated nature should be rational, but another irrational, when he is speaking to men, who think that nothing participates of sense which does not also participate of intelligence, and that nothing is an animal in which opinion and reasoning are not inherent, in the same manner as with animals every sense and impulse are naturally present. For nature, which they rightly assert produced all things for the sake of a certain thing, and with reference to a certain end, did not make an animal sensitive merely that it might be passively affected, and possess sensible perception; but as there are many things which are allied and appropriate, and many which are foreign to it, it would not be able to exist for the shortest space of time, unless it learnt how to avoid some things, and to pursue others. The knowledge, therefore, of both these, sense similarly imparts to every animal; but the apprehension and pursuit of what is useful, and the depulsion and avoidance of what is destructive and painful, can by no possible contrivance be present with those animals that are incapable of reasoning, judging, and remembering, and that do not naturally possess an animadvertise power. For to those animals from whom you entirely take away expectation, memory, design, preparation, hope, fear, desire, and indignation, neither the eyes when present, nor the ears, nor sense, nor phantasy, will be beneficial, since they will be of no use; and it will be better to be deprived of them than to labour, be in pain, and be afflicted, without possessing the power of repelling these molestations. There is, however, a treatise of Strato, the physiologist, in which it is demonstrated, that it is not possible to have a sensible perception of anything without the energy of intellection. For frequently the letters of a book, which we cursorily consider by the sight, and words which fall on the auditory sense, are concealed from and escape us, when our intellect is attentive to other things; but afterwards, when it returns to the thing to which it was before inattentive, then, by recollection, it runs through and pursues each of the before-mentioned particulars. Hence also it is said [by Epicharmus],--- 'Tis mind alone that sees and hears, And all besides is deaf and blind. |100 For the objects which fall on the eyes and the ears do not produce a sensible perception of themselves, unless that which is intellective is present. On which account, also, king Cleomenes, when something that was recited was applauded, being asked, if it did not also appear to him to be excellent, left this to the decision of those that asked him the question; for he said, that his intellect was at the time in Peloponnesus. Hence it is necessary that intellect should be present with ail those with whom sensible perception is present. SPAN 3.22. 22.Let us, however, admit that sense does not require intellect for the accomplishment of its proper work, yet, when energizing about what is appropriate and what is foreign, it discerns the difference between the two, it must then exercise the power of memory, and must dread that which will produce pain, desire that which will be beneficial, and contrive, if it is absent, how it may be present, and will procure methods of pursuing and investigating what is advantageous, and of avoiding and flying from hostile occurrences. Indeed, our opponents, in their Introductions, [as they call them], every where inculcate these things with a tedious prolixity, defining design to be an indication of perfection; the tendency of intellect to the object of its perception, an impulse prior to impulse; preparation, an action prior to action; and memory, the comprehension of some past thing,15 the perception of which, when present, was obtained through sense. For there is not any one of these which is not rational, and all of them are present with all animals. Thus, too, with respect to intellections, those which are reposited in the mind, are called by them εννοιαι, notions; but when they are in motion [through a discursive energy] they denominate them διανοησεις, or perceptions obtained by a reasoning process. But with respect to all the passions, as they are in common acknowledged to be depraved natures and opinions, it is wonderful that our opponents should overlook the operations and motions of brutes, many of which are the effects of anger, many of fear, and, by Jupiter, of envy also and emulation. Our opponents, too, themselves punish dogs and horses when they do wrong; and this not in vain, but in order to make them better, producing in them, through the pain, a sorrow which we |101 denominate repentance. But the name of the pleasure which is received through the ears is κηλησις, i.e. an ear-alluring sweetness; and the delight which is received through the eyes is denominated γοητεια, i.e. enchantment. Each of these, however, is used towards brutes. Hence stags and horses are allured by the harmony produced from reeds and flutes; and the crabs, called παγουροι, paguri, are evocated from their caverns by the melody of reeds. The fish thrissa, likewise, is said through harmony to come forth from its retreats. Those, however, who speak stupidly about these things, assert that animals are neither delighted, nor enraged, nor terrified, nor make any provision for what is necessary, nor remember; but they say that the bee as it were remembers, that the swallow as it were, provides what is requisite, that the lion is as it were angry, and that the stag is as it were afraid. And I know not what answer to give to those who say that animals neither see nor hear, but see as it were, and as it were hear; that they do not utter vocal sounds, but as it were utter them; and that, in short, they do not live, but as it were live. For he who is truly intelligent, will readily admit that these assertions are no more sane than the former, and are similarly destitute of evidence. When, however, on comparing with human manners and lives, actions and modes of living, those of animals, I see much depravity in the latter, and no manifest tendency to virtue as to the principal end, nor any proficiency, or appetition of proficiency, I am dubious why nature gave the beginning of perfection to those that are never able to arrive at the end of it 16. But this to our opponents does not appear to be at all absurd. For as they admit that the love of parents towards their offspring is the principle in us of association and justice; yet, though they perceive that this affection is abundant and strong in animals, they nevertheless deny that they participate of justice; which assertion is similarly defective with the nature of mules, who, though they are not in want of any generative member, since they have a penis and vulva, and receive pleasure from employing these parts, yet they are not able to accomplish the end of generation. Consider the thing, too, in another way: Is it not ridiculous to say that such men as Socrates, Plato and Zeno, were not less vicious than any slave, but resembled slaves in stupidity, intemperance, and injustice, and afterwards |102 blame the nature of brutes, as neither pure, nor formed with sufficient accuracy for the attainment of virtue; thus attributing to them a privation, and not a depravity and imbecility of reason? Especially since they acknowledge that there is a vice of the rational part of the soul, with which every brute is replete. For we may perceive that timidity, intemperance, injustice, and malevolence, are inherent in many brutes. SPAN 3.23. 23.But he who thinks that the nature which is not adapted to receive rectitude of reason, does not at all receive reason, he, in the first place, does not differ from one who fancies that an ape does not naturally participate of deformity, nor a tortoise of tardity; because the former is not receptive of beauty, nor the latter of celerity. And, in the next place, this is the opinion of one who does not perceive the obvious difference of things. For reason, indeed, is ingenerated by nature; but right and perfect reason is acquired by study and discipline. Hence all animated beings participate of reason, but our opponents cannot mention any man who possesses rectitude of reason and wisdom [naturally], though the multitude of men is innumerable. But as the sight of one animal differs from that of another, and the flying of one bird from that of another, (for hawks and grasshoppers do not similarly see, nor eagles and partridges); thus, also, neither does every thing which participates of reason possess genius and acuteness in the highest perfection. Indeed there are many indications in brutes of association, fortitude, and craft, in procuring what is necessary, and in economical conduct; as, on the contrary, there are also indications in them of injustice, timidity, and fatuity. Hence it is a question with some, which are the more excellent, terrestrial or aquatic animals 17? And that there are these indications, is evident from comparing storks with river horses: for the former nourish, but the latter destroy their fathers, in order that they may have connexion with their mothers. This is likewise seen on comparing doves with partridges: for the latter conceal and destroy their eggs, if the female, during her incubation, refuses to be connected with the male. But doves successively relieve each other in incubation, alternately cherishing the eggs; and first, indeed, they feed the young, and afterwards the male strikes the female with his beak, and drives her to the eggs and her young, if she has for a long time wandered from them. Antipater, however, when he blames asses and sheep for the neglect of purity, overlooks, I know not how, lynxes and swallows; of which, the former remove and entirely conceal and bury their |103 excrement, but the latter teach their young to throw it out of their nest. Moreover, we do not say that one tree is more ignorant than another, as we say that a sheep is more stupid than a dog. Nor do we say that one herb is more timid than another, as we do that a stag is more timid than a lion. For, as in things which are immoveable, one is not slower than another, and in things which are not vocal, one is not less vocal than another: thus, too, in all things in which the power of intellection is wanting, one thing cannot be said to be more timid, more dull, or more intemperate than another. For, as these qualities are present differently in their different participants, they produce in animals the diversities which we perceive. Nor is it wonderful that man should so much excel other animals in docility, sagacity, justice and association. For many brutes surpass all men in magnitude of body, and celerity of foot, and likewise in strength of sight, and accuracy of hearing; yet man is not on this account either deaf, or blind, or powerless. But we run, though slower than stags, and we see, though not so accurately as hawks; and nature has not deprived us of strength and magnitude, though our possession of these is nothing, when compared with the strength and bulk of the elephant and the camel. Hence, in a similar manner, we must not say that brutes, because their intellection is more dull than ours, and because they reason worse than we do, neither energize discursively, nor, in short, possess intellection and reason; but it must be admitted that they possess these, though in an imbecile and turbid manner, just as a dull and disordered eye participates of sight. SPAN 3.24. 24.Innumerable instances, however, might be adduced in proof of this natural sagacity of animals, if many things of this kind had not by many persons been collected and narrated. But this subject must be still further considered. For it appears that it belongs to the same thing, whether it be a part or a power, which is naturally adapted to receive a certain thing, to be also disposed to fall into a preternatural mode of subsistence, when it becomes mutilated or diseased. Thus, the eye is adapted to fall into blindness, the leg into lameness, and the tongue into stammering; but nothing else is subject to such defects. For blindness does not befall that which is not naturally adapted to see, nor lameness that which is not adapted to walk; nor is that which is deprived of a tongue fitted to stammer, or lisp, or be dumb. Hence, neither can that animal be delirious, or stupid, or insane, in which intellection, and the discursive energy of reason, are not naturally inherent. For it is not possible for any thing to be passively affected which does not possess the power, the passion of which is either privation, or mutilation, or some other deprivation. Moreover, I have met with mad dogs, and also rabid |104 horses; and some persons assert that oxen and foxes become mad. The example of dogs, however, is sufficient for our purpose: for it is a thing indubitable, and testifies that the animal possesses no despicable portion of reason and discursive energy, the passion of which, when disturbed and confounded, is fury and madness. For, when they are thus affected, we do not see that there is any change in the quality of their sight or hearing. But as he is absurd who denies that a man is beside himself, and that his intellectual, reasoning, and recollective powers, are corrupted, when he is afflicted with melancholy or delirium, (for it is usually said of those that are insane, that they are not themselves, but have fallen off from reason): thus also, he who thinks that mad dogs suffer any thing else than that of having the power, which is naturally intellective, and is adapted to reason and recollect, full of tumult and distortion, so as to cause them to be ignorant of persons most dear to them, and abandon their accustomed mode of living; he who thus thinks, appears either to overlook what is obvious; or, if he really perceives what takes place, voluntarily contends against the truth. And such are the arguments adduced by Plutarch in many of his treatises against the Stoics and Peripatetics. SPAN
63. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 2.18.6 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 157
2.18.6. In addition to all these there are extant also some single-volumed works of his; as for instance, the work On Providence, and the book composed by him On the Jews, and The Statesman; and still further, Alexander, or On the Possession of Reason by the Irrational Animals. Besides these there is a work On the Proposition that Every Wicked Man is a Slave, to which is subjoined the work On the Proposition that Every Good Man is Free.
64. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.46, 8.85 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 46, 156
1.46. His greatest service was this: Megara and Athens laid rival claims to his birthplace Salamis, and after many defeats the Athenians passed a decree punishing with death any man who should propose a renewal of the Salaminian war. Solon, feigning madness, rushed into the Agora with a garland on his head; there he had his poem on Salamis read to the Athenians by the herald and roused them to fury. They renewed the war with the Megarians and, thanks to Solon, were victorious. 8.85. His doctrine is that all things are brought about by necessity and in harmonious inter-relation. He was the first to declare that the earth moves in a circle, though some say that it was Hicetas of Syracuse.He wrote one book, and it was this work which, according to Hermippus, some writer said that Plato the philosopher, when he went to Sicily to Dionysius's court, bought from Philolaus's relatives for the sum of forty Alexandrine minas of silver, from which also the Timaeus was transcribed. Others say that Plato received it as a present for having procured from Dionysius the release of a young disciple of Philolaus who had been cast into prison.According to Demetrius in his work on Men of the Same Name, Philolaus was the first to publish the Pythagorean treatises, to which he gave the title On Nature, beginning as follows: Nature in the ordered universe was composed of unlimited and limiting elements, and so was the whole universe and all that is therein.
69. Justinus, Epitome Historiarum Philippicarum, 2.7.9  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 46
70. Alcmaeon, Fragments, Dk 14, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 150
71. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.154, 1.516, 1.528, 2.83, 2.515, 2.723, 2.725, 2.847.89, 3.69, 3.124-3.126, 3.178, 3.367, 3.371, 3.374, 3.459, 3.725  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 138, 143, 146, 155, 156, 157, 159
72. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, 251 (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •intellect,intelligence of beasts Found in books: Leão and Lanzillotta (2019), A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic, 160