1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 98, 104 | 1. And there was evening and there was morning, a fifth day.,And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day.,And God said: ‘Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters.’,And God made the two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; and the stars.,And the earth brought forth grass, herb yielding seed after its kind, and tree bearing fruit, wherein is the seed thereof, after its kind; and God saw that it was good.,And God said: ‘Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear.’ And it was so.,And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day.,And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament; and it was so.,And God called the firmament Heaven. And there was evening and there was morning, a second day.,And there was evening and there was morning, a third day.,And there was evening and there was morning, a fourth day.,And God set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth,,and to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is a living soul, [I have given] every green herb for food.’ And it was so.,and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness; and God saw that it was good.,And God called the dry land Earth, and the gathering together of the waters called He Seas; and God saw that it was good.,And God said: ‘Let the earth put forth grass, herb yielding seed, and fruit-tree bearing fruit after its kind, wherein is the seed thereof, upon the earth.’ And it was so.,And God saw the light, that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness.,And God blessed them; and God said unto them: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth.’,In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.,And God said: ‘Let the waters swarm with swarms of living creatures, and let fowl fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven.’,And God said: ‘Let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after its kind.’ And it was so.,And God said: ‘Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years;,And God blessed them, saying: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth.’,And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.,And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there was light.,And God said: ‘Behold, I have given you every herb yielding seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed—to you it shall be for food;,And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’,And God created the great sea-monsters, and every living creature that creepeth, wherewith the waters swarmed, after its kind, and every winged fowl after its kind; and God saw that it was good.,And God made the beast of the earth after its kind, and the cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the ground after its kind; and God saw that it was good.,Now the earth was unformed and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters.,and let them be for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth.’ And it was so. |
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2. Homer, Iliad, 6.407, 6.431, 6.442, 6.450, 6.484, 9.163-9.164, 9.247-9.248, 9.302, 9.628-9.630, 9.639-9.642, 9.645-9.648, 24.5, 24.49, 24.51-24.55, 24.486-24.487, 24.489, 24.491, 24.494-24.498, 24.502-24.506, 24.509, 24.511, 24.513-24.518, 24.521-24.522, 24.524-24.526, 24.529, 24.531, 24.533, 24.535, 24.537-24.539, 24.541, 24.544-24.546, 24.549, 24.551, 24.488000000000003, 24.491999999999997, 24.493000000000002, 24.499000000000002, 24.500999999999998, 24.506999999999998, 24.508000000000003, 24.511999999999997, 24.519000000000002, 24.523000000000003, 24.526999999999997, 24.528000000000002, 24.531999999999996, 24.534000000000002, 24.535999999999998, 24.541999999999998, 24.543000000000003, 24.546999999999997, 24.548000000000002 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, philosophy, peripatetic philosophy heroic code •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger •virgil, and hellenistic philosophy Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 65, 210, 227| 6.407. δαιμόνιε φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος, οὐδʼ ἐλεαίρεις 6.431. ἀλλʼ ἄγε νῦν ἐλέαιρε καὶ αὐτοῦ μίμνʼ ἐπὶ πύργῳ, 6.442. αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους, 6.450. ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι Τρώων τόσσον μέλει ἄλγος ὀπίσσω, 6.484. δακρυόεν γελάσασα· πόσις δʼ ἐλέησε νοήσας, 9.247. ἀλλʼ ἄνα εἰ μέμονάς γε καὶ ὀψέ περ υἷας Ἀχαιῶν 9.248. τειρομένους ἐρύεσθαι ὑπὸ Τρώων ὀρυμαγδοῦ. 9.302. τειρομένους ἐλέαιρε κατὰ στρατόν, οἵ σε θεὸν ὣς 9.628. οἵ που νῦν ἕαται ποτιδέγμενοι. αὐτάρ Ἀχιλλεὺς 9.629. ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν 9.630. σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται φιλότητος ἑταίρων 9.639. ἄλλά τε πόλλʼ ἐπὶ τῇσι· σὺ δʼ ἵλαον ἔνθεο θυμόν, 9.640. αἴδεσσαι δὲ μέλαθρον· ὑπωρόφιοι δέ τοί εἰμεν 9.641. πληθύος ἐκ Δαναῶν, μέμαμεν δέ τοι ἔξοχον ἄλλων 9.642. κήδιστοί τʼ ἔμεναι καὶ φίλτατοι ὅσσοι Ἀχαιοί. 9.645. πάντά τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσαο μυθήσασθαι· 9.646. ἀλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ ὁππότε κείνων 9.647. μνήσομαι ὥς μʼ ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν 9.648. Ἀτρεΐδης ὡς εἴ τινʼ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην. 24.5. ᾕρει πανδαμάτωρ, ἀλλʼ ἐστρέφετʼ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα 24.49. τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν. 24.51. ἵππων ἐξάπτων περὶ σῆμʼ ἑτάροιο φίλοιο 24.52. ἕλκει· οὐ μήν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τʼ ἄμεινον. 24.53. μὴ ἀγαθῷ περ ἐόντι νεμεσσηθέωμέν οἱ ἡμεῖς· 24.54. κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων. 24.55. τὸν δὲ χολωσαμένη προσέφη λευκώλενος Ἥρη· 24.486. μνῆσαι πατρὸς σοῖο θεοῖς ἐπιείκελʼ Ἀχιλλεῦ, 24.487. τηλίκου ὥς περ ἐγών, ὀλοῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ· 24.489. τείρουσʼ, οὐδέ τίς ἐστιν ἀρὴν καὶ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι. 24.491. χαίρει τʼ ἐν θυμῷ, ἐπί τʼ ἔλπεται ἤματα πάντα 24.494. Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ, τῶν δʼ οὔ τινά φημι λελεῖφθαι. 24.495. πεντήκοντά μοι ἦσαν ὅτʼ ἤλυθον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν· 24.496. ἐννεακαίδεκα μέν μοι ἰῆς ἐκ νηδύος ἦσαν, 24.497. τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους μοι ἔτικτον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γυναῖκες. 24.498. τῶν μὲν πολλῶν θοῦρος Ἄρης ὑπὸ γούνατʼ ἔλυσεν· 24.502. λυσόμενος παρὰ σεῖο, φέρω δʼ ἀπερείσιʼ ἄποινα. 24.503. ἀλλʼ αἰδεῖο θεοὺς Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τʼ ἐλέησον 24.504. μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός· ἐγὼ δʼ ἐλεεινότερός περ, 24.505. ἔτλην δʼ οἷʼ οὔ πώ τις ἐπιχθόνιος βροτὸς ἄλλος, 24.506. ἀνδρὸς παιδοφόνοιο ποτὶ στόμα χεῖρʼ ὀρέγεσθαι. 24.509. τὼ δὲ μνησαμένω ὃ μὲν Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο 24.511. αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς κλαῖεν ἑὸν πατέρʼ, ἄλλοτε δʼ αὖτε 24.513. αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥα γόοιο τετάρπετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, 24.514. καί οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἦλθʼ ἵμερος ἠδʼ ἀπὸ γυίων, 24.515. αὐτίκʼ ἀπὸ θρόνου ὦρτο, γέροντα δὲ χειρὸς ἀνίστη 24.516. οἰκτίρων πολιόν τε κάρη πολιόν τε γένειον, 24.517. καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα· 24.518. ἆ δείλʼ, ἦ δὴ πολλὰ κάκʼ ἄνσχεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν. 24.521. υἱέας ἐξενάριξα; σιδήρειόν νύ τοι ἦτορ. 24.522. ἀλλʼ ἄγε δὴ κατʼ ἄρʼ ἕζευ ἐπὶ θρόνου, ἄλγεα δʼ ἔμπης 24.524. οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις πέλεται κρυεροῖο γόοιο· 24.525. ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι 24.526. ζώειν ἀχνυμένοις· αὐτοὶ δέ τʼ ἀκηδέες εἰσί. 24.529. ᾧ μέν κʼ ἀμμίξας δώῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, 24.531. ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε, 24.533. φοιτᾷ δʼ οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν. 24.535. ἐκ γενετῆς· πάντας γὰρ ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο 24.537. καί οἱ θνητῷ ἐόντι θεὰν ποίησαν ἄκοιτιν. 24.538. ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ καὶ τῷ θῆκε θεὸς κακόν, ὅττί οἱ οὔ τι 24.539. παίδων ἐν μεγάροισι γονὴ γένετο κρειόντων, 24.541. γηράσκοντα κομίζω, ἐπεὶ μάλα τηλόθι πάτρης 24.544. ὅσσον Λέσβος ἄνω Μάκαρος ἕδος ἐντὸς ἐέργει 24.545. καὶ Φρυγίη καθύπερθε καὶ Ἑλλήσποντος ἀπείρων, 24.546. τῶν σε γέρον πλούτῳ τε καὶ υἱάσι φασὶ κεκάσθαι. 24.549. ἄνσχεο, μὴ δʼ ἀλίαστον ὀδύρεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν· 24.551. οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις, πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθῃσθα. | 6.407. but Andromache came close to his side weeping, and clasped his hand and spake to him, saying:Ah, my husband, this prowess of thine will be thy doom, neither hast thou any pity for thine infant child nor for hapless me that soon shall be thy widow; for soon will the Achaeans 6.431. thou art brother, and thou art my stalwart husband. Come now, have pity, and remain here on the wall, lest thou make thy child an orphan and thy wife a widow. And for thy host, stay it by the wild fig-tree, where the city may best be scaled, and the wall is open to assault. 6.442. Then spake to her great Hector of the flashing helm:Woman, I too take thought of all this, but wondrously have I shame of the Trojans, and the Trojans' wives, with trailing robes, if like a coward I skulk apart from the battle. Nor doth mine own heart suffer it, seeing I have learnt to be valiant 6.450. Yet not so much doth the grief of the Trojans that shall be in the aftertime move me, neither Hecabe's own, nor king Priam's, nor my brethren's, many and brave, who then shall fall in the dust beneath the hands of their foemen, as doth thy grief, when some brazen-coated Achaean 6.484. and may he bear the blood-stained spoils of the foeman he hath slain, and may his mother's heart wax glad. So saying, he laid his child in his dear wife's arms, and she took him to her fragrant bosom, smiling through her tears; and her husband was touched with pity at sight of her, 9.247. perish here in Troy, far from horse-pasturing Argos. Nay, up then, if thou art minded even at the last to save from the war-din of the Trojans the sons of the Achaeans, that are sore bested. To thine own self shall sorrow be hereafter, nor can healing 9.248. perish here in Troy, far from horse-pasturing Argos. Nay, up then, if thou art minded even at the last to save from the war-din of the Trojans the sons of the Achaeans, that are sore bested. To thine own self shall sorrow be hereafter, nor can healing 9.302. But if the son of Atreus be too utterly hated by thee at heart, himself and his gifts, yet have thou pity at least on the rest of the Achaeans, that are sore bested throughout the host; these shall honour thee as though thou wert a god, for verily shalt thou win great glory in their eyes. Now mightest thou slay Hector, seeing he would come very nigh thee 9.628. let us go our way, for the fulfillment of the charge laid on us will not methinks be brought to pass by our coming hither; and it behoveth us with speed to declare the message, though it be no wise good, to the Danaans, that, I ween, now sit waiting therefor. But Achilles hath wrought to fury the proud heart within him, 9.629. let us go our way, for the fulfillment of the charge laid on us will not methinks be brought to pass by our coming hither; and it behoveth us with speed to declare the message, though it be no wise good, to the Danaans, that, I ween, now sit waiting therefor. But Achilles hath wrought to fury the proud heart within him, 9.630. cruel man! neither recketh he of the love of his comrades wherewith we ever honoured him amid the ships above all others—pitiless one! Lo, a man accepteth recompense from the slayer of his brother, or for his dead son; and the slayer abideth in his own land for the paying of a great price, 9.639. and the kinsman's heart and proud spirit are restrained by the taking of recompense. But as for thee, the gods have put in thy breast a heart that is obdurate and evil by reason of one only girl; whereas we now offer thee seven, far the best that there be, and many other gffts besides; nay then, take to thee a heart of grace, 9.640. and have respect unto thine hall; for under thy roof are we come from the host of the Danaans, and we would fain be nearest to thee and dearest beyond all other Achaeans as many as there be. Then in answer to him spake Achilles, swift of foot:Aias, sprung from Zeus, thou son of Telamon, captain of the host, 9.641. and have respect unto thine hall; for under thy roof are we come from the host of the Danaans, and we would fain be nearest to thee and dearest beyond all other Achaeans as many as there be. Then in answer to him spake Achilles, swift of foot:Aias, sprung from Zeus, thou son of Telamon, captain of the host, 9.642. and have respect unto thine hall; for under thy roof are we come from the host of the Danaans, and we would fain be nearest to thee and dearest beyond all other Achaeans as many as there be. Then in answer to him spake Achilles, swift of foot:Aias, sprung from Zeus, thou son of Telamon, captain of the host, 9.645. all this thou seemest to speak almost after mine own mind; but my heart swelleth with wrath whenso I think of this, how the son of Atreus hath wrought indignity upon me amid the Argives, as though I were some alien that had no rights. Howbeit do ye go and declare my message, 9.646. all this thou seemest to speak almost after mine own mind; but my heart swelleth with wrath whenso I think of this, how the son of Atreus hath wrought indignity upon me amid the Argives, as though I were some alien that had no rights. Howbeit do ye go and declare my message, 9.647. all this thou seemest to speak almost after mine own mind; but my heart swelleth with wrath whenso I think of this, how the son of Atreus hath wrought indignity upon me amid the Argives, as though I were some alien that had no rights. Howbeit do ye go and declare my message, 9.648. all this thou seemest to speak almost after mine own mind; but my heart swelleth with wrath whenso I think of this, how the son of Atreus hath wrought indignity upon me amid the Argives, as though I were some alien that had no rights. Howbeit do ye go and declare my message, 24.5. Then was the gathering broken up, and the folk scattered, each man to go to his own ship. The rest bethought them of supper and of sweet sleep, to take their fill thereof; but Achilles wept, ever remembering his dear comrade, neither might sleep, 24.5. that mastereth all, lay hold of him, but he turned him ever to this side or to that, yearning for the man-hood and valorous might of Patroclus, thinking on all he had wrought with him and all the woes he had borne, passing though wars of men and the grievous waves. Thinking thereon he would shed big tears, 24.49. the which harmeth men greatly and profiteth them withal. Lo, it may be that a man hath lost one dearer even than was this—a brother, that the selfsame mother bare, or haply a son; yet verily when he hath wept and wailed for him he maketh an end; for an enduring soul have the Fates given unto men. 24.51. But this man, when he hath reft goodly Hector of life, bindeth him behind his chariot and draggeth him about the barrow of his dear comrade; in sooth neither honour nor profit shall he have therefrom. Let him beware lest we wax wroth with him, good man though he be; for lo, in his fury he doth foul despite unto senseless clay. 24.52. But this man, when he hath reft goodly Hector of life, bindeth him behind his chariot and draggeth him about the barrow of his dear comrade; in sooth neither honour nor profit shall he have therefrom. Let him beware lest we wax wroth with him, good man though he be; for lo, in his fury he doth foul despite unto senseless clay. 24.53. But this man, when he hath reft goodly Hector of life, bindeth him behind his chariot and draggeth him about the barrow of his dear comrade; in sooth neither honour nor profit shall he have therefrom. Let him beware lest we wax wroth with him, good man though he be; for lo, in his fury he doth foul despite unto senseless clay. 24.54. But this man, when he hath reft goodly Hector of life, bindeth him behind his chariot and draggeth him about the barrow of his dear comrade; in sooth neither honour nor profit shall he have therefrom. Let him beware lest we wax wroth with him, good man though he be; for lo, in his fury he doth foul despite unto senseless clay. 24.55. Then stirred to anger spake to him white-armed Hera:Even this might be as thou sayest, Lord of the silver bow, if indeed ye gods will vouchsafe like honour to Achilles and to Hector. Hector is but mortal and was suckled at a woman's breast, but Achilles is the child of a goddess that I mine own self 24.486. But Priam made entreaty, and spake to him, saying:Remember thy father, O Achilles like to the gods, whose years are even as mine, on the grievous threshold of old age. Him full likely the dwellers that be round about are entreating evilly, neither is there any to ward from him ruin and bane. 24.487. But Priam made entreaty, and spake to him, saying:Remember thy father, O Achilles like to the gods, whose years are even as mine, on the grievous threshold of old age. Him full likely the dwellers that be round about are entreating evilly, neither is there any to ward from him ruin and bane. 24.489. But Priam made entreaty, and spake to him, saying:Remember thy father, O Achilles like to the gods, whose years are even as mine, on the grievous threshold of old age. Him full likely the dwellers that be round about are entreating evilly, neither is there any to ward from him ruin and bane. 24.491. Howbeit, while he heareth of thee as yet alive he hath joy at heart, and therewithal hopeth day by day that he shall see his dear son returning from Troy-land. But I—I am utterly unblest, seeing I begat sons the best in the broad land of Troy, yet of them I avow that not one is left. 24.494. Howbeit, while he heareth of thee as yet alive he hath joy at heart, and therewithal hopeth day by day that he shall see his dear son returning from Troy-land. But I—I am utterly unblest, seeing I begat sons the best in the broad land of Troy, yet of them I avow that not one is left. 24.495. Fifty I had, when the sons of the Achaeans came; nineteen were born to me of the self-same womb, and the others women of the palace bare. of these, many as they were, furious Ares hath loosed the knees, and he that alone was left me, that by himself guarded the city and the men, 24.496. Fifty I had, when the sons of the Achaeans came; nineteen were born to me of the self-same womb, and the others women of the palace bare. of these, many as they were, furious Ares hath loosed the knees, and he that alone was left me, that by himself guarded the city and the men, 24.497. Fifty I had, when the sons of the Achaeans came; nineteen were born to me of the self-same womb, and the others women of the palace bare. of these, many as they were, furious Ares hath loosed the knees, and he that alone was left me, that by himself guarded the city and the men, 24.498. Fifty I had, when the sons of the Achaeans came; nineteen were born to me of the self-same womb, and the others women of the palace bare. of these, many as they were, furious Ares hath loosed the knees, and he that alone was left me, that by himself guarded the city and the men, 24.502. him thou slewest but now as he fought for his country, even Hector. For his sake am I now come to the ships of the Achaeans to win him back from thee, and I bear with me ransom past counting. Nay, have thou awe of the gods, Achilles, and take pity on me, remembering thine own father. Lo, I am more piteous far than he, 24.503. him thou slewest but now as he fought for his country, even Hector. For his sake am I now come to the ships of the Achaeans to win him back from thee, and I bear with me ransom past counting. Nay, have thou awe of the gods, Achilles, and take pity on me, remembering thine own father. Lo, I am more piteous far than he, 24.504. him thou slewest but now as he fought for his country, even Hector. For his sake am I now come to the ships of the Achaeans to win him back from thee, and I bear with me ransom past counting. Nay, have thou awe of the gods, Achilles, and take pity on me, remembering thine own father. Lo, I am more piteous far than he, 24.505. and have endured what no other mortal on the face of earth hath yet endured, to reach forth my hand to the face of him that hath slain my sons. 24.506. and have endured what no other mortal on the face of earth hath yet endured, to reach forth my hand to the face of him that hath slain my sons. 24.509. and have endured what no other mortal on the face of earth hath yet endured, to reach forth my hand to the face of him that hath slain my sons. So spake he, and in Achilles he roused desire to weep for his father; and he took the old man by the hand, and gently put him from him. So the twain bethought them of their dead, and wept; the one for man-slaying Hector wept sore, 24.511. the while he grovelled at Achilles' feet, but Achilles wept for his own father, and now again for Patroclus; and the sound of their moaning went up through the house. But when goodly Achilles had had his fill of lamenting, and the longing therefor had departed from his heart and limbs, 24.513. the while he grovelled at Achilles' feet, but Achilles wept for his own father, and now again for Patroclus; and the sound of their moaning went up through the house. But when goodly Achilles had had his fill of lamenting, and the longing therefor had departed from his heart and limbs, 24.514. the while he grovelled at Achilles' feet, but Achilles wept for his own father, and now again for Patroclus; and the sound of their moaning went up through the house. But when goodly Achilles had had his fill of lamenting, and the longing therefor had departed from his heart and limbs, 24.515. forthwith then he sprang from his seat, and raised the old man by his hand, pitying his hoary head and hoary beard; and he spake and addressed him with winged words: Ah, unhappy man, full many in good sooth are the evils thou hast endured in thy soul. How hadst thou the heart to come alone to the ships of the Achaeans, 24.516. forthwith then he sprang from his seat, and raised the old man by his hand, pitying his hoary head and hoary beard; and he spake and addressed him with winged words: Ah, unhappy man, full many in good sooth are the evils thou hast endured in thy soul. How hadst thou the heart to come alone to the ships of the Achaeans, 24.517. forthwith then he sprang from his seat, and raised the old man by his hand, pitying his hoary head and hoary beard; and he spake and addressed him with winged words: Ah, unhappy man, full many in good sooth are the evils thou hast endured in thy soul. How hadst thou the heart to come alone to the ships of the Achaeans, 24.518. forthwith then he sprang from his seat, and raised the old man by his hand, pitying his hoary head and hoary beard; and he spake and addressed him with winged words: Ah, unhappy man, full many in good sooth are the evils thou hast endured in thy soul. How hadst thou the heart to come alone to the ships of the Achaeans, 24.521. to meet the eyes of me that have slain thy sons many and valiant? of iron verily is thy heart. But come, sit thou upon a seat, and our sorrows will we suffer to lie quiet in our hearts, despite our pain; for no profit cometh of chill lament. 24.522. to meet the eyes of me that have slain thy sons many and valiant? of iron verily is thy heart. But come, sit thou upon a seat, and our sorrows will we suffer to lie quiet in our hearts, despite our pain; for no profit cometh of chill lament. 24.524. to meet the eyes of me that have slain thy sons many and valiant? of iron verily is thy heart. But come, sit thou upon a seat, and our sorrows will we suffer to lie quiet in our hearts, despite our pain; for no profit cometh of chill lament. 24.525. For on this wise have the gods spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they should live in pain; and themselves are sorrowless. For two urns are set upon the floor of Zeus of gifts that he giveth, the one of ills, the other of blessings. To whomsoever Zeus, that hurleth the thunderbolt, giveth a mingled lot, 24.526. For on this wise have the gods spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they should live in pain; and themselves are sorrowless. For two urns are set upon the floor of Zeus of gifts that he giveth, the one of ills, the other of blessings. To whomsoever Zeus, that hurleth the thunderbolt, giveth a mingled lot, 24.529. For on this wise have the gods spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they should live in pain; and themselves are sorrowless. For two urns are set upon the floor of Zeus of gifts that he giveth, the one of ills, the other of blessings. To whomsoever Zeus, that hurleth the thunderbolt, giveth a mingled lot, 24.531. that man meeteth now with evil, now with good; but to whomsoever he giveth but of the baneful, him he maketh to be reviled of man, and direful madness driveth him over the face of the sacred earth, and he wandereth honoured neither of gods nor mortals. Even so unto Peleus did the gods give glorious gifts 24.533. that man meeteth now with evil, now with good; but to whomsoever he giveth but of the baneful, him he maketh to be reviled of man, and direful madness driveth him over the face of the sacred earth, and he wandereth honoured neither of gods nor mortals. Even so unto Peleus did the gods give glorious gifts 24.535. from his birth; for he excelled all men in good estate and in wealth, and was king over the Myrmidons, and to him that was but a mortal the gods gave a goddess to be his wife. 24.537. from his birth; for he excelled all men in good estate and in wealth, and was king over the Myrmidons, and to him that was but a mortal the gods gave a goddess to be his wife. 24.538. from his birth; for he excelled all men in good estate and in wealth, and was king over the Myrmidons, and to him that was but a mortal the gods gave a goddess to be his wife. 24.539. from his birth; for he excelled all men in good estate and in wealth, and was king over the Myrmidons, and to him that was but a mortal the gods gave a goddess to be his wife. 24.541. Howbeit even upon him the gods brought evil, in that there nowise sprang up in his halls offspring of princely sons, but he begat one only son, doomed to an untimely fate. Neither may I tend him as he groweth old, seeing that far, far from mine own country I abide in the land of Troy, vexing thee and thy children. And of thee, old sire, we hear that of old thou wast blest; how of all that toward the sea Lesbos, the seat of Macar, encloseth, 24.544. Howbeit even upon him the gods brought evil, in that there nowise sprang up in his halls offspring of princely sons, but he begat one only son, doomed to an untimely fate. Neither may I tend him as he groweth old, seeing that far, far from mine own country I abide in the land of Troy, vexing thee and thy children. And of thee, old sire, we hear that of old thou wast blest; how of all that toward the sea Lesbos, the seat of Macar, encloseth, 24.545. and Phrygia in the upland, and the boundless Hellespont, over all these folk, men say, thou, old sire, wast preeminent by reason of thy wealth and thy sons. Howbeit from the time when the heavenly gods brought upon thee this bane, ever around thy city are battles and slayings of men. Bear thou up, neither wail ever ceaselessly in thy heart; for naught wilt thou avail by grieving for thy son, 24.546. and Phrygia in the upland, and the boundless Hellespont, over all these folk, men say, thou, old sire, wast preeminent by reason of thy wealth and thy sons. Howbeit from the time when the heavenly gods brought upon thee this bane, ever around thy city are battles and slayings of men. Bear thou up, neither wail ever ceaselessly in thy heart; for naught wilt thou avail by grieving for thy son, 24.549. and Phrygia in the upland, and the boundless Hellespont, over all these folk, men say, thou, old sire, wast preeminent by reason of thy wealth and thy sons. Howbeit from the time when the heavenly gods brought upon thee this bane, ever around thy city are battles and slayings of men. Bear thou up, neither wail ever ceaselessly in thy heart; for naught wilt thou avail by grieving for thy son, 24.551. /neither wilt thou bring him back to life; ere that shalt thou suffer some other ill. |
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| 3. Homer, Odyssey, 10, 302-304 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
4. Hesiod, Works And Days, 289-292 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 105| 292. ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. | 292. He made with humankind is very meet – |
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| 5. Hippocrates, Nature of Man, 2 (6.34, 6 l.) (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 6. Antiphon of Athens, Fragments, b58 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8 |
| 7. Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 88 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
8. Plato, Cratylus, 396b, 396a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100| 396a. Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσιν—συντιθέμενα δʼ εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οἵῳ τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς | 396a. Zena ( Ζῆνα ), and others Dia ( Δία ); but the two in combination express the nature of the god, which is just what we said a name should be able to do. For certainly no one is so much the author of life ( ζῆν ) for us and all others as the ruler and king of all. |
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| 9. Isocrates, Busiris, 44 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
| 10. Plato, Phaedrus, 246a, 246b, 246c, 246d, 246e, 243e-257b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 150 |
11. Plato, Protagoras, 342b, 342c, 342d, 342e, 343b, 343a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259| 343a. τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἕβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες | 343a. to utter such remarks is to be ascribed to his perfect education. Such men were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of our city, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, last of the traditional seven, Chilon of Sparta. All these were enthusiasts, lovers and disciples of the Spartan culture; and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short, memorable sayings that fell from each of them they assembled together [343b] and dedicated these as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in his Delphic temple, inscribing there those maxims which are on every tongue—“Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch.” To what intent do I say this? To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity; and so it was that the saying of Pittacus was privately handed about with high approbation among the sages—that it is hard to be good. 343a. to utter such remarks is to be ascribed to his perfect education. Such men were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of our city, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, last of the traditional seven, Chilon of Sparta . All these were enthusiasts, lovers and disciples of the Spartan culture; and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short, memorable sayings that fell from each of them they assembled together |
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| 12. Plato, Republic, 10 613b, 390b, 4, 430e, 589b, 9, 3 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
13. Plato, Symposium, 202e, 196c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8| 196c. ἅπτεται· οὔτε ποιῶν ποιεῖ—πᾶς γὰρ ἑκὼν Ἔρωτι πᾶν ὑπηρετεῖ, ἃ δʼ ἂν ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι Alcidamas, a stylist of the school of Gorgias. δίκαια εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Ἔρωτος δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν κρείττω εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἥττους, κρατοῖντʼ ἂν ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ, κρατῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὁ Ἔρως διαφερόντως ἂν σωφρονοῖ. καὶ μὴν εἴς γε ἀνδρείαν Ἔρωτι | 196c. takes not hold of Love; nor is there violence in his dealings, since Love wins all men’s willing service; and agreements on both sides willingly made are held to be just by our city’s sovereign, the law. Then, over and above his justice, he is richly endowed with temperance. We all agree that temperance is a control of pleasures and desires, while no pleasure is stronger than Love: if they are the weaker, they must be under Love’s control, and he is their controller; so that Love, by controlling pleasures and desires, must be eminently temperate. And observe how in valor |
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14. Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, 176b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 7; Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 150| 176b. ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δʼ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ | |
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| 15. Antiphon, Fragments, b58 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8 |
| 16. Plato, Phaedo, 96a5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy, according to galen Found in books: Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen (2012) 298 |
| 17. Plato, Gorgias, 491d11 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8 |
| 18. Antiphon Tragicus, Fragments, b58 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8 |
19. Sophocles, Antigone, 451-460, 450 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 92 | 450. ANTIGONE: Yes; for it was not Zeus that had published me that edict; not such are the laws set among men by the justice who dwells with the gods below; nor deemed I that thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life is not of today or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth. Not through dread of any human pride could I answer to the gods for breaking these. Die I must,-I knew that well (how should I: not?)-even without thy edicts. But if I am to die before my time, I: count that a gain: for when any one lives, as I do, compassed about with evils, can such an one find aught but gain in death? So for me to meet this doom is trifling grief; but if I had suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied corpse, that would have grieved me; for this, I am not grieved. And if my present deeds are foolish in thy sight, it may be that a foolish judge arraigns my folly. LEADER OF THE CHORUS: The maid shows herself passionate child of passionate sire, and knows not how to bend before troubles. 450. Yes, since it was not Zeus that published me that edict, and since not of that kind are the laws which Justice who dwells with the gods below established among men. Nor did I think that your decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten |
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20. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.2.1, 1.5.5, 2.1.1-2.1.34 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 8, 9| 1.2.1. θαυμαστὸν δὲ φαίνεταί μοι καὶ τὸ πεισθῆναί τινας ὡς Σωκράτης τοὺς νέους διέφθειρεν, ὃς πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρῶτον μὲν ἀφροδισίων καὶ γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν, εἶτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως, ὥστε πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα. 1.5.5. τίς γὰρ ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ μελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχρῶς διατεθείη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτὸν εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιούτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη. 2.1.1. ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοὺς γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μέν, ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δʼ, ὅπως μηδʼ ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; βούλει σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων· καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῴη γʼ ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο. 2.1.2. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 2.1.3. τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ ὀψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρῲ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, ἔφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε μὴ διὰ ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλʼ ἐθελοντὴν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. τί δέ, τὸ μαθεῖν εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; πολὺ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων. 2.1.4. οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἧττον ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα ἁλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γὰρ δήπου τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα, καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ ἁλίσκεται, τὰ δὲ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ λαγνείας, οἷον οἵ τε ὄρτυγες καὶ οἱ πέρδικες, πρὸς τὴν τῆς θηλείας φωνὴν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι τῶν ἀφροδισίων φερόμενοι καὶ ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τὰ δεινὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι; συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα. 2.1.5. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταὐτὰ πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων; ὥσπερ οἱ μοιχοὶ εἰσέρχονται εἰς τὰς εἰρκτάς, εἰδότες ὅτι κίνδυνος τῷ μοιχεύοντι ἅ τε ὁ νόμος ἀπειλεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἐνεδρευθῆναι καὶ ληφθέντα ὑβρισθῆναι· καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τὰ ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν; 2.1.6. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τάς τε πολεμικὰς καὶ τὰς γεωργικὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν; 2.1.7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς μηδʼ ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τὴν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτʼ ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτὸν δικαίως ἂν τάττοις; 2.1.8. ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καὶ οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω ἐμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί; 2.1.9. καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἅπτεσθαι, αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. 2.1.10. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότερον ἥδιον ζῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἥδιον οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν; 2.1.11. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλʼ εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει. 2.1.12. ἀλλʼ εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδὲ διʼ ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι· 2.1.13. ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται; ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδʼ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι. 2.1.14. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ· ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται· 2.1.15. σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δʼ ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὤν, καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἦ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα; 2.1.16. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἆρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἄν τι λαβεῖν ᾖ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τὴν ἀργίαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς; 2.1.17. κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅ τι διαφέρει τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν. 2.1.18. τί δέ, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε; ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ ἑκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ᾗ ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιτο καὶ ὁ ἑκὼν διψῶν πίοι καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, τῷ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ὁπόταν βούληται παύεσθαι; ἔπειτα ὁ μὲν ἑκουσίως ταλαιπωρῶν ἐπʼ ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἷον οἱ τὰ θηρία θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι. 2.1.20. ἔτι δὲ αἱ μὲν ῥᾳδιουργίαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναὶ οὔτε σώματι εὐεξίαν ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὥς φασιν οἱ γυμνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικνεῖσθαι ποιοῦσιν, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ἡσίοδος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δʼ ἐγγύθι ναίει. τῆς δʼ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δʼ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. Hes. WD 285 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷδε· τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθʼ οἱ θεοί. Epicharmus καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τόπῳ φησίν· ὦ πονηρέ, μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μῶσο, μὴ τὰ σκλήρʼ ἔχῃς. Epicharmus 2.1.21. καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδέ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι. φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὡρμᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν διʼ ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέψονται ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται· 2.1.22. καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιέναι μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἁπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι· κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν ἀποβλέπειν. 2.1.23. ὡς δʼ ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπῃ. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥᾴστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώσῃ. 2.1.24. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος διέσῃ τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὕροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης ἢ τίνων ὀσφραινόμενος ἢ ἁπτόμενος, τίσι δὲ παιδικοῖς ὁμιλῶν μάλιστʼ ἂν εὐφρανθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. 2.1.25. ἐὰν δέ ποτε γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφʼ ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσῃ, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω. 2.1.26. καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; ἡ δέ, οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν. 2.1.27. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· καὶ ἐγὼ ἥκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρʼ ἄν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλʼ ᾗπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετʼ ἀληθείας. 2.1.28. τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλʼ εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεούς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἴει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τούς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρῶτι. 2.1.29. καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος· ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε. 2.1.30. καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· ὦ τλῆμον, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιοὺς μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίῃς, οἴνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζῃ καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλίνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις παρασκευάζῃ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅ τι ποιῇς ὕπνου ἐπιθυμεῖς· τὰ δʼ ἀφροδίσια πρὸ τοῦ δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καὶ γυναιξὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γὰρ παιδεύεις τοὺς σεαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μὲν νυκτὸς ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δʼ ἡμέρας τὸ χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα. 2.1.31. ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζῃ· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δʼ ἄν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δʼ ἂν δεομένῃ τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἳ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι. 2.1.32. ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλὸν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτʼ ἀνθρώπειον χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίγνεται. τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκω, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενὴς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός. 2.1.33. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γὰρ ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν· ὕπνος δʼ αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθιᾶσι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται· καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἥδονται πράττοντες, διʼ ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δʼ ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι. 2.1.34. οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπʼ Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παίδευσιν· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. σοὶ δʼ οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ πειρᾶσθαί τι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον τοῦ βίου φροντίζειν. | 1.2.1. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. 1.2.1. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. 1.5.5. For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation. 1.5.5. For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation." 2.1.1. In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practise self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food? Oh yes, replied Aristippus, food does seem to come first; for one can’t live without food. 2.1.1. BOOK 2 In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practise self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: "Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food?" "Oh yes," replied Aristippus, "food does seem to come first; for one can't live without food." 2.1.2. Well, now, will not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times? Yes, naturally. Now which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger? The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State business might be neglected during his tenure. And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink? Certainly. 2.1.2. "Well, now, will not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times?" "Yes, naturally." "Now which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger?" "The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State business might be neglected during his tenure." "And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink?" "Certainly." 2.1.3. And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be? To the same again. And the power to control his passions, so that he may not be hindered in doing necessary work? To the same again. And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task, but undertaking it willingly? That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule. And to which would the knowledge needful for overcoming enemies be more appropriately given? Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge. 2.1.3. "And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be?" "To the same again." "And the power to control his passions, so that he may not be hindered in doing necessary work?" "To the same again." "And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task, but undertaking it willingly?" "That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule." "And to which would the knowledge needful for overcoming enemies be more appropriately given?" "Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge." 2.1.4. Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink. Yes, certainly. Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so? 2.1.4. "Don't you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink." "Yes, certainly." "Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so?" 2.1.5. He agreed again. Now, don’t you think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women’s quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer’s head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger? Yes, I think it is. 2.1.5. He agreed again. "Now, don't you think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women's quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer's head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger?" "Yes, I think it is." 2.1.6. And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don’t you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat? He agreed again. Don’t you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly? Certainly. 2.1.6. "And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don't you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat?" He agreed again. "Don't you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly?" "Certainly." 2.1.7. If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as fit to rule, shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers? He agreed again. Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself? 2.1.7. "If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as 'fit to rule,' shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers?" He agreed again. "Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself?" 2.1.8. I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. Cyropaedia I. vi. 7; vii. ii, 26 f. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. 2.1.8. "I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one's own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. 2.1.9. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with those fitted to be rulers : but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had. Here Socrates asked: 2.1.9. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with 'those fitted to be rulers': but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had." Here Socrates asked: 2.1.10. Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life? Certainly, replied Aristippus. To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life? 2.1.10. "Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life?" "Certainly," replied Aristippus. "To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maiotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life?" 2.1.11. Nay, replied Aristippus, for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness. 2.1.11. "Nay," replied Aristippus, "for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness." 2.1.12. Ah, said Socrates, if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers 2.1.12. "Ah," said Socrates, "if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the ruler 2.1.13. — I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk? Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land. 2.1.13. — I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk?" "Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land." 2.1.14. A very cunning trick, that! cried Socrates, for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes Highwaymen slain by Theseus, Plutarch, Thes. c. 8 f. no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged. 2.1.14. "A very cunning trick, that!" cried Socrates, "for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged. 2.1.15. But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living? 2.1.15. But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living? 2.1.16. But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can’t run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants? 2.1.16. "But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can't run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants?" 2.1.17. I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering. 2.1.17. "I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering." 2.1.18. What, Aristippus, exclaimed Socrates, don’t you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. 2.1.18. "What, Aristippus," exclaimed Socrates, "don't you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. 2.1.20. Moreover, indolence and present enjoyment can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, neither do they put into the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds, as good men say. And so says Hesiod somewhere: Hes. WD 285 Wickedness can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was. Hes. WD 285 And we have the testimony of Epicharmus too in the line: The gods demand of us toil as the price of all good things. Epicharmus And elsewhere he says: Knave, yearn not for the soft things, lest thou earn the hard. Epicharmus 2.1.20. Moreover, indolence and present enjoyment can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, neither do they put into the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds, as good men say. And so says Hesiod somewhere: 'Wickedness can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was.' And we have the testimony of Epicharmus too in the line: 'The gods demand of us toil as the price of all good things.' And elsewhere he says: "'Knave, yearn not for the soft things, lest thou earn the hard.' 2.1.21. Aye, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect concerning Virtue in the essay On Heracles that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it: When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth’s estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place, 2.1.21. "Aye, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect concerning Virtue in the essay 'On Heracles' that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it: "When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth's estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place, 2.1.22. and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature making towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow. 2.1.22. and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature making towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow. 2.1.23. When they drew nigh to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me, and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road. You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you shall never know. 2.1.23. "When they drew nigh to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: 'Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me, and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road. You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you shall never know. 2.1.24. First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find, what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume; what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble. 2.1.24. First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find, what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume; what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble. 2.1.25. And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you shall have the fruits of others’ toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will. 2.1.25. And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you shall have the fruits of others' toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions I give authority to pluck advantage where they will.' 2.1.26. Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, Lady, pray what is your name? My friends call me Happiness, she said, but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice. 2.1.26. "Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, 'Lady, pray what is your name?' "'My friends call me Happiness,' she said, 'but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice.' 2.1.27. Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said: I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and I have taken note of your character during the time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. 2.1.27. "Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said: 'I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and I have taken note of your character during the time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. 2.1.28. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas : if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat. 2.1.28. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.' 2.1.29. And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness. And Virtue said: 2.1.29. "And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: 'Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness.' "And Virtue said: 2.1.30. What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. 2.1.30. 'What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. 2.1.31. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. 2.1.31. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. 2.1.32. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. 2.1.32. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. 2.1.33. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness. 2.1.33. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness.' 2.1.34. Such, in outline, is Prodicus’ story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done now. But anyhow, Aristippus, it were well that you should think on these things and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you. 2.1.34. "Such, in outline, is Prodicus' story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done now. But anyhow, Aristippus, it were well that you should think on these things and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you." |
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| 21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 4.5.3 and 5-7, 1125b, 1149a7.6.25-b27, 6.5, 7, 1151b32, 1095a1, 1095a20, 1095a21, 1095a22, 1095a23, 1095a24, 1095a25, 5.7 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 283 |
| 22. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 2.2, 647b10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 23. Philemon, Fragments, 71 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 7 |
| 24. Philemon, Fragments, 71 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 7 |
| 25. Aristotle, On The Universe, 398b, 399b, 400b (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 131 |
| 26. Menander, Dyscolus, 714, 713 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 17 |
| 27. Menander, Aspis, 410, Jan-18, 336 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 17 |
| 28. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378a, b1-2b1-2 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 209 |
| 29. Aristotle, Politics, 1.5.1260a13 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, on anger in women Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 136 |
| 30. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a, 1072b, 12 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 122 |
| 31. Menander, Monostichoi, 105, 124, 2, 236, 384, 436, 50, 512, 515, 528, 563, 565, 588-589, 611, 65, 68, 684, 69, 749, 777, 806, 843, 863, 438 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 17 |
| 32. Plautus, Curculio, 31b ff., 30b (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 122 |
33. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 7.9, 7.11, 7.14, 7.22-7.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 150 | 7.9. And when he was at his last breath, he said, 'You accursed wretch, you dismiss us from this present life, but the King of the universe will raise us up to an everlasting renewal of life, because we have died for his laws.' 7.11. and said nobly, 'I got these from Heaven, and because of his laws I disdain them, and from him I hope to get them back again.' 7.14. And when he was near death, he said, 'One cannot but choose to die at the hands of men and to cherish the hope that God gives of being raised again by him. But for you there will be no resurrection to life!' 7.22. I do not know how you came into being in my womb. It was not I who gave you life and breath, nor I who set in order the elements within each of you.' 7.23. Therefore the Creator of the world, who shaped the beginning of man and devised the origin of all things, will in his mercy give life and breath back to you again, since you now forget yourselves for the sake of his laws.' |
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| 34. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 51 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 332 |
35. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 9.22-9.25, 13.13-13.15, 14.5-14.6, 17.12, 18.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 150 | 9.22. but as though transformed by fire into immortality he nobly endured the rackings. 9.23. Imitate me, brothers, he said. "Do not leave your post in my struggle or renounce our courageous brotherhood. 9.24. Fight the sacred and noble battle for religion. Thereby the just Providence of our ancestors may become merciful to our nation and take vengeance on the accursed tyrant." 9.25. When he had said this, the saintly youth broke the thread of life. 13.13. Each of them and all of them together looking at one another, cheerful and undaunted, said, "Let us with all our hearts consecrate ourselves to God, who gave us our lives, and let us use our bodies as a bulwark for the law. 13.14. Let us not fear him who thinks he is killing us, 13.15. for great is the struggle of the soul and the danger of eternal torment lying before those who transgress the commandment of God. 14.5. but all of them, as though running the course toward immortality, hastened to death by torture. 17.12. for on that day virtue gave the awards and tested them for their endurance. The prize was immortality in endless life. 18.23. But the sons of Abraham with their victorious mother are gathered together into the chorus of the fathers, and have received pure and immortal souls from God, |
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| 36. Terence, Andria, 959-961 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 14 |
37. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.83, 2.9, 3.7, 4.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of •hellenistic philosophy, cicero on •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 283; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 7, 285| 1.83. fit enim ad punctum temporis. Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus is quae sunt bona in vita . vide ne a malis nea malis K ( fuit m vel ni) dici verius possit. quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure possum; sed quid necesse est, cum id agam ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem? fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmet ipsos, quantum potuimus, consolati sumus. a malis igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si sqq. Val. Max 8, 9 ext. 3 quaerimus. et quidem hoc ecquidem GRV h q dĕ (= haec quidem) K 1 (hoc quidem ss. 2 ) a Cyrenaico Hegesia he gesia R 1 sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolomaeo ptolomeo K ptholomeo GV prohibitus esse dicatur illa in scholis dicere, quod quod V 2 s quo X multi is auditis mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. -scerent in r. V c 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 | |
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| 38. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 34.31-35.5, 35.18, 35.19, 35.20, 35.21, 35.22, 35.23, 35.24, 35.25, 35.26, 35.27, 35.28, 35.29, 35.30, 35.31, 35.32, 35.33, 35.34, 35.35, 35.36, 35.37, 35.38, 35.39, 35.40, 40.32-41.8, 41.28-42.14, 42.22, 42.23, 42.24, 42.25, 42.26, 42.27, 42.28, 42.29, 42.30, 42.31, 42.32, 42.33, 42.34, 44.20, 44.21, 44.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 215, 216 |
39. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.44-1.45, 1.95-1.96, 2.153 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 7, 8, 9 | 1.44. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question. For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) 1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that 'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.95. As for your saying that the gods are male and female, well, you must see what the consequence of that will be. For my part, I am at a loss to imagine how your great founder arrived at such notions. All the same you never cease vociferating that we must on no account relinquish the divine happiness and immortality. But what prevents god from being happy without having two legs? and why cannot your 'beatitude' or 'beatity,' whichever form we are to use — and either is certainly a hard mouthful, but words have to be softened by use — but whatever it is, why can it not apply to the sun yonder, or to this world of ours, or to some eternal intelligence devoid of bodily shape and members? 1.96. Your only answer is: 'I have never seen a happy sun or world.' Well, but have you ever seen any other world but this one? No, you will reply. Then why did you venture to assert the existence of, not thousands and thousands, but a countless number of worlds? 'That is what reason teaches.' Then will not reason teach you that when we seek to find a being who shall be supremely excellent, and happy and eternal as well — and nothing else constitutes divinity —, even as that being will surpass us in immortality, so also will it surpass us in mental excellence, and even as in mental excellence, so also in bodily. Why then, if we are inferior to god in all else, are we his equals in form? for man came nearer to the divine image in virtue than in outward aspect. 2.153. But what shall I say of human reason? Has it not even entered the heavens? Man alone of all animals has observed the courses of the stars, their risings and settings. By man the day, the month, the year, is determined. He foresees the eclipses of the sun and moon, and foretells them to futurity, marking their greatness, duration, and precise time. From the contemplation of these things the mind extracts the knowledge of the Gods — a knowledge which produces piety, with which is connected justice, and all the other virtues; from which arises a life of felicity, inferior to that of the Gods in no single particular, except in immortality, which is not absolutely necessary to happy living. In explaining these things, I think that I have sufficiently demonstrated the superiority of man to other animated beings; from whence we should infer that neither the form and position of his limbs nor that strength of mind and understanding could possibly be the effect of chance. 2.153. "Then moreover hasn't man's reason penetrated even to the sky? We alone of living creatures know the risings and settings and the courses of the stars, the human race has set limits to the day, the month and the year, and has learnt the eclipses of the sun and moon and foretold for all future time their occurrence, their extent and their dates. And contemplating the heavenly bodies the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, with its comrades justice and the rest of the virtues, the sources of a life of happiness that vies with and resembles the divine existence and leaves us inferior to the celestial beings in nothing else save immortality, which is immaterial for happiness. I think that my exposition of these matters has been sufficient to prove how widely man's nature surpasses all other living creatures; and this should make it clear that neither such a conformation and arrangement of the members nor such power of mind and intellect can possibly have been created by chance. |
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40. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.7, 1.29-1.30, 1.47-1.48, 1.63, 1.66-1.70, 2.40, 2.88, 3.4, 3.16-3.17, 3.62-3.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, cicero on •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20, 25, 28, 30, 285; Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8| 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 1.30. omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec haec ħ BE hoc NV putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. dulce esse mel R mel dulce A quorum nihil oportere oportere V oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum tantum om. BE satis esse esse satis A admonere. interesse enim inter inter om. BE argumentum argumentumque BE argumentatum R augmentatum A conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta promta AR et aperta iudicari. indicari NV etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut ad naturam AR ad naturam ( om. aut) BE aut naturam ( om. ad) N 1 aut secundum naturam N 2 aut verum (compend scr) V aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. post iudicari add. in V voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum; idem in N ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post iudicari signo eo- demque in marg. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et et aut NV dolorem? 1.47. Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. temperantia est enim, quae in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur monet. nec enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec quid eventurum proventurum R sit provident ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non non om. A 1 RN 1 necessariam et quae vel aliter pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore tum in morbos gravis, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur. 1.48. Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii ii A 1 V in BE hi A 2 hii RN voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. ex quo intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur. 1.63. optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et ab eo et om. R et ( ante gravissimas) om. V gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. viam om. R In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugtiumve ratio potest perspici. percipi R omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum omnium rerum regula R 1 dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. 1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A 2.40. hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum intellegendum, om. ad, AN et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. 2.88. haec dicuntur inconstantissime. cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem. qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam effici voluptate beatam vitam A putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? igitur ne dolorem quidem. an dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beatum epicurus appellet beatum B Epicurus beatum appellet E et aeternum? dempta enim aeternitate nihilo beatior Iuppiter iupiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. At enim hic etiam dolore. At eum nihili nihili edd. nihil (nichil) facit; ait enim se, se RNV, superscr. A, om. BE si uratur, si uratur A 2 BE si iuratur A 1 si uratum R se iura- turum NV Quam hoc suave! dicturum. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 | 2.40. They failed to see that just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God. The Cyrenaics held on the contrary that this godlike animal came into being, like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjoy the pleasure of procreation, â a view that seems to me the climax of absurdity. < 2.88. In this he is grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good in pleasure, and yet he says that no greater pleasure would result from a lifetime of endless duration than from a limited and moderate period. If a person finds the sole Good in Virtue, it is open to him to say that the happy life is consummated by the consummation of virtue; for his position is that the Chief Good is not increased by lapse of time. But if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? If it is not, pain is not either. Or if pain is worse the longer it lasts, is not pleasure rendered more desirable by continuance? On what ground then does Epicurus speak of the Deity (for so he always does) as happy and everlasting? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. 'Ah but,' you say, 'Epicurus is liable to pain as well.' Yes, but he thinks nothing of pain; for he tells us that if he were being burnt to death he would exclaim, 'How delightful this is!' < 3.4. Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street. < 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. < 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. < |
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| 41. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.7, 1.29-1.30, 1.47-1.48, 1.66-1.70, 3.4, 3.16-3.17, 3.62-3.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, cicero on •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 20, 25, 28, 30, 285 |
42. Cicero, On Divination, 1.8, 1.125-1.126, 2.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, cicero on •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 331; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 285| 1.8. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe et paulo accuratius nuper, cum essem cum Q. fratre in Tusculano, disputatum est. Nam cum ambulandi causa in Lyceum venissemus (id enim superiori gymnasio nomen est), Perlegi, ille inquit, tuum paulo ante tertium de natura deorum, in quo disputatio Cottae quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit. Optime vero, inquam; etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat, ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem. Tum Quintus: Dicitur quidem istuc, inquit, a Cotta, et vero saepius, credo, ne communia iura migrare videatur; sed studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere. 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 1.126. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant. 2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. | 1.8. This subject has been discussed by me frequently on other occasions, but with somewhat more than ordinary care when my brother Quintus and I were together recently at my Tusculan villa. For the sake of a stroll we had gone to the Lyceum which is the name of my upper gymnasium, when Quintus remarked:I have just finished a careful reading of the third book of your treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, containing Cottas discussion, which, though it has shaken my views of religion, has not overthrown them entirely.Very good, said I; for Cottas argument is intended rather to refute the arguments of the Stoics than to destroy mans faith in religion.Quintus then replied: Cotta says the very same thing, and says it repeatedly, in order, as I think, not to appear to violate the commonly accepted canons of belief; yet it seems to me that, in his zeal to confute the Stoics, he utterly demolishes the gods. 1.8. It often happens, too, that the soul is violently stirred by the sight of some object, or by the deep tone of a voice, or by singing. Frequently anxiety or fear will have that effect, as it did in the case of Hesione, whoDid rave like one by Bacchic rites made madAnd mid the tombs her Teucer called aloud.[37] And poetic inspiration also proves that there is a divine power within the human soul. Democritus says that no one can be a great poet without being in a state of frenzy, and Plato says the same thing. Let Plato call it frenzy if he will, provided he praises it as it was praised in his Phaedrus. And what about your own speeches in law suits. Can the delivery of you lawyers be impassioned, weighty, and fluent unless your soul is deeply stirred? Upon my word, many a time have I seen in you such passion of look and gesture that I thought some power was rendering you unconscious of what you did; and, if I may cite a less striking example, I have seen the same in your friend Aesopus. 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. 1.126. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come. Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep. [56] 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.8. Then dismiss Romuluss augural staff, which you say the hottest of fires was powerless to burn, and attach slight importance to the whetstone of Attus Navius. Myths would have no place in philosophy. It would have been more in keeping with your rôle as a philosopher to consider, first, the nature of divination generally, second, its origin, and third, its consistency. What, then, is the nature of an art which makes prophets out of birds that wander aimlessly about — now here, now there — and makes the action or inaction of men depend upon the song or flight of birds? and why was the power granted to some birds to give a favourable omen when on the left side and to others when on the right? Again, however, when, and by whom, shall we say that the system was invented? The Etruscans, it is true, find the author of their system in the boy who was ploughed up out of the ground; but whom have we? Attus Navius? But Romulus and Remus, both of whom, by tradition, were augurs, lived many years earlier. Are we to say that it was invented by the Pisidians, Cilicians, or Phrygians? It is your judgement, then, that those devoid of human learning are the authors of a divine science! [39] |
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| 43. Cicero, Academica, 2.69-2.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic school of philosophy Found in books: Bezzel and Pfeiffer, Prophecy and Hellenism (2021) 51 |
44. Cicero, On Duties, 1.63, 1.107-1.117, 2.40, 2.88, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 15; Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8; Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 91| 1.63. Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: Non, inquit, solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam fortitudinis. Itaque viros fortes et magimnos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae. 1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere. 1.116. Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. 1.117. Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas consilii, tur id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod maxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare. 2.40. Atque iis etiam, qui vendunt emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocitur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum, ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt; quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta re publica fore putamus? 2.88. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a Panaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda cum externis et externa cum corporis et ipsa inter se corporis et externa cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo comparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, cum corporis externa hoc modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus, ipsa inter se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana rusticis. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. | 1.63. This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice. < 1.107. We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. < 1.108. Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏÏν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. < 1.109. Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â both father and son â and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. < 1.110. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. < 1.111. If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. < 1.112. Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. < 1.113. How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. < 1.114. Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. < 1.115. To the two above-mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another. < 1.116. They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in some particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same department of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that distinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some have added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus, Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture and intellectual power. It happens sometimes, too, that a man declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a vocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve signal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their aims high. < 1.117. All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in mind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we must decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in life we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the world. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgement is most immature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that to which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in some particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide intelligently what is best for him. < 2.40. So also to buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct of business. Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius â the one surnamed "the Wise" â in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms, and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an easy conquest. Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts? < 2.88. But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against another; â for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with outward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages are compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical advantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as this: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than wealth; [external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better to have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while the physical advantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is preferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages also may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be preferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived from the farm. < 3.69. Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again â which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. < |
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45. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.322, 5.94-5.96 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 104; Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8| 3.322. ut nihil inpediat dignam dis degere vitam. 5.94. tris species tam dissimilis, tria talia texta, 5.95. una dies dabit exitio, multosque per annos 5.96. sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi. | |
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46. Livy, History, 22.51.9 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 275| 22.51.9. praecipue convertit omnes subtractus Numida mortuo superincubanti Romano uivus naso auribusque laceratis, cum ille manibus ad capiendum telum inutilibus in rabiemi rabiem ira versa laniando dentibus hostem expirasset. | |
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47. Vergil, Aeneis, 2.6, 2.57-2.59, 2.61-2.63, 2.568-2.569, 2.571-2.577, 2.582-2.589, 2.591-2.597, 2.602-2.603, 2.605, 2.608-2.609, 2.611-2.617, 2.622-2.623, 2.625, 2.627-2.628, 2.633, 2.5669999999999997, 2.5780000000000003, 2.5789999999999997, 2.5810000000000004, 2.5839999999999996, 2.5860000000000003, 2.5869999999999997, 2.5980000000000003, 2.5989999999999998, 2.6010000000000004, 2.6039999999999996, 2.6060000000000003, 2.6069999999999998, 2.6180000000000003, 2.6189999999999998, 2.6210000000000004, 2.6239999999999997, 2.6260000000000003, 2.6289999999999996, 2.6310000000000002, 2.6319999999999997, 4.47, 4.265-4.282, 4.305-4.308, 4.338-4.339, 4.361, 8.5, 8.47-8.49, 8.51-8.54, 8.471, 8.474-8.479, 8.481, 8.484-8.488, 8.491-8.499, 8.501-8.509, 8.512-8.516, 8.519, 8.521-8.526, 8.529, 8.531-8.533, 8.535-8.539, 8.472000000000001, 8.472999999999999, 8.482000000000001, 8.482999999999999, 8.488999999999999, 8.511000000000001, 8.517000000000001, 8.517999999999999, 8.527000000000001, 8.527999999999999, 8.533999999999999, 9.342-9.343, 9.762, 9.761000000000001, 10.41-10.44, 10.411-10.413, 10.415, 10.417-10.419, 10.421-10.423, 10.425, 10.427, 10.429, 10.431-10.433, 10.435-10.436, 10.439, 10.442, 10.513, 10.515, 10.552, 10.823, 10.825, 10.414000000000001, 10.415999999999999, 10.424000000000001, 10.425999999999998, 10.427999999999999, 10.434000000000001, 10.437000000000001, 10.437999999999999, 10.440999999999999, 10.514000000000001, 10.515999999999998, 10.517000000000001, 10.604000000000001, 11.5, 11.18, 11.29, 11.41-11.49, 11.51-11.58, 11.96-11.97, 11.179, 11.181, 11.177999999999999, 12.8, 12.57-12.58, 12.81-12.84, 12.92-12.95, 12.313-12.314, 12.499, 12.569, 12.571, 12.573, 12.581-12.582, 12.791-12.842, 12.919-12.952, 12.312999999999999, 12.494000000000002, 12.572000000000001, 12.790999999999999, 12.799000000000001, 12.800999999999998, 12.802999999999999, 12.809000000000001, 12.812000000000001, 12.812999999999999, 12.815999999999999, 12.822000000000001, 12.824000000000002, 12.825999999999999, 12.834000000000001, 12.835999999999999, 12.924000000000001, 12.925999999999998, 12.927999999999999, 12.934000000000001, 12.937000000000001, 12.937999999999999, 12.940999999999999, 12.947000000000001, 12.949000000000002, 12.950999999999999 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger •virgil, and hellenistic philosophy Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 275 2.6. et quorum pars magna fui. Quis talia fando 2.57. Ecce, manus iuvenem interea post terga revinctum 2.58. pastores magno ad regem clamore trahebant 2.59. Dardanidae, qui se ignotum venientibus ultro, 2.61. obtulerat, fidens animi atque in utrumque paratus, 2.62. seu versare dolos, seu certae occumbere morti. 2.63. Undique visendi studio Troiana iuventus 2.568. | 2.6. how Asia 's glory and afflicted throne 2.57. thus hailed the people: “O unhappy men! 2.58. What madness this? Who deems our foemen fled? 2.59. Think ye the gifts of Greece can lack for guile? 2.61. hides, caged in yonder beams; or this is reared 2.62. for engin'ry on our proud battlements, 2.63. to spy upon our roof-tops, or descend 2.568. at mailed Minerva's altar prostrate lay, 2.569. pierced by Peneleus, blade; then Rhipeus fell; 2.571. most scrupulously righteous; but the gods 2.572. gave judgment otherwise. There Dymas died, 2.573. and Hypanis, by their compatriots slain; 2.574. nor thee, O Panthus, in that mortal hour, 2.575. could thy clean hands or Phoebus, priesthood save. 2.576. O ashes of my country! funeral pyre 2.577. of all my kin! bear witness that my breast 2.582. tayed Iphitus and Pelias; one with age 2.583. was Iong since wearied, and the other bore 2.584. the burden of Ulysses' crippling wound. 2.585. Straightway the roar and tumult summoned us 2.586. to Priam's palace, where a battle raged 2.587. as if save this no conflict else were known, 2.588. and all Troy 's dying brave were mustered there. 2.589. There we beheld the war-god unconfined; 2.591. or, with shields tortoise-back, the gates assailed. 2.592. Ladders were on the walls; and round by round, 2.593. up the huge bulwark as they fight their way, 2.594. the shielded left-hand thwarts the falling spears, 2.595. the right to every vantage closely clings. 2.596. The Trojans hurl whole towers and roof-tops down 2.597. upon the mounting foe; for well they see 2.603. Thus were our hearts inflamed to stand and strike 2.605. bring succor, and renew their vanquished powers. 2.608. and exit rearward; hither, in the days 2.609. before our fall, the lone Andromache 2.611. in quest of Priam and her husband's kin. 2.612. This way to climb the palace roof I flew, 2.613. where, desperate, the Trojans with vain skill 2.614. hurled forth repellent arms. A tower was there, 2.615. reared skyward from the roof-top, giving view 2.616. of Troy 's wide walls and full reconnaissance 2.617. of all Achaea 's fleets and tented field; 2.622. It fell with instantaneous crash of thunder 2.623. along the Danaan host in ruin wide. 2.627. Pyrrhus triumphant stood, with glittering arms 4.47. weet babes at thine own breast, nor gifts of love? 4.265. but with the morn she takes her watchful throne 4.266. high on the housetops or on lofty towers, 4.267. to terrify the nations. She can cling 4.268. to vile invention and maligt wrong, 4.269. or mingle with her word some tidings true. 4.270. She now with changeful story filled men's ears, 4.271. exultant, whether false or true she sung: 4.272. how, Trojan-born Aeneas having come, 4.273. Dido, the lovely widow, Iooked his way, 4.274. deigning to wed; how all the winter long 4.275. they passed in revel and voluptuous ease, 4.276. to dalliance given o'er; naught heeding now 4.277. of crown or kingdom—shameless! lust-enslaved! 4.278. Such tidings broadcast on the lips of men 4.279. the filthy goddess spread; and soon she hied 4.280. to King Iarbas, where her hateful song 4.282. Him the god Ammon got by forced embrace 4.305. by hospitable grant! She dares disdain 4.306. our proffered nuptial vow. She has proclaimed 4.307. Aeneas partner of her bed and throne. 4.308. And now that Paris, with his eunuch crew, 4.338. the land Lavinian and Ausonia's sons. 4.339. Let him to sea! Be this our final word: 4.361. the speed of Mercury's well-poising wing; 8.5. then woke each warrior soul; all Latium stirred 8.48. “Seed of the gods! who bringest to my shore 8.49. thy Trojan city wrested from her foe, 8.51. and fair Laurentum long have looked for thee. 8.52. Here truly is thy home. Turn not away. 8.53. Here the true guardians of thy hearth shall be. 8.54. Fear not the gathering war. The wrath of Heaven 8.471. to shake his aegis in the darkening storm, 8.474. are but a memory of great heroes gone: 8.475. one father Janus built, and Saturn one; 8.476. their names, Saturnia and Janiculum.” 8.477. 'Mid such good parley to the house they came 8.478. of King Evander, unadorned and plain, 8.479. whence herds of browsing cattle could be seen 8.481. in proud Carinae. As they entered there, 8.484. he made his own. Dare, O illustrious guest, 8.485. to scorn the pomp of power. Shape thy soul 8.486. to be a god's fit follower. Enter here, 8.487. and free from pride our frugal welcome share.” 8.488. So saying, 'neath his roof-tree scant and low 8.491. Now night drew near, enfolding the wide world 8.492. in shadowy wings. But Venus, sore disturbed, 8.493. vexed not unwisely her maternal breast, 8.494. fearing Laurentum's menace and wild stir 8.495. of obstinate revolt, and made her plea 8.496. to Vulcan in their nuptial bower of gold, 8.497. outbreathing in the music of her words 8.498. celestial love: “When warring Argive kings 8.499. brought ruin on Troy 's sacred citadel 8.501. I asked not thee to help that hopeless woe, 8.502. nor craved thy craft and power. For, dearest lord, 8.503. I would not tax in vain shine arduous toil, 8.504. though much to Priam's children I was bound, 8.505. and oft to see Aeneas burdened sore 8.506. I could but weep. But now by will of Jove 8.507. he has found foothold in Rutulian lands. 8.508. Therefore I come at last with lowly suit 8.509. before a godhead I adore, and pray 8.512. of Nereus' daughter or Tithonus' bride. 8.513. Behold what tribes conspire, what cities strong 8.514. behind barred gates now make the falchion keen 8.515. to ruin and blot out both me and mine!” 8.516. So spake the goddess, as her arms of snow 8.519. knew the familiar fire, and o'er his frame 8.521. wift as the glittering shaft of thunder cleaves 8.522. the darkened air and on from cloud to cloud 8.523. the rift of lightning runs. She, joyful wife; 8.524. felt what her beauty and her guile could do; 8.525. as, thralled by love unquenchable, her spouse 8.526. thus answered fair: “Why wilt thou labor so 8.529. I could have armed the Teucrians. Neither Jove 8.531. of life to Troy and Priam. If to-day 8.532. thou hast a war in hand, and if thy heart 8.533. determine so, I willingly engage 8.535. molten alloy or welded iron can, 8.536. whate'er my roaring forge and flames achieve, 8.537. I offer thee. No more in anxious prayer 8.538. distrust thy beauty's power.” So saying, he gave 8.539. embrace of mutual desire, and found 9.342. where we have hunted all day long and know 9.343. each winding of yon river.” Then uprose 9.762. the shining swords looked thickest, there he sprung. 10.41. unblest and unapproved the Trojans came 10.42. to Italy, for such rebellious crime 10.43. give them their due, nor lend them succor, thou, 10.44. with thy strong hand! But if they have obeyed 10.427. the sword drove deep, and gored the gaping side. 10.429. ripped in her dying hour, and unto thee, 10.431. escaped the fatal steel. Hard by him fell 10.432. tout Cisseus and gigantic Gyas; these 10.433. to death were hurled, while with their knotted clubs 10.435. Herculean weapons, nor their mighty hands, 10.436. or that Melampus was their sire, a peer 10.439. But while he vainly raves, the whirling spear 10.442. while following in ill-omened haste the steps 10.513. yon lands are all too small. Ha! Shall we steer 10.552. grim Vulcan's serried flames; from some high seat 10.825. thy stern command? If I could claim to-day 11.5. for reward to his gods, a conqueror's vow, 11.18. our largest work is done. Bid fear begone 11.29. our comrades fallen; for no honor else 11.41. under less happy omens set to guard 11.42. his darling child. Around him is a throng 11.43. of slaves, with all the Trojan multitude, 11.44. and Ilian women, who the wonted way 11.45. let sorrow's tresses loosely flow. When now 11.46. Aeneas to the lofty doors drew near, 11.47. all these from smitten bosoms raised to heaven 11.48. a mighty moaning, till the King's abode 11.49. was loud with anguish. There Aeneas viewed 11.51. the smooth young breast that bore the gaping wound 11.52. of that Ausonian spear, and weeping said: 11.53. “Did Fortune's envy, smiling though she came, 11.54. refuse me, hapless boy, that thou shouldst see 11.55. my throne established, and victorious ride 11.56. beside me to thy father's house? Not this 11.57. my parting promise to thy King and sire, 11.58. Evander, when with friendly, fond embrace 11.96. the sad prince o'er the youthful body threw 11.97. for parting gift; and with the other veiled 11.181. to King Evander hied, Evander's house 12.8. unto his last grim fight, and gloriously 12.57. while Turnus lives? For what will be the word 12.58. of thy Rutulian kindred—yea, of all 12.82. from these new terms of duel, wept aloud, 12.95. with slave's eyes on Aeneas as my son.” 12.313. dejectedly drew near the place of prayer, 12.314. worn, pale, and wasted in his youthful bloom. 12.569. mantling her shape in cloud; and this she steeped 12.581. their courage 'gainst the foe. “This thing is done 12.582. not of man's knowledge, nor by sovereign skill; 12.791. dissension 'twixt the frighted citizens: 12.792. ome would give o'er the city and fling wide 12.793. its portals to the Trojan, or drag forth 12.794. the King himself to parley; others fly 12.795. to arms, and at the rampart make a stand. 12.796. 'T is thus some shepherd from a caverned crag 12.797. tirs up the nested bees with plenteous fume 12.798. of bitter smoke; they, posting to and fro, 12.799. fly desperate round the waxen citadel, 12.800. and whet their buzzing fury; through their halls 12.801. the stench and blackness rolls; within the caves 12.802. noise and confusion ring; the fatal cloud 12.804. But now a new adversity befell 12.805. the weary Latins, which with common woe 12.806. hook the whole city to its heart. The Queen, 12.807. when at her hearth she saw the close assault 12.808. of enemies, the walls beset, and fire 12.809. preading from roof to roof, but no defence 12.810. from the Rutulian arms, nor front of war 12.811. with Turnus leading,—she, poor soul, believed 12.812. her youthful champion in the conflict slain; 12.813. and, mad with sudden sorrow, shrieked aloud 12.814. against herself, the guilty chief and cause 12.815. of all this ill; and, babbling her wild woe 12.816. in endless words, she rent her purple pall, 12.817. and with her own hand from the rafter swung 12.818. a noose for her foul death. The tidings dire 12.819. among the moaning wives of Latium spread, 12.820. and young Lavinia's frantic fingers tore 12.821. her rose-red cheek and hyacinthine hair. 12.822. Then all her company of women shrieked 12.823. in anguish, and the wailing echoed far 12.824. along the royal seat; from whence the tale 12.825. of sorrow through the peopled city flew; 12.826. hearts sank; Latinus rent his robes, appalled 12.827. to see his consort's doom, his falling throne; 12.829. Meanwhile the warrior Turnus far afield 12.830. pursued a scattered few; but less his speed, 12.831. for less and less his worn steeds worked his will; 12.832. and now wind-wafted to his straining ear 12.833. a nameless horror came, a dull, wild roar, 12.834. the city's tumult and distressful cry. 12.835. “Alack,” he cried, “what stirs in yonder walls 12.836. uch anguish? Or why rings from side to side 12.837. uch wailing through the city?” Asking so, 12.838. he tightened frantic grasp upon the rein. 12.839. To him his sister, counterfeiting still 12.840. the charioteer Metiscus, while she swayed 12.841. rein, steeds, and chariot, this answer made: 12.842. “Hither, my Turnus, let our arms pursue 12.919. O sister, thou shalt look upon my shame 12.920. no longer. But first grant a madman's will!” 12.921. He spoke; and leaping from his chariot, sped 12.922. through foes and foemen's spears, not seeing now 12.923. his sister's sorrow, as in swift career 12.924. he burst from line to line. Thus headlong falls 12.925. a mountain-boulder by a whirlwind flung 12.926. from lofty peak, or loosened by much rain, 12.927. or by insidious lapse of seasons gone; 12.928. the huge, resistless crag goes plunging down 12.929. by leaps and bounds, o'erwhelming as it flies 12.930. tall forests, Bocks and herds, and mortal men: 12.931. o through the scattered legions Turnus ran 12.932. traight to the city walls, where all the ground 12.933. was drenched with blood, and every passing air 12.934. hrieked with the noise of spears. His lifted hand 12.935. made sign of silence as he loudly called: 12.936. “Refrain, Rutulians! O ye Latins all, 12.937. your spears withhold! The issue of the fray 12.938. is all my own. I only can repair 12.939. our broken truce by judgment of the sword.” 12.941. But Sire Aeneas, hearing Turnus' name, 12.942. down the steep rampart from the citadel 12.943. unlingering tried, all lesser task laid by, 12.944. with joy exultant and dread-thundering arms. 12.945. Like Athos ' crest he loomed, or soaring top 12.946. of Eryx, when the nodding oaks resound, 12.947. or sovereign Apennine that lifts in air 12.948. his forehead of triumphant snow. All eyes 12.949. of Troy, Rutulia, and Italy 12.950. were fixed his way; and all who kept a guard 12.951. on lofty rampart, or in siege below 12.952. were battering the foundations, now laid by | |
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| 48. Horace, Sermones, 2.3.158, 2.7.83 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 332 |
| 49. Horace, Letters, 1.1.106 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8 |
50. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 125 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100 | 125. Because God was the cause, not the instrument; and what was born was created indeed through the agency of some instrument, but was by all means called into existence by the great first cause; for many things must co-operate in the origination of anything; by whom, from what, by means of what, and why? Now he by whom a thing originates is the cause; that from which a thing is made is the material; that by means of which it was made is the instrument; and why, is the object. |
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| 51. Philo of Alexandria, On Rewards And Punishments, 409 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 105 |
52. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 2.9-2.14, 2.51-2.52 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 90, 253 | 2.9. Now these four qualities are closely connected with and related to the legislative power, namely, humility, the love of justice, the love of virtue, and the hatred of iniquity; for every individual who has any desire for exercising his talents as a lawgiver is under the influence of each of these feelings. It is the province of humanity to prepare for adoption such opinions as will benefit the common weal, and to teach the advantages which will proceed from them. It is the part of justice to point out how we ought to honour equality, and to assign to every man his due according to his deserts. It is the part of the love of virtue to embrace those things which are by nature good, and to give to every one who deserves them facilities without limit for the most unrestrained enjoyment of happiness. It is also the province of the hatred of iniquity to reject all those who dishonour virtue, and to look upon them as common enemies of the human race. 2.10. Therefore it is a very great thing if it has fallen to the lot of any one to arrive at any one of the qualities before mentioned, and it is a marvellous thing, as it should seem, for any one man to have been able to grasp them all, which in fact Moses appears to have been the only person who has ever done, having given a very clear description of the aforesaid virtues in the commandments which he established. 2.11. And those who are well versed in the sacred scriptures know this, for if he had not had these principles innate within him he would never have compiled those scriptures at the promptings of God. And he gave to those who were worthy to use them the most admirable of all possessions, namely, faithful copies and imitations of the original examples which were consecrated and enshrined in the soul, which became the laws which he revealed and established, displaying in the clearest manner the virtues which I have enumerated and described above. 2.12. But that he himself is the most admirable of all the lawgivers who have ever lived in any country either among the Greeks or among the barbarians, and that his are the most admirable of all laws, and truly divine, omitting no one particular which they ought to comprehend, there is the clearest proof possible in this fact, the laws of other lawgivers, 2.13. if any one examines them by his reason, he will find to be put in motion in an innumerable multitude of pretexts, either because of wars, or of tyrannies, or of some other unexpected events which come upon nations through the various alterations and innovations of fortune; and very often luxury, abounding in all kind of superfluity and unbounded extravagance, has overturned laws, from the multitude not being able to bear unlimited prosperity, but having a tendency to become insolent through satiety, and insolence is in opposition to law. 2.14. But the enactments of this lawgiver are firm, not shaken by commotions, not liable to alteration, but stamped as it were with the seal of nature herself, and they remain firm and lasting from the day on which they were first promulgated to the present one, and there may well be a hope that they will remain to all future time, as being immortal, as long as the sun and the moon, and the whole heaven and the whole world shall endure. 2.51. For both in his commandments and also in his prohibitions he suggests and recommends rather than commands, endeavouring with many prefaces and perorations to suggest the greater part of the precepts that he desires to enforce, desiring rather to allure men to virtue than to drive them to it, and looking upon the foundation and beginning of a city made with hands, which he has made the commencement of his work a commencement beneath the dignity of his laws, looking rather with the most accurate eye of his mind at the importance and beauty of his whole legislative system, and thinking it too excellent and too divine to be limited as it were by any circle of things on earth; and therefore he has related the creation of that great metropolis, the world, thinking his laws the most fruitful image and likeness of the constitution of the whole world. 2.52. At all events if any one were inclined to examine with accuracy the powers of each individual and particular law, he will find them all aiming at the harmony of the universe, and corresponding to the law of eternal nature: |
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53. Anon., Sibylline Oracles, 2.34-2.55, 2.145 (1st cent. BCE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 105 | 2.34. Nor yet enslaved. And every harbor then, 2.35. 35 And every haven, shall be free to men 2.36. As formerly, and shamelessness shall perish. 2.37. And then will God show mortals a great sign: 2.38. For like a lustrous crown shall shine a star, 2.39. Bright, all-resplendent, from the radiant heaven 2.40. 40 Days not a few; and then will he display 2.40. 40 Imperishable honor always first, 2.41. From heaven a crown for contest unto men 2.41. And next thy parents. Render all things due, 2.42. Who wrestle. And then there shall be again 2.42. And into unjust judgment come thou not. 2.43. A mighty contest of triumphal march 2.43. Do not cast out the poor unrighteously, 2.44. Into the heavenly sky, and it shall be 2.44. Nor judge by outward show; if wickedly 2.45. 45 For all men in the world, and have the fame 2.46. of immortality. And every people 2.47. Shall then in the immortal contests strive 2.48. For splendid victory. For no one there 2.49. Can shamelessly with silver buy a crown. 2.50. 50 For unto them will the pure Christ adjudge 2.51. That which is due, and crown the ones approved, 2.52. And give his martyrs an immortal prize 2.53. Who carry on the contest unto death. 2.54. And unto chaste men who run their race well 2.55. 55 Will he the incorruptible reward 2.145. 145 And murders come, and children hate their sires, |
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54. Philo of Alexandria, On The Embassy To Gaius, 152-158 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 87 | 158. Moreover, in the monthly divisions of the country, when the whole people receives money or corn in turn, he never allowed the Jews to fall short in their reception of this favour, but even if it happened that this distribution fell on the day of their sacred sabbath, on which day it is not lawful for them to receive any thing, or to give any thing, or in short to perform any of the ordinary duties of life, he charged the dispenser of these gifts, and gave him the most careful and special injunctions to make the distribution to the Jews on the day following, that they might not lose the effects of his common kindness. XXIV. |
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| 55. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 147 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 253 |
| 56. Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 10.12.11, 37.2.31, 37.3.61 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 11 |
| 57. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.62 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 123 |
58. Philo of Alexandria, Against Flaccus, 50 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 87 | 50. For if we were to neglect the opportunity of adhering to our national customs when it is afforded to us, we should deserve to meet with the severest punishment, as not giving any proper or adequate return for the benefits which we have received; but if, while it is in our power to do so, we, in conformity with our own laws which Augustus himself is in the habit of confirming, obey in everything, then I do not see what great, or even what small offence can be laid to our charge; unless any one were to impute to us that we do not transgress the laws of deliberate purpose, and that we do not intentionally take care to depart from our national customs, which practices, even if they at first attack others, do often in the end visit those who are guilty of them. |
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59. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 65, 65, ll.8-10, 2.5, 17, 50, 119.7, 73.13, 53.11, 53.12, 25.4, 92.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 123| 65. qui vicit ima: sceptra praeripiet patri. | 65. I shared my time yesterday with ill health;[1] it claimed for itself all the period before noon; in the afternoon, however, it yielded to me. And so I first tested my spirit by reading; then, when reading was found to be possible, I dared to make more demands upon the spirit, or perhaps I should say, to make more concessions to it. I wrote a little, and indeed with more concentration than usual, for I am struggling with a difficult subject and do not wish to be downed. In the midst of this, some friends visited me, with the purpose of employing force and of restraining me, as if I were a sick man indulging in some excess. ,So conversation was substituted for writing; and from this conversation I shall communicate to you the topic which is still the subject of debate; for we have appointed you referee.[2] You have more of a task on your hands than you suppose, for the argument is threefold. Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, declare that there are two things in the universe which are the source of everything, – namely, cause and matter.[3] Matter lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in motion. Cause, however, by which we mean reason, moulds matter and turns it in whatever direction it will, producing thereby various concrete results. Accordingly, there must be, in the case of each thing, that from which it is made, and, next, an agent by which it is made. The former is its material, the latter its cause. ,All art is but imitation of nature; therefore, let me apply these statements of general principles to the things which have to be made by man. A statue, for example, has afforded matter which was to undergo treatment at the hands of the artist, and has had an artist who was to give form to the matter. Hence, in the case of the statue, the material was bronze, the cause was the workman. And so it goes with all things, – they consist of that which is made, and of the maker. ,The Stoics believe in one cause only, – the maker; but Aristotle thinks that the word "cause" can be used in three ways: "The first cause," he says, "is the actual matter, without which nothing can be created. The second is the workman. The third is the form, which is impressed upon every work, – a statue, for example." This last is what Aristotle calls the idos.[4] "There is, too," says he, "a fourth, – the purpose of the work as a whole." ,Now I shall show you what this last means. Bronze is the "first cause" of the statue, for it could never have been made unless there had been something from which it could be cast and moulded. The "second cause" is the artist; for without the skilled hands of a workman that bronze could not have been shaped to the outlines of the statue. The "third cause" is the form, inasmuch as our statue could never be called The Lance-Bearer or The Boy Binding his Hair,[5] had not this special shape been stamped upon it. The "fourth cause" is the purpose of the work. For if this purpose had not existed, the statue would not have been made. ,Now what is this purpose? It is that which attracted the artist, which he followed when he made the statue. It may have been money, if he has made it for sale; or renown, if he has worked for reputation; or religion, if he has wrought it as a gift for a temple. Therefore this also is a cause contributing towards the making of the statue; or do you think that we should avoid including, among the causes of a thing which has been made, that element without which the thing in question would not have been made? ,To these four Plato adds a fifth cause, – the pattern which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon[6] when he created the work which he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has his pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns of all things, and his mind comprehends the harmonies and the measures of the whole totality of things which are to be carried out; he is filled with these shapes which Plato calls the "ideas," – imperishable, unchangeable, not subject to decay. And therefore, though men die, humanity itself, or the idea of man, according to which man is moulded, lasts on, and though men toil and perish, it suffers no change. ,Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says:[7] the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view. Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue, – to go back to the figure with which we began, – the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker's mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself. ,The universe also, in Plato's opinion, possesses all these elements. The agent is God; the source, matter; the form, the shape and the arrangement of the visible world. The pattern is doubtless the model according to which God has made this great and most beautiful creation. ,The purpose is his object in so doing. Do you ask what God's purpose is? It is goodness. Plato, at any rate, says: "What was God's reason for creating the world? God is good, and no good person is grudging of anything that is good. Therefore, God made it the best world possible." Hand down your opinion, then, O judge; state who seems to you to say what is truest, and not who says what is absolutely true. For to do that is as far beyond our ken as truth itself. ,This throng of causes, defined by Aristotle and by Plato, embraces either too much or too little.[8] For if they regard as "causes" of an object that is to be made everything without which the object cannot be made, they have named too few. Time must be included among the causes; for nothing can be made without time. They must also include place; for if there be no place where a thing can be made, it will not be made. And motion too; nothing is either made or destroyed without motion. There is no art without motion, no change of any kind. ,Now, however, I am searching for the first, the general cause; this must be simple, inasmuch as matter, too, is simple. Do we ask what cause is? It is surely Creative Reason,[9]– in other words, God. For those elements to which you referred are not a great series of independent causes; they all hinge on one alone, and that will be the creative cause. ,Do you maintain that form is a cause? This is only what the artist stamps upon his work; it is part of a cause, but not the cause. Neither is the pattern a cause, but an indispensable tool of the cause. His pattern is as indispensable to the artist as the chisel or the file; without these, art can make no progress. But for all that, these things are neither parts of the art, nor causes of it. ,Then, perhaps you will say, "the purpose of the artist, that which leads him to undertake to create something, is the cause." It may be a cause; it is not, however, the efficient cause, but only an accessory cause. But there are countless accessory causes; what we are discussing is the general cause. Now the statement of Plato and Aristotle is not in accord with their usual penetration, when they maintain that the whole universe, the perfectly wrought work, is a cause. For there is a great difference between a work and the cause of a work. ,Either give your opinion, or, as is easier in cases of this kind, declare that the matter is not clear and call for another hearing.[10] But you will reply: "What pleasure do you get from wasting your time on these problems, which relieve you of none of your emotions, rout none of your desires?" So far as I am concerned, I treat and discuss them as matters which contribute greatly toward calming the spirit, and I search myself first, and then the world about me. ,And not even now am I, as you think, wasting my time. For all these questions, provided that they be not chopped up and torn apart into such unprofitable refinements, elevate and lighten the soul, which is weighted down by a heavy burden and desires to be freed and to return to the elements of which it was once a part. For this body of ours is a weight upon the soul and its pece; as the load presses down the soul is crushed and is in bondage, unless philosophy has come to its assistance and has bid it take fresh courage by contemplating the universe, and has turned it from things earthly to things divine. There it has its liberty, there it can roam abroad;[11] meantime it escapes the custody in which it is bound, and renews its life in heaven. ,Just as skilled workmen, who have been engaged upon some delicate piece of work which wearies their eyes with straining, if the light which they have is niggardly or uncertain, go forth into the open air and in some park devoted to the people's recreation delight their eyes in the generous light of day; so the soul, imprisoned as it has been in this gloomy and darkened house, seeks the open sky whenever it can, and in the contemplation of the universe finds rest. ,The wise man, the seeker after wisdom, is bound closely, indeed, to his body, but he is an absentee so far as his better self is concerned, and he concentrates his thoughts upon lofty things. Bound, so to speak, to his oath of allegiance, he regards the period of life as his term of service. He is so trained that he neither loves nor hates life; he endures a mortal lot, although he knows that an ampler lot is in store for him. ,Do you forbid me to contemplate the universe? Do you compel me to withdraw from the whole and restrict me to a part? May I not ask what are the beginnings of all things, who moulded the universe, who took the confused and conglomerate mass of sluggish matter, and separated it into its parts? May I not inquire who is the Master-Builder of this universe, how the mighty bulk was brought under the control of law and order, who gathered together the scattered atoms, who separated the disordered elements and assigned an outward form to elements that lay in one vast shapelessness? Or whence came all the expanse of light? And whether is it fire, or something even brighter than fire?[12],Am I not to ask these questions? Must I be ignorant of the heights whence I have descended? Whether I am to see this world but once, or to be born many times? What is my destination afterwards? What abode awaits my soul on its release from the laws of slavery among men? Do you forbid me to have a share in heaven? In other words, do you bid me live with my head bowed down? ,No, I am above such an existence; I was born to a greater destiny than to be a mere chattel of my body, and I regard this body as nothing but a chain[13] which manacles my freedom. Therefore, I offer it as a sort of buffer to fortune, and shall allow no wound to penetrate through to my soul. For my body is the only part of me which can suffer injury. In this dwelling, which is exposed to peril, my soul lives free. ,Never shall this flesh drive me to feel fear, or to assume any pretence that is unworthy of a good man. Never shall I lie in order to honour this petty body. When it seems proper, I shall sever my connexion with it. And at present, while we are bound together, our alliance shall nevertheless not be one of equality; the soul shall bring all quarrels before its own tribunal. To despise our bodies is sure freedom. ,To return to our subject; this freedom will be greatly helped by the contemplation of which we were just speaking. All things are made up of matter and of God;[14] God controls matter, which encompasses him and follows him as its guide and leader. And that which creates, in other words, God, is more powerful and precious than matter, which is acted upon by God. ,God's place in the universe corresponds to the soul's relation to man. World-matter corresponds to our mortal body; therefore let the lower serve the higher. Let us be brave in the face of hazards. Let us not fear wrongs, or wounds, or bonds, or poverty. And what is death? It is either the end, or a process of change. I have no fear of ceasing to exist; it is the same as not having begun. Nor do I shrink from changing into another state, because I shall, under no conditions, be as cramped as I am now. Farewell. |
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| 60. Seneca The Younger, Dialogi, 1.1.5, 2.8.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 9 |
| 61. Plutarch, Greek Questions, 288, 287 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100 |
| 62. Plutarch, It Is Impossible To Live Pleasantly In The Manner of Epicurus, 7 1091b-c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8 |
63. Mishnah, Avodah Zarah, 3.4 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 334, 335| 3.4. שָׁאַל פְּרוֹקְלוֹס בֶּן פִלוֹסְפוֹס אֶת רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּעַכּוֹ, שֶׁהָיָה רוֹחֵץ בַּמֶּרְחָץ שֶׁל אַפְרוֹדִיטִי, אָמַר לוֹ, כָּתוּב בְּתוֹרַתְכֶם, וְלֹא יִדְבַּק בְּיָדְךָ מְאוּמָה מִן הַחֵרֶם. מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתָּה רוֹחֵץ בַּמֶּרְחָץ שֶׁל אַפְרוֹדִיטִי. אָמַר לוֹ, אֵין מְשִׁיבִין בַּמֶּרְחָץ. וּכְשֶׁיָּצָא אָמַר לוֹ, אֲנִי לֹא בָאתִי בִגְבוּלָהּ, הִיא בָאתָה בִגְבוּלִי, אֵין אוֹמְרִים, נַעֲשֶׂה מֶרְחָץ לְאַפְרוֹדִיטִי נוֹי, אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים, נַעֲשֶׂה אַפְרוֹדִיטִי נוֹי לַמֶּרְחָץ. דָּבָר אַחֵר, אִם נוֹתְנִין לְךָ מָמוֹן הַרְבֵּה, אִי אַתָּה נִכְנָס לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁלְּךָ עָרוֹם וּבַעַל קֶרִי וּמַשְׁתִּין בְּפָנֶיהָ, וְזוֹ עוֹמֶדֶת עַל פִּי הַבִּיב וְכָל הָעָם מַשְׁתִּינִין לְפָנֶיהָ. לֹא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא אֱלֹהֵיהֶם. אֶת שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם אֱלוֹהַּ, אָסוּר. וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם אֱלוֹהַּ, מֻתָּר: | 3.4. Proclos, son of a plosphos, asked Rabban Gamaliel in Acco when the latter was bathing in the bathhouse of aphrodite. He said to him, “It is written in your torah, ‘let nothing that has been proscribed stick to your hand (Deuteronomy 13:18)’; why are you bathing in the bathhouse of Aphrodite?” He replied to him, “We do not answer [questions relating to torah] in a bathhouse.” When he came out, he said to him, “I did not come into her domain, she has come into mine. People do not say, ‘the bath was made as an adornment for Aphrodite’; rather they say, ‘Aphrodite was made as an adornment for the bath.’ Another reason is, even if you were given a large sum of money, you would not enter the presence of your idol while you were nude or had experienced seminal emission, nor would you urinate before it. But this [statue of Aphrodite] stands by a sewer and all people urinate before it. [In the torah] it is only stated, “their gods” (Deuteronomy 12:3) what is treated as a god is prohibited, what is not treated as a deity is permitted. |
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64. Mishnah, Avot, 2.4-2.5, 3.15, 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 331, 332| 2.4. הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, עֲשֵׂה רְצוֹנוֹ כִרְצוֹנְךָ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה רְצוֹנְךָ כִרְצוֹנוֹ. בַּטֵּל רְצוֹנְךָ מִפְּנֵי רְצוֹנוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל רְצוֹן אֲחֵרִים מִפְּנֵי רְצוֹנֶךָ. הִלֵּל אוֹמֵר, אַל תִּפְרֹשׁ מִן הַצִּבּוּר, וְאַל תַּאֲמִין בְּעַצְמְךָ עַד יוֹם מוֹתְךָ, וְאַל תָּדִין אֶת חֲבֵרְךָ עַד שֶׁתַּגִּיעַ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וְאַל תֹּאמַר דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִשְׁמֹעַ, שֶׁסּוֹפוֹ לְהִשָּׁמַע. וְאַל תֹּאמַר לִכְשֶׁאִפָּנֶה אֶשְׁנֶה, שֶׁמָּא לֹא תִפָּנֶה: 2.5. הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, אֵין בּוּר יְרֵא חֵטְא, וְלֹא עַם הָאָרֶץ חָסִיד, וְלֹא הַבַּיְשָׁן לָמֵד, וְלֹא הַקַּפְּדָן מְלַמֵּד, וְלֹא כָל הַמַּרְבֶּה בִסְחוֹרָה מַחְכִּים. וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין אֲנָשִׁים, הִשְׁתַּדֵּל לִהְיוֹת אִישׁ: 3.15. הַכֹּל צָפוּי, וְהָרְשׁוּת נְתוּנָה, וּבְטוֹב הָעוֹלָם נִדּוֹן. וְהַכֹּל לְפִי רֹב הַמַּעֲשֶׂה:" 4.1. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, הֱוֵי מְמַעֵט בְּעֵסֶק, וַעֲסֹק בַּתּוֹרָה. וֶהֱוֵי שְׁפַל רוּחַ בִּפְנֵי כָל אָדָם. וְאִם בָּטַלְתָּ מִן הַתּוֹרָה, יֶשׁ לְךָ בְטֵלִים הַרְבֵּה כְנֶגְדָּךְ. וְאִם עָמַלְתָּ בַתּוֹרָה, יֶשׁ לוֹ שָׂכָר הַרְבֵּה לִתֶּן לָךְ: 4.1. בֶּן זוֹמָא אוֹמֵר, אֵיזֶהוּ חָכָם, הַלּוֹמֵד מִכָּל אָדָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים קיט) מִכָּל מְלַמְּדַי הִשְׂכַּלְתִּי כִּי עֵדְוֹתֶיךָ שִׂיחָה לִּי. אֵיזֶהוּ גִבּוֹר, הַכּוֹבֵשׁ אֶת יִצְרוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי טז) טוֹב אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם מִגִּבּוֹר וּמשֵׁל בְּרוּחוֹ מִלֹּכֵד עִיר. אֵיזֶהוּ עָשִׁיר, הַשָּׂמֵחַ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהלים קכח) יְגִיעַ כַּפֶּיךָ כִּי תֹאכֵל אַשְׁרֶיךָ וְטוֹב לָךְ. אַשְׁרֶיךָ, בָּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה. וְטוֹב לָךְ, לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. אֵיזֶהוּ מְכֻבָּד, הַמְכַבֵּד אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמואל א ב) כִּי מְכַבְּדַי אֲכַבֵּד וּבֹזַי יֵקָלּוּ: | 2.4. He used to say: do His will as though it were your will, so that He will do your will as though it were His. Set aside your will in the face of His will, so that he may set aside the will of others for the sake of your will. Hillel said: do not separate yourself from the community, Do not trust in yourself until the day of your death, Do not judge not your fellow man until you have reached his place. Do not say something that cannot be understood [trusting] that in the end it will be understood. Say not: ‘when I shall have leisure I shall study;’ perhaps you will not have leisure. 2.5. He used to say: A brute is not sin-fearing, nor is an ignorant person pious; nor can a timid person learn, nor can an impatient person teach; nor will someone who engages too much in business become wise. In a place where there are no men, strive to be a man. 3.15. Everything is foreseen yet freedom of choice is granted, And the world is judged with goodness; And everything is in accordance with the preponderance of works." 4.1. Ben Zoma said:Who is wise? He who learns from every man, as it is said: “From all who taught me have I gained understanding” (Psalms 119:99). Who is mighty? He who subdues his [evil] inclination, as it is said: “He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that rules his spirit than he that takes a city” (Proverbs 16:3). Who is rich? He who rejoices in his lot, as it is said: “You shall enjoy the fruit of your labors, you shall be happy and you shall prosper” (Psalms 128:2) “You shall be happy” in this world, “and you shall prosper” in the world to come. Who is he that is honored? He who honors his fellow human beings as it is said: “For I honor those that honor Me, but those who spurn Me shall be dishonored” (I Samuel 2:30). |
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65. Silius Italicus, Punica, 6.41-6.53 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 275 | 6.44. the distinction of the Roman vine-staff, lay there on the top of Tyres, a Nasamonian; and both were dead. He had neither spear nor sword: Fortune had robbed him of his weapons in the hard fight; yet in the unarmed contest rage found a weapon to fight with. He had fought with savage mouth, and his teeth did the work of steel, to gratify his rage. Already the nose of Tyres was torn and the eyes marred by the cruel jaws; the ears were bitten off and the head mutilated; the forehead itself was horribly gnawed, and blood streamed from the open lips; nor was Laevinus satisfied, until the breath left those champing jaws and dark death arrested the crammed mouth. While hideous valour displayed such portentous deeds, the stricken mob of fugitives were harassed meanwhile by a different fate. Covered with wounds, they slunk away along pathless tracks in the dark forests, and traversed the deserted fields all night. They were terrified by every sound, by the breeze, and by the stirring of a bird on its light wings. Sleep or peace of mind was impossible. Panicstricken, they were driven on now by fierce Mago, and now by Hannibal prancing on with relentless spear. Serranus bore a glorious name: he was the son of Regulus, whose fame ever increases with the passage of time, and of whom it will never be forgotten, that he kept faith with the faithless Carthaginians. Serranus was in the flower of his youth; but, alas, he had begun the war against Carthage with his fiither's ill-fortune, and now, sore-wounded, he sought in sad plight to return to his unhappy mother and the home he loved. |
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| 66. Plutarch, Lycurgus, 20.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
| 67. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 64.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
68. Mishnah, Eduyot, 8.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85| 8.7. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, מְקֻבָּל אֲנִי מֵרַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי, שֶׁשָּׁמַע מֵרַבּוֹ וְרַבּוֹ מֵרַבּוֹ, הֲלָכָה לְמשֶׁה מִסִּינַי, שֶׁאֵין אֵלִיָּהוּ בָא לְטַמֵּא וּלְטַהֵר, לְרַחֵק וּלְקָרֵב, אֶלָּא לְרַחֵק הַמְקֹרָבִין בִּזְרוֹעַ וּלְקָרֵב הַמְרֻחָקִין בִּזְרוֹעַ. מִשְׁפַּחַת בֵּית צְרִיפָה הָיְתָה בְעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן וְרִחֲקָהּ בֶּן צִיּוֹן בִּזְרוֹעַ, וְעוֹד אַחֶרֶת הָיְתָה שָׁם וְקֵרְבָהּ בֶּן צִיּוֹן בִּזְרוֹעַ. כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ, אֵלִיָּהוּ בָא לְטַמֵּא וּלְטַהֵר, לְרַחֵק וּלְקָרֵב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, לְקָרֵב, אֲבָל לֹא לְרַחֵק. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, לְהַשְׁווֹת הַמַּחֲלֹקֶת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, לֹא לְרַחֵק וְלֹא לְקָרֵב, אֶלָּא לַעֲשׂוֹת שָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג) הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ לָכֶם אֵת אֵלִיָּה הַנָּבִיא וְגוֹ' וְהֵשִׁיב לֵב אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים וְלֵב בָּנִים עַל אֲבוֹתָם: | 8.7. Rabbi Joshua said: I have received a tradition from Rabban Yoha ben Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher [heard it] from his teacher, as a halakhah [given] to Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near, but to put away those brought near by force and to bring near those put away by force. The family of Beth Tzriphah was on the other side of the Jordan and Ben Zion put it away by force; and yet another family was there, and Ben Zion brought it near by force. It is such as these that Elijah will come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near. Rabbi Judah says: to bring near, but not to put away. Rabbi Shimon says: to conciliate disputes. And the Sages say: neither to put away nor to bring near, but to make peace in the world, for it is said, “Behold I send to you Elijah the prophet”, etc., “and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2. |
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69. Mishnah, Peah, 2.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85| 2.6. מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁזָּרַע רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אִישׁ הַמִּצְפָּה לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְעָלוּ לְלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית וְשָׁאָלוּ. אָמַר נַחוּם הַלַּבְלָר, מְקֻבָּל אֲנִי מֵרַבִּי מְיָאשָׁא, שֶׁקִּבֵּל מֵאַבָּא, שֶׁקִּבֵּל מִן הַזּוּגוֹת, שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ מִן הַנְּבִיאִים, הֲלָכָה לְמשֶׁה מִסִּינַי, בְּזוֹרֵעַ אֶת שָׂדֵהוּ שְׁנֵי מִינֵי חִטִּין, אִם עֲשָׂאָן גֹּרֶן אַחַת, נוֹתֵן פֵּאָה אַחַת. שְׁתֵּי גְרָנוֹת, נוֹתֵן שְׁתֵּי פֵאוֹת: | 2.6. It happened that Rabbi Shimon of Mitzpah planted his field [with two different kinds] and came before Rabban Gamaliel. They both went up to the Chamber of Hewn Stone and asked [about the law]. Nahum the scribe said: I have a tradition from Rabbi Meyasha, who received it from Abba, who received it from the pairs [of sage], who received it from the prophets, a halakhah of Moses from Sinai, that one who plants his field with two species of wheat, if he makes up of it one threshing-floor, he gives only one peah, but if two threshing-floors, he gives two peahs. |
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| 70. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 2 1033c-d, 25-6 1046c-e, 1034d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 10 |
71. Mishnah, Yadayim, 4.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85| 4.3. בּוֹ בַיּוֹם אָמְרוּ, עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב, מַה הֵן בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. גָּזַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, מַעְשַׂר עָנִי. וְגָזַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. אָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, עָלֶיךָ רְאָיָה לְלַמֵּד, שֶׁאַתָּה מַחְמִיר, שֶׁכָּל הַמַּחְמִיר, עָלָיו רְאָיָה לְלַמֵּד. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָחִי, אֲנִי לֹא שִׁנִּיתִי מִסֵּדֶר הַשָּׁנִים, טַרְפוֹן אָחִי שִׁנָּה, וְעָלָיו רְאָיָה לְלַמֵּד. הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, מִצְרַיִם חוּץ לָאָרֶץ, עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב חוּץ לָאָרֶץ, מַה מִּצְרַיִם מַעְשַׂר עָנִי בַשְּׁבִיעִית, אַף עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב מַעְשַׂר עָנִי בַשְּׁבִיעִית. הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, בָּבֶל חוּץ לָאָרֶץ, עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב חוּץ לָאָרֶץ, מַה בָּבֶל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי בַשְּׁבִיעִית, אַף עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי בַשְּׁבִיעִית. אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, מִצְרַיִם שֶׁהִיא קְרוֹבָה, עֲשָׂאוּהָ מַעְשַׂר עָנִי, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ עֲנִיֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל נִסְמָכִים עָלֶיהָ בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, אַף עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב, שֶׁהֵם קְרוֹבִים, נַעֲשִׂים מַעְשַׂר עָנִי, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ עֲנִיֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל נִסְמָכִים עֲלֵיהֶם בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, הֲרֵי אַתָּה כִמְהַנָּן מָמוֹן, וְאֵין אַתָּה אֶלָּא כְמַפְסִיד נְפָשׁוֹת. קוֹבֵעַ אַתָּה אֶת הַשָּׁמַיִם מִלְּהוֹרִיד טַל וּמָטָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג), הֲיִקְבַּע אָדָם אֱלֹהִים כִּי אַתֶּם קֹבְעִים אֹתִי וַאֲמַרְתֶּם בַּמֶּה קְבַעֲנוּךָ הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְהַתְּרוּמָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, הֲרֵינִי כְמֵשִׁיב עַל טַרְפוֹן אָחִי, אֲבָל לֹא לְעִנְיַן דְּבָרָיו. מִצְרַיִם מַעֲשֶׂה חָדָשׁ, וּבָבֶל מַעֲשֶׂה יָשָׁן, וְהַנִּדּוֹן שֶׁלְּפָנֵינוּ מַעֲשֶׂה חָדָשׁ. יִדּוֹן מַעֲשֶׂה חָדָשׁ מִמַּעֲשֶׂה חָדָשׁ, וְאַל יִדּוֹן מַעֲשֶׂה חָדָשׁ מִמַּעֲשֶׂה יָשָׁן. מִצְרַיִם מַעֲשֵׂה זְקֵנִים, וּבָבֶל מַעֲשֵׂה נְבִיאִים, וְהַנִּדּוֹן שֶׁלְּפָנֵינוּ מַעֲשֵׂה זְקֵנִים. יִדּוֹן מַעֲשֵׂה זְקֵנִים מִמַּעֲשֵׂה זְקֵנִים, וְאַל יִדּוֹן מַעֲשֵׂה זְקֵנִים מִמַּעֲשֵׂה נְבִיאִים. נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ, עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב מְעַשְּׂרִין מַעְשַׂר עָנִי בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. וּכְשֶׁבָּא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן דֻּרְמַסְקִית אֵצֶל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּלוֹד, אָמַר לוֹ, מַה חִדּוּשׁ הָיָה לָכֶם בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ הַיּוֹם. אָמַר לוֹ, נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ, עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב מְעַשְּׂרִים מַעְשַׂר עָנִי בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. בָּכָה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְאָמַר, סוֹד ה' לִירֵאָיו וּבְרִיתוֹ לְהוֹדִיעָם (תהלים כה). צֵא וֶאֱמֹר לָהֶם, אַל תָּחֹשּׁוּ לְמִנְיַנְכֶם. מְקֻבָּל אֲנִי מֵרַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי, שֶׁשָּׁמַע מֵרַבּוֹ, וְרַבּוֹ מֵרַבּוֹ עַד הֲלָכָה לְמשֶׁה מִסִּינַי, שֶׁעַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב מְעַשְּׂרִין מַעְשַׂר עָנִי בַּשְּׁבִיעִית: | 4.3. On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, \"Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings\" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: \"The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covet, to make them know it\" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yoha ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. |
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72. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 10.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 98| 10.5. λογισμοὺς καθαιροῦντες καὶ πᾶν ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον κατὰ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ χριστοῦ, | |
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73. New Testament, Romans, 1.27 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 878| 1.27. ὁμοίως τε καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσιν, τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες. | 1.27. Likewise also the men, leaving the natural function of the woman, burned in their lust toward one another, men doing what is inappropriate with men, and receiving in themselves the due penalty of their error. |
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| 74. Plutarch, On The Obsolescence of Oracles, 414e, 415a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 165 |
| 75. Plutarch, On The Fortune Or Virtue of Alexander The Great, '328A (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 831 |
| 76. Plutarch, Advice To Bride And Groom, 2-3, 39 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 137 |
| 77. Tosefta, Yadayim, 2.16 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85 |
| 78. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 31 1075c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 9 |
| 79. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.1.1-1.1.2, 1.7.1, 1.8.1, 1.9.2-1.9.4, 1.12, 1.12.1-1.12.5, 1.17.1, 1.20.3, 2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.29.1, 3.3.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger •virgil, and hellenistic philosophy •hellenistic philosophy, on anger in women Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 136, 222, 284, 285 |
| 80. Juvenal, Satires, a b c d\n0 '13.22 '13.22 '13 22 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 761 |
81. Josephus Flavius, Life, 12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 330| 12. καὶ διατρίψας παρ' αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τελειώσας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑπέστρεφον. ἐννεακαιδέκατον δ' ἔτος ἔχων ἠρξάμην τε πολιτεύεσθαι τῇ Φαρισαίων αἱρέσει κατακολουθῶν, ἣ παραπλήσιός ἐστι τῇ παρ' ̔́Ελλησιν Στωϊκῇ λεγομένῃ. | |
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82. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 2.119 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 330| 2.119. Τρία γὰρ παρὰ ̓Ιουδαίοις εἴδη φιλοσοφεῖται, καὶ τοῦ μὲν αἱρετισταὶ Φαρισαῖοι, τοῦ δὲ Σαδδουκαῖοι, τρίτον δέ, ὃ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σεμνότητα ἀσκεῖν, ̓Εσσηνοὶ καλοῦνται, ̓Ιουδαῖοι μὲν γένος ὄντες, φιλάλληλοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλέον. | 2.119. 2. For there are three philosophical sects among the Jews. The followers of the first of which are the Pharisees; of the second, the Sadducees; and the third sect, which pretends to a severer discipline, are called Essenes. These last are Jews by birth, and seem to have a greater affection for one another than the other sects have. |
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83. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 10.277, 13.171-13.174, 15.371, 18.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 330, 331| 10.277. ταῦτα πάντα ἐκεῖνος θεοῦ δείξαντος αὐτῷ συγγράψας κατέλειψεν: ὥστε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα σκοποῦντας θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ τῇ παρὰ θεοῦ τιμῇ τὸν Δανίηλον καὶ τοὺς ̓Επικουρείους ἐκ τούτων εὑρίσκειν πεπλανημένους, 13.171. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τρεῖς αἱρέσεις τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων ἦσαν, αἳ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων διαφόρως ὑπελάμβανον, ὧν ἡ μὲν Φαρισαίων ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ Σαδδουκαίων, ἡ τρίτη δὲ ̓Εσσηνῶν. 13.172. οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἔργον εἶναι λέγουσιν, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνειν τε καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν ̓Εσσηνῶν γένος πάντων τὴν εἱμαρμένην κυρίαν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ μηδὲν ὃ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾶν. 13.173. Σαδδουκαῖοι δὲ τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς γινομένους καὶ τὰ χείρω παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀκριβεστέραν πεποίημαι δήλωσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βίβλῳ τῆς ̓Ιουδαϊκῆς πραγματείας. 15.371. ἀφείθησαν δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ̓Εσσαῖοι καλούμενοι: γένος δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν διαίτῃ χρώμενον τῇ παρ' ̔́Ελλησιν ὑπὸ Πυθαγόρου καταδεδειγμένῃ. 18.12. Οἵ τε γὰρ Φαρισαῖοι τὴν δίαιταν ἐξευτελίζουσιν οὐδὲν ἐς τὸ μαλακώτερον ἐνδιδόντες, ὧν τε ὁ λόγος κρίνας παρέδωκεν ἀγαθῶν ἕπονται τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ περιμάχητον ἡγούμενοι τὴν φυλακὴν ὧν ὑπαγορεύειν ἠθέλησεν. τιμῆς γε τοῖς ἡλικίᾳ προήκουσιν παραχωροῦσιν οὐδ' ἐπ' ἀντιλέξει τῶν εἰσηγηθέντων ταῦτα οἱ θράσει ἐπαιρόμενοι. 18.12. Οὐιτέλλιος δὲ παρασκευασάμενος ὡς εἰς πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς ̓Αρέταν δυσὶ τάγμασιν ὁπλιτῶν ὅσοι τε περὶ αὐτὰ ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππεῖς συμμαχοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ ̔Ρωμαίοις βασιλειῶν ἀγόμενος, ἐπὶ τῆς Πέτρας ἠπείγετο καὶ ἔσχε Πτολεμαί̈δα. | 10.277. All these things did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him, insomuch that such as read his prophecies, and see how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honor wherewith God honored Daniel; and may thence discover how the Epicureans are in an error, 13.171. 9. At this time there were three sects among the Jews, who had different opinions concerning human actions; the one was called the sect of the Pharisees, another the sect of the Sadducees, and the other the sect of the Essenes. 13.172. Now for the Pharisees, they say that some actions, but not all, are the work of fate, and some of them are in our own power, and that they are liable to fate, but are not caused by fate. But the sect of the Essenes affirm, that fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination. 13.173. And for the Sadducees, they take away fate, and say there is no such thing, and that the events of human affairs are not at its disposal; but they suppose that all our actions are in our own power, so that we are ourselves the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from our own folly. However, I have given a more exact account of these opinions in the second book of the Jewish War. 15.371. The Essenes also, as we call a sect of ours, were excused from this imposition. These men live the same kind of life as do those whom the Greeks call Pythagoreans, concerning whom I shall discourse more fully elsewhere. 18.12. 3. Now, for the Pharisees, they live meanly, and despise delicacies in diet; and they follow the conduct of reason; and what that prescribes to them as good for them they do; and they think they ought earnestly to strive to observe reason’s dictates for practice. They also pay a respect to such as are in years; nor are they so bold as to contradict them in any thing which they have introduced; 18.12. 3. So Vitellius prepared to make war with Aretas, having with him two legions of armed men; he also took with him all those of light armature, and of the horsemen which belonged to them, and were drawn out of those kingdoms which were under the Romans, and made haste for Petra, and came to Ptolemais. |
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84. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.2, 1.15.3, 1.28.10, 1.29.4, 2.1, 2.5.19-2.5.21, 2.9.1, 2.13.20, 2.18.15-2.18.19, 3.2.1, 3.25.1-3.25.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of •hellenistic philosophy, ideas about anger •virgil, and hellenistic philosophy Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 212; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 15, 33, 36, 37, 38 | 1.2. To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational. But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. But this, you say, would not be worthy of me. Well then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices. For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero’s spectacles, and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go down: and when Florus asked Agrippinus, Why do not you go down? Agrippinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or pleasure? I say pleasure. But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. Why? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple, that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple? Priscus Helvidius also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in. Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow. What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more. In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton’s school. Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations. Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. But I will take off your head? If that will do you any good, take it off. Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree. 2.1. THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do every thing both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind: if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so. We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding what he chooses: but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet who said Not death is evil, but a shameful death. Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness and indifference. These things Socrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will he separated afterwards. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open: if it does, bear (with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we have no trouble. What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: courageous in that which does not depend on your will; cautious in that which does depend on it. Well have I not read to you, and do you not know what I was doing? In what? In my little dissertations. —Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ); and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid: but as to these long and labored sentences you will take them and blot them out. What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so much?—But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon con. sequences. And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show, and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllogisms: do you labour at thinking about death, chains, the rack, exile; and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous: courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will. |
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| 85. Lucian, Menippus, Or Descent Into Hades, '21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 831 |
| 86. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 8.2 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
| 87. Philostratus The Athenian, Lives of The Sophists, 8.2 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism / hellenistic world, schools of philosophy Found in books: Petersen and van Kooten, Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (2017) 259 |
88. Tertullian, Apology, 47, 46 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 | 46. We have sufficiently met, as I think, the accusation of the various crimes on the ground of which these fierce demands are made for Christian blood. We have made a full exhibition of our case; and we have shown you how we are able to prove that our statement is correct, from the trustworthiness, I mean, and antiquity of our sacred writings, and from the confession likewise of the powers of spiritual wickedness themselves. Who will venture to undertake our refutation; not with skill of words, but, as we have managed our demonstration, on the basis of reality? But while the truth we hold is made clear to all, unbelief meanwhile, at the very time it is convinced of the worth of Christianity, which has now become well known for its benefits as well as from the intercourse of life, takes up the notion that it is not really a thing divine, but rather a kind of philosophy. These are the very things, it says, the philosophers counsel and profess - innocence, justice, patience, sobriety, chastity. Why, then, are we not permitted an equal liberty and impunity for our doctrines as they have, with whom, in respect of what we teach, we are compared? Or why are not they, as so like us, not pressed to the same offices, for declining which our lives are imperilled? For who compels a philosopher to sacrifice or take an oath, or put out useless lamps at midday? Nay, they openly overthrow your gods, and in their writings they attack your superstitions; and you applaud them for it. Many of them even, with your countece, bark out against your rulers, and are rewarded with statues and salaries, instead of being given to the wild beasts. And very right it should be so. For they are called philosophers, not Christians. This name of philosopher has no power to put demons to the rout. Why are they not able to do that too? Since philosophers count demons inferior to gods. Socrates used to say, If the demon grant permission. Yet he, too, though in denying the existence of your divinities he had a glimpse of the truth, at his dying ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Æsculapius, I believe in honour of his father, for Apollo pronounced Socrates the wisest of men. Thoughtless Apollo! Testifying to the wisdom of the man who denied the existence of his race. In proportion to the enmity the truth awakens, you give offense by faithfully standing by it; but the man who corrupts and makes a mere pretence of it precisely on this ground gains favour with its persecutors. The truth which philosophers, these mockers and corrupters of it, with hostile ends merely affect to hold, and in doing so deprave, caring for nought but glory, Christians both intensely and intimately long for and maintain in its integrity, as those who have a real concern about their salvation. So that we are like each other neither in our knowledge nor our ways, as you imagine. For what certain information did Thales, the first of natural philosophers, give in reply to the inquiry of Crœsus regarding Deity, the delay for further thought so often proving in vain? There is not a Christian workman but finds out God, and manifests Him, and hence assigns to Him all those attributes which go to constitute a divine being, though Plato affirms that it is far from easy to discover the Maker of the universe; and when He is found, it is difficult to make Him known to all. But if we challenge you to comparison in the virtue of chastity, I turn to a part of the sentence passed by the Athenians against Socrates, who was pronounced a corrupter of youth. The Christian confines himself to the female sex. I have read also how the harlot Phryne kindled in Diogenes the fires of lust, and how a certain Speusippus, of Plato's school, perished in the adulterous act. The Christian husband has nothing to do with any but his own wife. Democritus, in putting out his eyes, because he could not look on women without lusting after them, and was pained if his passion was not satisfied, owns plainly, by the punishment he inflicts, his incontinence. But a Christian with grace-healed eyes is sightless in this matter; he is mentally blind against the assaults of passion. If I maintain our superior modesty of behaviour, there at once occurs to me Diogenes with filth-covered feet trampling on the proud couches of Plato, under the influence of another pride: the Christian does not even play the proud man to the pauper. If sobriety of spirit be the virtue in debate, why, there are Pythagoras at Thurii, and Zeno at Priene, ambitious of the supreme power: the Christian does not aspire to the dileship. If equanimity be the contention, you have Lycurgus choosing death by self-starvation, because the Lacons had made some emendation of his laws: the Christian, even when he is condemned, gives thanks. If the comparison be made in regard to trustworthiness, Anaxagoras denied the deposit of his enemies: the Christian is noted for his fidelity even among those who are not of his religion. If the matter of sincerity is to be brought to trial, Aristotle basely thrust his friend Hermias from his place: the Christian does no harm even to his foe. With equal baseness does Aristotle play the sycophant to Alexander, instead of exercising to keep him in the right way, and Plato allows himself to be bought by Dionysius for his belly's sake. Aristippus in the purple, with all his great show of gravity, gives way to extravagance; and Hippias is put to death laying plots against the state: no Christian ever attempted such a thing in behalf of his brethren, even when persecution was scattering them abroad with every atrocity. But it will be said that some of us, too, depart from the rules of our discipline. In that case, however, we count them no longer Christians; but the philosophers who do such things retain still the name and the honour of wisdom. So, then, where is there any likeness between the Christian and the philosopher? Between the disciple of Greece and of heaven? Between the man whose object is fame, and whose object is life? Between the talker and the doer? Between the man who builds up and the man who pulls down? Between the friend and the foe of error? Between one who corrupts the truth, and one who restores and teaches it? Between its chief and its custodier? |
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| 89. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.44-9.47, 11.168-11.215 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 25; Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 7 |
| 90. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, '7.5, 1.3, 1.4, 1.xx; (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 91. Lucian, The Runaways, '15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 831 |
| 92. Chariton, Chaereas And Callirhoe, 1.1.3, 6.5.8, 7.1.8 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, philosophy, peripatetic philosophy heroic code •hellenistic philosophy, on anger in women Found in books: Braund and Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004) 136, 174 |
| 93. Athenagoras, Apology Or Embassy For The Christians, a b c d\n0 '7.2 '7.2 '7 2\n1 '5.1 '5.1 '5 1\n2 '2.5 '2.5 '2 5\n3 24.1 24.1 24 1\n4 24.2 24.2 24 2\n5 '23.2 '23.2 '23 2\n6 '10 '10 '10 None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 94. Athenagoras, The Resurrection of The Dead, a b c d\n0 '1.3 '1.3 '1 3\n1 '7.4 '7.4 '7 4\n2 '9.2 '9.2 '9 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 95. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, a b c d\n0 8.5 8.5 8 5\n1 '6.5.41 '6.5.41 '6 5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 831 |
| 96. Galen, On My [His] Own Books, 2 (4.741, 10 k.) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 97. Lucian, Demonax, 44176 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 831 |
| 98. Lucian, The Passing of Peregrinus, '13 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 99. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, a b c d\n0 '2.2 '2.2 '2 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 100. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, a b c d\n0 '11.3.1 '11.3.1 '11 3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
| 101. Babylonian Talmud, Menachot, 32a (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85 |
102. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, 30b-31a, 89b (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85 89b. שפרו ורבו עליה ישראל מדבר סיני שירדה שנאה לעכו"ם עליו ומה שמו חורב שמו ופליגא דר' אבהו דא"ר אבהו הר סיני שמו ולמה נקרא הר חורב שירדה חורבה לעכו"ם עליו:,מנין שקושרין לשון של זהורית וכו': כשנים כשני מיבעי ליה א"ר יצחק אמר להם הקב"ה לישראל אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים הללו שסדורות ובאות מששת ימי בראשית ועד עכשיו כשלג ילבינו: דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (ישעיה א, יח) לכו נא ונוכחה יאמר ה' לכו נא בואו נא מיבעי ליה יאמר ה' אמר ה' מיבעי ליה לעתיד לבא יאמר להם הקב"ה לישראל לכו נא אצל אבותיכם ויוכיחו אתכם,ויאמרו לפניו רבש"ע אצל מי נלך אצל אברהם שאמרת לו (בראשית טו, יג) ידוע תדע ולא בקש רחמים עלינו אצל יצחק שבירך את עשו (שם כז, מ) והיה כאשר תריד ולא בקש רחמים עלינו אצל יעקב שאמרת לו (שם מו, ד) אנכי ארד עמך מצרימה ולא בקש רחמים עלינו אצל מי נלך עכשיו יאמר ה' אמר להן הקב"ה הואיל ותליתם עצמכם בי אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים כשלג ילבינו:,א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן מ"ד (ישעיה סג, טז) כי אתה אבינו כי אברהם לא ידענו וישראל לא יכירנו אתה ה' אבינו גואלנו מעולם שמך לעתיד לבא יאמר לו הקב"ה לאברהם בניך חטאו לי אמר לפניו רבש"ע ימחו על קדושת שמך אמר אימר ליה ליעקב דהוה ליה צער גידול בנים אפשר דבעי רחמי עלייהו אמר ליה בניך חטאו אמר לפניו רבש"ע ימחו על קדושת שמך אמר לא בסבי טעמא ולא בדרדקי עצה אמר לו ליצחק בניך חטאו לי אמר לפניו רבש"ע בני ולא בניך בשעה שהקדימו לפניך נעשה לנשמע קראת להם (שמות ד, כב) בני בכורי עכשיו בני ולא בניך,ועוד כמה חטאו כמה שנותיו של אדם שבעים שנה דל עשרין דלא ענשת עלייהו פשו להו חמשין דל כ"ה דלילותא פשו להו כ"ה דל תרתי סרי ופלגא דצלויי ומיכל ודבית הכסא פשו להו תרתי סרי ופלגא אם אתה סובל את כולם מוטב ואם לאו פלגא עלי ופלגא עליך ואת"ל כולם עלי הא קריבית נפשי קמך פתחו ואמרו (כי) אתה אבינו אמר להם יצחק עד שאתם מקלסין לי קלסו להקב"ה ומחוי להו יצחק הקב"ה בעינייהו מיד נשאו עיניהם למרום ואומרים (ישעיה סג, טז) אתה ה' אבינו גואלנו מעולם שמך,א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן ראוי היה יעקב אבינו לירד למצרים בשלשלאות של ברזל אלא שזכותו גרמה לו דכתיב (הושע יא, ד) בחבלי אדם אמשכם בעבותות אהבה ואהיה להם כמרימי עול על לחיהם ואט אליו אוכיל:,| 89b. because the Jewish people were fruitful [paru] and multiplied in it; the Sinai Desert, because hatred descended upon the nations of the world on it, on the mountain on which the Jewish people received the Torah. And what is the mountain’s true name? Horeb is its name. And that disputes the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said: Mount Sinai is its name. And why is it called Mount Horeb? It is because destruction [ḥurba] of the nations of the world descended upon it.,We learned in the mishna: From where is it derived that one ties a scarlet strip of wool to the scapegoat? As it says: “If your sins be like scarlet [kashanim], they will become white like snow” (Isaiah 1:18). The Gemara wonders at this: Why does the verse use the plural form: Kashanim? It should have used the singular form: Kashani. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: Even if your sins are as numerous as those years [kashanim] that have proceeded continuously from the six days of Creation until now, they will become white like snow. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Go please and let us reason together, the Lord will say” (Isaiah 1:18)? Why does the verse say: Go please? It should have said: Come please. And why does the verse say: The Lord will say? The prophet’s message is based on something that God already said. Therefore, the verse should have said: God said. Rather, the explanation of this verse is that in the future that will surely come, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will say to the Jewish people: Go please to your Patriarchs, and they will rebuke you.,And the Jewish people will say before Him: Master of the Universe, to whom shall we go? Shall we go to Abraham, to whom You said: “Know certainly that your seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years” (Genesis 15:13), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf? Or perhaps we should go to Isaac, who blessed Esau and said: “And it shall come to pass when you shall break loose, that you shall shake his yoke from off your neck” (Genesis 27:40), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf. Or perhaps we should go to Jacob, to whom You said: “I will go down to Egypt with you” (Genesis 46:4), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf. And if so, to whom shall we go? Shall we go to our Patriarchs, who do not have mercy on us? Rather, now God Himself says what punishment we deserve. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Since you made yourselves dependent on Me, “If your sins be like scarlet, they will become white like snow.”,Apropos the Jewish people assessing their forefathers, the Gemara cites a related teaching. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For You are our Father; for Abraham knows us not, and Israel does not acknowledge us; You, Lord, are our Father, our Redeemer, everlasting is Your name” (Isaiah 63:16). In the future that will surely come, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will say to Abraham: Your children have sinned against Me. Abraham will say before Him: Master of the Universe, if so, let them be eradicated to sanctify Your name. God said: I will say it to Jacob. Since he experienced the pain of raising children, perhaps he will ask for mercy on their behalf. He said to Jacob: Your children have sinned. Jacob said before Him: Master of the Universe, if so, let them be eradicated to sanctify Your name. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: There is no reason in elders and no wisdom in youth. Neither Abraham nor Jacob knew how to respond properly. He said to Isaac: Your children have sinned against Me. Isaac said before Him: Master of the Universe, are they my children and not Your children? At Sinai, when they accorded precedence to “We will do” over “We will listen” before You, didn’t You call them, “My son, My firstborn son Israel” (Exodus 4:22)? Now that they have sinned, are they my children and not Your children?,And furthermore, how much did they actually sin? How long is a person’s life? Seventy years. Subtract the first twenty years of his life. One is not punished for sins committed then, as in heavenly matters, a person is only punished from age twenty. Fifty years remain for them. Subtract twenty-five years of nights, and twenty-five years remain for them. Subtract twelve and a half years during which one prays and eats and uses the bathroom, and twelve and a half years remain for them. If You can endure them all and forgive the sins committed during those years, excellent. And if not, half of the sins are upon me to bear and half upon You. And if You say that all of them, the sins of all twelve and a half years that remain, are upon me, I sacrificed my soul before You and You should forgive them due to my merit. The Jewish people began to say to Isaac: You are our father. Only Isaac defended the Jewish people as a father would and displayed compassion toward his children. Isaac said to them: Before you praise me, praise the Holy One, Blessed be He. And Isaac points to the Holy One, Blessed be He, before their eyes. Immediately they lifted their eyes to the heavens and say: “You, Lord, are our Father, our Redeemer, everlasting is Your name.”,And since the Gemara mentioned Jacob’s descent to Egypt, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥa said: Our father Jacob should have gone down to Egypt in iron chains as would an exile against his will, as decreed by God and related to Abraham. However, his merit caused him to descend without suffering, as it is written: “I drew them with cords of man, with bands of love, and I was to them as they that take off the yoke on their jaws, and I fed them gently” (Hosea 11:4).,halakhot of Shabbat, this mishna resumes treatment of the halakhot of carrying from domain to domain on Shabbat. One who carries out wood on Shabbat is liable for a measure equivalent to the amount of wood necessary to cook an easily cooked egg. The measure that determines liability for carrying out spices is equivalent to that which is used to season an easily cooked egg. And all types of spices join together with one another to constitute the measure for liability. The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, pomegranate peels, safflower, and madder, which are used to produce dyes, is equivalent to the amount that is used to dye a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out urine, natron, and borit, cimolian earth [Kimoleya], and potash, all of which are abrasive materials used for laundry, is equivalent to the amount that is used to launder a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. And Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure that determines liability for these materials is equivalent to that which is used to remove a stain.,we already learn it once? As we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, or if it was fragmented, the measure that determines its liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an egg most easily cooked, one that is already beaten and placed in a stew pot. The measure of firewood is clearly delineated. The Gemara answers: Still, this mishna is necessary. You might have said: There, the measure of the crushed reed reflects the fact that it is not suitable for anything other than kindling. However, regarding wood that is suitable to be used as a tooth of a key [aklida], the measure that determines its liability should be even any small amount. Therefore, it teaches us that wood is typically designated for burning, and that determines the measure for liability for carrying out wood on Shabbat.,We learned in the mishna that all types of spices join together with one another to constitute the measure equivalent to that which is used to season an easily cooked egg. The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which we learned elsewhere: Spices, which are prohibited due to two or three different prohibitions, e.g., one is prohibited due to orla, and one due to the prohibition of untithed produce, and they were all of a single species (Tosafot), or if they were of three different species, are prohibited, and they join together with each other to constitute a complete measure. And Ḥizkiya said: | |
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103. Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim, 24a (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85| 24a. ואם אינו ענין לאכילה תנהו ענין לאיסור הנאה,אי מה כאן בשריפה אף כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה אמר קרא (ויקרא ו, כג) בקדש באש תשרף בקדש בשריפה ואין כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה,והאי בקדש באש תשרף להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדרבי שמעון דתניא רבי שמעון אומר בקדש באש תשרף לימד על חטאת ששורפין אותה בקדש ואין לי אלא זו בלבד פסולי קדשי קדשים ואמורי קדשים קלים מנין תלמוד לומר (וכל) בקדש באש תשרף,אמר ליה רבי יונתן רבך מהאי קרא קאמר לה (שמות כט, לד) ואם יותר מבשר המלואים ומן הלחם עד הבקר וגו' שאין תלמוד לומר לא יאכל ומה תלמוד לומר לא יאכל אם אינו ענין לגופיה דהא כתיב (שמות כט, לד) ושרפת את הנותר באש תנהו ענין לשאר איסורין שבתורה ואם אינו ענין לאכילה תנהו ענין לאיסור הנאה,אי מה כאן בשריפה אף כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה אמר קרא ושרפת את הנותר נותר בשריפה ואין כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה,והאי לא יאכל להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדרבי אלעזר דאמר ר' אלעזר לא יאכל כי קדש הוא כל שבקדש פסול בא הכתוב ליתן לא תעשה על אכילתו,אמר אביי לעולם מקרא קמא ואיפוך דליכתוב באש תשרף ולא בעי לא תאכל מה תלמוד לומר לא תאכל אם אינו ענין לגופו דנפקא ליה מדרבי אלעזר תנהו ענין לכל איסורין שבתורה ואם אינו ענין לאכילה תנהו ענין לאיסור הנאה,אי מה כאן בשריפה אף כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה אמר קרא הנותר הנותר בשריפה ואין כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה,אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי ואימא ליחודי ליה לאו לגופיה הוא דאתא דאי מדרבי אלעזר אין לוקין על לאו שבכללות,אלא אמר רב פפא מהכא (ויקרא ז, יט) והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל באש ישרף שאין תלמוד לומר לא יאכל מה תלמוד לומר לא יאכל,אם אינו ענין לגופו דהא נפקא ליה מקל וחומר ממעשר הקל ומה מעשר הקל אמרה תורה (דברים כו, יד) לא בערתי ממנו בטמא בשר קדש חמור לא כל שכן,וכי תימא אין מזהירין מן הדין הקישא הוא דכתיב (דברים יב, יז) לא תוכל לאכול בשעריך מעשר דגנך תירושך ויצהרך ובכורות בקרך וגו',מה תלמוד לומר לא יאכל אם אינו ענין לגופו תנהו ענין לכל איסורין שבתורה ואם אינו ענין לאכילה תנהו ענין להנאה,אי מה כאן בשריפה אף כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה אמר קרא הנותר הנותר בשריפה ואין כל איסורין שבתורה בשריפה,אמר לי' רבינא לרב אשי ואימא לעבור עליו בשני לאוין לאו מי אמר אביי אכל פוטיתא לוקה ארבע,נמלה לוקה חמש | 24a. And if it does not apply to the matter of the prohibition against eating, as the prohibition against eating these items has already been mentioned, apply it to the matter of the prohibition of deriving benefit.,The Gemara continues: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the sin-offering is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that only that which is disqualified in the sacred place is disposed of with burning, but all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani asked: And did this verse: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire,” come to teach this halakha? It is needed to teach in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire”; this taught that one must burn a disqualified sin-offering in the sacred place, and not outside the Temple. And I have only derived this, meaning the sin-offering. From where do I derive that disqualified offerings of the most sacred order and portions consumed on the altar, such as the fats of offerings of minor sanctity that become impure, are burned in the Temple courtyard? The verse states: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire.” This indicates that any disqualified offering must be burned in the sacred place.,The Sage who taught this halakha to Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said to him: Rabbi Yonatan, your teacher, said that same halakha from this verse: “And if the flesh of the consecration offering, or of the bread, remains until the morning, then you shall burn the leftover with fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall not be eaten,” what is the meaning when the verse states: “It shall not be eaten”? If it does not refer to the subject matter itself, as it is already written explicitly: “Then you shall burn the leftover with fire,” which indicates that one may not eat it, refer it to the matter of the other prohibitions in the Torah. And if it does not refer to the matter of the prohibition against eating, as eating these items is explicitly prohibited, refer it to the matter of the prohibition of deriving benefit. This indicates that it is prohibited for one to derive benefit from any item that it is prohibited for him to eat.,The Gemara continues: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the sin-offering is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah, from which one may not benefit, must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “You shall burn the leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibitions in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning, despite the fact that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them.,The Gemara challenges: And did this phrase: “It shall not be eaten,” come to teach this prohibition against deriving benefit? This phrase is needed to teach in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said with regard to the statement in the verse: “It shall not be eaten, because it is sacred,” that the verse comes to place a negative mitzva of eating on whatever has been rendered disqualified in the sacred place. In other words, this verse teaches a general halakha that one who eats from offerings that have been disqualified in the Temple transgresses a negative mitzva and is liable to be flogged. It teaches nothing with regard to a prohibition against deriving benefit.,Abaye said: Actually, derive this halakha from the first verse cited by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: “And any sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the tent of meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). And reverse the construct of his exposition. Let the verse write: “It shall be burnt with fire,” and it will not need to write: “Shall not be eaten.” For what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall not be eaten”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself, as that was already derived from the statement of Rabbi Elazar that whatever has been rendered disqualified in the sacred place may not be eaten, apply it to all other prohibitions in the Torah, including leavened bread on Passover and a stoned ox. And if it does not apply to the prohibition against eating, which is written explicitly, then apply it to the prohibition of deriving benefit.,The Gemara asks: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the leftover sacrificial meat is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah, from which one may not benefit, must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “You shall burn the leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning.,Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And why do you hold that the phrase: “You shall not eat,” describing the sin-offering that was sacrificed inside the Sanctuary, is not needed for other purposes? Say that this expression comes in order to designate a negative mitzva for this prohibition itself. As, if this prohibition were derived only from the source quoted by Rabbi Elazar, there will be a prohibition to eat the meat of the sin-offering whose blood was brought into the sanctuary; however, one would not be liable to be flogged for violating it, because one is not flogged for violating a negative mitzva stated in general terms. One is not flogged for violating a negative mitzva that contains several different prohibitions, such as this one, which refers to all disqualified offerings. This is because the negative mitzva is formulated too broadly. Therefore, it is possible to say that when the Torah states: “You shall not eat” with regard to this issue, it is teaching that there is a particular prohibition here and that one is flogged for violating it. If so, the verse cannot indicate a general prohibition against deriving benefit.,Rather, this suggestion should be rejected, and Rav Pappa said that one derives this halakha from here: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire. And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall not be eaten,” what does it mean when the verse states: “It shall not be eaten”?,If it does not refer to the subject matter itself, as that can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the second tithe, the halakhot of which are more lenient than those of offerings, then it must refer to something else. As it is possible to say: If with regard to the second tithe, which is more lenient because it does not have the status of an offering, the Torah said that when one recites the confession over the tithes, when destroying the tithes remaining in one’s possession that had not yet been given to the appropriate recipient, he says: “I have not eaten from it in my mourning, neither have I removed it while impure” (Deuteronomy 26:14), indicating that it is prohibited for one to remove tithes while impure, then with regard to consecrated meat, which is more stringent, all the more so is it not clear that it may not be eaten while a person is impure?,And if you say that there is a general principle that we do not warn, i.e., we may not deduce a prohibition, through logical derivation alone, then one could respond that his issue is not only derived through an a fortiori inference; rather, it is also derived from an analogy based on a juxtaposition. As it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows which you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). Since the verse itself juxtaposes tithes to offerings, it indicates that there is a prohibition with regard to offerings just as there is with regard to tithes.,The Gemara continues explaining Rav Pappa’s opinion: For what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall not be eaten” with regard to impure consecrated meat? If it does not apply to the subject matter of this verse itself, as that prohibition is derived from the second tithe, then apply it to the matter of all prohibited items in the Torah. And if it does not apply to the prohibition against eating, since that is clear, apply it to the prohibition of deriving benefit.,And if you say: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the meat that became impure in the Temple is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “The leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning.,Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And say that this expression: “It shall not be eaten,” comes to teach not the prohibition against deriving benefit, but rather that one who transgresses this negative mitzva violates two prohibitions. And there is precedent for such an explanation, as didn’t Abaye say with regard to a parallel case: If one ate a small water creature [putita], he is flogged with four sets of lashes because one violates four prohibitions when eating such a creature? Two of these prohibitions are found in the verse that discusses all types of creeping animals: “You shall not make yourselves detestable with any swarming thing that swarms, neither shall you make yourselves impure with them, that you should be defiled by them” (Leviticus 11:43). A third prohibition applies to creeping animals that live in the water, as the verses say: “And all that have neither fins nor scales…They shall be a detestable thing unto you; you shall not eat of their flesh” (Leviticus 11:10–11). A fourth prohibition is cited in the verse: “And whatever does not have fins and scales you shall not eat; it is impure unto you” (Deuteronomy 14:10).,Similarly, if one ate an ant, he is flogged with five sets of lashes, two sets for the previously mentioned prohibitions of eating a creeping animal, a third based on the verse: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41), and a fourth based on the verse: “All creeping things that swarm upon the earth, them you shall not eat; for they are a detestable thing” (Leviticus 11:42). A fifth prohibition is stated in the verse: “You shall not make yourselves impure through every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth” (Leviticus 11:44). |
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104. Babylonian Talmud, Niddah, 16b (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenism/hellenistic culture, philosophy and philosophical schools Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 331 16b. | 16b. the Sages taught in a baraita: Even though the Sages said with regard to one who engages in intercourse by the light of a lamp, that this is disgraceful, Beit Shammai say: A woman is required to examine herself with two cloths, once before and once after each act of intercourse, or she must engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. And Beit Hillel say: It is sufficient for her to examine herself with two cloths throughout the night, once before the first act of intercourse and once after the final act of intercourse.,It is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement that a woman may engage in intercourse several times in one night without an examination between each act of intercourse, let us be concerned lest she will see, i.e., emit, a drop of blood the size of a mustard seed during the first act of intercourse, and will thereby become impure, and semen from the second act of intercourse will cover it. Since the examination after the last act of intercourse will not reveal the drop of blood, the woman will erroneously think she is pure.,Beit Hillel said to them in response: Even according to your statement, let us be concerned that while the saliva was still in the mouth, i.e., while the blood was in her vagina, perhaps it was squashed and disappeared. Even if she examines herself after each act of intercourse, as mandated by Beit Shammai, it is possible that the semen of that act covered the blood, and it will not be revealed by the examination.,Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: One cannot compare the two situations, as a squashed drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse once is not similar to a squashed drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse twice, and therefore our concern is more reasonable.,It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said: I see as correct the statement of Beit Shammai in this case. His students said to him: Our teacher, how you have weighed [he’erakhta] us down with this stringent ruling. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: It is preferable that I weigh you down in this world, so that you do not sin by engaging in prohibited intercourse, i.e., so that your days in the World-to-Come will be lengthened [sheya’arikhu].,§ Rabbi Zeira says: From the statements of all of them, i.e., both Beit Shammai, who permit engaging in intercourse a second time only after an examination, and Beit Hillel, who rule that the second examination must be performed only after the final act of intercourse of the night, we can learn that their dispute relates only to that which is permitted after the fact. But a pious person [ba’al nefesh] should not engage in intercourse and repeat his act without an examination between each act.,Rava says: Even a pious person may engage in intercourse and repeat the act without an examination in between, as when that baraita is taught, it is referring to a woman who handles pure items. But with regard to intercourse with her husband, there is no cause for concern.,This opinion is also taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that a woman must examine herself before and after every act of intercourse according to Beit Shammai, or before the first act and after the last act, according to Beit Hillel? It was said with regard to a woman who handles pure items; but a woman is permitted to her husband even without any examination, and he is not required to ask her if she is pure. But in what case is this lenient statement said? When her husband traveled and left her with the presumptive status of ritual purity. But if he left her with the presumptive status of ritual impurity, she remains forever in her presumptive status of impurity until she says to him: I am pure.,§ Rabbi Abba says that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: If a woman examined herself at night with a cloth, and the cloth was then immediately lost, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse again until she examines herself with another cloth, as perhaps there was blood on the cloth that was lost. Rabbi Ila objects to this: If this cloth were intact, i.e., if it were not lost, couldn’t this woman engage in intercourse with her husband that night, on the basis that she will examine the cloth only the following day, and isn’t this the halakha even though she does not know at the time of intercourse whether there is blood on the cloth? Now too, although the cloth is lost, let her engage in intercourse with her husband.,Rava said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as when the cloth is intact, this woman’s proof exists, and if she discovers on the following day that she was impure they will be obligated to bring sin offerings for engaging in intercourse in a state of ritual impurity. But with regard to that woman who lost her cloth, her proof does not exist, and therefore they will never know if they require atonement.,§ Rabbi Yoḥa says: It is prohibited for a person to engage in intercourse by day. Rav Hamnuna says: What is the verse from which this is derived? As it is stated: “Let the day perish on which I was born, and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child” (Job 3:3). It is derived from here that nighttime is meant for conception, but daytime is not meant for conception. Reish Lakish says that the proof is from here: “But he who despises his ways shall die” (Proverbs 19:16). One might see something unpleasing in his wife in the daylight and come to despise her.,The Gemara asks: And how does Reish Lakish interpret this verse cited by Rabbi Yoḥa? The Gemara answers that he requires that verse for that which Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa interpreted that verse in the following manner: That angel that is appointed over conception is called: Night. And that angel takes the drop of semen from which a person will be formed and presents it before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and says before Him: Master of the Universe, what will be of this drop? Will the person fashioned from it be mighty or weak? Will he be clever or stupid? Will he be wealthy or poor?,The Gemara notes: But this angel does not say: Will he be wicked or righteous? This is in accordance with a statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hand of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven. People have free will to serve God or not, as it is stated: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10:12). The fact that God asks of the Jewish people to fear Him indicates that it is a person’s choice to do so.,The Gemara explains: And Rabbi Yoḥa derives two halakhot from the verse “and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child,” as he holds as follows: If so, i.e., if it is referring only to the statement of the angel, let the verse write: And the night that said: A man-child is conceived. What is the meaning of: “Conceived is a man-child”? It is derived from the juxtaposition of the word “night” and the word “conceived” that nighttime is meant for conception but daytime is not meant for conception.,The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥa, how does he interpret that verse cited by Reish Lakish? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥa requires that verse: “But he who despises his ways shall die,” to teach that which is written in the book of ben Sira: Three people I have hated, and a fourth I have not loved: A minister who frequents [hanirgal] drinking houses, as he disgraces himself and leads himself to ruin and death; and some say a different version of the text: A minister who chats [hanirgan] in drinking houses; and some say a third version: A minister who is short-tempered [hanirgaz] when in drinking houses.,That is the first that he hated. And the others are one who dwells at the highest point of the city, where everyone sees him; and one who holds his penis and urinates. And the fourth, whom he has not loved, is one who enters the house of another suddenly, without warning. Rabbi Yoḥa says: And this includes even one who comes into his own house without prior warning, as the members of his household might be engaged in private activities.,The Gemara cites a similar saying. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Four matters the Holy One, Blessed be He, hates, and I do not love them, and they are: One who enters his house suddenly, and needless to say one who suddenly enters the house of another; and one who holds his penis and urinates; | |
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| 105. Origen, Against Celsus, a b c d\n0 '3.75 '3.75 '3 75\n1 '1.9 '1.9 '1 9\n2 4.14.25 4.14.25 4 14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
106. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, a b c d\n0 7.166 7.166 7 166\n1 9.61 9.61 9 61\n2 9.64 9.64 9 64\n3 7.86 7.86 7 86\n4 10.118 10.118 10 118\n5 7.85 7.85 7 85\n6 7.33 7.33 7 33\n7 7.32 7.32 7 32\n8 7.27 7.27 7 27\n9 4.17 4.17 4 17\n10 2.95 2.95 2 95\n11 7.101 7.101 7 101\n12 7.102 7.102 7 102\n13 7.103 7.103 7 103\n14 7.15 7.15 7 15\n15 7.8 7.8 7 8\n16 6.87 6.87 6 87\n17 7.26 7.26 7 26\n18 7.7 7.7 7 7\n19 7.9 7.9 7 9\n20 7.29 7.29 7 29\n21 2.66 2.66 2 66\n22 7.3 7.3 7 3\n23 2.115 2.115 2 115\n24 '1.18 '1.18 '1 18 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 19 | 7.166. He is said to have had many admirers when a boy; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he compelled Herillus to have his head shaved, which disgusted them.His books are the following:of Training.of the Passions.Concerning Opinion or Belief.The Legislator.The Obstetrician.The Challenger.The Teacher.The Reviser.The Controller.Hermes.Medea.Dialogues.Ethical Themes. |
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107. Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah, 3a (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85| 3a. חייב בשמחה ואת שאינו לא שומע ולא מדבר ושוטה וקטן פטורין אף מן השמחה הואיל ופטורין מכל מצות האמורות בתורה מאי שנא לענין ראיה דפטירי ומאי שנא לענין שמחה דמחייבי,לענין ראיה גמר ראיה ראיה מהקהל דכתיב (דברים לא, יב) הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף וכתיב (דברים לא, יא) בבא כל ישראל לראות,והתם מנלן דכתיב (דברים לא, יב) למען ישמעו ולמען ילמדו ותניא למען ישמעו פרט למדבר ואינו שומע ולמען ילמדו פרט לשומע ואינו מדבר,למימרא דכי לא משתעי לא גמר והא הנהו תרי אילמי דהוו בשבבותיה דרבי בני ברתיה דרבי יוחנן בן גודגדא ואמרי לה בני אחתיה דרבי יוחנן דכל אימת דהוה עייל רבי לבי מדרשא הוו עיילי ויתבי קמייהו ומניידי ברישייהו ומרחשין שפוותייהו,ובעי רבי רחמי עלייהו ואיתסו ואשתכח דהוו גמירי הלכתא וספרא וספרי וכולה הש"ס,אמר מר זוטרא קרי ביה למען ילמדו רב אשי אמר ודאי למען ילמדו הוא דאי סלקא דעתך למען ילמדו וכיון דלא משתעי לא גמר וכיון דלא שמע לא גמר,האי מלמען ישמעו נפקא אלא ודאי למען ילמדו הוא,אמר ר' תנחום חרש באזנו אחת פטור מן הראיה שנאמר (דברים לא, יא) באזניהם,והאי באזניהם מבעי ליה באזניהם דכולהו ישראל ההוא מנגד כל ישראל נפקא אי מנגד כל ישראל הוה אמינא אע"ג דלא שמעי כתב רחמנא באזניהם והוא דשמעי,ההוא מלמען ישמעו נפקא,אמר רבי תנחום חיגר ברגלו אחת פטור מן הראיה שנאמר רגלים,והא רגלים מבעי ליה פרט לבעלי קבין ההוא מפעמים נפקא דתניא פעמים אין פעמים אלא רגלים וכן הוא אומר (ישעיהו כו, ו) תרמסנה רגל רגלי עני פעמי דלים ואומר (שיר השירים ז, ב) מה יפו פעמיך בנעלים בת נדיב,דרש רבא מאי דכתיב מה יפו פעמיך בנעלים בת נדיב כמה נאין רגליהן של ישראל בשעה שעולין לרגל בת נדיב בתו של אברהם אבינו שנקרא נדיב שנאמר (תהלים מז, י) נדיבי עמים נאספו עם אלהי אברהם אלהי אברהם ולא אלהי יצחק ויעקב אלא אלהי אברהם שהיה תחילה לגרים,אמר רב כהנא דרש רב נתן בר מניומי משום ר' תנחום מאי דכתיב (בראשית לז, כד) והבור רק אין בו מים משמע שנאמר והבור רק איני יודע שאין בו מים אלא מים אין בו אבל נחשים ועקרבים יש בו,ת"ר מעשה ברבי יוחנן בן ברוקה ורבי אלעזר (בן) חסמא שהלכו להקביל פני ר' יהושע בפקיעין אמר להם מה חידוש היה בבית המדרש היום אמרו לו תלמידיך אנו ומימיך אנו שותין אמר להם אף על פי כן אי אפשר לבית המדרש בלא חידוש,שבת של מי היתה שבת של ר' אלעזר בן עזריה היתה ובמה היתה הגדה היום אמרו לו בפרשת הקהל ומה דרש בה,(דברים לא, יב) הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף אם אנשים באים ללמוד נשים באות לשמוע טף למה באין כדי ליתן שכר למביאיהן אמר להם מרגלית טובה היתה בידכם ובקשתם לאבדה ממני,ועוד דרש (דברים כו, יז) את ה' האמרת היום וה' האמירך היום,אמר להם הקב"ה לישראל אתם עשיתוני חטיבה אחת בעולם ואני אעשה אתכם חטיבה אחת בעולם אתם עשיתוני חטיבה אחת בעולם דכתיב (דברים ו, ד) שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד ואני אעשה אתכם חטיבה אחת בעולם שנאמר | 3a. they are obligated in rejoicing. And one who does not hear and does not speak, an imbecile, and a minor are all exempt even from rejoicing, since they are exempt from all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah. The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to the mitzva of appearance, that a deaf person and a mute are exempt from this mitzva? And what is different with regard to the mitzva of rejoicing, that they are obligated?,The Gemara explains: With regard to their exemption from the obligation of appearance, the tanna derives this halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of appearance at the Temple on the pilgrim Festival and the term appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, i.e., the obligation to assemble in the Temple on Sukkot in the year following the Sabbatical Year. As it is written, with regard to the mitzva of assembly: “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones” (Deuteronomy 31:12), and it is written in that context: “When all of Israel come to appear” (Deuteronomy 31:11). Just as a deaf person and a mute are not obligated to attend the assembly, they are likewise exempt from appearing in the Temple on the Festivals.,The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to the mitzva of assembly, from where do we derive that a deaf person and a mute are exempt? As it is written there: “That they may hear, and that they may learn” (Deuteronomy 31:12), and it is taught in a baraita that the phrase “that they may hear” excludes one who speaks but does not hear; and the phrase “and that they may learn” excludes one who hears but does not speak, as he is unable to learn.,The Gemara asks: Is that to say that one who is not able to speak is not able to learn? But consider the following incident. There were two mute people who were in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. They were the sons of the daughter of Rabbi Yoḥa ben Gudgeda, and some say that they were the sons of the sister of Rabbi Yoḥa ben Gudgeda. Whenever Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would enter the study hall they would also enter and sit before the Sages, and they would nod their heads as if they understood and move their lips.,And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prayed for God to have mercy upon them, and they were healed. And it was discovered that they had learned and were proficient in halakha, i.e., Mishna; Sifra, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus; Sifrei, the halakhic midrash on Numbers and Deuteronomy; and the entire Talmud. This shows that those who cannot speak are able to learn.,Mar Zutra said that one should read into the verse: That they may teach [yelamdu], instead of: “That they may learn [yilmedu]” (Deuteronomy 31:12). Even if a mute person is able to learn he cannot teach others. Rav Ashi said that the verse is certainly to be read: That they may teach. As, if it enters your mind that one should read: “That they may learn,” as it is written, and you will explain that since he is not able to speak he is not able to learn, and similarly the reason for the exemption of a deaf person is that since he is not able to hear he is not able to learn, you will have erred. According to this interpretation, it is clear from the context that a deaf person is exempted by the phrase: “That they may hear,” not merely due to his lack of hearing but because his inability to hear prevents him from learning.,However, this is incorrect, for if so, this exemption of a mute could also be derived from: “That they may hear,” as the verse has already taught the basic principle that anyone who cannot learn is not obligated in the mitzva of assembly. Rather, the verse is certainly to be read as: “That they may teach,” which indicates that although a mute is able to learn himself, and therefore he is not exempted by the previous verse, he is nevertheless exempt because he is unable to teach others.,Rabbi Tanḥum said: One who is deaf in one ear is exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple, as it is stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly: “When all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He shall choose, you shall read this law before all Israel in their ears” (Deuteronomy 31:11). This verse indicates that the obligation of assembly applies only to those who can hear with both ears. Since the two mitzvot are connected by verbal analogy, as explained above, this halakha applies to the mitzva of appearance as well.,The Gemara asks: But this phrase: “In their ears,” is necessary to teach that the reading of the Torah at the assembly must enter the ears of the entire Jewish people. Consequently, it cannot serve as the source of the halakha concerning one who is deaf in one ear. The Gemara answers: That halakha, that the reading of the Torah must be heard by the entire Jewish people, is derived from the phrase: “Before all Israel” (Deuteronomy 31:11). The Gemara asks: If that halakha were derived from: “Before all Israel,” I would say that the mitzva applies even though they cannot hear; therefore, the Merciful One writes: “In their ears,” and that indicates that they must be able to hear. If so, this phrase is not available for deriving the halakha of someone who is deaf in one ear.,The Gemara answers: That halakha, that the people must hear, is derived from: “That they may hear” (Deuteronomy 31:12). Therefore, the phrase: “In their ears,” is not required for that purpose. Rather, it teaches that only those who can hear with both ears are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, and by extension, in the mitzva of appearance as well.,Rabbi Tanḥum said: One who is lame in one leg is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is stated: “Three times [regalim] shall you keep a feast for Me in the year” (Exodus 23:14).Since the term for feet is raglayim, it can be inferred from here that the obligation to ascend involves the use of both of one’s legs.,The Gemara asks: But the term “regalim” is necessary to exclude people with artificial legs. Although these people are capable of walking, as they do not have two natural legs they are exempt from ascending to the Temple. The Gemara responds: That halakha is derived from: “Three occasions [pe’amim] in the year all your males will appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). The term pe’amim can also mean legs, as it is taught in a baraita, with regard to the term “pe’amim”: Pe’amim means nothing other than legs. And so it says: “The foot shall tread it down, even the feet of the poor and the steps [pa’amei] of the needy” (Isaiah 26:6), and it says: “How beautiful are your feet [fe’amayikh] in sandals, daughter of the prince” (Song of Songs 7:2).,With regard to the aforementioned verse, Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “How beautiful are your feet in sandals, daughter of the prince [nadiv]”? How pleasant are the feet [raglehen] of the Jewish people when they ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival [regel]. “Daughter of the prince”: this is referring to the daughter of Abraham our father who is called a prince, as it is stated: “The princes of the peoples are gathered together, the people of the God of Abraham” (Psalms 47:10). The Gemara asks: Is God only “the God of Abraham,” and not the God of Isaac and Jacob? Rather, the verse mentions “the God of Abraham,” as he was the first of the converts. Abraham was the first prince, as all converts who follow in his path are called “the princes of the peoples.”,The Gemara cites another statement of Rabbi Tanḥum. Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to Joseph: “And they took him, and cast him into the pit; and the pit was empty, there was no water in it” (Genesis 37:24). By inference from that which is stated: “And the pit was empty,” don’t I know that there was no water in it? Rather, this teaches that there was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it.,§ The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥa ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥisma, when they went to greet Rabbi Yehoshua in Peki’in. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: What novel idea was taught today in the study hall? They said to him: We are your students and we drink from your water, i.e., all of our Torah knowledge comes from you, and therefore how can we tell you something you have not already learned? He said to them: Even so, there cannot be a study hall without a novelty.,He asked them: Whose week was it, i.e. who was the lecturer this week? They said to him: It was Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s week. He inquired: And on what subject was the lecture today? They said to him: He spoke about the portion of the mitzva of assembly. Rabbi Yehoshua persisted: And what verse did he interpret homiletically with regard to this mitzva?,They said to him that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya interpreted the following verse: “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones” (Deuteronomy 31:12). This verse is puzzling: If men come to learn, and women, who might not understand, come at least to hear, why do the little ones come? They come in order for God to give a reward to those who bring them, i.e., God credits those who bring their children to the assembly. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: This good pearl of wisdom was in your hands, and you tried to conceal it from me?,Upon seeing that Rabbi Yehoshua was pleased to hear this idea, Rabbi Yoḥa ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥisma said to him: Additionally, Rabbi Elazar interpreted the following verses homiletically: “You have affirmed, this day, that the Lord is your God, and that you will walk in His ways and keep His statutes, His mitzvot, and His ordices, and listen to His voice. And the Lord has affirmed you, this day, to be His treasure, as He promised you, and that you should keep all His mitzvot” (Deuteronomy 26:17–18).,Rabbi Elazar explained: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: You have made Me a single entity in the world, as you singled Me out as separate and unique. And therefore I will make you a single entity in the world, as you will be a treasured nation, chosen by God. You have made Me a single entity in the world, as it is written: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4). And therefore I will make you a single entity in the world, as it is stated: |
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| 108. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 13.12.1 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 98 |
109. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 31 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 26 | 31. But wisdom and knowledge have no part in chance. It is not painful to lack the gifts of chance, but rather to endure the unprofitable toil caused by vain opinions. Every disturbance and unprofitable desire is removed by the love of true philosophy. Vain is the word of that philosopher who can ease no mortal trouble. As there is no profit in the physician's art unless it cure the diseases of the body, so there is none in philosophy, unless it expel the |50 troubles of the soul. These and other like commands are laid on us by the law of our nature. |
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| 110. Porphyry, Against The Christians Fragments, '73 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 812 |
111. Babylonian Talmud, Megillah, 24b (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) Found in books: Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 85 24b. הכא נמי איכא נצויי אביו ונצויי רבו:,פוחח פורס על שמע וכו': בעא מיניה עולא בר רב מאביי קטן פוחח מהו שיקרא בתורה,אמר ליה ותיבעי לך ערום ערום מאי טעמא לא משום כבוד צבור הכא נמי משום כבוד צבור:,סומא פורס על שמע וכו': תניא אמרו לו לרבי יהודה הרבה צפו לדרוש במרכבה ולא ראו אותה מימיהם,ור' יהודה התם באבנתא דליבא תליא מילתא והא קא מיכוין וידע הכא משום הנאה הוא והא לית ליה הנאה,ורבנן אית ליה הנאה כרבי יוסי דתניא א"ר יוסי כל ימי הייתי מצטער על מקרא זה (דברים כח, כט) והיית ממשש בצהרים כאשר ימשש העור באפלה וכי מה אכפת ליה לעור בין אפילה לאורה,עד שבא מעשה לידי פעם אחת הייתי מהלך באישון לילה ואפלה וראיתי סומא שהיה מהלך בדרך ואבוקה בידו אמרתי לו בני אבוקה זו למה לך אמר לי כל זמן שאבוקה בידי בני אדם רואין אותי ומצילין אותי מן הפחתין ומן הקוצין ומן הברקנין:,| 24b. Here, also, according to Rabba bar Shimi, it is to prevent his father or teacher from quarreling.,§ We learned in the mishna: One whose limbs are exposed [poḥe’aḥ] may recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema and translate the Torah reading into Aramaic, but he may not read from the Torah. Ulla bar Rav raised a dilemma before Abaye: What is the halakha with regard to whether a minor whose limbs are exposed may read from the Torah? Can it be argued that a minor’s bare limbs do not fall under the category of nakedness, and therefore it is permitted for him to read the Torah despite the fact that parts of his body are exposed?,Abaye said to him: And according to this reasoning, raise the dilemma with regard to a minor who is totally naked. What is the reason that a minor who is naked may not read the Torah? It is due to respect for the public. Here, too, a poḥe’aḥ may not read from the Torah due to respect for the public.,The mishna continues: One who is blind may recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema, and he may also translate the Torah reading into Aramaic. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who has not seen the luminaries in his life may not recite the first of the blessings before Shema, which is the blessing over the luminaries. It is taught in a baraita that they said to Rabbi Yehuda: Many have seen enough with their mind to expound upon the Divine Chariot, although they have never actually seen it. Similarly, even one who has never seen the luminaries may recite the blessing.,And how does Rabbi Yehuda counter this argument? He can say that there, with regard to the Chariot, the matter depends upon the heart’s comprehension, and one can concentrate his mind and understand the Chariot even if he has never actually seen it. But here, with regard to the luminaries, the blessing is recited due to the benefit one derives from them, and one who is blind does not derive any benefit from them, and therefore he may not recite a blessing over them.,And the Rabbis maintain that even a blind man derives benefit from the luminaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: All of my life I was troubled by this verse, which I did not understand: “And you shall grope at noon as the blind man gropes in the darkness” (Deuteronomy 28:29). I was perplexed: What does it matter to a blind person whether it is dark or light? He cannot see in any event, so why does the verse speak about a blind man in the darkness?,I continued to ponder the matter until the following incident occurred to me. I was once walking in the absolute darkness of the night, and I saw a blind man who was walking on his way with a torch in his hands. I said to him: My son, why do you need this torch if you are blind? He said to me: As long as I have a torch in my hand, people see me and save me from the pits and the thorns and the thistles. Even a blind man derives at least indirect benefit from the light, and therefore he may recite the blessing over the heavenly luminaries.,A priest who has blemishes on his hands may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. Because of his blemish, people will look at his hands, and it is prohibited to look at the hands of the priests during the Priestly Benediction. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one whose hands were colored with satis, a blue dye, may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction because the congregation will look at him.,taught in a baraita: The blemishes that the Sages said disqualify a priest from reciting the Priestly Benediction include any blemishes found on his face, hands, and feet, but not blemishes that are not visible to others. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: If his hands are spotted with white blotches, he may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita: If a priest’s hands are spotted, he may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. Similarly, if his hands are curved inward or bent sideways, he may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction.,Apropos the previous discussion, Rav Asi said: A priest from Haifa or Beit She’an may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction, as he does not know how to properly pronounce the guttural letters. This is also taught in a baraita: One may not allow the people of Beit She’an, nor the people of Beit Haifa, nor the people of Tivonin to pass before the ark in order to lead the service because they pronounce alef as ayin and ayin as alef, and they thereby distort the meaning of the prayers.,The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ḥiyya once said to Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If you were a Levite, you would be disqualified from singing on the platform in the Temple courtyard because your voice is thick. offended by this remark, Rabbi Shimon went and told his father, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, what Rabbi Ḥiyya had said. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Go and say to him: When you study and reach the verse: “And I will wait upon [veḥikkiti] the Lord” (Isaiah 8:17), will you not be a maligner and a blasphemer? Rabbi Ḥiyya, who was from Babylonia, was unable to differentiate between the letters ḥet and heh, and he would therefore pronounce the word veḥikkiti as vehikkiti, which means: And I will strike.,Rav Huna said: A priest whose eyes constantly run with tears may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t there a certain priest with this condition in the neighborhood of Rav Huna, and he would spread his hands and recite the Priestly Benediction? The Gemara answers: That priest was a familiar figure in his town. Since the other residents were accustomed to seeing him, he would not draw their attention during the Priestly Benediction. This is also taught in a baraita: One whose eyes run should not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction, but if he is a familiar figure in his town, he is permitted to do so.,Rabbi Yoḥa said: One who is blind in one eye may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction because people will gaze at him. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t there a certain priest who was blind in one eye in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥa, and he would lift his hands and recite the Priestly Benediction? The Gemara answers: That priest was a familiar figure in his town, and therefore he would not attract attention during the Priestly Benediction. This is also taught in a baraita: One who is blind in one eye may not lift his hands and recite the Priestly Benediction, but if he is a familiar figure in his town, he is permitted to do so.,We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: One whose hands are colored should not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. It was taught in a baraita: If most of the townspeople are engaged in this occupation, dyeing, he is permitted to recite the Priestly Benediction, as the congregation will not pay attention to his stained hands.,One who says: I will not pass before the ark to lead the prayer service in colored garments, may not pass before the ark to lead the prayer service even in white garments. There is concern that one who insists on wearing clothing of a specific color during his prayers is a heretic and therefore unfit to lead the service. Similarly, if one says: I will not pass before the ark wearing sandals, he may not pass before it even barefoot, as he is not acting in accordance with the teachings of the Sages.,One who constructs his phylacteries in a round shape exposes himself to danger during times of persecution, when foreign governments impose a ban on the mitzva of phylacteries, and yet he does not fulfill the mitzva to don phylacteries, as phylacteries must be square. If one placed the phylacteries worn on the head on his forehead, and not in its proper place above his hairline, or if he placed the phylacteries worn on the arm on his palm, and not on his biceps, this is the way of the heretics, i.e., those who reject the tradition of the Sages with regard to the proper placement of the phylacteries. If one plated his phylacteries with gold or placed the phylacteries worn on the arm on the outside of his sleeve [unkeli], this is the way of the outsiders, i.e., those who do not take part in the traditions of the Jewish people.,What is the reason that one who wishes to pray only with white clothes or barefoot is not permitted to lead the prayer? We are concerned that perhaps he has been imbued with heresy, as these are the practices of idolaters. He is therefore barred from leading the service.,We learned in the mishna: One who constructs his phylacteries in a round shape exposes himself to danger and does not fulfill the mitzva to don phylacteries. The Gemara comments: Let us say that we already learned in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The requirement that phylacteries must be square is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. And Rava said about this: Square means along their seams and their diagonals [alakhso], i.e., they must be perfectly square. It would seem that all this was already stated in the mishna, which says that round phylacteries are disqualified.,Rav Pappa said: It is possible to understand that the mishna is referring to phylacteries that one constructed to be round like a nut, i.e., in the shape of a ball. However, the mishna does not indicate that the phylacteries must be square, as it does not address the case of phylacteries that are rounded but not a true sphere.,one says in his prayers: | |
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| 112. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, p. 48, 4 ff. (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 113. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.101, 2.7.11g (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 31 |
| 114. Chrysippus Historicus, Fragments, 3 no. 54, 3 p. 14.8-13 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 9 |
| 115. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.563, 2.1027, 3.265, 3.297, 3.332, 3.585-3.586 Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 10, 20, 29; McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 104 |
116. Anon., Letter of Aristeas, 16 Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100 | 16. Dis. This name was very appropriately bestowed upon him by our first ancestors, in order to signify that He through whom all things are endowed with life and come into being, is necessarily the ruler and lord of the Universe. Set all mankind an example of magimity by releasing those who are held in bondage.' |
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| 117. Orphic Hymns., Hymni, 4.1-4.3, 7.5, 8.11, 15.7 Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 112 |
| 118. Cicero, Qf, 3.1.9 Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 9 |
| 119. Epicurus, Deperditorum Librorum Reliquiae, 602 Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 8 |
| 120. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1a, 1b, 1c, 21, 21b, 21i, 21p, 22q, 24d, 25c, 25h, 25k, 2b, 2d, 2i, 2j, 58a, 58g, 65a, 65b, 66a, i, tb, tc, 61j, f Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 14 |
| 122. Philemon Iunior, Fragments, 71 Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic philosophy, ethics of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 7 |
| 124. Vergil, Xenocrates, fr.223, fr.213 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 165 |
| 125. Ps. Sol., Sentences of Syriac Menander, 7 Tagged with subjects: •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100 |
127. Anon., 4 Ezra, 3.1, 6.6 Tagged with subjects: •hellenistic, philosophy •philosophy (greek/hellenistic) •platonism, effects on hellenistic philosophy Found in books: McDonough, Christ as Creator: Origins of a New Testament Doctrine (2009) 100; Najman, The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity (2010) 238 | 3.1. In the thirtieth year after the destruction of our city, I Salathiel, who am also called Ezra, was in Babylon. I was troubled as I lay on my bed, and my thoughts welled up in my heart, 6.6. then I planned these things, and they were made through me and not through another, just as the end shall come through me and not through another." |
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| 128. Epicurus, Letters, 87, 95, 104 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bezzel and Pfeiffer, Prophecy and Hellenism (2021) 51 |
| 129. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 37, 78, 2-3, 37 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan |
| 130. Menander, Test., 146 kassel-austin Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 14 |
| 131. Donatus, Ter. An., 959 Tagged with subjects: •philosophy, hellenistic and imperial Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 14 |
| 132. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 127-128, 130-132, 135, 129 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 28, 30 |
| 133. Epicurus, Ep., 1.76, 3.123 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Meister, Greek Praise Poetry and the Rhetoric of Divinity (2019) 7 |
| 134. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 11-12, 29 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 30 |
| 135. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 33, 32 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hayes, The Literature of the Sages: A Re-Visioning (2022) 332 |
