1. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.4, 1.4.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 127, 130| 1.4.8. σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα διʼ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; | 1.4.8. Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity? |
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2. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 129, 130| 30a. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς; ΠΡΩ. λέγε τὸ ποῖον. ΣΩ. τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρʼ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν; ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν. ΣΩ. πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα; ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος | 30a. Soc. Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it? Pro. What is it? Soc. Shall we not say that our body has a soul? Pro. Clearly we shall. Soc. Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior? Pro. Clearly it could get it from no other source. Soc. No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, |
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| 3. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
| 4. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
| 5. Aristotle, Heavens, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
6. Cicero, Academica, 1.24-1.29, 2.118 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131| 1.24. De cf. Lact. inst. 7,3,1 natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant docebant *g ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque ea qua Man. ex qua Turn. ex eaque Mue. ea nominativus efficeretur efficerentur *gr 1 aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo tantum modo om. *d materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis habitis *g enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.' 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.27. Sed subiectam putant putant x -at *d -abant *g omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta efficat Turn. sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit possit x -sunt *g -sint *dn omnibusque modis mutari mutari s ? Dav. -re *g*d atque ex omni parte eoque eque *g eamque Chr. etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 1.28. et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque introque p in utroque w versetur, et materiam ipsam totam totam ipsam *g penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in in del. Dav. omni natura cohaerente cohaerente *gp m x cohercente *d et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum unum om. *d effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae mat. par *g sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); 1.29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse esse 2 om. *g mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt sint Mue. ei subiectae quasi prudentiam providentiam Lb. quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant pertinent r 1 wm ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter dum interdum p 1, idem et item p m inter *g*d seriem causarum Pl. * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non no num p numquam quidem quidem om. *g eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et et s ? Lb. haec *g*d ac Ha. necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. fortunam — — quod multa eff. inopinata nobis ... causarum Lact. inst. 3, 29, 3, cf. ibid. 18 (ign. rerum atque caus.) | |
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7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.18, 2.91, 3.27 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 129, 130 | 2.18. Yet even man's intelligence must lead us to infer the existence of a mind in the universe, and that a mind of surpassing ability, and in fact divine. Otherwise, whence did man 'pick up' (as Socrates says in Xenophon) the intelligence that he possesses? If anyone asks the question, whence do we get the moisture and the heat diffused throughout the body, and the actual earthy substance of the flesh, and lastly the breath of life within us, it is manifest that we have derived the one from earth, the other from water, and the other from the air which we inhale in breathing. But where did we find, whence did we abstract, that other part of us which surpasses all of these, I mean our reason, or, if you like to employ several terms to denote it, our intelligence, deliberation, thought, wisdom? Is the world to contain each of the other elements but not this one, the most precious of them all? Yet beyond question nothing exists among all things that is superior to the world, nothing that is more excellent or more beautiful; and not merely does nothing superior to it exist, but nothing superior can even be conceived. And if there be nothing superior to reason and wisdom, these faculties must necessarily be possessed by that being which we admit to be superior to all others. 2.91. For in the first place the earth, which is situated in the centre of the world, is surrounded on all sides by this living and respirable substance named the air. 'Air' is a Greek word, but yet it has by this time been accepted in use by our race, and in fact passes current as Latin. The air in turn is embraced by the immeasurable aether, which consists of the most elevated portions of fire. The term 'aether' also we may borrow, and employ it like 'air' as a Latin word, though Pacuvius provides his readers with a translation: What I speak of, we call heaven, but the Greeks it 'aether' call — just as though the man who says this were not a Greek! 'Well, he is talking Latin,' you may say. Just so, if we won't suppose we are hearing him talk Greek; in another passage Pacuvius tells us: A Grecian born: my speech discloses that. 3.27. "But then you tell me that Socrates in Xenophon asks the question, if the world contains no rational soul, where did we pick up ours? And I too ask the question, where did we get the faculty of speech, the knowledge of numbers, the art of music? unless indeed we suppose that the sun holds conversation with the moon when their courses approximate, or that the world makes a harmonious music, as Pythagoras believes. These faculties, Balbus, the gifts of nature — not nature 'walking in craftsmanlike manner' as Zeno says (and what this means we will consider in a moment), but nature by its own motions and mutations imparting motion and activity to all things. |
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| 8. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 127 |
| 9. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.75-9.122 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 130 |
| 10. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.1.10-7.1.11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.69, 7.2-7.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 127, 131 | 3.69. And the division from the centre to the circumference which is adjusted in harmony with the soul being thus determined, the soul knows that which is, and adjusts it proportionately because she has the elements proportionately disposed in herself. And when the circle of the Other revolves aright, the result is opinion; but from the regular motion of the circle of the Same comes knowledge. He set forth two universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it; and that it was once in disorderly motion but, inasmuch as God preferred order to disorder, was by him brought together in one place. 7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty. 7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you. |
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| 12. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.14.1 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
| 13. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, 26.7-26.15 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •intellect, cosmic and human Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131 |
