1. Homer, Iliad, 1.70 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 74 | 1.70. / and who had guided the ships of the Achaeans to Ilios by his own prophetic powers which Phoebus Apollo had bestowed upon him. He with good intent addressed the gathering, and spoke among them:Achilles, dear to Zeus, you bid me declare the wrath of Apollo, the lord who strikes from afar. |
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| 2. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 74 |
| 3. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 74 |
| 4. Anon., Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 5. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 74 |
| 6. Aristotle, Prophesying By Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 78 |
| 7. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 78 |
| 8. Aristotle, Problems, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 122 |
| 9. Philodemus of Gadara, De Pietate \ , None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 218 |
10. Cicero, On Divination, 2.104, 2.130, 2.137-2.139 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 78, 121| 2.104. Videsne, ut ad rem dubiam a concessis rebus pervenerit? Hoc vos dialectici non facitis, nec solum ea non sumitis ad concludendum, quae ab omnibus concedantur, sed ea sumitis, quibus concessis nihilo magis efficiatur, quod velitis. Primum enim hoc sumitis: Si sunt di, benefici in homines sunt. Quis hoc vobis dabit? Epicurusne? qui negat quicquam deos nec alieni curare nec sui; an noster Ennius? qui magno plausu loquitur adsentiente populo: E/go deum genus ésse semper díxi et dicam caélitum, Séd eos non curáre opinor, quíd agat humanúm genus. Et quidem, cur sic opinetur, rationem subicit; sed nihil est necesse dicere, quae sequuntur; tantum sat est intellegi, id sumere istos pro certo, quod dubium controversumque sit. 2.130. Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his verbis: vim cognoscentem et videntem et explicantem signa, quae a dis hominibus portendantur; officium autem esse eius praenoscere, dei erga homines mente qua sint quidque significent, quem ad modumque ea procurentur atque expientur. Idemque somniorum coniectionem definit hoc modo: esse vim cernentem et explatem, quae a dis hominibus significentur in somnis. Quid ergo? ad haec mediocri opus est prudentia an et ingenio praestanti et eruditione perfecta? Talem autem cognovimus neminem. 2.137. Quem enim tu Marium visum a me putas? Speciem, credo, eius et imaginem, ut Democrito videtur. Unde profectam imaginem? a corporibus enim solidis et a certis figuris vult fluere imagines; quod igitur Marii corpus erat? Ex eo, inquit, quod fuerat. Ista igitur me imago Marii in campum Atinatem persequebatur?—Plena sunt imaginum omnia; nulla enim species cogitari potest nisi pulsu imaginum. 2.138. —Quid ergo? istae imagines ita nobis dicto audientes sunt, ut, simul atque velimus, accurrant? etiamne earum rerum, quae nullae sunt? quae est enim forma tam invisitata, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit? ut, quae numquam vidimus, ea tamen informata habeamus, oppidorum situs, hominum figuras. 2.139. Num igitur, cum aut muros Babylonis aut Homeri faciem cogito, imago illorum me aliqua pellit? Omnia igitur, quae volumus, nota nobis esse possunt; nihil est enim, de quo cogitare nequeamus; nullae ergo imagines obrepunt in animos dormientium extrinsecus, nec omnino fluunt ullae, nec cognovi quemquam, qui maiore auctoritate nihil diceret. Animorum est ea vis eaque natura, ut vigeant vigilantes nullo adventicio pulsu, sed suo motu incredibili quadam celeritate. Hi cum sustinentur membris et corpore et sensibus, omnia certiora cernunt, cogitant, sentiunt. Cum autem haec subtracta sunt desertusque animus languore corporis, tum agitatur ipse per sese. Itaque in eo et formae versantur et actiones, et multa audiri, multa dici videntur. | 2.104. You see how Epicurus proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: If there are gods they are kindly disposed towards men. Now who will grant you that? Epicurus? But he says that the gods do not trouble a whit about themselves or about anybody else. Is it our own Ennius? But he says with general approval and applause:I always said that there were gods on high,And this I never will neglect to say;But my opinion is they do not careWhat destiny befalls the human race.To be sure he proceeds to give the reason for his opinion in succeeding lines, but there is no need to repeat them. Enough has been shown to make it clear that your Stoic friends assume as certain what is the subject of doubt and discussion. [51] 2.130. Chrysippus, indeed, defines divination in these words: The power to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods. Its duty, he goes on to say, is to know in advance the disposition of the gods towards men, the manner in which that disposition is shown and by what means the gods may be propitiated and their threatened ills averted. And this same philosopher defines the interpretation of dreams thus: It is the power to understand and explain the visions sent by the gods to men in sleep. Then, if that be true, will just ordinary shrewdness meet these requirements, or rather is there not need of surpassing intelligence and absolutely perfect learning? But I have never seen such a man. [64] 2.137. Now what Marius do you think it was I saw? His likeness or phantom, I suppose — at least that is what Democritus thinks. Whence did the phantom come? He would have it that phantoms emanate from material bodies and from actual forms. Then, it was the body of Marius from which my phantom came? No, says Democritus, but from his body that was. So that phantom of Marius was pursuing me to the plains of Atina? Oh, but the universe is full of phantoms; no picture of anything can be formed in the mind except as the result of the impact of phantoms. 2.138. Then are these phantoms of yours so obedient to our beck and call that they come the instant we summon them? And is this true even of the phantoms of things that do not exist? For what is there so unreal and unheard of that we cannot form a mental picture of it? We even shape things which we have never seen — as the sites of towns and the faces of men. 2.139. Then, by your theory, when I think of the walls of Babylon or of the face of Homer, some phantom of what I have in mind strikes upon my brain! Hence it is possible for us to know everything we wish to know, since there is nothing of which we cannot think. Therefore no phantoms from the outside steal in upon our souls in sleep; nor do phantoms stream forth at all. In fact I never knew anybody who could say nothing with more ponderous gravity than Democritus.The soul is of such a force and nature that, when we are awake, it is active, not because of any extraneous impulse, but because of its own inherent power of self-motion and a certain incredible swiftness. When the soul is supported by the bodily members and by the five senses its powers of perception, thought, and apprehension are more trustworthy. But when these physical aids are removed and the body is inert in sleep, the soul then moves of itself. And so, in that state, visions flit about it, actions occur and it seems to hear and say many things. |
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11. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •greek gods, images/ eidola Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 218 | 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. |
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| 12. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.2.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 101 |
| 13. Anon., Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
14. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 8.7.15 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 74 | 8.7.15. What then is the Arcadian doing in this case? What becomes of the absurd stories of victims slain? What is the use of urging you to believe such lies? For what never took place will be real, if you decide that it did take place. And how, my prince, are you to rate the improbability of the sacrifice? For of course there have been long ago soothsayers skilled in the art of examining slain victims, for example I can name Megistias of Acaria, Aristandrus of Lycia, and Silanus who was a native of Ambracia, and of these the Acarian was sacrificer to Leonidas the king of Sparta, and the Lycian to Alexander of Macedonia, and Silanus to Cyrus the Pretender; and supposing there had been found stored in the entrails of a human being some information truer or more profound or surer than usual, such a sacrifice was not difficult to effect; inasmuch as there were kings to preside over it, who had plenty of cup-bearers at their disposal, besides plenty of prisoners of war as victims; and moreover these monarchs could violate the law with impunity, and they had no fear of being accused, in case they committed so small a murder. But I believe, these persons had the same conviction which I also entertain, who am now in risk of my life of such accusation, namely that the entrails of animals which we slay while they are ignorant of death, are for that reason, and just because the animals lack all understanding of what they are about to suffer, free from disturbance. A human being however has constantly in his soul the apprehension of death, even when it does not as yet impend; how therefore is it likely that when death is already present and stares him in the face, he should be able to give any intimation of the future through his entrails, or be a proper subject for sacrifice at all?In proof that my conjecture is right and consot with nature, I would ask you, my prince, to consider the following points. The liver, in which adepts at this art declare the tripod of their divination to reside, is on the one hand not composed of pure blood, for all unmixed blood is retained by the heart which through the blood-vessels sends it flowing as if through canals over the entire body; the bile on the other hand lies over the liver, and whereas it is excited by anger, it is on the other hand driven back by fear into the cavities of the liver. Accordingly if, on the one hand, it is caused to effervesce by irritants, and ceases to be able to contain itself in its own receptacle, it overflows the liver which underlies it, in which case the mass of bile occupies the smooth and prophetic parts of the bowels; on the other hand, under the influence of fear and panic it subsides, and draws together into itself all the light which resides in the smooth parts; for in such cases even that pure element in the blood recedes to which the liver owes its spleen-like look and distension, because the blood in question by its nature drains away under the membrane which encloses the entrails and floats upon the muddy surface. of what use then, my prince, is it to slay a human victim, if the sacrifice is going to furnish no presage? And human nature does render such rites useless for purposes of divination, because it has a sense of impending death; and dying men themselves meet their end, if with courage, then also with anger, and, if with despondency, then also with fear. And for this reason the art of divination, except in the case of the most ignorant savages, while recommending the slaying of kids and lambs, because these animals are silly and not far removed from being insensible, does not consider cocks an pigs and bulls worthy vehicles of its mysteries, because these creatures have too much spirit. I realize, my prince, that my accuser chafes at my discourse, because I find so intelligent a listener in yourself, for indeed you seem to me to give your attention to my discourse; and if I have not clearly enough explained any point in it, I will allow you to ask me any questions about it. |
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| 15. Synesius of Cyrene, Letters, 154 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 16. Synesius of Cyrene, Letters, 154 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
17. Augustine, The City of God, 10.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 121 | 10.9. These miracles, and many others of the same nature, which it were tedious to mention, were wrought for the purpose of commending the worship of the one true God, and prohibiting the worship of a multitude of false gods. Moreover, they were wrought by simple faith and godly confidence, not by the incantations and charms composed under the influence of a criminal tampering with the unseen world, of an art which they call either magic, or by the more abominable title necromancy, or the more honorable designation theurgy; for they wish to discriminate between those whom the people call magicians, who practise necromancy, and are addicted to illicit arts and condemned, and those others who seem to them to be worthy of praise for their practice of theurgy - the truth, however, being that both classes are the slaves of the deceitful rites of the demons whom they invoke under the names of angels. For even Porphyry promises some kind of purgation of the soul by the help of theurgy, though he does so with some hesitation and shame, and denies that this art can secure to any one a return to God; so that you can detect his opinion vacillating between the profession of philosophy and an art which he feels to be presumptuous and sacrilegious. For at one time he warns us to avoid it as deceitful, and prohibited by law, and dangerous to those who practise it; then again, as if in deference to its advocates, he declares it useful for cleansing one part of the soul, not, indeed, the intellectual part, by which the truth of things intelligible, which have no sensible images, is recognized, but the spiritual part, which takes cognizance of the images of things material. This part, he says, is prepared and fitted for intercourse with spirits and angels, and for the vision of the gods, by the help of certain theurgic consecrations, or, as they call them, mysteries. He acknowledges, however, that these theurgic mysteries impart to the intellectual soul no such purity as fits it to see its God, and recognize the things that truly exist. And from this acknowledgment we may infer what kind of gods these are, and what kind of vision of them is imparted by theurgic consecrations, if by it one cannot see the things which truly exist. He says, further, that the rational, or, as he prefers calling it, the intellectual soul, can pass into the heavens without the spiritual part being cleansed by theurgic art, and that this art cannot so purify the spiritual part as to give it entrance to immortality and eternity. And therefore, although he distinguishes angels from demons, asserting that the habitation of the latter is in the air, while the former dwell in the ether and empyrean, and although he advises us to cultivate the friendship of some demon, who may be able after our death to assist us, and elevate us at least a little above the earth - for he owns that it is by another way we must reach the heavenly society of the angels - he at the same time distinctly warns us to avoid the society of demons, saying that the soul, expiating its sin after death, execrates the worship of demons by whom it was entangled. And of theurgy itself, though he recommends it as reconciling angels and demons, he cannot deny that it treats with powers which either themselves envy the soul its purity, or serve the arts of those who do envy it. He complains of this through the mouth of some Chald an or other: A good man in Chald a complains, he says, that his most strenuous efforts to cleanse his soul were frustrated, because another man, who had influence in these matters, and who envied him purity, had prayed to the powers, and bound them by his conjuring not to listen to his request. Therefore, adds Porphyry, what the one man bound, the other could not loose. And from this he concludes that theurgy is a craft which accomplishes not only good but evil among gods and men; and that the gods also have passions, and are perturbed and agitated by the emotions which Apuleius attributed to demons and men, but from which he preserved the gods by that sublimity of residence, which, in common with Plato, he accorded to them. |
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| 18. Anon., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 19. Orphic Hymns., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 20. Anon., Corpus Hermeticum, 16 Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 176 |
| 22. Nikephoros Gregoras, In De Ins., 13.8, 13.9, 13.10, 13.11, 13.12, 13.13, 13.14, 29.4-30.2, 33.15, 33.16, 33.17, 33.18, 33.19, 85.5, 85.6 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 176 |
| 23. Anon., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 25. Timocles, Aegyptii, None Tagged with subjects: •greek gods, images/ eidola Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 218 |
| 27. Anon., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 28. Anon., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
| 29. Ps. Longinus, On The Sublime, 15.1 Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 101 |
| 30. Anon., Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •images (eidola) Found in books: Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 92 |
