The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Index Database

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Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

graph

All subjects (including unvalidated):

subject	book bibliographic info
impressed, with a jew whom he met, aristotle, said to have been	Feldman (2006), Judaism and Hellenism Reconsidered, 26, 72
impression	Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 171, 172, 174, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193 Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 38, 39, 68, 69, 70
impression, cataleptic	Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 65
impression, cognitive	Celykte (2020), The Stoic Theory of Beauty. 82, 83, 140, 141 Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 68, 69, 188
impression, imagination, φαντασία	Frey and Levison (2014), The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 271, 278
impression, katalepsis, kataleptic	Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 102, 107, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 238, 246
impression, of dionysiac festival	Schwartz (2008), 2 Maccabees, 378
impression, plato, gorgias	McClay (2023), The Bacchic Gold Tablets and Poetic Tradition: Memory and Performance. 54, 55
impression, seal	Stavrianopoulou (2013), Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices and Images, 31
impression, sensory	Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 226
impressions	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 24, 25, 26, 114, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237 Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 24, 157, 158 Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 101, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 153, 154, 174
impressions, and involuntary feelings	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 94, 99, 103, 104
impressions, aristotle, on	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226, 236
impressions, cataleptic	Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 71
impressions, chrysippus, on	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 25, 113
impressions, cleanthes, on	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 25, 226
impressions, dative, of subjective	Meister (2019), Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity, 152, 167, 181
impressions, disordered, in the insane	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 113, 114, 240
impressions, imagination, stores	Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 165
impressions, impulsory	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 27, 28, 39
impressions, in aristotle	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 237
impressions, kataleptic	Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 251
impressions, of animals	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 24, 226, 240
impressions, persuasive	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 154, 155
impressions, posidonius, on involuntary feelings and	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 114
impressions, ratio, rational	Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 251
impressions, seal	Bruun and Edmondson (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, 380
impressions, sense perception, and	Brakke, Satlow, Weitzman (2005), Religion and the Self in Antiquity. 118
impressions, zeno of citium, on	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 24, 25
impression’, mareschal, a., ‘maternal	Cueva et al. (2018a), Re-Wiring the Ancient Novel. Volume 1: Greek Novels, 196

List of validated texts:

12 validated results for "impression"

1. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • animals, impressions of • depression • impressions, disordered, in the insane • impressions, of animals

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 240; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 156

2. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • cataleptic impression, • cataleptic impressions • cognitive impression • impression • impressions, • katalepsis, kataleptic impression • kataleptic impressions

Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 111; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 61, 62; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 69, 188; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 223, 225, 227, 231, 232; Stanton (2021), Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace, 251

3. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • impressions • impressions,

Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 144; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232

4. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 117.13, 121.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on impressions • Cleanthes, on impressions • Impression, Imagination (φαντασία) • animals, impressions of • impressions • ratio,rational impressions

Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014), The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 278; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 242

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117.13 There are, it is said, "certain natural classes of bodies; we say: \'This is a man,\' \'this is a horse.\' Then there attend on the bodily natures certain movements of the mind which declare something about the body. And these have a certain essential quality which is sundered from body; for example: \'I see Cato walking.\' The senses indicate this, and the mind believes it. What I see, is body, and upon this I concentrate my eyes and my mind. Again, I say: \'Cato walks.\' What I say," they continue, "is not body; it is a certain declarative fact concerning body – called variously an \'utterance,\' a \'declaration,\' a \'statement.\' Thus, when we say \'wisdom,\' we mean something pertaining to body; when we say \'he is wise,\' we are speaking concerning body. And it makes considerable difference whether you mention the person directly, or speak concerning the person." ^121.13 Everyone of us understands that there is something which stirs his impulses, but he does not know what it is. He knows that he has a sense of striving, although he does not know what it is or its source. Thus even children and animals have a consciousness of their primary element, but it is not very clearly outlined or portrayed. '' None

5. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • impression • impressions, and involuntary feelings

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 94; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 83

6. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • animals, impressions of • impression • impressions, disordered, in the insane • impressions, of animals

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 240; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 66, 77

7. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • cognitive impression • impression • katalepsis, kataleptic impression

Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 171, 172, 182; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 71; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 68, 69, 70, 188; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 226, 229, 231, 235

8. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • animals, impressions of • impressions • impressions, disordered, in the insane • impressions, of animals

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 240; Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 126

9. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on impressions • Impressions • impressions • impressions, in Aristotle

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 233, 235, 236, 237; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 158

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46, 7.49-7.52, 7.57, 7.63, 7.86, 7.88-7.89, 7.110-7.111, 7.116 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on impressions • Cleanthes, on impressions • Impressions • animals, impressions of • concepts, in registering sense-impressions • impression • impression, propositional content of • impressions • impressions, impulsory • impressions, persuasive • katalepsis, kataleptic impression • ratio,rational impressions

Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 172, 174; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 39, 154, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 247; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 61, 62, 63, 64, 88; Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 157; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 226, 241, 242, 246, 247

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7.46 There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions." ^7.49 The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. ^7.50 There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. ^7.51 According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. ^7.52 The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety. ^7.57 Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. ^7.63 To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.' "^7.86 As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." ^7.88 And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. ^7.89 By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. ^7.110 And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.' "^7.111 They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." ^7.116 Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.'" None

11. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • animals, impressions of • impression • impressions, disordered, in the insane • impressions, of animals

Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 172; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 240

12. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • impression • impression, propositional content of • katalepsis, kataleptic impression

Found in books: Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 63; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 227

Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database