1. Homer, Iliad, 2.871-2.872 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 213; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 213
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2.871 Νάστης Ἀμφίμαχός τε Νομίονος ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, 2.872 ὃς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμον δʼ ἴεν ἠΰτε κούρη'' None | sup>
2.871 These were led by captains twain, Amphimachus and Nastes—Nastes and Amphimachus, the glorious children of Nomion. And he came to the war all decked with gold, like a girl, fool that he was; but his gold in no wise availed to ward off woeful destruction; nay, he was slain in the river beneath the hands of the son of Aeacus, swift of foot; 2.872 These were led by captains twain, Amphimachus and Nastes—Nastes and Amphimachus, the glorious children of Nomion. And he came to the war all decked with gold, like a girl, fool that he was; but his gold in no wise availed to ward off woeful destruction; nay, he was slain in the river beneath the hands of the son of Aeacus, swift of foot; '' None |
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2. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 207, 210; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 207, 210
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3. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.14, 1.30, 2.7, 2.20, 2.23, 2.29-2.30, 2.48, 2.64, 2.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 208, 217, 218; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 208, 217, 218; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 149
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2.7 \xa0"What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said\xa0I; "now and then, I\xa0admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do\xa0I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I\xa0were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said\xa0I, "I\xa0haven\'t the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man â\x80\x94 who stands alone, so far as I\xa0am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I\xa0do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. <
2.20 \xa0"For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings â\x80\x94 not merely under a single name (for that I\xa0could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a\xa0number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master\'s Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I\xa0will ask you kindly to notice whether I\xa0translate this maxim correctly: <
2.23 \xa0"What then is the point of saying \'I\xa0should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds\'? That is tantamount to saying \'I\xa0should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.\' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I\xa0profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I\xa0should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a newâ\x80\x91broach\'d cask,\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I\xa0will never allow. <
2.29 \xa0"But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology), â\x80\x94 he fails, I\xa0say, to see that this, the sole Good which our strict and serious philosopher recognizes, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! <' "2.30 \xa0If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary use of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it, â\x80\x94 it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for converts: the wouldâ\x80\x91be roué need only turn philosopher. <" 2.48 \xa0"There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance \'moral\' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. <' "
2.64 \xa0Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every variety. <" 2.96 \xa0"But I\xa0must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: \'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I\xa0write these words,\' he says, \'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I\xa0am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.\' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. \'Yet all my sufferings,\' he continues, \'are counterbalanced by the joy which I\xa0derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I\xa0charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.\' <' ' None |
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4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14, 1.30, 2.7, 2.20, 2.23, 2.29-2.30, 2.48, 2.64, 2.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 208, 217, 218; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 208, 217, 218; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 149
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2.7 istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam; nam interdum nimis nimis minus R etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum, aut non possim quem ad modum ea dicantur ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti adsentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt.
2.20 duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum —nam id facilius paterer—, sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo nullo modo fieri BE potest. hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re, neque re neque neque ( om. re) BE remque R tamen dividit verbis. cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, appellant A 1 laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis, atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio oratio eius est BE de summo bono. in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt—quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kuri/as do/cas, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?—animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter:' "
2.23 quid ergo attinet dicere: 'Nihil haberem, quod reprehenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent'? hoc est dicere: Non reprehenderem asotos, si non essent asoti. isto modo ne improbos quidem, si essent boni viri. hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprehendendam non putat, et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Noli noli Se. nolui N nolim rell. codd. enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant, et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniis egeant. nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus vinum quibus vinum et q. s. cf. Lucilii carm. rell. rec. Marx. I p. 78, II p. 366 sq. defusum e pleno sit chrysizon, chrysizon Marx.; hirsizon A hrysizon vel heysizon B hrysizon E hyrsi|hon R hyrsizon N hrysiron V ut ait Lucilius, cui nihildum situlus et nihildum situlus et (situlus = situla, sitella) Se. nihil (nichil BE) dum sit vis et ABE nichil dum sit viset R nichil dempsit (e vid. corr. ex u, psit in ras. ) vis (post s ras.) et (in ras.) N nichil dempsit vis et V sacculus sacculus ABE saculos V sarculos R, N (a ex corr. m. alt., r superscr. ab alt. m. ) abstulerit, adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri, qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium—hos ergo ergo BER ego ANV asotos bene quidem vivere aut aut at BE beate numquam dixerim." 2.29 Hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse voluptatem illam, illam ullam RN 2 qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum—eam autem ita persequitur: persequer BE persequar R quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus; cetera addit, neget, 29 addit cf. p. 34, 30 sqq quae si appelles, honos praefandus praestandus NV prefraudus E perfraudus B sit—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt vidit BE ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus.' "2.30 quam haec sunt contraria! hic si definire, si dividere si dividere BE Non. in dividere R; individere A 1, N 1 (in-|d.), V ( uel ni d.); vel dividere A 2 N 2 didicisset, hic si definire ... incidisset Non. p. 177 didicisset potuisset Non. si loquendi vim, si denique consuetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. nunc vides, quid faciat. quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. hanc in motu voluptatem —sic enim has suaves suaves has BE et quasi dulces voluptates appellat—interdum ita extenuat, ut M'. M'. edd. marcum Curium putes putes potes A 1 po t R loqui, interdum ita laudat, ut quid praeterea praeter eam NV sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem. quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo, sed a censore opprimenda est. non est enim vitium in oratione solum, solum in oratione R sed etiam in moribus. luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut, qui asoti esse velint, philosophi ante fiant." "
2.48 Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor hys quattuor BE his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint qui hy qui BE ii qui Mdv. honestate honestate edd. honestatem summum bonum metiantur. Si Si Sic BE enim ad honestatem honestatem enim (om. ad) A 1 ad honestatem enim A 2 omnia referant referant Bentl. referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce ii ii voce R sonare— his enim ipsis verbis utitur—neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem hanc vocem Wes. apud Mdv. hac voce honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. 'Quod', inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissensio?" 2.64 cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat, sed sua satietate. habebat tamen rationem rationem edd. ratione valitudinis: utebatur iis iis edd. his AR hys BE hijs NV exercitationibus, ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo, qui et suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquendum, conoqquendum N coquendum BEV vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intellegere quid sit bonum. aberat omnis dolor, qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. color egregius, integra valitudo, summa gratia, vita denique conferta voluptatum confecta voluptatum V voluptatum conferta BE omnium varietate.' "
2.96 Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas intellegas (intellig.) BEA 2 intellegat A 1 intelligat R intelligantur N intelligatur V facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem autem om. A aderant aderant om. BE vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam me et philosophiam Bai. me (ne R) et philosophia A 1 RN me philosophia BE me et philosophia et A 2 V voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos." ' None | sup>
2.7 \xa0"What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said\xa0I; "now and then, I\xa0admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do\xa0I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I\xa0were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said\xa0I, "I\xa0haven\'t the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man â\x80\x94 who stands alone, so far as I\xa0am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I\xa0do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. <
2.20 \xa0"For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings â\x80\x94 not merely under a single name (for that I\xa0could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a\xa0number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master\'s Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I\xa0will ask you kindly to notice whether I\xa0translate this maxim correctly: <
2.23 \xa0"What then is the point of saying \'I\xa0should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds\'? That is tantamount to saying \'I\xa0should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.\' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I\xa0profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I\xa0should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a newâ\x80\x91broach\'d cask,\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I\xa0will never allow. <
2.29 \xa0"But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology), â\x80\x94 he fails, I\xa0say, to see that this, the sole Good which our strict and serious philosopher recognizes, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! <' "2.30 \xa0If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary use of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it, â\x80\x94 it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for converts: the wouldâ\x80\x91be roué need only turn philosopher. <" 2.48 \xa0"There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance \'moral\' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. <' "
2.64 \xa0Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every variety. <" 2.96 \xa0"But I\xa0must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: \'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I\xa0write these words,\' he says, \'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I\xa0am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.\' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. \'Yet all my sufferings,\' he continues, \'are counterbalanced by the joy which I\xa0derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I\xa0charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.\' <' ' None |
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5. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.111 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 218; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 218
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1.111 In what then does his life consist? 'In a constant succession of things good,' you reply, 'without any admixture of evils.' Things good — what things? Pleasures, I suppose — that is, of course, pleasures of the body, for your school recognizes no pleasures of the mind that do not arise from and come back to the body. I don't suppose that you, Velleius, are like the rest of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of certain utterances of Epicurus, in which he protests that he cannot conceive any good that is unconnected with the pleasures of the voluptuary and the sensualist, pleasures which in fact he proceeds without a blush to enumerate by name. "" None |
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6. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus
Found in books: Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 65; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 29
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7. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 218; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 218
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8. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 217, 218; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 204; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 217, 218; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 65, 68; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 149
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9. Horace, Sermones, 1.2.78-1.2.79, 1.2.127 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus, and sexual gratification
Found in books: Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 70, 71, 79; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 15, 107, 110
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1.2.78 However, since I observe a considerable number of people giving ear to the reproaches that are laid against us by those who bear ill will to us, and will not believe what I have written concerning the antiquity of our nation, while they take it for a plain sign that our nation is of a late date, because they are not so much as vouchsafed a bare mention by the most famous historiographers among the Grecians,
1.2.78 Moreover, he attests that we Jews, went as auxiliaries along with king Alexander, and after him with his successors. I will add farther what he says he learned when he was himself with the same army, concerning the actions of a man that was a Jew. His words are these:—
1.2.78 for if we remember, that in the beginning the Greeks had taken no care to have public records of their several transactions preserved, this must for certain have afforded those that would afterward write about those ancient transactions, the opportunity of making mistakes, and the power of making lies also;
1.2.127 Moreover, he attests that we Jews, went as auxiliaries along with king Alexander, and after him with his successors. I will add farther what he says he learned when he was himself with the same army, concerning the actions of a man that was a Jew. His words are these:— '' None |
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10. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 205; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 216; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 205; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 65, 76
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11. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 66.47 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 217; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 217
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66.47 I can show you at this moment in the writings of Epicurus18 a graded list of goods just like that of our own school. For there are some things, he declares, which he prefers should fall to his lot, such as bodily rest free from all inconvenience, and relaxation of the soul as it takes delight in the contemplation of its own goods. And there are other things which, though he would prefer that they did not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves, – for example, the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epicurus displayed on that last and most blessed day of his life. For he tells us19 that he had to endure excruciating agony from a diseased bladder and from an ulcerated stomach, – so acute that it permitted no increase of pain; "and yet," he says, "that day was none the less happy." And no man can spend such a day in happiness unless he possesses the Supreme Good. '' None |
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12. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 210; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 210
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13. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 202, 203, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 220; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 202, 203, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 220
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14. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 218; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 206, 218
| 187e The reason why he has traduced the young men may be seen in Plato himself. In the case of Alcibiades, he says in the dialogue named from him that he did not begin to have converse with Socrates until he had passed out of his early bloom, when all who lusted for his body had deserted him. He tells us this at the beginning of the dialogue. The contradictory things which he says in the case of Charmides may be learned from the dialogue itself by anyone who wishes. For he represents him inconsistently' ' None |
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15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 209; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 208, 209
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16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristippus of Cyrene, and hedonism • ethical hedonism • hedonism • presentist hedonism
Found in books: Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 91; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 384, 385
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17. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 204, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 204, 206
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18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.89-2.91, 6.69, 10.5-10.6, 10.13, 10.22, 10.24, 10.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristippus of Cyrene, and hedonism • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Hedonism • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • Plato, Hedonistic calculus • ethical hedonism • hedonic calculus, and acquisition of wealth/property • hedonism • presentist hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 202, 206, 209, 210, 216, 217, 218, 221; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 204; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 639; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 92, 93; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 239; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 202, 206, 209, 210, 216, 217, 218, 221; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 68; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 385, 404; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 85
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2.89 The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. 2.90 For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business. 2.91 They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections;' "
6.69 Being asked what was the most beautiful thing in the world, he replied, Freedom of speech. On entering a boys' school, he found there many statues of the Muses, but few pupils. By the help of the gods, said he, schoolmaster, you have plenty of pupils. It was his habit to do everything in public, the works of Demeter and of Aphrodite alike. He used to draw out the following arguments. If to breakfast be not absurd, neither is it absurd in the market-place; but to breakfast is not absurd, therefore it is not absurd to breakfast in the marketplace. Behaving indecently in public, he wished it were as easy to banish hunger by rubbing the belly. Many other sayings are attributed to him, which it would take long to enumerate." "
10.5 Furthermore that he extolled Idomeneus, Herodotus, and Timocrates, who had published his esoteric doctrines, and flattered them for that very reason. Also that in his letters he wrote to Leontion, O Lord Apollo, my dear little Leontion, with what tumultuous applause we were inspired as we read your letter. Then again to Themista, the wife of Leonteus: I am quite ready, if you do not come to see me, to spin thrice on my own axis and be propelled to any place that you, including Themista, agree upon; and to the beautiful Pythocles he writes: I will sit down and await thy divine advent, my heart's desire. And, as Theodorus says in the fourth book of his work, Against Epicurus, in another letter to Themista he thinks he preaches to her." '10.6 It is added that he corresponded with many courtesans, and especially with Leontion, of whom Metrodorus also was enamoured. It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms: I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form. And in his letter to Pythocles: Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture. Epictetus calls him preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him.Again there was Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who was his disciple and then left the school. He in the book entitled Merriment asserts that Epicurus vomited twice a day from over-indulgence, and goes on to say that he himself had much ado to escape from those notorious midnight philosophizings and the confraternity with all its secrets;
10.13 Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus, Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught. Both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though by some and by Apollodorus the Epicurean he is said to have been the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that Epicurus also attended the lectures of Xenocrates.The terms he used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite.
10.22 And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again.' "
10.24 Metrodorus wrote the following works:Against the Physicians, in three books.of Sensations.Against Timocrates.of Magimity.of Epicurus's Weak Health.Against the Dialecticians.Against the Sophists, in nine books.The Way to Wisdom.of Change.of Wealth.In Criticism of Democritus.of Noble Birth.Next came Polyaenus, son of Athenodorus, a citizen of Lampsacus, a just and kindly man, as Philodemus and his pupils affirm. Next came Epicurus's successor Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, a citizen of Mytilene, the son of a poor man and at the outset a student of rhetoric.There are in circulation the following excellent works by him:"
10.136 He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.'' None |
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19. Origen, Against Celsus, 3.80, 3.80.1, 3.80.26-3.80.27 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 207; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 207
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3.80.27 Seeing, however, that Celsus alleges that Christians are won over by us through vain hopes, we thus reply to him when he finds fault with our doctrine of the blessed life, and of communion with God: As for you, good sir, they also are won over by vain hopes who have accepted the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato regarding the soul, that it is its nature to ascend to the vault of heaven, and in the super-celestial space to behold the sights which are seen by the blessed spectators above. According to you, O Celsus, they also who have accepted the doctrine of the duration of the soul (after death), and who lead a life through which they become heroes, and make their abodes with the gods, are won over by vain hopes. Probably also they who are persuaded that the soul comes (into the body) from without, and that it will be withdrawn from the power of death, would be said by Celsus to be won over by empty hopes. Let him then come forth to the contest, no longer concealing the sect to which he belongs, but confessing himself to be an Epicurean, and let him meet the arguments, which are not lightly advanced among Greeks and Barbarians, regarding the immortality of the soul, or its duration (after death), or the immortality of the thinking principle; and let him prove that these are words which deceive with empty hopes those who give their assent to them; but that the adherents of his philosophical system are pure from empty hopes, and that they indeed lead to hopes of good, or - what is more in keeping with his opinions - give birth to no hope at all, on account of the immediate and complete destruction of the soul (after death). Unless, perhaps, Celsus and the Epicureans will deny that it is a vain hope which they entertain regarding their end - pleasure - which, according to them, is the supreme good, and which consists in the permanent health of the body, and the hope regarding it which is entertained by Epicurus. 3.80 Seeing, however, that Celsus alleges that Christians are won over by us through vain hopes, we thus reply to him when he finds fault with our doctrine of the blessed life, and of communion with God: As for you, good sir, they also are won over by vain hopes who have accepted the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato regarding the soul, that it is its nature to ascend to the vault of heaven, and in the super-celestial space to behold the sights which are seen by the blessed spectators above. According to you, O Celsus, they also who have accepted the doctrine of the duration of the soul (after death), and who lead a life through which they become heroes, and make their abodes with the gods, are won over by vain hopes. Probably also they who are persuaded that the soul comes (into the body) from without, and that it will be withdrawn from the power of death, would be said by Celsus to be won over by empty hopes. Let him then come forth to the contest, no longer concealing the sect to which he belongs, but confessing himself to be an Epicurean, and let him meet the arguments, which are not lightly advanced among Greeks and Barbarians, regarding the immortality of the soul, or its duration (after death), or the immortality of the thinking principle; and let him prove that these are words which deceive with empty hopes those who give their assent to them; but that the adherents of his philosophical system are pure from empty hopes, and that they indeed lead to hopes of good, or - what is more in keeping with his opinions - give birth to no hope at all, on account of the immediate and complete destruction of the soul (after death). Unless, perhaps, Celsus and the Epicureans will deny that it is a vain hope which they entertain regarding their end - pleasure - which, according to them, is the supreme good, and which consists in the permanent health of the body, and the hope regarding it which is entertained by Epicurus. ' None |
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20. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus, and acquisition of wealth/property • hedonism • psychological hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 220; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 214; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 98; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 220; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 28, 38
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21. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Aristippus of Cyrene, and hedonism • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Ovid, hedonic calculus in • choices/avoidances, and hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus • hedonic calculus, and acquisition of wealth/property • hedonic calculus, and frankness • hedonism • psychological hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 220; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 187, 188, 189, 200; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 214; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 220; Williams and Vol (2022), Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher, 64, 80; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 59, 149
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22. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 215; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 215
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23. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Aristippus of Cyrene, and hedonism • Epicureans, hedonism • hedonism
Found in books: Bryan (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 203, 215, 216, 218, 219; Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 203, 215, 216, 218, 219; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404
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