1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 3.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • intellect
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 397; Geljon and Runia (2019) 125
3.14. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־מֹשֶׁה אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶהְיֶה שְׁלָחַנִי אֲלֵיכֶם׃''. None | 3.14. And God said unto Moses: ‘I AM THAT I AM’; and He said: ‘Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: I AM hath sent me unto you.’''. None |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.26-1.27, 1.31, 9.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Adam, earthy intellect/mind • God, supreme intellect • Intellect, triad • Moses, perfect intellect • Soul, relation to Intellect • angel, intellectual nature • intellect • intellect, as charioteer • intellect, as steersman • intellect, earthly • intellect, intellectus V
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 180, 382, 404; Geljon and Runia (2013) 22, 96, 98, 106, 109, 124, 126, 131, 143, 161, 166, 170, 175, 181, 200; Geljon and Runia (2019) 48, 52, 91, 120, 146; Karfíková (2012) 241; Wiebe (2021) 84; Černušková (2016) 303
1.26. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃ 1.27. וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃
1.31. וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהִנֵּה־טוֹב מְאֹד וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם הַשִּׁשִּׁי׃' '. None | 1.26. And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ 1.27. And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.
1.31. And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day.
9.20. And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.' '. None |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Malachi, 3.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • angel, intellectual nature
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 438; Wiebe (2021) 28
3.1. הִנְנִי שֹׁלֵחַ מַלְאָכִי וּפִנָּה־דֶרֶךְ לְפָנָי וּפִתְאֹם יָבוֹא אֶל־הֵיכָלוֹ הָאָדוֹן אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּם מְבַקְשִׁים וּמַלְאַךְ הַבְּרִית אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּם חֲפֵצִים הִנֵּה־בָא אָמַר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת׃'
3.1. הָבִיאוּ אֶת־כָּל־הַמַּעֲשֵׂר אֶל־בֵּית הָאוֹצָר וִיהִי טֶרֶף בְּבֵיתִי וּבְחָנוּנִי נָא בָּזֹאת אָמַר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת אִם־לֹא אֶפְתַּח לָכֶם אֵת אֲרֻבּוֹת הַשָּׁמַיִם וַהֲרִיקֹתִי לָכֶם בְּרָכָה עַד־בְּלִי־דָי׃ '. None | 3.1. Behold, I send My messenger, and he shall clear the way before Me; and the Lord, whom ye seek, will suddenly come to His temple, and the messenger of the covet, Whom ye delight in, Behold, he cometh, Saith the LORD of hosts.''. None |
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4. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • intellect (nous) • intellect, • intellect, as charioteer • intellect, as steersman
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 321; Geljon and Runia (2013) 166; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 305; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 58, 59
247c. νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.' '. None | 247c. pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven. But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colorless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region' '. None |
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5. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, Forms not external to • Intellect, triad • Soul, relation to Intellect • intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) of the demiurge
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 204, 372, 374, 375, 391, 403; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 210; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 192
263e. καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων. ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ. ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν.' '. None | 263e. and the several differences between them. Theaet. Give me an opportunity. Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true? Theaet. Certainly. Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech? Theaet. True. Str. And in speech we know there is just— Theaet. What? Str. Affirmation and negation Theaet. Yes, we know that.' '. None |
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6. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • intellect • intellect,
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 531; Wilson (2012) 81; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 37, 58
176a. λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ . ΘΕΟ. εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατʼ ἀνθρώπους εἴη. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὔτʼ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε' '. None | 176a. THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind. SOC. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can;' '. None |
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7. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Aristotle on intellect • Aristotle on intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • Aristotle, intellect • Being-Life-Intellect and Forms • Being-Life-Intellect and celestial motion • Being-Life-Intellect and the Intelligible • Being-Life-Intellect and the One/First Cause • Being-Life-Intellect as plenitude of Forms (plerôma eidôn, πλήρωμα εἰδῶν) • Being-Life-Intellects thinking (itself) • Being/Intellect in Plotinus • Demiurgic/intellective Being-Life-Intellect • Intellect • Intellect Middle Platonism • Intellect, Forms not external to • Intellect, genesis of • Intellect, rejection of division • Intellect, triad • Intellective (noeric) • Intelligible Being-Life-Intellect • Intelligible Living Being-Life-Intellect • Paradigm in Demiurge (intellectual) • Plotinus on Being-Life-Intellect • Soul, relation to Intellect • contemplation (theôria, θεωρία) by Intellect • demiurge, as divine intellect • divine Intellect • human Being-Life-Intellect • images of Being-Life-Intellect • intellect • intellect (nous) • intellect (νούς) • intellect of cosmos (kosmos, κόσμος)/universe • intellect, as equivalent to god • intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) and being • potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις) of Intellect/Demiurge • self-knowledge of the intellect
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 172, 173, 372, 373, 374, 375, 379, 390, 391, 392, 398, 403, 423, 617; Dillon and Timotin (2015) 146, 172; Fowler (2014) 187; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 54, 102, 117, 195, 210, 221, 387; Horkey (2019) 129; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 32, 52; Osborne (2001) 29; Schibli (2002) 281; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 102, 107, 108, 118, 124, 151, 155, 242, 263, 286
19b. ΤΙ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτʼ ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀκούοιτʼ ἂν ἤδη τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἣν διήλθομεν, οἷόν τι πρὸς αὐτὴν πεπονθὼς τυγχάνω. προσέοικεν δὲ δή τινί μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῷα καλά που θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καί τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασιν δοκούντων' 19c. προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα· ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν. ἡδέως γὰρ ἄν του λόγῳ διεξιόντος ἀκούσαιμʼ ἂν ἄθλους οὓς πόλις ἀθλεῖ, τούτους αὐτὴν ἀγωνιζομένην πρὸς πόλεις ἄλλας, πρεπόντως εἴς τε πόλεμον ἀφικομένην καὶ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδιδοῦσαν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ κατά τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ἑκάστας τῶν πόλεων. ταῦτʼ οὖν, ὦ Κριτία καὶ Ἑρμόκρατες, 27d. δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν ταύτῃ παρακεκλήσθω· τὸ δʼ ἡμέτερον παρακλητέον, ᾗ ῥᾷστʼ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν μάθοιτε, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾗ διανοοῦμαι μάλιστʼ ἂν περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐνδειξαίμην. ΤΙ. 28a. ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δʼ αὖ δόξῃ μετʼ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπʼ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης 28c. δʼ αἰσθητά, δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετʼ αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη. τῷ δʼ αὖ γενομένῳ φαμὲν ὑπʼ αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνάγκην εἶναι γενέσθαι. ΤΙ. τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν· τόδε δʼ οὖν πάλιν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸν 29d. ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν. ΣΩ. ἄριστα, ὦ Τίμαιε, παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις ἀποδεκτέον· τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. ΤΙ. λέγωμεν δὴ διʼ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν 29e. τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ΤΙ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην 39e. ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως. ΤΙ. εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ 51e. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετʼ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. ΤΙ. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων '. None | 19b. Tim. Certainly not: this is precisely what was said, Socrates. Soc. And now, in the next place, listen to what my feeling is with regard to the polity we have described. I may compare my feeling to something of this kind: suppose, for instance, that on seeing beautiful creatures, whether works of art or actually alive but in repose, a man should be moved with desire to behold them in motion and vigorously engaged in some such exercise as seemed suitable to their physique;' 19c. well, that is the very feeling I have regarding the State we have described. Gladly would I listen to anyone who should depict in words our State contending against others in those struggles which States wage; in how proper a spirit it enters upon war, and how in its warring it exhibits qualities such as befit its education and training in its dealings with each several State whether in respect of military actions or in respect of verbal negotiations. And herein, Critias and Hermocrates, 27d. ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Tim. 28a. and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent. Again, everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause; for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming. But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity 28c. and things sensible, being apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation, come into existence, as we saw, and are generated. And that which has come into existence must necessarily, as we say, have come into existence by reason of some Cause. Tim. Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible. However, let us return and inquire further concerning the Cosmos,—after which of the Models did its Architect construct it? 29d. and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it. Soc. Excellent, Timaeus! We must by all means accept it, as you suggest; and certainly we have most cordially accepted your prelude; so now, we beg of you, proceed straight on with the main theme. Tim. Let us now state the Cause wherefore He that constructed it 29e. constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself. Tim. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos. 39e. Nature thereof. Tim. And these Forms are four,—one the heavenly kind of gods; 51e. Now these two Kinds must be declared to be two, because they have come into existence separately and are unlike in condition. For the one of them arises in us by teaching, the other by persuasion; and the one is always in company with true reasoning, whereas the other is irrational; and the one is immovable by persuasion, whereas the other is alterable by persuasion; and of the one we must assert that every man partakes, but of Reason only the gods and but a small class of men. Tim. This being so, we must agree that One Kind '. None |
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8. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anaxagoras on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • intellect (nous)
Found in books: Horkey (2019) 63; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 138
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9. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Intellect, triad • intelligible-intellective god (theoi, θεοί)
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 390; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 94
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10. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, Forms not external to • Intellect, triad • Intellective (noeric) • Soul, relation to Intellect
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 280, 397, 455; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 195; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 77
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11. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, intellect • Intellect • intellect • intellect, mind
Found in books: Fowler (2014) 187; Frede and Laks (2001) 27; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 120
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12. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Aristotle on intellect • Aristotle on intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • Being-Life-Intellect and celestial motion • Intellect/νοῦς • Intellect/νοῦς, objects of • Plato, Intellect is true self • Plotinus, Neoplatonist, We should aspire to identify with intellect • Self, Intellect as true self in Plato • intellect • intellect, • intellect, as divine • intellect, as essential to human nature • intellect, as godlike • intelligible objects, practical intellect • intelligible objects, theoretical/contemplative intellect
Found in books: Joosse (2021) 65; Segev (2017) 105, 106, 107, 108, 112; Sorabji (2000) 190, 250; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 39, 129, 225; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 260, 263
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13. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Aristotle on intellect • Being-Life-Intellect and the Intelligible • Being-Life-Intellect and the One/First Cause • Being-Life-Intellects thinking (itself) • Demiurgic/intellective Being-Life-Intellect • Intelligible Being-Life-Intellect • Plotinus on Being-Life-Intellect • contemplation (theôria, θεωρία) by Intellect • identity with object of intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • intellect • intellect, as divine • intelligible objects, theoretical/contemplative intellect • motion of Being-Life-Intellect • motion/change (kinêsis, κίνησις) of Intellect • potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις) of Intellect/Demiurge • priority of object of intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • self-knowledge of the intellect
Found in books: Segev (2017) 13, 20, 96, 99, 100; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 106, 118, 119
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14. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.36, 1.39, 2.22, 2.32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Intellect, intelligence • divine Intellect • intellect • intellect, divine
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 101, 112; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 115; Osborne (2001) 36; Wilson (2012) 102
| 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things.
1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. ' "
2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? " '
2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole. ''. None |
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15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pleasure, Plato approves pleasure of intellect • life (Lat. vita = Gr. bios), theoretical, intellectual or contemplative • mens = Gr. nous (mind or intellect)
Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201; Tsouni (2019) 146
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16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • emotions, source of intellectual error • life (Lat. vita = Gr. bios), theoretical, intellectual or contemplative
Found in books: Agri (2022) 15; Tsouni (2019) 144
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17. Philo of Alexandria, Plant., 126 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Moses, perfect intellect
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 53; Geljon and Runia (2013) 175
| 126. And Moses very appropriately says that the fruit of education is not only holy but also praised; for every one of the virtues is a holy thing, but most especially is gratitude holy; but it is impossible to show gratitude to God in a genuine manner, by those means which people in general think the only ones, namely offerings and sacrifices; for the whole world could not be a temple worthy to be raised to his honour, except by means of praises and hymns, and those too must be such as are sung, not by loud voices, but by the invisible and pure mind, which shall raise the shout and song to him. ''. None |
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18. Philo of Alexandria, On Drunkenness, 91-92, 98, 111, 133 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Abraham, the intellect represented by • Intellect, triad • intellect
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 238; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 172; Geljon and Runia (2013) 109, 143; Geljon and Runia (2019) 262
| 91. And the power which exists in the wise man will show the same result: for when it is occupied with the affairs of the living God it is called piety and holiness: but when it employs itself upon the heaven, and the things in heaven, it is natural philosophy; and when it devotes itself to the investigation of the air, and of the different circumstances attending its variations and changes, whether taking place in the uniform yearly revolutions of the seasons, or in the partial periods of months and days, it is then called meteorology. It is called moral philosophy when it busies itself about the rectification of human morals; and this moral philosophy is divided into several subordinate species; that namely of politics, when occupied about state affairs; economy, when applied to the management of a household; when it is devoted to the subject of banquets and entertainments, it is then convivial philosophy. Again, that power which concerns itself about the government of men, is royal; that which is conversant with commands and prohibitions, is legislative. 92. For all these different powers the wise man of many names and many celebrities does truly contain within himself, namely, piety, holiness, natural philosophy, meteorology, moral philosophy, political knowledge, economy, royal power, legislative wisdom, and innumerable other faculties; and in every one of them he will be seen to wear one and the same appearance. XXIII.
98. and the witness to this fact is one who has experienced its truth, and who cannot lie; for having heard the voice of the people crying out, he says to the manager and superintendent of the affairs, "There is a sound of war in the tent;" for as long as the irrational impulses were not stirred up, and had not raised any outcry in us, our minds were established with some firmness; but when they began to fill the place of the soul with all sorts of voices and sounds, calling together and awakening the passions, they created a civil sedition and war in the camp.
111. And Moses indeed, in the same manner, when he saw the king of Egypt, that arrogant man with his six hundred chariots, that is to say, with the six carefully arranged motions of the organic body, and with the governors who were appointed to manage them, who, while none of all created things are by nature calculated to stand still, think nevertheless that they may look upon everything as solidly settled and admitting of no alteration; when he, I say, saw that this king had met with the punishment due to his impiety, and that the people, who were practisers of virtue, had escaped from the attacks of their enemies, and had been saved by mighty power beyond their expectation, he then sang a hymn to God as a just and true judge, beginning a hymn in a manner most becoming and most exactly suited to the events that had happened, because the horse and his rider he had thrown into the Sea;" having utterly destroyed that mind which rode upon the irrational impulses of that four-footed and restive animal, passion, and had become an ally, and defender, and protector of the seeing soul, so as to bestow upon it complete safety. '
133. For since the Creator has in every instance made one thing a model and another a copy of that model, he has made the archetypal pattern of virtue for the seal, and then he has on this stamped an impression from it very closely resembling the stamp. Therefore, the archetypal seal is the incorporeal idea being a thing as to its intrinsic nature an object of the outward senses, but yet not actually coming within the sphere of their operations. Just as if there is a piece of wood floating in the deepest part of the Atlantic sea, a person may say that the nature of wood is to be burned, but that that particular piece never will be burnt because of the way in which it is saturated with salt water. XXXIV. '. None |
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19. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 3, 16, 20, 69-70 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Intellect, triad • Philo, intellectual and spiritual development of • Plotinus on Being-Life-Intellect • intellect • intellect (nous) • universe, possesses soul and intellect
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 242; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 172, 180, 398; Geljon and Runia (2019) 125; Hoenig (2018) 16; Horkey (2019) 285; Wilson (2012) 422; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 118
| 3. And his exordium, as I have already said, is most admirable; embracing the creation of the world, under the idea that the law corresponds to the world and the world to the law, and that a man who is obedient to the law, being, by so doing, a citizen of the world, arranges his actions with reference to the intention of nature, in harmony with which the whole universal world is regulated.
16. for God, as apprehending beforehand, as a God must do, that there could not exist a good imitation without a good model, and that of the things perceptible to the external senses nothing could be faultless which wax not fashioned with reference to some archetypal idea conceived by the intellect, when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect, in order that so using an incorporeal model formed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect. '
20. As therefore the city, when previously shadowed out in the mind of the man of architectural skill had no external place, but was stamped solely in the mind of the workman, so in the same manner neither can the world which existed in ideas have had any other local position except the divine reason which made them; for what other place could there be for his powers which should be able to receive and contain, I do not say all, but even any single one of them whatever, in its simple form?
69. So then after all the other things, as has been said before, Moses says that man was made in the image and likeness of God. And he says well; for nothing that is born on the earth is more resembling God than man. And let no one think that he is able to judge of this likeness from the characters of the body: for neither is God a being with the form of a man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind: for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which carries it about and bears its image within it. In the same rank that the great Governor occupies in the universal world, that same as it seems does the mind of man occupy in man; for it is invisible, though it sees everything itself; and it has an essence which is undiscernible, though it can discern the essences of all other things, and making for itself by art and science all sorts of roads leading in divers directions, and all plain; it traverses land and sea, investigating everything which is contained in either element. 70. And again, being raised up on wings, and so surveying and contemplating the air, and all the commotions to which it is subject, it is borne upwards to the higher firmament, and to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. And also being itself involved in the revolutions of the planets and fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music, and being led on by love, which is the guide of wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible by the external senses, it comes to aspire to such as is perceptible only by the intellect: '. None |
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20. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.66 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • intellect • intellect, cleansed
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 196; Geljon and Runia (2019) 240
| 1.66. We ought to look upon the universal world as the highest and truest temple of God, having for its most holy place that most sacred part of the essence of all existing things, namely, the heaven; and for ornaments, the stars; and for priests, the subordinate ministers of his power, namely, the angels, incorporeal souls, not beings compounded of irrational and rational natures, such as our bodies are, but such as have the irrational parts wholly cut out, being absolutely and wholly intellectual, pure reasonings, resembling the unit. ''. None |
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21. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Moses, perfect intellect
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 53; Geljon and Runia (2013) 175
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22. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2.28 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Intellect is true self • Self, Intellect as true self in Plato • beard, philosopher's beard or intellectual beard
Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 250; Zanker (1996) 260
| 1.2.28. To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational. But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. But this, you say, would not be worthy of me. Well then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices. For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero’s spectacles, and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go down: and when Florus asked Agrippinus, Why do not you go down? Agrippinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or pleasure? I say pleasure. But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. Why? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple, that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple? Priscus Helvidius also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in. Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow. What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more. In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton’s school. Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations. Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. But I will take off your head? If that will do you any good, take it off. Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.''. None |
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23. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 1.12-1.13, 3.1-3.3, 8.8, 13.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Clement of Alexandria, on the catechumenate,, framed within Clement’s overall intellectual and pedagogical program • Galen., on intellectual independence • Paul, on intellectual independence • Seer of Revelation,, as intellectual • angel, intellectual nature • divinizing, intellect/mind • formation, intellectual • intellect • intellect, intellectus V • intellectual independence • intellectual independence,, Galen and medical discourse on • intellectual independence,, Paul versus Valentinians on • intellectual independence,, in Christianity • medicine and medical discourse, intellectual independence and • specific Christian intellectuals, intellectual independence in
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 17, 90, 122, 124, 125; Karfíková (2012) 148; Penniman (2017) 4, 66, 70, 74; Wiebe (2021) 28, 29; Černušková (2016) 76
1.12. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, Ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀπολλώ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ. μεμέρισται ὁ χριστός. 1.13. μὴ Παῦλος ἐσταυρώθη ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ἢ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου ἐβαπτίσθητε;
3.1. Κἀγώ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς πνευματικοῖς ἀλλʼ ὡς σαρκίνοις, ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ. 3.2. γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα, οὔπω γὰρ ἐδύνασθε. 3.3. Ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἔτι νῦν δύνασθε, ἔτι γὰρ σαρκικοί ἐστε. ὅπου γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε;
8.8. βρῶμα δὲ ἡμᾶς οὐ παραστήσει τῷ θεῷ· οὔτε ἐὰν μὴ φάγωμεν, ὑστερούμεθα, οὔτε ἐὰν φάγωμεν, περισσεύομεν.
1
3.12. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.' '. None | 1.12. Now I mean this, that each one of yousays, "I follow Paul," "I follow Apollos," "I follow Cephas," and, "Ifollow Christ." 1.13. Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you?Or were you baptized into the name of Paul?' "
3.1. Brothers, I couldn't speak to you as to spiritual, but as tofleshly, as to babies in Christ." "3.2. I fed you with milk, not withmeat; for you weren't yet ready. Indeed, not even now are you ready," "3.3. for you are still fleshly. For insofar as there is jealousy,strife, and factions among you, aren't you fleshly, and don't you walkin the ways of men?" "
8.8. But food will not commend us to God. Forneither, if we don't eat, are we the worse; nor, if we eat, are we thebetter." '
1
3.12. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, butthen face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, evenas I was also fully known.' '. None |
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24. New Testament, John, 1.1-1.18, 6.44, 6.51 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • deixis (δεῖξις), intellectual • formation, intellectual • intellect • intellect, intellectus V
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 389, 397, 398, 404, 438; James (2021) 123; Karfíková (2012) 148; Penniman (2017) 125; Černušková (2016) 278, 282, 284, 285
1.1. ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 1.2. Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. 1.3. πάντα διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν. 1.4. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· 1.5. καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν. 1.6. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάνης· 1.7. οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν διʼ αὐτοῦ. 1.8. οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός. 1.9. Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.
1.10. ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος διʼ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω.
1.11. Εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον.
1.12. ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ,
1.13. οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.
1.14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔
1.15. Ἰωάνης μαρτυρεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκραγεν λέγων — οὗτος ἦν ὁ εἰπών — Ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν, ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν·̓
1.16. ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν, καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος·
1.17. ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωυσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο.
1.18. θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.
6.44. οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν, κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.
6.51. ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς· ἐάν τις φάγῃ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἄρτου ζήσει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ ὁ ἄρτος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω ἡ σάρξ μου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς.''. None | 1.1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 1.2. The same was in the beginning with God. 1.3. All things were made through him. Without him was not anything made that has been made. 1.4. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. ' "1.5. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness hasn't overcome it. " '1.6. There came a man, sent from God, whose name was John. 1.7. The same came as a witness, that he might testify about the light, that all might believe through him. 1.8. He was not the light, but was sent that he might testify about the light. 1.9. The true light that enlightens everyone was coming into the world. ' "
1.10. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, and the world didn't recognize him. " "
1.11. He came to his own, and those who were his own didn't receive him. " "
1.12. But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become God's children, to those who believe in his name: " '
1.13. who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.
1.14. The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth.
1.15. John testified about him. He cried out, saying, "This was he of whom I said, \'He who comes after me has surpassed me, for he was before me.\'"
1.16. From his fullness we all received grace upon grace.
1.17. For the law was given through Moses. Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.
1.18. No one has seen God at any time. The one and only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him.
6.44. No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up in the last day.
6.51. I am the living bread which came down out of heaven. If anyone eats of this bread, he will live forever. Yes, the bread which I will give for the life of the world is my flesh."''. None |
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25. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 31.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • intellect • intellect (νούς)
Found in books: Schibli (2002) 184; Wilson (2012) 48
| 31.11. What we have to seek for, then, is that which does not each day pass more and more under the control of some power which cannot be withstood.8 And what is this? It is the soul, – but the soul that is upright, good, and great. What else could you call such a soul than a god dwelling as a guest in a human body? A soul like this may descend into a Roman knight just as well as into a freedman's son or a slave. For what is a Roman knight, or a freedman's son, or a slave? They are mere titles, born of ambition or of wrong. One may leap to heaven from the very slums. Only rise And mould thyself to kinship with thy God.9 This moulding will not be done in gold or silver; an image that is to be in the likeness of God cannot be fashioned of such materials; remember that the gods, when they were kind unto men,10 were moulded in clay. Farewell."". None |
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26. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 2.13.10, 5.33.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • God as Intellect • Intellect • Intellectuals • divine Intellect • specific Christian intellectuals, living voice versus writing in
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 40, 41; Lampe (2003) 297; Osborne (2001) 30, 41
| 5.33.4. And these things are bone witness to in writing by Papias, the hearer of John, and a companion of Polycarp, in his fourth book; for there were five books compiled (suntetagmena) by him. And he says in addition, "Now these things are credible to believers." And he says that, "when the traitor Judas did not give credit to them, and put the question, \'How then can things about to bring forth so abundantly be wrought by the Lord?\' the Lord declared, \'They who shall come to these times shall see.\'" When prophesying of these times, therefore, Esaias says: "The wolf also shall feed with the lamb, and the leopard shall take his rest with the kid; the calf also, and the bull, and the lion shall eat together; and a little boy shall lead them. The ox and the bear shall feed together, and their young ones shall agree together; and the lion shall eat straw as well as the ox. And the infant boy shall thrust his hand into the asp\'s den, into the nest also of the adder\'s brood; and they shall do no harm, nor have power to hurt anything in my holy mountain." And again he says, in recapitulation, "Wolves and lambs shall then browse together, and the lion shall eat straw like the ox, and the serpent earth as if it were bread; and they shall neither hurt nor annoy anything in my holy mountain, saith the Lord." I am quite aware that some persons endeavour to refer these words to the case of savage men, both of different nations and various habits, who come to believe, and when they have believed, act in harmony with the righteous. But although this is true now with regard to some men coming from various nations to the harmony of the faith, nevertheless in the resurrection of the just the words shall also apply to those animals mentioned. For God is non in all things. And it is right that when the creation is restored, all the animals should obey and be in subjection to man, and revert to the food originally given by God (for they had been originally subjected in obedience to Adam), that is, the productions of the earth. But some other occasion, and not the present, is to be sought for showing that the lion shall then feed on straw. And this indicates the large size and rich quality of the fruits. For if that animal, the lion, feeds upon straw at that period, of what a quality must the wheat itself be whose straw shall serve as suitable food for lions?' '. None |
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27. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • intellect, cosmic and human
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 477; Inwood and Warren (2020) 130
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28. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Clement of Alexandria, on the catechumenate,, framed within Clement’s overall intellectual and pedagogical program • Intellectuals
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 119; Lampe (2003) 317
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29. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • freedom, of intellect • intellect, as grounded in good • intellect, first, as “father,” • intellect, soul and
Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 208; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 144
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30. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • intellect • intellect (νοῦς)
Found in books: Behr (2000) 139, 140; Černušková (2016) 282
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31. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Clement of Alexandria, on intellectual independence • Clement of Alexandria, on the catechumenate,, framed within Clement’s overall intellectual and pedagogical program • Galen., on intellectual independence • Intellect • divine Intellect • intellect • intellectual independence • intellectual independence,, Clement on • intellectual independence,, Galen and medical discourse on • intellectual independence,, faith, evidential basis of • intellectual independence,, in Christianity • medicine and medical discourse, intellectual independence and • specific Christian intellectuals, intellectual independence in
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 96, 97, 119, 124; Osborne (2001) 33; Wilson (2012) 258; Černušková (2016) 134, 282, 285
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32. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • divine Intellect • intellect, cosmic and human
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 131; Osborne (2001) 36
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33. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, triad • Intellective (noeric) • Soul, relation to Intellect • freedom, of intellect • intellect • intellect, as grounded in good • intellect, as second hypostasis of Calcidius • intelligible-intellective god (theoi, θεοί)
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 373, 386, 391, 392; Fowler (2014) 187; Hoenig (2018) 200; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 144; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 219
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34. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110, 7.135-7.136, 7.147, 10.119 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Intellect, intelligence • Intellect, triad • Pleasure, Plato approves pleasure of intellect • divine Intellect • intellect • intellect, as steersman
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 386; Geljon and Runia (2013) 181; Geljon and Runia (2019) 262; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 115, 136; Osborne (2001) 35; Sorabji (2000) 201
| 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.
7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.
10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.''. None |
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35. Origen, Against Celsus, 3.12, 6.26 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Clement of Alexandria, on intellectual independence • Galen., on intellectual independence • Intellect, triad • Intellectuals • Origen, on intellectual independence • ethical intellectualism, Socratic-Platonic • ethical intellectualism, Stoic • intellectual independence • intellectual independence,, Clement on • intellectual independence,, Galen and medical discourse on • intellectual independence,, Origen on • intellectual independence,, faith, evidential basis of • intellectual independence,, in Christianity • medicine and medical discourse, intellectual independence and • specific Christian intellectuals, intellectual independence in
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 98; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 388; Lampe (2003) 294; Ramelli (2013) 178
| 3.12. In the next place, since he reproaches us with the existence of heresies in Christianity as being a ground of accusation against it, saying that when Christians had greatly increased in numbers, they were divided and split up into factions, each individual desiring to have his own party; and further, that being thus separated through their numbers, they confute one another, still having, so to speak, one name in common, if indeed they still retain it. And this is the only thing which they are yet ashamed to abandon, while other matters are determined in different ways by the various sects. In reply to which, we say that heresies of different kinds have never originated from any matter in which the principle involved was not important and beneficial to human life. For since the science of medicine is useful and necessary to the human race, and many are the points of dispute in it respecting the manner of curing bodies, there are found, for this reason, numerous heresies confessedly prevailing in the science of medicine among the Greeks, and also, I suppose, among those barbarous nations who profess to employ medicine. And, again, since philosophy makes a profession of the truth, and promises a knowledge of existing things with a view to the regulation of life, and endeavours to teach what is advantageous to our race, and since the investigation of these matters is attended with great differences of opinion, innumerable heresies have consequently sprung up in philosophy, some of which are more celebrated than others. Even Judaism itself afforded a pretext for the origination of heresies, in the different acceptation accorded to the writings of Moses and those of the prophets. So, then, seeing Christianity appeared an object of veneration to men, not to the more servile class alone, as Celsus supposes, but to many among the Greeks who were devoted to literary pursuits, there necessarily originated heresies - not at all, however, as the result of faction and strife, but through the earnest desire of many literary men to become acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity. The consequence of which was, that, taking in different acceptations those discourses which were believed by all to be divine, there arose heresies, which received their names from those individuals who admired, indeed, the origin of Christianity, but who were led, in some way or other, by certain plausible reasons, to discordant views. And yet no one would act rationally in avoiding medicine because of its heresies; nor would he who aimed at that which is seemly entertain a hatred of philosophy, and adduce its many heresies as a pretext for his antipathy. And so neither are the sacred books of Moses and the prophets to be condemned on account of the heresies in Judaism.
6.26. It is in the precincts of Jerusalem, then, that punishments will be inflicted upon those who undergo the process of purification, who have received into the substance of their soul the elements of wickedness, which in a certain place is figuratively termed lead, and on that account iniquity is represented in Zechariah as sitting upon a talent of lead. But the remarks which might be made on this topic are neither to be made to all, nor to be uttered on the present occasion; for it is not unattended with danger to commit to writing the explanation of such subjects, seeing the multitude need no further instruction than that which relates to the punishment of sinners; while to ascend beyond this is not expedient, for the sake of those who are with difficulty restrained, even by fear of eternal punishment, from plunging into any degree of wickedness, and into the flood of evils which result from sin. The doctrine of Geenna, then, is unknown both to the diagram and to Celsus: for had it been otherwise, the framers of the former would not have boasted of their pictures of animals and diagrams, as if the truth were represented by these; nor would Celsus, in his treatise against the Christians, have introduced among the charges directed against them statements which they never uttered instead of what was spoken by some who perhaps are no longer in existence, but have altogether disappeared, or been reduced to a very few individuals, and these easily counted. And as it does not beseem those who profess the doctrines of Plato to offer a defense of Epicurus and his impious opinions, so neither is it for us to defend the diagram, or to refute the accusations brought against it by Celsus. We may therefore allow his charges on these points to pass as superfluous and useless, for we would censure more severely than Celsus any who should be carried away by such opinions. ''. None |
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36. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 2.34.2, 2.45.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Porphyry, Neoplatonist, Sex impedes intellect • Soul, relation to Intellect • intellect
Found in books: Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 165; Sorabji (2000) 284; Wilson (2012) 83
| 2.34.2. 34.Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a manner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to different powers;14 to the God indeed who is above all things, as a certain wise man said, neither sacrificing with incense, nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there is nothing material, which is not immediately impure to an immaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language, nor internal speech, adapted to the highest God, when it is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul, and with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, that being conjoined with and assimilated to him, we should offer to him, as a sacred sacrifice, the elevation of our intellect, which offering will be both a hymn and our salvation. In an impassive contemplation, therefore, of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected in perfection; |65 but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, hymns, orally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each of the divinities, a sacrifice is to be made of the first-fruits of the things which he bestows, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As therefore, the husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the season first produces; thus also we should offer to the divinities the first-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, giving them thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for truly nourishing us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us, associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for our salvation. 2.45.4. 45.Hence a defence of this kind has appeared to be necessary even to enchanters; though it is not efficacious with them on all occasions. For they invoke evil daemons for lascivious purposes. So that purity does not belong to enchanters, but to divine men, and such as are divinely wise; since it everywhere becomes a guard to those that use it, and conciliates them with a divine nature. I wish, therefore, that enchanters would make use of purity continually, for then they would not employ themselves in incantations, because, through this, they would be: deprived of the enjoyment of those things, for the sake of which they act impiously. Whence becoming full of passions, and abstaining for a short time from impure food, they are notwithstanding replete with impurity, and suffer the punishment of their illegal conduct towards the whole of things, partly from those whom they irritate, and partly from Justice, who perceives all mortal deeds and conceptions. Both inward, |72 therefore, and external purity pertain to a divine man, who earnestly endeavours to be liberated from the passions of the soul, and who abstains from such food as excites the passions, and is fed with divine wisdom; and by right conceptions of, is assimilated to divinity himself. For such a man being consecrated by an intellectual sacrifice, approaches to God in a white garment, and with a truly pure impassivity of soul, and levity of body, and is not burdened with foreign and external juices, and the passions of the soul. |
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37. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 3, 18 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Intellect, triad • Plotinus on Being-Life-Intellect • authority,, pagan sources, decline of non-intellectual authority in
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 190; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 403, 404; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 118
| 3. Despite his general reluctance to talk of his own life, some few details he did often relate to us in the course of conversation. Thus he told how, at the age of eight, when he was already going to school, he still clung about his nurse and loved to bare her breasts and take suck: one day he was told he was a 'perverted imp', and so was shamed out of the trick. At twenty-seven he was caught by the passion for philosophy: he was directed to the most highly reputed professors to be found at Alexandria; but he used to come from their lectures saddened and discouraged. A friend to whom he opened his heart divined his temperamental craving and suggested Ammonius, whom he had not yet tried. Plotinus went, heard a lecture, and exclaimed to his comrade: 'This was the man I was looking for.' From that day he followed Ammonius continuously, and under his guidance made such progress in philosophy that he became eager to investigate the Persian methods and the system adopted among the Indians. It happened that the Emperor Gordian was at that time preparing his campaign against Persia; Plotinus joined the army and went on the expedition. He was then thirty-eight, for he had passed eleven entire years under Ammonius. When Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia, it was only with great difficulty that Plotinus came off safe to Antioch. At forty, in the reign of Philip, he settled in Rome. Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus had made a compact not to disclose any of the doctrines which Ammonius had revealed to them. Plotinus kept faith, and in all his intercourse with his associates divulged nothing of Ammonius' system. But the compact was broken, first by Erennius and then by Origen following suit: Origen, it is true, put in writing nothing but the treatise On the Spirit-Beings, and in Gallienus' reign that entitled The King the Sole Creator. Plotinus himself remained a long time without writing, but he began to base his Conferences on what he had gathered from his studies under Ammonius. In this way, writing nothing but constantly conferring with a certain group of associates, he passed ten years. He used to encourage his hearers to put questions, a liberty which, as Amelius told me, led to a great deal of wandering and futile talk. Amelius had entered the circle in the third year of Philip's reign, the third, too, of Plotinus' residence in Rome, and remained about him until the first year of Claudius, twenty-four years in all. He had come to Plotinus after an efficient training under Lysimachus: in laborious diligence he surpassed all his contemporaries; for example, he transcribed and arranged nearly all the works of Numenius, and was not far from having most of them off by heart. He also took notes of the Conferences and wrote them out in something like a hundred treatises which he has since presented to Hostilianus Hesychius of Apamea, his adopted son. " "
18. This letter seemed worth insertion as showing, not merely that some contemporary judgement pronounced Plotinus to be parading on the strength of Numenius' ideas, but that he was even despised as a word-spinner. The fact is that these people did not understand his teaching: he was entirely free from all the inflated pomp of the professor: his lectures had the air of conversation, and he never forced upon his hearers the severely logical substructure of his thesis. I myself, when I first heard him, had the same experience. It led me to combat his doctrine in a paper in which I tried to show that the Intelligibles exist outside of the Intellectual-Principle. He had my work read to him by Amelius: at the end he smiled and said: 'You must clear up these difficulties, Amelius: Porphyry doesn't understand our position.' Amelius wrote a tract of considerable length In answer to Porphyry's Objections; I wrote a reply to the reply: Amelius replied to my reply; at my third attempt I came, though even so with difficulty, to grasp the doctrine: then only, I was converted, wrote a recantation, and read it before the circle. From that time on I was entrusted with Plotinus' writings and sought to stir in the master himself the ambition of organizing his doctrine and setting it down in more extended form. Amelius, too, under my prompting, was encouraged in composition. "". None |
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38. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, intelligence • Intellect, triad
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 386; Inwood and Warren (2020) 136
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39. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Intellective (noeric)
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 152; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 237
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40. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, intellect • Being-Life-Intellect and the Intelligible • Being-Life-Intellects thinking (itself) • Demiurgic/intellective Being-Life-Intellect • Intellect • Intellect, Forms not external to • Intellect, and motion • Intellect, and self-knowledge • Intellect, desire for One • Intellect, genesis of • Intellect, hypostasis • Intellect, no deliberation • Intellect, no principle between Intellect and Soul • Intellect, no virtue in Intellect • Intellect, number in • Intellect, triad • Intellect, vision of the One by • Intelligible Being-Life-Intellect • One, the, as source of intellect • Soul, relation to Intellect • awareness, in generation of intellect • divine Intellect • freedom, of intellect • happiness, and life of Intellect • human intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • intellect • intellect (nous) • intellect (νούς) • intellect, • intellect, as all-face thing • intellect, as best part of us • intellect, as dynamic • intellect, as equivalent to god • intellect, as grounded in good • intellect, as paradigm • intellect, contemplative • intellect, in Plotinus • intellect, non-rational • intellect, of particular beings • intellect, premises of action derived from • intellect, pure • intellectualism, • life of Intellect • number, in Intellect • priority of object of intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • self-knowledge of the intellect • soul, intellectual light of • soul, no principle between Intellect and Soul
Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 621, 622, 628; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 318, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325, 338, 342, 354, 370, 371, 372, 373, 379, 404, 419, 423, 446, 447, 455, 456, 468, 477, 479, 491, 502, 506, 508, 511; Dillon and Timotin (2015) 75, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 115, 172; Fowler (2014) 222; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 34, 51, 55, 77, 80, 82, 101, 104, 105, 117, 120, 122, 123, 126, 127, 143, 148, 149, 150, 186, 194, 195, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 221, 235, 247, 251, 259, 260, 261, 365, 366, 376, 377, 378, 379, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395; Hankinson (1998) 423; Horkey (2019) 144; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 32, 44, 63, 64, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 151, 154, 168; Osborne (2001) 44, 45, 46; Schibli (2002) 184, 259, 271, 295, 320, 343; Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 52, 54, 59, 90, 165, 173; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 243; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 37, 39, 40, 42, 45, 58, 65, 69; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 119, 135
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41. Augustine, The City of God, 8.4, 10.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chaldaean theology, Paternal intellect of • Intellect, triad • angel, intellectual nature • intellect, intellectus V
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 374; Karfíková (2012) 268; Simmons(1995) 170; Wiebe (2021) 26
| 8.4. But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By birth, an Athenian of honorable parentage, he far surpassed his fellow disciples in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplative - the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure truth - Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides it into three parts - the first moral, which is chiefly occupied with action; the second natural, of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the study of wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts - that is, what he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences - it would be a question too long to discuss, and about which we ought not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve of - opinions sometimes favorable to the true religion, which our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated. of which three things, the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things - that is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits - let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.
10.23. Even Porphyry asserts that it was revealed by divine oracles that we are not purified by any sacrifices to sun or moon, meaning it to be inferred that we are not purified by sacrificing to any gods. For what mysteries can purify, if those of the sun and moon, which are esteemed the chief of the celestial gods, do not purify? He says, too, in the same place, that principles can purify, lest it should be supposed, from his saying that sacrificing to the sun and moon cannot purify, that sacrificing to some other of the host of gods might do so. And what he as a Platonist means by principles, we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak as they have a mind to, and in the most difficult matters do not scruple to offend religious ears; but we are bound to speak according to a certain rule, lest freedom of speech beget impiety of opinion about the matters themselves of which we speak. ''. None |
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42. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect • Soul, relation to Intellect • intellect (νούς) • intellectual / intellective / noeric gods
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 144; Schibli (2002) 320; Schultz and Wilberding (2022) 244; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 334
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43. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Aristotle on intellect • Aristotle on intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • Being-Life-Intellect and celestial motion • Intellect/νοῦς • Intellect/νοῦς, objects of • intellect,
Found in books: Joosse (2021) 65; Xenophontos and Marmodoro (2021) 70, 73; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 263
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44. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Being-Life-Intellect • Being-Life-Intellect and Forms • Being-Life-Intellect and Intellects • Being-Life-Intellect and Soul/soul Ch. • Being-Life-Intellects thinking (itself) • Being/Intellect in Plotinus • Eternity and Intellect • Forms and Intellect/Demiurge • Intellect • Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Intellect as source of Form-Numbers • Intellect, triad • Intellective (noeric) • Plotinus on Being-Life-Intellect • activity of intellect • human of intellect, image of noetic life • intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) and being • life of Being-Life-Intellect • sacrifice, intellectual
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 196, 374; Dillon and Timotin (2015) 122, 149, 155; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 51, 54, 56, 59, 60, 69, 70, 131, 134, 261
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45. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle on Intellect (nous, νοῦς) • Aristotle on intellect • Being-Life-Intellect and the Intelligible • Being-Life-Intellects thinking (itself) • Demiurgic/intellective Being-Life-Intellect • Intellect • Intelligible Being-Life-Intellect • Intelligible Living Being-Life-Intellect • intellectual / intellective / noeric gods • intellectual and intelligible / noetic and noeric gods" • priority of object of intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • self-knowledge of the intellect • soul, intellectual • to intellect
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 122, 165; Schibli (2002) 303; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 341; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 119, 140, 242
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46. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Being-Life-Intellect and Forms • Intellect • Intellect Middle Platonism • divine intellection/thinking (noêsis, νόησις) • intellection in Chaldaean Oracles • soul, intellectual
Found in books: Dillon and Timotin (2015) 112, 121, 122; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 217, 218
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